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Maritime Commerce Security Plan MARITIME COMMERCE SECURITY PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MARITIME SECURITY OCTOBER 2005 FOREWORD By signing National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (NSPD-41/HSPD-13) President Bush underscored the importance of securing the Maritime Domain, which is defined as "All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.” NSPD-41/HSPD- 13 established a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee (MSPCC)—the first coordinating committee specifically tasked to address this issue—to oversee the development of a National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) and eight supporting implementation plans: • The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness lays the foundation for an effective understanding of anything associated with the Maritime Domain and identifying threats as early and as distant from our shores as possible. • The Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan uses existing capabilities to integrate all available intelligence regarding potential threats to U.S. interests in the Maritime Domain. • The Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan facilitates coordinated U.S. government response to threats against the United States and its interests in the Maritime Domain by establishing roles and responsibilities, which enable the government to respond quickly and decisively. • The International Outreach and Coordination Strategy provides a framework to coordinate all maritime security initiatives undertaken with foreign governments and international organizations, and solicits international support for enhanced maritime security. • Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan recommends procedures and standards for the recovery of the maritime infrastructure following attack or similar disruption. • Maritime Transportation System Security Plan responds to the President’s call for recommendations to improve the national and international regulatory framework regarding the maritime domain. • Maritime Commerce Security Plan establishes a comprehensive plan to secure the maritime supply chain. • The Domestic Outreach Plan engages non-Federal input to assist with the development and implementation of maritime security policies resulting from NSPD-41/HSPD-13. Although these plans address different aspects of maritime security, they are mutually linked and reinforce each other. Together, NSMS and its supporting plans represent the beginning of a comprehensive national effort to promote global economic stability and protect legitimate activities, while preventing hostile or illegal acts within the Maritime Domain. National Strategy for Maritime Security: Maritime Commerce Security Plan i TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD .................................................................................................................................................I TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................ II I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 1 II. OVERVIEW OF MARITIME COMMERCE SECURITY........................................................... 2 BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................................................... 2 THE CHALLENGE .................................................................................................................................. 2 III. THE MARITIME COMMERCE SECURITY PLAN ................................................................... 5 THE GOAL ............................................................................................................................................ 5 THE END STATE.................................................................................................................................... 5 SCOPE................................................................................................................................................... 5 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ............................................................................................................. 6 STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................................. 7 THE FRAMEWORK................................................................................................................................. 7 THE RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH ................................................................................................... 8 CURRENT INITIATIVES .......................................................................................................................... 9 Advance Electronic Cargo Information........................................................................................ 9 The Automated Targeting System ................................................................................................. 9 Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment .......................................................................................... 10 Container Security Initiative....................................................................................................... 10 Megaports Initiative.................................................................................................................... 10 Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism.......................................................................... 11 Operation Safe Commerce.......................................................................................................... 11 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.......................................................................................................... 11 IV. THE WAY FORWARD .................................................................................................................. 13 RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................................................................... 14 Accurate Data............................................................................................................................. 14 Secure Cargo .............................................................................................................................. 15 Secure Vessels/Ports................................................................................................................... 16 Secure Transit............................................................................................................................. 17 International Standards and Regulations ................................................................................... 19 PERFORMANCE MEASURES ................................................................................................................. 19 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 21 National Strategy for Maritime Security: Maritime Commerce Security Plan ii I. INTRODUCTION “A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it reinforces the habits of liberty.” National Security Strategy of the United States of America September, 2002 The Maritime Commerce Security Plan contains recommendations to promote international supply chain security. The Maritime Commerce Security Plan is a component of the National Strategy for Maritime Security. The National Strategy for Maritime Security was produced in response to National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/ Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13 (“Maritime Security Policy” December 21, 2004). This plan also supports the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The Maritime Commerce Security Plan was developed in conjunction with the other component plans of the National Strategy for Maritime Security. In particular, the development of the Maritime Transportation System Security Plan and the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan was closely coordinated with this plan. The Maritime Transportation System Security Plan addresses the security of the maritime transportation system as a system including vessels, facilities and ports that contribute so greatly to cargo security and, in this way, complements this plan. The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan also supports this plan because it enhances our ability to minimize the economic impact of an attack or other disruption of the maritime transportation system. This includes effective communication so that private sector organizations have the appropriate information to implement their contingency plans quickly. This is a risk management plan. As such, it is dependent on reliable information and intelligence to evaluate threats and assess risk. For this reason, the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness and the Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan are very
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