Coastal States, Regional Powers, Malacca-Singapore Straits
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Coastal States, Regional Powers, Superpowers and the Malacca-Singapore Straits A publication of the Institute of East Asian Studies University of California Berkeley, California 94720 The Research Papers and Policy Studies series is one of several publications series sponsored by the Institute of East Asian Studies in conjunction with its three con stituent units—the Center for Chinese Studies, the Center for Japanese Studies, and the Center for Korean Studies. The others include the China Research Monograph series, whose first title appeared in 1967, the Japan Research Mono graph series, and the Korea Research Monograph series. The Institute sponsors also a Faculty Reprint series. Correspondence may be sent to: Publications Office Institute of East Asian Studies University of California Berkeley, California 94720 RESEARCH PAPERS AND POLICY STUDIES 1C INSTITUTE OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF CALIF0R;NIA • BERKELEY Coastal States, Regional Powers, Superpowers and the Malacca-Singapore Straits Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger Yaacov Vertzberger received his Ph.D. summa cum iaude from The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he is a lecturer in the Department of International Relations. In addition to various journal articles, his publications include The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistani Relations 1960-1980 and Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking: The Sino-lndian Conflict 1959-1962. Although the Institute of East Asian Studies is responsible for the selection and acceptance of manuscripts in this series, responsibility for the opinions expressed and for the accuracy of statements rests with their authors. Copyright ® 1984 by the Regents of the University of California ISBN 0-912966-70-x Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 84-80607 Printed in the United States of America Contents Acknowledgments vii Map .facing page 1 I. Introduction 1 II. The Straits: Geographical, Historical, and Strategic Dimensions 4 III. The Littorals 19 IV. The Superpowers 38 V. The Regional Powers 62 VI. Alternative Solutions 78 VII. Prospects for the Future: Continuities and Discontinuities 85 References 93 Acknowledgments I am indebted to Martin Rudner for raising my interest in the issue, to Ruth Lapidoth for discussing with me various legal aspects related to passage through international straits, and to Donald K. Emmerson for useful comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank Jonathan Cohen, Rina Goldfiescher, and Yosef Meir for research assistance, and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem for financial support. Harry H. Kendall and Joanne Sandstrom provided invaluable help in making this a better and more readable study. Earlier versions of portions of this monograph appeared in Asian Survey 22:7 (July 1982):609-629 and Conflict Studies 140 (1982): 1-28. Vll KOREA JAPAN IRAQ IRAN ^ PAKISTAN ^ Persian Gulf EGYPT BANGLADESH)ESH"^ / Strait SAUDI ARABIA PACIFIC of Hormuz ^viet'nam* SUDAN Xu} HAILAND^ \ \ SOUTH Andaman Is. 0 "^. C^BODIi^ \ CHINA .^^yPHiuiPPINES Laccadive Is. ETHIOPIA ' -/fi . SRILANI^ Strait Of MalacpA\ /v .AT OCEAN Maldive Is. ;; " X^MALAYSIA ' A, KENYA \ V^!::^siNGfl Singapore Strait-^'^C Seychelles I Q ^INDONESIA Chagos Is. Diego Garcia '• Sunda Strait' Lombok Strait Ombai Wetar INDIAN OCEAN Straits MADAGASCAR AUSTRALIA 90« I Introduction A major problem facing the international community in recent years has been the collective management of the oceans. In legal terms, the problem consists of creating a common acceptable Law of the Sea,i or, in political science terms, an effective international regime so that "[by] creating or accepting procedures, rules or institutions for certain kinds of activity, governments regulate and control transnational and interstate relations."2 The complexity of this issue derives from its being a meeting ground for a host of political, economic, strategic, and legal problems. As such, it has some bearing on global (North-South, East-West), regional (landlocked versus littoral states), and bilateral relations and conflicts. A prominent subdivision within the general issue is the question of the 121 international straits, especially the more important ones, such as the Malacca, Baltic, or Hormuz straits, which are considered vital life lines of maritime traffic, commercial and military.^ This problem has become even more acute as the coastal states have tended to expand the traditional 3-mile limit of territorial waters so that a larger part, and at times the whole width, of the straits are included within their claims. This issue was a major bone of contention among the participants in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ' For a concise history of the evolution of the legal aspect of freedom of the seas, see, for example, R. Lapidoth, "Freedom of Navigation—Its Legal History and Its Normative Basis," Journal ofMaritime Law and Commerce 6:2 (January 1975): 259-272. ^ R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), p. 5. For detailed theoretical analyses of the substance, procedures, implementation, and change of international regimes, see O. R. Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," World Politics 32:3 (April 1980):331-356; E.B. Haas, "Why Collab orate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," World Politics 32:3 (April 1980:357-405. S.D. Krasner (ed.). InternationalRegimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). ^ This has become an issue of major importance with the growing use of naval forces to project national power and interest. One of the best theoretical analyses of the use of sea power in the modern international system is still E. N. Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974). Another useful analysis is K. Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979). which first convened in 1974 in Caracas and finally concluded in 1982 in Jamaica. This conference was to decide on a new convention on an international regime for the oceans to take the place of the existing regime established in the 1958 UNCLOS. One of its main components concerned the rights of passage through and above international straits. Agreement on the rules for such a new regime emerged only after tough bargaining among the coastal states and the naval powers. It is termed "the right of transit passage" and is defined in article 38, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as follows; Transit passage means the exercise, in accordance with this Part, of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economiczone.'* This monograph deals with the struggle for control of, and passage through and above, the Malacca and Singapore straits, the narrow and most vital navigation route connecting the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea, which is often referred to as the Suez of Southeast Asia. The actors discussed are the littorals—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore—on one hand, and the powers—the United States, the USSR, China, and Japan—on the other. Apart from examining the specific case at hand, it provides a maritime perspective for analyzing Southeast Asian international politics^ and a better understanding of the complexities and multidimensionality of the issue of passage through major international straits, which are also choke points astride vital sea lines of communication (SLOC). The study follows and analyzes the evolution of the different attitudes and positions of the actors, their background and reasons. Indonesia and Malaysia, and especially the former, have initially taken a position according to which the coastal states should have the power to regulate passage of both commercial and naval vessels. This position was entrenched in perceptions of their strategic, political, and economic ^ United Nations Convention on The Law of the Sea, A/CONF. 62/122, October 7, 1983, p. 15. It has already raised a debate among legal experts about interpretation of the actual freedom of navigation it provides. See W.T. Burke, "Submerged Passage Through Straits; Interpretation of the Proposed Law of the Sea Treaty Text," Washington Law Review 52:2 (April 1977):193-226; J.N. Moore, "The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea," American Journal of International Law 74:1 (January 1980:77-121. These two scholars argue that the right of transit passage in fact grants free passage in and above the international straits to which it applies. A different view is present ed by W.M. Reisman, "The Regime of Straits and National Security," American Journal of International Law!A:\ (January 1980:48-76. 5 On the need for such perspective, see D. K. Emmerson, "The Case for a Maritime Per spective on Southeast Asia," JournalofSoutheast Asian Studies 11:1 (March 1980): 139-145. vulnerabilities. Singapore, on the other hand, was first willing to go along with its larger neighbors only part of the way, mainly for economic reasons, but with time the positions of the three came much closer. Japan, the USSR, and the United States, unwilling to grant the littorals the power to regulate passage, have taken a different position. For Japan, it was mainly a matter of economic expedience. The Soviet Union and the United States, in spite of their conflicting interests in the area as well as in the adjacent regions, have been motivated by the need to project their power and influence, which makes free passage a necessity of a high order. This position also has important economic implications for the Soviets in light of the growing weight of the Soviet Far East in the Soviet economy. The policy of the United States and Japan, however, has recently shifted toward a position more accommodative to the littorals' position.