FIVE RISING DEMOCRACIES Geopolitics in the 21St Century

FIVE RISING DEMOCRACIES geopolitics in the 21st century For a quarter century since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world has enjoyed an era of deepening global interdependence, characterized by the absence of the threat of great power war, spreading democracy, and declining levels of confl ict and poverty. Now, much of that is at risk as the regional order in the Middle East unravels, the security architecture in Europe is again under threat, and great power tensions loom in Asia. The Geopolitics in the 21st Century series, published under the aus- pices of the Order from Chaos project at Brookings, will analyze the major dynamics at play and offer ideas and strategies to guide critical countries and key leaders on how they should act to preserve and renovate the established international order to secure peace and prosperity for another generation. FIVE RISING DEMOCRACIES AND THE FATE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LIBERAL ORDER TED PICCONE Brookings Institution Press Washington, D.C. Copyright © 2016 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 1775 Mas sa chu setts Ave nue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 www . brookings. edu All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Brookings Institution Press. The Brookings Institution is a private nonprofi t organization de- voted to research, education, and publication on impor tant issues of domestic and foreign policy. Its principal purpose is to bring the highest quality in de pen dent research and analysis to bear on current and emerging policy problems. Interpretations or conclusions in Brookings publications should be understood to be solely those of the authors. Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication data Names: Piccone, Theodore J., author. Title: Five rising democracies : and the fate of the international liberal order / Ted Piccone. Description: Washington, D.C. : Brookings Institution Press, [2016] | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed. Identifi ers: LCCN 2015049705 (print) | LCCN 2015040754 (ebook) | ISBN 9780815725787 (epub) | ISBN 9780815726951 (pdf) | ISBN 9780815727415 (hardcover : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780815725794 (pbk. : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: New democracies—Case studies. | Democracy— Case studies. | Democ ratization— Case studies. | Democracy— India. | Democracy— Brazil. | Democracy— South Africa. | Democracy— Turkey. | Democracy—Indonesia. Classifi cation: LCC JC423 (print) | LCC JC423 .P454 2016 (ebook) | DDC 321.8— dc23 LC rec ord available at http:// lccn . loc . gov / 2015049705 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Typeset in Sabon Composition by Westchester Publishing Services To Susan and our three beautiful birds in the trees and, forever, to my parents, Dante and Margaret Contents Preface and Acknowl edgments ix 1 The Road to the Rise: How Democracy and Development Powered the Five 1 2 The International Human Rights and Democracy Order: Convergence and Divergence 31 3 India: A Reluctant Leader 71 4 Brazil: In Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy 97 5 South Africa: A Confl icted Mediator 129 6 Turkey: A Questionable Model 161 7 Indonesia: A Quiet Player 189 8 Paths to Convergence 219 Notes 249 Index 325 CHAPTER FOUR Brazil In Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy Oh country vast by nature, fair and strong, brave and colossus, thy future mirrors this thy greatness. Brazil’s national anthem, 1922 Of all the misguided quests that Brazil had undertaken over the years, few rivaled our efforts to attain our dream of world promi- nence. But a history of awful follow-through meant that, in ret- rospect, such declarations always ended up looking rather brash. President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1985–95), from his memoirs BRAZIL HAS LONG SOUGHT a role in world affairs that would mirror its impressive physical attributes: its continental breadth, its status as the world’s fi fth largest country by size and population, and its rising place as the world’s sixth largest economy. Yet its own experience of erratic growth, high in equality, and unstable politics has tempered its infl uence on the world stage and reinforced traditional views of national development as the top priority in both its domestic and international agendas. Since its transition to democracy in 1985, Brazil’s dual strategy of pursuing its national economic interests and a higher profi le in regional and global affairs has served it well. As cataloged in chapter 1, Brazil has surged forward over the past three decades with one of the world’s largest increases in gross national product, major improvements in human 97 98 Brazil development, and a relatively stable democratic po liti cal order.1 Its seat at the table of the G-20 and BRICS and its viable bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its drive to establish regional institu- tions that stand apart from the United States, and its successful claim to host both the World Cup in 2014 and the Summer Olympics in 2016 are some of the fruits of its ambitious reach for a long- anticipated leadership role in the world.2 While Brazil may legitimately claim the mantle of an emerging democratic power, at peace with its neighbors and of growing weight eco nom- ically, its preference for noninterference in internal affairs, abjuration of use of military force, and drive to establish itself as a leader of the global South often put it at odds with the traditional powers’ concept of the international liberal order. This attitude is markedly on display in the realm of support for democracy and human rights, where Brazil has held fi rm, with some notable exceptions, to traditional principles of sover- eignty and against coercive tactics to effect change in other countries. As former foreign minister Celso Amorim phrased it, “We don’t give certif- icates of good be hav ior.”3 In a comparative study released by Freedom House in 2014, Brazil scored in the low end of the scale as a minimal supporter of democracy and human rights in the world.4 Given the personal and po liti cal trajectories of its three most recent demo cratically elected presidents—Dilma Rousseff, Lula da Silva, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, all victims in one form or another of the military dictatorship of 1964–85— its lackluster per for mance in this arena comes as a surprise to many observers. Despite the Brazilian con- stitution’s call to give priority to human rights in its international relations, Brazil has favored other historical strands in its foreign policy, such as self- determination, nonintervention, and peaceful confl ict resolution.5 Above all, it has sought strategic autonomy, that is, the fl exibility to secure and defend its national interests without the constraints of alliances or conditions imposed by external actors. Over time, however, a growing awareness in Brazilian elite and middle- class circles of the country’s constitutional and moral obligation to advance human rights both abroad and at home may pave the way for more progressive policies that better reconcile its interests with its values. In the de cades before it consolidated its position as Latin Ameri ca’s largest democracy, Brazil’s principal preoccupation was to secure its borders and develop its continental “empire” without much reference to the rest of the world. Once Foreign Minister Rio Branco, the father of Brazil 99 Brazilian diplomacy, negotiated the legal national borders at the end of the 1910s, Brazil turned wholeheartedly to national development as the North Star of its foreign policy, an approach former foreign minister Celso Lafer labeled “goal- oriented nationalism,” or nationalism as a means to development.6 As it grew in strength, Brazil also sought grandeza, to be recognized as a great country with the capacity to be region- ally and internationally infl uential.7 To achieve grandeza, its leaders chose the path of po litical autonomy, which has taken dif fer ent forms over the years, as Brazilian po liti cal sci- entists Tulio Vegevani and Gabriel Cepaluni explain. These ranged from autonomy through distance from international regimes, which prevailed from the 1930s through the Cold War, to autonomy through participa- tion in the international system, which predominated in the 1980s and 1990s.8 Late in the Cardoso administration and institutionalized by both the Lula and Rousseff governments, Brazilian foreign policy has shifted toward autonomy through diversifi cation by developing new alliances with partners from the global South as a way to reduce asymme- tries in its relations with more powerful countries. An early statement of these lines of diplomacy came from President Jânio Quadros, who wrote in 1961: We gave up the subsidiary and innocuous diplomacy of a nation aligned with worthy though alien interests, and, to protect our rights, placed ourselves in the forefront, convinced as we were of our ability to contribute with our own means to the understanding of peoples . My country has few international obligations . Not being members of any bloc . we preserve our absolute freedom to make our own decisions in specifi c cases and in the light of peaceful suggestions at one with our nature and history.9 An impor tant detour from the path of nonalignment came during the height of the Cold War when the military, encouraged by the United States, deposed the demo cratically elected government of João Goulart in 1964. The coup ushered in two decades of military rule in which op- ponents of the regime, including Fernando Henrique Cardoso, fl ed into exile, or, like Dilma Rousseff, stayed to take up arms against the government (see fi gure 4-1). Brazilian foreign policy then took sides with the United States against the Soviet Union and joined Operation Condor, a secret multinational campaign by military governments to eradicate Figure 4-1.

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