Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 61(1-2), 101-130. doi: 10.2143/JECS.61.1.2045831 © 2009 by Journal of Eastern Christian Studies. All rights reserved. HYPOSTASIS – THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCE IN JOHN OF DAMASCUS ANNA ZHYRKOVA* The notion of hypostasis, through the long tradition that presumably starts with the Stoa, appears to be one of the basic notions not only for philosophical argumentation, but also for developing theological doctrine. On the one hand, the notion of hypostasis relates, for example, to the ontological and logical issue of individual entities and individuation. On the other hand, a proper interpretation of hypostasis allows philosophical explanation of the unification of two natures in a human hypostasis, as well as the unification of human and divine nature in one hypostasis of the Son of God. Among the teachings of the authors who contribute to the formation of Christian philosophical and theological doctrines, the treatment of hypostasis by St. John of Damascus (650-749) appears to be of considerable value. John represents the final stage of Greek patris- tic tradition. His works were and are considered by the Eastern Church as a handbook of orthodoxy. They were well known also in the West since the 12th century,1 and were extensively used by Peter Abelard, Robert Grosseteste, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus. One can say that John of Damascus was the last Greek author to be accepted as an author- ity by Western Latin Christianity.2 Some medieval philosophers referred to him as the authority on the problem of individuation. Duns Scotus, * Dr Anna Zhyrkova has a PhD in the field of Patristics (John of Damascus’ philosophy) and is currently preparing her ‘Habilitation’ in Ancient Philosophy (on the interpretation of the Aristotelian categories in the Platonic tradition). 1 The two parts of Fount of Knowledge, namely Dialectica and Expositio, were translated into Latin. Around 1150 Expositio was translated by Burgundio of Pisa and at around the same time a partial translation was made by Cerebranus. Robert Grosseteste produced a translation of Dialectica around 1240. 2 M. Frede, ‘John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will, and Human Freedom’, in Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources, ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou (Oxford – New York: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 67-70. 22334-09_JECS09_03_Zhyrkova_ME.indd334-09_JECS09_03_Zhyrkova_ME.indd 110101 44/02/10/02/10 117:027:02 102 ANNA ZHYRKOVA for instance, named him along with such significant philosophers as Por- phyry and Avicenna.3 The interpretation of the concept of hypostasis found in John’s Fount of Knowledge4 is of special importance. In this work John outlines the logical and metaphysical bases of Christian theology and also presents a systematic reflection on Christian thought. The work is generally considered to be a compilation of Neoplatonic commentaries and patristic texts.5 Against this, I shall argue that John of Damascus not only presented a restatement of the views of Christian authors, but also, by an extensive use of certain phil- osophical doctrines, advanced some philosophical aspects of the notion of hypostasis that had important consequences in later theological and philo- sophical tradition. Combining patristic teachings with Neoplatonic, Aristo- telian and Stoic elements, John of Damascus created a definition according to which hypostasis is the principle of its own being and structure. In this way, hypostasis is the only principle of its individual existence. This conception anticipates to a certain extent Medieval theories of existential and essential individuation. In order to investigate John Damascene’s concept of hypostasis, I propose to consider that notion in relation to his views on the individual, substance, nature and form. Special attention is to be paid to the consequences of the use of the concept of hypostasis in theological doctrine. The last section is dedicated to the evaluation of the originality and value of his thought. 3 Joannis Duns Scotus Ord. VII 422. All references to Duns Scotus are based on the edition of P.M. Perantoni and C. Balic, Doctoris subtilis et Mariani Ioannis Duns Scoti Ordinis Fratrum Minorum Opera omnia (Citta del Vaticano: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950-). 4 I follow the edition of B. Kotter, ed., Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, vol. 1-2, Patristische Texte und Studien 7, 12 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969, 1973) and will also frequently refer to F.H. Chase’s generally fine English translation, but with a few modifications: Saint John of Damascus, Writings (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1999). 5 See, for instance, A. Grillmeier, ‘Patristische Vorbilder frühscholastischer Systematik. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Augustinismus’, Studia Patristica 6, vol. IV (1962), pp. 390-408; G. von Podskalsky, Theologie und Philosophie in Byzanz. Der Streit um die Theologische Methodik in der spätbyzantinischen Geistesgeschichte (14./15. Jh.), seine systema- tischen Grundlagen und seine historische Entwicklung (München: Beck, 1977), pp. 104-5; G. Richter, Die Dialektik des Johannes von Damaskos: eine Untersuchung des Textes nach seinen Quellen und seiner Bedeutung, Studia Patristica et Byzantina, 10. Heft (Ettal: Buch- Kunstverlag Ettal, 1964), p. 271. The same information can be found in any textbook of patristics. 22334-09_JECS09_03_Zhyrkova_ME.indd334-09_JECS09_03_Zhyrkova_ME.indd 110202 44/02/10/02/10 117:027:02 HYPOSTASIS – THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCE 103 I. HYPOSTASIS AS AN INDIVIDUAL ENTITY According to John, the term ‘hypostasis’ has two meanings. First, it denotes simple existence (äpl¬v Àparziv) and as such is interchangeable with the terms ‘substance’ and ‘nature’. In a second and more proper meaning, though, hypostasis refers to existence in itself, which is applied to the indi- vidual:6 ‘[Hypostasis] means the existence in itself according to its peculiar constitution (kaq’ aütò kaì îdiosústaton Àparzin). In this sense, it signifies the individual (tò ãtomon) that is numerically different (t¬ç âriqm¬ç diaféron), which is to say, Peter and Paul, or that certain horse’ (Dial. 43, 4-7). This definition requires further explanation. According to John, the term ‘individual’ can be used in a number of senses: 1. Something that cannot be divided or partitioned (e.g., “point” or “now”); 2. Something that is hard to divide or to cut up (a diamond and the like); 3. Most specific species (such as man or horse); 4. Something that does not preserve its species after division.7 The last is said to be the proper meaning of the term: ‘The term individual (ãtomon) is principally used as meaning that which, although it is divisible, does not maintain its prima species (tò pr¬ton ¤dov) after division. Thus Peter is divided into soul and body, but neither is the soul by itself a per- fect man or a perfect Peter, nor is the body’ (Dial. 11, 7-12). Interpreting the individual as an indivisible subject, as it is already pointed out by the etymology of this word (ã-tomov – uncut, that cannot be cut, indivisible), was a common view throughout the history of Western thought.8 Indivisibility itself might be interpreted as absolute or relative. In the first case, a subject is an individual if and only if it cannot be divided totally. However, this meaning causes difficulties if applied to subjects that 6 Dial. 30, 2-4; 43, 2-7; 21-23; 45, 16-17. 7 Dial. 11, 2-7. 8 The same treatment of individual is found in many Neoplatonic commentaries, some of which probably were known by John of Damascus. See for example Elias, in Isag. 74, 19-24; David, in Isag. 169, 18-25; Stephanus, in Int. 27, 37-28, 6. All references to the Greek texts of Neoplatonic authors are based on Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. 22334-09_JECS09_03_Zhyrkova_ME.indd334-09_JECS09_03_Zhyrkova_ME.indd 110303 44/02/10/02/10 117:027:02 104 ANNA ZHYRKOVA are divisible in principle, such as a stone, a piece of paper, etc. John accepted the second meaning of indivisibility, which is relative indivisibility. Accord- ingly, a particular entity, even though it is in principle divisible, loses its prima species by division. Therefore, the individual is understood as something that is logically not further divisible. Following Porphyry,9 John claims that the lowest species, containing no inferior species, are divided into individuals.10 Thus, the individual is the most particular subject, which is not divisible into entities of the same species. Accordingly, “Peter”, as an individual of the human species, cannot be divided into other humans, even though he can be split into organs or into soul and body. The example of human indivisibility demonstrates that indivisibility of an individual, in John’s teaching, possesses also ontological significance. It appears that being an individual is essential for the subject. Otherwise, divi- sion of an individual would not be able to affect its prima species. Hence, individual denotes the essence or nature of a given subject. In other words, an individual is a complete substance of a certain kind. Since the essential composites of a certain substance cannot be divided without destroying it as a substance, the substantial composites of an individual are not divisible. Therefore, division of the essential composites leads to a loss of being for a given individual. For example, the loss of a hand does not destroy human nature in a given individual, but the separation by death into soul and body does destroy the individual being of a human. Indivisibility is not the only characteristic of the individual. John of Damascus describes further features of an individual as follows: ‘An individual is that which subsists in itself of substance and accidents (tò êz oûsíav kaì sumbebjkótwn kaq’ ëautò üstámenon), is numerically distinct from the others of the same species (âriqm¬ç t¬n ömoeid¬n kexwrisménon), and does not signify what but whom’ (Dial.