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The Decline and Fall of Nicaragua's Somoza

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The Decline and Fall of Nicaragua's Somoza THE DECLINE AND FALL OF NICARAGUA’S SOMOZA DYNASTY A SENIOR ESSAY Presented to The Faculty of the Department of History The Colorado College In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Bachelor of Arts By Ian Adams April 18, 2016 Adams 1 Introduction The structure of the Nicaraguan political climate has remained intact for centuries. After achieving independence from Spain, authoritarian caudillos in Nicaragua replaced the repressive conquistadors of the colonial period and perpetuated the legacies of dependence and social inequality. The Nicaraguan Liberal and Conservative parties clashed for decades after Nicaragua gained independence, creating an oligarchic ruling elite. Nicaraguan rulers manipulated their opposition and strategically managed ties with the United States in their attempts to preserve their rule and their parties’ success. While these authoritarian leaders often undermined the social and economic progress of the nation, they always maintained a degree of legitimacy that enabled them to stay in power and perpetuate oppressive rule for generations. The country’s long history with authoritarian rule reached its peak in the final leg of the 42-year reign of the Somoza dictators (1937-1979), during Anastasio “Tachito” Somoza Debayle’s time in power. Tachito’s father, Anastasio Somoza-García, and his brother, Luis Somoza-Debayle, had both ruled Nicaragua as oppressive caudillos until 1967. They oppressed and restricted the rights of Nicaraguans and kept their power legitimate by maintaining support from Nicaragua’s business elite and the American government. Like his father and brother, Tachito manipulated Nicaragua’s political climate in order to retain and expand his power. However, Tachito took his corrupt, repressive tactics too far and they proved to be unsustainable. In the final years of his reign, Somoza lost the support of Nicaragua’s powerful elite and scared off Nicaragua’s most important ally to the north, while simultaneously fueling the strength of his largest opponent (the Frente Sandinista Liberación Nacional - FSLN) and securing Adams 2 their rise. By taking authoritarian tactics to an extreme, Tachito lost all the patronage and assistance that kept him in power. He transformed his family’s caudillistic approach into an absolute dictatorship, which lost all patronage for his family’s dynasty and provoked a strong opposition movement, bringing their dynasty to an end. Somocista Rule Authoritarian rule, in many different forms, has been rooted in Latin America since the colonization period. From the conquistadors of the colonial period to the caudillos and dictators of the 19th and 20th centuries, repressive rule has manifested itself in different fashions in many Latin American countries. The conquistadors of Central and South America ruled as representations of the Spanish crown, strictly oppressing the natives and lower classes. Systems of hierarchy were implanted in the region, leaving a select few with a vast majority of the money and power. When the crown left the Americas and countries became independent, the hierarchy remained, passing authority on to those who were already in control.1 Rather than achieving independence and having the opportunities to recreate their identities, the new Latin American countries fell into the same patterns of dependence and social inequality under new authoritarian leaders. 1 Richard Morse, “The Heritage of Latin America,” in The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia, ed. Louis Hartz, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1969), 156. Adams 3 A political transformation after independence resulted in the creation of the Latin American caudillos. Richard Morse, a Latin Americanist scholar, who writes extensively on the political organization of the region, explains, “the caudillo of the independence period controlling a clanlike or improvised retinue through charismatic appeal, was the latter day version of the conquistador.”2 Caudillos either relied on their charm and personality, amongst their country’s elite who were the most (and in some countries the only) politically active class or amongst the sizeable masses. Additionally, as caudillos evolved, they kept their rule intact by increasingly relying upon the ability to attract foreign trade and investment.3 In doing so, caudillos earned legitimacy for their rule, separating themselves from despotism. In Nicaragua, these were the conditions under which the Somoza family rose to power and successfully utilized their harsh ruling methods. The Somozas came to power in 1937 and ruled like traditional Latin American caudillos for the first 30 years of their family’s dynasty. Their power was highly oppressive, maintaining Nicaragua’s social inequality and repressing any perceived opposition. However, their strong ties to Nicaragua’s military and business elite in addition to their tight connection with the American government validated their power. Tacho, the first Somoza, possessed the ability to maneuver his crucial ties with the American government, which had maintained its influence that it had forced upon Nicaragua for nearly a century. He also endeared himself to Nicaragua’s business elite and successfully maneuvered the Nicaraguan political climate, all the while keeping any opposition at bay. 2 Ibid., 165. 3 Ibid., 169. Adams 4 The beginnings of the Somoza dynasty, like much of Nicaragua’s history, were closely intertwined with the United States government, and Tacho ensured that connection remained strong. Somocista rule arrived in Nicaragua in the early 1930s when Tacho ascended to the top of the National Guard (Nicaragua’s powerful gendarmerie) and eventually took over the presidency. Somoza I, who was born into wealth and educated in the United States, quickly rose in the ranks of the National Guard, becoming the Guard’s leader with the help of the United States government.4 The United States had invaded and intervened Nicaragua regularly since the early 19th century in order to keep their financial and political interests in the country safe. When overt intervention became less plausible in the 1930s, the United States made sure to carry on its influence in the Nicaraguan government by aiding the rise of Somoza I.5 With his Americanized character and strong desire for power, Tacho was the perfect candidate for the U.S. It was not difficult for both parties to recognize the reciprocal benefits of a healthy relationship. The United States would easily be able to maintain their political and corporate interests in Nicaragua and Somoza would be free to wield his power how he saw fit without worrying about his powerful northern neighbor. The U.S. trained and funded the rapidly growing National Guard and put the military organization under Somoza I’s control.6 Rather than allowing Nicaragua to determine their own political path, the American government did everything it could to strengthen a 4 Bernard Diederich, Somoza and the Legacy of U.S. Involvement in Central America, (New Jersey: Waterfront Press, 1989), 14. 5 Eduardo Crawley, Dictators Never Die: A Portrait of Nicaragua and the Somoza Dynasty, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), 99. 6 Diederich, 15. Adams 5 powerful authoritarian leader. They justified this support with strong anti-communist rhetoric throughout the dynasty, defending the Somozas’ commitment to keeping communism out of the Americas. Tacho took full advantage of their unharnessed power in congruence with considerable patronage from the Untied States, allowing Washington’s support to provide him a sense of confidence and legitimacy in his rule. Additionally, Tacho was able to maintain the support and benefaction of Nicaragua’s elite while bolstering his own wealth. He created corrupt mechanisms that utilized his power to strengthen his family’s business interests within the country. Tacho manipulated the markets to ensure that his exports and businesses were the most profitable in Nicaragua.7 Tacho put his family’s wealth in a position where it would be able to grow extensively, but he did not encroach too far on the business and agricultural elite’s stake of the country’s wealth. By simultaneously maintaining their support and funding his family’s enterprise, Somoza I cemented a dictatorship in Nicaragua that outlasted his time in power. Another characteristic of the Somoza dynasty that came from Tacho’s time in power was the ability to manipulate Nicaragua’s constitution and unpredictable political climate in order to feign democracy. Despite displaying all of the attributes of a dictatorship, Tacho understood that faking the democratic process would keep some opposition at bay and allow Nicaragua to remain in the Washington’s good favor.8 Somoza I allowed a handful of puppet governments to rule when his terms had expired 7 Crawley, 97. 8 Ibid., 93. Adams 6 and permitted a degree of opposition.9 By appearing to function democratically, Tacho added another element of validity to his rule. The United States was less likely to intervene and Nicaraguans were less likely to resist. However, these puppet governments never possessed much real power and Tacho’s reign was never truly threatened. Additionally, the Somozas intermittently shut down La Prensa. Somoza created a façade of democracy, but did not let it get in the way of his deceitful political maneuvers. Finally, one of the most significant features of the Somozas was their willingness to violently oppress anyone they perceived
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