Hypostasis – the Principle of Individual Existence in John of Damascus

HYPOSTASIS – THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCE IN JOHN OF DAMASCUS

ANNA ZHYRKOVA*

The notion of hypostasis, through the long tradition that presumably starts with the Stoa, appears to be one of the basic notions not only for philosophical argumentation, but also for developing theological doctrine. On the one hand, the notion of hypostasis relates, for example, to the ontological and logical issue of individual entities and individuation. On the other hand, a proper interpretation of hypostasis allows philosophical explanation of the unification of two natures in a human hypostasis, as well as the unification of human and divine nature in one hypostasis of the Son of God. Among the teachings of the authors who contribute to the formation of Christian philosophical and theological doctrines, the treatment of hypostasis by St. John of Damascus (650-749) appears to be of considerable value. John represents the final stage of Greek patristic tradition. His works were and are considered by the Eastern Church as a handbook of orthodoxy. They were well known also in the West since the 12th century,1 and were extensively used by Peter Abelard, Robert Grosseteste, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. One can say that John of Damascus was the last Greek author to be accepted as an authority by Western Latin Christianity.2 Some medieval philosophers referred to him as the authority on the problem of individuation. Duns Scotus,

* Dr Anna Zhyrkova has a PhD in the field of Patristics (John of Damascus’ philosophy) and is currently preparing her ‘Habilitation’ in Ancient Philosophy (on the interpretation of the Aristotelian categories in the Platonic tradition). 1 The two parts of Fount of Knowledge, namely Dialectica and Expositio, were translated into Latin. Around 1150 Expositio was translated by Burgundio of Pisa and at around the same time a partial translation was made by Cerebranus. Robert Grosseteste produced a translation of Dialectica around 1240. 2 M. Frede, ‘John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom’, in Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources, ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou (Oxford – New York: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 67-70.

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for instance, named him along with such significant philosophers as Por- phyry and Avicenna.3 The interpretation of the concept of hypostasis found in John’s Fount of Knowledge4 is of special importance. In this work John outlines the logical and metaphysical bases of Christian theology and also presents a systematic reflection on Christian thought. The work is generally considered to be a compilation of Neoplatonic commentaries and patristic texts.5 Against this, I shall argue that John of Damascus not only presented a restatement of the views of Christian authors, but also, by an extensive use of certain philosophical doctrines, advanced some philosophical aspects of the notion of hypostasis that had important consequences in later theological and philosophical tradition. Combining patristic teachings with Neoplatonic, Aristo- telian and Stoic elements, John of Damascus created a definition according to which hypostasis is the principle of its own being and structure. In this way, hypostasis is the only principle of its individual existence. This conception anticipates to a certain extent Medieval theories of existential and essential individuation. In order to investigate John Damascene’s concept of hypostasis, I propose to consider that notion in relation to his views on the individual, substance, nature and form. Special attention is to be paid to the consequences of the use of the concept of hypostasis in theological doctrine. The last section is dedicated to the evaluation of the originality and value of his thought.

3 Joannis Duns Scotus Ord. VII 422. All references to Duns Scotus are based on the edition of P.M. Perantoni and C. Balic, Doctoris subtilis et Mariani Ioannis Duns Scoti Ordinis Fratrum Minorum Opera omnia (Citta del Vaticano: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950-). 4 I follow the edition of B. Kotter, ed., Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, vol. 1-2, Patristische Texte und Studien 7, 12 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969, 1973) and will also frequently refer to F.H. Chase’s generally fine English translation, but with a few modifications: Saint John of Damascus, Writings (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1999). 5 See, for instance, A. Grillmeier, ‘Patristische Vorbilder frühscholastischer Systematik. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Augustinismus’, Studia Patristica 6, vol. IV (1962), pp. 390-408; G. von Podskalsky, Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz. Der Streit um die Theologische Methodik in der spätbyzantinischen Geistesgeschichte (14./15. Jh.), seine systema- tischen Grundlagen und seine historische Entwicklung (München: Beck, 1977), pp. 104-5; G. Richter, Die Dialektik des Johannes von Damaskos: eine Untersuchung des Textes nach seinen Quellen und seiner Bedeutung, Studia Patristica et Byzantina, 10. Heft (Ettal: Buch- Kunstverlag Ettal, 1964), p. 271. The same information can be found in any textbook of patristics.

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I. HYPOSTASIS AS AN INDIVIDUAL ENTITY

According to John, the term ‘hypostasis’ has two meanings. First, it denotes simple existence (äpl¬v Àparziv) and as such is interchangeable with the terms ‘substance’ and ‘nature’. In a second and more proper meaning, though, hypostasis refers to existence in itself, which is applied to the individual:6

‘[Hypostasis] means the existence in itself according to its peculiar constitution (kaq’ aütò kaì îdiosústaton Àparzin). In this sense, it signiﬁes the individual (tò ãtomon) that is numerically different (t¬ç âriqm¬ç diaféron), which is to say, Peter and Paul, or that certain horse’ (Dial. 43, 4-7).

This deﬁnition requires further explanation. According to John, the term ‘individual’ can be used in a number of senses: 1. Something that cannot be divided or partitioned (e.g., “point” or “now”); 2. Something that is hard to divide or to cut up (a diamond and the like); 3. Most speciﬁc species (such as man or horse); 4. Something that does not preserve its species after division.7 The last is said to be the proper meaning of the term:

‘The term individual (ãtomon) is principally used as meaning that which, although it is divisible, does not maintain its prima species (tò pr¬ton ¤dov) after division. Thus Peter is divided into soul and body, but neither is the soul by itself a perfect man or a perfect Peter, nor is the body’ (Dial. 11, 7-12).

Interpreting the individual as an indivisible subject, as it is already pointed out by the etymology of this word (ã-tomov – uncut, that cannot be cut, indivisible), was a common view throughout the history of Western thought.8 Indivisibility itself might be interpreted as absolute or relative. In the ﬁrst case, a subject is an individual if and only if it cannot be divided totally. However, this meaning causes difﬁculties if applied to subjects that

6 Dial. 30, 2-4; 43, 2-7; 21-23; 45, 16-17. 7 Dial. 11, 2-7. 8 The same treatment of individual is found in many Neoplatonic commentaries, some of which probably were known by John of Damascus. See for example Elias, in Isag. 74, 19-24; David, in Isag. 169, 18-25; Stephanus, in Int. 27, 37-28, 6. All references to the Greek texts of Neoplatonic authors are based on Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca.

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are divisible in principle, such as a stone, a piece of paper, etc. John accepted the second meaning of indivisibility, which is relative indivisibility. Accord- ingly, a particular entity, even though it is in principle divisible, loses its prima species by division. Therefore, the individual is understood as something that is logically not further divisible. Following Porphyry,9 John claims that the lowest species, containing no inferior species, are divided into individuals.10 Thus, the individual is the most particular subject, which is not divisible into entities of the same species. Accordingly, “Peter”, as an individual of the human species, cannot be divided into other humans, even though he can be split into organs or into soul and body. The example of human indivisibility demonstrates that indivisibility of an individual, in John’s teaching, possesses also ontological signiﬁcance. It appears that being an individual is essential for the subject. Otherwise, division of an individual would not be able to affect its prima species. Hence, individual denotes the essence or nature of a given subject. In other words, an individual is a complete substance of a certain kind. Since the essential composites of a certain substance cannot be divided without destroying it as a substance, the substantial composites of an individual are not divisible. Therefore, division of the essential composites leads to a loss of being for a given individual. For example, the loss of a hand does not destroy human nature in a given individual, but the separation by death into soul and body does destroy the individual being of a human. Indivisibility is not the only characteristic of the individual. John of Damascus describes further features of an individual as follows:

‘An individual is that which subsists in itself of substance and accidents (tò êz oûsíav kaì sumbebjkótwn kaq’ ëautò üstámenon), is numerically distinct from the others of the same species (âriqm¬ç t¬n ömoeid¬n kexwrisménon), and does not signify what but whom’ (Dial. 5, 136-138). Dial. 11, 7-12

Despite the fact that John did not make any clear distinction between logical and ontological aspects of individuality, the deﬁnition above seemingly presents the ontological meaning of an individual. Individual is not only a

9 Porphyrius, Isag. 7, 27-8, 3. 10 Dial. 5, 72-74; 9, 40-45; 10, 68-81.

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term which occurs in relation to species. Seeing that a term cannot possess existence in itself and be made of substance and accidents, an individual appears to be a real thing or entity, and not only a notion of logic. First of all, an individual is described as something that subsists in itself. As it is stated by John, existence in itself relates only to substance, whereas an accident cannot exist in itself but needs a substrate of existence to subsist in it.11 The individual, thus, is primarily deﬁned as a substance. However, such a designa- tion seems to be insufﬁcient, since it does not explain the difference between substance as such and the individual. Apparently, John, following the Aristo- telian tradition, accepted a moderate form of realism.12 Accordingly, universal entities, for instance substance as such, nature, form, species etc., really exist, but only individuals subsist by themselves. Universal entities possess their existence only in particulars.13 In consequence, it emerges that “individual”, according to John, denotes a particular substance, which subsists in itself. John characterizes such an entity as distinct or different from other entities of the same kind. Therefore, an individual has to possess some attribute that makes it different from other individuals of its species. On the one hand, he states that the individual should consist of substance and accidents. Substance determines the existence of an individual as such and all its essential content. Hence, a substance is that which individuals of the same species have in common. Thus, they cannot be differentiated by substance. In contrast, accidents appear to be the features that allow the distinction of an individual from other individuals of the same species. The combination of accidents (sumplok±ç t¬n sumbebjkótwn) marks off, for the different individuals, the individuality of their own individual substance (t®n îdiótjta t±v oîkeíav üpostásewv âfwrísanto); and this combination acquires individual existence (t®n kaq’ aütò êsxßkasin Àparzin).14 Two possible conclusions can be inferred from this: 1) that accidents might be considered as the principle of individuation; or 2) that accidental features are the only reason for individual “discernibility”.

11 Dial. 4, 61-67; 10, 100-107; 40, 2-6. 12 Cf. V.N. Tatakes and N.J. Moutafakis, Byzantine Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2003), pp. 11-112, in particular p. 68. Tatakes argues that John displays a ‘nomi- nalistic attitude’. 13 Dial. 43, 8-11. 14 Dial. 38, 8-11.

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On the other hand, John points out that the distinction between individuals is numerical. There are three kinds of differences corresponding to three kinds of sameness, namely: generic, specific and hypostatic or numerical.15 Things are generically the same or different if they belong to the same genus or to different genera respectively. Likewise, things are specifically the same if they belong to the same species and share the same essence. Things differ in species, i.e. in their essence, if they are specifically different. John considered things to be hypostatically the same when two natures are united in one compound hypostasis, as in the case of soul and body. In contrast, things are different hypostatically and numerically when they differ in their accidents and have individual existence.16 Numerical distinction, thus, holds between things that belong to the same species, but differ one from another in their accidents and have individual existence. Individuals are different not in species, or in other words, according to their substance or nature, but in number. The nature of the distinction of individuals is that which constitutes the individuality of things. From the analysis above it follows that the distinction might be considered either with respect to accidents or with respect to the numerical difference. In the last, it is also unclear whether accident is to be a principle of the numerical difference. As a matter of fact, John did not consider the question of the cause or the principle of individual distinctness in the discussed passage (Dial. 5, 136-138). Further reflection on this subject takes place in his analysis of hypostasis and hypostatic union. Therefore, the present stage of our investigation does not provide us with any evidence that would allow us to identify the principle of individuation in John. Being composed of accidents as well as being numerically different, thus, seem to be the principal characteristics of an individual.

15 The teaching of three kinds of sameness and differences probably is based on Neopla- tonic tradition. On sameness and difference according to genera and species, see Simpli- cius, in Cat. 54, 22-60, 10; Philoponus, in Cat. 40, 1-42, 29; Olympiodorus, in Cat. 52, 20-53, 6; Elias, in Cat. 155, 9-158, 16. All three kinds of differences are found in Boethius, Trinit. 1, 48-55. References to the theological works of Boethius are based on the edition of C. Moreschini, De Consolatione Philosophiae; Opuscula Theologica, 2 ed., Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum Et Romanorum Teubneriana (Munich: K.G. Saur, 2005). It is worth mentioning that the terms used by John for the description of hypostatic sameness and difference do not occur in a similar context in other authors. 16 Dial. 38, 3-11; 49.

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The last point of the above definition of the individual that should be examined is John’s statement that the individual ‘does not signify what but whom’ (oû tò tì djloÕn âllà tòn tiná).17 In my opinion, this statement does not lead to the conclusion that individual represents an equivalent for the term person. In contrast to the definitions of the former terms, when defining and describing the person John emphasizes actions of a certain individual. ‘A person (próswpon) is one who by reason of his own operations and properties (dià t¬n oîkeíwn ênergjmátwn te kaì îdiwmátwn) exhibits to us an appearance which is distinct and set off from those of the same nature as he is.’18 The Angel Gabriel is given as an example of a person, who is known as a distinct person due to his conversation with the Mother of God. Another example is St. Paul, who is seen as being distinct from the rest of humans, since he spoke from the stairs of Areopagus to people. Thus, probably, the analyzed statement, according to which individual ‘does not signify what but whom’, relates to John’s comment that the holy Fathers used the terms ‘hypostasis’, ‘person’ and ‘individual’ for the same thing. This thing subsists by itself as composed of substance and accidents, it is numerically different, and its various names signify ‘a certain one’ (tòn tiná). John illustrates ‘a certain one’ by examples of Peter, Paul and ‘this horse’.19 The term ‘individual’, then, denotes a certain particular subject. Therefore, it should not be understood as a synonym of ‘person’, since its extension is larger and includes the denotation of ‘person’. In this context, it is worth mentioning that J. Zizioulas sees the identification of the notion ‘hypostasis’ with ‘person’ as a revolutionary achievement of Greek patristic thought. The person is understood, according to Zizioulas, as a principle and cause of individual being. It is not something additional to individual substance, but constitutes its ontological structure.20 In my opinion, this treatment of patristic thought is not applicable to John’s doctrine. He clearly intends to be precise in using philosophical terms. He starts the Fount of Knowledge by settling and defining terms, which he uses extensively in the theological parts of this work. As will be shown below, John distinguishes the

17 Dial. 5, 138. 18 Dial. 44, 2-9. 19 Dial. 44, 10-14. 20 J. Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985), pp. 37-39.

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terms ‘individual,’ ‘hypostasis,’ and ‘person’. To be sure, those three terms are used in relation to a particular substance, but they are not identical. ‘Individual’ is a logical term that is used to signify a certain particular subject. ‘Hypostasis’ possesses an ontological meaning: it first of all designates the actual existence of an entity.21 ‘Person,’ in turn, refers to the actions of a certain individual. The term ‘person’ is clearly logically posterior to the ‘hypostasis.’ Being a person presupposes that some entity ontologically exists as a hypostasis. In John’s doctrine it is the hypostasis that is the principle of existence, while the person is the way of exhibiting itself as a certain hypostasis. However, being a person should not be understood as something accidental to the nature of a certain individual. It is the way in which an individual expresses his very essence, either in the case of a certain human person or of the Divine persons. Moreover, such terminological use does not mean that John’s doctrine lacks a personalistic trait. On the contrary, his interpretation of the term ‘person’ shows a much deeper personalistic (in the con- temporary meaning of the word) understanding of the human individual than in Boethius’ well-known definition of person as naturae rationalibis individua substantia.22 The roots of John’s definition of an individual as such (Dial. 5, 136-138 and parallels) can probably be traced to Porphyry’s treatment of an individual as a collection of characteristics that can never be the same for another (ãtoma oŒn légetai tà toiaÕta, ºti êz îdiotßtwn sunéstjken ∏kaston, ñ tò ãqroisma oûk ån êp’ ãllou potè tò aûtò génoito).23 A modified version of this doctrine is found in works of Boethius. Following Porphyry, Boethius claimed that the uniqueness of a set of accidental properties considered together constitutes the individuality of substance.24 He developed this opinion by asserting that the variety of accidents (accidentium varietas) or of place

21 See below Part 2. 22 Boethius, Eut. 3.4-5. 23 Porphyrius, Isag. 7, 19-24. 24 Boethius, in Isag. 231, 235-235 (PL 64, 112; 114), in the edition of L. Minio-Paluello and A.B.G. Dod, Categoriarum Supplementa: Porphyrii Isagoge Translatio Boethii et Anonymi Fragmentum Vulgo Vocatum ‘Liber Sex Principiorum’, Aristoteles Latinus (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1966). See J.J.E. Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages (Washington; München: Catholic University of America Press, 1984), pp. 67- 68; 76-78.

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(locus) makes substances numerically different (numero differentiam facit).25 In contrast to Boethius, John did not discuss the question of the causes of individuation of substance. Similarly, he didn’t regard a set of individual accidents as a principle of numerical difference. He rather described characteristics of the individual without deliberating about them as possible reasons for individuation. In spite of this, medieval philosophers such as Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines and John Duns Scotus referred to him as a proponent of the opinion that accidents constitute the principle of individuation.26 However, another medieval philosopher, Peter of Auvergne, used John’s text to support the idea that quantity is the principle of individuation.27 John Baconthorpe, in his turn, ascribed to him the idea that quantity is the principle of multiplication for individuals.28 To sum up the ﬁrst part of our investigation, we may conclude that, according to John, the term ‘hypostasis’ primarily signiﬁes individual substance. Consequently, ‘hypostasis’ denotes a complete substance of a certain

25 Boethius, Trinit.1, 55-63: ‘Quare diversum etiam vel genere, vel specie, vel numero dicitur. Sed numero differentiam accidentium varietas facit. Nam tres homines neque genere, neque specie, sed suis accidentibus distant; nam vel si animo cuncta ab his acci- dentia separemus, tamen locus cunctis diversus est, quem unum fingere nullo modo pos- sumus: duo enim corpora unum locum non obtinebunt, qui est accidens. Atque ideo sunt numero plures, quoniam accidentibus plures fiunt’. See Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation, pp. 98-100. 26 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet VII, q. 5, in the edition of M. de Wulf and J. Hoff- mans, Les Quodlibet Cinq, Six et Sept de Godefroid de Fontaines, vol. 3, Les philosophes belges; textes et études (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université, 1914); Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet II, q. 8, 69-95, in the edition of R. Wielockx, Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet, Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. Series 2 Henrici de Gandavo, Opera Omnia (Leuven; Leuven University Press; Leiden, Brill, 1983); John Scotus, Ord. VII 422. See J.F. Wippel, ‘Godfrey of Fontaines, Peter of Auvergne and John Baconthorpe’, in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation (1150- 1650), ed. J.J.E. Gracia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 225. Also cf. cap. 29 in Le Correctorium corruptori ‘Circa’ de Jean Quidort de Paris, ed. J.P. Müller (Rome: Herder, 1954). 27 Peter of Auvergne, Quodlibet II, q. 5, 65-68, in the edition of E. Hocedez, ‘Une question inédite de Pierre d’ Auvergne sur l’individuation’, Revue néoscolastique de Philosophie, 36 (1934). See Wippel, ‘Godfrey of Fontaines’, p. 229 28 John Baconthorpe, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum, III Sent. 11, 2, 3, in the edition of J.C. Marasca, Qvaestiones in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum,et Quodlibetales (Cremona Farnborough: Apud Marc. Antonium Belpierum, 1618, repr. Farnborough: Gregg International Publishers, 1969). See Wippel, ‘Godfrey of Fontaines’, p. 239.

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kind, which can be divided neither logically nor ontologically. In other words, it is indivisible into entities of the same species. The division of its essential components brings about the destruction of its prima species, which is equivalent to the loss of being a certain hypostasis. Furthermore, hypostasis as an individual substance possesses existence in itself. John claims that an entity of this kind corresponds to the substance of a certain species that differs numerically from the others of the same species by its accidental features. Accidental features appear to distinguish a certain hypostasis from other hypostases. Yet, it is unclear whether these features are responsible for the individuation of substance or for the numerical difference of a certain subject. Doubtlessly, it emerges that the ‘hypostasis’ in the sense of the individual denotes a particular subject, such as a certain human, this horse etc.

II. HYPOSTASIS IN RELATION TO SUBSTANCE, NATURE AND FORM

While he himself interpreted hypostasis as the individual, John claims that the holy Fathers, understood the term ‘hypostasis’ in the meaning of simple existence and utilized it as an equivalent of the term ‘nature’.29 Additionally, the terms ‘substance’, ‘nature’ and ‘form’ were applied by Christian authors to the same thing, namely to the most specific species.30. Obviously, such use of the terms yields a terminological difficulty, which could lead to significant problems in philosophical and theological doctrine as well. Indeed, in John’s opinion, a heretical error lies in the incorrect identification of nature with hypostasis.31 Thus, one should search for the exact meanings of the terms above as well as for the differences between them. Following the Neoplatonic teaching, according to which substance is one of the ten ultimate genera,32 John defines substance as ‘the first and most general genus’ (pr¬ton kaì genikÉtaton génov).33 In relation to accident, though, he defines substance as a thing that subsists in itself (pr¢gma

29 Dial. 43, 2-4. Cyrillus Apol, Thdt, (PG 76.401A). See also Leontius Byzantinus Fr., PG 86, 2012 B-D; Eulogius Fr. dogm., PG 86, 2953B-C. 30 Dial. 31, 26-27; 42, 8-12. 31 Exp. 47, 39-40. 32 Porphyrius, in Cat. 58, 8-21; Ammonius, in Cat. 44, 8-11. 33 Dial. 10, 136-139.

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aûqúparkton) and has no need of any other for its existence.34 The latter means that substance does not need any substrate of existence to exist, in contrast to accident, which does need it. Rather substance by itself is the substrate for the existence of accidents. In fact, any object, which neither exists by something else nor needs constituents for its existence, constitutes an individual being. Consequently, according to John’s definition, substance is not only the first and the most general genus, but also a concrete individual. Thus, it is possible to draw parallels between John’s two definitions of substance, namely substance as the individual and substance as the genus, and the notions of Aristotle’s primary35 and secondary36 substances respectively.37 However, it should be mentioned that in Aristotle’s doctrine substance is either one of homonymous notions (such as being) or one of notions which relate to individuals rather than to a genus of things. Thereby, it seems that John follows the Neo-platonic tradition by treating substance as a notion that corresponds to the notions of genus and of individual subject, which exists in itself.38 To be sure, substance in the meaning of the individual subject is interchangeable with the notion of ‘hypostasis’. However, John additionally claims that, according to some pagan philosophers, substance, in relation to the term ‘nature’, denotes simple being:

‘In this same way the pagan philosophers stated the difference between substance, and nature, by saying that substance was simple being (tò äpl¬v ˝nai), whereas nature was substance which had been made speciﬁc by essential differences so as to have, in addition to simple being, being in such a way (fúsin dè oûsían eîdopoijqe⁄san üpò t¬n oûsiwd¬n diafor¬n kaì metà toÕ äpl¬v e˝nai kaì tò toi¬sde e˝nai ∂xousan), whether rational or irrational, mortal or immortal’ (Dial. 31, 4-7).

34 Dial. 4, 61-67; 10, 100-107; 40, 2-6. 35 Aristoteles, Cat. 2a 11-13; 2b, 17-18; 2b 37-3a 1. References to the Categories are based on the edition of L. Minio-Paluello, Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber De Interpretatione (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949, repr. 1966)). 36 Aristoteles, Cat. 2a 14-16. 37 Richter,Dialektik, pp. 177-8. 38 Porphyrius, in Cat. 89, 10-90, 11; Ammonius, in Cat. 36, 2-21; 37, 22-40, 5; Dexippus, in Cat. 45, 3-46, 29; Simplicius, in Cat. 80, 15-85, 33; etc.

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According to this citation, substance qua substance denotes simple being (tò äpl¬v e˝nai) without any features. In other words, ‘substance’ corresponds to unqualified entity or substrate, which can be defined as simple being or as basic existence. In turn, ‘nature’ as ‘substance which had been made specific by essential differences’ relates to qualified entity or substrate. Thus, it has not only being in the former sense, but also being in such a way (tò toi¬sde e˝nai) according to its essential differences. The essential difference in its most specific sense is predicated of several things divergent with respect to their species. Moreover, essential differences make one species differ from another. It is possible, thus, to say that they constitute and indicate the essence of species.39 Consequently, specific being appears to be the way of existence of an informed substance according to the specific essential difference; in other words, it is the existence of some definite species. ‘Nature’, then, relates to a qualified substance, i.e. to the substance of a certain kind, which is specified by the essential difference, such as rational or irrational, mortal or immortal. It might be concluded, thus, that substance as simple being corresponds to the basic existence, which is prior to a qualified substance and is a basis of existence for all things. On the other hand, ‘nature’ corresponds to the notion of the most specific species (tà eîdikÉtata e÷dj), such as angel, man, horse, etc.40 The term ‘form’, subsequently, is defined by John of Damascus in the following way:

‘Form (morfß) is the substance which has been, as it were, informed and made specific by the essential differences (morfwqe⁄sa kaì eîdopoijqe⁄sa oûsía), and which signifies the most specific species (tò eîdikÉtaton e˝dov)’ (Dial. 42, 2-7).

In both of the quotations above, ‘substance’ corresponds to the notion of unqualified entity or substrate. In contrast, ‘form’ is considered here as informed and qualified substance, and denotes the most specific species. Since, according to the previous text, ‘nature’ refers to substance, which had been made specific by the essential differences, one can admit that, in John’s doctrine, ‘form’ is a synonym of ‘nature’. Therefore, substance as such relates

39 Dial. 5, 103-118; 10, 215-220; 12, 11-20. 40 Dial. 31, 7-19.

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to unqualified existence, while nature and form denote the existence of informed substance according to its essential difference, i.e. to the existence of the most specific species. Consequently, in relation to hypostasis, which is individual entity, such notions as substance, nature and form are universals (kaqólou)41 functioning as general predicates (kaqolikÉteron katjgore⁄sqai).42 As a result, they are predicated of particulars subordinated to them.43 There is also a need to say that, as stressed by John, neither substance, which is devoid of form, nor genus, nor species, nor essential difference, nor accident but only hypostases subsist by themselves.44 Thus, substance, nature and form have their existence in hypostases. According to John, simple substance (™ äpl± oûsía) is present equally in hypostases of all kinds. On the basis of the previous analysis one may presume that he construed ‘simple substance’ as unqualified substance without any features, which constitutes the basic existence of all entities. On the other hand, the origin of qualification of substance is the essential differences found in hypostases according to their specific species. The essential differences of specific species form hypostases belonging to those species and separate them from hypostases of other species.45 Moreover, John claims that one of the reasons for which ‘substance’ is predicated of a hypostasis is that the substance, to which a certain kind of hypostasis belongs, is complete (teleía ™ oûsía) in each of the hypostases of the same species. Opposite to ‘a simple substance’, the term ‘substance’ in the mentioned passage apparently corresponds to the notion of qualified substance, or in other words to the substance of a certain species, which is synonymous to the term ‘nature’. Therefore, specific substance or nature occurs in complete and equal manner in each of the hypostases of the same species. As the result, hypostases of the same species do not differ in their substance or nature. In fact, John considers hypostases to be different in number and in

41 Cf. Dial. 65, 76-77. 42 Cf. Dial. 15; 17. See also I. Ica, ‘“Dialectica” Sf. Ioan Damaschinul – Prolegomena Logico-Filosofica a “Dogmaticii”’, Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai. Theologia orthodoxa, 40 (1995), p. 106-7. 43 Exp. 48, 2-10; 50, 3-6; 55, 4-7. 44 Dial. 43, 8-11. 45 Dial., 43, 11-19.

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the accidental features, but not in substance or nature.46 Accordingly, he characterizes hypostasis as follows:

‘The hypostasis must have substance together with accidents and subsist in itself and be sensibly, that is, actually, perceivable (™ üpóstasiv qélei ∂xein oûsían metà sumbebjkótwn kaì kaq’ ëaut®n üfístasqai kaì aîsqßsei ≠goun ênergeíaç qewre⁄sqai). It is furthermore impossible for two hypostases not to differ from each other in their accidents and still to differ from each other numerically. And one should know that the characteristic peculiarity are the accidents which distinguish the hypostasis’ (Dial. 31, 29-31).

As was mentioned above, substance informed with essential difference becomes nature, that is to say form or species. Similarly, nature by assuming accidents becomes hypostasis. Hypostasis, thus, appears to be substance of a certain kind informed by accidents, i.e. by its characteristic properties (tà xaraktjristikà îdiÉmata). Consequently, hypostasis possesses the common characteristics of substance, for instance essential differences, as well as individual features, i.e. accidents. Since substance of a certain species consists of the essential differences (otherwise it would not exist at all), hypostasis, in order to subsist as a numerically different individual, must consist of accidents. Being, which is composed of accidents, is necessary for one hypostasis to be different from the other hypostases of the same species. Only under those conditions can hypostasis be sensibly and actually perceivable, that is, it can be distinguished as a numerically different individual. The unique set of accidents, then, seems to be the reason for the individual and numerical discernibility of a certain hypostasis. Thus, it is possible to say that two individual substances, such as Paul and Peter, have an identical nature of the human kind and do not differ essentially. In spite of this, they diverge as two different hypostases by their characteristic properties. Therefore, the peculiar characteristics of a certain hypostasis, i.e. its accidents, are the principle of individual divergence. However, it does not derive from the quotation above, nor from John’s deﬁnition of an individual, that accidents might be considered as the principle of individuation. Hypostasis is not only limited to a collection of the characteristic properties of a given individual, as it was

46 Exp. 50, 6-11.

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stated, for instance, by Porphyry.47 Since, for John, essential differences inform substance and distinguish one species from the other, they are essential constituents of a speciﬁc substance.48 On the contrary, the peculiar characteristics of a certain hypostasis are not essential for this very hypostasis. Thus, the unique set of accidents, which belongs to a certain hypostasis, only characterizes and discerns it from the others, but does not generate it as a subsisting entity. In addition, John claims that subsisting perceivably, as well as being a composition of substance with accidents, is a fundamental constituent of a hypostasis. Peculiar characteristics, then, appear to be appropriate to an entity subsisting in this way, but they do not cause that entity. Duns Scotus also interprets John’s teaching on individual discernibility in a similar way. Scotus draws on Introductio Dogmatum Elementaris,49 which is an abbreviation of John of Damascus’ Philosophical Chapters. According to Scotus, John emphasized the mutual separation of individual entities, rather than the fact that individuals have different features. This is because individuals differ by a separable being, rather than by certain features. On the basis of this interpretation, Scotus claims that the reason for individual difference is the division of nature, while the individuality should be explained by the factor of indivisibility of a particular entity.50 The set of accidental features, which is peculiar to a certain hypostasis, appears to be insufﬁcient for explaining the individuality of an entity as such. Therefore, to interpret John’s concept of hypostasis properly, special attention should be given to the hypostatic way of being. He strongly emphasizes the independent existence of a hypostasis, claiming that a hypostasis has ‘existence in itself’ (kaq’ aütò Àparzin)51 and ‘subsists in itself’ (kaq’ ëaut®n üfístasqai).52 To possess ‘existence in itself’ or, in other words, ‘to subsist in itself’ implies that an entity, which exists in this way, neither subsists by

47 See Porphyrius, Isag. 7, 19-24. 48 Dial. 5, 103-118; 10, 215-220; 12, 11-20. 49 Institutio elementaris, ed. B. Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, vol. 1, pp. 20-26. 50 Joannis Duns Scotus, Ord. II, q 4, n 126-127. See M. Koszka¥o, Indywiduum i jednostkowienie. Analiza wybranych tekstów Jana Dunsa Szkota (Eng. Individuum and Indi- viduality. An Analysis of Some of John Duns Scotus’ Works (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2003), pp. 126-127. 51 Dial. 38, 10; 43, 5. 52 Dial. 31, 30; 43, 8-11, 50, 11-13.

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something else, nor needs any substrate of existence to exist.53 In contrast, substance devoid of form possesses simple being (tò äpl¬v e˝nai), while substance informed by essential difference, i.e. nature or a species, has a certain kind of being (tò toi¬sde e˝nai). However, they do not exist by themselves, but actually subsist (ênergeíaç üfístatai) only in hypostases. Thus, it can be inferred that the basic difference between hypostasis and these entities is in their way of being. Substance as well as nature both really exist in a way proper to them, but do not actually subsist by themselves. In spite of that, being in itself, which assumes both of the above modes of being, refers only to hypostases.54 Yet, in order to characterize the hypostatic mode of being it is not enough to say that it is related to an entity, such as a hypostasis, which subsists in itself and does not need another substrate for existence. In the definition of hypostasis as discussed above, John specifies that such an individual, or in other words a hypostasis, must ‘subsist in itself and be sensibly, that is, actually, perceivable’ (kaq’ ëaut®n üfístasqai kaì aîsqßsei ≠goun ênergeíaç qewre⁄sqai). The accidental features of individuals distinguish hypostases of the same species and, as a result, allow a sensible perception of them. Yet, what seems to be more important is the fact that actually perceivable being characterizes the existence of a particular subject. This is followed by the conclusion that being in itself, constituting a hypostatic mode of being, amounts to the actual existence of an individual entity. It should also be admitted that, according to John, actual being is one of the basic constituents of hypostasis as such. In contrast to substance and nature, which constitute some kind of being, hypostasis possesses the substance with accidents as well as being in itself. Therefore, it can be assumed that, when considering hypostasis, John introduces a certain distinction between essence and existence. Indeed, this distinction is reflected implicitly in his explanation of hypostatic union of natures in human individuals as well as in the hypostasis of the Son of God. Particularly, according to John, the human individual is made up of two different natures, namely body and soul, which are united in one hypostasis.55 And in the case of the Lord Jesus

53 Dial. 4, 61-67; 10, 100-107; 40, 2-6. 54 Dial. 43, 19-23; Exp. 50, 8-13. 55 See for instance Dial. 45, 12-16. On the subject of Damascene’s anthropology see also F.R. Gahbauer, ‘Die Anthropologie des Johannes von Damaskos’, Theologie und Philosophie, 69 (1994), pp. 1-21.

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Christ, the same hypostasis of the Word has become the hypostasis of the divine and human natures.56 John suggests that the union of diverse natures in one compound hypostasis is possible due to the fact that actual being belongs to hypostasis and not to nature. As a result, the compound hypostasis is a principle of being and of the union of its composites.57 This distinction between essence and existence might be traced to Neopla- tonic origins. John, as well as other patristic authors, following the Neopla- tonic tradition, applies the verb üfístamai to hypostases, i.e. to particular and perceptible entities.58 In Pierre Hadot’s opinion, the distinction ensues from the distinction between absolute being (tò e˝nai) and determinate being (tò ∫n), which is found in the anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides and in Marius Victorinus, as well as in the late Neoplatonic distinction of Proclus, Damascius and also Victorinus, between pre-existence (Àparziv) and substance (oûsía). In fact, the latter distinction is between pure being in its simplicity prior to all things and a substance-determined subject taken together with all its accidents.59 Additionally, Kevin Corrigan claims that roots of the distinction between essence and existence are to be found already in Plotinus.60 Substance and nature are treated as universals by John. As a matter of fact, ‘substance’, in the meaning of unqualified substrate, signifies more generally entity than nature. The latter is identical with specific species. In contrast,

56 See for instance Exp. 71, 18-28. 57 For the theological and philosophical consequences of Damascenus’ treatment of hypostasis as a principle of being, see the next Part. 58 Ch. Rutten, ‘ÊUparziv et üpóstasiv chez Plotin,’ in Hyparxis e hypostasis nel Neoplaton- ismo: Atti del I Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo, Universitá Degli Studi di Catania, 1-3 Ottobre 1992, ed. F. Romano and D.P. Taormina, Lessico Intellettuale Europeo; 64 (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 1994), pp. 25-32. 59 P. Hadot, ‘Forma essendi: interprétation philologique et interprétation philosophique d’une formule de Boèce’, Les Études Classiques, 38 (1970), pp. 143-56; Id., ‘L’être et l’étant dans le Néoplatonisme’, Revue de Théologie et Philosophie, 23 (1973), pp. 101-113; Id., ‘La disitinction de l’être et de l’étant dans le De hebdomadibus de Boèce’, in Die Meta- physik im Mittelalter. Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung; Vorträge des II. internationalen Kongresses für Mittelalterliche Philosophie, Köln, 31. August-6. September 1961, ed. Interna- tional Society for the Study of Medieval Philosophy, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 2 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1963), pp. 147-156. 60 K. Corrigan, ‘Essence and Existence in the Enneads’, in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. L. P. Gerson (Cambridge – New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 105-129.

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hypostasis exists in the way of the most particular entity. Therefore, we might conclude that the difference between substance, nature and hypostasis lies in the level of individualization. Substance as unqualified substrate is admitted to be an ultimate genus, i.e. a genus of substance. Yet, this substrate by assuming essential differences becomes such kind of substance, i.e. nature or, in other words, most specific species, such as man, horse etc. In turn, hypostasis informed by accidents constitutes an indivisible individual of a certain species that represents the end of individualization. This treatment, on the one hand, reveals signs of Stoic influence. As a matter of fact, according to the Stoic doctrine, the first genus, ‘being’ or ‘substrate’, is generally equated with primary matter, viewed in abstraction as ‘unqualified’, while the second genus is ‘qualified’. In other words, it is a substance viewed as ‘having’ (containing as parts) certain qualities. The second genus of ‘qualified’ divides into ‘commonly qualified’, i.e. anything that is described by a common noun or adjective; and ‘peculiarly qualified’, i.e. qualitatively unique individuals. Moreover, common quality is the quality that makes a substance, to which this quality is proper, to be such kind of substance, as well as it corresponds to the universal concept of such a kind of substance.61 Conse- quently, we may suppose that John’s interpretation of notions related to hypostasis exposes the traces of the Stoic genera. In particular, John’s notion of ‘substance’ appears to be an equivalent of Stoicism’s first genus and ‘unqualified substance’; ‘nature’, i.e. the most specific species, relates to the second genus or ‘informed substance’; ‘essential difference’ relates to common quality; the terms ‘hypostasis’ and ‘accident’ relate to Stoicism’s ‘individual’ and ‘peculiar quality’ respectively.62 On the other hand, the above-mentioned gradation of individualization relates to the so- called ‘Porphyry’s tree of predication’.63 However, John’s

61 See Simplicius, in Cat. 222, 30-3; Syrianus, in Metaph. 28, 18-19; Dexippus, in Cat. 30, 20-6, and also A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1 (Cambridge – New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 174. 62 A. Zhyrkova, Filozofia Jana Damascenskiego w swietle “Pege Gnozeos” (Eng.: The Phi- losophy of John Damascene in the Light of “Pege Gnoseos”) (Ph.D. diss., Catholic University of Lublin, 2002), pp. 164-181. 63 Cf. Ica, ‘“Dialectica”’, pp. 119-121; Th. de Régnon, Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité, vol. 1 (Paris: V. Retaux, 1892-1898), pp. 278-279. Discussing the use of Porphyry’s tree, de Régnon has made a very interesting point. Namely, he emphasizes that while scholastic philosophers start from the most general entity and lead down to the most

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gradation is ontological, and it thus diverges from Porphyry’s ladder of predication, which is rather logical.64 To be sure, following Porphyry, John presents the hierarchy of predication, according to which superior genera are predicated of subaltern genera and species up to particular individuals.65 Yet, predication as such, as well as division of general classes into particulars, possesses only logical meaning and is unrelated to the formation of a real particular entity, which is concerned in the case of the relation of hypostasis to substance and nature. According to John, a hypostasis is an entity, which

particular one, John starts from the individual and leads up toward nature and substance in its most general meaning. In contrast to scholastic philosophers, for whom individual is indefinable and can be described as something non-substantial and even non-existing, for John it is the hypostasis that is the fundamental and real existence. As a matter of fact, de Régnon describes differences between the Latin scholastic tradition, as he sees it, and Greek patristic thought represented by John. The consequences of those merely philosophical differences turned out to be dramatically important for Trinitarian doctrines in the Latin West and Greek East. One can point to analogous differences between the Neoplatonic account of universal and particular entities and the patristic theological approach to the problem of nature and hypostasis. For Neo-Platonists, the sensible substance was prior only epistemologically, while it was considered posterior ontologically. By contrast, according to the so-called Chalcedonic logic of patristic authors, the hypostasis had an undeniable ontological priority. Ostensibly, it seems that John’s view of hypostasis might be explained by influence of an Aristotelian philosophy. Such an explanation misses the point that, for Aristotle and his commentators, the form is the utmost reality (Met. Z). By contrast, for John, hypostasis is the primary and most fundamental ontologically entity, while form is something that subsists in hypostasis. This philosophical view was formed with respect to theological prerequisites rather than from purely philosophical doctrines. 64 Porphyrius, Isag. 4, 16-5, 9. ‘The tree of Porphyry’ is a difficult subject in itself, which cannot be analyzed in detail here. However, I find it useful to point out that the division of the genus of substance, which traditionally is called ‘the tree of Porphyry’, occurs in a purely logical text that was to serve as an introduction to another logical work, namely the Categories. The latter, according to Porphyry, is only a work for beginners, and does not concern ontological issues (in Cat. 56, 28-29; 134, 28-29). Moreover, the context of this division is about the relation of genera to species, in the meaning of highest and lowest classes respectively. The division itself is only a division of one of the categories (katjgoríai, in Boethius’ translation ‘praedicamenta’), namely the category of substance into lower classes (species). A category itself is interpreted by Porphyry not as a genus of being, but as a kind of predication. The categories per se constitute expressions, which are predicated of objects (in Cat. 56, 8-9; 58, 3-6; 70, 25-29). Thus, in Porphyry, ‘the tree’ can be hardly treated as a ‘tree of being’. Such an interpretation rather can be traced to Porphyry’s commentators. 65 Dial. 5, 71-79; 9, 40-45; 10, 128-154.

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ﬁrst and foremost actually subsists in itself and subsequently is discerned as a distinct individual due to its peculiar features. In turn, substance and nature are the kinds of universal entities constituting hypostases, but they do not actually subsist by themselves and are found in hypostases.

III. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

As mentioned above, John’s interpretation of the notion of ‘hypostasis’ possesses important theological and philosophical consequences for his doctrines and allows him to solve several problems found in anthropology and Chris- tology. Simultaneously, theological needs influenced his concept of hypostasis and inspired its further development. In fact, in his anthropological and Christological studies the notion of ‘hypostasis’ occurs primarily as the principle of existence and union of natures in one individual entity. This section, hence, presents a detailed list of consequences that follow from John’s use of the notion of ‘hypostasis’ for the needs of theology and anthropology. For the reason that only hypostases possess existence in themselves, John, following his Byzantine predecessors,66 defines things as ‘enhypostaton’ (tò ênupóstaton)67 when they do not subsist in themselves but are considered in hypostases. Accordingly, enhypostata are the species or natures that are not contained in their own hypostases but in individuals of the respective species. In addition, things that differ in substance and constitute one compound hypostasis, are called ‘enhypostata’. For instance, soul and body of a human hypostasis are not hypostases by themselves, but enhypostata. Additionally, an ‘enhypostaton’ is a nature that has been assumed by another hypostasis and exists in it, as when human nature was assumed by the hypostasis of God the Word.68 Consequently, in relation to hypostasis, substance, as well as nature, is defined as enhypostaton, since it does not subsist in itself but is found in hypostasis.69

66 Leontius Byzantinus, Nest. et Eut., PG 86, 1240 C; 1277D; Fr. 2009D; Maximus, Ep. 15, PG 91, 557D-560A = Doctrina Patrum, 137, 4-7. 67 According to John, the term ‘enhypostaton’ is used also to mean (1) existence in a strict sense or (2) self-subsistent hypostasis. However, in its proper sense ‘enhypostaton’ denotes something that does not subsist in itself but is considered in hypostases. Dial. 45, 2-8. 68 Dial. 45, 8-22. 69 There is a very interesting disscusion on the roots of Karl Barth’s Christological doctrine of anhypostatos-enhypostatos. See U.M. Lang, ‘Anhypostatos-Enhypostatos: Church Fathers,

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John maintains that different natures can be components of one compound hypostasis, in which they subsist. This becomes obvious in the case of the human individual, which comprises in itself two different natures, such as body and soul. However, neither substance nor nature can be made of diverse substances or natures respectively. One of the reasons for such an opinion is that essential differences constitute substance and assure the existence of species. It is impossible for an essential difference and its opposite to be in the same subject.70 Moreover, substance as such has no contrary in itself.71 Therefore, substance cannot be made of two substances formed of diverse speciﬁc differences. Correspondingly, it is impossible for nature, in the meaning of substance qualiﬁed by essential differences, to be made of two substances of different kinds, i.e. of two natures.72 Likewise, it is impossible for the substance of man to be comprised of being rational and irrational, or mortal and immortal. Since nature as such cannot possess in itself diverse essential differences, the compound nature will not preserve its composites, but will change and alter them.73 On the contrary, according to John, it is possible for one compound hypostasis to be made of diverse natures.74 A hypostasis, in this case, might be considered as the principle of union of its enhypostatic components, namely natures. As indicated by John, natures are united according to hypostatic union (kaq’ üpóstasin ∏nwsiv), which is the union of natures or the union of nature and hypostasis in one hypostasis. Things are united by the following kinds of union (∏nwsiv): by mixture (katà furmón), by welding (katà kólljsin), by joining (katà ärmonían), by fusion (katà súgxusin), by mingling (katà ânákrasin), by composition (katà súnqesin), by blending (kr¢siv), by apparent union (proswpikß) and relative one (sxetikß).75 Yet,

Protestant Orthodoxy and Karl Barth’, Journal of Theological Studies, 49 (1998), pp. 630- 657; contra: F. LeRon Shults, ‘A Dubious Christological Formula: From Leontius of Byzantium to Karl Barth’, Theological Studies, 57 (1996), pp. 431-446. Lang very convinc- ingly shows that Barth’s ‘anhypostatic-enhypostatic model’ is based on John’s teaching. 70 Dial. 5, 103-110. 71 Dial. 48, 20-21. 72 Dial. 42, 16-18. 73 Dial. 67, 39-45. 74 Exp. 42, 18-26; 47, 40-50. 75 Dial. 65, 98-121. Separately, John presents several kinds of unions, as proposed by Nestorius: union according to dignity (katà t®n âzían), equality in honour (ömotimían),

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only union on the basis of composition suits a hypostatic union of natures. This kind of union is a mutual association of the parts without damage to any of them.76 In contrast to the remaining types of union, the hypostatic union preserves natures without alteration:

‘The hypostatic union produces one compound hypostasis of the thing united and [that] preserves unconfused and unaltered in itself both the uniting natures and their difference as well as their natural properties. Moreover, this has no hypostatic difference with itself, because those characteristic differences of the things united, by which each of them is distinguished from the others of the same species, become its own… Since hypostasis is the initial constitution for the being of each particular in itself (üpóstasiv gár êstin ™ ên t±Ç ârx±Ç t±v ëkástou üpárzewv kat’ aûtò súmpjziv)’ (Dial. 67, 2-8; 21-22).

In hypostatic union, natures are united as components of one hypostasis, but they are not united in nature. Therefore, there is no creation of a compound nature, which consists of different essential features. The united natures remain essentially unchangeable in themselves and different from each other. The principle that allows such union appears to be the character of a hypostasis as an indivisible individual of a certain species. A hypostasis, as stated above, possesses actual being in itself. The independent and actual existence of a hypostasis permits the hypostatic uniting of natures. As long as actual being belongs to a hypostasis and not to a nature, the hypostasis remains the principle of being and the existence of its components. The united natures, however, exist via participation in a hypostasis. In other words, the way of existence of the united natures is not the being of a compound nature, which might be a subsisting entity, but rather the being of hypostatic components that subsist in a hypostasis. The different natures, then, participate in the one existence of a hypostasis and complete one entity. However, they do not compose another nature. For this reason, each of the essential characteristics of the respective natures, such as differences and essential properties, are kept unchangeable and unmixed.

identity of will (tautoboulían), good pleasure (eûdokían) and the bearing of the same name (ömwnumían). Dial. 65, 121-123. 76 Dial 65, 104-113.

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On the other hand, characteristic differences of the united natures, by which each of them is distinguished from the others, become the differences of the compound hypostasis. As a result, the compound hypostasis essentially differs from its components. In this case we can speak of one nature, to which hypostasis belongs, yet only in the sense of a common species.77 ‘Common species’ appears here not in the sense of the ‘natura communis’ of Avicenna and Scotus, but in the sense of common kind. In this way, the hypostasis of a human that contains in itself two natures, i.e. soul and body, receives differences of each of the united natures. As a result, such a hypostasis essentially diverges from both of the natures. A human is neither a pure soul, nor a body. However, there is no such thing as a compound humane nature. A human hypostasis unites in itself two different natures, which remain unchangeable and unmixed. Hence, a human nature might be considered as one, only in the sense of the human species. Furthermore, since hypostasis is the initial constitution of the being of each particular entity in itself (™ ên t±Ç ârx±Ç t±v ëkástou üpárzewv kat’ aûtò súmpjziv), the constitution of a compound hypostasis is the way of being of its components. In other words, each of the united natures subsists only as a component of its hypostasis. The hypostasis, in turn, is the principle of being of its components and as such persists even after their separation. If natures become separated, it appears that each of them remains as a composite of a certain hypostasis. Accordingly, the human hypostasis, composed of soul and body, preserves the substances and differences of compounds distinct and their properties unconfused, while the principle of their union remains indivisible. Even if the soul is separated from the body in death, the hypostasis of both remains one and the same.78 This philosophical doctrine has many important theological and anthropological consequences. For instance, the claim that the human hypostasis is the principle of being and existence of its components, implies the conclusion that a soul is not a form of the human individual. Rather the constitution of the compound hypostasis might be considered as the form of an individual human. Indeed, John deﬁnes the human soul as a special kind of matter. In point of fact, according to his doctrine, only God is

77 Exp. 47, 39-49. 78 Dial. 67, 8-24

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immaterial.79 The soul as such, then, is a particular ex deﬁnitione and its individual being should not be proven. Since a human soul exists due to the existence of a particular human hypostasis, the soul as such could belong solely to this particular man. Therefore, the reincarnation of a soul is abso- lutely impossible. Moreover, since the being of human nature is the being according to the existence of the compound hypostasis, the existence of a human after separation of the soul from the body in death could not be complete and perfect. This gives rise to philosophical and theological expla- nations of the resurrection of the human body. John’s teaching has also remarkable consequences for Christology. One compound nature cannot be made of two substances. For it is impossible for contrary essential differences to exist in one and the same subject. Even if, as heretics believed, Christ had a compound nature after the union, He would have neither been of divine nor of human essence. For the compound nature cannot be of the same essence as any of the natures out of which it is com- pounded.80 In contrast, since a hypostasis exists in itself and is the principle of being, two natures can be united and exist in one hypostasis distinctly and unconfusedly. Thus, the divine and the human nature are hypostatically united in the one hypostasis of Christ. Yet, as it is maintained by John, in Him not only are natures united to each other hypostatically, but also the hypostasis assumes an additional nature. The pre-existent hypostasis of God the Word assumed perfect human nature, which is the human soul and the body. The hypostasis of God remains the principle of the existence for both. Both natures do not subsist as independent existence, but rather as hypostatic components of one hypostasis of the Son of God.81 This union is essential in the sense that the union is real and not imaginary. The two natures have been united with each other without a change or alteration and have remained perfect. Moreover, their essential differences have been pre- served. Therefore in Christ are united and remain perfect and unchangeable the divine and human natures with all their characteristics.82 Furthermore, John claims that both natures from the beginning had existence in one hypostasis. Consequently, each of them remains in possession of the hypostasis of

79 Exp. 26, (II 12) 2-5. 80 Dial. 47, 10-16. 81 Dial. 53, 7-17. 82 Dial. 47, 19-74.

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God the Word, even during the separation in death. Hence, the hypostasis of Christ persists always one and the same as well as it preserves in itself hypostatically united divine and human natures.83 The anthropological and Christological theses concerning being composed of different natures raise questions about the essence and structure of such a compositum. John tried to solve these problems by deﬁning hypostasis as the principle of being and of the structure of a hypostatic union. According to his teaching, natures are united in a hypostasis and subsist as its composites without being mixed and without losing their essential characteristics. Apparently, the hypostatic union is based on the actual being in itself of the hypostasis. In turn, natures participate in the existence of the hypostasis as its components. Hypostatic being, then, might be considered as the principle of existence for its components, namely united natures, as well as for the whole composite entity. Moreover, since being in itself encompasses individuals, the hypostatic mode of being is presumably responsible for the individuation of the hypostatic components. However, on the ground of John’s writings, it might hardly be deﬁned as the explicit cause and principle of individuation.

IV. THE ORIGINALITY AND HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF JOHN’S CONCEPT

John’s teaching inherited the long tradition of philosophical and theological reﬂection focused on the notion of hypostasis. This notion is a well known derivative of Stoic doctrine. Moreover, the inﬂuence of Stoicism also seems to have a remarkable impact on John’s treatment of the terms, such as substance, nature, and individual. However, by the time of John, the elements of Stoicism had become strongly embedded in Neoplatonic and patristic traditions.84 John’s interpretation of the individual, as it follows from the

83 Dial. 71, 24-28. On the subject of Christological consequences see also A. Louth, St. John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 157-179; B. Schultze, ‘Byzantinisch- Patristische ostchristliche Antropologie (Photius und Johannes von Damaskus)’, Orientalia Christiana Periodica, 38 (1972), pp. 172-194. 84 For instance, he extensively used works of Neoplatonic commentators such as Simpli- cius and Dexippus, which presented information about Stoic doctrine and also presumably were influenced by this teaching. Cf. Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, critical apparatus ad loc.; Richter, Dialektik, pp. 12-17.

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above analyses, is based on Neoplatonic sources. Similar to Porphyry and his successors, John considers a unique set of accidental features to be the principle of individual “discernibility”. Moreover, his concept of the hypostatic mode of being, i.e. the actual existence of an individual entity, as well as the distinction between essence and existence, might presumably have Neoplatonic origins. However, John’s existential realism of hypostatic being seems to exceed Platonic transcendental essentialism, which considers existence to be an accident of essence.85 Nonetheless, as stated above, his concept of hypostasis was mainly formed on the basis of theological doctrine. Thus, the closest sources for his teaching ostensibly may be placed amongst the texts of Christian authors. It is well known that as a result of Trinitarian controversies, a tradition of distinguish- ing between the notions ‘substance’ and ‘hypostasis’ persisted in the doctrine of the patristic authors, established already by the Cappadocian Fathers. In general, the term oûsía referred to what is common for all members of the Holy Trinity, while hypostasis referred to proper (÷dion) characteristics of each member of the Trinity.86 In other words, ‘hypostasis’ corresponds to the mode of existence (trópov t±v üpárzewv) of each member of the Trinity,87 e.g. being un-begotten, begotten, proceeding, etc.88

On the influence of Stoic tradition in the West, see G. Verbeke, The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1983), p. 7: ‘In fact, Stoic ideas and doctrines penetrated into the Latin West through many channels. Some Greek commentaries on Aristotle were translated into Latin during the thirteenth century. Several of these provide important information about Stoic thought, especially Simplicius’s Commentary on the Categories. Some writings by Arab-speaking philosophers were also translated into Latin. According to Osman Amin, there was much sympathy for Stoic ethics among Arab philosophers. Even classical literary authors passed on some ideas and teachings that originally stem from Stoic sources. The same is true of several early Christian writers’. 85 See Ica, ‘“Dialectica”’, p. 121. 86 See A. de Halleux, Patrologie et oecuménisme: Recueil d’études, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium; 93 (Leuven: Leuven University Press – Peeters, 1990), pp. 113-214; Louth, John Damascene, pp. 48-57; de Régnon, Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité, pp. 167-215. 87 On the conception of ‘mode of existence’ up to Maximus the Confessor, see P. Sher- wood, The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and His Refutation of Origenism, Studia Anselmiana, 36 (Rome: Herder, 1955), pp. 155-166. 88 John also uses the term trópov t±v üpárzewv for describing the Trinity; see for instance Exp. 8.

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The parts of Fount of Knowledge that concern the issues related to the concept of hypostasis are generally considered to be dependent upon the works of the founders of Byzantine theology such as Leontius of Byzantium († 543/4), Maximus the Confessor († 662), and Anastasius Sinaita († 700).89 Some brief comments that concern our topic can be found in the works of these authors. According to all of them, substance designates the simple being of entities, while nature is the simple motion of things.90 Leontius suggests that the substance as well as the nature correlates with the species, while the notion of ‘hypostasis’ denotes the individual substance (ãtomon oûsían).91 Maximus the Confessor and Leontius Byzantinus also gave some emphasis to existence in itself, which is proper only to hypostases.92 In their opinion, a hypostasis subsists in itself and has its own existence. In contrast, a nature does not exist independently from a hypostasis. Some parallels also can be drawn with Boethius’ treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius. In this work, person is defined as the individual substance of a rational nature. By contrast, nature is defined as the specific property of any substance.93 In this context, Boethius distinguishes the following kinds of entities: essentia, subsistentia and substantia, which are Latin rendering of Greek terms oûsía, oûsíwsiv, and üpóstasiv respectively. According to Boethius, to be an essence means to exist. Subsistentia relates to a kind of entity, which is not accidental to any subject and needs no accidents in order to be, while substantia relates to a subject for accidents (accidentibus subjectum). Similarly individuum is defined as an entity informed by its properties and specific differences; and it serves as a subject for accidents.94 Boethius emphasizes

89 According to Louth, John applies so-called ‘Chalcedonian logic’ as developed by theo- logians before him. In this respect, the level of fúsiv or oûsía, in which entities are defined by their lógov t±v oûsíav, is distinguished from the level of existence, in which entities really exist as hypostases according to their ‘mode of being’. See Louth, John Damascene, pp. 48; 113-115; 157. Cf. Richter, Dialektik, pp. 153-159. 90 Leontius Byzantinus, Nest. et Eut., PG 86, 1280A; Maximus, Opusc., PG 91, 276B, Anastasius Sinaita, Qu. et Resp., PG 89, 824B. 91 Leontius Byzantinus, Sect., PG 86, 1193 A. 92 Leontius Byzantinus, Nest. et Eut., PG 86, 1280A; Maximus, Ep. 15, PG 91, 557D- 560A; Doctrina Patrum,137, 4-7. 93 Boethius, Eut. 4, 270-2: ‘natura est cuiuslibet substantiae specificata proprietas, persona vero, rationabilis naturae individua substantia’. 94 Boethius also distinguishes the term ‘particular’ in Eut. 2, 159-160: ‘Particularia vero sunt quae de aliis minime praedicantur’.

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that essences and subsistences have existence (esse, e˝nai) in universals but subsist (substare; üfístasqai) only in individuals. In fact, only particular substances, i.e. individuals, really subsist (verum substant).95 Undoubtedly, John continued to consider the problem of hypostasis in accordance with the Christian tradition. However, the similarity between texts is rather of a terminological character and can be explained by commonality of subject and of possible sources. In spite of the similarity of the technical terms occurring in the patristic texts, John’s treatment of the issue exceeds and develops the considerations of his precursors. His concept is based on a deeper philosophical context and presents a further step of Christian philosophical reflection on the subject of hypostasis as such and of hypostatic union. John reviewed the issue from logical and ontological perspectives. Hypostasis is primarily defined as an indivisible individual, which diverges from other individuals numerically and accidentally. The set of accidental features qualifies the substance of a hypostasis and, as a result, forms a certain unique individual. However, the numerical and accidental differences only indicate the individuality of a hypostasis, but do not generate it. The main characteristic of a hypostasis is its modus of being. A hypostasis as a particular entity possesses actual and perceivable existence in itself. Therefore, a hypostasis might be considered as the principle of being and of its own structure. As stated above, such treatment allows John to solve theological problems related to the hypostatic union. Yet, what is more, his existential realism of hypostatic being exceeds Platonic transcendental essentialism, which considers existence to be an accident of essence. An extensive use of different philosophical doctrines inspired him to formulate a concept, which appears to be closer to Christian Medieval philosophy than to the writings of his predecessors.96 As a matter of fact, his teaching on the subject of hypostasis apparently corresponds to what Jorge Garcia called The Standard Theory of Individual- ity, which was widely accepted in the early Middle Ages. The above theory is based on four fundamental principles: 1. individuality is identified with a kind of difference or distinction; 2. individuality extends only to substances; 3. there is a lack of distinction between the problem of individuation and

95 Boethius, Eut., 3, 201-21. 96 Cf. Ica, ‘“Dialectica”’, pp. 116; 121.

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the problem of individual “discernibility”; 4. individuation possesses accidental character.97 Despite the fact that John did not explicitly consider the problem of individuality, these aspects are present in his work. Yet the interpretation of hypostasis as a principle of its own existence and structure, as well as an emphasis on the actual existence in itself of a hypostasis that allows the existing of the individual subject and its constituents, appears to exceed the scope of the Standard Theory of Individuality. To a certain extent, the above aspects of John’s teaching anticipate the theories of existential and essential individuation, i.e. sui generis individuation. According to the first theory, elaborated, for instance, by Thomas Aquinas, the principle of individuation of particular substances is their existence or the act of existence. The second theory holds that individuation is due to a sui generis principle of things whose function is only to individuate and has no characteristics of its own. Scotus’ doctrine of haecceitas, or in other words ‘thisness’, might be considered as another version of this theory.98 What is more, according to Lawrence Dewan, the principle of individuation in Thomas is the individual’s mode of existence.99 Therefore, it is possible to say that many aspects of John’s concepts correspond to Christian Medieval philosophy. This probably explains why medieval philosophers such as Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, Peter of Auvergne, John Baconthorpe and Scotus referred to him as one of the authorities in the problem of individuation. Nevertheless, John never explicitly considered this problem. To sum up, the analysis of the presumable sources of John’s doctrine suggests the conclusion that, in order to solve the theological problem related to the nature of the human hypostasis and the hypostasis of Son of God, John made an extensive use of a number of philosophical traditions. Traces of Aristotelian, Stoic, Neoplatonic and obviously patristic influences may be discerned in his work. The combination of the above traditions allows John to present this issue in a different light and to serve theological needs more efficiently. In fact, he puts forward the concept of hypostasis by defining it as the principle of being and structure of an individual entity. Therefore, in

97 Garcia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation, pp. 125-127. 98 Ibid., pp. 44-45. 99 See L. Dewan, Form and Being: Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy; 45 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2006), pp. 229-248.

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spite of the generally accepted conviction that John’s teaching is a compilation of previously written philosophical and theological works, his concept of hypostasis might be considered as an important improvement of Christian philosophical thought. Possibly, however, this improvement has never been utilized completely. John’s doctrine still offers possibilities that can be explored by theological anthropology in its difﬁcult endeavor of building a truly holistic vision of human person that integrates spirituality with corpo- rality. The effort of understanding the nature of human personal being, which has been undertaken by modern theology, cannot be complete without creative studies inspired by the doctrine of John of Damascus.

Abstract

John of Damascus’ teaching is usually regarded by modern scholars as a compilation of Neoplatonic commentaries and patristic texts. Nevertheless, significant figures in Eastern and Western Christianity referred to him as one of the greatest authorities on various philosophical and theological problems. This is the case especially of his interpretation of hypostasis and individuation of substance. John, actually, absorbed many ideas from earlier philosophy. Yet, I argue that his doctrine contains many significant philosophical developments, all stemming from theological requirements. For instance, in order to explain the theological problems of the human individual and the hypostatic union of Christ, John formulated the conception of hypostasis as the principle of being and existence of its composites. I offer a detailed analysis of John’s conceptions of hypostasis and individuality in relation to their use in theological discourse. This may help to evaluate properly the originality of John’s legacy, which I reckon an important contribution to Christian philosophical and theological thought.

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