Corruption of Our Democracy
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Corruption Facts
facts_E.qxd 07/12/2005 14:12 Page 1 Corruption Facts Corruption causes reduced investment. • Investment in a relatively corrupt country compared to an uncorrupt one can be as much as 20 per cent more costly. [“Economic Corruption: Some Facts”, Daniel Kaufmann 8th International Anti-Corruption Conference 1997] • Nations that fight corruption and improve their rule of law could increase their national income • Each year, over US$ 1 trillion is paid in bribes by 400 per cent. worldwide. [“US$ 1 Trillion lost each year to bribery says World Bank”, UN Wire, 12 April 2004] [World Bank, www.worldbank.org] • Corruption reduces a government's ability to provide basic resources and services for Increasing evidence indicates widespread its citizens. corruption in the judiciary in many parts of the world. • Corruption and the transfer of illicit funds • Judicial corruption undermines the rule have contributed to capital flight in Africa, of law and government legitimacy. with more than US$ 400 billion having been looted and stashed away in foreign countries. • A corrupt judiciary cripples a society's Of that amount, around US$ 100 billion is ability to curb corruption. estimated to have come from Nigeria alone. • A report examining the judiciary in 48 • Former President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko countries found that judicial corruption (in power 1965-1997) is believed to have looted was pervasive in 30 of them. the country's treasury of some US$ 5 billion— [Centre for Independence of Judges and Lawyers, an amount equal to the country's external Ninth annual report on Attacks on Justice, March 1997, February 1999.] debt at the time. -
How Does Corruption Affect the Adoption of Lobby Registers? a Comparative Analysis
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463) 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 116–127 DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i2.2708 Article How Does Corruption Affect the Adoption of Lobby Registers? A Comparative Analysis Fabrizio De Francesco 1 and Philipp Trein 2,3,* 1 School of Government and Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, G42 9RJ, UK; E-Mail: [email protected] 2 Department for Actuarial Sciences, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland; E-Mail: [email protected] 3 Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland * Corresponding author Submitted: 14 December 2019 | Accepted: 19 March 2020 | Published: 28 May 2020 Abstract Recent research has demonstrated that some governments in developed democracies followed the OECD and the EU rec- ommendations to enhance transparency by adopting lobby registers, whereas other countries refrained from such mea- sures. We contribute to the literature in demonstrating how corruption is linked to the adoption of lobbying regulations. Specifically, we argue that governments regulate lobbying when they face the combination of low to moderate levels of corruption and a relatively well-developed economy. To assess this argument empirically, we compare 42 developed countries between 2000 and 2015, using multivariate logistic regressions and two illustrative case studies. The statistical analysis supports our argument, even if we include a number of control variables, such as the presence of a second par- liamentary chamber, the age of democracy, and a spatial lag. The case studies illustrate the link between anti-corruption agenda and the adoption of lobby registers. -
HARD, SOFT and DARK MONEY Introduction Early Political Scandals
HARD, SOFT AND DARK MONEY Introduction Early political scandals involved money used for bribery or buying votes. Modern day scandals involve the appearances of corruption depending where gifts and campaign money came from. The U.S. Supreme Court has made a number of controversial decisions expanding the amounts of money in politics by characterizing political donations and expenditures to be exercises of freedom of speech. Among other results, those decisions have created a large and growing category of election related donations and contributions called “dark money.” Important Terms Defined Terms relating to money in politics that are used in this paper have definitions more exactly set out by law. These terms are fully addressed in the MIP paper Definitions for Money in Politics, Disclosure Requirements for PACs The relationships of PACs to their disclosure requirements are shown in the chart below. May Funding Disclosure Donations coordinate Corporations Sources required limited with can donate candidate Political parties PAC’s Super Pac’s 527’s 501(c)’s Dark Money Twenty-nine types of corporations are listed in §501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) as qualified for nonprofit status. Social Welfare Organizations under §501(c) (4), Labor Unions under §501(c)(5), and Trade Associations under §501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code are not required to report from whom they get their donations. Hence these donations are referred to as dark money. Since social welfare or business interests often intersect with political issues, these groups are allowed to use funds to influence elections, but there is otherwise no dollar limit on how much that can be, and they only need to report the majority of their expenditures in general terms. -
Eletrobras Settles Alleged FCPA Violations Revealed Through Brazil's "Operation Car Wash"
Eletrobras Settles Alleged FCPA Violations Revealed Through Brazil's "Operation Car Wash" January 16, 2019 Anti-Corruption/FCPA On December 26, 2018, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") settled an enforcement action against Centrais Eléctricas Brasileiras S.A. ("Eletrobras"), an electric utilities holding company majority-owned and controlled by the Brazilian government. This is the second time in 2018 in which the United States government charged a Brazilian state-owned entity with violating the books and records and internal accounting controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"). As with the September 2018 settlement with Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. ("Petrobras"), the alleged corruption scheme at an Eletrobras subsidiary was uncovered as part of the larger Operation Car Wash ("Lava Jato") in Brazil. Petrobras's settlement, however, involved a coordinated resolution with the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the SEC, and the Brazilian Federal Public Ministry ("MPF"). In particular, the Eletrobras enforcement action was based on allegations that spanned from 2009 to 2015, former officers at Eletrobras's majority-owned nuclear power generation subsidiary, Eletrobras Termonuclear ("Eletronuclear"), inflated the costs of infrastructure projects and authorized the hiring of unnecessary contractors. In return, the former officers allegedly received approximately $9 million from construction companies that benefitted from the corrupt scheme. The construction companies also used the overpayment to fund bribes to leaders of Brazil's two largest political parties. The SEC alleged that Eletrobras violated the FCPA by recording inflated contract prices and sham invoices in Eletrobras's books and records, and by failing to devise and maintain a sufficient system of internal accounting controls. -
Mystery Money
MYSTERY MONEY How a loophole could allow foreign money to flow into super PACs through secretive shell companies ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report was written by Research Director Michael Beckel and Research Associate Amisa Ratliff. Design by Communications Associate Sydney Richards. Cover image credit: bioraven/Shutterstock.com ABOUT ISSUE ONE Issue One is the leading crosspartisan political reform group in Washington. We unite Republicans, Democrats, and independents in the movement to increase transparency, strengthen ethics and accountability, and reduce the influence of big money in politics. Issue One’s ReFormers Caucus of more than 200 former members of Congress, governors, and Cabinet officials is the largest bipartisan coalition of its kind ever assembled to advocate for solutions to fix our broken political system. Issue One 1401 K Street NW, Ste. 350 Washington, D.C. 20005 © 2020 Issue One MEDIA CONTACT Michael Beckel [email protected] | 202-888-6770 issueone.org | facebook.com/issueonereform | @issueonereform [ 2 — Mystery Money ] Issue One MYSTERY MONEY BY MICHAEL BECKEL & AMISA RATLIFF INTRODUCTION oney laundering schemes to illegally funnel foreign money into super PACs M through shell companies threaten the integrity of our political system. Since the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision in 2010 paved the way for the super PAC era, there has been a proliferation of corporate super PAC donors — including scores of opaque and obscure companies that allow the people behind them to remain hidden. Such secretive entities provide especially ideal cover for foreigners wishing to evade the existing prohibition on their involvement in U.S. elections. A new Issue One analysis shows why this loophole needs to be closed. -
Parting the Dark Money Sea: Exposing Politically Active Tax- Exempt Groups Through FEC-IRS Hybrid Enforcement
William & Mary Law Review Volume 57 (2015-2016) Issue 1 Article 7 10-2015 Parting the Dark Money Sea: Exposing Politically Active Tax- Exempt Groups Through FEC-IRS Hybrid Enforcement Carrie E. Miller Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr Part of the Election Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons Repository Citation Carrie E. Miller, Parting the Dark Money Sea: Exposing Politically Active Tax-Exempt Groups Through FEC-IRS Hybrid Enforcement, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 341 (2015), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol57/iss1/7 Copyright c 2015 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr PARTING THE DARK MONEY SEA: EXPOSING POLITICALLY ACTIVE TAX-EXEMPT GROUPS THROUGH FEC-IRS HYBRID ENFORCEMENT TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ....................................... 343 I. TAX LAW AND ELECTION LAW FOUNDATIONS ............. 346 A. Internal Revenue Code Provisions ................... 347 1. Section 501(c)(4) Social Welfare Organizations ...... 347 2. Section 527 Political Organizations ............... 349 B. Campaign Finance Doctrinal Framework ............ 350 1. Statutory Basis and Underlying Values ............ 350 2. Evolving Case Law ............................. 351 II. ESCALATING POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF TAX -E XEMPT SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS : WHERE TAX LAW AND ELECTION LAW INTERSECT ........................... 354 A. IRS Treatment of Political Activity .................. 355 1. Conflicting Threshold Standards ................. 355 2. Vague Definitional Problem ...................... 357 B. Section 501(c)(4) Organizations Have Emerged as the Preferred Campaign Finance Vehicle ................ 359 1. Increased Independent Expenditures .............. 360 2. Relaxed Reporting Provisions .................... 363 3. The Coordination Problem ....................... 367 C. Deregulation’s Impact on Values that Support Campaign Finance Restrictions ................... -
Fighting Dark Money
Your Citizen Tool Kit: Fighting Dark Money Help Bring Transparency to Campaign Giving and Spending Table of Contents: Issue Brief 3 A Model of Success 8 Progress Report 12 Additional Readings 25 Other Helpful Organizations 27 !2 Brought to you by: ReclaimTheAmericanDream.org Issue Brief: Fighting Dark Money How Dark Money Haunts U.S. Elections In modern American politics, the first omen that “dark money” was corrupting American democracy were revelations that bundles of cash and checks were being delivered in brown paper bags and suitcases to President Richard Nixon’s re-election campaign in 1972. In a few short weeks, CREEP, as the Committee for the Re-Election of the President was called, hauled in roughly $20 million – $100 million in today’s dollars – half of it from a handful of super donors. That river of money all moved in secret, rushed to campaign operatives to beat the imminent deadline for disclosure of campaign contributions set by the new Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. After the secret Nixon slush fund was exposed, Congress tightened campaign laws again in 1974, setting spending limits and providing public funding for presidential campaigns. Disclosure as the Disinfectant for Tainted Money But the foundation stone of campaign reform, then as now, was disclosure – transparent openness about the sources of political money. Full disclosure was the disinfectant prescribed in the Nixon era to kill the epidemic of tainted money and to cleanse the nation’s political system. In the decades since then, disclosure has been the one campaign reform that has won general endorsement from conservatives as well as liberals and moderates. -
The Investigation and Prosecution of Police Corruption
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 65 | Issue 2 Article 1 1974 The nI vestigation and Prosecution of Police Corruption Herbert Beigel Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation Herbert Beigel, The nI vestigation and Prosecution of Police Corruption, 65 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 135 (1974) This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. Tox JouwAx op Canaz AL LAW & CRnmLoaGy Copyright C 1974 by Northwestern University School of Vol. 65, No. 2 Law Printed in U.S.A. CRIMINAL LAW THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF POLICE CORRUPTION HERBERT BEIGEL* INTRODUCTION vestigation and prosecution of police corruption. Within the last few years there has been a This analysis will identify the specific methods marked proliferation of federal investigations and employed by federal prosecutors to subject local 2 prosecutions of state and local officials for official police officials to federal prosecution, thereby misconduct and corruption. So active has the offering insight into the intricacies of the investi- federal government become in investigating the gation of one governmental body by another. In local political arena that state and city politicians addition, the federal investigation of state and and police officers are being investigated, indicted local corruption has raised new questions about and often convicted for a wide variety of violations the proper role of federal law enforcement. -
Money in Politics
CARR CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 1 FALL 2020 ISSUE 2020 - 003 CARR CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL Money in Politics Reimagining Rights & Responsibilities in the U.S. 2 CARR CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY Reimagining Rights & Responsibilities in the United States: Voting Rights Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University November 18, 2020 John Shattuck Carr Center Senior Fellow; Former US Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Professor of Practice, Fletcher School, Tufts University Mathias Risse Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Philosophy and Public Administration; Director for the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy The authors’ institutional affiliations are provided for purposes of author identification, not as indications of institutional endorsement of the report. This report is part of a Carr Center project on Reimagining Rights and Responsibilities in the United States, directed by John Shattuck. The project has been overseen by a faculty committee chaired by Mathias Risse, with the collaboration of Executive Director Sushma Raman, and the support of the Carr Center staff. This research paper was drafted by Kate Williams (RA). The authors are grateful to Michael Blanding and Mayumi Cornejo for editing, and Alexandra Geller for editorial and design. CARR CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 1 Table of Contents 2. Introduction 3. Early Efforts to Regulate Campaign Finance 5. Campaign Finance, Freedom of Speech, and the Rise of Soft Money 6. Enhanced Disclosure and Transparency 7. Challenges to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 9. Citizens United and Subsequent Rulings 10. Money in Politics Today: Undermining the Democratic Process 12. -
Dark Money Matters
Dark Money Matters Dark money—that is, election-related spending whose donors are kept secret from voters—continues to play a major and troubling role in U.S. elections, thanks to a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions and weak rules and enforcement by the Federal Election Commission (FEC). Most Dark Money Spending Is Never Reported In the years since Citizens United, at least $800 million in dark money has been reported to the FEC. But even that number is an underestimate. FEC data omits a huge chunk of secret funds, because most dark money spending is never “Most dark money is reported to the FEC. Candidate-focused ads that stop short of expressly telling spent outside FEC viewers to vote for or against a candidate are only reported to the FEC if they reporting windows.” air within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of the general election. Most dark money is spent outside of these FEC reporting windows. For example, Karl Rove’s dark money group One Nation spent $40 million on advertising during the 2016 election cycle supporting vulnerable Republican Senators. Yet, because most of that spending was for ads outside of FEC reporting windows, One Nation reported spending only $3.4 million to the FEC. One Nation Spending, 2016 Election Cycle 3.4 million, 8% Spending Reported to the FEC Spending not Reported to the FEC 36.6 million, 92% CAMPAIGNLEGALCENTER.ORG What’s more, recent election cycles have seen the rise of what might be called “grey money,” where groups that don’t disclose their donors make “The actual sources of pass-through contributions to entities that do, like super PACs. -
United Nations Convention Against Corruption
04-56160_c1-4.qxd 17/08/2004 12:33 Page 1 Vienna International Centre, PO Box 500, A 1400 Vienna, Austria Tel: +(43) (1) 26060-0, Fax: +(43) (1) 26060-5866, www.unodc.org UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION Printed in Austria V.04-56160—August 2004—copies UNITED NATIONS UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME Vienna UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION UNITED NATIONS New York, 2004 Foreword Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish. This evil phenomenon is found in all countries—big and small, rich and poor—but it is in the developing world that its effects are most destructive. Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a Government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice and discouraging foreign aid and investment. Corruption is a key element in economic underperformance and a major obsta- cle to poverty alleviation and development. I am therefore very happy that we now have a new instrument to address this scourge at the global level. The adoption of the United Nations Convention against Corruption will send a clear message that the international community is determined to prevent and control corruption. It will warn the corrupt that betrayal of the public trust will no longer be tolerated. And it will reaffirm the importance of core values such as honesty, respect for the rule of law, account- ability and transparency in promoting development and making the world a better place for all. -
Rent Seeking and Corruption in Financial Markets
Rent Seeking and Corruption in Financial Markets Asim Ijaz Khwaja1 and Atif Mian2 1Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 2Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720; email: [email protected] by Harvard University on 02/14/13. For personal use only. Annu. Rev. Econ. 2011.3:579-600. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org Annu. Rev. Econ. 2011. 3:579–600 Keywords First published online as a Review in Advance on agency issues, financial market design and regulation May 25, 2011 The Annual Review of Economics is online at Abstract economics.annualreviews.org We describe recent advances in the study of rent seeking and This article’s doi: corruption in financial markets. We outline three areas of inquiry: 10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080310 (a) conceptualizing rent seeking, (b) identifying rent-provision Copyright © 2011 by Annual Reviews. channels and their general equilibrium impact, and (c) designing All rights reserved feasible remedial mechanisms. We provide suggestions for making JEL codes: G2, G3, G18, O16 further progress in these areas and review a variety of approaches 1941-1383/11/0904-0579$20.00 taken in the recent literature. 579 1. INTRODUCTION Financial markets are entrusted with the all-important task of intermediating capital to where it is most productive and maintaining a healthy balance between risk and reward. As a result, rent seeking, to the extent that it distorts this allocation, is deemed costly for an economy. This article draws on some of the recent literature on rent seeking in financial markets in order to present an analytical road map that we hope will be useful for researchers interested in this topic.