Contemporary Mexico's policy toward the Mexican diaspora in the United States

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CONTEMPORARY MEXICO'S POLICY TOWARD THE MEXICAN DIASPOEIA IN THE UNITED STATES

by Maria Rosa Garcla-Acevedo

Copyright @ Maria Rosa Garcia Acevedo A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

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Copyright 1997 by Garcia-Acevedo, Maria Rosa

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA ® GRADUATE COLLEGE

As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have

read the dissertation prepared by Msria Rosa Garcia~Acevedo

entitled Contemporary Mexico's Policy Toward the Mexican

Diaspora in the United States

and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation

requirement for the Degree of Philosophy

Date

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Date

Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copy of the dissertation to the Graduate College.

I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my di;;«r5tion and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement. [T\N[M- )issertatipn Director 3 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR

This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under the rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgement of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder.

SIGNED: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

A mis padres Leopoldo Garcia Nunez y Carmen Acevedo Moya de Garcia, analistas politicos innatos

A David, extraordinario constructor de puentes entre "los dos Mexicos" TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES 8 ABSTRACT 9 1. INTRODUCTION 11 Notes 18 2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 20 Looking at the Policy Content 21 Goals 23 Agents 28 Targets 30 Tools 32 In Search of Explanations for the Mexican Policy Toward Chicanos 34 The Evolution of Chicano Politics 35 Mexican Domestic Policy 37 Pluralism 38 Political Economy-Foreign Policy 39 Domestic Policy-Foreign Policy 40 The U.S.-Mexican Relation 41 Conclusion 45 Notes 48 3. SOME LESSONS OF HISTORY 59 Goals 59 civil Rights 62 Attainment of Political Support 65 Enhancement of Mexican Culture 66 Participation in U.S.-Mexican Relations 68 Business Links 69 Agents 70 The Presidency 70 Ministries and Other Agencies 72 Targets 76 U.S.-born Chicanos or Mexican Immigrants 76 The Portrayal of the Mexican Diaspora. 81 Tools 83 Resource Tools 83 Capacity-building Tools 86 Hortatory Tools 91 Conclusion 93 Notes 97 4. LO MEXICANO EN AZTLAN: THE SUPPORT TO CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS 109 Goals 110 Enhancement of Mexican Culture 110 Civil Rights 112 TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued Attainment of Political Support 113 Participation in U.S.-Mexican Relations 114 Business Links 114 Agents 115 The Presidency 116 Ministries and Other Agencies 118 The Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores 118 The Secretaria de Educacion Publica 126 The Secretaria de Desarrollo Social 130 State and Local Government 131 Targets 135 U.S.-born Chicanos or Mexican Immigrants 135 The Portrayal of the Mexican Diaspora. 140 Tools 143 Resource Tools 144 Capacity-building Tools 148 Hortatory Tools 155 Conclusion 159 Notes 161 PROPOSITION 187 174 Goals 178 civil Rights 178 Participation in U.S.-Mexican Relations 181 Agents 182 The Presidency 183 Ministries and Other Agencies 184 The Legislative Branch 187 State and Local Governments 190 Targets 191 U.S.-born Chicanos or Mexican Immigrants 191 The Portrayal of the Mexican Diaspora. 196 Tools 198 Authority Tools 199 Resource Tools 199 Capacity-building Tools 201 Hortatory Tools 202 Conclusion 202 Notes 205 7 TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

6. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 214 Goals 214 Attainment of Political Support 215 Participation in U.S.-Mexican Relations 215 Business Ties 216 Agents 217 The Presidency 218 Ministries and Other Agencies 218 State and Local Governments 224 Targets 224 U.S.-born Chicanos or Mexican Immigrants 225 The Portrayal of the Mexican Diaspora..233 Tools 234 Resource Tools 235 Capacity-building Tools 236 Hortatory Tools 237 Conclusion 238 Notes 241 7. COMPARING AND CONTRAST: THE THREE CASE STUDIES OF MEXICO'S OUTREACH POLICY TOWARD THE MEXICAN DIASPORA 248 Goals 248 Civil Rights 249 Enhancement of Mexican Culture... 252 Attainment of Political Support.. 253 Participation in U.S.-Mexican Relations 254 Business Ties 256 Political Agents 257 Chicanos as Political Targets 263 Political Tools 267 Conclusion 273 8. TOWARD A CONCLUSION: THE SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS OF MEXICO'S OUTREACH POLICY TOWARD THE MEXICAN-ORIGIN COMMUNITY 275 The Evolution of Chicano Politics 275 Mexican Domestic Policy 282 Pluralism 283 Political Economy-Foreign Policy. 284 Domestic Policy-Foreign Policy... 287 The U.S.-Mexican Relation 290 Conclusion 294 Notes 296 REFERENCES 299 8

1. LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Mexico's Policy Toward Chicanos (1970-1988) 60 Table 2. Principal Mexico's Governmental Institutions In Charge of Cultural and Educational Outreach Programs toward the Mexican- Origin Community in the United States, 1988-1996 117 Table 3. Contemporary Mexico's Outreach Policy Toward the Chicano Community. Goals Pursued 250

Table 4. Contemporary Mexico's Outreach Policy Toward the Chicano Community. Political Agents Involved 260 Table 5. Contemporary Mexico's Outreach Policy Toward the Chicano Community. Target Populations 265

Table 6. Contemporary Mexico's Outreach Policy Toward the Chicano Community. Tools 269 9

ABSTRACT

Mexico's outreach policy toward the Mexican diaspora in the United States is an innovative aspect of its contemporary foreign policy. This dissertation focuses upon this theme. The literature on policy design provides a set of concepts

that permit certain conclusions regarding the blueprint of the policy design. Various studies on Chicano-Mexico relations and Mexico's foreign policy provide specific propositions that

serve as guidelines in the examination of three case-studies. Both primary and secondary sources are used in this study, including governmental reports and documents, speeches and other written statements. Important pieces of information are obtained by elite interviewing of high-ranking Mexican officials, Mexican and Chicano scholars and certain Chicano political leaders.

This study is divided into eight parts. After the List of Tables and the Introduction of the subject matter, Chapter 2 reviews various bodies of literature that shed light on the contemporary links between the Mexican government and the Mexican diaspora in the United States. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the antecedents of the Mexican outreach policy prior to the late-1980s. Chapter 4 examines the educational and cultural ties that the Mexican government sponsored vis-^- 10 vis the Chicano community. Chapter 5 focuses on immigration issues, especially on the links between the Mexican government and Chicanos with reference to Proposition 187. Chapter 6 discusses the business links toward Chicanos in the framework of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Chapter 7 compares and contrast in detail the three case-studies examined. Reference is made to the major characteristics of the policy content, including; the multiple number of goals enunciated, the web of governmental agencies involved in outreach programs, the specific segments of the Mexican diaspora that were selected, and the wide array of tools employed by the Mexican government to pursued its goals. As a concluding note. Chapter 8 critically underscores the impact of the evolution of Chicano politics, the transformations of Mexico's domestic policy and the changes of U.S.-Mexican relations in the design of Mexico's outreach policy toward the Mexican diaspora in the United States. Lastly, included is a list of references used in this study. 11 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Mexico has been closely linked from the mid-19th century to the very present to an important ancestral community of Mexican-origin population in the United States. This community originated in a legal sense after Mexico lost more than half of its territory as a result of the war with the United States (1846-1848). The original Mexican-origin population (100,000 people in 1848) has been continually enlarged by constant waves of Mexican immigrants and by high demographic growth.^ According to the data from the 1990 Census, the Mexican-origin population in the U.S. consists of, at least, 13,495 million people—including those who are U.S. citizens and first generation immigrants. It is estimated that the Chicano community* is nearly doubling size every twenty years. By the turn of the century, it will be the single largest ethnic minority in the United States.' The academic study of Chicano-Mexicano relations has not, for the most part, received the scholarly attention that it merits, either from researchers in the United States or from Mexico. As Chapter I discusses, there exist certain selected

' The terms Chicano community, Chicanos, Mexican diaspora and Mexican-origin community are used interchangeably in the present study. They refer to the Mexican nationals who lived permanently in the United States and to the American citizens of Mexican descent. 12 studies of limited aspects of this stibject matter, including the historical events that have linked Mexicans from both sides of the border, the economic connections between Mexican

nationals in the U.S. and their families in Mexico, and the various dimensions of cultural ties.^ However, an aspect that has not received significant inquiry is the relation between the Mexican government and the Mexican-origin community in the United States. The present study focuses precisely upon this theme. It examines a key era in the contemporary links between the Mexican government and the Chicano community, from the late- 1980s to the present.' Specifically, it discusses the characteristics of Mexico's outreach policy toward the Mexican diaspora in the U.S. during this particular period. Several assumptions can be drawn from this question. First, it is the contention of this work that this formulated Mexican efforts at closer political links with the Chicano community are an innovative and critical dimension of its foreign policy. In addition, this study acknowledges that the Mexican government has launched an extensive and well-funded project aimed at reaching out to the Mexican diaspora in the United States." It is, therefore, possible to compare and

The administrations of Presidents Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (1994- 2000) are a major focus of attention. 13 contrast case-studies of the Mexican policy toward this community that included economic, political and cultural ties. Second, unless otherwise stated, whenever mention is made in this study of Mexico's governmental agencies or programs, they pertain to the dominant political order, that is the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Party of the Institutionalized Revolution, PRI). Although there exists a current debate regarding the separation between the formal governmental apparatuses and the PRI, the reality has been that traditionally they have been one and the same.

Third, the definition of the Chicano community, the subject of Mexico's governmental policies, is examined from the perspective of the Mexican government. In other words, it includes exclusively the segments or organizations that Mexican governmental agencies have targeted in the contemporary period.*

* For this purpose. La Paloma^ a publication issued bi­ monthly from 1993 to the present by the Direccion General del Programa Presidencial para la Atencion de las Conninidades Mexicanas en el Exterior (Bureau for Mexican Communities Abroad) of the Secretarxa de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) will be a key source. This Programa Presidencial became the agency in charge of the coordination of the Mexican governmental policy toward Chicanos. In addition, the Mexican newpaper La Jornada, and the indexes of Los Angeles Times and The Chicago Tribune (1988-1996) were also consulted in order to have an alternative list of Chicano organizations involved in relations with the Mexican government. 14 Fourth, this study recognizes that competing (or complementary) explanations exist, which are drawn from different bodies of political science literature. Such explanations can shed light on the root causes of Mexico's outreach policy to the Chicano community. As a first methodological step, this study uses certain categories from policy design—the study of crafting public policies—to explore the underlying patterns and logic of three case-studies of the Mexican policy toward Chicanos.® These case-studies refer to different areas of contemporary Mexico's outreach policy toward the Chicano community. They include: (1) the cultural and educational bonds, one of the most traditional and permanent aspects of the relationship, and an issue considered by many Mexican policy-makers as the "most legitimate" of the Chicano-Mexicano relations agenda; (2) the Mexican reaction to a restrictive immigration action. Proposition 187,* as it involves the Mexican-origin community; and (3) the construction of business links, especially those pioneer efforts developed in the framework of the North

' Proposition 187 was approved in California in November 1994 by 59% of all California voters. Among its main provisions are: the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from public social services, publicly funded health care, public elementary and secondary schools, and post-secondary educational institutions. Max J. Castro, "'No More Immigrants!' A New Nativism," vista. February 4, 1995, pp. 25- 26. 15

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Mexicans and the Mexican diaspora in the United states. After the conceptual identification of the main features of the policy design, this study concludes with the review of the case-studies in light of the contexts® that can shape the characteristics of Mexico's policy toward Chicanos. Such contexts can provide possible explanations of the Mexican outreach policy toward Chicanos. The first one is drawn from the field of Chicano studies. It examines the proposition that an ethnic minority, such as Chicanos, can develop an interest in domestic (with an impact abroad) or foreign policy issues, including those of its homeland.' The second explanation, related to linkage approaches," searches for connections

between Mexican economic and political domestic factors and the emergence of a foreign policy issue, such as the outreach policy toward Chicanos. Finally, the third explanation draws upon the dependency approach, focusing on the core of greater

U.S.-Mexican relations to explain the make-up of the Mexican policy design toward Chicano organizations.' Both primary and secondary sources are used in this study, including governmental programs, speeches and other written statements. Important pieces of information are 16

obtained by elite interviewing* of Mexican officials, Mexican and Chicano scholars, and certain Chicano leaders. As Professor John Kingdon states, the ideas included in such sources are "far from being smokescreens or rationalizations,

[they] are integral parts of decision-making."" This study is divided into seven parts. Chapter l reviews certain ideas provided by various bodies of literature that can shed light on the contemporary links between the Mexican government and the Chicano/Latino organizations. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the antecedents of the Mexican policies toward Chicanos prior to the late-1980s.

Chapter 3 examines the educational and cultural ties that the Mexican government sponsored vis-^-vis the Chicano community. Chapter 4 focuses on immigration issues, especially on the links between the Mexican government and Chicanos with reference to Proposition 187. Chapter 5 discusses the characteristics of the business links toward Chicanos, examined in the framework of the negotiations and passing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Chapter 6 compares and contrast in detail the three case-studies examined. Finally, as a concluding note. Chapter 7 reviews

* The elite status "depends not on their role in society but on their access to information that can help answer a given research question." Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political Analysis. Research Methods in Political Science (New York: Longman, 1991), pp. 139-147. 17 the findings of the case-studies in light of different clusters of explanation. 18 NOTES

1. Juan Gomez-Quinones, "Notes on the Interpretation of the Relationship between the Mexican Community in the United States and Mexico" in Mexico and U.S. Relations. Conflict and Convergence. Carlos Vazquez and Manuel Garcia y Griego, eds. (Los Angeles: University of California, 1983) p. 419.

2. Raiil Hinojosa and Sherman Robinson, Assessing the Impact of NAFTA (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990), p. 6. 3. See, for example, Juan Gomez-Quinones, "Piedras contra la Luna. Mexico in Aztldn and Aztlan in Mexico; Chicano- Mexicano Relations and the Mexican Consulates" in Contemporary Mexico; Papers on the IV International Congress of Mexican History. James Wilkie ed. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975. pp. 494- 510; David R. Maciel, "'The Two Mexicos': Representation and Cultural Interactions between the Chicano and its Ancestral Land (1900-1930)," New Mexico Historical Review, (in press); and Sidney Weintraub, A Marriage of Convenience; Relations between Mexico and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

4. Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez, "The Mexican Diaspora," in The California-Mexico Connection, eds. Abraham Lowenthal and Katrina Burgess (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1993).

5. Anne L. Schneider and Helen Ingram, "Electoral Dynamics, The Cultural Construction of Target Populations, and Citizen Participation." Paper Prepared for the Public Policy Conference On Policy Design and Citizen Capacity, University of Arizona, March 1991; and Anne L. Schneider and Helen Ingram, "Systematically Pinching Ideas: A Comparative Approach to Policy Design," Journal of Public Policy I (January 1989). See also, Ann L. Schneider and Helen M. Ingram, Policy Design for Democracy, (in press), p. 4. 6. Schneider and Ingram in Policy Design for Democracy, p. 13) discuss the question of contexts. 7. The literature, however, debates on which segment of this community—Mexican nationals or U.S. born Chicanos—is more interested in establishing ties with Mexico. Juan Gdmez-Quinones, "Notes on the Interpretation," p. 420. 8. Linkage is defined as "any patterned sequence of behavior that originates in one system [domestic] and is reacted in the other [international]. James Rosenau, for example, suggests different "clusters" of internal and external variables that can be taken into consideration, although they may vary case by case. James Rosenau, Linkage Politics (New York: Free Press, 1980), p. 145. 9. Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependency," American Economic Review 60 (1970), p. 231. Peter Evans, Dependent Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). Mario Ojeda, Alcances v Llmites de la Polltica Exterior de Mexico (Mexico; El Colegio de Mexico, 1976), pp. 80, 88, 114-124. 10. John Kingdon, Agendas. Alternative, and Public Policy (Boston: Little Brown, 1984), p. 131. 20 CHAPTER 2 A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The study of the Mexican policy towards Chicanos pertains to the domain of foreign policy since these outreach programs have had an impact beyond the borders of Mexico—within an ethnic groups that resides in the United States. The classic approach that conceives foreign policy as state actions directed at other states^ is, however, not very helpful to address the specific questions regarding the content and the contexts of the Mexican policy toward Chicanos.

In this scenario, this study draws upon a wide range of political science literature. First, this chapter utilizes certain categories borrowed from public policy^ to explore the design of such Mexican policy. In addition, the literature on Chicano Studies* and Mexican foreign policy® are also used to construct certain propositions that permit the study of the outreach policy during the contemporary period. Second, this section examines various bodies of literature, including Comparative Politics® and International Relations', in order to consider possible clusters of explanations of the Mexican policy vis-a-vis the Mexican community in the United States that were set in motion from the late-1980s on. 21

Looking at: the Policy Content

The study of the contemporary Mexican policy of reaching out to the Chicano community can be conducted by using Public Policy literature that deals with the examination of public decisions on this matter. Especially, the use of policy design concepts, a relatively new field in public policy studies, is fruitful." Policy design alludes to the architecture of the policy content.' Thus, it permits the interpretation of several efforts conducted by the Mexican government in reaching out to the Chicano community in the contemporary period. Most of the studies that use policy design categories have been elaborated regarding developed countries, such as the United States and Canada." However, policy design categories are "travelling concepts" that can be adapted to the study of other countries." In addition, policy design provides "a conceptual framework to study in detail the process of crafting public policies, and specifically to guide the analysis of statutes, programs, practices and other empirical examples of public policy." Accordingly, the study of the Mexican policy toward Chicanos using policy design concepts permits the examination of the underlying logic and patterns through which policy intends to achieve its objectives." Furthermore, policy design concepts permit the examination of a policy 22 which has domestic and foreign policy components, and whose goals are aimed to a population target located beyond the borders, such as the Mexican-origin community in the United States.

The concepts goals, governmental agents, targets and tools borrowed from the policy design literature can be applied to different case-studies of Mexico's policy toward the Mexican-origin community in the U.S. This study focuses on three key aspects of this complex policy: cultural and educational links, immigration issues (Proposition 187) and trade links (NAFTA). Moreover, these concepts permit an in- depth study of the changes within the crafting of policy design, through contrasting a number of its different attributes over time.^* This section examines these concepts and discusses them in light of certain hypotheses provided by other bodies of literature, including Comparative Politics, Chicano Studies, International Relations and Mexican Foreign Policy. The purpose is to construct certain propositions that can guide the examination of the Mexican policy toward Chicanos. 23

Goals

The goals of a policy design can be defined as the "purposive statements"" directed at a particular problem. These statements can be found in vnritten documents, such as statutes or governmental programs, and inferred from the analysis of the policy statements articulated by policy­ makers." A particular policy design may state few or many goals. Such goal(s) can be addressed in a clear or ambiguous manner. Thus, the task of the analyst might be rather simple in identifying the goals, or difficult if such goals are hidden." The literature on Chicano-Mexicano relations outlines five goals that Mexico has pursued vis-^-vis Chicanos. Among these goals are: (1) the defense of the civil rights of Mexican nationals in the United States, (2) the enhancement of Mexican culture in the U.S., (3) the attainment by the Mexican government of Chicano political support, (4) the promotion of Chicano participation in select areas of U.S.-Mexican relations, and (5) the fomenting of business links between Mexico and Chicano/Latino business sector. Various scholars discuss and present examples regarding the successes and limitations of such goals—although none of the studies provide an in-depth discussion. 24

The defense of the civil rights of the Mexican-origin community in the U.S. is examined from different perspectives. Some scholars point out that, generally speaking, Mexico's policy has been committed to this goal. Armando Gutierrez portrays the Mexican government as essentially devoted to the protection of the civil rights of Mexicans in the United States.^" Others agree with this statement, although introduce certain caveats. For instance, Juan G6mez-Quinones provides historical examples on how the Mexican government had "a modest but significant role in the defense of the civil rights of the Mexicans in the Southwest." Moreover, Jos6 Angel Gutierrez asserted that, at times, the Mexican government has voiced its concerns regarding the discrimination of Mexicans in the United States, yet in other periods its response has been rather weak.^° Conversely, Rodolfo de la Garza dismisses the existence of such a strong commitment of the Mexican government on civil rights, especially regarding U.S.-born Chicanos. He specifically alludes to the shortcomings of the Mexican government, such as its failure to respond to the land grant claims in Texas of Mexican-origin individuals from the 1920s to the 1970s. The enhancement and promotion of Mexican culture within the Chicano community is a notable goal in the literature. Such a goal supposes that Mexican population in the United 25

States—regardless of its possible differences—shares a

common cultural identification with its homeland." Jorge Bustamante, Rodolfo de la Garza, Juan Gdmez-Quinones and Carlos Zazueta^^ consider that this is a permanent goal and has been the most successful one implemented by Mexico.'* Furthermore, Bustamante considers that the enhancement of Mexican culture is the most appropriate of the goals that can be pursued by an ancestral country vis-^-vis an ethnic group. He states that "the government of Mexico has the legitimate right to promote the diffusion and reinforcement of historical knowledge and values of Mexican culture among its descendants outside of the country."'®

A point of contention regarding the goal of enhancing Mexican culture within the Mexican diaspora in the U.S. refers to whether or not the pursuit of cultural ties could attain more profoxand political links between the Mexican government and Mexicans in the U.S. John Garcia discusses cultural identity as a factor that can foster political participation

within the Mexican community in the U.S., although he does not precisely elaborate on whether such potential mobilizations can also result in closer ties with its homeland.'* In addition, Jorge Castaneda, Rodolfo de la Garza and Robert Pastor add that Chicano cultural affinity with Mexico is not the equivalent of supporting the Mexican political system." 26

The development of political support within the Chicano community toward the Mexican government forms the third goal sought. According to the literature on Chicano-Mexicano relations, this goal has flourished in periods of political turmoil in Mexican history, such as the 19th century, the French intervention (1863-1867) in Mexico, and the Revolution of 1910." In the contemporary period, Denise Dresser points out the rebirth of this goal. She examines the connection between the appearance of a strong opposition presidential candidate (Cuauhtemoc Cdrdenas) in the late-1980s with renovated Mexican governmental efforts to reach out to the Chicano community." Moreover, certain scholars agree that a controversy always arose regarding whether it was appropriate for the Mexican government to involve Mexicans abroad in domestic controversies.

Another controversial goal of the Mexican policy refers to the participation of the Chicano community in certain aspects of greater U.S.-Mexican relations. A case in point is immigration, since this particular issue affects the Mexican- origin community, both U.S. and Mexican domestic policies, and the bilateral agenda between the two countries. According to Juan Gomez-Quinones, the immigration issue is a "tangible common interest" between Mexico and Chicanos.^° In the same vein, the members of the Comision para, el Futuro de las Relaciones Mexico-Estados Unidos (Commission for the Future of 27

U.S.-Mexican Relations), integrated by scholars and policy­ makers from both countries, stated that "if defined with clarity" immigration can be the issue in which the Chicano

community can get further involved in U.S.-Mexican relations.'^ However, some scholars doxobted that there exists a solid common ground between the Mexican government and the Chicano community regarding U.S. immigration policy. Rodolfo de la Garza and Adela Flores concluded that assiomptions which point to the undocumented worker issue as an automatic basis for linking Chicanos and Mexico "are tenuous at best." Their

argument stressed that important segments of working class Chicanos are affected by the increased presence of Mexican undocumented workers from Mexico.®'

Other possible topics of Chicano involvement in U.S.­ Mexican relations are also mentioned in the scholarly literature. Juan Gdmez-Quinones suggests that the numerous issues related to the U.S.-Mexican border offer certain opportunities for members of the Chicano community to participate in bilateral relations, although he did not develop this point further." The promotion of business ties, the fifth Mexican goal, has received less attention in the literature than the others. Rodolfo de la Garza and Jose Angel Gutierrez point out that this goal emerged in the Mexican agenda in the 1970s. 28

However, de la Garza, however, is rather pessimistic because of what he perceives as the lack of interest of Mexican entrepreneurs toward Chicano business, while Gutierrez does not elaborate further under which conditions this goal could be successful.^* It is worth noting, thus, that in the 1990s, Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez is rather optimistic regarding the possibilities of trade and joint ventures between Mexico and Mexicans in the U.S. in the framework of

NAFTA."

Agents

The political agents can be defined as those agencies or individuals within the government in charge of the implementation of statutes or programs regarding certain policy. According to Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, the study of such agents requires focusing on the level of the government in which they are located, the reasons why they are selected for the implementation of the policy goals, and the amount of discretion given to them to alter or add the basic blueprint of policy during the implementation process of a particular statute or program." The literature on Mexico and Chicano-Mexicano relations mainly focuses on the location of such political agents.

Various studies on the Mexican political system, including The 29

Dilemma of the Mexican Economic Development by Raymond Vernon and The Mexican Profit-Sharing Decision by Susan Kaufman Purcell, point out the importance of the executive branch of

the Mexican government in the design of both Mexico's domestic and foreign policies." In addition, from the perspective of Chicano Studies, Juan G6mez-Quinones underscores the role of the Mexican President as a preeminent political actor who, by the power and structure of the Mexican presidency, is fully able to design and implement a particular agenda on Chicano issues.'"

Rodolfo de la Garza and Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez attribute certain influence to the members of the Cabinet in the policy design toward the Mexican diaspora in the United States. Ministries in Mexico can be either supportive or antagonistic to Chicano issues—although the Mexican president is the preeminent agent in the policy-making.In the early-1980s, de la Garza, for example, points out that "at least two of the most recent Secretaries of Foreign Relations were known to be openly hostile to Chicanos."*" Looking at the bureaus of the executive branch in the 1990s, Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez arrives at different conclusions. Through the discussion of the role of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations), the Secretaria de Educacion Piiblica (Ministry of Education) and the Secretaria del Trabajo y Prevision Social (Ministry of Labor) in 30 contemporary Mexican policy on Chicanos, he provides examples that emphasize the commitment of these agencies to working on Chicano issues."

Targets

The target populations are "all people who stand to benefit or lose" from a particular policy." They can also be described as the groups or individuals whose behavior or capacity "is intended to change or effect" by the statute or governmental program.*^ There exist two key aspects in the study of such targets. First, the governmental programs or statutes may define the target populations they plan to reach either broadly or narrowly. In other words, the political agents can tend to either "oversubscribe" or "undersubscribe" the political targets.** Second, these governmental programs choose the targets "on the basis of need, merit, equality, fairness, political power, wealth, image and other principles,"*® and they can portray the targets in a positive or negative manner.*® Such a portrayal has a consequence in terms of the positive or negative policies directed to them. The literature on Chicano-Mexicano relations addresses both points. The question related to the oversubscription or undersubscription of Chicanos as targets is examined while discussing the way the Mexican government defines the Chicano 31 community. Jorge Bustamante argues that both Mexican nationals and American-born Chicanos have been the focus of such policies,*' although he acknowledges that since the Second World War, the attention of the Mexican authorities has been

mainly concentrated on the situation of Mexican nationals.*" Conversely, Rodolfo de la Garza introduces a caveat as he claims that Mexican policies have been directed almost exclusively to Mexican nationals.*' The reasons he argues are two-fold. First, the Mexican-born population in the U.S. maintains closer familial, economic and political ties with Mexico, and such population is more willing to interact with Mexican governmental officials. Second, the Mexican government has legal obligations toward its citizens—even while they reside in another country—but it does not have any toward American-born Chicanos."®

Another topic that the literature emphasizes is the portrayal of Chicanos in Mexico. Several scholars recognize the "condescending attitude" toward members of this community of certain Mexican officials, considered a reflection of the views of the greater society.They provide, however, different explanations. Rodolfo de la Garza states that the origin of this attitude is that Chicanos are not "a sufficiently important political force in the U.S. to merit serious attention."" He found, however, a change in the perception of Mexican high officials toward Chicanos in the 32 period 1988-1992,®^ although he does not fully explain the

reasons of this change in attitudes among Mexican policy­ makers. From another perspective, Armando Gutierrez, Juan G6mez Quinones and Carlos Zazueta perceive such an attitude as

a product of "class biases" among Mexicans toward Chicanos.®* Elaborating on this point, Zazueta states that Mexicans tend to link the members of this minority with "their poorer countrymen.

Tools

The tools are important pieces of any policy design.

Generally speaking they are methods through which government seeks a policy goal," and are considered an important linkage between the goals, political agents, and target populations of a certain policy. A variety of tools can be implemented within a policy design. First, authority tools can prescribe orders. They rely on sanctions and assume that targets are voluntarily willing to take the action needed. Second, resource tools can enlight and empower action by the target populations. Third, capacity-building tools provide training, technical assistance, education, and information to permit targets to take certain actions. Finally, hortatory tools appeal to ascribed values and feelings of the target 33 populations. They can be used in times of lack of financial resources." The choice of tools tend to reflect assumptions about the characteristics of the target populations, and can have positive, negative or even bring about unintended consequences on the targets. Such a choice, however, can change as political power and social construction of the targets evolve, and rely on a wide range of tools—in an effort to reach out to many different populations—or concentrate in just few tools.

The literature on Chicano-Mexicano relations has mainly discussed three types of tools. First, the traditional literature underscores capacity-building tools. Jos6 Angel Gutierrez stressed the support for education as important, especially the scholarships and donations of books and educational aides provided by the Mexican government from the 1970s on.®'

Second, various scholars stress the importance of resource tools. Carlos Gonzdlez Gutierrez points out the significance of governmental grants made available to foment business links between Chicanos and Mexicans.*® In addition, the access given to Chicano leadership by Mexican high officials is seen as a tool that contributes new resources for the Chicano community—in terms of gaining "political experience and visibility."" As Vilma Martinez, the head of 34 the Mexican American Legal Defense Fxand (MALDEF), stated, "We all understand that Washington will finally have to listen to Chicanos because of Mexico".®^

A third kind of tools that refer to ••common cultural values^* between Mexico and Chicanos are also discussed by the literature on Chicano Mexicano relations. From a Comparative Politics perspective, Louis Gerson posed a question regarding whether the tools that alluded to ascribed values could further cement the political links between an ethnic group and its homeland. This scholar dismissed the idea that the exaltation of common culture and traditions could become a major motivation for such an ethnic group to involve itself in foreign policy matters, including those with its homeland." Accordingly, De la Garza points out that although the implementation of hortatory tools could be ••beneficial'• to Chicanos, it does not seem strong enough for Chicanos to lend their support to Mexico on other issues."

In Seeirch of Explanations for the Mexican Policy Toward Chicanos

Beyond the study of the content of the Mexican policy toward Chicanos, a key question can be posed, dealing with the contexts of such a policy, as possible explanations of the characteristics of the policy design. The exploratory study 35 of the contexts can provide further understanding of Mexico's outreach policy toward the Mexican-origin community in the U.S. Yet, it is not assumed in this study that such contexts can mechanically predict policy outcomes, since policy-makers can conduct certain efforts to take advantage or avoid the effects of events.

On the study of contexts, Juan G6me2-Quinones contributes three key hypothesis that explain Mexican policy toward Chicanos to: (l) the evolution of Chicano politics, including the changes in the political situation of this minority group in the United States; (2) the unfolding of certain Mexican domestic economic and political events; and (3) the development of international events, especially the evolution of U.S.-Mexican relations." This section elaborates on these propositions using materials from the fields of Comparative Politics, Chicano Studies and International Relations.

The Evolution of Chicano Politics

According to this first explanation, since the 1960s to the present, the Chicano community has been struggling for political clout in the U.S. As part of this effort, key community leaders and organizations increased their visibility in the U.S. domestic scene, and their interest in foreign 36 policy—especially on those matters linked to their homeland.*® Following this argument, such changes were extensively acknowledged by the Mexican government.

The interest of the Chicano community in foreign policy has been docximented in the literature. Louis Gerson, looking at ethnic groups in a comparative perspective concludes that their involvement in U.S. foreign policy is related specifically to their search of the "achievement of dignity, equality, respectability and unhampered access to American values and benefits."®'

In the case of the Chicano community and Mexico, other scholars provide a similar perspective. Judy Bertelsen points out that this community, as a non-state actor in a disadvantaged position vis-ei-vis other groups in American politics, moves "into an arena that offers more allies and better opportunities of success."®" Such arena is located in the international scene, especially in connection to the homeland. In addition, George Grayson stresses that the increasing numbers of Mexican Americans, and their "newly gained political clout and experience in coalitions,"®' can help the U.S. improve relations with Mexico. Thus, he forecasts the emergence of a Chicano lobby as an "interest group sensitive to Mexico's goals."'® Furthermore, Juan Gomez-Quinones sustains that, in certain domestic issues with 37 a foreign policy connection, Chicanos perceive their homeland as a potential ally.'^ These argiunents portray the Chicano community as active subjects able to develop an agenda with Mexico aimed at improving their standing in the U.S." The literature, however, does not include case-studies in which the possibilities of Chicano attitudes on foreign policy issues, including Mexico are discussed in-depth. A different point of view is sustained by Rodolfo de la Garza. He stresses that American-born Chicanos had remained inactive and "completely uninvolved" in foreign affairs, specifically on the relation with Mexico.'^ Elaborating on this proposition, de la Garza states that in the 1970s and 1980s, certain Chicano leaders and organizations demonstrated interest in pursuing links with Mexico while looking for political legitimacy within the American political system. Yet, they were only a "small core group," an elite group, integrated by few organizations that cannot represent the community at large.'*

Mexican Domestic Policy

The study of how the Mexican domestic policy can affect a foreign policy area, such as the relation with Chicanos can be addressed from different theoretical perspectives. The 38

Comparative Politics/International Relations literature suggests the examination of the interests of societal actors in Mexico (pluralism), a review of certain aspects of economic policy, and a consideration of the changes in the domestic political scene connected to the outcomes in foreign policy.

Pluralism The pluralist approach'® illustrates the role of societal actors in policy-making. According to its assumptions, an argiiment could be made that a certain area of policy is the product of the interaction of several interest groups. Such groups are supposed to flourish spontaneously in a society where the input of governmental institutions is perceived as minimal. It is also assumed that all interest groups possess a comparable number of resources in the political arena.'® A pluralist argument states that active and competitive interest groups formulate recommendations in Mexico toward Chicanos. Those groups would endorse competing proposals, and in tern present them to the government. In this scenario, the Mexican government is supposed to have a rather passive role. Yet, the application of such a framework in terms of Mexican governmental policies toward Chicanos is criticized by scholars who study Mexican foreign policy and Chicano-Mexicano relations, such as Rodolfo de la Garza. They agree that the 39

Mexican government has always played a key role in reaching out to Chicanos, and recognize that the various segments of Mexican society have not fully developed their own independent interest in Chicano issues yet.'''

Political Economy-Foreign Policy Another possibility to link the changes in Mexican domestic policy with the development of the policy toward Chicanos is to review some aspects of the political economy.

Certain scholars establish a connection between business confidence and foreign policy actions. As Fred Block considers, the role of the state encompasses the establishment and maintenance of conditions for private accumulation that could neutralize the ability of capital to cease investing, and even the possibility to wreck economies, and bring down governments.'* For this reason, he considers that state managers need to promote business confidence to strengthen the economy." In addition, other scholars concur on the connection between certain economic policies and foreign policy decisions. Nora Hamilton stresses that the state's main responsibility is to establish and maintain conditions for the private accumulation of both national and domestic capital.*" In the same vein, Joyce Kolko points out that the different aspects of the governmental tasks are driven by the power of 40

those who possess capital." Suamiing up the stated propositions, any major disturbances in the accumulation process expressed, for example, in capital flight, could generate certain changes in the governmental policies oriented toward regaining business confidence. The specific connection between a policy of fomenting business confidence and the governmental decisions on foreign policy is addressed in various scholarly texts. In the classical study. The Making of Modern Mexico. Frank Brandenburg states that "Mexican foreign policy stems from primarily economic and financial considerations," including the creation of "a propitious investment climate."" In a more recent commentary, Carlos Rico stresses that certain forces beyond the control of both the Mexican and the U.S. governments will shape their future ties. They pertain to the capitalist nature of both socio-economic formations." Following these types of arguments, the Mexican policy aimed toward the Chicano community could be driven by efforts to improve a climate of "business confidence" in Mexico. In this scenario can be examined the case-studies on Mexico's outreach policy toward this community, discussed in the next chapters.

Domestic Policy-Foreian Policy

The relationship between internal political changes and 41

foreign policy issues can also be examined looking at "linkage approaches." David Ronfeldt and Caesar Sereseres point out the strong connection between the evolution of Mexican politics and the advent of new developments in foreign policy.®* In addition, from a historical perspective, Juan Gomez-Quinones offers some examples on the connection between Mexican domestic politics and an outreach policy toward Chicanos from the days of the French intervention in the 19th century to the Revolution of 1910.*® The problem, however, is that the elements that should be examined in order to pursue this kind of analysis are not always clearly stated."® Looking at the contemporary period, Carlos Zazueta perceives that a more active foreign policy toward this community emerges "if important domestic concerns "are at stake," but he does not elaborate more on that.*' Denise Dresser made an interesting point. She stresses that the influence of the Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (Party of the Democratic Revolution, PRD) among Mexicans in the United States—especially in California—was a key factor that fostered a more active Mexican policy toward the Mexican diaspora from the late-1980s on."

The U.S.-Mexican Relation

A third possible explanation of the Mexican governmental 42 policy on Chicanos emphasizes that the status of the greater U.S.-Mexican relations may influence the evolution of the

Mexico's foreign policy. As David Rondfeldt and Caesar Sereseres maintain, "few economies and societies are as tangled together as those of the United States and Mexico."®' The dependency approach contributes certain guidelines for the study of the relationship between two asymmetrical

countries like the U.S. and Mexico. This approach connects the role of a particular country in the international division of labor with key aspects of its domestic and foreign policy. The classical characterization of the dependency approach states that the foreign policy of a developing country is imposed from the outside. Theotonio Dos Santos, for example, characterizes dependency as "a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected.

Several scholars who study the ties between Mexico and the U.S. subscribe to the dependency approach.'^ In his classical book, Alcances y llmites de la polltica exterior de Mexico. Mario Ojeda examines the dependency of Mexico vis-^- vis the United States looking at the vulnerabilities of Mexico in terms of trade, investment, and external debt." In the same vein. Axel Ramirez concurs that "the responsibility of Mexico vis-^-vis Chicanos has its boundaries; the United 43

States imposes such limits through its bilateral relation

[with Mexico ]. Rodolfo de la Garza elaborates on certain conditions that a dependent relationship can impose on Mexico's policy toward Chicanos.'* He emphasizes that if the United States perceives the relationship between the Mexican government and Chicanos as a threat to its "national interest," Washington will put pressure on Mexico to restrict its outreach policy to this minority." For instance, de la Garza mentions that in the 1970s, Hispanic officials at the State Department advised some members of the National Council of la Raza that they might "be viewed as agents of a foreign power" because of their ties with Mexico." Furthermore, this scholar even extends a policy recommendation to Chicanos willing to pursue further ties with the Mexican government. He cautions them about the possibility of jeopardizing the "political legitimacy" in the American political system that this minority "has recently won."" Following his argument, the possibility always exist that the U.S. government could exert strong pressure "behind the scenes" on Mexico that could halt its efforts of outreach to the Chicano community. According to a Mexican source cited by Rodolfo de la Garza, the U.S. had a sort of "veto power" in the development of Chicano-Mexicano relations. As an example, in 1988, before the first meeting between presidential 44 candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari and the Chicano leader, Cesar Chdvez, "an adviser to Salinas consulted an American official to get his views on whether to schedule it [a meeting] or not. The meeting was held [only] after the official strongly supported it."'" Yet, the argiiment is made in the literature that the Mexican government can manage to preserve certain autonomy in its foreign policy decisions." Mario Ojeda considers that Mexican foreign policy, although conditioned by its economic dependency, can be autonomous to a certain extent.^"®

Looking at Chicano-Mexicano relations, Armando Gutierrez proposed a specific hypothesis. He states that Mexico's search for a more independent foreign policy toward the U.S. has indeed occurred at times during the 1970s and 1980s in multilateral forums and peace negotiation efforts in Central America. Such periods characterized by more autonomous foreign policy actions coincide with efforts to outreach to the Chicano community. Another hypothesis emphasizes how in times of prosperity of Mexico's economy (which are linked to closer ties to the U.S.) the Mexican government will not be likely to pursue further ties with the Chicano community. Juan G6mez-Quinones states during such prosperity periods, Mexico "is not going to risk its substantial and continuing relations with the U.S. because of Mexican Americans. 45 Finally, a third hypothesis points out that in a scenario of more "vulnerability" for Mexico vis-a-vis the United States, the Mexican government may attempt to engage in further links with Chicanos, including the pursuit of a "Chicano lobby." De la Garza and G6mez-Quinones coincide that a restrictive U.S. immigration policy vis-^-vis Mexican migrants would be an example of such a possibility."^

Conclusion

The principal aim of this chapter is (1) to review certain scholarly interpretations that provide key propositions in examining the content of the Mexican policy design toward Chicanos, and (2) to explore the possible contexts or explanations that help spawn such a policy. In terms of the characteristics of Mexican policy, the use of the policy design literature as a framework to examine its different components promises to be fruitful. In addition, other literature on Chicano Studies and Mexican foreign policy provides the possibility of constructing certain arguments that can guide this study.

Looking at the policy content, five main goals were examined, drawn from programs, speeches and interviews with Mexican policy-makers. In the study of the agents, three main points are considered: their location within the Mexican 46 political system, the reasons for their involvement, and the degree of discretion that the policy programs gave to the agents. The discussion of Chicanos as the target populations was conducted from various points of view. The literature on policy design emphasizes the way the targets are portrayed, and whether they are oversubscribed or undersubscribed by the political agents. On this point, various studies on Chicano-

Mexicano relations discusses whether the Mexican agents have focused their attention on either Mexican nationals in the United States or U.S.-born Chicanos, or both. Finally, the study of the tools permits gauging the specific kind of instruments used by the Mexican government to reach out to Chicanos. Most scholars agreed that such tools can grant new capacities or resources to the Chicano community and appeal to its common values with Mexico. After studying the different components of the policy design, the root causes of the Mexican policy toward Chicanos was examined. For this purpose, three explanations pointed out by the literature were explored. The first explanation proposes the analysis of whether Chicano organizations that in their search for political clout in the U.S. have become interested in Mexico—as a potential ally to enhance their position on the United States. A caveat, however, has to be introduced, since certain scholars 47 point out that only a "small core" of Chicano organizations has pursued links with Mexico. The second explanation underscores that Mexican domestic policy, specifically certain economic and political events, might have influenced the policy toward the Chicano community, including the pursuit of policies to gain business confidence or the emergence of new political events, such as the flourishing of opposition parties. The links between Chicanos and Mexico were also reviewed in light of the greater relationship between the United States and Mexico. The question discussed is whether the U.S. government put any kind of limits on the Mexican policy toward Chicanos when it perceived a concern of their "national interests", or whether the Mexican government enjoys certain spaces of autonomy in its relations with the Chicano community. 48

NOTES

1. Ethnic groups are characterized as having a common identity that steams "from real or believed common ancestry, symbolized or expressed by shared characteristics as race, religion and customs." Astri Suhrket and Lela Garner Noble, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976), p. 4. See, also, Abdul Aziz Said and Luiz Simmons, "Ethnicity in an International Context" in Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1977), pp. 10-17, 21. 2. On realism, see for example, Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man versus Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); and Kenneth Waltz, Man State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). 3. Schneider and Ingram, "Electoral Dynamics, The Cultural Construction of Target Populations," p. 3. 4. The area of Chicano-Mexicano relations is, though, one of the least developed areas in Chicano studies. Rodolfo de la Garza, a political scientist, and Juan G6mez-Quinones, a historian, are two leading scholars. See, for example, Rodolfo de la Garza, "Chicanos and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Future of Chicano-Mexican Relations" in Mexican-U.S. Relations Conflict and Convergence; and G6mez Quinones, "Piedras contra la Luna." pp. 10,18. The majority of such literature is based manly upon historical research and qualitative analysis. The scholarship that explains such links using quantitative methods is rather scarce. A pioneer piece that examines the role of ethnicity and the ties with the homeland from the perspective of the Latino (including Chicano) population, using the results of survey analysis obtained from the Latino National Political Survey, was written by Rodolfo de la Garza, Angelo Falcon, F. Chris Garcia and John Garcia. "Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban Foreign Policy Perspectives: A Test of Competing Explanations". Unpublished manuscript, 1992. 5. This literature includes some essays written by actual participants in forging Chicano-Mexicano connections (such as Armando Gutierrez, Jos6 Angel Gutierrez and Reies L6pez Tijerina). They principally describe their personal experiences, although in a few cases, they go beyond personal discursive narrative to develop certain 49

theses regarding the possibilities and limits of such a relationship. Jorge A. Bustamante "Chicano-Mexicano Relations: From Practice to Theory" in Chicano-Mexicano Relations ^ eds. Tatcho Mindiola and Max Martinez (Houston: University of Houston-University Park, 1986); Armando Gutierrez, "The Chicano Elite in Chicano-Mexicano Relations", in Ibid.; Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexicano-Norteamericano Foreign Relations" in Ibid; and Reies L6pez Tijerina, Mi lucha por la tierra (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1972). 6. Traditional studies on Comparative Politics do not address actions taken by state institutions beyond its borders. Yet, there exists a promising—although emerging literature that examines the political actions of the nation-state vis-^-vis the diaspora of their nationals and their descendants. An interesting thesis points out that such governments had the possibility to either design policies oriented to reach out those who left the country or just ignored them. Certain case-studies indicate that several governments have decided to follow the first path. For instance, the governments of Colombia and the Dominican Republic have conceded their nationals who reside out of the country (mostly in the U.S.) the option of "dual citizenship." India has advocated that their nationals abroad are preferred business partners. Finally, the government of Portugal has declared its aspiration to construct special ties with the "global" Portuguese nation that includes both its nationals living abroad and their descendants — although they are citizens from another country. Randy A. Williams, "New Mexican Foreign Policies" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1994). 7. Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependency," American Economic Review 60: (1970), p. 231. Interestingly, other non-marxist perspectives also share the idea that Third World foreign policies are externally driven by either threats or promises from dominant powers. Eugene Wittkopf, "Foreign Aid and UN Votes: a Comparative Study," American Political Science Review 67 (1975) pp.868-888. 8. See, the pioneer book on policy design. Politics. Economics and Welfare by Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom (1953), pp. 3-7. 50 9. The study of policy content has evolved slowly. An important effort was undertaken by Austin Ranney, The Governing of Men. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966). 10. See, Schneider and Ingram, Policy Design for Democracy^ p. 6. 11. Manheim and Rich, Empirical Political Analysis, pp. 9-10.

12. Schneider and Ingram, Policy Design for Democracy, pp. 1, 22. 13. Ibid., p. 2. See also, Schneider and Ingram,"Systematically Pinching Ideas," p. 61. 14. Schneider and Ingram, Policy Design for Democracy, p. 35.

15. Helen Ingram and Anne Schneider, "The Choice of Target Populations," Administration and Society 23:3, November 1991, p. 336. 16. Schneider and Ingram, "Systematically Pinching Ideas," p. 70.

17. Schneider and Ingram, Policy Design for Democracy, p. 32. 18. G<5mez-Quinones, "Notes on the Interpretation of the Relations Between the Mexican Community in the U.S. and Mexico," p. 437.

19. Juan G<5me2-Quinones, "Una interpretaci6n de las relaciones entre la comunidad mexicana en Estados Unidos y Mexico" en El Mexico olvidado: historia del pueblo chicano. David R. Maciel ed. (Ciudad Judrez-El Paso: Universidad Autdnoma de Ciudad Judrez- University of Texas, El Paso, 1996.

20. Jose Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano Elite in Chicano- Mexicano Relations," p. 22. 21. De la Garza, "Chicanos as an Ethnic Lobby: Limits and Possibilities" in Chicano~Mexicano Relations. p. 36. 22. Bustamante, "Chicano-Mexicano Relations: from Practice to Theory," p. 11.

23. Carlos Zazueta, "Mexican Political Actors in the United States and Mexico" in Mexico and U.S. Relations, p. 431. 51 24. Juan Gdmez-Quinones. Chicano Politics. Reality and Promise 1940-1990 (Albuquerque; University of New Mexico Press, 1990) p. 205. 25. Bustamante, "Chicano-Mexicano Relations from Practice to Theory," p. 12. 26. John Garcia, "Ethnic Identity. Research and Policy Implications for Mexican American." (Tucson; Mexican American Studies and Research Center, 1987). 27. Rodolfo de la Garza, "Demythologizing Chicano-Mexicano Relations in Mexico-U.S. Relations," Susan Kaufman Purcell, ed. (New York; Praeger Pxiblishers, 1981) p. 95; Robert Pastor and Jorge Castaneda, Limits to Friendship. The United States and Mexico (New York; Alfred Knopf, 1988) p. 261.

28. Gdmez-Quinones, "Piedras contra la Luna," p. 6; G6mez- Quinones, "Una interpretacidn de las relaciones," p. 148.

29. Dresser, "Exporting Conflict. Transboundary Consequences of Mexican Politics," pp. 82-112; and Dresser, "Exporting Conflict," pp. 103-105. 30. G6mez-Quinones, Chicano Politics, p. 204. 31. Comisidn sobre el Futuro de las Relaciones M6xico-Estados Unidos. El desaflo de la interdenendencia; M6xico-Estados Unidos (Mexico; Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1988), pp. 165-166.

32. Rodolfo de la Garza and Adela Flores, "The Impact of Mexican Immigrants on the Political Behavior of Chicanos; a Clarification of Issues and Some Hypothesis for Future Research." The University of Texas at Austin. Unpublished Paper, pp. 2, 12. 33. G<5mez-Quinones, "Una interpretaci6n de las relaciones," p. 146. 34. Rodolfo de la Garza, "Chicanos as an Ethnic Lobby:" in Chicano Mexicano Relations, p. 38; Rodolfo de la Garza, "Demythologizing, pp. 90-91; and Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexico-Norteamericano Foreign Relations,"

35. Gonzdlez Gutierrez, "The Mexican Diaspora," pp. 232-233. 52

36. Schneider and Ingrain, "Systematically Pinching Ideas," pp. 68, 71. See also, Schneider and Ingram, Policy Design for Democracy, pp. 21-23. 37. Raymond Vernon, El dilema del desarrollo econ6mico de Mexico. (Mexico: Editorial Diana, 1966) pp. 13-14; Susan Kaufman Purcell, The Mexican Profit-Sharing Decision (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1975) pp. 38- 46.

38. Gomez-Quinones, "Una interpretaci6n de las relaciones," p. 150. 39. Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexico- Norteamericano Foreign Relations", p. 21; De la Garza, "Chicanos as an Ethnic Lobby," pp. 42-43. 40. Rodolfo de la Garza, "Chicanos and U.S. Foreign Policy: the Future of Chicano-Mexicano Relations" in Western Political Quarterly 33 (December 1980), p. 572. 41. Gonzdlez Gutierrez. The California-Mexico Connection, pp. 230-235. 42. Schneider and Ingram, Policy Design for Democracy, p.5.

43. Ibid. p. 2. 44. Ibid., p. 4. 45. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 46. Helen Ingram and Anne Schneider, "The Choice of Target Populations," Administration and Society 3 (November 1991), p. 340. 47. From his perspective, the Mexican government did not make any distinctions between Mexican or U.S.-born Chicanos from the mid-19th century and the 1940s. Jorge Bustamante, "Chicano Mexicano Relations," p. 12. other scholars also argue that strong cultural, linguistic and familial ties bounded Mexicans and Chicanos. Francisco Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza (Tucson; University of Arizona Press, 1982); and Mercedes Carreras de Velasco, Los Mexicanos que Devolvid la Crisis (Mexico; Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1974).

48. Jorge Bustamante, "Chicano-Mexicano Relations," p. 12. 53

49. Rodolfo de la Garza, "Chicanos and U.S. Foreign Policy; the Future of Chicano-Mexicano Relations" in Mexico and U.S. Relations, p. 404. 50. As examples, he points out that in certain periods of time, such as the Porfirio Diaz's regime (1880-1910) and the second postwar (1945-1963), Mexican policy toward Chicanos was particularly low profile. Rodolfo de la Garza, "Chicanos and the U.S. Foreign Policy; the Future of Chicano-Mexicano Relations," Western Political Quarterly. p. 576. See also, de la Garza, "Chicanos and U.S. Foreign Policy," in Mexico and U.S. Relations, p. 404; and de la Garza, "Chicanos as an Ethnic Lobby," p. 38. 51. According to certain sources, the Chicano community used to be portrayed by the Mexican government as integrated as rather powerless migratory workers and their descendants. Keenan, "Harnessing Hispanic Power," in Mexico Journal (Mexico City) 20, 22 February 1988, p. 17. 52. De la Garza, "Demythologizing Chicano-Mexicano Relations" p. 4. See also, de la Garza, "Chicanos and the U.S.," in Mexico and U.S. Relations, p. 401; and de la Garza, "Chicanos and U.S. Foreign Policy," Western Political QuaEteciy, p. 582. 53. Rodolfo de la Garza and Claudio Vargas, "The Mexican- Origin Population of the United States as a Political Force in the Borderlands; From Paisanos to Pochos to Potential Political Allies," in Lawrence A. Herzog ed. Changing Boundaries in the Americas (San Diego; Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1992), p. 93. 54. Armando Gutierrez, "The Chicano Elite in Chicano-Mexicano Relations," p. 472; G6mez Quinones, Chicano Politics, p. 204; de la Garza, "Chicanos and U.S. Foreign Policy," in Mexico and U.S. Relations, p. 405; and Zazueta, "Mexican Political Actors in the United States and Mexico," p. 465. 55. Zazueta, "Mexican Political Actors," p. 465. 56. Salamon Lester and Michael Lund. Beyond Privatization; the Tools of Government Action (Washington D.C.: Urbana Institute Press, 1989) p. 29. 54

57. A profound discussion of the different kind of tools can be found in Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, "Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools," Journal of Politics 2 (May 1990) pp. 514-522; Schneider and Ingram, "Electoral Dynamics, The Cultural Construction of Target Populations, and Citizen Participation," p. 4; and Schneider and Ingram, "Systematically Pinching Ideas," p. 68. See also, the unpublished manuscript of Schneider and Ingram, Policy Design for Democracy, pp. 12-17.

58. Ibid., pp. 12-17. 59. Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexicano- Norteamericano," pp. 32-33. 60. Gonzdlez Gutierrez, "The Mexican Diaspora," 232-233 pp. 61. Such tools suppose to enhance the political stature in the U.S. domestic politics of the Chicano organizations. Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexicano Norte Americano Relations," p. 23. 62. Cited in Rodolfo de la Garza, "Chicanos and U.S. Foreign Policy" in Mexico and U.S. Relations, p. 408. 63. Louis Gerson, "The Influenced of Hyphenated Americans on U.S. Diplomacy," in Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 30. 64. De la Garza, "Demythologizing," pp. 86, 88. 65. G6mez-Quinones, "Una interpretaci6n de las relaciones," pp. 61—63. 66. Gerson, "The Influenced of Hyphenated Americans on U.S. Diplomacy," p. 30. 67. Ibid, p. 30. 68. Judy Bertelsen, ed., Non-State Nations in Internal Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 3. 69. George W Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980).

70. Ibid., p. 20. 71. Gomez Quinones, Chicano Politics, p. 3. 55

72. These possibilities of the targets are foreseen in Schneider and Ingram, "Systematically Pinching Ideas," p. 71. See also, Paul Sabatier, "Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research: a Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis," Journal of Public Policy 6 (1987), pp. 21-48. 73. Rodolfo de la Garza et al., "Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban Foreign Policy Perspectives." pp. 24-25. 74. Ibid.

75. See the classical studies of, Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government, Evanson, 111: Principia Press, 1949, and David Truman, The Governmental Process. New York, Knopf, 1971. 76. Certain scholars—mainly Americans—used pluralism to study the Mexican society in the 1960s. See, Robert Scott, Mexican Government in Transition (Urbana: University of Chicago Press, 1964). However, from the 1970s to this date, the idea that Mexico have a pluralist society have been the object of an intense scrutiny.

77. De la Garza. "Chicanos and the U.S. Foreign Policy: the Future of Chicano-Mexicano Relations," Western Political Quarterly. pp. 571-582. 78. Fred Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule. Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State," Monthly Review 33, May/June 1977, pp. 8-9. Private capital is seen as having a key role in organizing nations' production and distribution of wealth. Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets. 1977. For a further commentary, see, David Vogel, "The New Science of Corporate Power."The Public Interest, no.87, 1987, p. 69.

79. Block, Ibid, pp. 8-9. 80. Nora Hamilton, Mexico; the Limits of State Autonomy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 23. 81. The ones who can always take their money out of the country and destabilize an economy and a government. Joyce Kolko, Restructuring the World Economy. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988. 82. Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1964) pp. 328-330. 56

83. Carlos Rico, "The Future of Mexican-U.S. Relations and the Limits of the Rhetoric of 'Interdependence'," in Rosario Green and Peter H. Smith, Foreign Policy in United States-Mexican Relations. (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies), p. 128. 84. Ronfeldt and Sereseres, "The Management of U.S.-Mexico Interdependence," p. 78. 85. G6mez-Quinones, "Piedras contra la Luna," pp. 496-497. 86. Linkage is defined as "any patterned sequence of behavior that originates in one system [domestic] and is reacted in the other [international]. James Rosenau, for example, suggests different "clusters" of internal and external variables that can be taken into consideration, although they may vary case by case. Rosenau, Linkage politicsf p. 145.

87. Carlos Vdzquez and Manuel Garcia y Griego, eds., "Introduction." in Mexico-U.S. Relations, p. 25.

88. Dresser, "Exporting Conflict," pp. 94-112. 89. David Ronfeldt and Caesar Sereseres, "The Management of U.S.-Mexico Interdependence; Drift Toward Failure?" in Mexican-U.S. Relations, p. 46.

90. Dos Santos, "The structure of Dependency," p. 231. Interestingly, other non-marxist perspectives also share the idea that Third World foreign policies are externally driven by either threats or promises from dominant powers. Wittkopf, "Foreign Aid and UN Votes; a Comparative Study," pp. 868-888. 91. Such relationship is docximented based upon various figures. For example, during the 1980s, in terms of the external debt, one-third was contracted with U.S. commercial banks. In addition, from 60 to 70% of the Mexican exports were sold to the U.S. Mark Nelson, "U.S.-Mexican Trade. The Curtain is Going Up," Hispanic Business. March 1991, p. 22; Weintraub, Marriage of Convenience. pp. 12-13. 92. Mario Ojeda, Alcances v llmites de la politica exterior de Mexico (Mexico; El Colegio de Mexico, 1977), p. 11. 57 93. "The responsibility that Mexico has vis-^-vis Chicanos has its limits. Such limits are imposed by the U.S. though its bilateral relations with Mexico. Axel Ramirez, "Los chicanos como lobby etnico," Uno mds unop 10 February 1990, p. 3. 94. De la Garza, "Chicanos and U.S." in Mexico and U.S. Relations. p. 412. De la Garza, "Chicanos and U.S. Foreign Policy," p. 404; De la Garza, "Chicanos as an Ethnic Lobby" in Chicano-Mexicano Relations. p. 38. For example, the failure of the Mexican government to respond to the land grant claims in Texas from the 1920s to this date, and the lack of commitment on the issue of Chicano civil rights during President L6pez Portillo's term. De la Garza, "Chicanos and the U.S. Foreign Policy" 2 Latin American Research Review (1980), p. 574.

95. A problem with this assertion is, however, that the author does not elaborate on the definition of "national interests." De la Garza, "Chicanos and U.S." in Western Political Quarterly, p. 521. See also, De la Garza "Chicanos and U.S. Foreign Policy," p. 409. 96. De la Garza, "Chicanos and U.S. Foreign Policy" in Mexico-U.S. Relations, p. 409. 97. Ibid., p. 400. This argument has also been discussed in the case of other ethnic groups in the U.S. It states that ethnic groups act against the national interests if get involved in the bilateral relations between the country they live and the mother country. See, Louis Gerson, "The Influence of Hyphenated Americans in U.S. Foreign Policy", in Ethnicitv and U.S. Foreign Policv. p. 52. 98. Cited in de la Garza and Vargas, "The Mexican- Origin Population," p. 102.

99. Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The Consiamption of Dependency Theory in the United States. Latin American Research Review. 11, (1977), pp. 7-21; and Peter Evans, Dependent Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 6-8. 100. Mario Ojeda, Alcances v Llmites de la Polltica Exterior de Mexico (Mexico; El Colegio de Mexico, 1976), pp. 80, 88, 114-124. 58 101. Armando Gutierrez, "The Chicano Elite," p. 49. 102. Gdmez Quinones, "Notes on an Interpretation/' p. 438. 103. De la Garza, "Chicanos and U.S." in Mexico-U.S.Relations. p. 401; G6mez-Quinones, "Notes" p. 437. 59

CHAPTER 3 SOME LESSOKS FROM HISTORY

From 1848 to the late-1980s, the relationship between the Mexican government and the Chicano community has been constantly evolving. This chapter focuses on its historical roots through the examination of the main features of the Mexican outreach policy. An overview of the history of the Mexican policy toward Chicanos is presented, employing the policy design categories discussed in the Introduction—goals, political agents, targets and tools. The main purpose of this chapter is to provide certain foundations that can illuminate the study of the contemporary period. Table 1 summarizes some of the most important findings that occurred in the contemporary period, 1970-1988.

Goals

From the mid-19th century to the 1980s, Mexican governments have stated several goals toward the Chicano community. These goals cannot be found in comprehensive programs, but in a collection of memoranda from various agencies, political lectures, newspaper reports, etc. After this note of caution, three main goals can be pointed out: the TABLE 1

MEXICO'S POLICY TOWARD CHICANOS (1970-1988)

L. Echeverrfa J. Ldpez Portillo M. de la Madrid (1970-1976) (1976-1982) (1982-1988)

Goals Defense of Defense of Defense of Civil Rights Civil Rights Civil Rights (U.S.-bom (U.S.-bora (Mex nationals) Chicanos/Mex Chicanos/Mex nationals) Nationals)

Enhancement Enhancement Enhancement of Mexican of Mexican of Mexican Culture Culture Culture

Participation Participation in U.S./Mex in U.S./Mex Relations Relations (immigration) (Chicanos as "communicators")

Business Links Business Links

Agents Residency Presidency Presidency SEP SEP SEP SRE" SRE SRE Comisidn Mixta CONAPO= de Enlace"

Stcrttarta it Educadin P6bBea (Miaisiry of EdaabOD)

Seartarta de Rehdona EsKriorts (Maastry ^ Futifcu Afbin)

Consejo NadonoJ de Pobtatidn (Minisny of liie Interiar)

Liakay (Mintsffy of Labv) 61

TABLE 1 - Continaed

Targets'

La Raza Unida Hispanic Commission Intellectuals

Alianza Federal Certain School de Mercedes Districts

iQQiS

Resource Resource Resource Tools Tools Tools

Capacity- Capacity Capacity Building Building Building Tools Tools Tools

Hortatory Hortatory Hortatory Tools Tools Tools

' Mexican governmental discourse on the targets of its policy include the Chicano population as a whole (U.S. born Chicanos and Mexican nationals). However, it has focused its attention on certain organizations during the period 1970- 1988. 62 defense of the civil rights of the Chicano comiaunity, the attainment of political support within the conununity, and the enhancing of the Mexican culture among the Mexican diaspora. Additionally, in the post-1970 period, new goals were defined, such as the fostering of Chicano participation in U.S.-Mexican relations, and the promotion of Chicano-Mexicano business links.

Civil Rights

Mexico's efforts to advocate the civil rights of the Mexican-origin community started immediately at the end of the war between Mexico and the U.S. on the grounds of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.^ The correspondence between the Consulates of Mexico in the Southwest, the Mexican embassy in Washington, D.C., and the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores

(Minister of Foreign Affairs) in Mexico during the second half of the 19th century accounted for these Mexican complaints.^ As early as 1849, Mexico's embassy in Washington, D.C. voiced its official protest, condemning "violent enmity and persecution" of Mexicans throughout the Southwest, and the lack of cooperation of U.S. authorities with Mexico.^ The denunciation of ill-treatment of Mexicans in the United States, including discrimination, lack of access to fair justice and segregation in schools, became part of the 63

Official discourse of the Mexican government from the mid-19th century on.* Such points configured the politicas de proteccion (policies designed to defend the civil rights of Mexican citizens abroad), which have been a constant characteristic of the policy toward the Mexican community in the United States. During the 1970s, a renovated effort in support of the civil rights of the Mexicans in the U.S. was initiated. In various speeches. Presidents Luis Echeverria and Jos6 L^pez Portillo included statements in favor of the access of the Chicano community to health, education, and a fair system of justice beyond the Mexican borders. Some of these speeches were delivered in the United States. Various examples illustrate the political discourse about civil rights. In June 1972, President Echeverria urged better treatment of Chicanos, specifically in teinns of educational opportunities in private talks with Richard Nixon and other high officials.® Later, in September 1979, President L6pez Portillo included the issue of Chicano civil rights in the agenda of his meeting with President James Carter.® Moreover, when L6pez Portillo returned from an official trip from the United States, he declared in his speech in the Palacio Nacional (the National Palace): "as a result of a passionate request on behalf of our Chicano brothers, I told the

President of the United States that we observed with much 64 concern that the rights to education, health and legal protection were denied to them [Chicanos]... and this

assessment was acknowledged However, these examples of presidential statements had no major consequences in terms of improving the defense of the civil rights of Chicanos. Furthermore, such declarations were portrayed by various U.S. officials as acts of interventionism, and used to criticized Mexico.® Although U.S. policy-makers did not make any official comment on Echeverria's statements, an infoirmed source observed a cold response to the Mexican petition.' In addition, according to some American sources, Jimmy Carter was "visibly annoyed" by Lopez Portillo's critical points, and replied to the Mexican President: "next time tell them [Chicano leaders] to get in touch directly with me."^°

In the early-1980s, certain changes in the political discourse on civil rights occurred. Because of an anti- immigrant ambience that prevailed in the United States," the Mexican government focused its attention on the rights of the Mexican nationals living in this country. President L6pez Portillo's regime argued that although immigration policy was an internal affair of any state, including the United States, it was necessary for Mexico to guarantee the rights of the Mexican workers residing in this country, regardless of their migratory status. He made his case by stating that these 65

rights were universal and protected by international law."^^

Attainment of Political Support

A second goal of the Mexican policy was to cultivate political support for the dominant political order within the Mexican diaspora in the United States. The diaspora was also seen as a possible source for political and in-kind resources to support certain political causes in Mexico. A precursory example occurred in the mid-19th century, during Benito Judrez's regime. The Mexican government sponsored the Juntas Patrioticas (Patriotic Groups) in California to raise money and recruit volunteers for the struggle against France. Later, the regimes of Porfirio Diaz and Victoriano Huerta also established links with Mexicans in the United States, and tried to neutralized the presence of their political opponents, such as Ricardo Floras Mag6n, within the community. Furthermore, by 1913, the Gobierno de la Convencion (Government of the Convention) also acknowledged the

importance of the Mexican-origin organizations as a source of economic resources and political clout." Most postrevolutionary governments, however, did not perceive that the Mexican community in the U.S. was such a key source for support, although this situation was modified in the late-1980s. The activism of the Mexican opposition 66

parties within the Chicano coromunity and the results of the presidential elections of 1988 that President Salinas won with only 50.3 of the votes fostered major changes.During the

transition between Miguel de la Madrid and Carlos Salinas's regimes, a major campaign to construct political links with the Mexican diaspora was designed. It was conceived as a "preventative measure" that sought to avoid Mexican leftist opposition to gain further economic support from the Mexican- origin community in the U.S. As Jos6 Angel Gutierrez stated, "the Mexican government understood that many anti-PRI Mexicans, who live in California, return periodically to their

communities and have influence there.""

Enhancement of Mexican Culture

The promotion of Mexican culture in the U.S. was the third goal of the Mexican policy toward Chicanos pursued from the mid-l9th century to the 1980s. During this time, the

Mexican government instructed its Consulates in the Southwest to become "the center of the socio-cultural activity" in the Chicano community." In the postrevolutionary period, numerous Mexican regimes stated the importance of supporting exhibitions and performances of Mexican artists in the U.S. The decade of the 1920's and 1930's was particularly active.

The Ministry of Foreign Relations conceived a program 67 entitled, Preservacion de la mexicanidad (Preservation of Mexicaness) that was to be implemented in the U.S. by the Mexican Consulates. The policy consisted of organizing and fomenting Mexican culture, commemorating patriotic dates and events and encouraging the teaching of Spanish and Mexican themes in Chicano communities." After these decades, the enhancement of Mexican culture was in low profile. The major event sponsored by the Mexican Consulates in the United States was the annual celebration of the fiestas patrias (the Mexican Independence Day celebrations). Such event was always attended by a minister of other high-ranking official." From the early-1970s on, a major change took place. Mexican administrations perceived that cultural and educational links with Chicanos were the optimal channel for interacting with this community." President Echeverria emphasized the commitment of the Mexican government in providing Chicanos with the resources they needed to preserve the Mexican culture and the Spanish language. In addition, he maintained that, through cultural activities, Mexicans from both sides of the border could make their links more profound.^® Their successors also committed themselves to this goal. For example, both Jos6 Ldpez Portillo and Miguel de la Madrid set into motion new initiatives toward the 68

Mexican diaspora, focused on cultural and educational matters.

Participation in U.S.-Mexican Relations

The decade of the 1970s also brought new goals to the Mexican agenda vis-^-vis Chicanos, including the promotion of their participation in key aspects of greater U.S.-Mexican relations.This goal, undoubtedly, assumed the increasing visibility and political clout of the Chicano community. As one Mexican high-level official argued in the late-1970s, "an anti-Mexican or even neutral Chicano movement could spell disaster on us, but on our side, they can be an important lobby."" Defying the principle of absolute non-intervention in the internal affairs of another country that characterized Mexican foreign policy, from the late-1970s on, certain Mexican policy-makers stressed that Chicanos were critical allies of

Mexico on one particular issue of the bilateral agenda with the United States: immigration.'* In this vein, in the 1980s, Mexican officials stated in their political discourse that "the best [for the rights of the Mexican undocumented workers in the U.S.] is the solidarity between Mexico and the communities of Mexican-origin."'® 69

Also emphasizing a new role for Chicanos, President Miguel de la Madrid underscored that the links between Mexico

and the Chicano community would "solidify and enrich a respectful and dignified friendship between Mexico and the U.S."'® De la Madrid admitted that although the Chicano community had its own interests, it may play the role of special "communicator" between Mexico and the U.S.'' According to his proposal, Chicano leaders could become better informed regarding Mexican affairs and transmit a more accurate account and images of Mexico to the American public and policy-makers."

Business Links

Another goal of the Mexican government in the period 1970-1988 was the promotion of business ties between Mexico and Chicanos. Luis Echeverria and Jos6 Lbpez Portillo stated this objective during their administrations." Furthemnore, Lopez Portillo made the directive that the possibilities for Chicano businessmen to invest in Mexico were discussed within the Comision Mixta de Enlace (Binational Outreach Commission), coordinated by the Secretaria del Trabajo (Minister of Labor). Subsequently, the development of business ties between Chicanos and Mexicans was a key goal in the most comprehensive memorandum on Chicanos elaborated during Miguel de la Madrid's 70

regime, the Proyecto de Acercamiento del Gobierno y Pueblo de Mexico con la Comunidad Mexico-Norteamericana (Linkage Program of the Government and People of Mexico toward the Mexican- American Community).'"

Agents

Certain characteristics of the political agents involved in the Mexican policy toward Chicanos are worth reviewing. First, the role that the Mexican presidents had in the crafting of the policy toward the Mexican-origin commxinity. Second, the number and capacities of a variety of governmental agencies that were in charge of Chicano issues.

The Presidency

After 1848, various Mexican presidents involved themselves in actions aimed at reaching out to the Chicano community. Presidents Jose Joaquin de Herrera and Alvaro 0breg6n, for example, promoted repatriation policies for Mexicans in the United States in times when the ambience in that country was particularly hostile to immigrants. In addition, during Benito Judrez and Venustiano Carranza's regimes, for example, certain efforts were pursued, to gain 71

the political support of the Mexican community beyond the border.

Contemporary Mexican Presidents were also actively involved in promoting links with the Chicano community. In the mid-1960s, a pioneer effort was conducted. President Adolfo Ldpez Mateos had meetings with members of the Chicano community in Los Angeles during an official visit to the U.S. By this action, he acknowledged the importance of the Mexico de ctfuera (Mexico abroad)." His successors, Luis Echeverria Jose L6pez Portillo and Miguel de la Madrid followed his path. From 1970 on, Mexican Presidents sought to enhance Mexico's outreach policy to the Chicano community in different ways. President Echeverria conducted the formulation of goals using an ad-hoc informal style. Conversely, Presidents Lbpez Portillo and de la Madrid aspired to institutionalize relations toward Chicanos through the Comision Mixta de Enlace (a forum created to develop a common agenda between the Mexican government and various Chicano/Latino organizations), and the interagency committee headed by the Consejo Nacional de Poblacion (National Council for Population, CONAPO), respectively. These presidential endeavors encountered certain problems. Luis Echeverria's ad-hoc efforts toward Chicanos had limited chances for following-up the projects launched. Jos6 72 Lopez Portillo's attempts to institutionalize consultations on immigration matters were not very successful in the end.

Meanwhile, Miguel de la Madrid's ambitious agenda was designed late in his term, and it did not fully materialize.^*

Ministries and other Agencies

Besides the involvement of Mexican presidents in outreach policies, other governmental agencies conducted their own

actions toward the Mexican-origin community in the United States—following the general directives stipulated by the presidency. As an example, early in the present century, Mexican support for the voluntary repatriation of Mexicans

living in the United States required an interagency effort which included the Secretaria de Agricultura (Ministry of Agriculture); the Secretaria de Fomento (Ministry of the Treasury), which became the Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico after 1917; and the Secretaria de Gobernacion (Ministry of the Interior). The Secretaria de Agricultura collaborated closely in the repatriation efforts through the allocation of lands, while the Secretaria de Fomento was in charge of providing traveling funds for repatriation." In addition, from the 1920s to the late-1940s, the Departmento de Repatriacion (Department for Repatriation) of the Secretaria de Gobernacion sponsored the returning of Mexican workers as 73 well as discouraged prospective immigrants—who did not have contracts— to work to the United States.^®

In the 1970s, the heads of the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes (Ministry of Communications and Transportation), the Secretaria de Educacion Priblica (Ministry of Public Education), and the Secretaria de la Presidencia (Ministry of the Presidency) pursue further ties with leaders of the Chicano community as a priority. President Echeverria personally issued a directive to these agencies.''' Later, during President L6pe2 Portillo's term, new mechanisms were created to achieve the outreach to Chicanos. For example, in the late-1970s, the Secretaria de Trabajo y Prevision Social" coordinated the work of the Comision Mixta de Enlace.Its agenda included immigration issues, and also cultural, educational and business matters. Moreover, in the early-1980s, the Mexican presidency gave directives to various high-ranking officials within the

Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores to reinforce the politicas de proteccion. As part of this change, Mexican Consulates in the U.S. obtained new resources in terms of budget and staff to help them implement this task.*° Later, the Secretaria de Educacion Piiblica strengthened its important role in promoting educational and cultural links. As a result, this agency developed new ties with a variety of Chicano cultural and educational institutions. 74 including numerous school districts, and became particularly instrumental in supporting bilingual education programs in the United States.*^ Moreover, during Miguel de la Madrid's term, the Secretaria. de Educacion Piiblica developed new functions in reaching out to Chicanos. A new bureau established in 1983, the Programa Cultural de las Fronteras (Cultural Program for the Borders), became one of the most active agencies. The first director, Alejandro Ordorica gave Chicano issues a top priority; he went beyond the mandate he received.

In 1987, President de la Madrid's administration sponsored a more ambitious endeavor toward Chicanos through CONAPO", an agency of the Secretaria de Gobernacxon. CONAPO elaborated the Proyecto de Acercamiento del Gobierno y Pueblo de Mexico con la Comunidad Mexico-Norteamericana that specified how Mexican federal and state governmental agencies could pursue further relations with Chicanos.** Among the agencies more permanently active on Chicano issues were the Consulates in the United States. In the postrevolucionary period, these Consulates promoted a variety of political, economic and cultural tasks. Because of their relative autonomy, however, some Consuls committed themselves more than others to promoting Mexican policy toward Chicanos. 75

One of the most active periods for Consulates was the Great Depression, specifically in terms of the defense of the civil rights issues. Mexican consuls, such as Rafael de la Colina in Los Angeles were in charge of the delicate task of aiding the repatriation of thousands of Mexicans." During the 1980s, the functions of the Consulates were reinforced. One the one hand, the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores invigorated the politicas de proteccion toward Mexican nationals in the U.S. As part of this effort, in 1980 a new bureau at the level of Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was created. This was the Direccion General de Proteccion (Bureau for Protection of Mexicans Abroad) which worked in close collaboration with the Consulates in the U.S. for the defense of the civil rights of Mexican nationals. On the other hand, the cultural activities of the Consulates were intensified by the end of the decade. The purpose was to promote the image of Mexico in the United States through the difussion of the best expressions of its art and culture.*'

At times, however, Mexican presidential directives on outreach policies to Chicanos faced the covert resistance of some high-ranking officials. During the 1980s, among the off- the-record arguments presented by certain policy-makers were: budgetary preoccupations, differences of agendas between the Mexican government and Chicano leadership, and a possible deterioration in the ties with the United States because of 76 Mexico's "Chicano connection."" Moreover, at times, there existed disputes between ministers regarding the agenda with

Chicanos that caused an stalemate in the policy-making.*'

Targets

From the mid-19th century on, the policy of the Mexican government toward Mexicans in the United States had numerous targets. This section focuses on two interrelated issues; the changes observed in the selection of such target populations, and the fluctuation of the images of Chicanos within the Mexican government.

U.S.-Born Chicanos or Mexican Immigrants

During the first decades after the U.S.-Mexican war (1846-1848), Mexican governmental documents usually referred to the Mexican-origin community in the United States as "Mexicans and their descendants." The place of birth and nationality of the Mexicans "left behind," did not seem to be a matter of concern for the Mexican authorities.®" In spite of this approach, from the late-19th century on, certain modifications in terms of the targets of Mexican policy could be observed. The Secretaria de Relaciones 77

Exteriores stated, at times, that the support of the Mexican government to civil rights in the United States should be focused upon those who maintained Mexican nationality.®"^

However, groups integrated by both Mexican nationals and U.S. citizens from Mexican descent were the targets of Mexican policy after 1848. Such targets included the organizations that emerged in times of conflict in Mexico—as the Juntas Patrioticas during the years of Judrez and the Juntas Constitucionalistas (Groups that supported Venustiano Carranza) during the Revolution. In addition, political associations related to opposition parties were also contacted by Mexican authorities. Such organizations, for example, provided a broad base of support for leaders like Ricardo Flores Mag6n, Francisco Villa, and later, independent candidate, Jose Vasconcelos.®^

In the postrevolucionary period, Mexico targeted key organizations within the colonia mexicana (the Mexican community), integrated by both Mexican nationals and U.S.-born Chicanos. They provided supplementary resources for the diffusion of Mexican cultural activities, and more specifically, additional economic aid to assist thousands of Mexicans deportees during the Great Depression in the United States." A major turning point in the selection of target populations occurred in the early-l940s. After the signing of 78 the bilateral agreements between the Mexican and U.S. governments on immigration, the Convenios Braceros (migratory agreements) the links with Mexican nationals were priority in

Mexican policy.'" However, in certain situations the Mexican Consulates in the United States were still involved in cases related to civil rights of U.S. citizens of Mexican descend. For example, during the Sleepy Lagoon Case and the Zoot Suit Riots in Los Angeles, the Mexican Consulate played an important role in the defense of the Chicanos involved.'® In the early-1970s, Mexican outreach policies were modified; U.S.-born Chicanos became a critical target. During President Luis Echeverrla's regime, the leaders who emerged from the Chicano movement, such as Jos^ Angel Gutierrez and Reies Lopez Tijerina, received preferential treatment.'® They also had a positive response vis-^-vis Mexico's outreach efforts and provided new ideas in terms of program development." Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, founder and leader of La Raza Unida Party, had privileged access to the Mexican Presidency. According to his own account, he discussed a variety of issues of mutual interest with President Echeverrla, from "moral and financial support" to immigration policy. Specifically, he successfully advocated the creation of educational programs for the Mexican-origin community to be funded by the Mexican government. He also suggested the establishment of a pioneer 79

program of scholarships for Chicanos to study Medicine and Social Sciences in Mexico.®® Reies L<3pez Tijerina, leader of the Alianza Federal de

Mercedes went further with his petitions. He requested the support of the Mexican government for his struggle to reclaim land grants in New Mexico. Such land grants had been taken from those Mexicans "left behind" in the U.S. after the 1846- 1848 war.®' Although President Echeverria stated his concern for the land grant struggle in New Mexico, he finally admitted that he was unable to fully support this cause further.®® In addition, Ldpez Tijerina advocated the idea of creating an Office of Chicano Affairs within the Mexican government that could deal with the increasingly complex Chicano-Mexican agenda.

A different approach in the selection of targets within the Chicano community emerged in the subsequent Mexican administration. President Jos6 Lopez Portillo took advantage of the fact that a new crop of moderate Chicano leadership and organizations—such as the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF), the National Council of la Raza (NCLR), as well as rejuvenated organizations as the League of Latin American Citizens (LULAC)—had developed a deeper and broader interest in foreign policy, including immigration and economic matters.®^ 80

This new interest of Chicano organizations in the international arena was exemplified by concrete actions. In the late-1970s, various Chicano/Latino leaders established an

umbrella organization, the Hispanic Commission" that dealt with immigration issues.®* Subsequently, this Commission accepted the invitation of the Mexican government to dialogue on this matter within the framework of the Comision Mixta, de Enlace.^' Moreover, during the 1980s, the Hispanic Caucus, LULAC, and the NCLR became interested in U.S. trade issues. In 1979, both LULAC and the NCLR proposed that Mexico be given the status of most favored nation by the United States.®®

In contrast to Jose L6pez Portillo, Miguel de la Madrid focused on a different set of targets. At the beginning of his administration, such targets were almost exclusively

Chicano intellectuals and artists.®' Later in his term, his programs enunciated certain efforts to reach out various political and economic organizations as well. However,

President de la Madrid's efforts were not always successful, since by the late-1980s, Chicano leaders expressed, at times, their "disenchantment" with Mexico. They questioned the possibilities of a meaningful political dialogue with a government that faced so many domestic conflicts. In 1988, Antonia Hernandez from MALDEF was quoted by the Wall Street Journal on de la Madrid's Proyecto de Acercamiento del

Gobierno y Pueblo de Mexico con la Comunidad Mexico- 81

Norteamericana stating that "they [Mexicans] have to get their house in order before they try to reach out to Chicanos."®®

The Portrayal of the Mexican Diaspora

Mexico's images and perspectives toward the Chicano community have been evolving from the mid-19th century on. After 1848, the community abroad was portrayed as a source of support and cooperation for Mexico." This positive attitude, however, changed with the dawn of the new century and the economic and historical forces that ensued. At this time, the sympathetic views of the Mexican community gave way to others of a different nature. As Mexican immigration to the United States escalated and millions of Mexicans permanently settled in the U.S., resentment from Mexico flourished. The Mexican press and certain Mexican officials voiced their concern and criticism on this issue. Writers and officials, expressing strong nationalistic sentiment, equated the process of emigrating to the United States with treacherous acts, or betrayal to one's country. Early Mexican writings at the onset of the Mexican Revolution revealed the changing attitudes toward Chicanos. Jose Vasconcelos and Martin Luis Guzman, two leading intellectual and high-ranking officials of post-revolutionary 82

Mexico, wrote disparagingly of the Chicano community they encountered in their travels and stays in Texas.'" The label pocho" was placed on Chicanos whom Mexicans

(including certain Mexican officials) believed consciously attempted to assimilate into U.S. society, at the expense of their Mexican roots.Many Mexicans alleged that Chicanos also had a condescending attitude toward their homeland. Later, class biases were incorporated into the stereotypes. Most Chicanos were thought to be descendants of working class Mexicans, since it was widely believed in Mexico that only the poor, the unskilled and the illiterate emigrated to the United States." In the 1980s, the Programa Cultural de las Fronteras undertook the difficult task of educating the Mexican pxablic on Chicano issues, especially on cultural manifestations. This Programa financed the publication of various manuscripts on Chicano history and culture, and founded the journal Cultura norte. Another interesting effort was the broadcasting in 1988 of a series of thirty television programs on Chicanos by Channel 11, the Mexico City cultural channel. These programs

* Pocho as a generalized symbolic and pejorative term for Chicanos became popularized throughout Mexico by the 1940s. In fact, pocho was the most employed Mexican label for Chicanos until the late-1960s. Monsivais. Interview by author, 12 February 1993. 83

included interviews, reports and parts of Chicano documentaries and films.'*

Tools

Mexico's outreach policy toward the Chicano community implemented different tools from the mid-19th century to the 1980s. They provided new resources and capacities, or appealed to the beliefs and values shared by Chicanos and Mexicans. Among the resource tools are: the granting of

resources for voluntary repatriation to Mexico, and the fomenting of business links between Chicanos and Mexicans (from the 1970s on). Regarding capacity-building tools, Mexican policy-makers provided assistance with a variety of legal procedures on civil rights for Mexicans in the U.S., promoted extensive programs oriented at the enhancement of Mexican culture beyond the Rio Bravo, and cosponsored the creation of Chicano political associations that supported the Mexican government. Finally, Mexico frequently used hortatory tools that alluded to the past it shared with the Mexican- origin community in the United States.

Resource Tools

Voluntary repatriation to Mexico was a tool implemented 84

by the Mexican government in the aftermath 1846-1848 war against the United States. In August 1848, President Jos^ Joaquin de Herrera issued a decree to attract Mexicans in the

Southwest back to Mexico. He sent three Comlsarios (special envoys), directly funded by the Office of the Presidency, to the United States border states, who announced the details of a voluntary repatriation program to Mexicans living in the United States. The Mexican government offered transportation and public lands in Mexico to those Mexicans willing to return." As a consequence, several groups of Mexicans returned to Mexico. Some of them migrated from Texas to Coahuila in 1853, and from Arizona and California to Sonora in 1878."^® Also, the Mexican government supported the establishment of new border towns on the Mexican side, such as Nuevo Laredo in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas, populated by people that used to reside in the United States.'"'

Later, the period of the consolidation of the Mexican Revolution coincided with new efforts to promote repatriations. This was a major task, taking into account the great niambers of Mexicans (more than 10% of the population) who had emigrated to the United States because of the country's economic and political problems of the country during the 1910s and 1920s. These efforts coincided with a 85

period of discrimination against Mexicans in the United States.

During the 1930s—the years of the Great Depression in

the United States—more than 300,000 Mexicans were forced to return to Mexico. As a response, the Mexican government announced the allocation of land; the right to import their personal belongings duty free, including work tools and cattle; and the access to repatriation loans." Unfortunately, the lack of reliable figures does not permit an accurate evaluation of the results of all of these governmental efforts and the numbers of individuals who actually returned to Mexico permanently.'" From the 1940s through the 1970s, Mexico did not support the voluntary repatriation of Mexicans from the united states. However, Mexican authorities provided supplementary funds when the U.S. government conducted massive deportations of Mexican undocumented workers, such as in the mid-1950s. It was not until the 1980s that strong statements favoring the voluntary repatriation of Mexicans were made again during President de la Madrid's administration. This change coincided with a hostile environment in the United States against Mexican immigration. Specifically, the U.S. Congress was about to pass a new and more restrictive immigration law (the Simpson-Rodino Act).'^ However, neither 86 a major deportation of Mexicans by U.S. authorities nor a massive voluntary repatriation of Mexicans ever took place. A different kind of resource tool was the support of projects to create Chicano-Mexicano business ties. President Lopez Portillo, for example, promoted a pioneer economic meeting in Ciudad Juarez in 1978. The participants in this event were Mexican businessmen and officials as well as small businessmen and members of community development corporations from California, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas and Utah.®" After that meeting, however, the encouragement of business ties was part of the political discourse, but no specific actions were taken.

Capacity-building Tools

The involvement of Mexican authorities on different civil rights cases is an example of capacity-building tools. At the turn of the century. Consul General Rafael de Negris in San Francisco stated his concern before California governor William D. Stephens regarding the segregation of Chicanos in schools.®® Years later, Consul Enrique Ferreira in San Diego helped out in the historic Lemon Grove incident also related to segregation in schools.®® Ferreira advised the colonia mexicana in filing the case of "Roberto Alvarez v. Lemon Grove

School District" in 1931. In addition, by that time, various 87

consulates subscribed to the findings of a team of Mexican and Mexican American educators that asserted that segregation held back the educational progress of Mexican-origin children in

the United States and deprived them of the opportunity to live "in harmony" with other groups.®"'

The number of cases related to violations of the civil rights of Mexican nationals in the U.S. in which the Mexican

government intervened was unusually high in the 1980s. The Mexican Consulates in the U.S. managed 5,811 cases in 1983 and 11, 271 in 1985.*® During those years, Mexico reinforced its ties with certain Chicano organizations, such as MALDEF, which worked closely with the Mexican Consulates in order to provide a better legal response.®'

The numerous cultural projects sponsored by the Mexican government were another example of capacity-building tools. In the 1920s, the postrevolutionary governments implemented an important program entitled, Preseirvacion de la mexicanidad through the Mexican Consulates in the U.S. This program sought to promote and exhibit art works that depicted and extolled the Mexican reality,including those by the famous muralists, Jos6 Clemente Orozco, Diego Rivera, and David Alfaro Siqueiros. Such artistic manifestations were shown in the United States, especially in cities such as Chicago and San Antonio, which were highly populated by

Mexicans. 88

During the 1960s, there existed a resurgence in Mexican efforts to promote Mexican culture in the United States. As an example, in 1964 President Adolfo L6pez Mateos, after his visit to California, established a fund to sponsor the teaching of Mexican arts and crafts, music and dancing in the Instituto Hexicano Norteamericano de Intercambio Cultural (Mexican-North American Institute for Cultural Exchange) of Los Angeles.'^ After 1970, Mexican administrations from Luis Echeverrla to Miguel de la Madrid funded a variety of cultural and educational programs.'^ During President Echeverrla's regime, numerous Mexican artists exhibited their works and performed for Chicano audiences." In addition, the Instituto Cultural in San Antonio, Texas was inaugurated. And, moreover, the Office of the Presidency even financed a full-length commercial film, Raices de Sanare (Roots of Blood), which dealt with the relationship between Mexicans and Chicanos on the border.'" Later, the Programa Cultural de las Fronteras, established by President de la Madrid in 1983, co-sponsored several academic events that included the participation of Chicano intellectuals and artists. Among them was the Chicano Encounter (Chicano Encounter), the first institutionalized academic meeting between Chicano and Mexican scholars.'®

Also, the Programa Cultural supported the Encuentro de 89

Literatura Mexicana (Mexican Literature Encounter), which was attended by many Chicano as well as Mexican writers."®

Furthermore, during Miguel de la Madrid's term, the Consejo Nacional de Poblacion also provided resources for seminars, piiblications, and art exhibitions related to Chicanos.®' This agency sponsored the symposium on Mexican immigration to the U.S., the Chicano community and the Simpson-Rodino Act entitled, "Los principales aspectos demograficos, sociales, politicos y culturales de la comunidad mexicano-americana y la ley Simpson-Rodino" (The Principal Demographic, Social, Political and Cultural Aspects of the Mexican-American Community and the Simpson-Rodino Law) held in 1988, and also published important books on Chicano economic, political and cultural affairs." In terms of education, the decade of the 1970s was particularly active. President Echeverria funded about 150 Chicano medical and social science students to study in Mexico. Later, a formal scholarship program, Becas para Aztlan (Scholarships for Aztlan), was established by the Mexican government." His successor, Jos6 L6pe2 Portillo sponsored ambitious projects on bilingual education^"® that included the training of Chicano bilingual teachers in Mexico and the supplying of books and other educational materials in

Spanish to certain school districts. In 1981, a pioneer group of 110 Mexican bilingual teachers was sent to Los Angeles to 90 work closely with Chicano educators. Furthermore, extensive books and other cultural materials were donated by the Secretcuria de Educacion Piiblica to libraries, educational centers, and specifically to Chicano Studies programs at the universities throughout the Midwest and Southwest.

Several Summer courses for Chicano educators in Mexico were promoted during President de la Madrid's term. More than 200 teachers and school administrators from California, Illinois and Texas attended such courses. Also, in 1986, the

Secretaria de Educacion Publica sponsored the Primer Semineirio Internacional sobre Educacion Bilingue y Bicultural (First International Seminar on Bilingual and Bicultural Education)

On capacity-building tools, the Mexican government also conducted various efforts on the political realm. In the second half of the 19th century, for example, the Mexican government inspired the creation of the Juntas Patrioticas within the Mexican-origin community, which "raised money, recruited volunteers, located arms for purchase and organized activities in favor of the Liberal Republic," and against the French invasion. During the Revolution of 1910, various Mexican governments promoted the establishment of groups of followers beyond the Rio Bravo. Many political leaders, such as Francisco I. Madero—and even his opponent Victoriano Huerta— 91

were in close contact with the Chicano community searching for material and political support. Later, Venustiano Carranza's

regime sponsored the Juntas Constitucionalistas (groups that supported the Constitution of 1917) in El Paso, Los Angeles, San Antonio, San Diego y Calexico. These organizations, besides raised funds, and recruited men, constituted a network for gathering information.^®* A new kind of capacity building tool was established in

the 1970s, Mexican governments encouraged the

participation of Chicanos in issues of the U.S-Mexican agenda. As an example. President Echeverria met with the Chicano

leadership frequently to discuss the developments of the U.S- Mexico agenda. Moreover, President L6pez Portillo created a forum (the Comision Mixta de Enlace) where the political clout of the Chicano/Latino leadership of various organizations on immigration matters was acknowledged.It is worth noting that according to Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, the access to the Mexican presidency was "a tool of leverage [vis-^-vis the United States] not previously available" for Chicanos and "an educational process in the exercise of political power and international affairs.

Hortatory Tools

Besides the use of tools that provided new resources or 92

capacities, the Mexican government frequently utilized hortatory tools that referred to shared common values. By the

mid-1920s, for example. Consul Rafael Aveleyra in Los Angeles supported the creation of the Conf&deracion de Asociaciones Mexicanas (Confederation of Mexican Associations), an umbrella organization of "social and recreational" groups to celebrate

the Mexican heritage.^"' The celebration of the fiestas patrias was also an opportunity to preserve Mexican traditions and culture. Such events also opened up new opportxinities for the Mexican authorities to educate themselves about the Chicano community and promote the common heritage.^®' From the 1960s up to the mid-1980s, most members of the Cabinet traveled to various cities of the U.S. to preside during the celebration of the quince de septiembre (Mexican Independence Day).^®' For example, Luis Echeverria, as Secretario de Gobernacion (Minister of the Interior), attended the quince de septiembre ceremony at least twice in U.S. Midwestern and Southwestern cities. On these occasions, he expressed his admiration to the community and pointed out that he was impressed with the patriotism of the Mexicans in Los Angeles. In their political discourse, several postrevolutionary presidents of Mexico used symbolic tools to outreach the

Chicano community. President L6pez Mateos stated in one of

his official trips to the United States, "I know that you 93

[Chicanos] have the blood and the soul of the spirit of Mexico in your veins.Several years later, Echeverria reiterated the "profound ethnic and cultural links""* that existed between Chicanos and Mexico. In the same vein, his successor, Jose Lopez Portillo mentioned frequently to

Chicanos that "the doors of this country [Mexico] are opened" for them."-^

Conclusion

From the 19th century to the 1980s, a variety of connections between the Chicano community and Mexico were established. The purpose of this chapter was to discuss key aspects of the Mexican outreach toward this community. Certain concepts from the siibfield of policy design (goals, agents, targets and tools) were used as analytical constructs of analysis. From the study conducted, several conclusions can be drawn. First, the Mexican administrations enunciated five main goals regarding the Chicano community. One of the most important was the defense of the civil rights of Mexicans in the U.S. From the mid-19th century on, Mexico constantly expressed its obligation to protect the rights of those Mexicans "left behind." During periods of nativism in the

United States, Mexico restated the same goal, especially 94 toward Mexican nationals residing in the United States. The enhancement of Mexican culture in the United States was a second goal of contemporary Mexican policy from the 19th century to the 1980s. This goal is based on the assumption that Mexico has the right to maintain and disseminate Mexican cultural manifestations outside its borders. The attainment political support was the third important goal. During all major political events in Mexico, including the French intervention and the Revolution of 1910, the Mexican governments made considerable efforts to gain the support of the Mexican-origin community from North of the border. Later, the consolidation of the ruling of one-party after 1929, and the remarkable stability gained by the political system, made unnecessary the pursuit of this goal. After the presidential elections of 1988, however, this goal resurfaced again. Its main objective was to deter the influence of the Mexican opposition parties abroad. Regarding the fostering of Chicano involvement in U.S.­ Mexican relations, and the construction of business links between Mexico and Chicanos, several statements on these themes can be found after the 1970s. President Jos§ L6pe2 Portillo considered Chicano leaders as potential political allies of the Mexican government on immigration. His successor, Miguel de la Madrid, stated that Chicanos were crucial in the promotion of a better image of Mexico in the 95

United States. Both presidents also stressed the importance of promoting business ties with the Mexican community in the

United States. Second, in terms of agents, the Mexican Presidents were the most important single agent in Chicano-Mexicano relations from the 19th century to the 1980s. They personally crafted important policies regarding the Chicano commxinity, and also designated certain agencies and bureaus from the executive branch to deal with Chicano affairs. Generally speaking, the

Mexican presidents adopted an ad-hoc style. They dealt with Chicano issues one by one, sending directives to specific governmental agencies. In the contemporary period, however, the Mexican presidents following Luis Echeverria experimented with a variety of approaches that sought to institutionalize the policy dealing with Chicano issues. During Presidents L6pez Portillo and de la Madrid's terms, an increasing number of high-ranking Mexican bureaus and agencies were involved in Chicano affairs. Besides some of the cultural bureaus within the Secretaria de Educacion Publica and Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores that traditionally were key participants in Chicano-Mexicano relations, other agencies played a key role, including the Secretaria del Trabajo and the Secretaria de Gobernacion. Third, looking at target populations, during the mid-19th century and early this century, the attention of the Mexican 96 policy seemed to be focused on the Mexican-origin population as a whole, since was very difficult to make a distinction regarding the place of birth; later, this situation changed. In this century, after the 1940s, the efforts of the Mexican government to protect civil rights were mainly focused on

Mexican nationals residing in the United States. Yet, both Mexican nationals and U.S.-born Chicanos were the targets of other goals, such as the enhancing of Mexican culture in the U.S., and the promotion of business with Mexico. Regarding participation in U.S.-Mexican relations, the organizations of the American-born Chicanos were the main focus of the Mexican government, since they were seen potential allies in certain bilateral issues, such as immigration and trade. It is worth noting that the portrayal of the targets of the Mexican policies changed dramatically during the present decade. Once considered pochos by certain Mexican policy­ makers, Chicanos in the U.S., including U.S. citizens, became potential political allies of the Mexican government. At times, the Mexican government also launched specific programs designed to change attitudes in Mexico vis-^-vis the Mexican community in the U.S. The efforts of the Programa Cultural de las Fronteras were certainly successful. Fourth, a variety of political tools were used by Mexican officials to reach out to the Chicano community. In spite of certain obstacles, many tools that provided new resources and 97 capacities were implemented as well as those that appealed to common values. Many of these tools were designed for specific segments of the Chicano community; yet, as in the case of cultural and educational projects, they benefit ed the Mexican-American community at large. 98

NOTES

1. Angela Moyano, Antoloala de la Proteccidn Consular a Mexicanos en Estados Unidos. 1849-1900 (Mexico; Secretarla de Relaciones Exteriores, 1989) p. 10. 2. For example, the Mexican consul in San Francisco protested against the Foreign Miner's Tax Law in 1850 as a violation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexico-Norte Americano Foreign Relations," p. 20. 3. Interestingly, the usual response of the American government to the Mexican protests emphasized that the members of the Mexican-origin community had to place their complaints before U.S. authorities first, instead of asking for the Mexican government's help. David Weber, Foreigners in Their Native Land (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973), p. 151; Moyano. Antoloala de la Proteccidn. pp. 17-20.

4. Ibid. Gomez-Quinones, "Piedras contra la Luna," p. 19; and Patricia Morales, Indocumentados mexicanos (Mexico: Editorial Grijalvo, 1982) pp. 40-50. 5. Frank del Olmo, "Problem-Solving Lies with Chicanos, Echeverrla Says," Los Angeles Times. 22 June 1972, p. 3.

6. Alan Riding, Distant Neighbors (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), p. 475. 7. Jos6 L6pez Portillo, "Dignidad y Confianza en Mexico". Paper published by Comity del PRI en el D.F., 1 October 1979, pp. 4, 5. Cited en Jose Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexicano-Norte Americano," pp. 29-30. 8. Riding, Distant Neighbors, p. 485. 9. Frank del Olmo, "Problem-Solving Lies with Chicanos, Echeverrla Says," Los Angeles Times. 22 June 1972, p. 3. 10. Riding, Distant Neighbors, p. 475.

11. David Vidal, "Hispanic Americans Meet Mexico Leader," New York Times. 28 September 1979, p. 11. 12. "Inmigracion Asunto Crucial," Excelsior. 30 November 1977, p. 10. 99

13. Gdmez-Quinones, "Piedras contra la Luna," p. 32. 14. Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter Smith, Modern Latin America. 3rd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 251.

15. Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, interview by Denise Dresser, June 19, 1991, Los Angeles, Calif. Cited in Dresser, "La nueva politica mexicana en Estados Unidos," pp. 15-21.

16. Ibid., p. 17. 17. Carlos Monsivais, interview by author, San Diego, California, 12 February 1987. 18. David R. Maciel, "The Two Mexicos," pp. 4-6; and "Leaders Say Goodby After Colorful Fiesta," San Dieao Union. 23 February 1964. p. 1.

19. Gonzdlez Gutierrez, "The Mexican Diaspora," p. 234. 20. "Texto Complete del Informe de LE," Excelsior. 20 June 1972, pp. 7, 15. 21. Armando Gutierrez, "The Chicano Elite in Chicano-Mexicano Relations in Chicano-Mexicano Relations^" p. 16; and Joe Keenan, "Harnessing Hispanic Power," in Mexico Journal (Mexico City) 20, 22 February 1988, p. 17. During the la Madrid's term, the pursuing of this goal was interpreted as an attempt to "depoliticize the relationship [of the Mexican government] with Chicanos to limit it to cultural and social contacts." Juan M. Vdzquez, "Mexico-Chicano Political Dialogue Fades," Los Anaeles Times. 12 August 1983, pp. 117-118. 22. Before 1971, the idea to involve Chicanos in U.S.-Mexican relations was not openly discussed in the Mexican government. The only exception is President Adolfo L<5pez Mateos's speech in Los Angeles in 1964. Then, he stated, "we are confident that the existence of numerous groups of Mexicans and Mexican descend in the U.S. will be a factor of understanding between the two countries. Carlos Denegri, "Mensaje a los mexicanos de E.U.," Excelsior. 23 February 1964, p. 1. 23. Marlise Simons, "Mexico in Shift, Beginning to Court Chicano Movement, Washington Post. 3 March 1978, p. A-16. 24. "Inmigraci6n asunto crucial,". Excelsior. 30 November 1977, p. 10. 100

25. Roberta Lajous, "Reunion de Consules Generales," PROA. Publicacion de la Asociaci6n del Servicio Exterior Mexicano 10, (1982) pp. 34-37.

26. "MMH: los Chicanos puente para afianzar la amistad con EU," La Jornada. 20 June 1987, p. 1.

27. Ibid., p. 1.

28. See, "Discurso Pronunciado por el Lie. Miguel de la Madrid ante Intelectuales Chicanos, el 3 de Marzo de 1982," Mexico D.F., p. 4. Cited in Armando Gutierrez, "The Chicano Elite," p. 59. These kinds of ideas were shared by other members of the Cabinet, Mexican official from the Direccidn General de Relaciones Internacionales, Secretaria de Educacion Publica, interview by author, 25 July 1989, Mexico City. 29. According to Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, a key participant in Chicano dialogue with Mexico, this was an important goal of Mexican policy toward Chicanos. Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexicano-Norteamericano," p. 31.

30. Consejo Nacional de Poblaci6n, Proyecto de Acercamiento del Gobierno y Pueblo de Mexico con la Comunidad M6xico- Norteamericana^ (Mexico; Consejo Nacional de Poblacidn, 1987), pp. 22-23. 31. Moyano, Antoloala de la Protecci6n. p.10; and Lawrence Cardoso, Mexican Immigration to the United States.1897- 1931 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1980), pp. 99- 103. 32. "Leaders Say Goodby After Colorful Fiesta," San Diego Union. 23 February 1964. p. 1. Regarding this presidential visit to Los Angeles, see, Rafael Ibanez, Adolfo L6pez Mateos en el Mexico de Afuera (Mexico: Paginas del Siglo XX, 1964). 33. Consejo Nacional de Poblaci6n. Proyecto de Acercamiento del Gobierno de Mexico con la Comunidad M6xico- Norteamericana p. 6.

34. Interview with a high-ranking official from the Subsecreataria de Asuntos Bilaterales, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, interview by author, Mexico City, 19 June 1996. 101

35. Moyano. Antoloala de la Proteccionf p 24. 36. Cardoso, Mexican Immigration. pp. 99-103.

37. Jorge Bustamante, as personal advisor of the President, also had a key role in setting the goals and direction of the policy toward Chicanos. Armando Gutierrez, "The Chicano Elite," p. 51. 38. This agency was in charge of conducting a study of Mexican immigration to the U.S. through the Centro Nacional de Informaci6n y Estadlstica de Trabajo (CENIET). The CENIET carried out the most comprehensive research project on emigration ever conducted in Mexico. Centro Nacional de Informaci6n y Estadlstica de Trabajo. Andlisis de alounos resultados de la primera encuesta a trabaiadores mexicanos no documentados devueltos de los Estados Unidos (Mexico: CENIET, 1979). 39. In September 1979, President Jos^ L6pez Portillo established the Comisi6n Mixta de Enlace, an ad-hoc task force oriented to institutionalize the links of the Mexican government with Chicanos. Guido Belssaso, a top aide of the Secretario del Trabajo, Pedro Ojeda Paullada, became the General Coordinator of this Comisi6n. Marlise Simons, "U.S. Hispanics Petition Mexican Leader" Los Angeles Times. 27 September 1979, p. 12.

40. David R. Maciel, "An Unwritten Alliance; Mexican Policy on Immigration to the United States," in The World and I. Chronicle of Our Changing Times 7 (1986), pp. 695-699. 41. As a result of the agreement between the Mexican and Chicano members of the Comisi6n Mixta de Enlace in 1980, the Secretario de Educaci6n Publica initiated contacts with the Association of Mexican American Educators in order to collaborate in such programs. Armando Gutierrez, "The Chicano Elite," p. 52. 42. Mexican official from the Programa Cultural de las Fronteras, interview by author, 28 July 1989, Mexico City.

43. The Consejo Nacional de Poblaci6n is in charge of demographic studies. 102

44. Consejo Nacional de Poblacidn. Proyecto de Acercamiento del Gobierno de Mexico con la Comunidad M^xico- Norteamericana. p. 6. 45. Francisco E. Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982) pp. 30-35. 46. Ibid., pp. 37-40, 42. 47. Jorge Alberto Lozoya, "La cooperaci6n cultural y la polltica exterior de Mexico," in La polltica internacional de M6xico en el decenio de los ochenta. ed., C6sar Sepulveda (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1994), p. 469. 48. Armando Gutierrez, "The Chicano Elite in Chicano-Mexicano Relations," pp. 50-51; Chicano as an Ethnic Lobby; Limits and Possibilities; Limits and Possibilities, p. 407. The question of the budgetary concerns were pointed out by a former President of Mexico in an interview with the author. Mexico City, 22 July 1994.

49. Interview with a high-ranking official from the Secretarla de Relaciones Exteriores, interview by author, Mexico City, 19 June 1996. 50. Consejo Nacional de PoblacicSn, Proyecto de Acercamiento del Gobierno de Mexico con la Comunidad M6xico- Norteamericana. pp. 5-35.

51. Carta de Eleuterio Avila, Oficial Mayor de la Secretarla de Relaciones Exteriores a Manuel Escalante, cdnsul de Mexico en Tucson. Mexico, 2 December 1878. Cited in Moyano, Antologla, p. 103.

52. Victoria Lerner, "Los exiliados de la Revoluci6n Mexicana y la comunidad chicana (1915-1930)" in El Mexico olvidado; la historia del pueblo chicano, David R. Maciel (ed.). Ciudad Judrez/El Paso: Universidad Autdnoma de Ciudad Judrez/ University of Texas at El Paso, 1996. pp. 46-51. See also, Gdmez-Quinones, "Notes on the Interpretation," p. 420. 53. Lerner, "Los exiliados," pp. 37-40, 42. 54. Remedies G6mez Arnau, Mexico y la protecci6n de sus nacionales en Estados Unidos (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Aut<5noma de Mexico, 1990), pp. 156-160. 103

55. Armando Gutierrez, "The Chicano Elite," p. 47. 56. Celeste Durand, "Officials Turn Out to Welcome Mexican President, Wife to L.A." Los Angeles Times. 20 June 1972, p. 3. 57. The interest of Chicanos in the support of the Mexican government had its critics, certain Chicano leaders expressed opposition to the establishment of closer relations with the Mexican government. C^sar Chavez, leader of the United Farm Workers union, and Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales, leader of La Raza Unida Party, were among those who initially did not perceive any major advantages for the Chicano movement in cultivating closer links with their homeland. Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexicano-Norte Americano Relations," p. 30. In addition, in the early-1970s, some groups linked to La Raza Unida Party openly criticized specific authoritarian activities of the Mexican government, such as the repression of Mexican students in 1968 and 1971 and of the continued incarceration of "political prisoners" in Mexico. "No bastan carteles hay que sostener tesis," Excelsior. 20 June 1972, p. 1. 58. Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, Mexicanos y Chicanos. Paper presented as part of the symposium "Encuentro Chicano," at the Palacio de Minerla, Mexico, 1986. p. 11; "Avance," Ciencia y Desarrollo 21 (July-August 1978), p. 73; de la Garza, "Chicanos and the U.S." (1980) p. 571; and Jose Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexicano-Norte Americano," p. 24. 59. Rodolfo de la Garza and Karl Schmitt, "Texas Landgrants and Chicano-Mexican Relations," Latin America Research Review: 1, 1986, pp. 75-78. 60. Specifically, L6pez Tijerina requested President Luis Echeverria to sponsor the creation of a United Nations task-force on the land grant issue. At first, President Echeverria offered his support to Reies L6pez Tijerina's struggle on the land grants in New Mexico, although later he expressed that Mexico was not able to offer help since the Tratados de Bucareli. signed between Mexico and the United States in 1923, had settled all kinds of land reclamations between the two countries. Reies L6pez Tijerina, Mi lucha por la tierra (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1978), pp. 544, 548, 549. 61. Ibid., pp. 555-556. 104 62. In this scenario, by the late-1970s, such "moderate" organizations as LULAC, MALDEF and NCLR monopolized the dialogue with Mexico, excluding the "traditional" leaders of the Chicano movement that used to enjoy a close relation with the Mexican government. Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexicano-Norte Americano," p. 32.

63. Ten Chicano/Latino organizations integrated the Hispanic Commission. Christine Sierra, "The Political Transfomnation of a Minority Organization, the Council of la Raza 1965-1980" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1983) p. 258. 64. According to Guido Belssaso, General Coordinator of the Comision Mixta de Enlace, the Hispanic Commission recognized the danger of restrictive U.S. immigration bills, since this type of legislation would act as "an incentive for racist employers to deny Chicanos job opportunities." Guido Belsasso, "Undocumented Mexican workers in the U.S.: A Mexican Perspective" in Mexico and the U.S. Robert McBride ed. (New York: Prentice Hall, 1978), p. 134. 65. Simons, "U.S. Hispanics Petition," p. 12. 66. Jos^ Angel Gutierrez, Mexicanos y Chicanos. pp. 21-28; David Vidal, "Hispanic Americans Meet Mexico Leader," New York Times. 28 September 1979, p. 11.

67. Vazquez, "Mexico-Chicano Political Dialogue Fades," pp. 117-118. 68. Diana Solis and Alfredo Corchado, "Mexico Looks for Friends among the Family," Wall Street Journal. 4 January 1988, p. 14.

69. Juan Gomez-Quinones, "Notes of an interpretation of the relations between the Mexican community in the United States and Mexico," pp. 434-36. 70. Cited by Juan Bruce-Novoa, "Chicanos in Mexican literature" in Missions in Conflict (Tubingen: Narr, 1986), p. 57. Years later, in one of the most read and discussed books in Mexico, The Labyrinth of Solitude, noted writer, Octavio Paz, reiterated his compatriots sentiments. Octavio Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude (New York, 1961), pp. 12-13. 105

71. Carreras de Velasco points out that "it is a well-known fact that for the repatriated Mexicans, the desire to return to the U.S. was a normal state of affairs...This situation coupled with the differences in costumes and dress between stay-at-home Mexicans, and of the repatriated Mexicans, created a climate of tension between the two groups. The former were unwilling to accept any claimed superiority on the part of the latter, and would call the assimilated Mexican Americans "ayanlcados" or "gringos." Mercedes Carreras de Velasco, Los mexicanos que devolvid la crisis (Mexico; Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1974), p. 124. 72. Juan Gomez Quinones, Chicano Politics (Albuquerque, 1992), pp. 203-204 73. Mexican official from the Programa Cultural de las Fronteras, interview by author, 28 July 1989, Mexico City.; and "Encuentro Chicano-Mexico 1987," Cultura Norte 4 (February-April 1988), p. 6. 74. "Televisi6n para Chicanos," Cultura Norte 5 (May-July 1988), p. 18. 75. Moyano, Antoloala de la Protecci6n. pp. 10, 17-20. 76. Cardoso, Mexican Immigration to the United States. p. Gr­ and Moyano, Antoloaia de la Proteccion. pp. 163-189.

77. Weber, Foreigners. pp. 142-143. 78. Specifically, President Alvaro Obregbn's regime revitalized governmental efforts in favor of voluntary repatriation. Obregbn stated that "the Mexican government will spend all the money necessary to repatriate Mexicans who are unemployed in the United States." Following these guidelines, a group of workers located in the Arizona Salt River Valley, whose contracts had been broken by growers, were brought back to Mexico with governmental funds. Cardoso^ Mexican Immigration. pp. 99-103.

79. Ibid., p.142. 80. Carreras de Velasco, Los Mexicanos que Devolvid la Crisis, p. 138. 81. G6mez Arnau, Mexico y la protecci6n. p. 143. 106

82. This piece of legislation was the result of a process initiated in early 1970s. Many hearings were held in Congress during the 1970s and 1980s in which immigration proposals were discussed. See, for example. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Summary of Hearings Held by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983). 83. Barbara K. Strickland, "Simpson Rodino, 1987-1988: ibomba que no estallo?" in Mexico-Estados Unidos.1987 eds. Gerardo M. Bueno y Lorenzo Meyer (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1989), pp. 26-42. 84. Jose Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexicano- Norteamericano," pp. 32-33.

85. Rafael de Negris to William D. Stephens, 7 June 1919 in National Archives, Department of State, Record group 59, 311.12\422. Cited in Francisco Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza. p. 56.

86. Secretarla de Relaciones Exteriores. Memoria de la Secretarla de Relaciones Exteriores 1930-1931 Presentada al H. Congreso de la Unidn. Vol.2. Mexico, pp. 1782-1786. 87. Ibid., pp. 1782-1786, 1791-1794. 88. Gomez Arnau, Mexico v la protecci6n. pp. 174-175; and Maciel, "An Unwritten Alliance," pp. 677-699. 89. "Organizaciones Chicanas piden al gobierno de Mexico defienda con una actitud m^s agresiva a los ilegales," Uno m^s uno. 23 June 1987, p. 6. 90. David Maciel and Maria Rosa Garcia, "El Mexico de afuera: politicas mexicanas de protecci6n," Revista Mexicana de Polltica Exterior 3:12 (July-September 1986) pp. 14-32.

91. Carlos Denegri, "Mensaje a los Mexicanos de E.U." Excelsior. 23 February 1964, p. 1. 92. Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexicano-Norte Americano," pp. 32-33; "Avance," Ciencia y Desarrollo 21 (July-August 1978), p. 73. 93. Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, Mexicanos y Chicanos. p. 14. 107

94. Jesus Trevino, "Raices de Sangre. First Feature Film Directed by a Chicano," SOMOS (June-July 1978) pp. 16-19. 95. In 1986, the Programa Cultural and the Chicano Studies Program at the National University (UNAM), with the support of the Office of the President organized the Encuentro Chicano. President de la Madrid and key members of his cabinet inaugurated this event at the National University (UNAM). "Chicanos," Cultura Norte 4 (February-April 1988), p. 6. 96. Mexican official from the Programa Cultural de las Fronteras, interview by author; and "Encuentro Chicano- Mexico 1987," Cultura Norte 4 (February-April 1988), p. 6. 97. Mexican official from the Programa Cultural de las Fronteras, interview by author, 28 July 1990, Mexico City. 98. David Maciel and Jos6 Guillermo Saavedra, eds., A1 Norte de la Frontera; El Pueblo Chicano (Mexico: Consejo Nacional de Poblacidn, 1988). 99. Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, Mexicanos y Chicanos. p. 11. 100. Mexican Official from the Direccidn General de Relaciones Internacionales, Secretaria de Educacidn Piiblica, interview by the author, Mexico City, 28 August 1989.

101. Ibid. 102. Ibid. 103. The tradition of celebration of the cinco de mayo (May 5) the anniversary of the major Mexican victory over the French army came from that time. Gomez Quinones. "Piedras contra la Luna," pp. 8,32. 104. G6mez-Quinones, "Piedras contra la Luna," p.32. 105. Simons, "U.S. Hispanics Petition Mexican Leader," p. 12. 106. Jos6 Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexicano-Norte Americano," p. 27. 107. Balderrama, In Defense of La Raza. p. 56. 108

108. "Leaders Say Goodby," p. 1, and "Regres6 de Los Angeles," p. 12. 109. The chronicle of such events can be documented on the issue of the 17 September of Excelsior from 1960 to 1988. 110. "Regreso de Los Angeles el Lie. Echeverria," Excelsior^ 18 September 1965, p. 12. 111. "Leaders Say Goodby After Colorful Fiesta," San Diego Union, 23 February 1964. p. 1. Regarding this presidential visit to Los Angeles, see, Rafael Ibanez, Adolfo L6pe2 Mateos en el Mexico de Afuera (Mexico: Pdginas del Siglo XX, 1964). 112. "Echeverria en Los Angeles," Excelsior. 2 September 1972, p. 1. 113. "Unidad con Mexico, meta de los chicanos. JLP nos abri6 las puertas del pals." Excelsior. 26 January 1978, p. 1. 109

CHAPTER 4 LO MEXICANO EN AZTLANz THE SUPPORT TO CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

The sponsoring of cultural and educational programs oriented to the preservation of the Spanish language and the

Mexican culture in the United States has been one key aspect in Mexico's outreach policy vis-^-vis the Chicano community.^ In the contemporary period, various high-ranking officials in Mexico have pointed out how the Mexican community in the United States has turned to education in order to overcome an initial drawback in their adaptation to a completely different culture. From their perspective, education is "the greatest demand that came from communities of Mexican-origin."^ In addition, Mexico's policy-makers have also perceived that the support of cultural events is critical, since important segments of the Chicano community have sought to maintain their Mexican cultural roots and pass them on to the next generations.^ From the late-l980s to the present, the Mexican government has been active in promoting programs for literacy and adult education in Spanish, bilingual teacher training, the development of teaching materials in Spanish as well as sponsoring art exhibitions and artistic performances from Mexico throughout the Chicano communities.* These aspects of the Mexico's outreach policy merit a careful study that can 110 emphasize their main goals, outline the political agents committed with them, discuss the segments of the Chicano community targeted, and analyze the political tools put into motion. This chapter principally examines these points.

Goals

Mexico's support for cultural and educational programs in the United States is linked with various goals that the literature on Chicano-Mexicano relations emphasizes, including: the enhancement of Mexican culture, the defense of the civil rights of Mexicans in the United States, the attainment by the Mexican government for Chicano political support, the promotion of Chicano participation in selected areas of U.S.-Mexican relations, and the fomenting of business ties.

Enhancement of Mexican Culture

The continued enhancement of Mexican culture abroad is an important goal in Mexico's outreach policy.® This goal stresses the maintenance of the cultural identity of the Mexican diaspora in the United States.® Accordingly, numerous high-ranking officials in Mexico have stated that one of the tasks of the Mexican government is "to defend and enhance the Ill Mexicaness (mexicanidad) of the sons and daughters who live

abroad (the hijos ausentes)During President Carlos Salinas's regime, Mexican Consul in New York, Manuel Alonso, pointed out how one of the major purposes of the Institutos

Culturales was to construct "stronger bridges" between Mexico and the Chicano community.® Currently, President Ernesto Zedillo, and Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores Jose Angel Gurrla have underscored that one of the priorities of Mexico's foreign policy was the enhancement of the common cultural heritage that Mexicans and Chicanos share.' Interestingly, state governors from different political parties have also promoted Mexico's common cultural heritage

with the Mexican diaspora from the early 1990s to the present. Governor of Jalisco, Carlos Rivera Aceves (from the PRI), elaborated on the importance for Mexico of strengthening its

cultural links with the community, and contributing to instilling pride in their roots among the young generations of Chicanos in the U.S.^° By that time, Carlos Medina Placencia, governor of Guanajuato (from the PAN) also supported the cultural ties with guanajuatenses abroad." The literature considers that the goal of enhancing Mexican culture in the United States to be "above politics." The fact that politicians from different political parties supported outreach policies toward the Mexican-community is certainly an example of this. Yet, during the 1990s, this 112 goal can also be linked to more "political" purposes as well.

Several Mexican officials agreed that cultural promotion could be an optimal way of representing a positive image of Mexico (and the Mexican community) within the United States."

Subsecretaria Rosario Green in the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores emphasized this argument during Presiden Salinas's term." By that time. Consul Teodoro Maus, who briefly directed the Programa Presidencial para la Atencion de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior,* pointed out that projects focusing on Mexican culture were related with the creation of an effective appreciation of Mexico in the United States, and also with the struggle against the stereotypes of Mexicans that are widely held by large sectors of U.S. society.^*

Civil Rights

The defense of the civil rights of Mexicans north of the border can be connected to Mexico's governmental support for educational programs, especially those oriented to adult education in the United States. During the 1990s, Mexican officials have sustained that such programs would reinforce

' Subsequently, the term Programa Presidencial will be used in reference to this bureau of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. 113

the possibilities of Mexican nationals in the United States to enhance their work skills, and, moreover, would empower them to defend their civil rights in the U.S. in a better manner.^® Such a strategy has been expressed in other policy actions, such as the proposal of no-loss of Mexican

nationality, which is discussed in Chapter IV.

Attainment of Political Support

The sponsorship of cultural and educational projects can also achieve the goal of attaining more constructive ties

between the Mexican government and the Mexican-origin community in the U.S. Through the promotion of patriotism and certain loyalty to the homeland, certain Mexican officials predict (off the record) that these projects may contribute to

a more favorable, or at least a more neutral, view of the Mexican government within the Mexican-origin community in the U.S. Accordingly, a major objective stated by the Programa Presidencial is to improve the mechanisms of communication between Mexico and the Mexican-communities abroad, including the distribution of information from Mexico, and the services provided to the Mexican community.^® However, these endeavors have carefully avoided any overt campaign in favor of the ruling party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, in an attempt to avoid any counterproductive effect." 114

Participation in U.S.-Mexican Relations

The support to outreach programs in the area of education in Spanish also encompassed the goal of strengthening Chicano participation in one aspect of greater U.S.-Mexican relations, cooperation in educational programs,. Subsecretario Andres Rozenthal in the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores stressed this goal in 1994, pointing out that "the huge potential that they [Chicanos] represent as participants in the development of both of our countries and their contribution to improving our bilateral relations."" As a consequence, joint efforts between the Mexican government, certain Chicano organizations involved on education matters, and American educational authorities were designed to implement new programs on adult and bilingual education.^"

Business Ties

The goal of promoting business ties between Mexicans and the Mexican-origin community is also related, although more marginally, with Mexico's promotion of educational and cultural programs throughout the Chicano community. From the late-1980s to the present, the Mexican government has actively been encouraging the participation of numerous community organizations of Mexican nationals in the U.S., the clubes de 115 oriundos (organizations of Mexican nationals by state of origin), as potential partners in jointly financing public works in the Mexican provinces, such as schools and libraries." In summation, the enhancement of education in Spanish and Mexico's culture in the U.S. has been an important part of the outreach programs toward the Chicano community. At times, these efforts have been characterized as apolitical ones. However, after reviewing the political discourse of contemporary decision-makers in Mexico, a connection is established with other goals of the Mexico's policy toward the Mexican diaspora in the United States. These ambitious goals have been implemented by numerous and high-ranking political agents as it is discussed in the following section.

Agents

After the late-1980s, a variety of political agents, including some "new" ones, participated in the design of Mexican cultural and educational programs in the United States. This section examines the location and mandate of the most important of the ntunerous political agents in charge of such programs. Among them are; the Office of the Presidency, as well as several ministries in Mexico, including: the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, the Secretaria de 116

Educacion Publica, the Secretaria de Desarrollo Social and several state and local governments. Table 2 includes a more comprehensive list of Mexico's governmental biareaus which have been extensively involved in contemporary efforts directed as outreach to the Chicano community.

The Presidency

Both Presidents Carlos Salinas (1989-1994) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) were committed to a wide array of cultural and educational programs aimed at the Mexican-origin community in the United States. President Salinas gave the initial directive and provided the funding to the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores to institute the Programa Presidencial in 1990, in an effort to institutionalize these projects.

Among its functions, this office had the mandate to establish closer cultural links with the Mexican-origin community in the U.S. Later, President Salinas encouraged the creation of a network of Institutes and Centres Culturales (Cultural Centers and Institutes) of Mexico in various U.S. cities.'^ Subsequently, President Ernesto Zedillo supported during his first year in office certain projects related to adult and bilingual education, dating from his earlier days as head of the Secretaria de Educacion Publica.He also underscored that one of the priorities of Mexico's foreign policy was the 117

TABLE 2 PRINCIPAL MEXICO'S GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS IN CHARGE OF CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL OUTREACH PROGRAMS TOWARD THE MEXICAN-ORIGIN COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1988-1996

Office of the Presidency

Ministries Secretaria de Gobernacion Centra de Desarrollo Municipal Institute Nacional de Estudios Histdricos de la Revolucion Mexicana Secretaria de Educacion Publica Comision Nacional para los Libros de Texto Gratuito Consejo Nacional de Fomento Educativo Direccion General de Educacion Bilingue Direccion General de Educacion Extraescolar Direccion General de Educacion Preescolar Direccion General de Relaciones Internacionales Institute Nacional de Antropologia e Historia Institute Nacional de Bellas Artes Institute Nacional para la Educacion de los Adultos Unidad de Proyectos Especiales (1993-1994) Unidad de Television Educativa Secretaria de Desarrollo Social Area de Cooperacion Tecnica Internacional Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores Subsecretaria de Asuntos Bilaterales Programa Presidencial Mexican Consulates in the United States Institutes and Centres Culturales Secretaria de Salud Consejo para la Promocion y el Control del SIDA 118

Table 2 - Continued

Agencies

Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes Instltuto Mexiceino de Cinematografia Instituto MBxicano de Radio Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes State and Local Governments Durango Guanajuato Hidalgo Jalisco Nayarit Oaxaca Puebla San Luis Potosi Zacatecas.

Sources: Secretaria de Selaciooes Meriotes, Priapnt nonnion jtegionaJ de los Consnlados de Kexico. lastitatos Y Centres Caltarales de califnma y Hashington {Hmco: Program para las Comnidades llezicaias en el Exterior, Jane 1995), pp. S-li. Also, 'Sdacacion jr Biemtar Social,* La Piloia 14, Kay-Jm 1993, p. 9.

enhancement of the common cultural heritage that Mexicans and Chicanos share.

Ministries and Other Agencies

The Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores From the late-1980s to the present, the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores has become the single most important political agent in a cabinet level in carrying out this outreach policy. During President Salinas's, term, there 119

existed a group of policy-makers committed to the idea of

developing innovative ties with the Chicano community in various areas, including in cultural and educational matters.

Secretario Fernando Solana, Subsecretario Andres Rozenthal, Roger Diaz de Cossio, Director of the Programa Presidencial, as well as several Consuls located in key U.S. cities (many of them political appointees) were among those who provided an input to this new activism. These high-ranking officials in Mexico City frequently traveled to the U.S. to listen to the demands and suggestions of the Mexican-origin community first hand. For instance, Secretario Solana conducted a pioneer trip to twenty six cities in California.^®

Such group of officials within the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores developed a pioneer task. They managed to create an environment that provided legitimacy to the efforts of outreaching the Mexican diaspora that never existed in the past. As a consequence, such issue have become a key area of Mexico's foreign policy in the current administration of President Ernesto Zedillo.^® As mentioned in Table 2, several bureaus of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores have been involved in the outreach programs toward the Chicano community. Among them are: the Programa Presidencial, the Mexican Consulates in the United States, and the semi-autonomous Institutes and Centres

Culturales of Mexico in the U.S. 120

The Programa Presidencial of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, created in 1990, has become the single most important bureau in charge of cultural and educational projects toward the Chicano community in the contemporary period.^"' In President Salinas's administration, the Programa Presidencial had a siibstantial budget that permitted it to fund or, at least, to put seed money into numerous cultural and educational programs, including the donation of libraries, the organization of a variety of academic, artistic and cultural events, and the support for adult and bilingual educational programs.

Moreover, the Programa Presidencial has played a fundamental role in promoting interest by other federal, state and local authorities to design and implement their ovm foreign policy vis-^-vis the Chicano community. Specifically, this bureau has permanently briefed other federal agencies on Chicano issues, and supervised some of the projects of the Secretaria de Desarrollo Social, the Secretaria de Educacion

Piiblica, and the Secretaria de Salud aimed at the Chicano community.^" In addition, at the state level, about nineteen state governments were part of cultural projects inspired by the Programa Presidencial. Some state governments (such as Guanajuato) even established their own specific offices for the attention of their "constituency abroad," as a suggestion of the Programa Presidencial 121

During President Zedillo's administration, the Programa Presidencial has established as a priority area the promotion of broader ties between the organizations of first-generation Mexicans, the clubes de oriundos, and Mexican federal, state and local authorities.''^ As part of this effort, the Programa was particularly interested in fomenting ties between state and local governments and Mexican nationals residing in the U.S. High-ranking officials from this bureau have been permanently in touch with governors and majors regarding issues related to the Mexican diaspora. Specifically, several meetings have been held with almost 500 mayors from sixteen Mexican states with the collaboration of the Centra de Desarrollo Municipal (Center for Municipal Development of the Secretaria de Gobernacion.^^

The functions of the Programa Presidencial have, however, evolved during the administration of President Zedillo's term. In a scenario characterized by the reduction of resources, this bureau has been playing more the role of an advocate of

certain projects toward the Chicano community vis-^-vis other governmental agencies in Mexico, such as the Secretaria de Educacion Publica or the state governments, than the one of a major font of resources. Some officials from the Programa foresee a change in the near future, although this would be dependent upon the economic fortunes of the country as a whole.'' 122

The Mexican Consuls in the United States have been critical agents in the relation between Mexico and the Chicano community. Increasingly, from the late-1980s to the present, they have supported projects, such as artistic performances and exhibitions and programs on adult and bilingual education, directed to the Mexican-origin community. Consuls in Chicago and Los Angeles have played a particularly critical role in pioneering these outreach programs. In addition, some Mexican Consuls in the U.S. have acquired new responsibilities in the areas of education and culture, since they serve as permanent honorary presidents of the board of directors of the

Institutos and Centros Culturales of Mexico.^' Yet, the commitment of the forty Mexican Consulates in the United States regarding the promotion of links with the Mexican diaspora has been uneven. The lack of training or sensitivity of the Consuls to issues related to the Mexican diaspora have limited the kind of activities they are committed to.

The Institutos and Centros Culturales were created by the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores as counterparts to the Programa Presidencial during President Carlos Salinas's term.^® Mexican authorities considered such Institutos and Centros as political agents that could contribute "with vitality and freshness" to the achievement of the objectives of the foreign policy of Mexico." These new agents 123 constituted a pioneering experiment in Mexico's foreign policy, since they were conceived as a semi-autonomous entities from the Mexican government and were established as non-profit corporations according to U.S. law.®"'

Their principal mission was to institutionalize the cultural and educational ties between Mexico and the Chicano community, regardless of future changes in Mexican administrations that could affect Chicano-Mexicano relations.^® Among their responsibilities in the areas of education and culture (many of them shared with the Consulates) are: promote children and adult education within the Chicano community; disseminate Mexican culture with particular emphasis to those cultural motifs which have more affinity with Chicano culture; improve Mexico's image in communities where such institutes operate; permit Consuls to have a better relation with the community at large; and cooperate with community organizations of Mexicans in the U.S, offering, at times, a consulting seirvice for the formation of non-profit organizations according to the state laws in the United States.'' The Institutes and Centres Culturales flourished all over the U.S. from the early-1990s on. By 1995, the network had spread from Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles to twenty U.S. 124 cities.* To understand the magnitude of the effort, it is worth noting that Mexico has forty Consulates in the United

States.

The organization of the Institutes and Centros Culturales corresponds to the specific conditions of the community which

they serve.*" There exist, however, certain common characteristics in terms of their structure. First, the director is designated by the Programa Presidencial in consultation with the board of directors. Second, their board

of directors (whose permanent honorary president is the Mexican Consul) is usually integrated by noted members of the community from academia, the arts, business and media (U.S.- born Chicanos or Mexican nationals). Non-Chicanos, however, can also participated if they have ties with the Mexican-origin community in areas such as culture, politics, business and academe (in fact in certain cities like Atlanta, such members outnumbered Chicanos).*^ Third, the board is in charge of developing strategies to ensure financial autonomy as well as to seek and implement the demands from the community.

* After Washington D.C. and Los Angeles, other Centros and Institutes were created in Atlanta, Brownsville, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, El Paso, Fresno, Houston, McAllen, Miami, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose and Tucson. "Mexico Promotes Ties with the Mexican-American Community," 6 in Mexico on the Record [Washington, D.C.] June 1992, p. 2; and La Paloma (1991-1994). 125

Although primarily linked to the Programa Presidencial, the Institutos and Centros Culturales have collaborated with other entities of the Mexican government. The Institute Cultural Mexicano in Los Angeles signed agreements in 1991 with the Consejo Nacional de Fomento Educativo (National Council of Education Promotion) to promote, exhibit and distribute educational books in Spanish for kindergarten and elementary school in California.*^ Moreover, the Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes (National Council for Culture and the Arts, CONACULTA) has even participated in the board of directors of certain Institutos and Centros

Culturales** while some state governors are active in the direction of the Instituto Cultural in Los Angeles." In terms of resources about the 70% of the budget of most of the Centros and Institutos still comes from the

Programa Presidencial.*^ These financial ties of the Institutos and Centros Culturales and the Mexican government varies from one city to another. In some places, the community provided more resources to create an Instituto or Centros Cultural, such as in Brownsville, New York and Phoenix.*'' As Consul Martha Elvia Rosas in Browsville, Texas acknowledged, various segments of the Chicano community, including bankers and public institutions of the city, sponsored the Centro CulturalIn other cities, the characteristics of the community, or the leadership of the 126

Consulate limited that possibility. Accordingly, Mexican Consul in Sacramento, Alfredo Ramirez Araiza stated: "New York has a million possibilities to collect funds [for the Institute Cultural], not so Sacramento."*'

The Secretaria de Educacion Publica. The Secretaria de Educacion Publica is another important agency in terms of the outreach policy toward the Mexican diaspora. During President Salinas's regime, Secretario Manuel Barlett, (a pioneer in the development of ties with Chicanos) actively promoted meetings with Chicanos on issues

related to bilingual and adult education for Mexicans in the U.S.®" Later, his successor, Ernesto Zedillo, signed an agreement in 1993 with the Los Angeles Unified School District regarding extensive collaboration in the realm bilingual education." Zedillo also met with Chicano leaders committed with programs in adult education in Spanish, such as Bert Corona from Hermandad Mexicana. He promised such leaders to increase efforts of Mexico to support these projects." In addition, by that time other high-ranking officials also reinforced the commitment of the Secretaria de Educacion Publica with outreach programs toward Chicanos.®'

Subsecretario Esteban Moctezuma and Subsecretario Jos6 Angel Pescador pointed out that the education of Mexican nationals. 127

including those living in the United States, was a top priority for the Mexican government.®'* Numerous bureaus within the Secretaria de Educacion

Piiblica have played critical roles in the promotion of educational and cultural links. In 1993, during an interagency meeting on this matter, about twenty one bureaus of this ministry presented their projects related to the Chicano community.®' Among them, the Direccion de Asuntos Internacionales (Bureau of International Affairs), and the Unidad de Proyectos Especiales (Special Projects Unit) were particularly active. The Direccion de Relaciones

Internacionales has reinforced its outreach programs on bilingual education.'® The Unidad de Proyectos Especiales (Special Projects Unit) was established in 1993—through a presidential directive. Its main endeavor was the development of projects in the field of education toward the Mexican-origin community. The head of the Unit was the exdirector and founder of the

Programa Presidencial, Roger Diaz de Cossio, under the direct responsibility of Secretario de Educacion Piiblica Fernando Solana—former Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores. The creation of the Unidad de Proyectos Especiales was justified as an effort to reinforce educational projects aimed at the Chicano community." Some observers, however, interpreted the move as an attempt of the founders of the 128

Programa Presidencial (Roger Diaz de Cossio and Fernando Solana) to preserve such projects from possible budgetary reductions that the change of high-ranking officials in the Secretciria de Relaciones Exteriores. could bring about. After 1995, during President Ernesto Zedillo's term, Unldad de Proyectos Especiales was dismantled, and other bureaus took over its functions.

From the late-1980s to the present, agencies affiliated to the Secretaria de Educacion Piiblica have also been involved in educational programs directed at Chicanos (see Table 1). The Institute Nacional para la Educacion de los Adultos

(National Institute for Adult Education), along with more than fifteen Mexican Consulates in the U.S., promoted literacy campaigns for Mexican nationals, and endorsed other educational programs in Spanish for adults. Also, the Consejo Nacional de Fomento Educativo (National Council for Educational Foment) and the Comision Ifacional para los Libros de Texto Gratuito (National Commission for Free Textbooks) contributed with donations of books to schools and public libraries that served commtmities where large segments of population of Mexican-origin reside. In addition, the Unidad de Television Educativa (Unit for Educational Television) produced classes in Spanish from first to ninth grade to be broadcasted in the U.S." 129

Moreover, in the realm of culture, the independent agency, the Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes

(National Council for Culture and the Arts, CONACULTA) performed an outstanding role in reaching out to the Mexican- origin community. It provided scholarships for Chicano artists to study in several universities located in different places of Mexico.®' Meanwhile, other agencies affiliated to

CONACULTA were also active. The Institute Mexicano de Cinematografla (Mexican Film Institute) co-sponsored film festivals of Mexican cinema in areas with an important population of Chicanos; the Instituto Mexicano de Radio

(Mexican Radio Institute) produced cultural programs; the

Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia (National Institute for History and Anthropology) brought popular Mexican art to U.S. communities and the Instituto Nacional de

Bellas Artes (National Institute of Fine Arts) supported art exhibitions and artistic performances in various U.S. cities. However, the specific functions and the degree of commitment of these agencies affiliated to the Secretaria de Educacion Piiblica and CONACULTA with this outreach policy toward the Chicano community varied. Although certain high- ranking officials from both institutions pointed out that this policy was a priority, there existed certain degree of skepticism regarding the concrete benefits of promoting such 130 ties.®" Such kind of attitude has already been vanished from other ministries like the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores.

The Secretaria de Desarrollo Social

The Secretaria de Desarrollo Social (Ministry of Social Development, SEDESOL) was critically involved in the policy­ making toward Chicanos during President Carlos Salinas's regime. The bureau of Cooperacion Tecnica Internacional (International Technical Cooperation) was created in SEDESOL with this purpose. Luis Donaldo Colosio was particularly concerned with the strengthening of ties with Mexican nationals in the United States, as Secretaria de Desarrollo Social during President Salinas's term. In 1993, he personally met with community organizers from the clubes de oriundos from Jalisco, Michoacan, Nayarit, Puebla, Sinaloa and Zacatecas. His agenda with the clubes included the designing of new cultural and educational programs in the United States and the possibilities of jointly financing the construction of schools and libraries in Mexico.®^ As a result of these meetings the Programa de Solidaridad Internacional entre Mexicanos (Program for International Solidarity between Mexicans) was created." By the end of President Salinas's term, several projects in the areas of culture and education were funded by the Programa de Solidaridad—in collaboration with the Programa 131

Presidencial, state and local authorities and the clubes de oriundos." During President Zedillo's administration, because of the economic crisis in Mexico, the funding for the Programa de Solidaridad diminished substantially. Moreover, its fate is uncertain, since the existence of SEDESOL as a ministry is still indefinite. In this scenario, by 1995, the functions of the bureau of Cooperacion Tecnica Internacional had already changed. From being a provider of resources, it has become more as a broker vis-^-vis other governmental agencies that have major possibilities to fund projects.®'

State and Local Government

From the late-1980s on, among the most active political agents in the outreach policy toward Chicanos have been the Mexican state governors, including some from the opposition party, Partido Accion Nacional (National Action Party). They have vigorously constructed new ties to their constituency in the United States. Although, some of them had traditionally endorsed selected cultural activities, they had never before exercised leadership in cultivating new ties with Mexican nationals in the United States

With the blessings of the Programa Presidencial, nine state governments have established bureaus in charge of the 132 issues related to Mexican nationals in the United States— Durango, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Puebla, San Luis Potosi and Zacatecas. Moreover, some of these state governments (such as Guanajuato and Jalisco) also created an office in the United States to better respond to the demands of their constituency living there.®® Two major purposes guided the outreach policy of the governors on cultural and educational matters. First, to contribute to specific projects in the areas of residency of their "constituency abroad," and, second, to promote

arrangements with community organizations of Mexicans in the United States to cosponsor development programs in their states of origin. A pioneer effort to reach out to such constituency was conducted by the government of Zacatecas. In the late-1980s, Governor Genaro Borrego, cultivated new ties with community organizations of zacatecanos in the United States;®" his successors followed his path. Accordingly, in 1993, the government of Zacatecas negotiated specific developmental projects with more than forty clubes de oriundosi the Clubes Zacatecanos de California (Clubs from Zacatecas in California).®' Subsequently, during the 1990s, governors from the states of Aguascalientes, Baja California, Chihuahua, Colima,

Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nayarit, Puebla, San Luis Potosi, 133

Sinaloa, Tlaxcala, and Zacatecas, among others, aggressively pursued an outreach policy toward the Mexican nationals who reside in the United States."' Jos4 Francisco Ruiz Massieu from Guerrero visited his constituency abroad in Chicago in 1991. He signed an agreement with various community organizations from his state to institutionalize their binational links.®' Governor Renato Vega from Sinaloa had a similar experience that year. He held meetings with several clubes de oriundos. In late-1992, Diodoro Carrasco visited the community of oaxaquenos in California, integrated by more than 400,000 individuals. He met with the leaders of its community organizations, including the Frente Mixteco-^apoteco (Mixteco-

Zapoteco Front). It is worth noting that governors from the opposition party, Partido Accion Nacional were also interested in developing programs with their constituency abroad, including

Francisco Barrio Terrazas (Chihuahua) and Carlos Medina Placencia (Guanajuato).'^ Carlos Medina Placencia was undoubtedly the most active. He visited his constituency in various U.S. cities during his tenure. Only in Houston, there exists a community of more than 300,000 guanajuatenses. In summation, several characteristics can be noticed in terms of the location and mandate of the political agents, which have participated in Mexico's policy toward the Mexican diaspora from the late-1980s to the present. First, the 134 Executive Branch has been instrumental in the design of cultural and educational projects. In a presidencial regime such as Mexico, the interest of the President is crucial in providing mandate and resources to other bureaucratic entities. Second, an extensive web of bureaus and agencies at federal, state and local levels was established during the 1990s. The political agents that have been traditionally involved in outreach program on culture and education (the

Secretaria de Educacion Publica and the Secretaria de Relaciones Exterlores) have had a renovated role. Their new bureaus, such as the Programa Presidencial, the Centros and Institutes Culturales, and the Unidad de Proyectos Especiales have been in charge of challenging tasks. In addition, other ministries in Mexico (such as the Secretaria de Gobernacion and the Secretaria de Salud) have also become involved in specific aspects of Mexico's cultural and educational efforts toward the Mexican diaspora in the United States. At the state and local level, state governors and mayors, have also been an active part of the efforts to reach out to the Mexican-origin community. In several states, offices in charge of the affairs of Mexicans abroad have been created. Furthermore, governors and mayors could be one of the major sources of ideas and funding regarding the outreach programs 135 toward Chicanos during current President Zedillo's administration.

Targets

Different target populations have been the focus of Mexico's programs toward the Mexican diaspora in the United States: U.S.-born Chicanos, and first-generation Mexican immigrants. This section examines first the outreach efforts of the Mexican government to find partners within the Mexican- origin community for the implementation of cultural and educational projects. In addition, it concentrates on the efforts of target populations on cultural and educational matters that have influenced their portrayal in Mexico.

U.S.-born Chicanos or Mexican Immigrants

In regard to cultural projects, Mexico targeted numerous Chicano national and local organizations. The National Council of la Raza (NCLR) and the clubes de oriundos were among the most important. In the early-1990s, the NCLR signed an agreement with the Programa Presidencial and the Secretaria de Educacion Pdblica making scholarships available for Chicano students and practitioners in Mexico in the areas of journalism, dance, literature and theater. In addition, a 136

program of exchange of artists was implemented."'' Moreover, during the annual meetings of the NCLR, several of Mexico's state governments, the Programa Presidencial and the Secretaria de Educacion Piiblica sponsored exhibitions of arts and crafts as well as artistic performances from Mexico."'^ The Mexican government concentrated many efforts in the establishment of ties with the clubes de oriundos, and, at times, it even refocused its priorities on cultural matters as a request of such clubes. For example, the Instituto Cultural and the governments of Aguascalientes, Jalisco and Zacatecas contemplated the opening a cultural center representing each state reacting to a request from the oriundos.''* On one occasion, because of a petition of the clubes de oriundos from Oaxaca, the governor, Diodoro Carrasco, and the Instituto Cultural co-sponsored the Semana de Oaxaca (the Oaxaca Week) in Los Angeles,'" On education matters, Mexico targeted certain Chicano organizations that shared a common concern on the lack of funds and human resources for instruction in Spanish in the United States, and the need for supplemental aid.'® Among the organizations recognized as committed with the enhancing of education in Spanish, Mexican policy-makers have emphasized the role of the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) , One Stop Immigration (OSIEC) and the clubes de oriundos. 137 MALDEF is a leading organization in litigation cases

related to educational matters has been acknowledged by Mexican officials. From the 1970s, this organization has filed lawsuits against several school districts for discrimination, segregation and the lack of adequate access to

bilingual education programs of Chicano/Latino students. In 1988, for example, MALDEF won a major case against the Los Angeles Unified School District. The settlement involved the implementation of a more comprehensive plan on bilingual education. Moreover, MALDEF's legal actions have contributed to increase the number of Chicano/Latino teachers in cities like Los Angeles. The School District has 650,000 elementary school children (65% Latinos), while only 10% of the teachers are Chicanos."'" Certain Mexican Consulates improved their working relationship with MALDEF on educational matters during the 1990s. In 1991, President Salinas, as a guest in the Annual Meeting of this organization, pointed out the key role that this organization had played in this area." OSIEC has been praised in Mexico for being an organization highly committed to the implementation of programs related to adult education within the Mexican-origin (and Latino) community.This organization through its 110 regional centers in California have provided instruction at the elementary and junior high levels to more than 50,000 138

students in California, 90% of them from Mexico.'^ In the early-1990s, the Instituto Nacional para la Educacion de los Adultos, the Programa Presidencial, and the Secretaria de Educacion Publlca signed an ambitious agreement with OSIEC to develop new adult education programs.®^ The efforts of the clubes de orlundos have been increasingly recognized by Mexican officials, specifically in terms of their support to programs of bilingual education." A case in point is the Frente Mixteco-Zapoteco that successfully contacted U.S. authorities for the establishment of a bilingual program (Mixtec-English) in California. This program benefited over 5,000 Mixtec Indians from Oaxaca who reside in Madera County in California. In the early-1990s, this community organization received further support from the Mexican government.®* The clubes de oriundos also presented specific ideas to the Mexican authorities related to education to be implemented in their hometowns in Mexico. In the early-1990s, in cities like Los Angeles and Chicago, the Consulados and the

Institutes Culturales began to develop ties with clubes from more than ten states of origin.*® Several of these clubes have participated in jointly- financed projects with the Mexican government related to the construction/reconstruction of schools in their hometowns in

Mexico, such as Fraternidad de Sinaloenses from California;'® 139

Club Social from Durango; Club Amialco and Club Teuzizapan

from Guerrero; Club Estacion San Juan, Club Juchitlan, Club San Julian and Club Talpa de Allende from Jalisco; Club Social de Jala from Nayarit; Club Piaxtla from Puebla; Club Cerritos from San Luis Potosf; and Club Montescobedo from Zacatecas.

In addition, the Club Agua Verde and the Club Villa Judrez funded the completion of public libraries in San Luis Potosi; while the AsociacicSn Nayarita and the Club Acaponeta from Nayarit promoted scholarships for students from their state. Moreover, other clubes, such as, the Comite de Apoyo a Compatriotas del Condado de San Mateo have submitted petitions for assistance to the Mexican government, regarding the creation of literacy programs," and also demanded further support from Mexican authorities to provide supplementary funding to the schools in their sending communities.®'

An important agreement was signed in the 1990s to create a fund to finance various development projects, including the construction of schools and libraries. For that purpose, the clubes from Zacatecas raised $300,000 dollars, the state of Zacatecas a similar amount, and the SEDESOL contributed the rest of the money. Thus, close to $1 million were invested in such projects.'" 140

The Portrayal of the Mexican Diaspora

From the late-1980s, the portrayal of the different segments of the Mexican-origin community in the United States have become more positive within the Mexican government. The assertiveness of the community's efforts to preserve its common cultural heritage (including the Spanish language) with Mexico has been increasingly appreciated. Mexican authorities have acknowledged the developments of Chicano culture from art and literature to cinema and theater." As an example, in the 1990s, an editorial of La Paloma (the newsletter issued by the Programa Presidencial) stated that the Mexican-American culture exhibits a high degree of maturity, and points out how its literature is already translated into different languages and its films are being shown in theaters throughout the world. In the same vein, various Mexican officials celebrated "the creative manifestations and educational contributions of these [Mexican-origin] communities to our national culture.'*"

Furthermore, distinguished members of the Chicano community have submitted new proposals to the Mexican government on cultural matters. The project to create a cultural center in Los Angeles was suggested by notable Chicanos, including film director Luis Valdez, according to

Roger Diaz de Cossio (the founder and first director of the 141 Programa Presidencial), In addition, leaders and organizations of the Chicano coinmunity also proposed numerous cultural projects including the promotion of art exhibitions and film festivals.'^ Moreover, members of the National Association of Latino Appointed and Elected Officials (NALEO) promoted before President Salinas, the creation of the Casas de Mexico (Houses of Mexico) in Southern California, to be administered directly by the Chicano community. These new institutions, although partially financed by the Mexican government, would design their own cultural programs, independently from the Institutos and Centres Culturales .'** Interestingly, the organizations integrated mainly by first-generation Mexicans residing in the United States, the clubes de oriundos, have been portrayed in a very positive manner, particularly during the last two years of President

Salinas's administration and in President Zedillo's term. From being considered powerless or just ignored in the past, the clubes became important organizations to deal with.'® Moreover, the Mexican government characterized them as highly committed to the preservation of Mexican culture in the United States. In the realm of education, the Mexican government have been increasingly aware of the fact that the support to adult and bilingual education in Spanish has profound roots in the community, among both U.S.-born Chicanos and Mexican 142 nationals. Mexican officials have pointed out frequently that although the organizations of the Mexican-origin community may, at times, pursue different agendas, they concurred on their support to educational programs." As an example, both the Hispanic Chambers of Commerce and the clubes de oriundos have asked the collaboration of the Mexican government in the sending of biligual teachers from Mexico.'® Moreover, notable members of the Mexican-origin community have proposed innovative projects to the Mexican government during the 1990s. As an example. Professor Blandina Cardenas from the Institute of Teaching and Learning in Education of Southwestern Texas State University suggested to officials of the Secretaria de Educacion Piiblica the designing of a version in Spanish of the exam for General Education Diploma (equivalent to a high school diploma), which, undoubtedly, could benefited first-generation Mexican immigrants residing in the United States." Based upon such a positive image of the Mexican-community in the U.S., the Mexican government has targeted a variety of organizations within the community to pursue its cultural and educational projects in the United States. Mexican officials have always portrayed such organizations and their leaders as valuable allies.

In summation, for first time in the contemporary period, organizations of U.S.-born Chicanos (MALDEF, National Council 143

of la Raza) and Mexican first-generation inunigrants (the clubes de oriundos) were main targets of Mexico's outreach policies. Regarding the clubes, the administration of

President Carlos Salinas, and, later, the regime of Ernesto Zedillo elaborated a pioneer progreun to construct ties with them.^°° The efforts of these clubes were hardly new, yet,

they had been carried out without previously gaining any

praise from Mexican authorities.

Tools

Political tools are motivating devices that insure that people's behavior changes. Some tools rely on the authority of the government, do their task without major consultation with the potential targets, and can even use sanctions to achieve their aims. Others provide new resources, create capacities, or allude to the common symbolic values that agents and targets share. This section reviews all these types of tools, since they have been used by the Mexican government in its programs to reach out to the Chicano community in the areas of culture and education.

Authority Tools

Numerous programs of the government of Mexico have relied 144 upon authority tools. Mexican officials tended to design

mostly in Mexico City the majority of the cultural and educational projects oriented at the Mexican diaspora in the United States—which ranged from artistic performances to donations of libraries and educational courses. From the early 1990s on, however, there has been an increasing input from the communities themselves in the design of the projects. Specifically, the creation of the Programa Presidencial and the Institutos and Centres Culturales in the United States opened up new institutional avenues for the participation of the community. Moreover, the priority given by the Mexican authorities to the ties with the clubes de oriundos has been also a step in the same direction.

Resource Tools

An array of political tools has been aimed at empowering the Mexican-origin community. The first case in point is the nurturing of closer bonds between Mexican nationals residing in the U.S. and their hometowns in Mexico—through the development of specific programs that would contribute to bring them together. The Secretaria de Desarrollo Social and the Programa Presidencial have promoted the collaboration of the clubes de oriundos to carry out several municipal projects related to 145

education, including the construction of additional public libraries and schools (see section on Targets) in ten Mexican states. As an example, in 1991, a group of almost 10,000

Mexicans from Piaxtla, Puebla, who reside in New York, provided the resources for the construction of a new high school."' Later, in 1994, various clubes from Guanajuato, Jalisco, Oaxaca, San Luis Potosi and Zacatecas discussed collectively in Chicago the construction of new schools in their hometowns."^ Also, that year, SEDESOL developed various programs in Sinaloa, including a new kindergarten in

Escuinapa and a program of free school breakfasts in Mazatlan, with the support of the Fraternidad de Sinaloenses en Los Angeles."* In the same vein, various state governments established or cosponsored cultural and educational programs oriented to the Mexican community abroad. In 1994, Carlos Medina Placencia, governor of Guanajuanto from the PAN, visited the Institute Cultural in Los Angeles, and created a fund for supporting artistic manifestations of his state in the United states."® Moreover, Governor Medina Placencia was among the first to establish a specific office in charge of the oriundos from his state, residing in the U.S., the Oficina para las Comunidades de Guanajuato en el Exterior (Office for Reaching out to Guanajuato Communities Abroad). This office administers the Casas de Guanajuato (Houses of Guanajuato) in 146 cities like Dallas, Chicago, Houston and Los Angeles^"® where

the largest number of guanajuatenses reside. Such institutions offer support for artistic and cultural programs —as well as legal counsel and social assistance.^"'

By that time, the governor of Jalisco, Carlos Rivera Aceves from the PRI, also traveled to Los Angeles to meet with the Federacion de Clubes Jaliciences (Federation of Clubs from Jalisco), and received petitions and demands from them, including the construction of schools back home. Rivera Aceves also inaugurated two Casas de Jalisco (Houses of Jalisco) in Long Beach and Orange County in California, and donated 25,000 dollars to the Mexican Cultural Institute in

Los Angeles to develop programs for jalicienses in the area."' He also announced that he would match the funds provided by the clubes de oriundos for specific developmental projects in Jalisco."' A second type of resource tools that also empower the Chicano community are those oriented at opening up to the community new channels of access to the United States government. Interestingly, Mexican policy-makers have emphasized that the Institutes and Centres Culturales have created a unique space where Mexican nationals, Mexican-origin individuals, and Anglos who are interested in Mexico can meet, and disseminate views and information."® 147 In the same vein, from 1990 on, the Secretaria de

Educacion Publica with the support of the officials from the California Education Department, and the cooperation of the Mexican American Opportunity Foundation (MAOF) established the Mexico-U.S. Kindergarten Teachers' Bilateral Exchange Program that permitted Mexican and Chicano kindergarten teachers to participate in exchange programs.'-" Moreover, other arrangements between the Mexican government and U.S. officials on education were also implemented. On September 1993, an agreement was signed between the Secretaria de Educacion Publica and the Chicago Public School System related to the specialization courses for Chicano bilingual teachers."^

Furthermore, Mexican state governments and the Secretaria de Educacion Publica (with the collaboration of nineteen Mexican Consulates) signed agreements with U.S. authorities to create a Binational Migrant Education Program California-Baja California-Guanajuato-Michoacdn oriented to support the education of children from these states, who have relocated to California because their parents hold temporary farming jobs there. This program permits students to transfer course units and grades when moving. Other meetings with state authorities are also taking place. Thousands of students from Baja

California (1,766), from Guanajuato (2,043) and Michoacdn (6,491) have benefited from this program.^" In the 1990s, 148

this program has been updated with the name of Tan facil como tocar una puerta (As easy as knocking a door). By 1993, about 50,000 Mexican students from sixteen states (mainly Michoacan and Jalisco) were benefited by this transfer program for immigrant students.

Capacity-building Tools

Mexico has been implementing this type of tools in three major areas: (1) bilingual education, (2) adult education and (3) culture. The purpose of such tools has been to educate the community, and provide better information and training to

its members on cultural and educational matters. First, regarding bilingual education, Mexican authorities have been involved in sending Mexican teachers to U.S. school districts, as instructors or trainers. Initiatives have also included the promotion of further training of bilingual teachers in the U.S. (especially Mexican-origin instructors) in methods and the use of content materials in bilingual education.

Following a tradition that started in the 1970s, Mexican authorities have promoted bilingual education by sending Mexican teachers to several states (mainly California and Illinois) whose school districts were in dire need of supplementary support.In 1990, for example, the 149 Secretaria de Educacion Publica funded the travel expenses of

twenty six Mexican teachers to the U.S. to participate in a two-year bilingual program organized by Illinois school districts. Given the demand and success of their services, this project was extended through 1996."® Moreover, in

1991, President Carlos Salinas, in a meeting with several Chicano organizations in California offered to provide at least one hundred Mexican teachers to reinforce bilingual programs in Los Angeles as well as further collaboration in the preparation of textbooks in Spanish. The program included teachers from the Federal District, Guerrero, Jalisco, Michoacan and Tlaxcala who were assigned to teach for a one to two-year period at selected elementary schools in Los Angeles According to the Programa Presidential, the goal of the program of sending teachers to school districts in the United

States is ambitious. A high-ranking official, interviewed by Educaci6n. stated that ideally, Mexico should send more than 100,000 bilingual education instructors to reinforce bilingual

education programs for Mexican children in the U.S."' In addition, Mexican authorities have encouraged the recruitment and further training of Mexican-origin teachers (both U.S. Chicanos and Mexican nationals) in the United States. The Institute Cultural in Chicago started a recruitment campaign among teachers who had graduated in 150

Mexico and were now living in the U.S. The purpose was to invite these teachers to attend a training program that would permit them to exercise their teaching careers at state schools in Illinois. As a result, more than 300 teachers were registered in the courses backed by the Chicago State School

Program. Moreover, Mexican officials from the Programa Presidencial disseminated information regarding Suiuner courses

for bilingual teachers in Spanish, and Mexican history and culture in thirteen universities, located in Mexico, especially about those courses which had been adapted to the needs of the school districts in the United States. An agreement signed between the Secretaria de Educacion Publica, the Universxdad Pedagogica Nacional and the California State University, Long Beach established Summer credit courses on Spanish and Mexican/Latin American culture for bilingual teachers taught by Mexican instructors.^^' Furthermore, the Direccion General de Relaciones Internacionales of the Secretaria de Educacion Publica

established a scholarship fund for Chicano students in Mexico, coordinated training courses for U.S. bilingual teachers in Mexico, and also sponsored binational efforts for the education of children who sojourned every year to the U.S. This bureau maintained a consistent presence in the professional meetings in the U.S. related to bilingual 151

education, such as the National Association of Bilingual

Educators. Second, regarding adult education, during the 1990s, various Mexican governmental agencies have increasingly granted in-kind resources to develop new projects, one such

project is on literacy."^ This is an important project, since according to the figures of the Instituto Nacional para la Educacion de los Adultos, about 125,000 Mexicans residing in the U.S. cannot read and write in Spanish, the figure for

those who did not finish elementary or junior high school is even higher."^ In 1991, several Mexican Consulates, including those in

Dallas, Houston, Miami, Sacramento, San Francisco and San Jose initiated literacy and other remedial courses courses with the assistance of volunteers from the Mexican-origin community, trained by Mexico's Instituto Nacional para la Educacion de los Adultos, with the purpose of promoting bilingualism among Mexican nationals."* Furthermore, there exists the project to broadcast by television, courses of elementary and junior high school from Mexico to the U.S. to serve the population of Mexican-nationals."' A successful program aimed at adult education was developed by Mexican authorities during the early-1990s in collaboration with One Stop Immigration in California.

Instructors from this organization received special training 152

from the Instituto Nacional para la Educacion de los Adultos.^^^ The main purpose was to design a program to provide literacy courses for more than 17,000 adults.In addition, OSIEC was also the recipient of library collections from this Instituto that consisted of books for its programs on elementary and junior high education for adults. Only in the period 1990-1991/ OSIEC received about 20,000 books for elementary education. Also in the area of adult education, during President Ernesto Zedillo's administration, a new program, "Aun fuera de Mexico te apoyamos" (Even out of Mexico, we still support you) was implemented. It was sponsored by all Mexican Institutos and Centres Culturales in the U.S., twenty two Mexican Consulates, the Instituto Nacional para la Educacion de los Adultos (which has already trained more than 500 voluntary instructors), and the Programa Presidencial. This program offers literacy courses as well preparation to get the diploma of elementary school and junior high. The studies are in Spanish and recognized by the Secretaria de Educacion Piiblica. Interestingly, "Aun fuera de Mexico" is a program that is advertised in radio spots in Spanish as a step to prepare students to learn English and other skills to have a better life in the U.S.^" As an important part of Mexico's programs to support adult and bilingual education, the Mexican government donated 153

specialized libraries to schools, community organizations, public libraries, and even prisons that served important segments of the Chicano/Latino population."" During the 1990s, library collections of books in Spanish were donated to Arizona (Phoenix, Tucson); California (Chico, Davis, Esparto,

Fresno, Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Jose, Santa Cruz, Stockton, West Sacramento, Winters, Woodland, and Yuba City); Colorado (Denver School Districts and public libraries); Florida (Miami); Georgia (Atlanta); Illinois (Chicago); Philadelphia (Programa de Educacion Migrante); New Mexico (Albuquerque); and Texas (Brownsville Unified School District)."^ Particularly important was the program of

donation of libraries in California since the Mexican government invested about $500,000 dollars to acquire one hundred book collections that consisted of 400 volumes, including elementary and high school texts."' Third, in terms of culture, the Mexican government has also channeled extensive in-kind resources to the Chicano community in the contemporary period. The Programa Presidencial, several agencies of the Secretaria de Educacion Publica, and some state governments have sponsored a variety of art exhibitions and performances from Mexico throughout the Chicano communities, including exhibitions of Mexican foods, masks, painting,"* toys and typical customs; performances of 154 traditional Mexican dances and musical recitals;"® and film festivals that consisted of Mexican films."®

The major purpose of these cultural endeavors has been to show the best of Mexico to the Mexican-origin community."' As an example during the period 1995-1996, the Programa Presidencial sponsored the art exhibitions: Campeche Maya, Mujeres de Armas tomar...Vida Cotidiana durante la Revolucion, and Simbolos Patrios, as well as concerts of Mexican music, performances of Mexico's folkloric and pre-Columbian dances, and showings of Mexican films."" To understand the magnitude of these efforts, it is worth noting that Mexican officials from the Programa Presidencial emphasize that "no other place of Mexico had so many art exhibits as the [Chicano] Community in the 1990s.""' In addition, Mexico's state governments funded cultural events in the United States.^*" Increasingly, state governments have sponsored activities (such as courses on Mexican traditional dance and music, and Spanish) requested by their "constituency abroad. Semanas Culturales (Cultural Weeks) dedicated to enhance the artistic manifestations of Mexico's states have been institutionalized in major U.S. cities. The Semanas Culturales include art exhibitions, lectures, and films from Mexico. Moreover, the support of the clubes de oriundos from Guanajuato, Jalisco, Oaxaca, San Luis

Potosi, Sinaloa and Zacatecas, and the co-sponsorship of the 155

Institutos and Centros Culturales have permitted the scheduling of such cultural activities on a permanent basis.

The Institutos and Centros Culturales have extended in- kind contributions to help sponsor innovative cultural activities. In the case of Chicago, the Jnstituto Cultural was involved with the production of television cultural programs, broadcast in Spanish by local Channel 22. This Instituto also targeted certain schools that have large numbers of students of Mexican origin, and worked closely with them in programs designed at the enhancement of Mexican culture. In addition, the Centra Cultural Mexicano in San Francisco funded a series of radio soap-operas based on celebrated Mexican literary works with the co-sponsorship of KBBF, "La Nuestra"—the only bilingual radio station in Northern California. Furthermore, on March 1994, this Centra Cultural produced some television programs that were later broadcasted by Napa Public Access Cable Television. Those programs were intended to inform the community on the activities of the Centre—including the cultural ones.^*'

Hortatory Tools

The Mexican government has used symbolic (hortatory) tools to exalt the common heritage that the Mexican-origin 156

community and Mexico share. According to high-ranking

officials in Mexico, one of the tasks of the Mexican government during President Carlos Salinas's regime was "to defend and enhance the 'mexlcanxdad' of the sons and daughters who live abroad (the hijos ausentes) ."'•** Accordingly, Mexican Consul in New York, Manuel Alonso, pointed out how one of the major purposes of the Institutes Culturales was to construct "stronger bridges" between Mexico and the Chicano community.^*® Furthermore, President Ernesto Zedillo, and Secretario Jose Angel Gurria of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores underscored recently that one of the priorities of

Mexico's outreach policy toward Chicanos was the enhancement of the common cultural heritage."^ Governors from different political parties have also celebrated such common heritage. Governor of Jalisco, Carlos

Rivera Aceves (from the PRI), elaborated on the importance for Mexico of strengthening its cultural links with the community, and contributing to instilling pride in their roots among the young generations of Chicanos in the U.S.'-*"' In addition, Carlos Medina Placencia, governor of Guanajuato (from the PAN), pointed out that a major purpose of the Casas de Guanajuato in the United States is: "making known to our brothers and sisters [living in the U.S.] that here in their homeland, we are concerned for their welfare."^*® 157

Beyond the political discourse, specific tools have been implemented by the Mexican government to reach out to the Chicano community. Such tools include the granting of awards and the sponsorship of meetings to enhance mexicanidad. In the realm of academe and the arts, several Chicanos have received the Aguila Azteca during the 1990s (this is the most prestigious official award that the Mexican government can grant to a foreigner for outstanding service and contributions to Mexico. Among the recipients of this award were: Blandina Cardenas (Education), Antonia Hernandez (Education), Luis Leal (Literature), Americo Paredes (Literature), Julian Samora

(Sociology) and Luis Valdez (Theater and Film). The ceremony of the presentation of the Aguila Azteca has always been an occasion to celebrate the common historical roots that Mexicans and Chicanos share, and has received a wide covering from the Mexican media."' During the 1990s, an interesting and innovative symbolic tool has been the sponsorship of meetings between Chicano and

Mexican children and adolescents.As an example, sixty four Mexican children, two from each state of Mexico, were chosen by the Secretaria de Educacion Piiblica because of their academic merits to travel to Los Angeles and interact with children from the Chicano community in schools. Moreover, three Encuentros Nacionales, Juventud en Solidaridad (National Encounters for the Youth), have been held so far with the 158

participation of more than 500 Chicanos. The traveling expenses of this group of Chicanos in Mexico was funded by SEDESOL with the cooperation of certain Mexican Consulates in the U.S. During such Encuentros Nacionales, Chicano visitors from more than twenty U.S. cities were exposed to different cultural events."^ In the same vein, during the administration of President Zedillo, the Programa Presidencial in conjunction with state governments sponsored the Primer Intercambio Juvenil de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Extranjero (First Youth Exchange of the Mexican Communities Abroad) with the participation of

144 young men and women both U.S.-Chicanos and Mexican nationals residing in the U.S."^ The purpose of this effort has also been to develop greater awareness of their Mexican heritage among young Chicanos and straighten their cultural identity through interaction with Mexican students."' Other innovative tools that allude to common symbolic values are the capsulas informativas (radio spots) that provide information about themes such as, patriotic celebrations (5 de mayo, the Day of the Flag, Mexican Independence Day and the Mexican Revolution Day); Mexican heroes, such as Benito Judrez; and Mexican traditions, such as Christmas and the Day of the Death."* In summation, Mexico's policy oriented at supporting cultural and educational programs toward the Chicano community 159

has used a wide array of tools. Two points can be drawn upon

the examination of such tools. On the one hand, the use of authority tools has been diminishing in the areas of culture

and education. Instead, the Programa Presidencial, the Institutes and Centros Culturales, the Consulates, and certain state governments have become permanent channels of transmission of the demands generated within the Mexican- origin community. On the other hand, the numerous tools employed illustrate the magnitude of the effort that the Mexican government carried out in the promotion of Mexican culture and the preservation of the Spanish language in the

U.S. Moreover, most of the tools are oriented to empower, to educate the community, or both (at times it is difficult to provide a clear cut distinction between them).

Conclusion

The promotion of cultural and educational programs oriented to the Chicano community is undoubtedly a major part of Mexico's outreach policy toward the Chicano community. Several points can be stated regarding this effort. (1) The number of goals and agents involved, exemplified the priority given to the outreach policies. (2) Interestingly, the merits of the efforts of the Mexican diaspora in favor of the enhancement of Mexican culture and the preservation of the 160

Spanish language have been acknowledged among Mexican

politicians. Moreover, the 1990s unfolded, certain Mexican policy-makers were in favor of a privileged relation with associations integrated mainly by first-generation immigrants from Mexico—the clubes de oriundos—alluding to the fact that they "are very supportive of Mexico.""® And (3) the impressive number and types of tools implemented reinforced the idea that the cultural and educational programs were probably the most important part of the Mexican efforts toward the Chicano community overall, and that this cultural policy remains as the major continuijm between the two recent

presidential administrations. 161

MOTES

1. This point was one of the conclusions of the meeting between Subsecretario Javier Barros Valero and the directors of the Institutes y Centres Culturales of Mexico in the U.S. Javier Barros, "First Meeting of Mexican Institutes and Centers " La Paloma 13, March- April 1993, p. 1. 2. The first director of the Programa Presidencial para la Atencion de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, Roger Diaz de Cossio, emphasized this. "United by Education" La Paloma 12 January-February 1993, p. 9. This point has also been stressed by Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Andres Rozenthal ("La Relacion Bilateral," La Paloma 13, March-April 1993, p. 3) and by the "Programa de Educaci6n 1995-1996," elaborated by the Direccion de Estudios Comunitarios of the Programa Presidencial para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores in May 1995. 3. Rozenthal, "La relacidn bilateral," p. 3. 4. Barros, "First Meeting of Mexican Institutes," p. 1. 5. Interestingly, according to Mexican high ranking officials, the tena culture not only refers to artistic manifestations, but should be understood as including the promotion of education, health and sports. See the speech by Teodoro Maus, Director of the Programa Presidencial in "II Reunion de Centres e Institutes Culturales Mexicanos, La Paloma 19, May-June 1994, p. 1. 6. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Direcci6n General del Programa Presidencial para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, Direccion de Comunicacion y Difusi6n Comunitaria, "Programa Cultural 1995- 1996," 1995, p. 1. 7. Gonzalez Gutierrez, "La erganizacion de los inmigrantes, p. 89. 8. "Mexican Cultural Institutes in New York and Houston," La Paloma 5 June-August 1991, pp. 1-2.

9. "Zedillo: una nueva dimensi6n en las relaciones con Estades Unidos" La Paloma 25, July-August 1995, p. 25. 162

10. "Comunidades," La Paloma 14, May-June 1993, p.9. 11. "Cronica de la comunidad," La Paloma 15, July-August 1993, p. 3; and "Carta del Gobernador Carlos Medina Placencia a sus Paisanos," La Paloma 21, September- November 1994, p. 13. 12. "Los 20 Institutos y Centres," La Paloma 21, September, October and November 1994, p. 1. 13. Rosario Green. "The Cultural Exchange," La Paloma 13, March-April 1993, p. 5. 14. "Institutes and Centers," La Paloma 13, March-April 1993, p. 6. 15. Gonzalez Gutierrez, "La organizacibn de los inmigrantes mexicanos," pp. 81, 88. 16. Direccion General del Programa Presidencial para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, Direcci6n de Asuntos Comunitarios, "Sistema de Informaci6n 1995- 1996," May 1995, p. 1. 17. Gonzalez Gutierrez, "La organizaci6n de los inmigrantes," pp. 87-88. 18. Green, "The Cultural Exchange," p. 5. 19. Remarks by Ambassador Andres Rozenthal, Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico at the National Congress of the Hispanic National Bar Association, Phoenix, AZ, 17 September 1994, p. 3. 20. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Direcci6n General del Programa Presidencial para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, "Programa Cultural 1995-1996," p. 1. See also, "United by Education," p. 9. 21. Gonzalez Gutierrez, "La organizacion de los inmigrantes," p. 86.

22. "Conclusions," La Paloma 13 March-April 1993, p. 15. 23. "SEP-LAUSD Agreement," La Paloma 15, July-August 1993, p. 6; and "The Key to a Close Door," La Paloma 16, September-December 1993, p. 8. 24. "Zedillo: una nueva dimension," p. 25. 163

25. "Casas de Mexico en el sur de California," La Paloma 14, May-June 1993, p. 5. 26. Interview with a high ranking official of the Siibsecretaria de Asuntos Bilaterales, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, interview by author, Mexico City, 19 June 1996. 27. "Cinco anos del Programa para las Comunidades Mexicanas," 22 La Paloma. January-February 1995, p. 1. 28. "Cronica de la Comunidad, July-August 1993, p. 3; and "Comunidades," La Paloma 21, September-Novemlser 1994, p. 2. 29. These state governments became members of an advisory board created by the Programa Presidencial to jointly promote different outreach programs. "Se intensifican vinculos entre paisanos," La Paloma 9, June-July 1992, p. 4; "Comunidades," La Paloma 14, May-June 1993, p. 3; and "El porvenir del Programa," 18 La Paloma^ March-April 1994, p. 1. 30. "Comunidades," September-November 1994, p. 2. 31. For a comprehensive panorama, see, "Conclusions," La Paloma 13, March-April 1993, p. 15. 32. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Direccidn General del Programa Presidencial para la Atencion de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, "Informe de Actividades 1995," p. 18. 33. Interview with a an official from the Subsecretaria de Asuntos Bilaterales of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Interview by author, 19 June 1996, Mexico City. 34. "Soon in San Diego," p. 6; "An Important Meeting," p. 1; and "Conclusions," La Paloma 13 March-April 1993, p. 15. 35. "Los 20 Institutes y Centres de Mexico," La Paloma 21, September-November 1994, p. 1. 36. Fernando Solana, "Los Institutes y la Cancillerla," La Paloma 13, March-April 1993, p. 2.

37. Barros, "Los Consulados," p. 4. 164

38. "Mexican Cultural and Educational Institute Founded in Chicago" La Paloma. March-May 1991, p. 7. See also, "Soon in San Diego," p. 6; Javier Barros, "Los Consulados," La Paloma 13, March-April 1993, p. 4; and "An Important Meeting," La Paloma 13, March-April 1993, p. 1.

39. "Opening of the Mexican Cultural Institute of San Diego," La Paloma 12 January-February 1993, p. 6; "Conclusions," March-April 1993, p. 15; Fernando Solana, "Los Institutes y la Cancillerxa," p. 2; "Mexican Institutes and Centers," La Paloma 18, March-April 1994, p. 16; and "Los 20 Institutes," p. 1.

40. The idea that such institutions cannot have a single structural and organizational pattern was stressed in the conclusions of the First Meeting of Mexican Cultural Institutes and Centers, held in Mexico City in March 1993. "Conclusions," March-April 1993, p. 15. 41. As certain Mexican officials have argued the "activity [of the Institutes and Centres Culturales] becomes more efficacious, pertinent and well-received," when distinguished members of the community are involved. Solana, "Los Institutes y la Cancillerxa," p. 2. See also, "Institute Cultural Mexicano en Los Angeles," La Paloma 3, January-February 1991, p. 1; and "Se funda el Institute Cultural y Educative Mexicano de Chicago," La Paloma 4, March-May 1991, p. 9.

42. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Funcionamiento de los Institutes y Centres Culturales en los Estados Unides. Manual Operative (Mexico: Pregrama para las Comunidades en el Extranjere, n.d.), pp. 4-6. See also, "Seen in San Diego, p. 6; "An Important Meeting," p. 1; and "Los 20 Institutes y Centres de Mexico," p. 1.

43. "Distribution of Educational Material," La Paloma 5 June- August 1991, p. 4; and "Courses in Spanish and Mexican Culture," Ibid. 44. Green. "The Cultural Exchange," p. 5. 45. This has been the case of the governors from Aguascalientes, Jalisco and Zacatecas. "Institutes and Centers," March-April 1993, pp. 6, 7, 10, 11. 46. Interview with an official of a Mexican Consulate in the United States, interview by author, 8 June 1995, Mexico City. By 1994, the Secretaria de Cemercie, the Secretaria 165

de Hacienda and the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores agreed that they would hold periodic meetings with Mexican and U.S. businessmen in order to seek alternative sources of financial support for Institutes y Centres Culturales, although this project has not materialized yet. "II Reuni6n de Institutes y Centres Culturales," p. 2. 47. "Institutes and Centers," March-April 1993, p. 6.

48. Ibid. p. 6. 49. Ibid., p. 11. 50. "Visita de Manuel Barlett," La Paloma 5, June-August 1991, p. 3. 51. "The Key to a Close Door," La Paloma 16, September- December 1993, p. 8.

52. "SEP-LAUSD Agreement," p. 6 53. Subsecretario Jos6 Angel Pescador of the SEP visited Los Angeles several times to discuss various projects on education with Chicano organizations and authorities of the Unified School District. "Educaci6n y bienestar social," La Paloma 14, May-June 1993, p. 8. 54. "United by Education" p. 9; and "Comunidad," La Paloma 10, August-September 1992, p. 6. 55. Many of them, such as the Direcci6n de Educaci6n Extraescolar (Bureau for Education out of the Classroom), the Direccion de Educaci6n Bilingue (Bureau for Bilingual Education), and the Direccion de Educaci6n Preescolar (Bureau for Pre-School Education) donated libraries to help out several educational projects toward the Chicano community. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Direcci6n General del Programa Presidencial para la Atencidn de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, "Primera Reuni6n Regional de los Consulados de Mexico, Institutes y Centres Culturales de California y Washington," Fresno, California, June 1995, pp. 6-12. See, also, "Educaci6n y Bienestar Social," La Paloma 14, May-June 1993, p. 9.

56. "United by Education," p. 9; and "Migrant Education," La. Paloma 4, March-May 1991, p. 6. 166

57. "El Programa Hermano," La Paloma 16 September-December 1993, p. 1. 58. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Primera Reunion Regional. pp. 6-12. See, also, "Educacion y Bienestar Social," p. 9. 59. "Culture," La Paloma 5 June-August 1991, p.6. 60. Interview with an official from the Institute Mexicano de Cinematograf ia. 61. "Alld donde vivia," La Paloma 14, May-June 1993, pp. 2-3.

62. "Conclusions," March-April 1993, p. 15.

63. Ibid. pp. 2-3. 64. Interview with an official from the Programa Presidencial para la Atencion de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, interview by author, 3 November 1995, Mexico City. 65. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Programa Presidencial para la Atenci6n de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, "Informe de Actividades 1995," p. 18. 66. Previously, Governor of Zacatecas, Jose Rodriguez Ellas, traveled to Los Angeles in 1962 to visit the community of zacatecanos in various cities in California. Cited in Gonzdlez Gutierrez, "La organizaci6n de los inmigrantes mexicanos, p. 177. 67. "Alia donde vivia," p. 4. 68. "Institutes and Centers," La Paloma 13, March-April 1993, pp. 6, 7, 10, 11. 69. Governor Ruiz Massieu signed an agreement of cooperation with various clubes de oriundos: the "Acuerdo para la promoci6n de comites mixtos para la ejecuci6n de obras y servicios publicos con la participaci6n de guerrerenses que temporal o permanentemente residen en el exterior." See, "Ruiz Massieu in Chicago," La Paloma 4, March-May 1991, p. 11 . 70. "Governor of Oaxaca in California," La Paloma 16 September-December 1993, pp. 2-3. 167

71. "Mexican Institutes and Centers," La Paloma 18, March- April 1994, p. 15. 72. "Culture," June-August 1991, p. 6. 73. "Conferencia Anual del Consejo Nacional de la Raza," La Paloma 15, July-August 1993, p. 1. 74. "Mexican Institutes and Centers," La Paloma 12, January- Febiruary 1993, p. 12. 75. "Governor of Oaxaca," pp. 2-3. 76. According to Armando Navarro, director of the Institute of Social Justice, "We have a massive crisis now in education, and for us as Latinos, it's a supercrisis...with devasting implications for the future." Brackman and Erie, "The Once-and-Future Majority," pp. 208-209. See also, "Conference on Literacy and Adult Education," La Paloma 5 June-August 1991, p. 4; and "Los Angeles Organization Representatives," La Paloma 6, September-December 1991, p. 10. 77. Harold Brackman and Steven P. Erie, "The Once-and-Future Majority," in The California-Mexican Connection, p. 215. 78. "Our Future," La Paloma 12 January-February 1993, p. 5 79. "President Salinas Greets Mexican Americans," La Paloma 4, March-May 1991, p. 1. 80. "The Program's Future," La Paloma 18, March-April 1994, pp. 1, 2. 81. "'We want to keep on Studying,'" La Paloma 1 September 1990, p. 3; and "OSIEC Informs," La Paloma. June-August 1991, p. 10. 82. "OSIEC Informs," p. 10. 83. "Governor of Oaxaca in California," pp. 2-3. 84. "First English-Mixtec Bilingual Program," La Paloma 7, January-March 1992, p. 6. 85. "Institutes and Centers," March-April 1993, pp. 6, 7, 10, 11. 168

86. "Sinaloa Week in Los Angeles," La Paloma 15, July-August 1993, p. 2. 87. "Solidaridad en el extranjero," La Paloma 8, April-May 1992, p. 10; "Alia donde vivia," pp. 2-3; and "SEP-LAUSD Agreement," p. 6. See also, Gonzalez Gutierrez, "La organizacion de los inmigrantes," p. 65. 88. "Teacher Training in San Francisco," La Paloma 9 June- July 1992 p. 7. 89. "Governor of Oaxaca," pp. 2-3.

90. "Alia donde vivia," p. 4. 91. Subsecretario Rozenthal exalted the fundamental contribution made by Mexican communities in the U.S. to "our common culture." "Remarks by Andres Rozethal," p. 2. See also, Georgie Ann Geyer, "Mexico's 'Friendly' Intrusions on U.S. Sovereignity," Chicago Tribune. 21 October 1995, p. 23.. 92. Green, "The Cultural Exchange," p. 5. 93. "Chronicle," La Paloma. 1 September 1990, p. 5. 94. "Casas de Mexico en el Sur de California," p. 5.

95. Gonzdlez Gutierrez, "La organizacion de los inmigrantes," pp. 81, 88. 96. "Institutes and Centers," March-April 1993, pp. 6, 7, 10, 11. 97. This is the case of the Hispanic Caucus and the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce. Michelle J. Meyers, "The Hispanic Caucus: United or Divided," Hispanic. September 1994, p. 22; and "Representantes de organizaciones mexicanas se entrevistaron con el Presidente de Mexico," La Paloma 6, September-December 1991, p. 10. 98. "Representantes de organizaciones mexicanas se entrevistaron con el Presidente de Mexico," La Paloma 6, September-December 1991, p. 10. 99. "Positive Planning Gives Educational exchange a Boost," La Paloma 10 August-September 1992, p. 6. 169

100. Gonzalez Gutierrez, "La organizacion de los immigrantes," pp. 60—62. 101. "Los 20 Institutes y Centres," p. 1. 102. "School is Built in Piaxtla," La Paloma 5, June-September 1991, p. 16 103. "Chicago for Guerrero," La Paloma 19, May-June 1994, p. 3. 104. "Comunidades," September-November 1994, p. 2. 105. "Mexican Institutes and Centers," La Paloma 18, March- April 1994, p. 15. 106. "Comunidades," September-November 1994, p. 2. 107. "Community Chronicle," La Paloma 15, July-August 1993, p. 3. Carta del Gobernador Carlos Medina Placencia, Gobernador del Estado de Guanajuato a sus Paisanos, 19 Octvibre 1994, Guanajuato, Gto. La Paloma 21, September- November 1994, p. 13.

108. "Alia donde vivia,", p. 3. 109. "Jalisco's Governor Visits Los Angeles," La Paloma li, October-December 1992, p.4.

110. "Los 20 Institutes y Centres," p. 1. 111. "Educational Exchange Reaches Kindergarten," La Paloma 8 April-May 1992, p. 6; and "Pre-school Education Exchanges," La Paloma 12 January-February 1993, p. 9. 112. "The Key to a Close Doer," p. 8.

113. "Educacion Migrante," La Paloma 4, March-May 1991, p. 6. 114. Generally speaking, there exists a clear shortage of bilingual teachers in the U.S. Just in California, the school districts needed 19,000 bilingual instructors in 1992. 115. "The Key to a Close Door," p. 8. 116. As part of the agreement, these Mexican teachers would have access to college courses that will provide them with new professional experience and skills, useful when 170

their return to Mexico. "SEP-LAUSD Agreement," p. 6. See also, Ivonne Melgar, "Migracion a Estados Unidos y Educacion," Educacion (Mexico City) 13, June 1996, pp. 8- 9 117. Melgar, "Migracion a Estados Unidos y Educacion," p. 12. 118. "Institute Mexicano de Cultura y Educacion de Chicago," La Paloma 8, April-May 1992, p. 13. 119. "New Edition of Summer Courses Catalogue," La Paloma 10 August-September 1992, p. 7. 120. "United by Education," p. 9; and "Migrant Education," La Paloma 4, March-May 1991, p. 6. 121. "Books" La Paloma 2 November-December 1990, p. 8; and "Aun fuera de Mexico te apoyamos," La Paloma 26, September-October 1995. p. 10.

122. Melgar, "Migracic3n a Estados Unidos y Educaci6n," p. 13. 123. "Libros para los Institutes," La Paloma. January-February 1991, p. 7; "A Push Forward: Education for Mexicans in the U.S.," La Paloma. June-August 1991, p. 9; "Mexico in Los Angeles. Conferencia Anual de Educacidn Bilingue y Migrante," La Paloma 8, April-May 1992, p. 7; "Mexican Institutes and Centers," La Paloma 12, January-February 1993, p. 12; and "Education on its Way," p. 5. 124. "Te interesa algo de lo que te ofrece el programa," La Paloma 26, September-October 1995, p. 15. 125. Secretaria de Educaci6n Piiblica. Direcci6n General del Programa Presidencial para la Atencion de las Comunidades en el Extranjero, "Programas de Educacion, 1995-1996" p. 1. 126. "Educaci6n," La Paloma 2 November-December 1990, p. 8; and "Books," p. 8. 127. "'We Want to Keep on Studying,'" La Paloma 1 September 1990, p. 3; "Books," p. 8; "Educacibn," p. 8; and "OSIEC Informs," p. 10. 128. "We Want to Keep on Studying," p. 3. 129. "Aun fuera de Mexico te apoyamos," p. 10. 171

130. "Te interesa algo de lo que te ofrece el Programa," p. 15. 131. "First English-Mixtec Bilingual Program," p. 6; and "Mexican Institutes and Centers" La Paloma 21, September- December 1994, p. 17. See also, Direcci6n General de Informacion de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, "Cronologxa de la Polltica Exterior Mexicana," in Revista Mexicana de Polltica Exterior, p. 240; and "Actividades de Centres e Institutes Culturales.La Paloma January- February 1995, pp. 9, 11.

132. "SEP-LAUSD Agreement," p. 6 133. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Direccion General del Programa Presidencial para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, "Programa Cultural 1995-1996," p. 1. 134. As an example, an important exhibition of painting was organized in the Museo Chicano in Phoenix, Arizona. "Culture," La Paloma 14, May-June 1993, p. 11. 135. "Mexican Cultural Institutes in New York and Houston," La Paloma 5, June August 1991, pp. 1-2. 136. Film festivals were held in Albuquerque, Denver, New York, Sacramento and San Antonio; they especially targeted to the Chicano community. "Culture," La Paloma 14, May-June 1993, p. 15. 137. Ibid., p. 15. 138. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Direcci6n General del Programa Presidencial para la Atenci6n de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, "Informe de Actividades 1995," p. 25.

139. "The Program's Future," p. 1. 140. As an example, in the early-1990s, the government of Chiapas funded the presentations of the marimba "Las Aguilas de Chiapas" en Chicago while the government of Puebla sent la "Estudiantina La Salle" to Milwaukee."Chiapas Marimba," La Paloma 5, June-August 1991, p. 3. 141. "La semana de Sinaloa en Los Angeles," La Paloma January- February 1991, p. 2; and "Mayor proteccion a los 172

mexicanos en Estados Unidos," La Paloma January-February 1995, p. 7. 142. "Mexican Institutes" La Paloma. March-May 1991, pp. 10- 11. 143. "Institutes and Centers," March-April 1993, p. 13; "Institutes and Centers," La Paloma 18, March-April 1994, p. 16. 144. Gonzalez Gutierrez, "La organizacion de los inmigrantes, p. 89.

145. "Mexican Cultural Institutes in New York and Houston," La Paloma 5 June-August 1991, pp. 1-2. 146. "Zedillo: una nueva dimensidn," p. 25. 147. "Comunidades," La Paloma 14, May-June 1993, p.9.

148. "Cr6nica de la comunidad," p. 3; and "Carta del Gobernador Carlos Medina Placencia," p. 13.

149. "El 'Aguila Azteca' a tres mexicano-norteamericanos," La Paloma 2, November-December 1990, p. 1; "El Aguila Azteca a tres mexico-norteamericanos," La Paloma. October- December 1992, p. 1; and "Our Future," La Paloma 12 January-February 1993, p. 5 150. Barros, "First Meeting of Mexican Institutes," p. 1. 151. Ibid. p. 1. See also, "300 jovenes mexicano-americanos en el 2o. Encuentro Nacional Juventud en Solidaridad," La Paloma ^ August-September 1992, p. 1; and "SEP-LAUSD Agreement," p. 6. 152. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Direcci6n General del Programa Presidencial para la Atencion de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, "Informe de Labores 1995," p. 25. 153. "Alia donde vivia," pp. 2-3; "SEP-LAUSD Agreement," p. 6; and "The Key to a Close Door," pp. 7-8. 154. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, "Informe de Labores 1995," p. 34. 173

155. Javier Barros, "Los Consulados," La Paloma 13, March April 1993, p. 4. 174 CHAPTER 5 PROPOSITION 187

The immigration of Mexicans to the United States has been in the U.S.-Mexican agenda for more than sixty years. In the 1990s, the issue reemerges with a new vitality because of the anti-immigrant ambiance that currently prevails in the United States.^ Recent alarming actions directed at Mexican immigrants in the U.S. have forced the authorities in Mexico to respond and address the issue forcefully.

Concurrently, Mexican immigration has, in fact, become a salient political issue in U.S. national and state elections. In this political climate, immigration from Mexico has polarized public opinion^ and policy-making. On the one hand, the restrictionists have called for measures, such as: the mobilization of the National Guard to patrol the border and aid in the apprehension of undocumented workers, the hiring of substantial number of additional border patrol agents, the upgrading of technology for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the building of a wall along the U.S.-Mexican border. Even legal residents from Mexico have been portrayed as a burden for the taxpayer because alleged abuses to the welfare system.^ Responding to such concerns, the U.S. Congress is currently discussing various bills addressing immigration 175

reform which are aimed at increasing sanctions to those employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers, and instituting various measures of control and deterrent of

undocumented immigration, and reducing the legal one. On the other hand, opponents to these measures emphasize the multiple contributions of immigrants (legal and undocumented) to the economy and society of the United States, and assume that salaries not social services are the magnets for the immigration from Mexico. In addition, they argue that it has indeed been the labor and the efforts of immigrants that made much of the growth and prosperity of America possible.* At the state level, several voices, including Governor Pete Wilson of California have underscored that undocumented workers are a heavy burden to the state and national economies. Wilson actively endorsed different proposals aimed at the curtailing the civil rights of the undocumented workers as a way to accelerate their deportation from the United

States. From 1993 on. Governor Wilson have attempted to limit to the access of undocumented workers to education and health services—and even stresses the expenses caused by their incarceration to his state. According to Wilson, two million undocumented workers that reside in California cost about 3,000 million dollars to the economy of this state.® He also 176 assumes that the social services, not the salaries, are the

magnet of the Mexican immigration.® In such a restrictive atmosphere, Proposition 187, a milestone of the current anti-immigrant sentiments in the U.S. was drafted and debated in California in 1994. This initiative contains dispositions that bar public schooling, social services and non-emergency health care to undocumented workers. Specifically, (1) it stipulates that each school district, community college or university must verify the legal status of students enrolling; (2) it bans undocumented workers from welfare services; and (3) it denies non-emergency public health care to undocumented workers.^ Proposition 187 passed with the support of 59% of the electorate in California in November 1994," but it is expected that the initiative will be tied up in courts for at least two years.' In November 1995, U.S. district judge Mariana Pfaelzer ruled that it was unconstitutional for California to deny access to elementary education to the sons and daughters of undocumented workers. Thus, teachers and school administrators do not have to inform the Immigration and Naturalization Service about the legal status of those minors in the United States. In addition. Judge Pfaelzer argued that the guestion of illegal immigration fell exclusively under federal jurisdiction. Yet, she left the door open to the possibility that higher education institutions could deny 177 education benefits to individuals who do not have legal documentation in the United States." If Proposition 187 is ever implemented, it can affect millions of Mexican nationals who live in California, including those who reside without proper documents and even legal residents. In the 1990s, at least 4 million Mexican nationals live in this state, and one million specifically in Los Angeles county." Moreover, various studies stress that California has been the most common destination of Mexican undocumented workers who consider this state as a suitable place to find a job." This chapter focuses on issues relating to Proposition 187 in terms of its connection with the Mexican outreach policy toward the chicano community on immigration matters. As Rafael Alarcon y Jesiis Martinez stated, "[Proposition] 187 afflicted the Mexicans residing in California but also distressed the foundations of Los Pinos [Mexico's Presidential House]."" Consequently, certain goals of Mexico's policy toward the Mexican diaspora in the U.S. were restated, new political agents participated in the decision-making process, the status of the targets was revisited, and innovative tools were implemented.^* From this perspective, the reaction of the Mexican government to the passage of Proposition 187 can be interpreted as a test of the possibilities and limits of the cooperation between the Mexican government and the Chicano 178

commtmity on aspects related to Mexican immigration to the United States. This chapter focuses on the discussion of this theme.

Goals

While the debates on Proposition 187 were taking place in

1994, the policy design of the Mexican government toward Chicanos was changing. Mexico condemned the growing anti- immigrant ambiance in California and, later, the passage of Proposition 187." Specifically, the goals relating to the (1) defense of the civil rights of Mexicans in the U.S. and (2) the role of Chicanos in the U.S.-Mexican relations were revisited by high-ranking officials in Mexico.

Civil Rights

By 1995, as part of this new Mexican activism, the defense of the civil rights of Mexicans in the U.S. was considered among the highest priorities of Mexico's foreign policy." Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Jose Angel Gurria stated the commitment of the Mexican government to "the defense of the quality of life and the rights of the Mexicans who live out of Mexico."" Innovative perspectives regarding sovereignty and citizenship—which had become part of a novel 179 political discourse on Mexican foreign policy—were incorporated into this subject matter. Secretario Gurria, justified the preoccupation of his government for the situation of the civil rights Mexicans in the U.S. by stressing that the Mexican nation in the contemporary period encompasses Mexican nationals who reside beyond the physical frontiers of the country." Moreover, by 1995, this goal (the defense of civil rights) was restated. First, Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores (Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs) Andres Rozenthal of the emphasized that the Mexican government "will always give support to the actions taken by Hispanic and human rights organizations in California to avoid the passage of Proposition 187."" Moreover, other Mexican policy-makers presented the strengthening of links with the organizations of Mexicans in the U.S. as the only viable way to deter the effects of the xenophobic wave against them.^° Later, in 1995, the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo also elaborated extensively on this point."

Second, as the number of cases of violation of the civil rights of Mexican in the U.S. was skyrocketing (in 1994, the Mexican Consulate in Los Angeles alone received more than one thousand new cases every month), the Mexican government admitted the tremendous financial limitations of the governmental programs that provided legal assistance in civil. 180

penal and laboral matters to Mexican nationals afflicted by the current anti-immigrant measures in the U.S., including Proposition 187. As a consequence, the initiative of no loss of Mexican

nationality was formulated.* Such an initiative would permit those Mexicans who legally have the possibility to get U.S. citizenship to do so without renouncing the advantages of retaining Mexican nationality. In other words the initiative, if approved, would permit to hold "dual nationality" to Mexicans in the U.S. who qualified for the U.S. citizenship. Specifically, the proposal of no loss of Mexican

nationality consisted of various components, according an internal document of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Among them were: the consideration that Mexican nationality cannot be renounced, the prohibition to hold double nationality to those who carry out "strategic and national security" governmental positions in Mexico," the limits to the transmission of Mexican citizenship to subsequent generations born abroad, and the creation of mechanisms to avoid that foreigners acquire Mexican nationality for personal

* At first the debates on such an initiative referred to "dual nationality." Months later the common term used was "proposal of the no loss of Mexican nationality." The domestic critique to the lack of inclusion of the "voting component" in the initiative as well as the fear of misinterpretation of the term "dual nationality" in the U.S. may have motivated the change. 181 convenience." The proposal of no loss of Mexican nationality did not include the possibility of granting the right of vote to those who hold the Mexican nationality obtain U.S. citizenship. Yet, this point is still a matter of debate in the hearings held in the Chamber of Deputies." The dramatic changes in the political discourse regarding the defense of civil rights of Mexicans in the United States has not occurred without a debate. Certain experts in constitutional and international law have raised their concerns. Alonso Gomez-Robledo Verduzco, a professor of the Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas (Institute for Juridical Research) of the Autonomous National University in Mexico (UNAM) pointed out that complex changes would be needed in the Mexican Constitution to permit the holding of dual nationality. He also stated that if approved, the proposal on dual nationality must stress that only one nationality is fully operative, at any given time.^®

Participation in U.S.-Mexican Relations

Another goal of the Mexican outreach policy toward the Chicano community that can be related to Proposition 187 is the support of Chicano participation in the immigration debate in the United States, a seminal issue in the current bilateral agenda.^® In their political discourse. Presidents Carlos 182

Salinas and Ernesto Zedillo welcomed the commitment of Mexican-origin leaders and organizations in the campaign to avoid the passage of Proposition 187, and, later, in its legal dispute in courts.^"' Subsecretario Andres Rozenthal of the Secretciria de Relaciones Exteriores stated that the Mexican government "will always give support to the actions taken by Hispanic and human rights organizations in California to avoid the passage of Proposition 187."=® Furthermore, other voices within the Mexican government presented the strengthening of links with the organizations of Mexicans in the U.S. as the only viable way to deter the effects of the xenophobic wave against them.^' In 1995, the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo as well as the blueprint of future objectives of the Programa Presidencial also elaborated extensively on this point.'"

Agents

Several Mexican governmental agents raised their concerns regarding Proposition 187—passed in late-1994. Some of them even became involved in innovative efforts to reach out toward the Chicano community on this issue. They included officials in the administrations of both President Salinas and President Zedillo, since the transition occurred in December 1994. This section examines the position of such agents within the political system as well as their agendas. Interestingly, 183

these agents are housed in the executive as well as the

legislative branches.

The Presidency

Mexican Presidents Carlos Salinas and Ernesto Zedillo were committed to taking certain actions to limit the negative effects of Proposition 187 on the Mexican-origin population in

the United States. After Proposition 187 was passed, Salinas's administration stressed its opposition to such an initiative that "pretend to deter the rights established by international covenants on civil rights."" Meanwhile, President Salinas's successor, Ernesto Zedillo—even as a presidencial candidate pointed out that he was committed to be "the first defender of the labor rights and dignity of Mexicans who have emigrated to the United States."" Later, as President, Zedillo pointed out the importance of creating new mechanisms to protect the civil rights of Mexicans in the United States." Moreover, in October 1995, President Zedillo declared during a meeting with Mexican-American leaders in Washington D.C. that he was fully committed to the proposal of no loss of Mexican nationality." 184

Ministries and other Agencies

Various ministries of the Mexican government were involved in the outreach efforts toward the Chicano community —implemented during the debate and final passing of Proposition 187. Among them, the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, through various bureaus, had a critical role. Other ministries (the Secretaria de Salud and the Secretaria de Educacion Priblica) were only put on alert because of the possible consequences of the initiative.^® They, however, never had to take any major action, since after the passage of the initiative its constitutionality was successfully challenged in courts. In the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, various high- ranking officials expressed their concern on issues related to Proposition 187, including the Office of the Secretary, the Consultoria Juridica, the Programa Presidencial, the Mexican embassy in Washington, D.C., certain Consuls and a group of members of the Foreign Service. From 1994 to the present. Secretaries Manuel Tello and Jos6 Angel Gurria have made strong statements against Proposition 187. Tello underscored the negative effects of Proposition 187 in various forvims.^® A year later, his successor, Jos6 Angel Gurria, followed up his critique. In early 1995, he sent a letter against the initiative to the 185

Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate." More recently, Secretario Gurria landerscored the benefits of the no loss of the Mexican nationality.'® He also pointed out the satisfaction of the Mexican government because certain provisions of Proposition 187 were annulled in court. "This is a step in the right direction," he said." The Consultoria Juridica (Legal Bureau) of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores was in charge of studying the legal feasibility of the proposal of no-loss of Mexican nationality. This bureau studied the possible modifications to the Mexican Constitution (articles 30, 37 and 38) and other statutes that had to be changed in order to implement this proposal.

Ambassador Miguel Angel Gonzalez F61ix, head of this bureau, stressed that, if approved, these changes will remove the "straight jacket" [la camisa de fuerza] to a population "between two to three million Mexicans in the United States," opening up for them the possibility of defending themselves in a better manner against nativist actions as U.S. citizens.*" Other bureaus within the Secretaria de Relaciones

Exteriores were also involved on issues related to Proposition 187. The Programa Presidencial reinforced its networking activities within Mexican-origin organizations. For that purpose, the Programa held several meetings with the heads of the Mexican cultural centers and institutes in the U.S.*^ to 186 discuss possible common strategies to be implemented in light of the xenophobic actions against Mexican immigrants." In addition, the Mexican Embassy in Washington presented several written complaints to the State Department because of the violations of civil rights against Mexican nationals.*^ Specifically, Ambassador Jorge Montano sent a diplomatic note to the Department of State that expressed the preoccupation of the Mexican government by the negative ambiance that Proposition 187 generated against Mexicans and Mexican- Americans in California.*' The Mexican Consulates in the U.S. also rendered an important role on the critical situation of the Mexican immigrants in the U.S.*' These bureaus announced their participation in a campaign to improved the image of Mexicans in the United States that highlighted their contributions to U.S. economy, society and culture.*® In addition, the consulates in California became particularly active in cases related to the defense of civil rights that included violence, mistreatment and even homicide of undocumented workers during 1994. Furthermore, Mexican Consul Jos6 Angel Pescador in Los Angeles was in contact with the organizations that struggle against Proposition 187. Later, he was one of the most active advocates of the proposal of no loss of Mexican nationality. He argued that millions of Mexicans would be positively 187 affected since they could better defend their civil rights in the United States.*^ A group of career officials of the Mexican Foreign

Service—taking an unusual step—also became interested in the repercussions of Proposition 187. They circulated a memorandum that urged the Mexican government to take a more active stand on immigration matters vis-^-vis the United states. These officials suggested that the Mexican government should engage in lobbying activities to influence U.S. decisions on immigration, following the model implemented by the Mexican government in the case of NAFTA.*® They also pointed out that in such lobbying activities, certain key arguments, including the contribution of Mexicans to the U.S. regional economies should be developed. In addition, these members of the Foreign Service proposed the starting of bilateral negotiations for a new type of "guest-worker program" in U.S. agriculture and services. Lastly, they recommended the strengthening of the programs which protect the civil rights of Mexicans abroad as well as those that discourage Mexican immigration to the U.S."'

The Legislative Branch

The legislative branch in Mexico has not usually made any major contribution to the outreach policy toward the Chicano 188 community. However, the Mexican Congress reacted to Proposition 187 in an exceptional way, exercising impressive leadership.®" In the Senate, members of the three major political parties protested against the initiative. They condemned the exacerbation of racism and discrimination that Proposition 187 generated in the U.S. domestic scene. In addition, several of its members asked the executive branch to take the issue of the civil rights of Mexicans in the U.S. to the Organization of American States and the United Nations." Other ideas also flourished in the Mexican Congress. The current president of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, Fernando Solana, suggested the holding of bilateral negotiations with the United States on immigration.®^ Perhaps the major contribution of the legislative branch to the Mexican outreach policy toward has been the debate on the no loss of Mexican nationality. An ad-hoc committee in the Mexican Congress was established to study possible modifications in articles 30, 36 and 37 of the Mexican Constitution—needed to state that the Mexican nationality cannot be renounced, even when a Mexican citizen acquired another nationality.®^ Several legislators from the Party of the PAN, the PRD, and PRI agreed that the proposal regarding the no loss of the Mexican was positive. Yet, they disagree on their content. While members of the PRI defined the concept of no loss of 189

Mexican nationality as the maintenance of the economic and legal privileges of Mexican nationality for those Mexicans who acquired another nationality, certain members of the PAN and the PRD stated that the proposal of no loss of Mexican nationality must have a political component ("dual citizenship") that would permit Mexicans residing in the U.S. to have a direct participation in Mexican politics —specifically in casting their vote in Mexican elections.®*

Recently, however, members of the Comisi6n Plural para la Reforma Electoral (Plural Commission for the Electoral Reform) from different parties supported an amendment to grant voting rights to those Mexicans residing in the U.S., so they could vote in the presidential elections of the year 2000.®® Such an amendment, however have not been approved by the floor.

In addition, the Mexican Congress, through the Instituto de Investigaciones Legislatlvas (Institute for Legislative Research), conducted several hearings on the proposal of no loss of Mexican nationality. As part of these endeavors, the colloquium, "La Doble Nacionalidad(Double Nationality) was held in June 1995 at the Palacio Legislative (Legislative Palace); legislators, high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch as well as certain Chicano leaders were invited to attend this meeting.®® This forxim included voices who argued in favor and against this important proposal.®' 190

This year, the debates that are taking place within both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate will be decisive for the final passing of the proposal of no loss of Mexican nationality.®® Next September, when a new period of sessions of the Congress will start, a bill on this issue may be formally introduced in the floor for final approval and passage into law.

State and Local Governments

State and local governments in Mexico were among the voices that expressed concern because of the anti-immigrant sentiments in the U.S., including Proposition 187. Governors and mayors complained about the mistreatment of Mexicans in the U.S. as well as the economic consequences that massive deportation and the diminishing of resources coming from the U.S. would bring to such communities. As an example, in the state of Oaxaca, all members of the state Congress concurred on the negative effects of the initiative. They considered that Proposition 187 would affect 400,000 Mexicans from Oaxaca residing in the United States (Oaxaca is after Zacatecas and Michoacdn the third largest sending state of origin of Mexican migrants to the U.S.)®' In addition, legislators from all political parties in the Congress of Hidalgo also denounced Proposition 187, and even sent communications to the 191

Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores and the federal Senate to be forwarded to U.S. government authorities, criticizing the negative consequences of such proposal for its state.

Targets

As the literature on Chicano-Mexicano relations emphasizes, the Mexican outreach policy toward Chicanos envisioned a community integrated by different target populations (related to the place of origin of its members): first-generation immigrants, and U.S. born-Chicanos. In the examination of these targets, two points can be taken into consideration. First, which particular organizations or groups were the main focus of the Mexican government, and, second how they were portrayed by Mexican agents. These two related aspects are discussed in the following pages.

U.S.-born Chicanos or Mexican Immigrants

Certain organizations of U.S.-born Chicanos that raised their voice against Proposition 187 were a preferential target population of the Mexican outreach policy related to Proposition 187. Among them were: the National Council of la Raza (NCLR), the Mexican American Legal and Defense Fund 192

(MALDEF), and the One Stop Immigration and Educational Center (OSIEC). The Mexican government stressed, at times, its interest in planning concerted actions with these organizations. In 1994, Consul Enrique Loaeza Tovar in Los Angeles emphasized that the Mexican government should make contacts with U.S.

organizations, including Chicano/Latino ones, such as MALDEF as well as with organizations of first-generation Mexicans to block the effects of Proposition 187.®^

However, the announced alliance between the Mexican government and the Mexican-origin organizations never fully materialized. Some meetings were held during President Carlos Salinas's term by Subsecretario Rozenthal and certain Mexican consuls in California with various Chicano/Latino organizations opposed to Proposition 187 in 1994. Yet, such efforts do not seem to be followed-up since them." Consequently, the actions of these organizations in terms of Proposition 187 took place concurrently of those conducted by Mexican governmental agencies. In other words, the Chicano organizations that developed an agenda against this initiative did that based upon their well-established commitment with the defense of the civil rights of the Mexican undocumented workers, and, only at selected times, they were aided by the Mexican government. In 1991, for example, Antonia Hernandez, President and General Counsel of this organization stressed 193 that "Mexican-Americans are defending the rights of Mexicans from the moment they cross the border.""

The NCLR was a key participant in the crusade against the Proposition 187. Its affiliates in California joined other groups in an attempt to defeat the initiative.®* This organization stated two major arguments that summarize the interest of Chicano organizations on this issue. First, the valuable contribution to the economy of California that undocumented workers make was stressed. According to the

NCLR, 3.5 million undocumented immigrants (1.1 million from Mexico) who reside in California these workers pay, at least, $15 million dollars in taxes annually." Second, the fact that any action against Mexican undocumented immigrants affects the civil rights of Chicano/Latino population as whole. As its director, Raul Yzaguirre argued, "the initiative [Proposition 187] created a climate of suspicion against U.S. citizens and legal immigrants because of their appearance, surname, language or speech accent."" The Mexican American Legal Defense Fund®' and One Stop Immigration and Educational Center®' also took a critical stand on Proposition 187. They, however, had differences regarding the strategy to be pursued vis-^-vis the initiative. MALDEF and other organizations mainly focused on influencing the U.S. public opinion, arguing that Proposition 187 was going to be disputed in the polls and later in courts. 194

Accordingly, they considered counterproductive any other form of political activities that could alienate the Anglo-Saxon electorate. Meanwhile, One Stop Immigration (and other

organizations) considered that political activism, including massive demonstration, was the right path to be pursued.®'

Certain evidence confirms that the massive demonstrations in protest of Proposition 187 did, in fact, generate a backlash and prompted individuals to vote in favor of Proposition 187. The display of the Mexican flag was especially unfortunate, since it alienated many voters. However, extensive campaigns which contained information and statistical materials countering many of the assertions of proponents of the initiative as well as arguments that alluded to immigration traditions in U.S. history did have positive effect especially among Latino voters. A majority of the Latinos in California (73%) voted against Proposition 187 while only 36% of the non-Hispanic White population voted against it.''° After the passage of Proposition 187, the expertise of organizations in dealing with immigration legal cases, such as the Mexican American Legal and Defense Fund, became more important from the perspective of the Mexican government. MALDEF, along with other civil rights and ethnic organizations,'^ filed at least eight lawsuits in California courts to fight against this initiative. A major argument was 195

that Proposition 187 was unconstitutional since the U.S. Supreme Court (in the case Plyler v. Doe) ordered the state of Texas to reopen its schools to all children, including the sons and daughters of undocumented workers in 1982. As a consequence of these lawsuits, U.S. district court Judge W.

Matthew Byrne in California issued a temporary restraining order that prohibited state officials from enforcing Proposition 187.'® Later, U.S. district judge, Mariana Pfaelzer ruled in a similar manner."

Other Chicano actions related to Proposition 187 are also worth noting since they coincided with an important proposal raised by the Mexican government. During 1994-1995, various organizations focused (or refocused) their attention on encouraging Latinos to apply for U.S. citizenship. Such Chicano organizations, as One Stop Immigration and Educational Center, offered to help legal residents apply for U.S. citizenship.'* In addition, OSIEC , for example, advocated the idea of "dual nationality" for Mexicans in the United States,'® because it would encourage them to apply for American citizenship and thus protect them for anti-immigrant policies.'® Moreover, in early 1994, leaders of OSIEC traveled to Mexico City, and lobbied the Minister of the Interior, Jorge Carpizo, in favor of this idea as a way to prevent the negative effects of anti-immigrant actions in the

U.S., such as Proposition 187." 196

In addition, the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) and the Southwest Voter Registration and

Education Project (SWVRP), among other Chicano/Latino organizations, also supported a campaign in favor of the naturalization of eligible immigrants. They envisioned that about one million (most of them Mexican nationals) individuals

would file for naturalization in the U.S. during 1995 as a reaction to the negative consequences of the anti-immigrant environment in the U.S.'® Such a figure can be increased in the future if the Mexican government passes the proposal of no-loss of Mexican nationality.

The Portrayal of the Mexican Diaspora

In light of the new challenges that Proposition 187 (and other restrictive actions to immigration) brought about to Mexico, its high-ranking officials depicted the Mexican diaspora in the United States in a positive manner." The contributions of Mexican-immigrants as well as those of U.S.- born Chicanos were constantly emphasized.

An example of the representation of Mexican immigrants is the article published in La Jornada by Luis Ortiz Monasterio, Mexican Consul in Miami, which was an eulogy to those individuals who are part of the Mexican diaspora. Ortiz

Monasterio expressed his "admiration" for their patriotism, 197

pointing out that they provided at least $3 billion annually to Mexico's economy, a critical figure considering its fragile situation.*" Looking specifically at undocumented workers, President Carlos Salinas praised "those Mexicans who with enormous courage and audacity cross the border in search of opportunities."®^ Later, dtiring President Zedillo's

administration, the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo formally recognized Mexican undocxamented workers in the U.S. for their valuable contributions to the U.S. and Mexican societies.®^

However, Mexican undocumented workers were also seen as "defenseless" vis-^-vis the anti-immigrant environment that they currently encountered in the United States, as

Subsecretarlo de Relaciones Exteriores Andr6s Rozenthal pointed out."^ Even when they participated in demonstrations and other forms of protests against Proposition 187 (between 8,000 to 10,000 students in California, many of them the sons and daughters of undocumented workers participated in such demonstrations),"' few voices within the Mexican government explicitly recognized the potential of such activism as a foundation of further political mobilization of the Chicano community for Mexican causes.*® Mexican legal residents in the U.S. were also perceived as in danger by Mexico's officials because of the possible effects of Proposition 187. However, many high-ranking 198

Officials considered that they can be empowered through the proposal of no loss of Mexican nationality."® "Mexico is on your side," President Zedillo said to a group of Mexican residents in the U.S. while arguing in favor of such a proposal."

Certain organizations of U.S.-born Chicanos (NCLR, MALDEF, OSIEC) that raised their voice against Proposition 187 were also portrayed in a positive way, and considered influential in the U.S. political scene.®® During President

Salinas's term, Manuel Tello, Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, pointed out that Mexico would be "attentive to observe whether there existed groups in California that question the legality of the Proposition [187], besides studying the possibility to support a lawsuit that could be filed before U.S. federal courts.®' Furthermore, in May 1995, his successor, Jose Angel Gurria, pointed out; "So far, we are pleased with the outcome of the legal actions [some of them brought to court by Chicano organizations] that have blocked the application of [Proposition] 187]."'°

Tools

Different types of tools were implemented by the Mexican government as a reaction to Proposition 187 and other restrictive initiatives on immigration in the United States. 199

Some of these tools are based on the authority of the government, and do their task without major consultation with the potential targets, and can even use sanctions. Others provide new resources, create capacities, or allude to the common values that agents and targets share (hortatory tools).

Authority Tools

President Ernesto Zedillo's regime employed certain authority tools in regard to Mexican undocxjmented workers. During a U.S.-Mexico bilateral meeting in Zacatecas in February 1995, it was formally announced "a two-step plan to slow illegal immigration to the United States by cracking down on migrant smuggling operations and creating inducements to persuade workers not to leave the country."'^ Besides that, in October 1995, President Zedillo made the offer to U.S. authorities that his government would collaborate in returning to their place of residence, those Mexican workers who—having a prior history of crossings without proper dociamentation "voluntarily" accepted—their deportation.'^

Resource Tools

The Mexican government also emphasized certain tools that could provide some resources to the population of Mexican 200

nationals in the Unites States. Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Andres Rozenthal, declared in 1994 that Mexican Consulates in the United States, especially in California,

would reinforce the politicas de proteccion while getting more economic resources and staff.'^ Furthermore, Consul Enrique Loaeza Tovar in Los Angeles announced the securing of supplemental allocations for the protection of Mexicans in the United States.'* In January 1996, the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores disclosed new actions to protect Mexican undocumented workers.

As a result, consulates increased their budget (in 20%) and staff to deal with the politicas de proteccion in a better manner. In addition, these Mexican representations were authorized to hire more legal consultants and reinforced their ties with organizations which share the common preoccupation of the defense of civil rights of Mexican nationals. Moreover the creation of a data bank was proposed, so Mexico could monitor any violations to the civil rights of Mexican nationals in the United States.'® It is worth noting that although these actions showed a commitment of the Mexican government with the defense of civil rights, public opinion in Mexico have the sense that they are not enough to deter the effects of the nativist wave against immigrants in the United States. The other problem is that 201

these resource tools seemed to contradict the authority tools also implemented during President Zedillo's administration. Another important resource tool directed at the

protection of the civil rights of Mexican nationals in the U.S. is the proposal of the no loss of Mexican nationality, if it becomes law in Mexico. The reason is that it would potentially benefit a population between two to three million Mexican nationals whose civil rights cannot be currently fully protected or guaranteed by Mexico. Furthermore, since Mexico is in the middle of a profound economic crisis it seems very unlikely that the country could implement many other capacity tools that could empowered the Mexican diaspora, especially those that require the allocation of additional funds.

Capacity-building Tools

A campaign also directed at Mexican nationals who resided in the United States can be considered as a capacity-building tool. According to the Annual Report of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores (1995), the Consulates in the U.S.— especially in California—were responsible for launching a crusade to let such residents know their rights and responsibilities as immigrants.'® So, they could defend themselves in a better manner. 202

Hortatory Tools

Hortatory tools were frequently used in light of

Proposition 187. They highlighted the common values that link the Mexican government with the Mexican-origin community in the United States, which is seen as a component of the great

Mexican nation. High-ranking officials from the Executive branch as well as legislators from different political parties have underscored the loyalty to their homeland that Mexicans nationals in the U.S. have traditionally kept. Elaborating on

this point, Senator Jose Ramdn Medina (PAN) pointed out the intense "spiritual link" between the "two Mexicos.""

Conclusion

In summation, the Mexican policy to outreach Chicanos on Proposition 187 has had interesting characteristics. Looking

at the goals, Mexican policy-makers focused their political discourse on two areas: the reinforcement of the protection of the civil rights of the Mexicans in the United States, and the role of the Mexican-origin organizations in the debates on Proposition 187 (and other restrictive proposals that emerged

in the United States). The goal of protecting civil rights was updated to include novel concepts of sovereignty and citizenship. 203

The Mexican outreach policy toward Chicancs on

Proposition 187 involved the participation of a unique combination of political agents. Within the Secretaria. de Relaciones Exteriores, various bureaus were involved. In this case the Programa Presidencial that usually takes the lead in issues related to the Mexican diaspora was only one among the agents that presented ideas regarding the proposal of no loss of Mexican nationality. The legislative branch, absent in other outreach efforts, was particularly active. Both chambers of Congress have held hearings on the no loss of the Mexican nationality and are responsible for passing the final bill. In addition, state and local governments have also expressed their concern on the negative implications of the implementation of Proposition 187 in their states. The targets of the Mexican outreach policy on Proposition

187 have received different treatment. Mexican undocumented residents were portrayed as an energetic segment of the great Mexican nation whose contributions to the economy of Mexico are critical. Yet, this population is also seen as powerless vis-^-vis U.S. restrictive proposals on immigration. Conversely, those Mexicans who reside legally in the U.S. are presented by Mexican policy-makers as being capable of protecting themselves against anti-immigration policies, if empowered through actions, such as the proposal of no-loss of

Mexican nationality. In addition, organizations whose 204 membership is mainly integrated by U.S.-born Chicanos were considered influential but few common actions materialized. 205

NOTES

1. A summary of the U.S. anti-immigrant proposals can be found in Monica Verea Campos, "The U.S. Immigration Debate and its Consequences for Mexico," Voices of Mexico. October-December 1995, pp. 18-21. 2. According to a Gallup survey, conducted in 1993, 65% of the American public consider that the undocximented workers have a negative impact on U.S. economy and society. Yet, 81% admitted that they did not know any undocumented worker personally. 3. Armando Ortiz Rocha, "La Operacidn Bloqueo," in Institute Matias Romero de Estudios Diplomdticos, La miaraci6n laboral mexicana a Estados Unidos de America: una perspectiva bilateral desde Mexico (Mexico: Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1994), pp. 227-229. Javier Rodriguez Gomez, "Censura el PRO, la 'indolencia' del gobierno ante la xenofobia en EU," El Financiero. 25 October 1994, p. 61; and David Aponte, "Ha deportado el SIN un mill6n 100 mil mexicanos," La Jornada. 10 November 1994, pp. 1, 10."En estudio, nueva versi6n del programa bracero," La Jornada,. 24 June 1995, p. 23.

4. California State Legislation, "Statement by Manuel Garcia y Griego Ph.D. and Leo Chavez, Ph.D. to the Assembly Select Committee on California-Mexico Affairs, Sacramento, 25 February 1995.

5. Monica Verea de Yturbe, "El debate actual sobre la inmigraci6n en California," en Instituto Matlas Romero de Estudios Diplomdticos in La miaracion laboral mexicana a Estados Unidos de America, pp. 233-234. 6. Ibid, p. 128.

7. "Inside Proposition 187," Los Anaeles Times. 10 November 1994, p. A-28. 8. Francisco Hernandez Puente y Manas§s Hernandez Barr6n, "La 187, solucion migratoria o presion econdmica? Tiempo. January 1995, pp. 42-43. 9. Karen Brandon and Hugh Dellies, "Legal Battle in California Begins over Proposition 187," Chicago Tribune. 10 November 1994, p. 14. 206

10. Michael Miller, "California measure receives setback," Reuter, Los Angeles, 22 November 1995 in [email protected]. 11. Enrique Loaeza Tovar, "La proteccion consular de los mexicanos en Estados Unidos," en La miaraci6n laboral mexicana. p. 246. See also, Salvador Camarena, "Mexicanos mas alia de las fronteras. La diaspora mexicana" Reforma. 16 June 1996, p. 12.

12. According to a study conducted by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 30% of the undocumented workers declared during the years 1983-1993 that their destination was California. Jorge Bustamante, "Migracion de Mexico a Estados Unidos: un enfoque sociol6gico," in La miaraci6n laboral mexicana. p. 63.

13. Rafael Alarc6n and Jesus Martinez, "La doble nacionalidad en una nacion de emigrantes," La Jornada. 21 June 1995, p. 45. 14. Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez, "La organizaci6n de los immigrantes mexicanos en Los Angeles: la lealtad de los oriundos." Unpublished Paper. 1995. pp. 15-16. 15. David Aponte, "Protestb Mexico ante Washington por abusos contra indocumentados," La Jornada. 29 October 1994, p. 3. and Elena Gallegos y Emilio Lomas, "Reitera Mexico su rechazo a la Propuesta 187," La Jornada. 10 November 1994, p. 3.

16. "La represidn no detendra a indocumentados," La Paloma 23, March-April 1995, p. 1. 17. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Discursos del Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores. Anael Gurrla. Mexico, Mayo-June 1995, p. 25. 18. Adriana Diaz, "No permitira Mexico que ningun organism© mundial juzgue nuestros comicios: Gurria," 15 June 1995, El Universal, p. 12. 19. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Remarks by Ambassador Andres Rozenthal, Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico on the occasion of the ceremony awarding the Aztec Eagle to Luis Valdez and Baldemar Velazquez, Los Angeles, California, 13 August 1994, mimeo. Cited in Monica Verea Campos, "Mexican Foreign Policy's New Activism in the U.S.," Voices of Mexico. July-September 1995, p. 37; and 207

Norma Carro, "Defendera el gobierno integridad de migrantes mexicanos a EU: Rozenthal," El Sol de Mexico. 11 October 1994, p. 19. 20. "Sera irrenunciable la nacionalidad mexicana," La Paloma 23, March-April 1995, p. 1; and "El Programa responde. Mayor enfasis a la organizacion de las comiinidades," La Paloma 24, May-June 1995, p. 1. 21. Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Piiblico, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1994-2000. Mexico, 1994, p. 15. 22. David Aponte, "No podrian obtener la doble nacionalidad militares y policias," La Jornada 7 July 1995, p. 12.

23. David Aponte, "Limites generacionales en el proyecto de doble nacionalidad," La Jornada. 6 July 1995, pp. 18-60. 24. "Analizan diputados tres vias para el voto mexicano en el extranjero," La Jornada. 5 June 1996, p. 7. 25. Alonso Gdmez-Robledo Verduzco, "Dual Nationality," in Voices of Mexico 33, October-December 1995, pp. 13-14.

26. In a diplomatic note sent to the Department of State after the passing of the initiative, the Mexican government argued that the "hostile" environment generated in California against Mexican nationals had a negative impact in the bilateral relations, and distressed the spirit of cooperation developed between Mexico City and Washington, D.C. in recent years.David Aponte, "Comenzo el gobierno mexicano consultas con el de Estados Unidos sobre la iniciativa 187," La Jornada. 22 November 1994, p. 3. 27. "Mexico backs defeat of measure," El Paso Times. 30 October 1994, p. IIA.

28. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Remarks by Ambassador Andres Rozenth. Cited in Verea Campos, "Mexican Foreign Policy's New Activism in the U.S.," p. 37; and Carro, "Defendera el gobierno integridad de migrantes," p. 19. 29. "Sera irrenunciable la nacionalidad mexicana," La Paloma 23, March-April 1995, p. 1; and "El Programa responde- Mayor enfasis a la organizaci6n de las comunidades," La Paloma 24, May-June 1995, p. 1. 208

30. Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Pxiblico, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1994-2000. p. 15; Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, "Programa para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Extranjero. Objetivos Estrategicos 1995-2000," March 1996, p. 3. 31. Gallegos y Lomas, "Reitera Mexico su rechazo," p. 3. 32. Jose Urena, "Ante miles de zacatecanos, Zedillo resistid la lluvia," La Jornada. 24 June 1994, p. 9. 33. "Serd irrenunciable la nacionalidad mexicana,"p. 1; and "Zedillo: una nueva dimension en las relaciones con Estados Unidos," La Paloma 25, July-August 1995, p. 1. 34. Ricardo Alemdn Aleman y Nestor Martinez, "Ofrecen empresarios de EU mantener capitales en Mexico," La Jornada. p. 6. 35. Gallegos y Lomas, "Reitera Mexico," p. 3; and Jesus Aranda, "De aprobarse la 187, Mexico no acudira a tribunales internacionales," La Jornada. 4 November 1994, p. 3.

36. Geyer, "Mexico's 'Friendly' Intrusions," p. 23. 37. "Mayor proteccidn a los mexicanos en Estados Unidos," La Paloma. January-February 1995, p. 7. 38. Secretario Gurrla restated this idea on his speech commemorating the Mexican Independence Day. "Texto Complete del discurso de Jose Angel Gurria," La Jornada. 17 September 1995, p. 25. 39. David Aponte, "Conferencia regional sobre migraci6n, en marzo de 96," La Jornada. 24 November 1995, p. 5. 40. "A continuaci6n se reproduce de manera Integra una entrevista concedida por el Consultor Juridico Miguel Angel Gonzalez Felix, a La Jornada relativa al proyecto sobre doble ciudadanla," NOTISEM. [Direccidn de Informaci6n Internacional, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores], June 1995, p. 5. 41. Chapter IV discusses in more detail the creation and current functions of such institutions. 42. "El Programa responde," p. 1. 209

43. "Respeto a inmigrantes, orden a la Border Patrol," La Jornada. 3 November 1994, pp. 1, 6.

44. Aponte, "Comenzd el gobierno mexicano consultas," p. 3. 45. They deal with more that 130,000 cases of proteccion. the majority of them occurred in California. David Aponte, "En EU, 130 mil abusos contra mexicanos en 94," La Jornada. 27 November 1994, pp. 1-8. 46. David Aponte, "Los malos tratos contribuyen a 'tensar' la relacion bilateral, indica la Cancilleria," La Jornada. 15 October 1995, p. 20. 47. Officer from the Partido Revolucionario Institucional. Interview by Author, Mexico City, 21 July 1995. See also, Julieta Medina, "Apoya EU naturalizar residentes," Reforma 10 June 1995, p. 1.

48. Jesus Aranda, "Temor de que la 187 se extienda a otros estados," La Jornada^ 18 Noventoer 1994, p. 3. 49. Elena Gallegos, "Aconsejan Comprometer a Clinton, II," La Jornada. 19 November 1994, p. 68. 50. Nestor Martinez, "Demanda el Senado al gobierno que refuerce sus acciones de defensa para indocumentados," La Jornada. 4 November 1994, p. 3. 51. Ibid, p. 3.

52. "Informacion de la Cancilleria," NOTISEM [Direccidn de Informacidn Internacional, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores], June 1995. 53. "Los partidos pollticos y la doble nacionalidad," La Paloma 23, March-April 1995, p. 4. 54. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Institute Matias Romero de Estudios Diplomdticos. "Minuta de la Sesi6n Doble Nacionalidad como Via para Propiciar los Derechos de los Mexicanos en Estados Unidos." February 1995. p. 3. 55. "Analizan diputados tres vlas para el voto mexicano en el extranjero," La Jornada. 5 June 1996, p. 7. 56. Jaime Arizmendi, "La doble nacionalidad disminuiria la discriminacibn," El Sol de Mexico. 9 June 1995, p. 5. 210

57. For those critical conments to the proposal of dual nationality. See, Antonio Tenorio Adame, "Observador Parlamentario," El Sol de Mexico. 14 June 1995, p. 5.

58. "Mexican Immigrants May Soon Get Double Nationality," p. 2; "Senate Reviews Proposed Legislation on Double Nationality," Program for Mexican Cnnmmnities Abroad. Bi­ weekly News Bulletin 18 (January 16-31 1996), 1.

59. Francisco J. Sanchez, "Intacta, la dindmica migratoria en Oaxaca," El Financiero. 28 October 1994, p. 60. 60. "Repudian sectores de la sociedad mexicana la 187; marchan y realizan mitines," El Universal. 5 November 1994, p. 3. 61. Loaeza Tovar, "La protecci6n consular de los mexicanos," pp. 247-248. 62. Interview with an official from the Programa Presidencial para la Atencidn de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, Interview by author. Mexico City. 18 November 1995.

63. "Aztec Eagle to Three Mexican-Americans," La Paloma 6, September-December 1991, p. 2. See also, Juan G6me2- Quinones, "Inmigraci6n y cambio cultural. La participacidn civica, la sindicalizacidn y la educaci6n" in Ma. Esther Sch\imacher ed., Mitos en las relaciones Mexico-Estados Unidos" (Mexico: Secretarla de Relaciones Exteriores/Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1994), pp. 329- 392. 64. This organization also took a strong stand against other actions that can halt the civil rights of undocumented workers, such as the creation of a nationwide computer verification system to check the legal status of the prospective workers. "NCLR Assails Immigration Commission Report," Agenda 3, Fall/Winter 1994-1995, p. 7; "Proposition 187 Passes in California," Ibid. p. 7. 65. Jose Luis Ruiz, "Serlan perseguidos 3.5 millones de ilegales con la ley antiinmigrante," El Universal, 30 October 1994, p. 24.

66. "Statement of NCLR President Raul Yzaguirre on the Enactment of Proposition 187." Agenda 3, Fall-Winter 1994-1995, p. 8. See also, Michelle A. Heller, "Stemming the Tide," Hispanic^ April 1994, p. 26. 211

67. On Proposition 187, this organization pointed out that it "denies various constitutional rights partly by encouraging discrimination against persons who appear or sound foreign." Paul Feldman and Rich Connell, "Wilson Acts to Enforce Parts of Prop. 187; 8 Lawsuits Filed," Los Angeles Times. 10 November 1995, p. 1-28. 68. This organization has helped Mexican workers (from 1960 to the present) to be part of educational programs, and to pursue a naturalization process, and legal aid. G6mez- Quinones, "Inmigraci6n y cambio cultural," pp. 329-392. 69. Aviles Sends, "Difieren lideres en estrategias," p. 6; Aviles, "Protestan estudiantes en California," p. 1; and Ferreyra, "Estiman dirigentes estudiantiles," p. 18. 70. Yet, only 52.6% of the more than 14 million of the citizens of California went to the polls. Hernandez Puente y Hernandez Barron, "La 187, soluci6n migratoria o presi6n econ6mica?, pp. 42-43. See also, "Hispanic Voters Stayed Away from California Polls," Chicago Tribune. 27 November 1994, pp. 1-6. 71. A variety of Asian American organizations acted together with Latino organizations against this Proposition. K. Connie Kang, "Asian American Groups Organize to Fight Measure," Los Angeles Times. 9 October 1994, pp. 1-3. 72. Hugh Dellios, "Immigration Fight May turn on '82 Ruling," Chicago Tribune, November 17, 1994, p. 28.

73. Miller, "California measure receives setback," p. 1. 74. Diane Seo, "Latino Groups assail Proposition 187 Boycott," Los Angeles Times. 12 November 1994, p. 4.

75. Alejandro Carrillo Castro, "La diferencia entre nacionalidad y ciudadania." Paper presented at the Coloquio Doble Nacionalidad, Cdmara de Diputados, June 1995, pp. 7-8. 76. A pioneer effort to support dual nationality took place in 1993. That year Chicano Councilmen and Majors of 26 California cities met with Secretario Fernando Solana and Enrique Loaeza, Consul in Los Angeles for this purpose - although with no major results. "Casas de Mexico in Southern California," p. 5. 212

77. This demand is, however, not new. In 1982, One Stop Immigration and Educational Center asked the Mexican government to consider this issue—although by that time the proposal was rejected because of the changes of the Constitution that were needed. Verea, "Mexican Foreign Policy's New Activism, pp. 37-38. 78. Raymundo Reynoso, "Doble nacionalidad a debate," La Opinion. 6 August 1995, pp. 1,6.

79. Salvador Guerrero and Aurelio Garibay, "Version de que se impulsaria la doble nacionalidad de migrantes," La Jornada. 13 November 1994, p. 20. 80. Luis Ortiz Monasterio, "Un encuentro con 'metedolares'," La Jornada. 28 January 1995, p. 5.

81. "Salinas to Mexicans in the U.S.: Come Home," The Albuquerque Tribune^ 14 November 1994, p. 1.

82. Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 1994-2000^ p. 15.

83. Remarks by Ambassador Andr6s Rozenthal. Cited in Verea Campos, "Mexican Foreign Policy's New Activism," p. 37. 84. Alberto Aviles Sen6s, "Difieren lideres en estrategias," Reforma. 26 October 1994, p. 6; Alberto Avil6s, "Protestan estudiantes en California," Reforma. 29 October 1994, p. 1; and Carlos Ferreyra, "Estiman dirigentes estudiantiles que habr^ desordenes, de aprobarse la 187," El Universal. 3 November 1994, p. 18. 85. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Remarks by Ambassador Andr6s Rosenthal. Cited in Verea Campos, "Mexican Foreign Policy's New Activism p. 37; and Carro, "Defender^ el gobierno," p. 19. 86. Ibid, pp. 2-3. See also, "A continuaci6n se reproduce de manera Integra," p. 6. 87. Ricardo Alem^n y Nestor Martinez, "Ofrecen empresarios de EU mantener capitales en Mexico," La Jornada. 12 October 1995, p. 6. 88. Aranda, "De aprobarse," p. 3; and Secretaria de Hacienda y Cr6dito Publico, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. p. 15.

89. Aranda, "De aprobarse," p. 3. 213

90. "Critica Gurria en EU trato a inmigrantes," Reforma. 17 May 1995, p. 1.

91. Gallegos, "Aconsejan comprometer a Clinton," pp. 1-10; and Dick Kirschten, "Pressured, Mexico City Gives Way," National Journal^ p. 488. 92. "Deploran acuerdo para repatriar a inmigrantes," Diario de Juarez 12 October 1995, p. 3.

93. David Aponte, "Combatird Mexico a la 187 en todos los foros: Rozenthal," La Jornada. 13 November 1994, p. 13. 94. Loaeza Tovar, "La Protecci6n Consular de los Mexicanos," pp. 246-248.

95. "Se refuerza protecci6n consular a mexicanos en Estados Unidos," Program for Mexican Communities Abroad. Bi­ weekly News Bulletin 18 (16-31 January 1996), 1. 96. Aponte, "Los malos tratos contribuyen," p. 15,

97. Such a link would not be deterred but consolidated with the approval of the proposal of no loss of Mexican nationality, according to this legislator. "Los partidos pollticos y la doble nacionalidad," p. 4. 214

CHAPTER 6 NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

From the late-1980s to the present, Mexico pursued a policy oriented to intensifying the links with the Chicano community. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was an important part of this Mexican governmental effort. In order to evaluate specifically the policy design of reaching- out to Chicano/Latino organizations on NAFTA, this section focuses upon its specific characteristics: goals, agents, targets and tools.

Goals

The goals or "purposive statements,"^ in the Mexican policy toward Chicanos on NAFTA can be stated based upon various governmental documents.^ Among these goals were the support for business links, the promotion of Chicano participation in U.S.-Mexican relations, and the search for Chicano political support of the ruling party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PHI—which was a rather new one goal, at least in the contemporary period. 215

Attainment of Political Support

The search of the Mexican government for the political support of the Chicano community was a goal linked to NAFTA. Certain policy-makers admitted off-the-record the importance of this goal. According to their argioment, the dangers of the criticism from the Chicano organizations toward Mexico on various issues including NAFTA could be a disaster for Mexico. Chicanos could become "Mexico's worst enemy" within the U.S. Moreover, such officials argue that the Mexican left opposition parties could take advantage of that situation, as it would have occurred in during the presidential elections of 1988 and its aftermath.^

Participation in U.S.-Mexican Relations

Another important goal in Chicano-Mexicano relations refers to the explicit recognition of the role that Chicano/Latino organizations could play in greater U.S-Mexican relations." During the negotiations of NAFTA, Mexican officials frequently stated this goal. Specifically, they mentioned that Chicano organizations were critical allies of the Mexican government. In 1991, for example, during President Salinas's visit to Chicago, he stated before the leaders of various Chicano organizations: 216

I invite you to be the most fervent promoters in the American union of this trilateral trade agreement... our main objective is to export goods not Mexican labor... with the treaty, more jobs will be created in both countries. Without it, we will all be hurt.®

In the same vein, Secrstario de Comercio, Jaime Serra Puche, the Mexican major negotiator of NAFTA, stressed that the support of Chicano/Latino organizations was extremely important.® For this purpose, the Secretarxa de Comercio developed special ties with the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce and the National Council of la Raza, considered key partners of Mexico on the final passing of NAFTA in the U.S. Congress.'

Business Ties

By the time U.S. and Mexican Presidents disclosed their intentions to carry out negotiations for a free trade agreement, Mexican officials began to point out the importance of promoting business connections with Chicanos. Although this goal was briefly mentioned at various times in the 1970s and 1980s,® it did not flourish until the administration of President Carlos Salinas.' President Salinas and other high-ranking officials stated frequently that it was possible to build a very positive relationship between Mexicans and Chicano/Latino organizations through the development of business opportunities. Salinas 217 stated: "I am convinced that specific business opportunities between Mexicans and Hispanics, we can build a very positive relationship. The Free Trade Agreement between Mexico and the

United States will be a formidable opportunity for the Hispanic community and for a better relationship between Mexico and this community."^" Moreover, Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Fernando Solana, remarked that: "Today's Mexico is a propitious place to engage in good business. We want our American friends to actively participate in this task. We include, of course, those [friends] from

Mexican-origin.

Agents

A variety of governmental agents from the Executive branch were involved in reaching out to the Mexican-origin community in the case of NAFTA. They included the Office of the Presidency, several cabinet-level bureaus and state governments. This section explores briefly the rank of these agencies in charge of outreach policies toward the Mexican diaspora in the U.S. and the discretion and political resources that the they had. 218

The Presidency

The Office of the Presidency was extremely active in the outreach policy toward Chicanos on NAFTA. President Carlos

Salinas de Gortari was personally involved in various activities. Moreover, in a political system where the President had a key role in the decision-making process, Salinas also provided mandate and resources to other bureaus within the Executive branch to pursue such a policy. In several occasions. President Salinas visited Midwestern and Southwestern cities in his trips to the U.S. to celebrate meetings with Chicano organizations and leaders." He held several meetings with the leadership of organizations, such as the National Council of la Raza (NCLR), LULAC (League of United Latin American Citizens, and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF). Interestingly, in the case of MALDEF, an organization that expressed specific concerns on NAFTA, he personally invited its leaders to discuss them in

Mexico.

Ministries and Other Agencies

The role of the cabinet-level bureaus within the Executive branch is also worth noting. Among the such bureaus involved in outreach tasks toward Chicanos are: the Secretaria 219

de Relaciones Exteriores, the Secretaria de Comercio, the Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior (National Bank for Foreign Trade, BANCOMEXT), and Nacional Financiera (National Finance

Agency, NAFIN). The Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, an agency that some scholars have considered reluctant on Chicano affairs, developed closer political links vis-^-vis Chicano

organizations.^* The Programa Presidencial para la Atencion de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior and the Mexican Consulates in the U.S. were also really active in outreach efforts. The Programa Presidencial promoted vigorously the business links between Mexico and those Chicanos. For this purpose, it created a special division on business. The main tasks of this division were "to explain Mexican economic policy, the novel trade opportunities, and the new possibilities opened up to the Chicano community because of

NAFTA."" It is worth noting that under the coordination of the Programa Presidencial, the Consejo para la Promocion de Negocios con las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior (Council for the Promotion of Business with the Mexican Communities Abroad) was established in 1990." Various Mexican governmental bureaus and Mexican business organizations are 220 part of the Consejo para la Promocion de Negocios.' This Coxincil is in charge of promoting business, providing assistance to Latino investors on Mexican laws and regulations and organizing expositions, conferences and other events to foment trade links.^"' In 1992, the Consejo para la Promocion de Negocios was a co-signer with Nacional Financier a (National Financial Agency, NAFIN), the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce and the National Council of la Raza of the Reserva Hispana CHispanic Reserve) This was "historic" cooperation agreement for the promotion of joint ventures between Mexican and Chicano/Latino entrepreneurs that included the creation of an initial fund to support such co-investments.^®

Within the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, the Mexican Consulates in the U.S., also had an important role.

They were usually in charge of setting up meetings and

* The Asociaci6n Nacional de Importadores y Exportadores de la Republica Mexicana (the National Association of Importers and Exporters of the Mexican Republic, ANIERM); the Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior; CANACO; CANACINTRA; the Fondo Mexicano de Inversi6n (the Mexican Investment Board, MIB); Nacional Financiera (NAFIN); the Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico; the Secretaria de Comercio; and the Secretaria de Turismo.

The signers of this agreement were: Nacional Financiera, the Mexican Investment Board, the National Council of la Raza, the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the Texas Association of Mexican American Chambers of Commerce and the California Hispanic Chamber of Commerce. Other characteristics of the Hispanic Reserve are discussed later since Nacional Financiera was the Mexican agency entitled to implement it. 221 briefings between Mexican officials and the organizations of the Mexican-origin community regarding the status of the negotiations on NAFTA, and the promotion of business with

Mexico under the new trade framework. The consulates in Chicago, Los Angeles, San Antonio, and San Diego were particularly active in these tasks." However, because of

limited resources, and the supervision of high-ranking offices in Mexico City, most of the Consulates only enjoyed limited discretion in their action, and their spending resources on this matter.

New players in the Executive branch came to life on NAFTA. The Secretarla de Comercio became a key new agent. This agency, through its Oficina Negociadora (Office for Negotiations) in Washington, D.C., organized periodic meetings in sixteen U.S. cities to disseminate information on the Mexican economy and business opportiinities in Mexico for Latino/Chicano business. Various Chicano/Latino organizations were targeted as key possible political allies of the Mexican government. High-ranking officials of the Secretaria de Comercio briefed Chicano/Latino leaders on the Mexican position on NAFTA, and invited to visit Mexico to learn first­ hand about specific opportunities to invest. Distinctive ties were developed with the Hispanic Caucus, Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the National Council of la Raza, and with individual small and medium entrepreneurs.^" 222

Moreover, the Secretaria de Comercio, as part of its efforts to support the passing of NAFTA,hired three Chicanos as registered lobbyists of the Mexican government. Their most important task was to identify Chicano

organizations (or leaders) that could be influential and supportive regarding the final passing of this trade agreement; thus, the Mexican government could establish contact with them." The activism of the Secretaria de Comercio toward Chicanos had no precedents, although it was undoubtedly

conducted as part of strategy design from the office of the Presidency. None ministry in charged of economic affairs in Mexico was ever so involved in an outreach policy toward the Chicano community.

Various sources reported that the Mexican government, mainly through the Secretaria de Comercio, spent from May 1989 to May 1993 more than $20 million dollars in various activities in favor of NAFTA.About 25% of these resources were used to financed a broad public relations campaign, and other 25% to fund professional lobbyists. As part of this endeavor, Mexico hired various Chicano/Latino lobbyists, including: Toney Anaya, former governor of New Mexico (1983- 1986) and currently involved in the Democratic National Committee; Jerry Apodaca, also a former governor of New

Mexico; Gabriel Guerra-Mondragon (Puerto Rican), former U.S. 223

Foreign Service officer and current President of TKT International Inc. in Washington, D.c.; Edward Hidalgo, a lawyer in Washington D.C., and a former Secretary of the Navy

(1977-79); and Abelardo L. Valdes, a long-term proponent of a free trade agreement. In addition, various public relations Chicano/Latino firms were also involved in lobbying activities, including Campos Communications from Houston;

Moya, Villanueva and Associates in Southern California and Pantin Partnership in Miami. other governmental agencies linked to economic matters helped spawn the support of Chicano/Latino organizations on NAFTA, such as the Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior. BANCOMEXT allocated new resources to foment investment,^® and offer its technical assistance to Chicano/Latino firms engaged in trade and investment in Mexico.'® In addition, from 1992 on, Nacional Financiera in the creation of a fund, the Reserva Hispana, to promote investment from Chicano/Latino entrepreneurs in Mexico.As a consequence, Chicano/Latino investors "are offered an attractive investment alternative, the Mexican entrepreneurial experience and the access to new markets."" According to NAFIN, the areas that were promising in terms of potential joint ventures between Mexican and Chicano/Latino investors were: environment, food and agriculture, furniture, machinery and equipment, services and textiles- 224

State and Local Governments

Among the novel agents involved in the promotion of NAFTA were Mexican state governors. From 1990 to 1993, various governors from the states of large migratory tradition to the U.S. (Guanajuato, Oaxaca, San Luis Potosi and Zacatecas) increased their visits to the U.S. to meet with their "constituency abroad." They traveled to various U.S. states

(California, Illinois, Pennsylvania) to meet with the clubes de oriundos, looking for support for their party, the PRI.

Interestingly, as part of their agenda, they also held meetings with the Hispanic Chamber of commerce and with individual Chicano entrepreneurs interested in investing in their states."

Targets

Chicano organizations, as target populations, can be examined from various perspectives. The literature suggests the study of the composition of these targets, specifically in terms of the place of birth of their members. Since the organizations of the Mexican-origin community were not passive recipients of the Mexican outreach policy,'® it is useful to use a bottom-up approach to point out their inputs to the Mexican policy design on NAFTA. In addition, the discussion 225 on target populations also focuses on how they are portrayed— positively or negatively—by the political agents.

U.S.-born Chicanos or Mexican Immigrants

The most active supporters of NAFTA were organizations comprised of U.S.-born Chicanos. Accordingly, the specific reactions of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the NCLR and MALDEF are discussed in the following pages. In addition, the position of the Labor Council of Latin American Advancement is also discussed.

Although this is not strictu sensu a chicano organization, Chicanos are part of its membership. Moreover, the arguments of the Labor Council regarding NAFTA exemplified the kind of critique that also emerged from the Mexican-origin commxinity regarding this trade agreement. At the beginning of the negotiations on NAFTA, the Chicano members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus had different opinions on the negotiations of NAFTA." In 1990, when Congress voted for the "fast track" procedure on NAFTA, five of eleven members of the Caucus supported it: Albert Bustamante (D-Texas) Eligio (Kika) de la Garza (D-Texas), Solomon P. Ortiz (D-Texas), Bill Richardson (D-New Mexico), 226 and Edward Roybal (D-California).* Matthew Martinez (D- California) and Esteban Torres (D-California) voted against it." Interestingly, all of them argued that reasons linked to their constituencies were behind their votes.

During the negotiations of NAFTA, a major ally of the Mexican government within the Caucus was Representative Bill

Richardson (D-NM). He was instrumental in the process of gaining support for the trade agreement.'* Richardson maintained that chicanos in the U.s could benefit from the passage of NAFTA because of the new jobs that would be created. Moreover, he stated that those Chicanos/Latinos in business, who share "a common heritage, language and culture" with Mexico,'® could take advantage of the new opportunities to invest in this country.

There existed, however, critical voices regarding to NAFTA within the Hispanic Caucus. Representative Esteban Torres stated that "Latino business leaders are mistaken. They have been courted and led to believe that they will be large participants in this process. But by and large this is designated to impact large scale, multinational industry."'® Specifically, Torres and other Chicano representatives addressed the question of the infrastructure of the border.

* Henry Gonzalez (D-Texas). who is not a member of the Caucus, was also in favor of the "fast track." 227

In July 1993, Esteban Torres introduced legislation to create the North American Development Bank (NADBank) as an agency responsible for financing environmental, housing and other developmental programs on the border. A group of Latino academicians contributed to the design of the bill. NADbanJc was designed a lending institution funded initially by the U.S., the Canadian and the Mexican governments." The proposal to create NADbank and the "side-agreements" on NAFTA regarding labor and environmental issues (that will be discussed in the following pages) were important to gain the vote of various undecided members of the Hispanic Caucus, such as Ed Pastor (D-Arizona) On November 18, 1993, the day when the House of Representatives passed NAFTA," the vote of the seventeen members of the Hispanic Caucus was split. Nine of its members, all of them Chicanos, voted in favor: Xavier Becerra (D-Calif), Henry Bonilla (R-TX), Eligio "Kika" de la Garza (D-TX), Solomon Ortiz (D-TX), Ed Pastor (D-AZ); Bill Richardson (D-NM), Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-Calif), Frank Tejeda (D-TX), and Esteban Torres (D-Calif). Eight members of the Caucus voted against, including two Chicanos: Henry Gonzalez (D-TX) and Matthew Martinez (D-Calif).*° The position of the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce on NAFTA evolved from 1990 to 1993. At the beginning of the negotiation process, for example, several of its members, such 228

as the Texas Association of Mexican-American Chambers of

Commerce argued that only large corporations, with experience in international markets, could benefit from this trade agreement."^ Later, these concerns disappeared.*' For example, the president and key members of the Greater San

Antonio Chamber of Commerce traveled to Washington, D.C. in 1991 to lobby the U.S. Congress in favor of the agreement." Other Chicano members of the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce also became particularly supportive of NAFTA. As Gilberto Partida, President of the San Diego County Hispanic Chamber of Commerce pointed out, the trade agreement would provide financing opportunities for Hispanic-owned businesses.'* In summation, the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce became an active lobbyist in favor of NAFTA. The National Council of la Raza was an early advocate of North American Free Trade Agreement. This organization even played the role of broker between the Mexican government and various Chicano/Latino organizations. The NCLR, for instance, took delegations of Chicano/Latino business, community and media representatives to meet with their counterparts in Mexico, looking for a better understanding of the agreement. Raul Yzaguirre, the President of the National Council of la Raza, explained these actions in the following terms: "We [Chicanos] must be players on that issue [NAFTA]. Hispanics must learn how to make our presence felt-"'® 229

Yzaguirre, however, expressed preoccupation with the negotiations in certain areas such as agriculture and textiles, as well as on the consequences of NAFTA for the American workers and the environment, especially on the border.*® He argued that numerous members of his constituency lived close to Mexico, and they would be seriously affected by the trade agreement.*"' MALDEF took a cautious step at the beginning of the negotiations on NAFTA. Its President, Antonia Herndndez, stated: "It is imperative that issues like migration and job loss remain on the table during free trade negotiations and be addressed by the administration and Congress." Her specific concerns were job displacement, immigration, environment and health." Following her advice, MALDEF established a commission to set up a policy on these issues.*' Later on, when the leaders of MALDEF supported the inclusion of the "side agreements" on labor and environmental issues, the stand of the organization on the trade agreement became favorable. In addition, the foundation of the NADBank was enthusiastically endorsed by MALDEF." Antonia Hernandez emphasized: "Over one hundred million dollars will be dedicated [by NADBank] to short and long-tena retraining and income support for workers displaced by NAFTA over the next 18 months."" 230

Interestingly, various of the organizations that supported NAFTA (included those discussed above) sponsored coordinated efforts, on October 1993, the National Council of la Raza and MALDEF, among other individuals and organizations, were part of the Latino Consensus on NAFTA, an umbrella organization established to lobby in favor of the final passing of the agreement. It is worth noting that the Latino Consensus enthusiastically endorsed the "side agreements" of NAFTA. Proposed by President Bill Clinton and signed that year by the governments of the U.S., Mexico and Canada, such agreements exemplified the fact that the U.S. government had responded positively to their main concerns regarding the enforcement of the labor laws, the establishment of a retraining program for those workers affected by NAFTA, and the protection of the environment.®^ In addition, the creation of the North American Development Bank (NADBank) in November 1993, based on a piece of legislation introduced by a member of the Hispanic Caucus, Representative Esteban Torres (D-CA), became another common proposal of the Latino Consensus." Besides the fact that various members of the Hispanic Caucus voted in favor of NAFTA because of the inclusion of this issue, the creation of this bank had the strong support of the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, MALDEF and the NCLR, among other Chicano/Latino organi zations. 231

The NADBanJc was created to be the leading regional

institution that will provide economic resources to the communities negatively affected by NAFTA.Its starting capital was $3 billion, but "additional and private funds could generate upwards of $20 billion for the financing of projects."" Mexico agreed to contribute an initial capital of $225 million to develop new projects.®® The main purpose of the NADbank was to finance the upgrading and cleaning of the U.S.-Mexico border region in a period of ten years, including border water clean-up and environmental-related border infrastructure, and the development of projects anywhere in the U.S. where NAFTA causes job loss, "through the issuance of long-term, low-interest loans."®' More than two years after its founding, the NADbank has received more than 100 proposals related to various border issues, including the cleaning of water, improvement of sanitary sewage, and increase in the generation of electricity. Conversely, the role of the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement on the negotiations of NAFTA was completely different. Despite the efforts of the Mexican government to gain its support, its leaders, such as Joaguin Otero, were against the agreement. Although Otero said that he was in favor of the U.S. collaboration with Mexican economic 232 development, he rejected the free trade agreement as a way to fulfill this purpose.

The Labor Council for Latin American Advancement was mainly concerned about job losses—as a result of the shutting down of U.S. plants and their shift to Mexico—and the unemployment and wage depression that the implementation of NAFTA could cause in the U.S.®" Otero stated that "Hispanic workers in the U.S. will be more affected than anyone else, because we are the ones who are the last hired, and the first fired. If we do not lose our jobs, then we are going to have to lower our standards in order to compete with the maquilas."" During his participation in congressional hearings, Joaquin Otero cited the case of a Green Giant plant that moved from Watsonville, California, to Guanajuato to illustrate his points. The consequence of the closing of that plant was that 1,000 Chicano workers were fired. Another example was a Zenith plant in Evansville, Indiana. This company emigrated to Mexico leaving behind 1,400 unemployed Latinos." It is worth noting that the arguments maintained by the Labor Council echoed the stand regarding NAFTA of other sectors of the Chicano community. According to those voices, even if NAFTA created high-skilled high-paying jobs in the thousands, it would reduce blue-collar, low-skilled, low-wage employment in the short-term," exactly in the segment of the 233

labor market where most Latinos (including Chicanos) are located.®* Thus, the community would bear a disproportionate share of the cost of the economic adjustment.®^

The Portrayal of the Mexican Diaspora

Mexico's outreach policy toward the Mexican diaspora on NAFTA included important changes in the way Chicanos and their organizations were portrayed by Mexican officials. For first time, high-ranking officials in Mexico, such as Subsecretario Javier Barros Valero from the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, candidly admitted that pochismo'^^ and other forms of prejudice against Chicanos had affected negatively the development of Chicano-Mexicano relations, and suggested a change.®' Echoing such thoughts, another Mexican influential official in the Office of the Presidency acknowledged that paternalistic attitudes in the Mexican side had also been an obstacle in Chicano-Mexicano relations.®®

Accordingly, while Mexican officials pursued the support of NAFTA, they portrayed the organizations of the Mexican diaspora, as important actors in U.S.-Mexican relations. Specifically, their role was depicted as a "bridge" between the two governments. Elaborating on this point, Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Javier Barros Valero, stated that: 234

Through Chicanos, it will be possible to transmit a more accurate image of the Mexicans which states with fairness the accomplishments of the government and its efforts to overcome ancient problems, including the risks of the modernization. This is the case of the drug trafficking and the extreme poverty."®'

In the same vein, before a meeting of MALDEF, Secretario de Relaciones Exterlores, Fernando Solana, pointed out that "as long as Mexico is a more respected country, the values that Mexican-Americans represent in the pluralist U.S. society will be considered in a better light.

The positive portrayal of the Mexican diaspora did not make any explicit distinction between U.S.-born Chicanos or Mexican nationals. However, it seems that the organizations considered more influential in U.S. politics and more valuable political allies for the Mexican government were those mainly integrated by U.S.-born Chicanos.

Tools

The tools are important pieces of the Mexican policy design. They connected the Chicano organizations as targets and the Mexican governmental goals and agents. Generally speaking, the tools in a policy design can give orders, resources, new capacities, and appeal to ascribed values. In the case of NAFTA, the Mexican government used various types of tools. 235

Resource Tools

A tool designed to empower the Mexican-origin entrepreneurs was announced by president Salinas in 1991. According to Salinas, the Mexican government would convince larger American companies that it would be easier for them to do business with Mexico if they had Latino people at the leadership level, because this policy would facilitate communication and dialogue with Mexico.'^ In addition, the funds provided by the Reserva Hispana can also qualified as a resource tool. These funds are oriented to the promotion and the financing of new business links. Nacional Financiera committed more than $35 million to the Reserva Hispana to promote investment from Chicano/Latino entrepreneurs in Mexico.'^ In discussing the commitment of the Mexican government to finance Chicano/Latino projects, Ernesto Chavarria from the Texas Association of Mexican- American Chambers of Commerce stated, "I have a verbal commitment from [Jaime] Serra [Mexican Minister of Commerce]... that when this money is exhausted [to foment joint ventures between Mexicans and Chicanos] more will be made available.'"' So far, fifteen projects have been submitted to the Reserva Hispana.''* Moreover, Raul Yzaguirre, the leader of the NCLR pointed out other capacity tool that brought positive changes in the 236

perceptions on Chicanos in the United States. According to his argument, as a consequence of NAFTA, "the U.S. and Mexico have come to the table as equals; this newfound respect has

got to help improve the image and prestige of Hispanic Americans.

Capacity-building Tools

Certain tools provided information on the possibilities to make business in Mexico for Chicano organizations and individuals. For example, the Mexican government established a variety of programs that gave those members of the Mexican- origin community interested in business, the possibility to promote and expand their ties to Mexico. In 1990, the Programa Presidencial played the role of broker between Latino/Chicano business organizations, such as various state associations (especially from California y Texas) affiliated to the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, and Mexican business organizations, especially the Camara de Comercio de la Ciudad de Mexico (Mexico City Chamber of Commerce, CANACO), and the Camara Nacional de la Industria de la Tranformacion (National Confederation of Industrial ChambersAs a result, the Primer Congreso de Hombres de Negocios Chicanos y Mexicanos (First Congress of Chicano and Mexican Businessmen) took place

in Chicago in 1990. 237

In addition, NAFIN agreed to provide business information to the Chicano/Latino community in the United States. That task includes economic briefings on Mexico, advise on projects'feasability, and assistance on contact Chicano/Latino investors with potential partners in Mexico.'®

Hortatory Tools

In the search for support for NAFTA, the Mexican government frequently alluded to hortatory tools that refer to shared common values. The purpose of these tools was to "cement" the links of President Salinas's regime (and its party, the PRI) with key Chicano organizations and individuals. In April 1991, for example. President Salinas, while asking for MALDEF's blessings on NAFTA, pointed out: "We know your fathers had to come here in search of work they could not find in Mexico, we do not want the past to be repeated.

Even in the description of the objectives of the Reserva Hispana, it is stressed that this financial fund gives the businesses of the Mexican-origin community "the opportunity to contribute to Mexico's economic development." Interestingly, such an assertion assxames that Chicano entrepreneurs are indeed concerned about this issue, and also gratified because of their contribution to the homeland.®" 238

Finally, another example of such hortatory tools is that for five consecutive years (1990 and 1994), President Salinas granted Mexico's most prestigious award, the Aguila Azteca, to distinguished Chicanos.®^ Among the leaders that have received the award were Antonia Hernandez from MALDEF, Raiil Yzaguirre from the NCLR, and Bill Richardson of the Hispanic Caucus; all of them valuable allies of the Mexican government during the negotiations and final passage of NAFTA.

Conclusion

This chapter focused on the goals, agents, targets and tools that encompassed the Mexican policy design toward Chicanos in relation to NAFTA. During the period 1990 to 1993, the Mexican government stated various goals in its policy vis-a-vis Chicanos, including the attainment of political support of Salinas's government and its party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional; the promotion of Chicano participation in U.S.-Mexican relations and the strengthening of business ties.

Various Mexican governmental agents were involved in pursuing such goals. They were part of the Executive branch. The Office of the Presidency had a major role: dealing directly with Chicano issues, and setting guidelines for other agencies. 239

Looking at the governmental agencies in terms of mandate and resources, the Programa Presidencial within the Secretaria de Relaciones Exterlores scores high. However, the novel role of economic agencies (not predicted by the literature), such as the Secretaria de Comercio, BANCOMEXT and NAFIN in Chicano matters was instrumental in the outreach policy. Finally, the role of certain Mexican state governors was modest, but it exemplified the type of foreign policy actions they can display. In terms of the targets, the Mexican government focused on certain specific organizations with national visibility in its search of support for NAFTA. Interestingly, the membership of such organizations is mainly made up of U.S.- born Chicanos. This point is worth noting in light of the controversy in the literature regarding whether American-born or Mexican-born Chicanos are more prone to cooperate with the Mexican government.

Certain targets mentioned in this chapter did not limit their role to promoting or rejecting the Mexican government's stand on NAFTA. They provided some input to the negotiations; the support to the creation North American Development Bank is an interesting example. Finally, the tools of the Mexican policy design to reach- out to Chicano organizations provided various positive payoffs for certain Chicano/Latino organizations. These rewards 240 included: new financial resources, the granting of prestige, and the celebration of their common heritage with Mexico. 241 MOTES

1. Ingram and Scheneider, "The Choice of Target," p. 336. 2. Such as position papers, speeches, and interviews with high-ranking officials from the Office of the Presidency, the Secretaria de Comercio, and the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. 3. Mexican official from the Secretariado Tecnico del Gabinete de Politica Exterior, Office of the Presidency, interviewed by author, 30 July 1991, Mexico City. 4. Joe Keenan, "Harnessing Hispanic Power," p.17. 5. Constanza Montana and Melita Garza, "Chicago Greets Mexico's Salinas," Chicago Tribune^ 11 April 1991, p.7.

6. Jaime Serra Puche "U.S. Hispanics Will Benefit," vista. 4 April 1992, p. 6.

7. Mexican Official from the Secretarla de Comercio, interviewed by author, 22 June 1994, Mexico City. 8. Consejo Nacional de Poblaci6n, Proarama de Acercamiento del Gobierno de Mexico con la Comunidad M6xico- Norteamericana. p. 20. See also, Rodolfo de la Garza and Claudio Vargas, "The Mexican-Origin Population of the United States as a Political Force in the Borderlands: From Paisanos to Pochos to Potential Political Allies," p. 93.

9. Alfredo J. Estrada, "Interview with President Carlos Salinas de Gortari," Hispanic. September 1992, p.22, 10. Ibid, p. 22.

11. "Palabras del Canciller Fernando Solana." Paper presented at the XV Meeting of MALDEF, Los Angeles, CA, 30 November 1989. 12. In April 1991, for example, he went to Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and San Antonio. In all of these cases, he actively promoted NAFTA. Constanza Montana, "Salinas Won't Ignore Mexican Americans," Chicago Tribune. 10 April 1991, p.17; and Montana and Garza, "Chicago Greets Mexico's Salinas," p.7. 242 13. Montana, "Salinas Won't Ignore Mexican-Americans," p.17. 14. Rodolfo de la Garza states that in the 1970s, "at least two of the most recent Secretaries of Foreign Relations were known to be openly hostile to Chicanos." De la Garza, "Chicanos and U.S. Foreign Policy" in Western Political Quarterly, p.572.

15. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Programa para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, "Descripcion General," October 1992, p. 4. 16. Ibid. p. 3. 17. La Paloma. no.15, Julio-Agosto de 1993, p. 15. 18. Nacional Financiera, Reserva Hispana NAFIN-MIB (Mexico, D.F.: Nacional Financiera, 1992), p. 7. 19. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Direccidn General de Infonaacion, "Entro en funciones el Programa Presidencial para la Atenci6n de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior," Comunicado B-060, Mexico, 27 January 1990, p. 2. 20. Ibid, p. 4. See also, "Programa para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Extranjero", Estados Unidos Informe Trimestral (Mexico City) 4 (October-December 1991), p. 59.

21. Maribel Hastings, "Mexico invirtio $25 millones en cabildeo a favor del TLC," La Opinion^ 28 May 1993, p.l.

22. Dresser, "La nueva politica mexicana en Estados Unidos." p. 22; and Mexican Official from the Secretaria de Comercio, interview by author, 22 June 1994, Mexico City. 23. Hastings, "Mexico invirtio $25 millones," pp. 1, 18. 24. Rick Mendosa, "The Business of Influence," Hispanic Business. September 1993, pp. 34-36; and Martha Frase- Blunt, "On the Fast Track to Free Trade," Hispanic. August 1991, p.16. 25. Rick Mendosa, "Money to Grow By," Hispanic Business. March 1993, pp. 26-27; and Rick Mendosa, "Natural Bridges of Opportunity," Hispanic Business^ January 1993, p.22. 243

26. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Direccion General del Programa Presidencial para la Atencion de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, "Objetivos, Pollticas e Ideas Programaticas," April 1990, p. 2; and Serra, "Hispanics Will Benefit", p. 8. 27. Mendosa, "Natural Bridges of Opportunity," p.22; and Mendosa, "Money to Grow By," pp. 26-27. 28. The Hispanic Reserve will provide financial support through the following mechanisms: "Direct Equity Investment Program in the company's capital, on an strictly minoritarian (up to 25%) and temporary basis (up to 7 years. [And] Indirect Equity Investment through the Venture Capital Funds (Sincas) specialized in equity financing for small and medium size firms to induce additional resource contribution to the company's capital." Nacional Financiera, Reserva Hispana. p. 8.

29. "Cronica de la Comunidad," La Paloma (San Antonio, TX) 16 (September-December 1993), p. 4. 30. Interview with an official of the Direcci6n General del Programa Presidencial para la Atenci6n de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, interview by author, 22 July 1993, Mexico City. 31. After the elections of November 1992, the Hispanic Caucus has 17 members (11 of them are Chicanos). Hector Cantii, "New Muscle in Washington," Hispanic Business. February 1993, p. 16. 32. Rick Mendosa, "Taking the Fast Track to Mexico," Hispanic Business. July 1990, p.10. 33. Rodolfo Medina, "TLC y el hueso latino," Uno mas uno. March 26, 1993, p.23. 34. Humberto Lopes, "A Caucus Bitterly Divided," Hispanic Business. November 1993. pp. 12-16 35. Bill Richardson, "With NAFTA, Opportunities Will Be Bright for U.S. Business," Hispanic. January/February 1994, p.132. 36. Jesus Sanchez, "U.S. Latinos Divided over Free Trade Pact," in Los Angeles Times. August 18, 1992, pp. Al, A25. 244 37. "Side Agreements Mean that NAFTA Finally Goes to Congress," Hispanic Business. September 1993, p. 28.

38. Lopes, "A Caucus Bitterly Divided," p. 16; and Karen Ball, "Clinton Offers to Defend Republicans Who Back NAFTA," Albuquerque JournalNovember 13, 1993, p. A3. 39. "Houses Passes NAFTA 234-200," Los Angeles Times. 18 November 1993, p.l.

40. Interestingly all the Cuban and Puerto Rican members of the Hispanic Caucus voted against NAFTA. "How They Voted," Los Angeles Times. 18 November 1993, p.16. 41. Tomas Rivera Center, The Free Trade Agreement. A Mexican- American Perspective. n.p., 1991, p.4; and Constanza Montana, "Hispanics Seek Piece of the Pact," Chicago Tribune^ 18 September 1991, p.l 42. Gabriel Aguirre, the Chairman of the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce expressed his optimism regarding the benefits that the agreement will bring to its organization. Mark Nelson, "U.S.-Mexican Trade Hispanic Business. March 1991, p.20. Rich Mendosa, "Natural Bridges of Opportunity," pp. 18-22. 43. Rick Mendosa, "Taking the Fast Track to Mexico, p. 10; and "Mexico podria aumentar exportaciones en 100% con el TCL preve6 John Ciaccia." Uno mds uno (Mexico City), 27 February 1991, p. 34.

44. Although he stresses that the agreement should offer financing opportunities specifically for Hispanic-owned businesses, and that the U.S. government should provide retraining and education for business people along the border to help them take advantage of the new opportunities of NAFTA. Frase-Blunt, "On the Fast Track to Free Trade," pp. 17-19. 45. Ibid. p. 13. 46. "Apoya el TLC la mayoria de los latinos en Estados Unidos," La Jornada (Mexico City), 12 July 1991, pp.13, 41. 47. Frase-Blxint, "Committed to Unity," p. 13. 48. Montana, "Salinas Won't Ignore Mexican-Americans," p.17. 245

49. "MALDEF," La Paloma 4 (March-April-May 1991), p. 5. 50. MALDEF, and the National Council of la Raza, along with otherindividual leaders and organizations, became part of the Latino Consensus on NAFTA. This association was dedicated to lobby in favor of the agreement. Latino Consensus on NAFTA, There Are 20 Billion Reasons to Support Presidents Clinton^s NAFTA...(Montebe11o. CA: Latino Consensus on NAFTA, 1993) p.3. 51. "Analyzing NAFTA, Latino Voices Emerge," p. 3. See also, Mary Jo Marion, "NAFTA Passes," Agenda 4 (Fall 1993), p. 1. 52. Latino Consensus on NAFTA, There Are 20 Billion Reasons to Support p. 1.

53. Raul Yzaguirre, "Latinos Will Prosper and Not Just Financially," Los Anaeles Times. 16 November 1993, p.11; and Marion, "NAFTA Passes," pp.2-3. 54- The creation of a bank to finance developing programs in the border have been discussed by Chicano scholars since 1991. Other Chicano leaders, such Jos§ Angel Gutierrez, also favored the idea of "a sort of a Marshall Plan for the border," which included about 600 billion in investment for the next 10 years. Hector Cantii, "A Lone Star in Texas," Hispanic Business^ April 1993, p.14. 55. Latino Consensus on NAFTA, "There Are 20 Billion Reasons," p.l. 56. "NAFTA Passes," p.l. 57. "MALDEF-Supported Worker Training, Economic Development Package Key to NAFTA Passage," MALDEF (Los Angeles) 1 (February 1994), p.2. 58. "Trade Pact at Glance," Los Anaeles Times. 18 November 1993, p.A-17. 59. Ibid. 60. Joaquin F. Otero, " 'Hispanics' Jobs at Risk," in Vista, p.8. 61. Frase-Blunt, "On the Fast Track," p.20. 246

62. See Jack Otero's statements on NAFTA in Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on P\ablic Works and Transportation, "Free Trade Pact with Mexico Would Hurt U.S. Workers," (Washington, GPO, 1991): 347-351. 63. Chicanos had references that furniture-making stores and a major cannery were relocated from California to Mexico. Sergio Munoz, "Big Deal, Unknown consequences," Los Angeles Times. April 12, 1991, p. B-7.

64. Certain indicators support this trend. In 1987, 28.3% of Mexicans were classify as poor. In 1991, the unemployment rate was 6.7% for the nation and 9.6 for Mexicans. Rebecca Morales and Lisa Magana, "Latinos in the U.S. Economy: Challenges and Policy Implications." in The Journal of Hispanic Policy VI. January 1993, pp. 4-7. See also, Jesus Sanchez, "U.S. Latinos Divided over Free Trade Pact," in Los Anaeles Times. August 18, 1992, pp. Al, A25. 65. Morales and Magana, "Latinos in the U.S. Economy: Challenges and Policy Implications," pp. 4-7. 66. Pocho is a derogatory temn used in Mexico referring to members of the Chicano community in the U.S., either American-born or Mexican-born. It denotes an attitude by Chicanos of condescending and neglect toward Mexico. It also implies the loss of Mexicanidad (the maintaining of Mexican values, tradition, and Spanish language). 67. "Palabras de Javier Barros Valero, Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the National Council of La Raza, Washington, D.C., 19 January 1990. 68. Mexican official from the Secretariado Tecnico del Gabinete de Politica Exterior, 1991. 69. "Palabras de Javier Barros Valero". 70. "Palabras de Fernando Solana." 71. Mendosa, "Money to Grow by," p. 26. 72. Mendosa, "Natural Bridges of Opportunity," p.22; and Mendosa, "Money to Grow By," pp. 26-27. 73. Rick Mendosa, "Natural Bridges of Opportunity," p.22. 247

74. One of the projects is from Manuel Resales, president of the California Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, who is involved in ventures as helicopter and drinking-water distribution in Mexico City. Sandra Marquez, "Closing the Deal," Hispanic. April 1993, pp. 40, 42-43. 75. Latino Consensus on NAFTA, There Are 20 Billion Reasons to Support, p. 1; and Yzaguirre, "Latinos Will Prosper," p. 11. 76. Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Descripci6n General. Programa para las Comunidades en el Exterior (Mexico City), October 1992, p. 3; and Marquez, "Closing the Deal," pp. 40, 42-43. See also, Mexican official from the Direccion General del Programa Presidencial para la Atencidn de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, interview by author, 25 June 1991, Mexico City. 77. "Que es el Programa Presidential". Chicago Deportivo (Chicago, ILL), 31 May 1990, p. 7. 78. Ibid, p.10 79. Constanza Montana, "Salinas Wins Hearts in Little Village," Chicago Tribune. 12 April 1991, p.8. 80. Nacional Financiera, Reserva Hispana. p. 8. 81. "Mexico Promotes Ties with the Mexican-American Community, La Paloma. September 1992, p. 2.

82. "NCLR President Raul Yzaguirre Receives Aztec Eagle Award from Mexican Government," Agenda 2 (Winter 1993), p.2. 248

CHAPTER 7 Comparing and Contrast: the Three Case-Studies of Mexico's Outreach Policy to%fard the Mexican Diaspora

This chapter has one major purpose. It compares and contrasts the findings of the three case-studies (cultural and educational programs, Proposition 187 and NAFTA) discussed that pertain to Mexico's policy design toward the Mexican diaspora in the United States. The principal objective is to derive certain general conclusions from an examination of the case-studies. In order to conduct this task, the propositions discussed in the section Looking at the Policy Content in Chapter 1 served as guidelines.

Goals

Mexico has developed an outreach policy toward the Chicano community since the mid-19th century when Mexico was defeated in a war against the United States and about 100,000 Mexicans were left behind in the Southwest that came under U.S. control. Some of the goals of this policy can be traced back to the I9th century, including the support for the civil rights of Mexicans in the United States, the search of political support from the Mexican community and the enhancement of Mexican culture in the United States. From that time to the present, however, such goals have certainly 249 evolved. In addition, other goals have emerged in the contemporary period, such as the search for business ties between Mexicans and Chicanos, and the fostering of Chicano participation in certain areas of U.S.-Mexican relations. As Table 3 indicates, Mexico has pursued a variety of goals in its outreach policy toward the Chicano commxanity in the contemporary period. The following pages discuss each of the goals presented in Table 3 in light of the literature and arrive at certain conclusions drawn from the case-studies.

Civil Rights

The literature discusses whether the goal that deals with the defense of the civil rights of the Mexican-origin community in the United States focuses on the community as a whole or whether the population of Mexican nationals is the main point of interest (a similar debate exists in terms of the targets of Mexico's outreach policy). The conclusions drawn upon the case-study on Proposition 187 supported the first assumption. The main focus of the Mexican reaction to this Proposition was a segment of Mexican nationals residing in the U.S. In several occasions, Mexican policy-makers stated that the proteccion of the civil rights of Mexicans abroad (including the undocvimented ones) was a key 250

TABLE 3 CONTEMPORARY MEXICO'S OUTREACH TOWARD THE CHICANO COMMUNITY

Goals Pursued (x)

Goals Case~Stu

Cultural and Educational Proposition 187 NAFTA Programs

Civil Rights

Enhancement o-T Mexican Cultut-e

Attainment of Po11t1ca1 Support

PartIclpatlon In U.S.-Mexican Relations

Bu s1ness Ties

principle of Mexico's foreign policy. In addition to that, Mexico's political discourse acknowledged that certain Chicano organizations whose agenda includes the defense of civil rights of Mexicans are instrumental in the implementation of such a goal. A development on Chicano-Mexico relations that the literature did not predict is the possibility of a new conceptualization of Mexico's defense of the civil rights of Mexican nationals abroad, such as the linkage of education and 251 the proposal of no-loss of Mexican nationality with the defense of the civil rights. This change started during the 1990s.

At the end of President Salinas's regime, Mexican officials recognized certain financial and staff limitations that could affect the pursuit of the defense of the civil rights of Mexicans abroad. As a consequence, Mexico's contribution to adult education in Spanish in the U.S. began to be linked with the promotion of civil rights of first- generation Mexican immigrants. Following this line of thought, any advancement in the educational level of the Mexican population in the United States is related to an improvement in its standing in U.S. society, and thus be more able to defend its civil rights.

Furthermore, as a response to the nativist wave in the United States, which explains the emergence of Proposition 187, another innovative proposal has been enunciated by the Mexican government during President Zedillo's administration, the proposal of the no loss of mexican nationality. It refers to a proposed change in the Mexican Constitution and other related laws to include a clause of non-loss of the Mexican nationality for the acquisition of U.S. citizenship. According to Mexican officials, the purpose of this change is to permit a considerable segment of first-generation immigrants (at least 2 to 3 million people) who qualify for 252

U.S. citizenship, to do so without the deterrent of losing

certain economic and transit privileges that Mexican nationality entitles. This segment of potential new U.S.

citizens, thus, will be able to defend their civil rights in a better manner.

Enhancement of the Mexican Culture

The enhancement of Mexican culture within the Chicano community is a notable goal in the literature. It is widely accepted that this has been the single most successful goal implemented by Mexico's outreach policy. A point of contention, however, refers to whether or not the pursuit of cultural ties can attain closer political links between the Mexican government and Mexicans in the United States. The chapter on cultural and educational programs sustains that the enhancement of Mexican culture has indeed been an important goal pursued in the contemporary outreach policy

toward the Chicano community. Yet, after the discussion of the case-study, it is not possible to conclude whether or not this goal has permitted Mexico's government to attain the political support of this community, although it is clear that the administrations of Presidents Salinas and Zedillo have other goals in mind besides the promotion of Mexican culture

per se. 253 Attainment of Political Support

The development of political support within the Chicano community toward the Mexican government forms the fifth goal sought. Certain scholars stress that this goal reemerges in the mid-1980s, with the appearance of a strong opposition presidential candidate (Cuauhtemoc Cardenas) whose agenda included efforts to actively reach out to the Chicano community.

From that time to the present, the search for the political support of the Mexican diaspora has been a behind- the-scenes goal in two of the case-studies (cultural and educational programs and NAFTA). This goal is not explicitly written about in Mexican programs and public documents, but certain policy-makers have admitted off-the-record that Chicano support for cultural and educational programs, and the reaction to Proposition 187 and NAFTA were important vehicles to cultivate better political ties with the Mexican-origin community in the U.S. According to this argument, Mexico has sought to avoid the dangers of criticism from the organizations of the Mexican diaspora toward Mexico for doing nothing vis-^-vis the community. Through the implementation of such an agenda, policy-makers prevented that Chicanos had the potential of becoming the "Mexico's worst enemy" within the United States. 254

The goal of attainment political support from the Mexican-origin community is linked to the idea of instilling in this community the sense that its members are an important constituency for Mexico. This is particularly clear in the cases of cultural and educational programs and in Mexico's reaction to Proposition 187. In the case of NAFTA, Mexico sought the support of the agreement by certain segments of the community with more visibility in the U.S. political scene, and, at least, a non-antagonist attitude from the others.

Participation in U.S.-Mexican Relations

Regarding this goal that fosters the participation of the Chicano community in certain aspects of greater U.S.-Mexican relation, the existing scholarly literature on Chicano- Mexicano relations only discusses the issue of immigration, and on this theme scholars sustain different points of view.

Some of them emphasize the common interests that Mexico and the Chicano community share vis-^-vis U.S. immigration policy, while others underscore the difficulties of sustaining any political alliance on this matter. The examination of Mexico's goals in reaction to Proposition 187 supports the position that the Mexican government and Chicanos share, in fact, a common ground on immigration issues. Several Mexican policy-makers explicitly 255 enunciated the necessity of establishing closer ties with the community to better defend the rights of Mexican undocumented workers against the wave of nativism that also affects the Chicano community as a whole.

Yet, a caveat needs to be introduced. As the section on tools discusses, the Mexican government did not provide the specifics on how the Mexican-origin community or its organizations could significantly contribute in the bilateral discussions regarding immigration policy. Certain common actions between organizations of the Chicano community and the Consulate of Los Angeles were developed before the final passage of Proposition 187. However, they received harsh criticism of interventionism in the United States. Even a speech delivered by Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Andres Rozenthal, on April 1994 criticizing the antiimigrant sentiments in the U.S. was considered as a violation of Mexico's principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries.

The literature on Chicano Mexican© relations does not foresee other areas besides immigration in which the Mexican government can foster the participation of the organizations of the Mexican diaspora in U.S.-Mexican relations. However, after conducting this study, it can be concluded that the design of cultural and educational programs and the negotiations of NAFTA have been important opportunities for 256

Mexico to state that Chicanos can indeed participate in certain areas of U.S.-Mexican relations—education and trade. In both cases, Mexico openly defended the idea of including Chicano participation directly in the negotiations of agreements on adult or bilingual education, in the implementation of cultural projects or even as lobbyists or

brokers in the campaign of the passage of NAFTA. Interestingly, the goal of including the Mexican-origin community in bilateral talks has been enunciated without the outbreak of any major conflict neither in Mexico nor in the United States. Such a fact leads to the conclusion that in certain areas (cultural and educational programs and trade), the collaboration between the Mexican government and Chicano

organizations do not bring about any negative consequence in Mexico's foreign policy vis-a-vis the United States. While in others—immigration—criticism may arise and at times does arise.

Business Ties

The promotion of business ties is a goal that has received less attention in the literature than others. Some scholars, however, express their pessimism regarding the possibilities of increasing such ties while others sustain the opposite view. 257

After reviewing the case-study on NAFTA, it is clear that for first time in history, the Mexican political discourse enunciated explicitly the importance of reaching out to Chicano/Latino business in the framework of the trade agreement. Specifically, the Mexican government announced its intentions to create the mechanisms to permit the investment of Chicano/Latino entrepreneurs in Mexico. In addition, an unexpected development of this goal has been the promotion of new investment ties between Mexicans and the Mexican-origin community abroad. A promising part of this has been the joint ventures sponsored by federal, state or

local authorities in Mexico with community organizations of Mexican nationals in the United States—the clubes de oriundos. Included in such projects have been the construction of schools, libraries and other educational facilities in certain towns in Mexico.

Political Agents

According to the literature on Chicano-Mexicano relations, the most important political agent in Mexico's outreach policy toward the Chicano community has been the President. Mexican presidents (from Jose Joaquin de Herrera in the mid-19th century on) have been capable of redefining 258

the policy design toward this community when they were interested in the issue. A conclusion drawn upon the case-studies discussed emphasizes that Mexican presidents have been indeed key

political agents. Moreover, both in periods of relative abundance of resources and in ones of economic crisis, Mexican presidents in the contemporary period have been instrumental

in the conceptualization of projects aimed to the Mexican- origin community in the United States. President Salinas designated an important amount of resources and a presidential mandate to the creation of new programs for Chicanos. His successor. President Zedillo, has continuously been promoting major innovative actions directed at the Mexican diaspora (such as the proposal of no loss of Mexican nationality), even in a scenario characterized by the lack of resources. The literature on Chicano-Mexicano relations also discusses the amount of discretion that the variety of bureaucratic entities involved in outreach policies have had

vis-a-vis the President. Specifically, the ability of the ministers and other high-ranking officials to design autonomous projects (either supportive or antagonistic to Chicano issues) is carefully reviewed.

Each of the case-studies related to Mexico's outreach policy toward the Chicano community confirms that the strong support from the Office of the Presidency was crucial in the 259

development of new governmental institutions and the beginning of innovative actions toward this community. Major efforts, such as the design and funding of the Programa Presidencial, and the Institutes and Centres Culturales have been inspired by the presidency. Yet, as the decade of the 1990s unfolds, a complex web of governmental institutions related to the outreach policy toward the Mexican diaspora was established, as Table 4 indicates. Some of these institutions are located beyond the Executive branch. In this scenario, the specifics of their actions started to develop rather independently from the

Office of the Presidency. Certain ministries were part of the outreach policy on a particular issue: cultural and educational programs.

Proposition 187 or NAFTA. The Secretaria de Comercio was actively involved in a particular case, NAFTA. This action was linked to a higher visibility of this ministry in international economic affairs. However, after the passing of NAFTA the role of this agency in Chicano-Mexico relations has diminished. Other ministries were also involved in one particular case-study. The Secretaria de Desarrollo Social provided funds for several cultural and educational programs during President Salinas's administration, especially those that 260

TABLE 4 CONTEMPORARY MEXICO'S OUTREACH POLICY TOWARD THE CHICANO COMMUNITY

Political Agents Involved (x)

Ral i-tlcml AQ^n-^s Cultural and Educational Proposftion 2B7 NAFTA PKagrams PeO£RAL LEVEL CExecut-fy^a Branch) of th^ Prasidancy Sacr^tarfa da Comarcio Sacratar-fa da Dasarrol1o Social GobamaciSacratar ta^n da Sacratar fa da Educ^cfdn PQblica Sacratarfa da Salud Sacratarta da Ralacionas Extarloras Othar- Agancfas NAFIN FEDERAL LEVEL ( Lagi Si atiy^a Branch )

STATE/LOCAL LEVEL

involved the participation of the clubes de oriundos. In addition, the Secretaria de Gobernacion—through some of its agencies—has been active in the support of cultural efforts from the early-1990s on. Meanwhile, the Secretaria de Educacion Pxiblica has become one of the single most important source which finances cultural, adult and bilingual educational programs from the late 1980s to the present. And finally, the Secretaria de Salud has participated in specific 261 programs on health education oriented toward Mexicans in the United States, such as a campaign for the prevention of AIDS through during the 1990s. Furthermore, the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores has played a key role in the three case-studies. Although each with different degrees of commitment, the Programa Presidencial, the forty Mexican Consulates in the U.S., and the Institutos and Csntros Culturales have been most active in creating innovative outreach projects regarding culture and education. In terms of the Mexican reaction to Proposition 187, other bureaus, such as the Consultoria Juridica, were highly involved. This bureau produced an extensive study on the legal impact upon Mexico and the Mexican-origin community of the proposal of the no-loss of Mexican nationality. In addition, the Mexican Consul in Los Angeles, Jose Angel Pescador, was a key political agent in carrying out Mexico's policy vis-^-vis Proposition 187. He was even singled out by U.S. authorities as responsible for the orchestration of the participation of Mexican nationals (even carrying Mexican flags) in demonstrations and other forms of civil pressure against the passing of such initiative. An agency in charge of economic domestic affairs, such as Nacional Financiera, is currently developing its expertise in Chicano-Mexicano relations. NAFIN promotes business ties between the Mexican-origin community and Mexico through the 262 administration of a fund especially created for that purpose— the Reserva Hispana. The literature on Chicano-Mexicano relations does not predict the participation of the legislative branch or the state and local governments in actions directed at the Chicano community. A conclusion drawn from the three case-studies, however, strongly suggests that they are already involved and will have an even major role in the near future. The participation of the legislative branch has focused on one particular theme: to better articulate Mexico's response to Proposition 187 and other restrictive aspects of U.S. immigration policy. As an example, both chambers of the

Mexican Congress have held hearings on the consequences for Mexico and the Mexican-origin community of the proposal of the no-loss of Mexican nationality in 1994, and various of its committees are active in the drafting of a bill on this issue that will be introduced in Congress in the Fall of 1996. In addition, the dynamic role in foreign policy of Mexican governors and mayors has been outstanding during the 1990s in the three case-studies, especially if compared with their disengagement from international affairs in the past. They became real participants in the process of reaching out to the Chicano community, previously reserved to the members of the Executive branch. In cultural and educational issues and in NAFTA, they have worked intensively with the 263 organizations of the Mexican diaspora, including the clubes de oriundos in the design of jointly financed developmental projects for the communities of origin. On Proposition 187, they raised their voices against the effects of such an initiative to the economy and society of their states.

Chicanos as Political Targets

Scholars interested in policy design underscore two key aspects in the study of targets: the broad or narrow definition of targets that governmental programs provide, and the consequences of a positive or negative portrayal of such populations. These intellectual puzzles are also emphasized by the literature on Chicano-Mexicano relations. Specifically, this literature discusses first whether both Mexican nationals and U.S.-born Chicanos have been the main focus of the Mexican outreach policies, or whether only Mexican nationals have been the major target population. secondly, this literature addresses the question of whether the condescending attitude that used to be a characteristic of Mexico's dealings with members of the Mexican diaspora has already changed, and a more positive portrayal of this populations prevails now. The case-studies examined revealed that the accent in the place of birth of the members of the Mexican diaspora is useful only as an starting point in the study of the targets. 264

As Table 5 indicates, Mexico's outreach policy in terms of cultural and educational programs. Proposition 187 and NAFTA has been directed at a variety of segments of the community. The fact that so many different segments of the Mexican diaspora have been targeted by the Mexican government is related to an increasingly positive portrayal of them. In the early 1990s, high-ranking officials in Mexico committed themselves to the promotion of a better image of the Mexican- origin community within Mexico's society and government. For first time, Mexican authorities candidly admitted that pochismo, paternalism and other forms of prejudice against the community had affected negatively the development of Chicano- Mexico relations. As a consequence, the major Chicano national organizations mainly composed by U.S. Chicanos have been portrayed as potential partners of the Mexican government in various endeavors (for example, the National Council of la Raza and One Stop Immigration in the case of cultural and educational programs, MALDEF in terms of Proposition 187, and the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce and the Hispanic Caucus, NCLR and MALDEF regarding NAFTA). But the most dramatic change in terms of image took place regarding Mexican nationals and their organizations. Earlier, this population used to be considered powerless within the

U.S. During the 1990s, Mexican nationals have been identified TABLE 5

CONTEMPORARY MEXICO'S OUTREACH POLICY TOWARD THE CHICANO COMMUNITY

Target Populations

Target Populations Case-Studies

Cultural and Educational Propos i tion 187 NAFTA Programs

riRSI GCHCRAIIOH IWIGAAMIS mteiRS Of iti£ CHICANO cimwnt lie CaMMIU AS A Mac. RCSIOING IN lit UNI 1(0 SIAUS able to )n*ejt or co-lnveit tn RCGARDICSS (IC PIACE Of who qua Illy Henlco In builneji venture* or eiRIH or IIS MCWCRS for U.S cttlienihip de«cloonefltal projectj that uy be attrjcted to attend cultural lunctlons (art exhlbUtons. perlorMnces. or (<<• festUilil oriented it enhancing ne>lcan culture

riRSl MHtRAUOH IWIGBAHIS CIIICAM) mnAMIIAIIONS AND tlUBlS DC miUNOQS that are Involoed In the delivery of cultural and educational wrvlcei

NCIICAN NAIIONAIS RCSIOINS IN IHt IMIKO SIAUS hI)o are Illiterate or have not completed einentary or Junior high educilton

IHE OIIIWCH OF MXICAN fIRSI GtHlRAllQH imiCRANIS who require bilingual education to better advance In the U S. educational lyite* 266 as a constituency able to endorse and foment economic and political projects in Mexico. The article published in La Jornada* in 1995 by Luis Ortiz Monasterio, Mexican Consul in Miami, is an example of the new discourse on Mexican immigrants: they are loyal to the country, able to organize themselves, and, moreover, their $4 billion remittances that they send to Mexico per year are the second most important source of foreign currency for the Mexican economy. Moreover, at least some of its members were considered capable of empowering themselves and greatly improved their stand and influence in U.S. society. Specifically, those Mexican nationals who are part of the clubes de oriundos became considered potential partners of the Mexican government in the creation of developmental programs—including cultural and educational ones—in their hometowns. Even Mexicans who are illiterate or have a low level of education have been targeted to improve their education through programs of literacy and content courses. In addition, those first- generation immigrants who qualify for U.S. citizenship became also key targets of innovative proposals, such as the no-lose of Mexican nationality is. Such a positive image, however, contrasts with the approach pursuit by the Mexican government in the other case-

* "Un encuentro con 'metedolares'" La Jornada. 28 January 1995, p. 3. 267

studies, especially in the case of NAFTA. The Mexican government did not select Mexican nationals as a priority target. At times, certain radio spots in Spanish intended to

explain the advantages of NAFTA to these group of Mexicans were broadcasted, but they were sponsored by organizations such as the Chambers of Commerce, and not appeared to be directly sponsored by the Mexican government.

Political Tools

According to the literature, a particular policy design can include various kinds of tools in order to pursue different goals and reach out to distinct target populations. Moreover, the choice of tools tends to reflect assumptions about the political power and social construction of the targets. In the case of Mexico's outreach policy toward the Mexican diaspora, the specialists acknowledge the existence of different types of tools. Generally speaking, authority tools transmit orders to the targets; resource tools intended to empower a particular population; capacity-building tools transmit information or educate regarding a particular issue; and hortatory tools allude to symbolic values. Table 6 provides an overview of the types of tools that the Mexican government used in the three case-studies 268

examined. Few authority tools have been implemented. One

exception is the case of undocximented workers in the U.S., since the Mexican government agreed with the U.S. to participate in a pilot program to return such workers to their place of origin and not just to the Mexican border. In addition, certain cultural programs are still designed from Mexico City without any in-depth consideration of the interests of the community. Yet, the tendency exists that the Consulates, the Institutos and Centres Culturales, and the individual members of the community have increasingly provided an input in such programs during the contemporary period.

Looking at resource tools, various of them were implemented on cultural and educational programs. On the one hand, certain financial funds were created to provide seed money to projects of co-investment between Chicanos/Latinos and Mexico. Such seed monies were available to the clubes de oriundos by the Secretarxa. de Desarrollo Social and the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores to co-invest in the construction of schools and libraries in certain towns in Mexico. On the other hand, Mexico's promoted the participation of certain Chicano organizations in bilateral agreements on education. As a consequence of Proposition 187, various resource tools were implemented by the Mexican government. The most 269

TABLE 6

CONTEMPORARY MEXICO'S OUTREACH POLICY TOWARD THE CHICANO COMMUNITY

Tools

Too 1 s Case-S-tudles Cultural and Educational Proposition 187 NAFTA Programs

Authority Tools

CERTAIN CULTURAL COtLABORATTON ON PROOAMS REPATRlATIOft OF UWOCUMENTED PCXICAN NATIONALS

Resource Tools

PROJECTS OF NO LOSS OF RESERVA INVESTMEJfT MEXICAN HISPANA NATIONALITY

Capacity-building Tools

CULTURAL CAMPAIGN TO BUSINESS PROGRAMS INFORM INFORMATION imiCRANTS ABOUT THEIR RIGHTS PROGRAMS ON ADULT ft BILINGUAL EDUCATION 270 TABLE 6 - Continued

Hortatory Tools ASUILA AZTECA MUIU ATTECA AOIILA AZTECA •CETINGS BETVEEN CHICANOI MEXICAN CHIUXEII AM) AOOlESCEKrS

RAOtO SPOTS CN NEXICO'S HISTCRY AM) TMirriONS PaiTICAL BISCOWSE PainCAL OISOJURSE POIITICAL OISCOWSE ON CCMOl HERITAeE ON COM«N HERITAGE ON COMOi HERITASE

important is the proposal of the no loss of Mexican nationality. If it passes this year in Mexico's legislative branch, this proposal may become a major political tool because of its impact in a substantial segment of the Mexican- origin population (about 2 to 3 million immigrants). Interestingly, this proposal does not include the transfer of

any kind of monetary or in-kind resources. Yet, as a Mexican high-ranking official noted, such provision would remove the obstacles (the loss of economic and transit privileges and ultimately mexicanidad) that historically have discouraged Mexicans who qualified for U.S. citizenship to apply for it. Another pioneer resource tool was the creation of the Reserva Hispana. This is fund, administered by Nacional Financiera, may provide credits to viable business ventures, which involved Mexicans and Chicanos/Latinos. In terms of capacity-building tools, they have included in-kind support for numerous cultural activities, such as art 271 exhibitions, music and dance performances, and film festivals. The Iniciativa Nacion Mexicana (Mexican Nation Iniciative) has been instrumental in the support of all of this activities. It

originated during President Zedillo's term. Moreover, in the realm of education, the Mexican government sponsored literacy

courses as well as programs in Spanish for adults that aimed at preparing them to obtain their elementary school or junior high diplomas. Moreover, the sending of Mexican teachers to selected U.S. school districts and the training of bilingual

instructors, especially Chicanos, were also a part of the efforts to support the education of those Mexican children who permanently or temporarily reside in the United States. Another important tool has consisted of the impressive donation of libraries that include both textbooks and general interest books in Spanish to schools, public libraries, community centers and prisons. Regarding Proposition 187 and NAFTA, the capacity- building tools implemented deal with the dissemination of information: The campaign (carried out by certain Consulates) to inform Mexican immigrants about their rights and information on how to start and fund a business in Mexico in the case of NAFTA. Finally, hortatory tools refer to those cultural values that Mexico and Chicanos share, specifically important is the question posed by the literature regarding whether or not the 272 tools that alluded to such common values could further cement the political links between the Mexican-origin community and Mexico. Moreover, hortatory tools have been used in regard to the three case-studies. The political discourse that alludes to the common cultural heritage between Chicanos and Mexico is part of all efforts, although specific actions have been conducted. During the 1990s, the Secretaria de Desarrollo Social and the Programa Presidencial sponsored trips of young people from the Mexican-community to meet Mexicans and thus enhance their mexicanldad. In addition, the granting of the

Aguila Azteca to distinguished members of the Chicano community from academia, the arts and politics involved in immigration and trade matters has also been an opportunity to celebrate the common roots between Mexico and the Mexican diaspora in the United States. Finally, during the current administration, radio spots on Mexico's historical dates have been broadcasted through radio stations in Spanish all over the Midwest and the Southwest.

Conclusion

It is most evident that from the 1980s to the present, a new era in the relations between Mexico and Chicanos was inaugurated. Although an inheritor of the past, the policy 273

design has been much redesigned. The goals have become more ambitious, a complex web of more committed political actors have been involved, different segments of the Mexican diaspora have been the targets and a variety of more well-funded tools have been implemented. The present chapter siammarizes the findings of this dissertation in terms of the internal logic of the policy design, and interprets them in light of previous theses that the literature of Chicano-Mexico relations provide. In many cases, the findings supported the argximents already sustained by other authors. However, at times, the review of the three case-studies emphasize new scenarios that have not been explored at all by the existing literature. Among the findings of the present study, there exist some that deserve further consideration:

(1) The participation of Chicanos in certain areas of U.S.-Mexican relations have been highly successful in cultural and education matters and in NAFTA. It is disturbing, however, that the possibility of an alliance between Chicano organizations or even organizations of Mexican nationals have been observed with so much caution by Mexican policy-makers, since it has been a cause of distress in the U.S. government (at least at the state and local level). (2) The complex interactions within the increasing number of Mexican political institutions in charge of issues related 274

to the Mexican diaspora needs further examination. It is now too early to evaluate, for example, what is the impact of the involvement of officials from opposition parties in the outreach tasks. (3) The question of targets is the one that possibly needs more elaboration. The classification of the Mexican diaspora in terms of the place of birth, although an objective demographic feature, needs to be enriched with other categories of analysis. Moreover, if the proposal of no loss of Mexican nationality is passed, a considerable number of Mexican first-generation immigrants will become U.S. citizens, and so its impact will need to be closely monitored and analyzed. (4) The impact of the tools on the target populations needs to be carefully evaluated. The successes or shortcomings of the tools currently implemented will be clearly perceived in the years to come and will render and assessment. 275

CHAPTER 8 Toward a Conclusion: tiie Search for Explanations of Mexico's Outreach Policy to%fard the Mexican-origin Community

A major conclusion of this study of Mexico's policy design toward the Mexican-origin community is that such a policy has become a critical aspect of Mexico's foreign policy during the contemporary period. Mexican political discourse has incorporated this outreach policy as one of its major principles. Moreover, Mexico's policy-makers have ac3cnowledged the magnitude and significance of the community in the U.S. as an important constituency. As a consequence, they have directed a variety of political tools to different segments of the Mexican diaspora in the United States.

The main purpose of the present chapter is to explore the three case-studies reviewed as dependent variables, in light of the different contexts or clusters of explanations discussed in Chapter 1: (1) the evolution of Chicano politics,

(2) the unfolding of certain Mexican domestic economic and political events, and (3) the changes in U.S.-Mexican relations.

The Evolution of Chicano Politics

According to this first explanation, since the 1960s to the present, the Chicano community has been struggling for its 276 civil rights. As part of this effort, key community leaders and organizations increased their visibility in the U.S. domestic scene regarding issues crucial to the community, such as cultural and educational themes and on immigration. Some segments of the community even ventured into foreign affairs issues, including trade policy. All of these efforts were acknowledged by the Mexican government and have contributed to shape its outreach policy. Yet, a counterargument exists. It states that U.S.-born Chicanos had remained inactive in foreign affairs, specifically on the relation with Mexico.'- Moreover, those Chicanos who were interested were only a "small core group," integrated by few organizations that do not represent the community at large.^ The following section provides elements for this discussion. An overview of Chicano views on culture and education, immigration and trade is offered. Culture, according to John Garcia can be seen as an element that fostered group identity within the Mexican-origin community in the aftermath of the Chicano movement.^ From the early-1970 to the present, there has been an increasing demand for cultural events such as, the presentations of artistic performances, art exhibition or film festivals that depicted the Chicano-Mexicano heritage. This search for cultural roots has become a matter of foreign policy when petitions from leaders and organizations of the Mexican diaspora began to be 277 presented to the Mexican government to organize or co-sponsor such cultural events in U.S. soil in the 1970s and beyond. Moreover, in the 1990s, the cultural events organized in the Institutes and Centres Culturales demonstrated that Chicano art and Mexican art can be depicted together.

Education also has emerged as a major concern within the Chicano community because of its strong connection to its socio-economic development and social mobility. In the contemporary period, as Susan Gonzdlez-Baker points out, the Mexican-origin community "rated low on educational achievements vis-^-vis other Latino communities as well as non-Latinos."* In 1991, less than half (44%) of all Mexican origin persons over 25 years old have a high school diploma (against 80% of Whites, 61% Cubans and 58% Puerto Ricans).' Considering those figures and the fact that about 33% of the Mexican-origin population in the United States were born in Mexico (42% in California),® any effort to improve adult education in Spanish may be considered as an important strategy in improving the situation of the community as a whole. In addition, because of the number of children from Mexico who reside permanently or temporarily in the United States, the programs on bilingual education have been increasing from the 1970s.'' Yet, from the 1980s to the present, bilingual education has been in danger because of the 278 lack of resources and the stigma of being remedial courses.

Moreover, the Republican majority in the current U.S. Congress is much against bilingual programs. There is no doubt that bilingual education is an area in dire need of financial resources, and more and better trained instructors. From the 1970s on, several Chicano leaders have requested an invigorated commitment by the Mexican government in providing supplemental resources for adult and bilingual education in the U.S. Interestingly, organizations of the Mexican diaspora that pursued different agendas have concurred on their support to educational programs.® In the 1990, certain organizations, such as One Stop Immigration and Educational Center from California, negotiated special agreements with the Mexican government on this matter that helped these organizations considerably enlarge its literacy and content courses programs directed at adult immigrants. Moreover, on bilingual education, from the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce to the clubes de oriundos, the petitions to the Mexican government have included: the sending of Mexican teachers to the U.S. Southwest and Midwest, the creation of intensive courses in Spanish for Chicano teachers, and the donation of large quantities of Mexican books and other educational materials.' The study of the numerous cultural and educational programs sponsored by Mexico (reviewed in Chapter 3) can be 279 related to the evolution of Chicano politics that has enhanced its cultural heritage as well as education matters. But still, the question exists regarding why in the 1990s, the Mexican government sponsored such ambitious efforts, such as the creation of a network of Institutes and Centros Culturales in forty U.S. cities. Other factors seemed to account for this. Such factors deal with the unfolding of domestic events in Mexico and with the changes in U.S. Mexican relations, and are reviewed in the following sections of this chapter. Immigration has also been a salient issue for the Mexican-origin community. The struggle of organizations of this community against restrictive measures that affect Mexican immigrants is hardly new. Based upon the assumption that any restrictive policy for undocumented workers also affects the Chicano community as a whole, from the 1980s to the present, several Chicano organizations have been active on immigration matters.^" The agenda of various Chicano organizations in the 1980s have included issues related to the defense of the civil rights of Mexicans immigrants in the United States in courts and in Congress. It can be argued that although only certain Chicano organizations have been active, their actions have, nonetheless, had a major impact in the entire community. As an example, MALDEF brought litigation (case Plyer v. Doe) to protect the access of undocumented children to education. In 280 the early-1980s, the Supreme Court ruled that it was not in the public interest to deny education to such children.^^ In addition, during the final negotiations on the Simpson-Rodino Law in 1986, various Chicano organizations, such as LULAC, MALDEF, NCLR and other organizations were particularly active. Their main objective was to include certain provisions that guaranteed the civil rights of both American-born Chicanos and Mexican nationals, specifically in relation to the amnesty provision that permitted at least 2 million Mexican individuals (and their families, because a later provision) to adjust their status and thus were able to become lawful permanent residents of the U.S. Proposition 187 was, though, only one episode in the struggle against restrictive immigration policies. Before its passage, many segments of the Chicano community were part of the mobilizations that took place in Los Angeles and elsewhere against this initiative. Associations of Mexican nationals took to the streets to demonstrate against this Proposition (many have argued, though, that this kind of actions were not very positive and, in fact, counterproductive). At the end, the majority of the Chicano/Latino population (70%) voted against the initiative. In the aftermath of its passage, certain organizations, including MALDEF, were involved in bringing Proposition 187 to court and were successful in the litigation of their case. 281

These developments could led to the conclusion that the mobilizations of the Chicano community on immigration, being so extensive, had to be read in Mexico as part of the factors that could influence its reaction to any new nativist action in the U.S., including Proposition 187. However, the final outcome, in terms of Mexico's policy on immigration cannot be interpreted without looking to Mexican politics and the development of the bilateral relations with the U.S. If the preoccupations on culture, education and immigration are at the core of the agenda of the U. S.-Mexican- origin community, trade issues are a rather a new development within the community. By the 1980s, certain organizations, such as the Hispanic Caucus, the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, MALDEF and the NCLR and certain individuals began to establish certain contacts with the Mexican government on this matter." Some voices even advocated for free trade zones during that decade. By 1981, Abelardo L. Valdez, a high-ranking official in the Department of State during James Carter's administration, as well as Mario Obledo the head of LULAC proposed a common market along the border, extending 200 miles into each country's territory from Brownsville, Texas to San Diego, California." Four years later, the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce asked for U.S. governmental assistance "to help Hispanic business enter international trade.Mexico, and 282 Latin America in general, were critical targets. In addition, by that time, a member of the Hispanic Caucus, Representative Bill Richardson (D-NM), revisited the project of a free trade zone. He supported the plan to transform the United States-Mexico border into a tariff-free trade zone that encompassed the entire 2,000-mile border, and extended 200 miles into each country. Within this free zone, favorable tax and tariff incentives to eligible joint ventures would be granted. In addition, products would also move freely within the zone. This proposal, introduced to the Congress as the U.S.-Mexico Border Revitalization Act, was supported by other members of the Caucus, such as Henry Gonzalez (D-Texas),

Albert Bustamante (D-Texas) and Solomon P. Ortiz (D-Texas)." The timing of the negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement did not actually coincide with such pioneer Chicano proposals. NAFTA needed to be explained looking at changes in the domestic policy of Mexico and the relations between the U.S. and Mexico. Yet, it can be argued that Chicanos' stand on trade, positioned themselves as potential players in the negotiations and the final passage of this trade agreement.

Mexican Domestic Policy

The study of how Mexican domestic policy can affect a 283

foreign policy area, in this case the outreach policy toward with Chicanos, can be addressed from different theoretical perspectives. The Comparative Politics/International Relations literature proposes three analytical ways in which this can take place; (1) the examination of the interests of societal

actors in Mexico (pluralism), (2) a review of certain aspects of economic policy, and (3) a consideration of certain changes in the domestic political scene.

Pluralism

The pluralist approach emphasizes the role of societal actors in policy-making. It would state that an array of active interest groups formulate recommendations in Mexico toward Chicanos. Those groups would endorse competing proposals, and then present them to the government. Under this conceptual model, the Mexican government is supposed to have a rather passive role. This approach does not seem to be useful in the discussion of these case-studies. The Mexican government, not societal actors, has played a leading role in the contemporary outreach policy toward the Chicano community. Yet, it is worth noting that the Programa Presidencial, one of the most active political agents, has initiated an ambitious program in the outreach toward Mexican business sources "with interest in 284 the Chicano/Latino market" to fund programs for the Mexican- origin community in the U.S. Institutions, such as Bancomer Foundation and Levy's Foundation have already came on board. Moreover, an endowment was created in the Fondo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes (Nacional Endowment for Culture and the Arts), by which the resources could be donated and properly channeled to specific projects, including cultural and educational ones." The conditions discussed above are not part of a classical pluralist model. However, it may bring the input of certain societal groups in Mexico in the design of the outreach policy toward the Chicano community in the future.

Political Economy-Foreign Policy

The literature establishes a connection between certain economic policies and foreign policy actions. Specifically the role of the state encompasses—according to some scholars—the establishment and maintenance of conditions for private accumulation for both national and international capital. In his classic study on the Mexican political system. The Making of Modern Mexico. Frank Brandenburg agrees with this perspective. He states that "Mexican foreign policy stems from primarily economic and financial considerations," including the creation of "a propitious investment 285

climate. Following this type of argument, Mexico's foreign policy (including the outreach policy to the Chicano community) can

be linked with decisions taken in the economic realm. The decade of the 1980s was a difficult period for the Mexican economy. Early in this decade, the economic model of import substitution was exhausted. A clear sign was the crisis of 1982 characterized by the dramatic diminishing of the central bank's reserves," the decline of the oil prices, the difficulties to meet debt service, and the necessity to establish harsh stabilization programs—as condition by international monetary agencies for further loans to meet the crisis

As a long-term response, the Mexican government implemented a new economic model, oriented toward the recuperation of the growth of the economy.Such a model promised stability to the Mexican economy through the control of inflation and the diminishing of governmental spending. Among its tools were: the further liberalization of trade, the privatization of public enterprises, the cutting of governmental subsides,®^ incentives given to exportations, and specifically the promotion of foreign investment." These economic changes had an impact in the foreign policy arena. The Mexican government developed new policy tools in its bilateral relation with Washington. New 286

governmental measures that included .the liberalization of trade and investment were implemented. A more aggressive foreign policy was needed to fulfill the new objectives. So,

instead of the traditional diplomacy, focused upon the Department of State and the White House, Mexico sought to reach out to the U.S. Congress as well as to U.S. state and local authorities. In addition, Mexico developed ties with different segments of U.S. society.^* In the late-1980s, the role of the Mexican ambassador in Washington changed dramatically. In the early-1990s, for example. Ambassador

Gustavo Petriccioli, breaking a tradition of officials who "rarely ventured further south or west than the State Department," actively promoted NAFTA in a variety of circles. The Mexican embassy, that used to be low-profile in Washington, became "one of the city's most influential foreign mission,"'® and its staff increased. In addition, a new crop of Consuls—many of them skillful PRI politicians—were sent as Consuls all over the U.S. Besides their traditional tasks, they had "to oversee the public-relations offensive and to improve relations with local Mexican Americans.

In summation, Mexico's traditional restraint vis-ci-vis American domestic policy was practically abandoned. From 1987 on, Mexico's hired American lobbyists, designated more specialized diplomatic staff to Washington, and gave directives to the Mexican Consulates in the U.S. to involve 287 themselves in innovative tasks, such as the promotion of a better image of Mexico. These initial efforts were not always completely successful, although a landmark to the future established.^"' This novel foreign policy approach permitted the Mexican government to venture in the use of novel tools in the outreach policy toward the Chicano community. The opening of more than twenty Centres and Institutes Culturales was part of a larger approach intended to be connected with American audiences—including Chicanos. In the case of NAFTA, the

Mexican government openly contacted those in favor, while it tried to convince others that were against, using a similar task developed vis-a-vis ether groups of U.S. society

Domestic Policy-Foreign Policy

The relationship between domestic political changes and foreign policy is examined by the literature under the umbrella of "linkage approaches." There do net exist, however, precise trails to follow in the complex world of domestic policy. In the case of Mexico, scholars suggested to focus en political crises. Political crises have been precisely a major characteristic of the Mexican political landscape in the contemporary period. On the one hand, the elections held in 288

July 1988 brought a time of turmoil within the Mexican party system. In the best scenario, the candidate of the PRI, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, won the presidency "with a bare 50.4 percent majority."" His victory, however, was surrounded by serious complains of electoral fraud. Salinas's party also lost as many as 240 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and four seats in the Senate.^' Meanwhile, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas obtained 31.1% of the votes, the highest percentage attributed to any opposition candidate since the foundation of the PRI. Manuel Clouthier, the PAN candidate, received 17% of the total vote. The outcome of the elections could be linked to the fostering of new Mexican policies toward Chicanos. President Salinas and his party took special actions to reverse the effects of criticism and even the mobilizations against the PRI that occurred within the Mexican community in the U.S.^^ In addition, the Mexican government wanted to avoid the proliferation of negative images of Mexico among Chicanos, since they could influence the overall American view on Mexico. The effects of the political crisis during President Salinas's term can be observed in the change of objectives in the outreach policy toward Chicanos. It may not be a coincidence that the search for political support by the

Chicano community is present in the three-case studies. It 289 also can be hypothesized that Mexican policy-makers realized that the Mexican-origin community, especially first-generation immigrants, were a constituency that can certainly influence

Mexican politics. And ultimately, high-ranking officials seemed to have followed Cuauhtemoc Cardenas's recommendation^^ in terms of reinforcing cultural ties and the defense of civil rights of Mexicans in the U.S.^* On the other hand, there exists a new type of political crisis in Mexico in the mid-1990s. Its characteristics are unique and it is not similar to others in the past. The current debates went beyond the question of elections. The rules (written and unwritten) of the political game have been destroyed, including the one that stipulates that the president is the most important decision-maker.^' The consequences in terms of the outreach policy toward the Chicano community are unknown yet. Yet a profound political change as the one that it is taking place in Mexico, certainly opened up the decision-making to new forces. It may be no coincidence that the Congress in Mexico is holding intense hearings on proposals, such as the no-loss of Mexican nationality, a matter that would have kept been in the hands of the Executive branch in the past. The active role of state and municipal authorities seeking joint ventures with organizations of the Mexican diaspora for development projects 290 of business can also been seen as a part of their more meaningful role within the Mexican political system.

The U.S.-Mexican Relation

A third possible explanation of the Mexican governmental policy toward Chicanos emphasizes that the status of the greater U.S.-Mexican relations influences the evolution of the Mexican policy vis-^-vis the Mexican community in the U.S. The dependency approach contributes certain general guidelines for the study of the relationship between two asymmetrical countries like the U.S. and Mexico. The classical characterization of the dependency approach states that the foreign policy of a developing country is super­ imposed from the outside. In the contemporary period, the economic influence of the U.S. upon Mexico is certainly a fact that can be well- documented. The U.S. is the most important trade partner of Mexico (60 to 70% of the Mexican exports are sold to the U.S.), the source of the majority of the foreign investment to the country, and one-third of its external debt is contracted with U.S. banks. In addition,'® the U.S. is the one country that can bail out Mexico in times of economic crisis. These kind of indicators have been used in the past by scholars to 291 support the thesis that the U.S. is in position to condition other areas of Mexican polity, including foreign policy.^' Yet, the dependency approach admits the possibility of certain areas of state autonomy. Different hypothesis have been raised by the Chicano-Mexicano literature on this issue: 1) eras of prosperity are linked with a low profile in Chicano-Mexicano relations, 2) periods of vulnerability are connected with an active outreach policy, and 3) U.S. "national interest" is seen as the only limit of the ties between Mexico and the Mexican diaspora in the U.S. The first proposition stated that in the periods of prosperity of Mexico's economy, the Mexican government will not be likely pursue further ties with the Chicano community. Mexico "is not going to risk its substantial and continuing relations with the U.S. because of Mexican Americans," a notable scholar states.^® President Salinas's policy design toward Chicanos, however, proved the contrary. In the early-

1990s, when the economic indicators for Mexico were more positive, and the relation with the U.S. was closer than ever, the government launched an ambitious campaign to reach out to the Mexican-origin community in various areas, including culture, education, and trade. The second proposition states that in a scenario of more "vulnerability" (in terms of immigration, for example) of

Mexico vis-^-vis the U.S., the Mexican government tends to 292 engage in further links with Chicanos, including in the pursuit of a "Chicano lobby." Mexico is currently in a "vulnerable" position in terms of the U.S. The nativist wave in the U.S. is one of the strongest in the entire century. Yet immigration issues are the area in which the Mexican government has developed less efforts to construct any "lobby." Although as a response to restrictive actions, such as Proposition 187 (and the Simpson Rodino Law in 1986), Mexico has launched non-traditional outreach tools, such as the proposal of the no loss of Mexican nationality, and the outreach of the clubes de oriundos.^^ A third proposition suggests that the development of further links between Chicanos and Mexico has another specific limit: the "U.S. national interest" (although the definition of this term is not provided). After examining the three case-studies, it can be concluded that the areas of cultural and educational programs and NAFTA should not be included as part of such "national interest" of the U.S., since Mexico's outreach policy toward the Chicano community has not encountered any visible limits regarding such issues. In the particular case of NAFTA, the agreement was enthusiastically sxibscribed by both George Bush and Bill Clinton's administrations as well as by a variety of powerful U.S. interests groups—including business ones. Even more so, the participation of Chicano/Latino business in the 293 free trade agreement was endorsed by the U.S. government. The U.S. Department of Commerce even sponsored several business seminars between Chicanos and their business counterparts in Mexico that provided valuable information regarding the business opportunities in Mexico. In addition, the lobbying activities of Chicano/Latino organizations in Congress in favor of NAFTA was endorsed by the U.S. government as well as business interests.*®

Proposition 187 may be examined as part of the "national interest," although, U.S. state politicians have been the ones that have been harshly criticizing Mexico for his "intervention" in a domestic affair, such as immigration. On whether the response of Mexico to the restrictive immigration actions in the U.S.—such as the proposal of no loss of the Mexican nationality—can alarm U.S. "national interests," Mexican officials seems divided if the issue can be "vetoed" by the U.S. While some government agents sustain that such a proposal should be approved taking into account the political calendar of presidencial in the U.S. to avoid any possible pressure. Others maintain that the U.S. federal government has not put any real pressure on Mexico to delay or modify the proposal. 294

Conclusion

The principal aim of this chapter was to explore Mexico's outreach policy as a dependent variable, and thus explore certain clusters of explanations. The three contexts of Mexico's outreach policy are able to explain certain aspects of this foreign policy area. Yet, the propositions offered by the literature does not always offer a clear explanation on the emergence and development of the outreach policy. In conclusion, the three case-studies examined would be seen as an stepping stone for future studies on Mexico's outreach policy to the Mexican diaspora as well as for other research designs that focus on other developing countries and their diasporas residing in the United States. 295

NOTES

1. De la Garza et al., "Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban Foreign Policy Perspectives." pp. 24-25.

2. Ibid. 3. John Garcia, "The Chicano Movement: Its Legacy for Politics and Policy" in Chicanas/Chicanos at the Crossroads. David R. Maciel and Isidro D. Ortiz eds. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1996), p. 101.

4. Susan Gonzalez-Baker, "Demographic Trends in the Chicana/Chicano Population," in Chicanas/Chicanos at the Crossroads. p. 11.

5. Ibid. 6. Leo Chavez and Rebecca Martinez, "Mexican Immigration in the 1980s and Beyond," in Chicanas/Chicanos at the Crossroads. p. 33.

7. Garcia, "The Chicano Movement," p. 96. 8. "Representantes de organizaciones mexicanas se entrevistaron con el Presidente de Mexico, La Paloma 6, September-December 1991, p. 10. See also, Michelle J. Meyers, "The Hispanic Caucus: United or Divided," Hispanic. September 1994, p. 22. 9. Leticia Quezada, "Presentacion panordmica de la poblaci6n mexico americana en Estados Unidos. Educaci6n." Paper presented as part of the symposium "Encuentro del Lie. Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Candidate Presidencial a la Presidencia de la Repiiblica con los Representantes de la Comunidad Mexicano-Norteamericana," Ti juana, B.C. (Mexico), 8 April 1988, photocopied. 10. Looking at several Latino organizations, in terms of the destination of resources, education received the largest share. Other issues related to immigration: civil rights, legal services, and social services obtained the 24.6% of the total budget. "Foundations Aid Big Latino Groups, Snub Most," Hispanic Link Weekly Report 50 (10 December 1984), p. 1.

11. "Latinos Counter Anti-immigrant Sentiment," MALDEF 1 (February 1994), p.5. 296

12. Jose Angel Gutierrez, "The Chicano in Mexico- Norteamericano Relations," p. 32. 13. After a ten-year old period, if successful, this zone could be expanded. This proposal was considered an experiment for the future creation of "a European-type common market." Abelardo L. Valdez. "A Proposal for a 200-Mile Free Trade Zone," Nuestro (May 1981), pp. 45,46. See also, Mario Obledo, "U.S.-Mexico Border: A Common Market," Ibid., pp. 44,47. 14. "Business Chamber Calls for More Federal Aid," Hispanic Link Weekly Report" 12, 25 March 25 1985. pp. 1-2.

15. The main theme of the 1985 Convention of the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce portrays Hispanic business as "El Puente de las Americas" (A Bridge between the Americas). Nicolds Kanellos, The Hispanic Almanac (Detroit: Gale Research Inc.), 1993) p. 309. 16. "Free Trade Zone Bill Introduced", Hispanic Link Weekly Report 32, 12 August 1985, p.2. 17. Secretarxa de Relaciones Exteriores, Programa para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Extranjero, "Informe de Actividades, 1995," p. 25. 18. Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico, pp. 328-330. 19. Wayne Cornelius, "The Political Economy of Mexico Under De la Madrid; Austerity, Routinized Crisis and Nascent Recovery," Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos l (1985), p.92. 20. Weintraub, Marriage of Convenience, pp. 11, 200. 21. Interestingly, this change was supported by U.S. Ambassador John Gavin who openly stated that he favored the liberalization of trade as a condition of maintaining good relations with Mexico. See, Latin America Weekly Report. January-February 1983. Cited in Estados Unidos Perspectiva Latinoamericana [Mexico] 2 (February 1983), pp.15-17. 22. Cardenas, Cuauhtemoc, "Misunderstanding Mexico," Foreign Policy 78 (Spring 1990), pp.123-124. 297

23. Rene Villarreal, Industrializacion. deuda y desecpailibrio externo (1929-1988^ (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1988). See also, Stephanie R. Golob, "Un Nuevo orden internacional. La decisi6n de Mexico respecto al libre comercio," en Estados Unidos. Informe Trimestral 1, (Spring 1993), p. 38. 24. Carlos Rico, "La politica estadounidense hacia Mexico. Es realista esperar coherencia? in La politica exterior v la agenda Mexico-Estados Unidos. eds. Rosario Green and Peter H. Smith (Mexico: Comisi6n sobre el futuro de las relaciones Mexico-Estados Unidos, 1989), pp.126-127. 25. Tim Golden, "Mexico Is Trying Hard to Lift Its Political Profile in the U.S.," New York Times. 30 December 1991, pp. Al, A-4. 26. Ibid. pp. Al, A-4. 27. Ibid. A-1. 28. Weintraub, Marriage of Convenience, p. 47. 29. Only 22% of Mexico's 38 million voters voted for Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Weintraub, Marriage of Convenience, p. 47; Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter Smith, Modern Latin American. 3rd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 251. 30. For an analysis of the 1988 presidential election, see, Roderic Ai Camp, Politics in Mexico (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 151-153. 31. Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez, "La diplomacia descentralizada: el papel de los consulados mexicanos en las relaciones de Mexico con su diaspora. Unpublished Paper, 1996. p. 20. 32. According to a high-ranking Mexican official, the dangers of the hostility of the Chicano community toward their homeland needed to be prevented. Otherwise, Chicanos from the next generation will turn in "el peor enemigo de Mexico" (Mexico's worst enemy). Mexican official from the Secretariado T6cnico del Gabinete de Politica Exterior, 30 July 1991. 33. Cardenas, as a presidential candidate, included in his political discourse a harsh criticism against the Mexican policy toward Chicanos. He pointed out that the Mexican 298

government had abandoned the defense of the civil rights and the promotion of culture, specially among the "bilingual immigrant population." Interestingly, according to Cardenas, such tasks "might have been possible... without interfering in our neighbor's life." Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, interview, Mexico City, 10 January 1988, cited in Carlos B. Gil. Hopes and Frustration (Willmington, DEL; SR Books, 1992), p. 160. 34. As an informed observer of Chicano-Mexicano relations, Jose Angel Gutierrez, stated: "El Gobierno mexicano comprendi6 que en California viven muchos antipriistas quienes periodicamente regresan a sus comunidades y tienen influencia ahi." [The Mexican government realized that in California many people are against the PRI. They come back periodically to their communities [in Mexico] and have influences there]. Jose Angel Gutierrez, interview by Denise Dresser, 19 June 1991, Los Angeles, Calif. Cited in Dresser, "La nueva politica mexicana en Estados Unidos," pp. 15-21. 35. Carlos Fuentes, Feliz Ano Nuevo (Mexico: Aguilar, 1995), pp. 5-32; and Sidney Weintraub, "Mexico's Painful Detour on the Way to the Promised Land," San Dieao Union- Tribune. 12 May 1996, p. G-5. 36. Mark Nelson, "U.S.-Mexican Trade. The Curtain is Going Up," Hispanic Business. March 1991, p.22; Weintraub, Marriage of Convenience, pp.12-13. 37. Fuentes, Feliz Ano Wuevo. pp. 25-27. 38. Gomez-Quinones, "Notes on an Interpretation," p. 438. 39. Currently, just in the area of Los Angeles, there exist more than 150 clubes that have already been contacted by Mexican authorities. Their members are from the states of Chihuahua, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, Michoacan, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Puebla, San Luis Potosl, sinaloa, Sonora, Tlaxcala, Yucatan and Zacatecas. Mexican Official from the Programa Presidencial, interview by author, 18 November 1995, Mexico City. 40. "Frequently Asked Questions about the Free Trade Agreement," Business America. 8 October 1990, pp. 5-6. 299

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Albuquerque Journal Albuquerque Tribune Chicago Deportivo Chicago Tribune Cultura Norte Diario de Juarez El Financiero El Sol de Mexico El Universal Excelsior La Jornada La Opini6n La Paloma Los Angeles Times Reforma San Diego Union Uno mds uno Vista Wall Street Journal Washington Post

Interviews.* Monsivais, Carlos, interview by author, 12 February 1987, San Diego, California.

Mexican Official from the Programa Cultural de las Fronteras, interview by author, 28 July 1989, Mexico City.

Mexican Official from the Direcci6n General de Relaciones Internacionales, Secretarla de Educaci6n Publica, interview by the author, 28 August 1989, Mexico City. Mexican Official from the Secretariado T6cnico del Gabinete de Polltica Exterior, Office of the Presidency, interview by author, 30 July 1991, Mexico City. Mexican Official from the Direccidn General del Programa Presidencial para la Atenci6n de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, interview by author, 25 June 1991, Mexico City.

* In chronological order by date conducted. 316 Mexican Official from the Direccidn General del Programa Presidencial para la Protecci6n de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, interview by author, 22 July 1993, Mexico City. Mexican official from the Direcci6n General de Programa Presidencial para la Atencidn de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, interview by author, 16 June 1994.

Mexican Official from the Secretarla de Comercio, interview by author, 22 June 1994, Mexico City. Former President of Mexico, interview by author, 22 July 1994, Mexico City. Mexican Official from a Mexican Consulate in the U.S., interview by author, 8 June 1995, Mexico City.

Mexican Official from the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, interview by author, 21 July 1995, Mexico City.

Mexican Official from the Direcci6n General del Programa Presidencial para la Atenci6n de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, interview by author, 3 November 1995, Mexico City. Mexican Official from the Direccion General del Programa Presidencial para la Atenci6n de las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior, interview by author, 18 November 1995, Mexico City.

Mexican Official from the Sxibsecretarla de Asuntos Bilaterales. Secretarla de Relaciones Exteriores, interview by author, 19 June 1996.