Electoral Quotas and the Challenges of Democratic Transition in Conflict-Ridden Societies
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Elec tor al Quotas and the Challeng Electoral Quotas and the Challenges of Democratic Transition in Conflict-Ridden Societies es of Democr A NORDEM SPECIAL REPORT 2011 a tic T r ansition in C onflic t -Ridden Societies A N O R D Nils A. Butenschøn and Kåre Vollan E M With contributions by Bjørn Erik Rasch and Tonje Merete Viken S P E C I A L R E P O R T 2 0 1 1 The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights Nils A. Butenschøn and Kåre Vollan: Electoral Quotas and the Challenges of Democratic Transition in Conflict-Ridden Societies A NORDEM Special Report Editor: Siri Skåre Copyright: Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, (NCHR) The Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM) Nils A. Butenschøn and Kåre Vollan Quotations and extracts from this report may be reprinted by permission and if accompanied by source information. This report is published electronically in a pdf version on the NCHR web pages: http://www.jus.uio.no/smr/english/about/programmes/nordem/ NORDEM is a programme at The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights The Faculty of Law University of Oslo P.O. Box 6706 St. Olavs plass NO-0130 Oslo NORWAY [email protected] Front page photo: Kåre Vollan. Printed by permission ISBN 978-82-8158-071-8 Technical consultant: Christian Boe Astrup/NCHR Printed by: 07 Gruppen AS Electoral Quotas and the Challenges of Democratic Transition in Conflict-Ridden Societies Nils A. Butenschøn and Kåre Vollan With contributions by Bjørn Erik Rasch and Tonje Merete Viken September 2011 2 3 Contents 1: Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 6 1.1 The Purpose of the Study ............................................................................................ 6 1.2 The Case Studies ......................................................................................................... 9 1.3 Scope and Limitations ............................................................................................... 10 2: Power-Sharing Arrangements: Representation and Decision-Making Rules ...................... 14 2.1 Democratic Institutions in Deeply Divided Societies ............................................... 14 2.2 Power-Sharing through Representation and Decision Rules .................................... 17 2.3 The Systems of Representation ................................................................................. 19 2.4 Methods for Securing Group Representation ............................................................ 25 2.5 Power-Sharing – Decision-Making Procedures ........................................................ 34 3: Broad Overview of Systems ................................................................................................. 37 3.1 The Americas ............................................................................................................ 37 3.2 Asia-Pacific ............................................................................................................... 40 3.3 Central Eastern Europe .............................................................................................. 52 3.4 Middle East and North Africa ................................................................................... 59 3.5 Sub-Saharan Africa ................................................................................................... 63 3.6 Western Europe ......................................................................................................... 79 4: Case Study Lebanon ............................................................................................................. 86 4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 86 4.2 Historical and Political Background ......................................................................... 86 4.3 Building Democracy in Lebanon. ............................................................................. 94 4.4 The Quota Arrangements and Other Power-Sharing Elements ................................ 99 4.5 The Field Study ....................................................................................................... 106 4.6 Main Conclusions and Thoughts for the Future ...................................................... 108 5: Case Study Nepal ............................................................................................................... 110 4 5.1 Historical and Political Background ....................................................................... 110 5.2 The Quota Arrangements and Other Power-Sharing Elements .............................. 133 5.3 The Intended Effects – a Discussion ....................................................................... 139 5.4 Some Side Effects of the 2008 System ................................................................... 144 5.5 The Field Study ....................................................................................................... 144 5.6 Conclusions and Thoughts for the Future ............................................................... 148 6. Case Study Bosnia and Herzegovina ................................................................................. 152 6.1 Historical and Political Background ....................................................................... 152 6.2 The Quota Arrangements and Other Power-sharing Elements ............................... 159 6.3 The Field Study ....................................................................................................... 169 6.4 Main Conclusions and Thoughts for the Future ...................................................... 171 7: Conclusions and Recommendations .................................................................................. 175 7.1 Conflicts and Tools ................................................................................................. 175 7.2 Quotas and Veto Powers in Conflict-Ridden Societies. Main Findings ................. 175 7.3 Methods for Group Representation ........................................................................ 179 7.4. What May Work in Conflict Situations? ................................................................ 192 7.5 The Quota Tool Box ............................................................................................... 197 7.6 A Feature of Representative Systems ...................................................................... 201 Appendices ............................................................................................................................. 202 A: A Method for Quotas on the Total Result in a List PR System ............................... 202 B: Abbreviations of Names of Electoral Systems ......................................................... 207 References .............................................................................................................................. 208 5 Preface Electoral Quotas and the Challenges of Democratic Transition in Conflict-Ridden Societies is a project organised under NORDEM, the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo. The basic purpose is to contribute to the filling in of what we consider to be a gap in our understanding of the significance of the type and design chosen for electoral laws and systems in critical stages of political transition from open conflict to democratic stability in conflict-ridden societies. We look particularly into cases of conflicts between socio-cultural groups mobilised along ethnic, religious, and linguistic cleavages. This report addresses an aspect of a classical theme in political analysis: How can designing a political system contribute to overcoming deep-seated conflicts in society? Peace agreements after civil wars should seek to overcome the mistrust and enmity between the groups, possibly overcoming the conflict-producing cleavage structure itself. The assumption is that democracy and stability are strengthened if citizens see their interests in terms of socio- economic factors across cultural divides rather than in terms of socio-cultural identities. The recommendation would therefore be to encourage types of political representation that criss- cross cultural divides in society. On the other hand, a democratic system should also reflect real opinions and interests in society as the voters themselves define them. We observe that in most post-conflict societies, the political system tends to be organised along the ethnic divides that defined the previous conflict. The dilemma then is how a democratic principle of representation that tends to reflect group-based identities can contribute to overcoming group- based conflict dynamics. This is where electoral quotas come into the picture: What are the effects of introducing quotas? Will they contribute to democratic stability or rather preserve and strengthen the cleavages that led to open conflict in the first place? In addition to the three cases of Lebanon, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Nepal, the report includes a broad overview of all relevant systems in the world where such quotas are applied (Chapter 3). We believe that this has a value in its own right as a catalogue of applied quota systems. It furthermore gives a valuable empirical context for the comparative discussion and the “tool box” developed in the concluding chapter. Researcher Tonje Merete