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Thesis Organization Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2010-06 Hydrostatic and hydrodynamic analysis of a lengthened DDG-51 destroyer modified repeat Hlavin, Justin C. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5287 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS HYDROSTATIC AND HYDRODYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF A LENGTHENED DDG-51 DESTROYER MODIFIED REPEAT by Justin Hlavin June 2010 Thesis Advisor: Fotis Papoulias Second Reader: Clifford Whitcomb Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2010 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Hydrostatic and Hydrodynamic Analysis of a Lengthened DDG-51 Destroyer Modified Repeat 6. AUTHOR(S) Justin C. Hlavin 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. IRB Protocol number ________________. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The purpose of this thesis is to determine the feasibility of lengthening the current DDG-51 ARLEIGH BURKE class destroyers and the resulting effects on the hydrostatics and hydrodynamics. A modified repeat of a current, proven ship design would offer a more cost-effective solution for the acquisition of ships to reach the U.S. Navy goal of a 313-ship fleet in the 30-year shipbuilding plan. An analysis is performed to determine a proposed length that would be added to the ship at the parallel midbody. The current DDG-51 hullform is compared to this lengthened version, analyzing the key hydrostatic and hydrodynamic characteristics. The result is a ship that would be able to offer increased mission capability with increased weight and electrical power margins. This modified repeat would also offer potential cost savings, as compared to designing a completely new surface combatant. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF Hydrostatics, Hydrodynamics, Destroyer PAGES 133 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited HYDROSTATIC AND HYDRODYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF A LENGTHENED DDG-51 DESTROYER MODIFIED REPEAT Justin C. Hlavin Lieutenant, United States Navy B.S., Ocean Engineering, Virginia Tech, 2003 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MECHANICAL ENGINEERING from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2010 Author: Justin C. Hlavin Approved by: Fotis Papoulias Thesis Advisor Clifford Whitcomb Co-Advisor Knox Millsaps Chairman, Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis is to determine the feasibility of lengthening the current DDG- 51 ARLEIGH BURKE class destroyers and the resulting effects on the hydrostatics and hydrodynamics. A modified repeat of a current, proven ship design would offer a more cost-effective solution for the acquisition of ships to reach the U.S. Navy goal of a 313- ship fleet in the 30-year shipbuilding plan. An analysis is performed to determine a proposed length that would be added to the ship at the parallel midbody. The current DDG-51 hullform is compared to this lengthened version, analyzing the key hydrostatic and hydrodynamic characteristics. The result is a ship that would be able to offer increased mission capability with increased weight and electrical power margins. This modified repeat would also offer potential cost savings, as compared to designing a completely new surface combatant. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 B. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................1 C. RESEARCH TOPICS .....................................................................................2 D. BENEFIT OF STUDY.....................................................................................2 E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ..................................................................2 F. CHAPTER SUMMARY..................................................................................4 II. HISTORY OF THE DDG-51 DESTROYER............................................................5 A. HISTORY AND FUTURE OF U.S. NAVY DESTROYERS.......................5 B. DDG-51 FLIGHT I ..........................................................................................8 C. DDG-51 FLIGHT II AND IIA......................................................................10 D. DDG-51 FLIGHT III CONCEPT.................................................................12 E. MISSIONS......................................................................................................14 1. Core Functions ...................................................................................14 2. Primary Missions ...............................................................................14 3. Secondary Missions............................................................................15 4. Ballistic Missile Defense ....................................................................16 F. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................17 III. COMBAT SYSTEMS................................................................................................19 A. LEGACY SYSTEMS.....................................................................................19 1. Sensors ................................................................................................20 a. AN/SLQ-32(V).........................................................................20 b. AN/UPX-29(V) Interrogator System ......................................20 c. AN/SPS-64(V) Navigation and Search Radar .......................21 d. AN/SPS-67(V) Search Radar..................................................22 e. AEGIS Weapon System Mk 7.................................................23 f. AN/SQS-53 Sonar System.......................................................24 2. Countermeasures ...............................................................................25 a. Nulka Active Missile Decoy System........................................25 b. Super Rapid Bloom Offboard Countermeasures (SRBOC) Decoy Launching System (DLS) ............................................26 c. AN/SLQ-25A NIXIE...............................................................27 d. AN/SQQ-28 Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS)..................................................................................27 3. Weapons..............................................................................................27 a. Vertically Launched System (VLS) MK-41............................27 b. RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) ...................28 c. Standard Missile (SM) ............................................................29 d. RUM-139A Vertically Launched Anti-Submarine Rocket (VLA) .......................................................................................30 e. MK-32 Surface Vessel Torpedo Tubes (SVTT) .....................31 vii f. MK-15 Close In Weapons System (CIWS).............................32 g. MK-45 5 Inch Deck Gun ........................................................33 h. Tomahawk Missile ..................................................................34 B. NEW SYSTEMS ............................................................................................35 C. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................38 IV. LENGTHENING ANALYSIS ..................................................................................39 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................39 B. U.S. NAVY SURFACE COMBATANTS ....................................................39
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