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Open Source Licenses for Cisco Modeling Labs, Release 1.0.1 Open Source Used in Cisco Modeling Labs 1.0.1 Cisco Systems, Inc. www.cisco.com Cisco has more than 200 offices worldwide. Addresses, phone numbers, and fax numbers are listed on the Cisco website at www.cisco.com/go/offices. OL-32808-01 OL-32808-01 Ubuntu 12.04.3 LTS The operating system that Cisco Modeling Labs 1.0.1 runs on is the Ubuntu 12.04.3 LTS Operating System, which is separate from Cisco Modeling Labs 1.0.1. Ubuntu is a registered trademark of Canonical Ltd. For your convenience, we have made the Ubuntu 12.04.3 LTS Operating System available for download at http://www.cisco.com/web/learning/le31/le46/cln/cml/ubuntults.html, if you would like access to the source code and/or would like to review the licenses. The file is approximately 8.1 GB. Therefore, we recommend that you use a download manager to assist you in obtaining the file. Open Source Used in Cisco Modeling Labs 1.0.1 Cisco Systems, Inc. www.cisco.com Cisco has more than 200 offices worldwide. Addresses, phone numbers, and fax numbers are listed on the Cisco website at www.cisco.com/go/offices. OL-32808-01 Ubuntu 14.04 LTS Users can create a virtual Linux server image, to be used for purposes such as jump hosts, traffic generation, and scripting. The Ubuntu 14.04 LTS Operating system source code is available at: http://www.cisco.com/web/learning/le31/le46/cln/cml/ubuntults.html Ubuntu is a registered trademark of Canonical Ltd. Open Source Used In Cisco Modeling Labs 1.0.1 Cisco Systems, Inc. www.cisco.com Cisco has more than 200 offices worldwide. Addresses, phone numbers, and fax numbers are listed on the Cisco website at www.cisco.com/go/offices. Text Part Number: 78EE117C99-54081098 Open Source Used In Cisco Modeling Labs 1.0.1 1 This document contains licenses and notices for open source software used in this product. With respect to the free/open source software listed in this document, if you have any questions or wish to receive a copy of any source code to which you may be entitled under the applicable free/open source license(s) (such as the GNU Lesser/General Public License), please contact us at [email protected]. In your requests please include the following reference number 78EE117C99-54081098 Contents 1.1 autonetkit 0.8 1.1.1 Available under license 1.2 configobj 4.7.1 :2010/02/07 1.2.1 Available under license 1.3 lxml 3.1.0 1.3.1 Available under license 1.4 mako 0.8.0 1.4.1 Available under license 1.5 markupsafe 0.9.3 1.5.1 Available under license 1.6 netaddr python library 0.7.10 :4.8.0 1.6.1 Available under license 1.7 networkx 1.7 1.7.1 Available under license 1.8 PyYAML 3.10 :3.el6 1.8.1 Available under license 1.9 tornado 3.0.1 1.9.1 Available under license 1.1 autonetkit 0.8 1.1.1 Available under license : Copyright (c) 2012, University of Adelaide All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright Open Source Used In Cisco Modeling Labs 1.0.1 2 notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * Neither the name of the University of Adelaide nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior written permission. THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL <COPYRIGHT HOLDER> BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 1.2 configobj 4.7.1 :2010/02/07 1.2.1 Available under license : This package was debianized by Gustavo Noronha Silva <[email protected]> on Sun, 07 May 2006 22:54:10 -0300. It was downloaded from http://www.voidspace.org.uk/python/configobj.html Copyright: Copyright (C) 2005-2010 Michael Foord, Mark Andrews, Nicola Larosa License: Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * Neither the name of Michael Foord nor the name of Voidspace may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this Open Source Used In Cisco Modeling Labs 1.0.1 3 software without specific prior written permission. THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. # configobj.py # A config file reader/writer that supports nested sections in config files. # Copyright (C) 2005-2010 Michael Foord, Nicola Larosa # E-mail: fuzzyman AT voidspace DOT org DOT uk # nico AT tekNico DOT net # ConfigObj 4 # http://www.voidspace.org.uk/python/configobj.html # Released subject to the BSD License # Please see http://www.voidspace.org.uk/python/license.shtml # Scripts maintained at http://www.voidspace.org.uk/python/index.shtml # For information about bugfixes, updates and support, please join the # ConfigObj mailing list: # http://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/configobj-develop # Comments, suggestions and bug reports welcome. 1.3 lxml 3.1.0 1.3.1 Available under license : GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE Version 2, June 1991 Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc. 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this license document, but changing it is not allowed. Preamble The licenses for most software are designed to take away your freedom to share and change it. By contrast, the GNU General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change free Open Source Used In Cisco Modeling Labs 1.0.1 4 software--to make sure the software is free for all its users. This General Public License applies to most of the Free Software Foundation's software and to any other program whose authors commit to using it. (Some other Free Software Foundation software is covered by the GNU Library General Public License instead.) You can apply it to your programs, too. When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for this service if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it if you want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it in new free programs; and that you know you can do these things. To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid anyone to deny you these rights or to ask you to surrender the rights. These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for you if you distribute copies of the software, or if you modify it. For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether gratis or for a fee, you must give the recipients all the rights that you have. You must make sure that they, too, receive or can get the source code. And you must show them these terms so they know their rights. We protect your rights with two steps: (1) copyright the software, and (2) offer you this license which gives you legal permission to copy, distribute and/or modify the software. Also, for each author's protection and ours, we want to make certain that everyone understands that there is no warranty for this free software. If the software is modified by someone else and passed on, we want its recipients to know that what they have is not the original, so that any problems introduced by others will not reflect on the original authors' reputations. Finally, any free program is threatened constantly by software patents. We wish to avoid the danger that redistributors of a free program will individually obtain patent licenses, in effect making the program proprietary.
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