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4-1-2014 Reassessing Neo-. Another Look at ’s Kant Interpretation Sebastian Luft Marquette University, [email protected]

Published version. Philosophical Readings: Online Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 2014): 90-114. Permalink. © 2014 Philosophical Readings. Published under Creative Commons License CC BY-NC-SA 2.5 IT. Miscellaneous Articles

Reassessing Neo-Kantianism. Another of Enlightenment moral philosophy out of the sources of Judaism.1 His Jewish Look at Hermann Cohen’s Kant Interpre- was woven into his life as well as his philoso- tation phy.2 However, he felt very much as a Jewish German and came to be a vehement oppo-

nent of assimilation and, an energetic, irrita- Sebastian Luft ble personality, despised converts who ne- Marquette University glected or even denied their Jewish origins (USA) (such as, e.g., Edmund Husserl3). Dismayed

1 For historical details about Cohen’s life, cf. Holz- 1. Introduction: The Historical hey’s works in Holzhey 2004 and Politisches Denken, Background of the Marburg School pp. 15-36. One should mention that Cohen’s views and Hermann Cohen’s Contribution on Jewish identity changed over the years. In his early years, he was rather indifferent to his Jewish origins but was forced to take a stand on this issue. he life and works of Hermann Especially after his involvement in the Treitschke Cohen are on various levels sym- affair, he shifted from the idea of assimilation to bolic for many aspects of Western promoting a proliferation of Jewish customs and Tintellectual history, a Jew, a philoso- traditions within a society that was not allowing pher, and living in a critical time on the Jews to assimilate. 2 Especially Cassirer makes this point in his writings European continent, more pre- on his teacher, also increasingly in Cassirer’s later cisely, and being more than an observer but writings. Cf. Cassirer 2001. instead someone who made a significant 3 There is evidence for this in some letters from and mark on this epoch. Though largely forgot- about Cohen, where he speaks unfavorably about ten today, he was one of the most outstanding Husserl. In a letter to Natorp of August 23, 1914, he intellectuals in Europe around 1900. Studying writes: “Der oesterreichische Konvertit ist auch so eine geschwollene Eitelkeitsfigur, ohne Aufrichtig- his life and his thought helps us reconstruct a keit & Wahrhaftigkeit.” (Quoted in: H. Holzhey, fascinating epoch in Western history. A brief Cohen und Natorp, Vol. 2, p. 430). Cohen makes this historical consideration be useful to ap- in the context of his fight against anti- proach his specifically philosophical contribu- Semitism on the part of the Jewish community, tion. which has to become, he , more “positive” Hermann Cohen was born in 1842 in (ibid.), instead of, as the Husserls, denying their Jewish origins (Husserl and his wife had converted Coswig (State of Anhalt) into an orthodox to Christianity and were overall quite secular). Ac- Jewish family. Besides attending the German cording to Karl Schuhmann, with whom the author Gymnasium he also went to a Hebrew school discussed this passage, there can be no doubt that it and maintained his Jewish ties over the years, is Husserl that Cohen is referring to in this passage. until at the end of his philosophical journey Cf. also ibid., pp. 369 f. (Cohen’s letter to Natorp of he even attempted to reconstruct the origins December 1908), where he warns Natorp of Husserl

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and frustrated by anti-Semitic tragedy of so many Jews of his generation both as a citizen as well as an academic was the realization that they were simply not throughout his lifetime, he came to ponder, allowed and welcome to assimilate them- and ultimately reject, Theodor Herzl’s idea of selves in a country they loved and to which a Jewish State. The Jewish cause became so they felt a strong sense of belonging. Cohen dear to him that, upon retiring from Marburg died in 1918 amidst the rubble of the Great in 1912, Cohen moved to where he War, poring over the proofs of his great taught at the School of the Study of Judaism, work on the philosophy of (Religion where he was influential for a young genera- of out of the Sources of Judaism, pub- tion of Jewish theoreticians such as Franz lished posthumously in 1919, edited by Rosenzweig and . Being critical Rosenzweig and Cassirer) and with the plans of the idea Zionism,4 he always felt a part of in his mind to finish his philosophical system German intellectual life, to which he made an culminating with a work on psychology, con- invaluable contribution with his philosophical ceived as a science of the “unity of cultural works. consciousness” (“Einheit des Kultur- Yet Cohen was also an outspoken public bewusstseins”), the topic that was at the heart intellectual who commented publicly on is- of his philosophical endeavors. One late and sues pertaining to his religion. He became tragic irony is that his wife, Martha Cohen, known to a larger audience in Germany when who survived her husband by more than two he took a stance against Heinrich von Tre- decades, was deported to the Concentration itschke in the famous “Judenstreit.”5 The Camp in Theresienstadt in 1942, where she fell victim to the Nazi regime within days of and suggests “einige Reserve und nicht vollkom- her arrival. mene Vertrauensseligkeit” (p. 370). Husserl, on his Cohen was not the first neo-Kantian in part, conspicuously ignored Cohen, while he was Marburg, though he is, and with good rea- exceptionally friendly with Natorp. 4 The idea that was floated at the time was the Brit- sons, considered the founder of the “Marburg ish suggestion to offer Uganda, a former colony, for School.” He was lured to Marburg in 1873 by Jews to settle. This idea was rejected especially by his predecessor , who the Zionists like Herzl, to whom the only site of a had become famous through his History of Jewish State could be Palestine. (Geschichte des Materialismus, 5 In his anti-Semitic pamphlets, Treitschke claimed 1866) that was considered one of the found- that the Jews could never be a part of German cul- ture. More specific hate speech was later directed at Jewish neo-Kantians such as Cohen himself, who was attacked by the main editor of Kantstudien, Bruno Bauch, for being unable to understand Kant Kantstudien. However, he later, after Hitler’s sei- as a non-German. The fight that ensued after this zure of power, became an avid Nazi. All of these attack—the counter-attack came from Cassirer— connections are laid out in great detail in Sieg’s de- led Bauch to resign from his editorship of finitive historical study on the Marburg School.

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ing works of the neo-Kantian movement.6 plex with a clear Due to Cohen’s first major work, entitled philosophical agenda reached its peak around Kant’s Theory of (Kants Theorie der 1900 as well.9 Erfahrung, 1st ed.1871), which was well- Cohen’s reputation mainly owed to his received at the time and quickly became a personal aura and powerful classroom per- classic of Kant scholarship, Cohen gained a sona. Also in his writings, one gets the im- reputation for being a penetrating and pro- pression of an original, deep thinker who found Kant scholar, but also an original moves quickly from seemingly minute details thinker. Publishing a number of works on to raising the most fundamental questions Kant, but also on (ancient and who writes in a deeply passionate, com- and early modern) quickly and in short suc- mitted manner that is at all times highly cap- cession, he was subsequently offered a per- tivating.10 Analogies to ’s manent position in Marburg in 1876 and soon classroom presence, incidentally also first gained a nationwide reputation as a philoso- displayed in Marburg, have been drawn.11 He pher succeeding in Lange’s footsteps, al- though with an entirely different philosophi- academic philosophers such as Kierkegaard, cal agenda.7 Cohen’s reputation grew enor- Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Willey (1987) has mously within the next decade and, with the made the interesting connection between younger receiving a funded po- Nietzsche’s and Cohen’s philosophical intentions. For an historical account of the development of the sition in 1882, was seen as the founder as well Marburg School, cf. also Sieg 1994. as the head of the emerging “Marburg 9 Sieg (1994, p. 190) has called the time between School.” It is fair to say that he was one of the 1900 and 1910 the “golden era” of the Marburg most influential and well-known academic School. philosophers in Germany at the end of the 10 As of ca. 1900, Cohen suffered from an eye disease 19th Century.8 The Marburg School as a com- that made him unable to read and write on his own. His wife, Martha, read things out loud for him and also penned down what her husband dictated to her. 6 More famous than the actual content of the work One immediately notices this “spoken ” was the fact that each chapter, by laying out the im- style in his later writings and the passion with which portance of Kant’s philosophy, ended with the pas- these texts must have been dictated is very explicit. sionate expression “Daher muss zu Kant zurückge- 11 Cf. Brandt, 1992. One could speculate that the fact gangen warden!” (“This is why we must go back to that Heidegger was able to build such a strong repu- Kant!”). Again one can draw the analogy to the tation in Marburg was (in part at least) due to the phenomenological movement in its “battle cry” “Zu fact that there was a fertile ground in the student den Dingen selbst!” (“To the things themselves!”). body for him to launch his career. After all, by the 7 To be precise, Cohen took over Lange’s chair that time Heidegger came, Marburg as a whole (not just had become vacant due to Lange’s death in 1875. the Philosophy Department) was still considered a 8 It is clear that we are talking here about the phi- very active university, bustling with students from losophical scene within the academe. Arguably as far away as Russia and Japan. Moreover, Natorp, more famous at the time were “popular” non- who was by all accounts a very modest, quiet and

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soon attracted many students, also from of the 1880s that one has spoken of the “Mar- abroad, in what was to become one of the burg School of neo-Kantianism”—an image centers of neo-Kantianism, next to the two that the Marburgers were keen on promot- university towns in Southwest Germany, ing.13 With Cohen’s departure to Berlin after Freiburg and . Neo-Kantianism his retirement in 1912 and Natorp’s passing had at that time (around 1900), as Jürgen away in 1924, the character and image of a Habermas puts it, an “imperial stance” in the Schulgemeinschaft had vanished. As has been philosophical scene of Germany (as well as, asserted14, however, the Marburg School of to a lesser extent, France, Italy and Spain). In neo-Kantianism was one of the most “com- this outstanding role, Cohen also attracted pact” philosophical schools ever to exist in philosophers who would join him in his Germany. Whether this school was a typical cause, most importantly the already men- phenomenon of the Kaiserreich and was “ob- tioned Natorp, who arrived in Marburg in solete” by the time the Weimar Republic was 1881. came to Marburg as a established, is a question for historians, not student from Berlin in the 1890s and, though philosophers, who attempt to take their he never taught at Marburg, nevertheless was thoughts seriously. No matter how timely considered—and considered himself—an neo-Kantian thought might be today, it is offspring of the Marburg School.12 It was as undoubtedly the case that this movement paved the way for most tendencies to emerge th in the 20 Century. Simply in terms of his- shy person, was never able to fill the vacuum that tory of effects, one cannot ignore neo- the ebullient Cohen left behind upon his departure Kantianism when one is committed to his- from Marburg in 1913. Another “Marburger” was torically responsible scholarship. , who had at that time also broken Neo-Kantianism arose as of the 1870s in with the main tenets of the Marburg Method. So Germany with the battle cry “Back to Kant!” perhaps the students were waiting for a new “prophet”? Interestingly, this call was first issued not by 12 Though the most famous members of the Mar- philosophers who were still, as it were, in a burg School were these three thinkers upon which I state of shock after the much-quoted “col- focus here, there were at least another dozen phi- losophers in this context that have become forgotten today but who were active within this movement. of Kant’s works) and journals (Kantstudien and Lo- The character of this school becomes clear in its gos). workings, if one sees it almost as a big factory with 13 While Natorp staid put for the most part in Mar- a clear division of labor. The member of this school burg and worked in quiet solitude, Cohen went on worked on items ranging from theoretical, practical extensive travels during the semester breaks. Holz- and aesthetical philosophy to and, hey has also spoken of Cohen as the “Minister of the last not least (and representing one of the staples of Exterior,” Natorp as the “Minister of the Interior” neo-Kantianism), Kant commentary and Kant of the Marburg School. scholarship in the form of Kant philology (editions 14 Cf. Holzhey, 1986/I.

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lapse of German .” Instead, the call ily sensorial apparatus.16 This brings about came from cutting-edge scientists such as the specter of psychologism that seemed to Helmholtz15 who, in the midst of the sciences’ occupy much of philosophers’ efforts in the impressive achievements through novel ex- latter third of the 19th century. In a general perimental methods, sought guidance in sense, psychologism was the view that cogni- questions concerning the epistemological tion depended on the human being’s psyche foundations of scientific cognition. In this in its particular form of hardwiring. This has quest, they turned to the founder of critical consequences for the role of philosophy itself; philosophy, bypassing the overly speculative whatever it may be, it is clear what it can no of the German Idealists (esp. longer lay claim to: to be a first philosophy Schelling). As is known, Kant’s theoretical with the function of providing a foundation philosophy rephrased the question of cogni- for the sciences as second . Ret- tion in terms of subjective conditions of pos- rospectively, we now see mainly Husserl as sibility of by proposing the notion involved in this battle; however, Husserl was that we can only know of things what we actually rather “late” in this general battle ourselves put into them. This new foundation that was waged over philosophy’s character of after the Copernican turn, so as scientific. As Natorp laconically comments it seemed, could be utilized in principle but in his review of Husserl’s Prolegomena of had to be transformed so as to be adequate to 1900, the neo-Kantians enthusiastically wel- assess the problems of the day. Most impor- come Husserl’s refutation of psychologism— tantly, it was Kant’s transcendental a priori another refutation will hopefully help us to that was the main source of inspiration; yet finally overcome this wrong-headed under- Helmholtz transformed and interpreted it in a standing of epistemology’s task—but that the physiological, essentially psychologistic, Marburg School actually “could not learn manner. This was Helmholtz’s reading of much” from this. Husserl had merely, Kant, namely that the way of the human be- through his own trials and tribulations, come ing’s experiencing contributed to that which to see the light from his angle.17 was perceived: But forms of were no Ironically, thus, the origins of neo- longer of a transcendental in Kant’s Kantianism lie in a “materialistic” (Lange), sense (as conditions of possibility of objective knowledge), but were now seen as physio- 16 The text that one refers to in this context is Helm- logical traits of the human being with its bod- holtz’s talk “Ueber das Sehen des Menschen” (“On Man’s Seeing”), delivered in Königsberg in 1855. Cf. Hatfield, who explores and reconstructs Helm- holtz’s transformation of Kant’s transcendental phi- 15 On the side of academic philosophy one would losophy into a psychologistic reading. also have to mention Herbart, Fries and Beneke, cf. 17 Natorp notes this several times, esp. in his review Stolzenberg, p. 24. of Ideas I.

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psychologistic rendering of Kant’s theoretical nological Movement.20 Yet, the close ties to philosophy. Cohen himself in his early works the sciences of their day—psychology and contributed to this reading in articles where —were to become a trade- he expounds his psychological research (in a mark of the Marburg School, to the extent journal dedicated to studies in “Folk Psy- that the Marburg Interpretation was even chology”18). It is not until his theoretical perceived by some as a mere “theory of sci- work on Kant after entering the debate con- ence.” This is echoed in the harsh verdict in cerning the famous “third alternative” debate the famous critique of, e.g., Heidegger, who between and Adolf Trendelen- claimed that in neo-Kantianism philosophy burg19 that Cohen overcomes this psycholo- was demoted to “the handmaiden of the sci- gistic reading, being highly critical of his ear- ences.”21 This critique proved devastating for lier stance. As of 1871, thus, Cohen in his the reputation of neo-Kantianism and has “critical” reading wages a vicious battle since been repeated like a mantra in philoso- against psychologism. The “objective” and phical historiography.22 The way in which I “logical” tendency—or over-emphasis, as will present the Marburg School inaugurated has been asserted—of neo-Kantianism can be by Cohen will reveal this verdict to be wrong explained through the opposition against any as well as wrong-headed on several counts. form of psychologism. This is the origin and Criticizing this erroneous view of the Mar- distinctive trait of the Marburg School in burg School makes way for a crucial under- which it soon found allies in the Southwest as standing and appreciation of this school. well as in Dilthey and the arising Phenome- 20 It is interesting to note that Husserl underwent the same development as Cohen. In his first publication, the Philosophy of Arithmetic in 1891, Husserl took a 18 The full title of this journal was “Zeitschrift für psychologistic attitude with regard to the “constitu- Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft” (Jour- tion” of mathematical entities, only to harshly refute nal for Folk Psychology and ); cf. Holz- his own psychologism in the famous first volume of hey 2004, p. 44. the Logical Investigations, the Prolegomena. 19 In short, the “third alternative” reading that 21 Historically, this is actually an echo of Max Trendelenburg proposes makes the point that Kant Scheler’s earlier critique of neo-Kantianism in his did not rule out that between an “idealistic” and habilitation thesis (and first book), entitled Phe- “realistic” reading of Kant’s doctrine of the appear- nomenology and Epistemology. There, Scheler comes ances in space and time (as forms of intuition) and to the conclusion that the neo-Kantians consider the thing in itself there could be a third alternative. philosophy as merely an “owl of Minerva.” Cf. This alternative is the idea that one cannot rule out Scheler, and Edel, pp. 120 f., esp. 121, fn. 11. For that the thing in itself actually conformed to our Heidegger’s view of neo-Kantianism, cf. the Davos way of thinking, that space and time are equally Debate in Heidegger 1997, pp. 193 f. forms of intuition as well as categories of the thing 22 See, e.g., (Gardner 1999, p. 342), where this ver- in itself. For a summary of this argument and its dict is again repeated almost as a matter of course consequences, cf. Gardner, 1999, p. 107-111. and without any reference.

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Cohen’s philosophical development as of ing within the horizons of his philosophy. Yet his first “critical” work on Kant hence cen- such a stance will be telling with respect to tered upon an elucidation of Kant’s Critiques, the critic as well: “One cannot pass judgment proceeding with a rather sophisticated, yet on Kant, without revealing in each and every highly reflected, approach as a mix of eluci- line which world one carries around in one’s dation and interpretation. As he says already own head.”25 A combination of such a his- in the first edition of Kant’s Theory of Experi- torical and systematic inquiry renders ence, he sees his work as a “combination of Cohen’s critical-interpretative work on Kant, the systematic and historical task,”23 while as he calls it, a “Metacritique.”26 Thus it is being true to the “letter of Kant” and not shy- clear that from the outset Cohen engages in a ing away from the “dirty work” (Kärrnerar- highly reflected of dealing with beit) of Kant philology. This approach ele- Kant and the accomplishments of his philoso- vated Kant scholarship to a new level. By the phy that are seen in the light of contemporary 1870s, more than half a decade after Kant’s problems, e.g., in the sciences. As Gadamer death, Kant could be seen as a classic and the would later say, a successful interpretation of neo-Kantians introduced a new style of deal- a classical author means an application to ing with Kant, witnessed also by emerging one’s own understanding and one’s own time. Kant commentaries and critical editions of This principle is already applied with explicit Kant’s works.24 Being true to the spirit as well consciousness by Cohen. as the letter, however, could mean acknowl- Soon after Cohen’s work on the First Cri- edging that Kant was clearly mistaken on cer- tique followed one on the Second and, tain accounts and needed to be corrected or somewhat later, on the Third Critique. Espe- overcome, precisely by remaining true to the cially the works on the first two Critiques spirit of Kant. In all of his interpretations of have become classics in Kant scholarship and Kant, Cohen applies the hermeneutical prin- at the same time have been, rightfully, con- ciple, to be found in the First Critique, of un- sidered highly difficult and complex works. derstanding the author better than he under- Especially Kants Theorie der Erfahrung un- stood himself. But this has consequences for derwent extensive expansion. While the first the interpreter as well; dealing with Kant phi- edition was a booklet of 270 pages, the second losophically required taking a stance (Parte- edition of 1885 was blown up to more than inahme) on Kant. Remaining true to Kant 600 and the last edition of 1918 nearly 800 could mean refuting his claims, while remain- pages! These works are difficult to assess in their systematic content, as they present the 23 KTE1, p. X. reader with an intricate mixture of a line-by- 24 The commentaries on Kant that were published in this time are to this day classical works on Kant. I mention only the works by and 25 KTE1, p. XI. Kuno Fischer. 26 Ibid., p. XII.

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line interpretation of the Critiques as well as Cohen’s interpretation is stated boldly in the critical reinterpretations of Kantian doctrines title of Cohen’s book on the first Critique, that quickly depart from the interpretative that is, Kant’s transcendental philosophy is a passages. It is sometimes not clear where novel theory of experience, with experience be- Cohen paraphrases Kant and where he goes ing mainly—though not exclusively—that beyond him, yet while remaining close to the experience ascertained in the natural- text and offering a barrage of quotations in mathematical sciences. From the standpoint support of his point. At the same time, all of of transcendental philosophy, the nature that Cohen’s writings display a superb grasp of we experience is given in natural science. the totality of Kant’s oeuvre. As Cassirer re- “What nature may really be does not matter counts anecdotally, when he first heard the to us as long as we want to philosophize, not name Cohen mentioned in the lectures that write poetry.”29 Secondly, what is crucial and he followed with in Berlin, of highest importance in this theory is Kant’s Cohen was mentioned as an author whose method. This method Cohen calls the tran- works on Kant were recommended as being scendental method, a term actually not itself of exceptional depth and originality. Simmel utilized by Kant himself30. The way Cohen went on to mention their difficulty and interprets this allegedly Kantian method soon pointed out that, thankfully, there were commentaries on these books, namely Kant’s 27 Southwest School), but none of these really “stuck.” three Critiques! Increasingly, however, On the other hand, the neo-Kantians very much Cohen moved away from Kant and devel- conceived of themselves as a “school” and unified oped his own philosophical system that he “movement,” which explains that the global label also conceived in analogy to Kant’s three ma- “neo-Kantianism” came to be used by themselves jor works, while in his latest phase he focused and was clearly intended as a form of self- on the , in which he promotion, whereas a closer look reveals quickly how each of these highly original thinkers was worked on a philosophical interpretation of working on his own project. In view of the diversity Judaism’s import for moral philosophy. within the neo-Kantian movement, however, the Regardless of Cohen’s own philosophical Marburg School was indeed the most “compact” to system and its merits, it is the Kant interpre- the point that differences were deliberately sup- tation itself that has become the trademark of pressed. See Holzhey’s Cohen und Natorp (Vol. I), the Marburg School as a whole. This inter- where these differences are clearly indicated and spelled out. pretation goes beyond Kant to the extent that 29 Quoted in Holzhey 2004, p. 47 (from Cohen’s some even referred to the Marburg reading as programmatic preface to his edition of Lange’s His- a “neo-Fichteanism.”28 The main thesis of tory of Materialism). The phrase is difficult to trans- late, thus here the original: “Was Natur sei, das geht 27 Cf. Cassirer, 2001. uns nichts an, sofern wir philosophieren, nicht dichten 28 There was a plethora of other designations for the wollen.” neo-Kantian tendency as a whole (including the 30 Cf. Baum, 1980.

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reveals an original understanding of it that is questioned, to the contrary: it is an endless both a radical reading of Kant as well as it ul- task. timately departs from Kant’s scope, with the Yet, taking the point of departure from intention of “fixing” what in Kant was only scientific cognition also secures the scientific darkly anticipated. What Kant means by ex- character of philosophy itself. Philosophy it- perience is something more fundamental, or self can only have a scientific character if the more encompassing, than the two elements object it deals with is scientific as well. There that make cognition possible, sensibility and is an internal connection between philoso- understanding. phy’s role as first science and the natural sci- Moreover, part of this method—which ences as of Newton. The overall bold claim is was in fact highly contested—is to take the that experience, in the way it is understood analytical path of the Critique that Kant pre- by Kant in the First Critique, is to be found in sents in the Prolegomena, taking one’s point mathematical natural science and as such con- of departure from already established facts. structs , while taking its cue mainly And there is a reason for this. One needs to from experience and cognition in the positive start from an already presupposed factum be- sciences. Reality, in the sense that Cohen un- cause this factum is not simply given but derstands it, is ultimately a construction in given as a problem or task that critical phi- pure thought. Reality that we are to deal losophy deals with. The factum is not gege- with, if we philosophize and not indulge in ben, but aufgegeben. The factum that presents poetry, is purely logical and structured by us with the most problems is the factum of laws. It is for these that the Marburg the sciences. This is the systematic reason School has also been characterized as a “pan- why the Transcendental Method starts out logism” or “logical idealism.”31 The tran- with the factum of the sciences, not as some- scendental method developed by Cohen by thing simply given but as a problem to be ex- way of his Kant interpretation is the guiding plained. Or as Cohen likes to say, the factum clue to the Marburg School as a whole. While is not a terminus ad quem—something that we it has been modified and applied in different must arrive at ultimately—but as a terminus a aspects by Natorp and Cassirer; their phi- quo—something from which philosophy losophical efforts are incomprehensible with- must take its point of departure. It is the ex- out this methodological groundwork laid by planandum, not the explanans. The “hand Cohen. maiden” critique refers to this opening move, This “logical” reading of Kant is incon- and thereby already misunderstands it com- ceivable, however, without first understand- pletely. It is not that con- ing how Cohen views the purpose and con- tents itself with coming after the fact, the fac- cept of philosophy and its role both vis-à-vis, tum; rather, this is the starting point of the whole enterprise. The factum is not left un- 31 Cf. Holzhey, as well as Gadamer, 1954.

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as well as within, cultural life at large. Thus, midst of a culture, thereby in culture’s center. before I present Cohen’s theoretical philoso- Yet within cultural activities, the sciences are phy focusing on the transcendental method as culture’s pinnacle, the highest and most dig- it arises from his Kant interpretation, I will nified achievement of a cultural humanity. first lay out his broader of what philosophy is Philosophy, as first science, has an inherent to accomplish. In this understanding, he has a connection to culture and its science and can- remarkably broad view; critical philosophy not be understood without it. So how can one might have been invented by Kant, but Kant reconstruct the emergence of philosophy and is merely reformulating philosophy’s task in science within a culture? light of the new developments in modern sci- Culture comes out of nature, but as such ence following Newton’s innovations. The arises first as a study of nature. This is possi- transcendental method that Kant develops, ble because the fascinating discovery in the way Cohen reconstructs Kant’s inten- Greek Enlightenment is that our mind, e.g., tions, is incomprehensible without first clari- in doing mathematics, conforms to nature. As fying Cohen’s own understanding of critical Cohen says, “the first direction of culture is philosophy. Only then is the systematic the science of nature. The latter begins with framework provided within which the tran- mathematics: in astronomy we have the com- scendental method can be couched. bination of mathematics and nature.”32 But by establishing itself as such a study of nature, culture arises as a world of its own, parallel to 2. Cohen’s of Philosophy as the world of nature, with its own forms of life “Foundational Science” (“Grundle- in distinction from nature: religion, law, art. gungswissenschaft”) Consequently, there arise studies (sciences) of the cultural world as well: study of relig- o appreciate the impetus of Cohen’s ion, of law, of politics, even of art. This is the philosophy one has to expound first broad understanding of science as — his concept of philosophy and, con- study in its basic sense—which Cohen pre- Tversely, what view he is battling, philosophy supposes here as well as in his reconstruction as psychologism. After overcoming the psy- of . Thus, parallel to natu- chologistic reading of transcendental phi- ral science, a novel concept of science is cre- losophy, he wants to give philosophy back its ated, sciences of and within culture. In flour- original meaning of as first phi- ishing cultures, such as the Greek, ever new losophy, but in a new guise and as standing on the ground laid by Kant’s Copernican 32 “Die vornehmlichste Cultur-Richtung ist die turn. Kant merely rephrases the spirit of Wissenschaft der Natur. Diese beginnt mit der at the zenith of the En- Mathematik in der Astronomie liegt die Verbindung lightenment. Already in Antiquity and reborn von Mathematik und Natur vor.“ (Beinecke, Cas- sirer papers, B 56, F 1107) in the Renaissance, philosophy stands in the

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sciences arise of ever new cultural forma- tant aspect of Cohen’s philosophy, one can- tions. It is now the task of the philosopher33 not but grossly misunderstand his overarch- to reflect upon these manifold forms of sci- ing intentions, his and that of the rest of the ence—of episteme—and find their common Marburg School. Thus, philosophy needs to traits as actions that are of the highest dignity provide a unifying basis for the sciences as in humanity, for otherwise there would be no cultural activities as well as, thereby, clarify unity, no focus in a given culture. “This one its own position vis-à-vis the sciences. Yet basic factum—the multiplicity [Vieldeutig- even natural sciences are cultural activities. keit] of the concept of science in culture— The transcendental question, hence, is, ‘how proves the necessity of philosophy. This is is culture possible?’ This is the basic question the meaning of philosophy, that it overcomes that philosophy addresses. Yet culture is un- this multiplicity, that it brings the concept of derstood from the very start as standing in science to a principal definition, that it deter- connection to science. Science as a study of a mines the constant factor of science in all its region of reality is precisely to find the ra- different directions. That means that philoso- tional elements in and with which man can phy is the reconstruction of culture in all its penetrate these regions to ascertain knowledge directions from out of this constant factor of about reality. Yet this reality that is found is science.”34 thereby a reality based and founded on the Philosophy as “reconstruction of culture” knowledge with which it is cognized. As Na- is the guiding clue that runs through the torp says, in view of Cohen’s achievements, Marburg School as a whole. If one does not philosophy has to ascertain “the creative understand this approach as the most impor- ground of all such deed of object-formation, … the primal law [Urgesetz] that one terms as 33 In this context, Cohen mentions Socrates’ famous that of logos, of ratio, as reason.”35 saying that nature had nothing to teach him and that To provide such a basis, one needs to start he preferred going into the marketplace to converse with his fellow citizens. Cohen interprets this as from a privileged science. The obvious ques- ’s shift from science as natural science to sci- tion is, if philosophy is the reconstruction of ence as a study of human culture. culture, why then focus on the mathematical 34 “Diese eine Grundfactum – die Vieldeutigkeit des natural sciences and not some other cultural Begriffs der Wissenschaft in der Cultur – beweist formation, such as art or religion? Answering die Notwendigkeit der Philosophie. Das bedeutet this question leads immediately to Cohen’s die Philosophie, dass sie diese Vieldeutigkeit auf- hebt, den Begriff der Wissenschaft zur prinzipiellen focus on Kant’s critique of reason that he sees Bestimmung bringt, den constanten Factor der Wis- as having developed most importantly sensachaft in allen verschiedenen Richtungen through Kant’s study of Newton.36 Kant was auszeichnet. Damit ist Philosophie die Reconstruction der Cultur 35 Natorp 1912, pp. 196 f. in all ihren Richtungen aus diesem constanten Fak- 36 Cf. the famous apodictic statement (KTE3, 94): tor der Wissenschaft.“ (Beinecke, op. cit.) “Die transzendentale Methode [Kants] ist in dem

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intrigued by Newton’s sketch of mathemati- menting on Cohen, “in the system of Kant cal science because he saw this as a remedy the actual vital question [Schicksalsfrage] of against Skepticism. There exists , and philosophy as such becomes decided: the this is found in pure mathematics, and, a forti- question as to the relation of philosophy and ori, in natural science modeled on the former. science.”37 Thus it is clear what philosophy Indeed, science of nature the way Newton can not be: it cannot be another science; to let sketched it is of the utmost exactitude due to philosophical questions be taken over by par- Newton’s focus on mathematics as the meth- ticular sciences is a sellout of the purpose and odology of the science of nature. However, task of science. As scientific philosophy it this is possible for Newton because there is a must provide the basis and foundation for fundamental correlation between mathemat- culture, a culture, however, that becomes ics, as an operation of human reason, and na- manifest as culture in its cultural activities of ture as object domain of cognition, a domain which mathematical natural science is the that conforms to reason. Reason has to do highest, since it provides us with exact knowl- with establishing laws, and these are most edge of the world as we experience it. But lay- immediately available in mathematical natu- ing the foundations of culture as such, in ral science. Kant’s guiding question was, turn, brings philosophy back into the position ‘how is this possible?’ More precisely: How is of being the mother of all sciences. However, it possible to have objective, exact knowledge based since Kant on the Copernican turn, this of something that is external to us? How are role is carried out in critical fashion as clarify- we able to ascertain laws of nature? Purifying ing the conditions of possibility of scientific reason of any empirical elements is parallel to cognition. Newton’s attempt to strip nature of any intui- In this sense, philosophy must come forth tive qualities or subjective impressions and as a foundational science, and that means, as reduce it to its pure elements: mathematical laying ultimate foundations. Philosophy’s laws. function as “” (Letztbe- Therefore Kant’s philosophy was the ulti- gründung) has also been misunderstood for mate attempt to not only provide a philoso- the most part. Philosophy, according to phical foundation and justification of science, Cohen, must come forth as a critical idealism, but thereby to determine the scientific charac- as foundational discipline for these cultural ter of philosophy itself. Kant’s system as an activities, starting with mathematical natural attempt at this marks the world-historical im- science, but thereby observe the character of portance of Kant. As Cassirer asserts, com- the respective science. Philosophy must be foundational — letzt-begründend — but in a Nachdenken über die Philosophiae naturalis principia critical way as for the first time laying the mathematica entstanden.“ In the following, Kants Theorie der Erfahrung will be quoted as “KTE” and I will be quoting from the third edition. 37 Cassirer, op. cit., p. 120.

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foundations of science, and that means in sci- what renders mathematical natural science entific cognition itself. As opposed to meta- different from other cultural activities, and physics as a science of foundations (Grundla- which is the reason why Cohen favors them, genwissenschaft), where these foundations are is that the latter purports to ascertain truth of fixed and unquestioned axioms or principles, general and universal character; these laws are critical idealism must be a science of laying valid a priori. Laying the grounds for these foundations (Grundlegungswissenschaft) by rigorous scientific activities is, hence, of the providing the critical justification for the highest value for culture as such. cognition that is accumulated in science. Critical philosophy is thus not simply epis- These foundations are expressed in basic temology—Erkenntnistheorie, theory of cog- judgments that express synthetic a priori nition—but, as Cohen calls it, Erk- principles of cognition. These foundations enntniskritik, epistemic critique of the cogni- are, however, in constant reinterpretation and tion gained in science, and it is directed “ex- re-grounding, since the sciences and clusively at the content of cognition”38 that is deepen their knowledge of the world, while purely logical (a priori) and not the psycho- also constantly testing and revising their own logical means of attaining it. This marks foundations. This is why philosophy, the way Cohen’s clear anti-psychologistic bent that is Cohen sees it, is a method of laying founda- maintained to the point that he deems any in- tions, not a discipline of first unshakable prin- vestigation into the subjective elements in- ciples, but a reflection establishing basic con- volved in science as a of “immaturity.”39 cepts that ground and strengthen the sciences, This marks the path of Kant’s own matura- thereby providing a launching pad for further tion process from the A to the B Deduction, inquiry. This is the genuine philosophical as- the latter of which increasingly eliminates pect of science; the moment the scientist re- subjective elements. Philosophy’s task is to flects on the foundations of her science, she is scrutinize the of science as they have no longer merely a scientist. Yet the scientist been constituted by the scientists in their needs help from the who pro- laboratories. These are, to Cohen, the most vides a transcendental critique of these scien- salient aspects of culture.40 This is why, based tific findings. Philosophy as a discipline of laying foundations is hence a methodological 38 Infinitesimalmethode, p. 53. 39 justification of the sciences’ results by laying KTE, p. 103. 40 In Natorp’s text on the Marburg School from the grounds that make possible the types of which was already quoted, Natorp continues: phi- cognition that are ascertained in the multitude losophy has to “zum Faktum den Grund der of scientific inquiries as disciplines that ascer- ‘Möglichkeit’ und damit den ‘Rechtsgrund’ tain truths about the world as we know it (as nachzuweisen, das heisst: eben den Gesetzesgrund, cognized). However, only in mathematical die Einheit des Logos, der Ratio in all solcher schaf- natural science do these truths have the char- fenden Tat der Kultur aufzuzeigen und zur Reinheit herauszuarbeiten” (Natorp 1912, pp. 196 f.). acter of laws, not just empirical rules. Hence,

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on Cohen’s overall view of culture and phi- forms this factum, with Kant, again into a losophy’s position in culture, the factum problem.”41 where philosophy begins its work cannot be Philosophical questioning in general, the mere factum of prescientific experience hence, must commence from an already exist- but the factum of science. The slogan “the fac- ing, established science. In developing his tum is the factum of the sciences” (“das Fak- critical method Kant started out from the cut- tum ist das Faktum der Wissenschaft”), how- ting edge of natural science of his day, New- ever, must be understood in this broad under- tonian physics. It is here where Kant found standing of science. Science is not just natural an exactitude and rigor that was found in no science, but science is cognition of the world, other science. “The transcendental method both that of nature and culture, and philoso- came about in [Kant’s] reflections on the Phi- phy must make its beginning from the multi- losophiae naturalis principia mathematica.”42 tude of scientific activities, while taking its This was the factum of science that marked specific point of departure in the reconstruc- the outset of Kant’s system. Newtonian phys- tion of theoretical cognition from the natural- ics is not the only type of cognition, but it is mathematical sciences, and unify them into a the most exact one, and it is here where Kant general interpretation of what goes on in formed his concept of the a priori in the two these edifices. As such, philosophy does not notions that Cohen emphasizes: universality come after the fact and, as it were, clean up and generality.43 That is why theoretical phi- the mess that the scientists have left after do- losophy must focus on the conditions of pos- ing their work (as their handmaiden). In- sibility of cognition of the type of universal stead, it first of all lays the foundations that and general character. In Holzhey’s words, make possible scientific cognition: these are the foundations of cognition itself. In clarify- 41 Cassirer, op. cit., p. 120. 42 ing the conditions of possibility of cognition KTE, p. 94. 43 Cf. Stolzenberg 1995, p. 29, who explains this in the sciences, critical philosophy first of all move succinctly: “[N]un wird [in Cohen] die kan- provides the basis for scientific deed. This tische Bestimmung der Apriorität als Herkunft eines task, however, can only be achieved in con- Begriffs aus Quellen der Vernunft aufgrund der stant interaction with the sciences. The fac- psychologischen Konnotationen preisgegeben und tum is accepted—Cohen has the highest ad- auf die Charaktere der Notwendigkeit und Allge- miration for the impressive work of the scien- meinheit bzw. auf den Charakter der Gesetzlichkeit einer Erkenntnis reduziert. Daher kann Cohen tists—but it is thereby anew turned into a sagen, daß aprioriische Prinzipien Teile der Bedeu- task for philosophy. In Cassirer’s words, tung des Begriffs der naturwissenschaftlichen Erk- Cohen “accepts without restrictions the fac- enntnis bzw. Erfahrung sind, und daher ist es auch tum of science as foundation; but he trans- verständlich, daß Cohen diejenigen Bereiche, in denen diese Prinzipien enthalten sind, die Mathe- matik und reine Naturwissenschaft, als Teilbestim- mungen des Begriffs der Erfahrung aufgefaßt hat.“

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“what is at stake under the title of a transcen- 3. Kant’s Novel Concept of Experi- dental theory of experience, for Cohen, are ence and the Transcendental Method the conditions of validity of a priori cogni- tion.”44 And this is why Newtonian physics is s has become clear, the thesis that Kant’s model and . Yet depending Cohen boldly puts forth is: the fac- on the type of transcendental inquiry—and tum that we have to contend with the theoretical is but one—other sciences will inA is the factum of serve as points of departure. Each direction of natural mathematical science. Hence, the ob- critical philosophy must hence choose a sci- ject of experience is not “brute” nature but the entific discipline as its factum. As Cohen de- nature experienced in natural science. Experi- clares in his interpretation of Kant’s Second ence, the way Kant understands it, is not Critique, must take as its primitive sensation or ; rather, the factum the established discipline of jurispru- content and the object of judgments of experi- dence (Rechtswissenschaft) to reconstruct ence are the general truths of science in the ethical norms that function as conditions of form of synthetic judgments a priori. This no- possibility for the former. This does not ren- tion can be backed up with reference to the der a given jurisprudence authoritative, but is original meaning of the word “Erfahrung,” the starting point for reconstructing the ethi- which was historically introduced into phi- cal norms and values that underpin and factor losophical terminology in the 18th century into it. Theoretical philosophy, which is (presumably by the Wolff School) and means about universal and general truths, must originally at no point “mere experience” as in choose that scientific discipline where cogni- contemporary usage, but rather something tion of the highest “quality” and dignity is like investigation or scrutiny (cf. also Spanish gained: and this can only be cognition of experiencia, but the verb derived from it is ex- mathematical rigor.45 To justify this knowl- perimentar).46 Cohen is not saying that such edge is the task of epistemic critique and the “simple perception” (as sensation, Emp- result in addressing this task is the transcen- findung) does not exist. Rather, if we are to dental method. take our point of departure from mathemati-

44 Holzhey 2004, p. 48. 46 Cf. Duden, Das Herkunftswörterbuch, Duden- 45 Cohen makes it very clear in KBE that, while Verlag: Mannheim/Wien/Zürich, 1963, p. 141. The theoretical philosophy deals with knowledge in the original cognates of erfahren were “erforschen, ken- sense of theoretical cognition, practical philosophy nenlernen, durchmachen“ (investigate, get to know, with “moral knowing” (moralisches Erkennen vs. going through). Cf. also the adjective “erfahren” theoretisches Wissen). In other words, Cohen clearly which can also mean “smart, intelligent, educated.” recognizes the in the cognitive functions On Kant’s understanding of Erfahrung cf. also involved in these respective disciplines as well as the Kambartel 1972, pp. 609f., who reminds us that Er- type of philosophical treatment they demand. Cf. fahrung is primarily a translation of Greek empeiría, KBE, p. 321. which in is closely linked to epistéme.

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cal natural science, this is what is experienced rienced is not the life-world pure and simple, as nature: “Not the stars in the sky are the ob- but it is “shrouded over” by science. The ob- jects that this method teaches us to contem- ject of experience is always at least to a mini- plate, but the astronomical calculations; those mal extent “idealized.” Pure experience is facts of scientific reality are, as it were, the something that can only be reached by a sys- real that is to be accounted for, as that at tematic “unbuilding” (“Abbau”) of higher which the transcendental gaze is directed. layers. Hence, the two stems of cognition— What is the basis of this reality that is given in Kant’s canonical distinction—between sensi- such facts? Which are the conditions of this bility and understanding is in Cohen’s reading certitude from which visible reality derives its a mere methodological abstraction; they can reality? Those facts of laws are the objects, become separated only when one pursues dif- not the star-objects.”47 This is what reality is, ferent scientific spheres within pure cognition. or tersely put, “the law is the reality” (“das Cohen claimed, famously and influentially for Gesetz ist die Realität”).48 The that we Kant future scholarship, that Kant’s transcen- are talking about in mathematical science are dental aesthetic is a remnant from the precriti- the lawful relations ascertained in scientific cal period that has systematically been “in- cognition. They are available in “printed gested” into the transcendental by the tomes,”49 not objects of sensual perception. time Kant has developed his critical system.50 “Erfahrung,” hence, refers here to the object Logic is the dominant focus in Kant. or content of cognition, not the thought- What Kant’s philosophy is truly about is process in which it is created. In this sense, if establishing the sovereignty of thought over we are talking in the context of natural scien- being. This is the meaning of critical idealism, tific experiencing, there is no difference be- as Cohen sees it: thought creates being, but be- tween experience and cognition. What is ex- ing in the sense of the reality as just specified. perienced is not the object as pre-scientific If it is true that the First Critique talks of ex- thing, but what this thing stands for: an - perience as experience of scientific objects of ized object of mathematical science. law-like fashion, this conclusion makes sense. This has yet another consequence. If the Intuition and understanding are, as Cohen object that we experience is of law-like char- says, “epistemic-critical [erkenntniskritische] acter, then experience cannot be completely abstractions” or “abbreviations of scientific intuitive, but is “shot through” with cogni- methods”51. There is but one process of cog- tive, rational elements. Husserl’s phenome- nition in which knowledge is gained. But nology will later make a similar point that fur- ther clarifies Cohen’s intentions: what is expe- 50 Or, which says the same, had Kant understood himself correctly, he should not have had the archi- 47 KBE, pp. 20 f. tectonics of having a transcendental pref- 48 Ibid., p. 21. aced before the transcendental logic. 49 KBE, p. 27. 51 Princip der Infinitesimalmethode, p. 59.

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what counts, what advances science, is the in- step by step. The a priori itself is dynamic with crease of knowledge itself, that is, the construc- essentially open horizons.54 tion of new reality. There might be different This is the constructive character of the psychic dispositions in our way of progressing transcendental method. As a logic of cogni- knowledge, but these are irrelevant with re- tion, it is interested in the constitution of cog- spect to the furthering of knowledge that sci- nition and the object that is constituted in this ence aims at. In Cohen’s reading, the tran- cognition. But note that the object of cogni- scendental method of explaining the condi- tion is an entity of the type of a law of nature. tions of possibility of the cognition of scien- The law, however, is discovered only over tific objects is inherently monistic, with the fo- time in the process of scientific inquiry. This cus on logic—establishing laws—as its means, the scientist cannot assume the object trademark. This is why Cohen increasingly of her activity as something that is given. refers to his project as “logic of cognition” Rather, consciousness in its scientific activity (“Erkenntnislogik”) as opposed to the Kantian of establishing new laws constructs the object, title of critique of reason, which still implies thereby unfolding new elements of a law. In a an investigation into subjectivity or conscious characteristic phrase, Cohen says, the object processes that are involved in bringing about of science is not gegeben (given) but aufgege- cognition.52 Reason is first and foremost sci- ben (a task). There is no “myth of the given” entific cognition that reaches its results if one interprets Kant’s First Critique as a the- through pure thought and crystallizes in a ory of scientific cognition. Rather, it is priori laws. What distinguishes us as rational thought that produces in the form of creatures from non-rational is that our pure rational judgments that conceptualize reason allows us to establish ever new lawful laws of nature. Hence, over and above the re- connections and relations in the world we live jection of Kant’s intuition-thought distinction in. It is reason that makes us conscious, not Cohen also rejects as artificial any distinction vice versa. W. Marx has also spoken of a between the realms of understanding and rea- “methodological ” with an inherently son.55 Purely rational judgments are the way dynamic character: “The totality [of reality in which scientific principles are formulated, … ] is the product of a theoretical construc- specifically in the synthetic principles.56 tion that remains in principle open.”53 The a priori is not a fixed of laws, but is revealed 54 Cf. also the presentation in Holzhey 1986/I. 55 Marx, op. cit., p. 124. 52 This development in Cohen beginning with the 56 Cohen’s own Logic of Pure Cognition ultimately first edition of KTE via the systematically important takes on the form of a doctrine of judgments (Ur- Prinzip der Infinitesimalmethode to his own system in teilslehre), as this is the place in which pure cogni- the Logik der reinen Erkenntnis is traced in exquisite tion becomes “objective” as crystallization points of detail in Edel 1986. reason’s constructive activity. Cf. also Stolzenberg 53 Marx, in Politisches Denken, p. 125. 1995.

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Thought in this totalizing sense is productive the simple sense, prior to philosophical scru- and expresses its findings in principles that tiny, might be something “entirely acciden- formulate laws (the synthetic principles). The tal,” but what it constructs in its cognitive ac- process of scientific discovery is that of a con- tivity is of general and universal character: a struction of ever new laws of nature. As Na- law of nature. This is the enigma that critical torp says it in an oft-quoted slogan-like man- philosophy needs to give justification for by ner, the factum is, in truth, a fieri, the factum laying a foundation for these truth claims and is something that is being made, produced by by establishing the limits of the latter. Cohen the constructive activity in pure thought, i.e., asserts, “the transcendental method, by di- in a priori thought having the character of recting its deductions at the factum of mathe- lawfulness, i.e., of the type of generality and matical natural science, thus does not proceed universality.57 In Holzhey’s words: “The from some somehow assumed absolute, but Marburgers set themselves the task of inte- from experience as something ‘entirely acci- grating the dynamics of experience into the a dental,’ and in this approach lies the pride and priori foundation of experience, at least in the the modesty of critical philosophy, its striving realm of theory of science, where the progress for scientific truth and the insight into its lim- of cognition has already rendered obsolete its.”60 many a rigid theoretical foundation”58. What The factum is therefore not something ab- Holzhey here calls “integration” clarifies solute, but in constant revision as science con- Cohen’s concept of philosophy as the science tinually progresses. This is why science is not of laying foundations in “cooperation” with dealing with absolute truths and, conversely, the scientists. why philosophy cannot make a claim to abso- Reality is hence not something purely lute foundations, but instead contents itself given or that can ever be assumed as given, with laying foundations that are constantly to but a task that is given to us to discover and in be revised as well. The dynamics of scientific which we can cognize nature. Reality is itself progress have a correlative dynamics in the a “means of thought” (Denkmittel) that con- laying of foundations for the sciences, which structs itself in pure thought. Philosophy’s are equally constantly flexible and bound to task is about the justification involved in mak- change.61 In all of this, cognition is an open- ing such claims about nature of the type of ended process in which science progresses general and universal laws.59 Experience in over time, by covering new ground, thereby

57 Cf. Natorp 1911. 60 KTE, p. 637. 58 Holzhey 1986/I, p. 57. 61 Of these foundations, Cohen says: “This funda- 59 As Holzhey says, “The problem of reality hence ment is not given objectively; yet it is the unavoid- pertains to the legitimization of the positing of a able task of reason; it is the covering up of the abyss something as such.” (Holzhey 2004, p. 48, italics that is uncovered by intelligible arbitrariness.” added). (KBE, p. 34).

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creating this very ground, and thereby con- In accordance with this reading, Cohen pre- stantly opening up new horizons to be pene- sents an original interpretation of Kant’s thing trated, thereby making the object of science a in itself. If the object of the sciences is pro- problem anew. Pure cognition constructs the duced and in constant flux of refinement, veri- path on which it travels. One scientific finding fication, augmentation, then there can no is merely the incentive for further question- longer be a strict distinction between appear- ing. What is achieved in this endless process is ance and thing in itself. Consequently, the a constant gathering of new in thing in itself is interpreted by Cohen as a the form of new a priori laws. The object of “limit concept” (Grenzbegriff), as the ideal science, hence, is not arbitrary but is, as law, limit of an object of complete determinations. something necessary and universal. This is The thing in itself is the systematic unity and the character of the law as being universally the “totality [Inbegriff] of all scientific cogni- valid and Kant’s philosophy addresses this tions”63, as science moves from the accidental problem, how it is possible to have precisely to the necessary in pure thought, thereby con- this type of knowledge, by clarifying the con- stantly fleshing out further our knowledge of ditions under which it is possible to have such the thing in itself. Pure thought is nothing but a priori knowledge. Following Kant’s famous thought purely in its lawful form. The thing phrase, we can know only of that in objects in itself is never attainable, but ever more de- which we ourselves lay into them. Cohen’s terminable in scientific progress; knowledge interpretation of this Kantian tenet is that a gets ever more “fleshed out” and “filled in” priori knowledge is possible because we con- by scientific progress.64 Science is a teleologi- struct this knowledge in pure thought. Cohen cal progression of ever new “experiences” in summarizes these affairs in the following pas- this sense of ascertaining new and more re- : fined laws about nature. In pushing the

Nature is experience, that is, mathematical natural sci- 63 KTE, p. 660. ence, whose possibility lies in the ‘general natural 64 As an aside, this concept of a limit idea also crops laws’ of the synthetic principles. In this possibility of up again in Husserl’s account of perception, with experience lies therefore all necessity of nature. This the object being an indeterminable X that is ever is the sum of all transcendental insight into the a priori more filled in by additional experiences. Though conditions of experience. And this insight satisfies the Husserl focuses on the intuitive elements in percep- scientific mind, to which nature is not a thing given to tion, what becomes increasingly known as abiding the senses, but rather is the great question mark that knowledge of that object follows the same structure the senses present and that understanding has to solve of construction as in Cohen. The difference to step by step.62 Cohen is that Husserl speaks of constitution, not construction, and the reason for this is that Husserl is not talking of constructions of laws but of the constitution of objects in consciousness. Still, the 62 KTE, p. 638. similarity is striking.

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boundaries of scientific cognition, however, tion crystallizes in a logic of judgment. But the foundations of basic concepts become also his other two systematic parts are inter- equally revised at all times and are in constant ested merely in the purity, i.e., the lawful ele- flux. Thus, scientific cognition is pure ments in other mental faculties, namely will- thought through and through. In pure ing and feeling. is to deal with “pure thought reality becomes constructed, but it will” and aesthetics with “pure feeling.”67 becomes constructed on the basis of founda- In this pure sense and in its focus on the tions laid by the creative scientist who is, in objective achievements of reason, Cohen’s this sense, a philosopher. The creative act of idealism has also been called an “idealism the philosopher is the laying of a foundation without .”68 The subjective is entirely in what Cohen also calls—alluding to neglected and seen as premature or at the very Plato65—grounding a hypothesis, and what is least irrelevant for scientific cognition. It is achieved on this basis is pure thought, purely not that Cohen denies any inquiry into the that which is purely lawful in mental activity. subjective; rather, how it comes to pass that This is why Cohen has also been called an ex- we arrive at scientific cognition is irrelevant treme “logicist” as he “sublates” ultimately all for the truths of science. This emphasis—also cognition in pure thought.66 The notion of in his reading of Kant’s Deduction, favoring “purity” refers to the logical, lawful elements the B Edition—makes sense in his focus on in all human activity. This tendency becomes pure thought and the objective, lawful stronger as Cohen’s system progresses. Char- achievements. Only in so far as scientific cog- acteristically, his own theoretical work in par- nition is able to reach universal and general allel to Kant’s First Critique is called Logic of truths is it relevant philosophically. It is easy Pure Cognition, where all the purity of cogni- to see how such an over-emphasis could prompt critique from several points of view. Husserl’s phenomenology, e.g., is one big at- 65 A hypothesis is famously introduced in the dia- logue Meno, where Socrates posits the hypothesis tempt to draft a science of the subjective, as- that (arête) is either knowledge, in which case certaining ideal laws of thought itself. This is it can be learned and taught, or something alto- why phenomenology need not be construed gether different (it turns out to be “true opinion,” [dóxa alethés] in the end). On the Marburg interpre- tation of Plato, cf. Natorp’s influential Platons 67 While both of Cohen’s works on ethics and aes- Ideenlehre (Plato’s Theory of Forms). thetics (Kants Begründung der Ethik and the system- 66 The term “sublate” here is not to mean that atic Ethik des reinen Willens) have been received Cohen does this in any analogy to Hegel. Hegel’s with great interest and intensity, it is worth men- teleological system is rejected on several accounts, tioning that his works on aesthetics (Kants Be- though it has been remarked that Hegel receives an gründung der Aesthetik and Aesthetik des reinen Ge- unfair treatment altogether, or is nearly overlooked fühls) have been treated as curiosities up to being altogether, in the Marburg School. On Marburg’s mocked—even within Marburg. relation to Hegel, cf. Holzhey, 2004. 68 Willey, 1975.

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as antithesis to neo-Kantianism of the Mar- ment.70 The world is how it has been created burg brand, but rather its correlative and its by humanity. Culture is a great achievement, logical counterpart.69 and its pinnacle is reached in man’s rational At this point one can revisit the well- activity crystallized in science, in the highest known and oft-voiced critique of Cohen’s al- form of scientific cognition of general, uni- legedly rendering philosophy a mere “hand- versal . To say it bluntly: Human- maiden of the sciences.” As should have be- ity’s greatest achievements are present and lie come clear by now, this statement is simply readily available in the academic libraries of mistaken on many levels. It is neither a hand- this world. maiden, nor of the sciences, if one understands Moreover, it would be absolutely mislead- by sciences exclusively mathematical-physical ing to consider philosophy in this sense as a science. While Cohen takes it as point of de- “handmaiden” of these activities; philosophy parture both in his Kant interpretation as well lays the foundations upon which cultural ac- as in his own system, it is clear that it is the tivities become possible. Philosophy begins its paradigm exclusively for theoretical philoso- work where problems arise for the scientist, phy, where one is dealing with truths of which the scientist cannot answer without mathematical rigor, as seen in Kant’s under- making recourse to philosophy. That is, these standing of a priori as general and universal. problems become question marks and as such Rather, the sciences must be seen as a totality challenges for mankind’s rational powers. Or of knowledge about the world as we know it, said differently, philosophy forever turns un- in the broad sense in which the Greeks used questioned givennesses into tasks to be prob- the term episteme and which is also present in lematized and ultimately solved with the use the German Wissenschaft. As such, the sci- of reason, thereby opening up new avenues ences are but one, though the highest form of for questioning. Where scientists are at their culture, and what is relevant about culture is wits’ end, philosophers begin their work. It the ways man as a rational animal forms the may be that the philosopher becomes moti- world he lives in. Culture is the ultimate focus vated to begin her job on the basis of an al- of Cohen’s philosophy and any philosophy ready existing activity and in this sense comes that sees itself as working within culture that temporally after the fact of cultural produc- is fuelled by the optimism of the Enlighten- tion. But this does not mean that she cannot then creatively interact with the cultural for-

69 On a manner in which one could merge the neo- mations of her time, giving them guidance Kantianian and phenomenological methods, cf. Luft and laying the theoretical foundations of that 2004. One would also have to mention that, to Hei- which is achieved, for the most part, intui- degger, this reading of the Deduction—Heidegger favoring that of the A-edition—was precisely the point of disagreement and of a fundamental parting 70 Cf. also Natorp’s summary of Cohen’s philoso- of the ways. phical scope, cf. above, note 56.

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tively and without explicit reflection. Cohen’s sirer took their cue from the foundations laid view of philosophy is in this sense not entirely by Cohen. Natorp, for one, perceived there irreconcilable with an Hegelian idealism to be a gap in Cohen’s system by not consid- without, however, its teleological vision that ering the “subjective” element in reason’s would require all knowledge to ultimately be- activity. The “objective founding [Be- come self-knowledge in absolute knowing gründung] of cognition” would have to be that sublates all differences and brings the dia- complemented by a “subjective founding.” lectical process to an end. Thus, in Natorp’s own sketch of a transcen- What has been said, thus, about the con- dental psychology, which was quietly structive character of pure thought holds frowned upon by Cohen, Natorp attempts a throughout Cohen’s entire system. In this “reverse” tendency. If scientific cognition, sense, Cohen’s idealism is a bold statement of as the transcendental method teaches, con- the constructive achievements of humanity’s structs reality, then a consideration of the cultural activities. His idealism has in this re- subjective would have to go its opposite gard undoubtedly and self-consciously a cul- path, that of a re-construction of the subjec- tural relevance and implications not only for tive elements from which objective cogni- the sciences but also for politics in his “social tion has become constructed. Natorp’s re- idealism,” also referred to as “ethical social- constructive psychology, however, is not ism.” The fundamental claim is: “The world developed ultimately and Natorp himself of things is based on the foundation of the gives up this project altogether in his late laws of thinking”71, and this holds throughout thought in favor of a deepened method that and has, and (in accordance with Kant) ought purports to unify both objective and subjec- to have, ethical and political consequences that tive tendencies. It is, ironically, Husserl who are spelled out in Cohen’s moral and political takes the cues from Natorp’s attempts and philosophy. actually drafts such a transcendental psy- chology in the transcendental phase of his phenomenology, as an eidetic science of 4. Outlook: The Unity of the transcendental subjectivity. Husserl’s key to Marburg School solve Natorp’s problem of psychology merely being a “reverse tendency” of the hile the later Cohen further transcendental method is the phenomenol- delves into this “productive” ogical reduction. While Cohen moves to- aspect of reason, with an ever wards an ever purer logic, Natorp aims at a Wmore radical focus on the purity of thought, unifying method that reconciles both ten- it becomes clear how both Natorp and Cas- dencies, which he calls “life” and “thought” and ends up ultimately in a that listens to a primal logos that reveals being. 71 Holzhey 2004, p. 51. Heidegger, who, as usual, obscures the

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sources of his thought, could not have come reality being constructed.73 If one has this to his fundamental without the in- broad perspective, new phenomena come fluence of Natorp, which he was exposed to into view: these are what Cassirer calls the in his time at Marburg.72 symbolic forms, of which he analyzes lan- Cassirer, for his part, departs freely and guage, myth and knowledge in his three- creatively from Cohen in several respects, volume systematic Philosophy of Symbolic while, arguably, remaining in keeping with Forms. These are ways in which cultural re- the overall scope and conception of Cohen. ality becomes constructed in different ways Both Cohen and Natorp never questioned and in different . And this is the second the principal “logical” aspect of the tran- element where Cassirer modifies the Mar- scendental method in the sense of its con- burg method: Cohen is still committed to the structive character. ‘Logical’ means ‘lawful’, paradigm of reason in his focus on law-like and so in every aspect of culture Cohen formations in pure thought. In Cassirer, rea- sought to find the lawful elements, with a son becomes spirit, as a term for the general rather rigid notion of law. This is the first activity of human “mental” activity that tenet that Cassirer questions and overcomes. goes beyond, or is more fundamental than, The main idea is here that, while there are cognition. different ways of viewing reality, this im- These can only be very broad strokes, to plies that one should have to accommodate be sure, but should make clear how Cas- also different concepts of lawfulness, and sirer’s philosophy is based in a fundamental when one considers this, other cultural for- way on the foundations laid by his teacher mations come into view that were impossible Cohen in his original reading of Kant. Rea- for Cohen to appreciate. Though Cohen son is spirit that acts in this world, thereby sees the role of philosophy in the idea of a constructing, forming it, and viewing itself “reconstruction of culture,” he never really in these cultural achievements which are fulfills this promise; instead, it is Cassirer spiritual through and through. Thus, the who explicitly conceives of his philosophy as only, and most important, element of the a “critique of culture.” Culture, however, transcendental method that is preserved in has different ways of expressing itself, with Cassirer is that of construction. This is the different “logics” and henceforth different most radical and at the same time most en- types of laws. Whereas Cohen is a methodo- compassing notion of idealism imaginable, logical monist, Cassirer embraces methodo- which owes its basic foundation to Cohen’s logical pluralism, while retaining the idea of work. Although Cassirer in many respects

73 The methodological connection here is between Cohen’s work on mathematics in his Infinitesimal- 72 On Natorp’s influence on Heidegger’s Seinsfrage, prinzip and Cassirer’s first systematic work, Sub- cf. Stolzenberg and von Wolzogen. stance and Function.

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departed from his Marburg origins, he made posthumously in 1919, ed. by Cas- sure to always acknowledge the foundation sirer/Rosenzweig) of his system in the thought of Cohen. The real genius of the Marburg School, and Bibliography hence of this original way of transforming Kant, is, and remains, Hermann Cohen.74 Baum, Manfred, “Transzendentale Meth- ode,“ in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Wiss. Buchgesellschaft: Overview over Hermann Cohen’s Darmstadt, 1980, vol. 5, pp. 1375-1378. Main Writings: Brandt, Reinhard, “Hermeneutik und Sein- slehre bei Hermann Cohen,“ in: Poli- Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1st ed. 1871, 2nd tisches Denken (see below), pp. 37-54. ed. 1885, 3rd ed. 1918) Cassirer, Ernst, “Hermann Cohen und die Kants Begründung der Ethik (1877) Erneuerung der Kantischen Philosophie Kants Begründung der Ästhetik (1889) (1912),“ in: Aufsätze und Kleine Schriften Das Prinzip der Infinitesimalmethode und seine (1902-1921), Gesammelte Werke, Ham- Geschichte. Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung burger Ausgabe, vol. 9, B. Recki, ed., der Erkenntniskritik (1883) Hamburg: Meiner, 2001, pp. 119-138. Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (System der Phi- Cohen, Hermann, Werke, ed. by the losophie, Vol. I, 1902, 2nd. ed. 1914) Hermann Cohen Archives under the aus- Ethik des reinen Willens (System d. Ph., Vol. pices of H. Holzhey at the Philosophical II, 1904) Seminar at the University of Zurich. Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls (System d. Ph., Hildesheim/New York: Olms, 1977 ff. Vol. III, 1912) Dussort, Henri, L’École de Marbourg, ed. by Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des J. Vuillemin, PUF: Paris, 1963. Judentums (completed in 1918, published Edel, Geert, Von der Vernunftkritik zur Er- kenntnislogik. Die Entwicklung der Theo- retischen Philosophie Hermann Cohens. 74 I thank Melissa Mosko for comments on a pre- Munich/Freiburg: Alber, 1988. liminary version of this paper. A shorter version of Friedman, Michael, A Parting of the Ways. this paper was delivered at the Northern American Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger, Chicago, Kant Society, Midwestern Study Group, Chicago, November 2005. I thank the participants of this La Salle: Open Court, 2000. study group, especially Claudia Schmidt, Fred Gadamer, Hans-Georg, “Introduction,” in: Rauscher, Sally Sedwick and Daniel Sutherland, P. Natorp, Philosophische Systematik, who contributed to the discussion, providing helpful Hamburg: Meiner, 1954, pp. XI-XVII. input and posing critical questions. Last not least, I Gardner, Sebastian, Kant and the Critique of thank David McPherson for help on grammar and Pure Reason, London: Routledge, 1999. style.

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Hatfield, Gary, The Natural and the Norma- 1992, R. Brandt & F. Orlik, eds., Hildes- tive, heim/Zürich/New York: Olms, 1993. Hermann Cohen und die Erkenntnistheorie, W. Poma, Andrea, The Critical Philosophy of Marx & E. W. Orth, eds., Würzburg: K Hermann Cohen, trans. by J. Denton, New & N, 2001. York: SUNY, 1997. Heidegger, Martin, Kant and the Problem of Sieg, Ulrich, Aufstieg und Niedergang des Metaphysics, trans. by R. Taft, 5th, en- Marburger Neukantianismus. Die larged ed., Bloomington/Indianapolis: Geschichte einer philosophischen Schulge- Indiana U Press, 1997. meinschaft, Würzburg: K&N, 1994 Holzhey, Helmut, Cohen und Natorp. Vol. 1: (Studien und Materialien zum Neukanti- Ursprung und Einheit. Die Geschichte der anismus 4). ‚Marburger Schule’ als Auseinandersetzung Stolzenberg, Jürgen, Ursprung und System. um die Logik des Denkens; Vol. 2: Der Probleme der Begründung systematischer Marburger Neukantianismus in Quellen. Philosophie im Werk Hermann Cohens, Zeugnisse kritischer Lektüre. Briefe der Paul Natorps und beim frühen Martin Hei- Marburger. Dokumente zur Philosophie- degger, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ru- politik der Schule. Basel/Stuttgart: precht, 1995. Schwabe, 1986. von Wolzogen, Christoph, Die Autonome –––––, “Der Neukantianismus,“ in: Holz- Relation. hey, H. & Röd, W., eds., Geschichte der Willey, Thomas E., Back to Kant. The Re- Philosophie, Vol. XII: Die Philosophie vival of Kantianism in German Social and des ausgehenden 19. und des 20. Jahrhun- Historical Thought, 1860-1914, Detroit: derts 2. Munich: Beck, 2004, pp. 13-132. Wayne State University Press, 1978. Kambartel, Friedrich, “Erfahrung,” in His- torisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 2, Basel, Schwabe, 1972, 609-617. Luft, Sebastian, “A Hermeneutic Phenome- nology of Subjective and Objective Spirit: Natorp, Husserl and Cassirer,” in: The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Vol. IV (2004), pp. 209-249. Marx, Wolfgang, “Philosophische Letztbe- gründung als Selbstbegründung des Reinen Denkens in ‚reiner’ Erkenntnis,“ in: Hermann Cohen, pp. 123-146. Politisches Denken – Philosophisches Wirken. Hermann-Cohen-Kolloquium Marburg

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