ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 17, No 5, pp 917± 940, 1996

Military rulein The Gambia: an interimassessment

JOHNAWISEMAN

On22 July 1994 the political system ofthe small West African state of The Gambiawas subjectedto anabrupt and dislocative change. On that day a group ofvery young junior of® cers fromthe Gambia National Army ( GNA) staged a coup d’ Âetat whichsucceeded in overthrowing the government of Sir Dawda KairabaJawara andhis People’ s ProgressiveParty ( PPP)whichhad ruled the countrysince independence in 1965. 1 Beforethe coup Jawara hadenjoyed the distinctionof being the very last of that generation of African leaders who had ledtheir countries to independence in the 1960s to remain in power. 2 Since independencethe Gambian political system hadexhibited a levelof continuity whichwas uniquein the region. Although control of government had remained continuouslyin the hands of Jawara andhis party, the country had experienced anunbroken run of multiparty politics in which opposition parties competed (ratherunsuccessfully) for power in a regularseries offree andrelatively fair elections.While the operation of Gambiandemocracy was certainlynot without ¯aws,it was realenough, and President Jawara hadestablished an international reputationas adefenderof human and civil rights. 3 Withthe exception of a failedcoup attempt by members oftheparamilitary Field Force (this was before thecreation of the army) in 1981, in conjunction with discounted urban elements,which had been defeated with the assistance oftroops from neighbour- ingSenegal, 4 theGambian political system hadalso been markedly stable. It was thusrather ironic that, at a timewhen the regional trend was awayfrom authoritarianismand towards the restoration of multiparty civilian rule, the Gambianpolitical system was movingin the opposite direction and experiencing militaryrule for the ® rst time.

Thearmy and the coup

The GNA is arelativelyrecent creation and a shortexamination of itsbrief history is highlyrelevant for any explanation of the new role of the army in Gambian politics.Before independence it was decidedthat the very small size ofThe Gambia,coupled with its economic backwardness and poverty, made the establishmentof an army an expensive irrelevance. It was acceptedthat peren- nialGambian fears ofdomination by Senegal, which, apart from the coastal strip,completely surrounds the smaller country, could best be dealtwith through diplomaticrather than military means, if only because the Senegalese armed

JohnA Wiseman,Department of Politics,University ofNewcastle,Newcastle UponTyne, NE1 7RU, UK.

0143-6597/96/050917-24$6.00 Ó 1996Third World Quarterly 917 JOHN AWISEMAN forces wouldinevitably be vastlysuperior to anythingThe Gambia could create. Internalsecurity was leftin the hands of the Gambian Police, including a paramilitarywing known as theField Force. Followingthe 1981 coup attempt the Gambian security forces wererestruc- tured.The participation of elements of the Field Force in the attempted overthrowof theJawara governmentled to itbeingdisbanded, although loyalist members wereco-opted into the new structures. Another closely related outcome ofthe events of 1981, and armed Senegalese participation in sustaining the government,was thecreation in 1982 of the Senegambian Confederation. 5 The initialdevelopment of the GNA was as acomponentof aconfederalarmy which was dominatedby theSenegalese. At thesame timea Gambiangendarmerie was alsocreated. Inthe period of its existence the Confederation failed to resolve the tensions inherentin its unbalanced composition. The Senegalese sought to establish greaterunity but this was resistedby the Gambians seeking to protect their sovereignty vis-aÁ -vis theirmore powerful neighbours. For the Gambian govern- mentthere was alwaysa ®nedividing line between the inescapable need for cooperationwith Senegal and the constant fear ofbeingtotally overwhelmed by thelatter, and in effect being reduced to thestatus of aprovincialadministration ina greaterSenegal. In December 1989 the Senegambian Confederation was formallydissolved. The end of the Confederation meant the end of the confed- eralarmy and the withdrawal of Senegalese troops based in The Gambia. This left the GNA as anindependent force for the ® rst time.The Jawara government thenturned to Nigeria to replace the Senegalese training and command func- tions.By the time of the 1994 coup the GNA was 800strong but the senior commanderswere seconded Nigerians. In 1992the gendarmerie were integrated withthe police and given the title of Tactical Support Group ( TSG). On22 July 1994 soldiers from the GNA tookcontrol of key installations, includingthe airport and radio station, and marched on government centres in Banjul.Coincidentally a USwarship,the LaMoureCounty ,was mooredoff the coastin preparation for joint training exercises withthe GNA.PresidentJawara andseveral of his senior government colleagues, including Vice-President SaihouSabally, boarded the ship, from where Jawara appealedto the rebellious troopsto returnto barracks.When this appeal was rejectedby therebels Jawara requestedthe assistance ofthe US marinesto crush the coup. The US govern- mentturned down the request for direct intervention but allowed the La Moure County totransport Jawara andhis ministers to safetyin Senegal,from where the oustedpresident moved on totheUK. 6 Bythe evening of 22July,Radio Gambia announcedthat government was inthe hands of the Armed Forces Provisional RulingCouncil ( AFPRC)ledby Lt Yahya Abdul Aziz Jamus JunkungJammeh. Asubsequentannouncement named the rest ofthe AFPRC as LtsSana Sabally, SadibouHydara, Edward Singhateh and Yankuba Touray (all were later pro- motedto the rank of Captain). Theseizure of power was achievedwithout apparent bloodshed, in spiteof the factthat Jammeh claimedthat he and his supporters had ` encountereda lotof resistancefrom the TSG’andthat ` wecame under® re¼butwe never returned any® re becausewe did not want to shed any Gambian blood’ . 7 Certainlythere 918 MILITARY RULE INTHE GAMBIA werewidespread reports of gunshotsbeing heard from within the army barracks andaround State House but it isdif®cult to reconcile AFPRC claimsof signi® cant armedresistance with the lack of any serious injury. It is notimpossible that Jammeh mighthave exaggerated the level of resistance to put his own actions ina moreheroic light : hehas subsequentlyrepeatedly stressed howhe risked hislife to ` save thecountry’ . Onealternative explanation which is widely believedin TheGambia is thatJammeh was protectedby `Jolamagic medicine’ , whichcaused bullets to bounce off him or to turn to water in mid-air. 8 Theapparent absence of bloodshed is alsoexplained by the fact that, unlike in1981, Senegalese forces didnot intervene to support the Jawara regime.In 1981over 30 Senegalese soldiers had been killed in TheGambia. No doubtthis weighedheavily in Senegalesedecision making in 1994,but it was primarilythe earliercollapse of the Senegambian Confederation which made Senegalese militaryintervention unlikely. Although Gambian civilians had mixed feelings aboutthe coup it is certainlytrue that they were extremely relieved by the fact thatthe high levels of death and violence which occurred during the 1981 coup attemptwere not repeated in 1994. Althoughthe absence of signi®cant armed resistance to the 1994 coup-makers helpsto explain why the attempt succeeded, it does not explain why the coup occurred.Explanations of military intervention are alwayscomplicated by the secrecy andconfusion surrounding the actual events, and by the inevitability of participantsseeking to present their actions in themost favourable light possible as partof the process ofattempting to legitimise the seizure of power. This is certainlythe case withthe 1994 coup in The Gambia. In the days following the coupYahya Jammeh madea numberof speeches inwhich he sought to justify theactions of the military and to persuade both internal and external audiences that the new AFPRC regimewas worthyof support, or at least should not be opposed.Predictably his reasoning was similarto that presented by many other coupleaders in other African states wheremilitary intervention had occurred in thepost-independence period. Jammeh’ sprincipalline of vindication was to presentthe action of themilitary as havingbeen necessary toprotectthe national interest,which had been subverted by theprevious regime, whom he accusedof `rampantoutrageous corruption’ and ` randomplundering of the country’ s assets tobene® t afewpeople’ . 9 Inits place he promised ` anewera offreedom, progress,democracy and accountability’ . Atthis stage Jammeh adopteda fairly conciliatoryattitude towards the ousted president, saying that ` weallknow that weowe it to him that the name of The Gambia has reachedthe international leveland we respect him’ and that ` wehavenothing against him ¼ fromtime totime we will need to consult him’ . Theproblem at that stage, according to Jammeh,was that` thepeople who were behind him misled him, were corrupt, didwhatever they wanted to do because he was toolenient’ . Jammeh even emphasisedthat his harsh criticism of members ofthe Jawara governmentwas notuniversally applicable when he said that ` thereare some goodguys in the PPP ¼weare notpainting all members ofthe PPP governmentas bador corrupt’ . Shortlyafterwards Jammeh appearedto underline this perception of the mixed qualitiesof theousted government when he appointedtwo ex- PPP ministersto his cabinet:Bakary Dabo became Minister of Finance and Fafa M’baiMinister of 919 JOHN AWISEMAN

Justiceand Attorney General. Subsequently the attitude of Jammeh andthe AFPRC towardsthe ousted government took on amuchharsher and less nuanced tone.In October 1994 Dabo was sackedfrom the cabinet and shortly afterwards ¯edthe country and in March 1995 M’ baiwas alsosacked and subsequently arrestedand charged with corruption. 10 Whilecensure of the previous regime, whether in its initial moderated form orin the later more strident and all-encompassing version, and the desire of the AFPRC torescue thecountry were presented by Jammeh as thejusti® cations for militaryintervention, experience elsewhere in Africa suggests that it is unwise toacceptsuch altruistic and sel¯ ess accountsof themotivations lying behind the coupphenomenon uncritically. Several intra-army factors also need to be taken intoconsideration. Evidence suggests that the appointment by Jawara ofNige- rianof® cers tothesenior command positions within the GNA causedconsiderable resentmentamong Gambian soldiers and that this resentment provided a signi®cant motivation for the coup. In retrospect these appointments appear less thanpolitically astute. In the 1980s the presence of Senegalese commanders causedresentment but the size ofthe Senegalese presence in The Gambia (around300 troops before the break-up of the Confederation), coupled with substantialmilitary might just over the border, was enoughto deter political ambitionsamong Gambian troops. The much smaller Nigerian presence com- binedmaximum irritation with minimum deterrence. Discontent within the GNA wentbeyond the question of the role of the Nigerians. In 1991 and 1992 there hadbeen serious army demonstrations against the late payment of special allowancesfor Gambian troops who had been involved in EconomicCommunity ofWest African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operations in Liberia. 11 Dissatisfactionwith living conditions in the barracks and the quality of army foodhad been frequently voiced. Inaddition to thegeneral grievances of themilitary Jammeh alsohad his own personalgrievances against Jawara. In 1989 Jammeh hadserved as Commander ofthe Presidential Guard and was knownto be resentfulof the fact that he had beentransferred from this position after around four months. Just 24hours beforethe coup, Jammeh hadbeen one of a groupof junior of® cers whohad beendisarmed and sent back to barracksafter arriving at Yundum airport as part ofa welcominggroup when Jawara returnedfrom his annual leave. From statementsmade by Jammeh inthe aftermath of the coup it was clearthat he felt bitterlyhumiliated by this experience. Inmany ways the most obvious possible motivation for the coup was the simpledesire on the part of the plotters to seize powerin order to gain access tothe considerable gains which accrue from controlling the state, and the `rent-seeking’opportunities that such control includes. 12 Personalself- enrichmentby African military rulers has beenan unfortunately common occurrence. Twocommon explanations of military intervention in other African states wouldappear not to be applicablein the Gambian case. Inthe past many coups inAfrica have exhibited a distinctiveethnic dimension. This feature would not appearto be present in July 1994 in The Gambia. Ethnicity has neverplayed a signi®cant role in Gambian politics and in this case thecoup leaders, and subsequentlythe membership of the AFPRC hada variedethnic background. 920 MILITARY RULE INTHE GAMBIA

Jammeh was aJola,Sabally was Fula,Hydara was a`Moor’(of Mauritanian ancestry),Touray was Mandinka,and Singhateh was aChristianMandinka with anEnglish mother. Nor can the coup be explained by reference to problems causedby economic structural adjustment. The latter took place in The Gambia inthe mid-1980s and was conductedin such a wayas toavoid a political backlash.13

Post-coupintra-military con¯icts Withthe establishment of military rule relationships within the army became a keyfactor in Gambian political life, albeit a dif®cult one to examine given the wallof secrecy surroundingthe inner workings of the military elite. The experienceof militaryrule in otherparts of Africahad clearly demonstrated the potentialfor the development of factional and personal con¯ icts within the militaryto prejudice the prospects for stable and effective government under a militaryregime. Developments since the coup suggest a highlycon¯ ictual set of relationshipswithin the army and, more particularly, within the AFPRC. Atthe time of the coup most of the senior Gambian of® cers withinthe GNA wereplaced in detention along with senior ® guresfrom the police force. Although some ofthe detainees were subsequently released a numberremained in jail two years laterwithout any form of charge being brought against them. Within a coupleof daysof thecoup two military members ofJammeh’ s®rst cabinetwere alsoarrested. Captains Mamat Omar Cham and Sherriff Samsudeen Sarr, who hadbeen appointed Minister of Informationand Tourism and Minister of Trade, Industryand Employment at the time of the coup were sacked and imprisoned afterJammeh becamesuspicious that they might be sympathetic to deposed PresidentJawara. Evidenceof moreserious con¯ icts within the military came inNovember1994 andJanuary 1995 in the form of what were presented as twoseparate attempts atacounter-coup.In neithercase isitabsolutelyclear that a realattempt to oust Jammeh occurred.Both cases weresurrounded by assertionand counter-assertion andthe evidence is inconclusiveand contradictory. Broadly speaking there are threealternative versions of what happened in thesetwo cases. First,there is the `of®cial’ version, propounded by Jammeh, that in both November and January therewere actual attempts by armed factions within the army violently to overthrowhis government. A secondinterpretation is thatthe attempts never took placebut that Jammeh believedthat plots were underway to ousthim and acted ina pre-emptivemanner to keep himself in power. The other interpretation of eventsis thatJammeh simplyused the spurious pretext of anattempted coup to eliminatepossible future rivals within the army to ensure his own dominance. Publiclythe ` of®cial’ version of eventsis acceptedin TheGambia but privately manyGambians believe one or other of the alternative explanations. On14 November 1994 there was largescale ®ghtingin the military barracks atYundum and Bakau (local residents testify to hearing a greatdeal of shooting).According to the government a coupattempt was launchedunder the leadershipof Lieutenants Bashiru Barrow, Abdoulie Dot Faal and Gibril Saye. Barrow,then Commander First Infantry Battalion, was widelybelieved to have 921 JOHN AWISEMAN beena conspiratorin the July coup who decided at the last moment not to participateat that time. In November the purported coup leaders, along with around20 other soldiers, were killed. Rather strangely, in the light of the extensivegun® re, it was reportedthat there were no casualties among troops loyalto Jammeh. Subsequently the family of Gibril Saye testi® ed that he had beenvisiting his parents’ compound after the ® ghtinghad taken place. 14 Although AFPRC memberSadibou Hydara dismissed Saye’ s familyas `inconsist- ent,foolish and irresponsible’ and denied that summary executions had occurred theirversion of events raises questionsover what actually took place. 15 Whicheverversion of events is correctthe existence of severe tensions amongstthe junior of® cers withinthe GNA seems apparent:the ` coupmakers’ wereof thesame lieutenantrank as themembers ofthe AFPRC,althoughthe latter weresubsequently promoted to the rank of Captain. Following these events the AFPRC claimedthat the rebels were linked to senior® guresin the PPP. It was also claimedthat they had planned to destroy a substantialpart of Banjulby blowing upthe Shell fuel storage tanks in Half Die in the port area ofthe city: 16 quite whatpurpose such action would have served remains a mystery. Theevents of January 1995 indicated an even more serious level of con¯ ict withinthe military because on thisoccasion the antagonisms exposed were right atthe heart of the AFPRC itself.On 27 January it was claimedthat a further attemptat a counter-couphad taken place and had included an assassination attempton Jammeh.The leaders of thiscoup ` attempt’were said to beCaptains SanaSabally and Sadibou Hydara who were key ® guresin the AFPRC: Sabally was ViceChairman and Hydara was Ministerof the Interior; respectively they hadranked second and third in the AFPRC.Itwas claimedthat as partof the coup attemptthe two had gone to Jammeh’ sof®ce tokill him but had been overpoweredand arrested. Subsequently there was anorchestrated campaign to denigratethe two, particularly Sabally, who was accusedof launching a `campaignof terror’ against the civilian population. 17 Bothwere accused of beingmotivated by personal greed and the desire to maintain military rule inde®nitely. In June 1995 Hydara died in jail, supposedly of complications arisingfrom high blood pressure, although his family denied any knowledge of thisparticular medical condition. Sabally was latercourt martialled and in December1995 was sentencedto nine years imprisonment(a comparatively lenientsentence in the circumstances). All the court martials arising from the coupattempts were held in secret,even their location being strictly con® dential. Because ofthis there is noreliable way of knowingwhat took place at the court martial,thus precluding the possibility of an examination of any evidence relatingto the events. Followingthe removal of Saballyand Hydara from the AFPRC CaptainEdward Singhatehwas promotedto Vice Chairman and second in command within the regime.In order to restore the membership of the AFPRC toits full complement of®ve,two new members wereincluded. Captain Lamin Bajo, a Mandinkawho hadpreviously served as Commissionerin WesternDivision and as Commander ofthePresidential Guard, became Minister of theInterior. Captain Ebou Jallow, aFulawho had previously served as theCommander of the GNA Marines, became AFPRC Spokesman(Singhateh’ s oldposition). Harmony within the AFPRC 922 MILITARY RULE INTHE GAMBIA was relativelyshort-lived. In October 1995 Ebou Jallow ¯ edthe country amid accusationsthat he hadstolen $3 millionof governmentmoney and was plotting withmembers ofthe outlawed PPP.Jallowdenied the theft and claimed he had beenforced into exile by Jammeh’ styrannyand corruption. 18 Accordingto the of®cial (ie government) version of events, Jallow had simply gone to theCentral Bankand ordered them to transfer the $3 million from the AFPRC Special DevelopmentAccount to a Swiss bankaccount in Geneva. It was claimedthat thishad been done on 4 Septemberbut that nobody had noticed until over a monthlater. If thisversion of events is accurateit says remarkablylittle in favour of AFPRC accountingprocedures when a youngsoldier can, without any furtherchecks, simply order the Central Bank to handover what is byGambian standardsan enormous amount of money. In December 1995 two further senior ®gures,but not AFPRC members,¯ edthe country. These were Captain Pa Sanneh, headof the Gambian contingent in ECOMOG,andMajor David Coker, third in commandin the GNA.19 Whetherthe true picture be of Chairman Jammeh besetby disloyalty and plottingagainst him from within the GNA and the AFPRC,orofJammeh ruthlessly purgingreal and/ orimaginedmilitary opponents in an attempt to consolidatehis ownpower, the prospects for unity and stability within the Gambian military appearless thanpromising. The consequences for the whole Gambian political system ofintra-military con¯ ict and factionalism could be severe. In an attempt toconsolidate his support in the army more generally Jammeh has increased nationalspending on perks and conditions for the troops. Shortly after the coup therehabilitation of barracks became a spendingpriority for the AFPRC. In February1996 Jammeh announceda newpackage of measures designedto appealto his soldiers. 20 AroundDalasi (D)8 million (£ 1 5 D15approx.) was to bespent on improving accommodation for soldiers and their families in the Yundumbarracks. Cheap loans were made available to the troops under the GambiaArmy Revolving Loan Scheme. Some members ofthe army were enrolledin the new University Extension Programme. 21 Itwas alsostated that, inthe future, members ofthe security forces wouldreceive special treatment overthe allocation of land for residential purposes. In December 1995 Jammeh announcedhis intention of establishing a GambiaNavy.

Military authoritarianismand civil society Althoughmilitary regimes do not have a monopolyon authoritarian rule it is clearthat in TheGambia there has beena signi®cant erosion of civil and human rightsfollowing the onset of military rule. Although the AFPRC havenot been notablymore abusive of human rights than most other military regimes in Africa,their period of rulestands in marked contrast to therelatively liberal and tolerantstyle of governmentin the Jawara era.Gambians are less free thanthey were. Aclearand important example of the development of authoritarianism, and thedecline of liberty, has beenthe relationship between the government and the press. Inspite of the immense problems posed by mass illiteracy,poverty and theabsence of modern printing technology, the Gambian press has alongand 923 JOHN AWISEMAN honourabletradition. 22 Inthe past many of theindependent newspapers resulted fromthe labours of a smallnumber of Gambian journalists working hard, in some cases single-handedly,to bring out their newspapers on a fairlyregular basis.Many of thesenewspapers were of apoortechnical quality, often no more thana fewcyclostyled pages stapled together by hand, but they made an importantcontribution to free politicaldebate in thecountry. In the years leading upto the coup there had been a signi®cant expansion of the press, particularly withthe establishment in May 1992 of the DailyObserver asthe® rst indepen- dentnewspaper to publish on a dailybasis. During the Jawara periodthe governmentattitude to the press was oneof laissez-faire: whilelittle was done toencourage the independent press equallylittle was doneto impede its operation. Fromthe very day of thecoup it was evidentthat a morehostile government attitudeto the press was inevitable.In a fascinatingaccount of his attempt to discoverwhat was takingplace on the day, the DailyObserver journalistAlieu BadaraN’ Jie reportedhow soldiers screamed athim ` youare from TheObserver buttoday we will be observing you’ before marching him off at gunpoint and detaininghim for several hours. 23 Inspite of the obvious danger, several newspapersadopted a criticalstance towards the AFPRC inthe following days. Mostprominent among the critical press was Foroyaa (meaning` freedom’) the paperof thesmall but in¯ uential radical party the, People’ s DemocraticOrgani- zationfor Independence and Socialism ( PDOIS),hithertoamong the harshest criticsof the Jawara government.In a demonstrationof impressive political integritythe PDOIS leadersrejected the offer of cabinetposts in the new military governmentand openly criticised the AFPRC.InAugust the editors of Foroyaa, HalifaSallah and Sidia Jatta, were arrested and charged under Decree No 4with publishingillegally, on the grounds that their newspaper was associatedwith a bannedpolitical party. Other newspapers rallied around those arrested: the independentbi-weekly newspaper The Point carrieda petitionentitled ` Stop MilitaryTerror: Free Halifaand Sidia’ . 24 Thetrial was heldin a civiliancourt. Althoughthe verdict of ` guilty’was inevitablesince the military decree had been,quite deliberately, ¯ outedby the accused, it was obviousthat the magistratewas sympatheticallydisposed towards the defendants. In the event the twowere placed on probation and required to pay D1000 costs. In November 1994 Foroyaa was relaunchedas anon-partypublication with the PDIOS logo missingfrom the masthead. Inlate October 1994 intimidation of the press was steppedup. The Liberian managingdirector and editor of TheObserver ,KennethBest, was deported. 25 Althoughthe AFPRC claimedthat this was theresult of some unspeci®ed, technicalinfringement of immigrationrequirements (Best hadlived and worked inThe Gambia for several years withno problem), this event proved to be no morethan an opening shot in anewcampaign against journalists. Over the next fewweeks several journalists were beaten up bythemilitary. In themost serious case AbdullahSavage of TheObserver was hospitalisedafter a particularly violentattack by soldiers who kicked, punched and stamped on him as wellas stealinghis tape recorder and cassettes. Otherjournalists, including Ebrima Sankareh of The Point,werearrested and held in detention for various periods 924 MILITARY RULE INTHE GAMBIA withoutany formal charges being brought against them. At the same time leading® guresin the AFPRC wereissuing statements and making speeches which wereextremely hostile to thepress. WhenEbrima Ceesay wrotean articlein The Observer whichmildly queried the rectitude of AFPRC members awarding themselvespromotions, he was roundedon by Captain Sadibou Hydara (who himselflater died in jail following the January 1995 ` coup’) andaccused of beinga `liar’, a`propagandatool’ of the previous government, and of ` misin- formingthe people like the former Jawara government’. 26 Inlate March 1995 a newround of arrests ofjournalistsbegan after The Point, carrieda reportof ariotat thejail where most of theregime’ s politicalprisoners werebeing detained. Three journalists from the paper, Pap Saine, Alieu Badara andBrima Ernest, were taken into custody and charged with ` publicationof false newswith intent to cause fear andalarm the public’ . Afourthjournalist from the same newspaperwas alsoarrested at the same timeon unconnectedcharges. The legislationunder which Saine and his colleagues were charged had been introducedby the colonial government during the Second World War but had remainedcompletely unused for over 50 years.The arrests werecriticised by the GambiaPress Union( GPU)whoexpressed ` graveconcern over this unnecessary harassmentof journalists in pursuit of their profession’ , withsimilar criticisms beingvoiced by the West African Journalists Association ( WAJA).Followinga sixmonth trial the three journalists were acquitted by the court but the next day Saine’s passportwas seizedand Brima Ernest (a SierraLeonean) was forcedto ¯ee thecountry to avoid deportation to Sierra Leone. At the same timeanother SierraLeonean journalist working for the DailyObserver ,ChernoOjuku-Cee- say,was deportedto his home country where he was arrestedon arrival. Since thattime arrests andgeneral harassment of journalists have continued on a regularbasis. InMarch 1996 a neworchestrated campaign against the independent press beganwhich involved several different tactics employed simultaneously. The regimeordered the Government Printing Department to stop printing indepen- dentnewspapers. For many years some small-scalenewspaper publishers lacking theirown equipment had been able to have their papers printed by the governmentprinters at commercial rates. This arrangement had bene® ted both parties,making newspaper production possible without vast expenditure on equipmentand providing a governmentdepartment with a usefulsource of revenue.The main victim of this change of policy was BaboucarrGaye, the publisherand editor of the weekly New Citizen,whohad used the Government PrintingDepartment for a numberof years. Both The Point and the Daily Observer possess theirown printing equipment and were unaffected by the change. Atthe same timethe AFPRC issuedtwo new decrees, 70 and 71, which increasedthe bond required from any independent newspaper publisher from D1000to D100 000. This arbitrary hundred-fold increase was clearlydesigned todiscouragethe press. Acoupleof dayslater the editors of the DailyObserver , The Point, New Citizen and Foroyaa weretaken to court and charged with a technicalbreach of an obscure provision in the Newspaper Act (the state subsequentlydropped its case whenthe charges failed to stand up in court). At 925 JOHN AWISEMAN thesame timethe advertising manager of the DailyObserver ,LorraineForster, was detainedand charged with distributing a `seditiouspublication’ relating to EbouJallow’ s defection.In May it was announcedthat Forster’ s trialwould be heldin camera becauseit `was goingto raise verysensitive issues thattouch on thebuoyancy of thestate’ . 27 Atthesame timeas Forster’s arrest ayoungstudent journalistBaboucarr Sankanu was detainedafter he ®leda reportwith the BBC Focuson Africa programmeand a Nigerianjournalist working in The Gambia, ChikelubaKenechuku, was arrestedand beaten up. 28 Theindependent Gambian press has clearlyled a precariousexistence since theJuly 1994 coup. During this period it has walkeda tightropein trying to avoidtotal subservience to the regime on the one side and an even more repressiveclamp-down on the other. It has facedenormous obstacles ranging fromof® cial ` legal’challenges (from which, it mustbe said,it has receivedsome protectionfrom the judiciary) and unof® cial pressure fromrandom acts of violenceagainst journalists by military personnel. Rather than risk international condemnationwith an outright ban on the independent press theregime clearly hopedto frighten the journalists into self-censorship. In addition the Gambian press has beenharmed by the deportation of Liberian and Sierra Leonean journalistsworking in the country. In spite of these severe dif®culties the independentGambian press has continuedto operate as acriticalvoice even thoughits critical comment has perforcebecome increasingly subtle, subdued andcoded. An example of the latter tactic has beenthe reporting of the worldwidecriticisms of the Abacha military regime in Nigeria in sucha wayas topresent obvious but unstated parallels with the situation in The Gambia. Anothertactic has beento remind the regime constantly of its grand rhetorical statementson open government, democracy, accountability, transparency and free discussion,to providecover for criticisms of regimebehaviour. Aside from theindependent press thegovernment controlled GambiaDaily is totally supportiveof the regime while the less regular Upfront (sub-titled The Voice of the AFPRC)resembles aYahyaJammeh fanzine. Theprofessional association of Gambianjournalists, the GPU,has attemptedto maintainits autonomy and independence. Other Gambian groups and associa- tionshave likewise tried to act as aconstrainton military authoritarianism. Gambiantrade unions have never played a keyrole in political life: 29 no group ofworkers has thepolitical clout of, for example, copper miners in Zambia or oilworkers in Nigeria. Shortly after the coup Pa ModouFaal, the Secretary-Gen- eralof theGambia Workers’ Confederation ( GWC),whichis themost important groupin the organised labour sector, issued a statementwhich welcomed the bloodlessnature of the coup but which warned the AFPRC notto repeat the mistakesof other military regimes in the region. 30 Inearly October Faal publishedan article 31 expressingconcern over the arbitrary sackings taking place inthe public sector and concluding that ` peoplejust don’ t wantmilitary rule ¼ playyour provisional role and hand over.’ 31 Twoweeks later 32 Faal again attackedthe government, this time over the question of arbitrary arrests, complainingthat ` peopleare stillbeing held without any attempt to letus know whattheir crimes are,let alone allow even their relatives to visit them’ . 32 At the same timehe bitterly criticised the AFPRC decision(subsequently changed) to 926 MILITARY RULE INTHE GAMBIA stayin power for four years (theissue ofthe timetable of military rule is discussedin detail below). Shortly afterwards a statementby the Secretary Generalof the Gambia Workers Union ( GWU),AmadouAraba Bah, appeared to indicatedisagreement in the labour movement when he offered backing to the AFPRC andsupported the four year period. 33 Furtherdevelopments suggested that Bahwas isolatedin the labour movement. The Deputy Secretary General of the GWU,MahtarCeesay, stated that Bah’ s statementhad been issued without any consultationwith the union executive and did not represent the views of anybody else in the GWU.34 Furtherto this Modou Ceesay, Secretary General of the GambiaLabour Union ( GLU),expressedthe opposition of his union to Bah’ s pro-AFPRC statements.Both Mahtar Ceesay andModou Ceesay mademuch of thefact that Bah had been a nominated(by Jawara) MP inthe previous regime. MahtarCeesay describedhim as a`praise-singerof Jawara’ , 35 while Modou Ceesay calledhim, not without some justi®cation, a `chameleon’.36 Since then theunion movement has continuedto campaign for fair treatment of sacked workersand over the transition programme. TheGambia Medical and Dental Association ( GMDA)has beenthe most unequivocalin its condemnation of military rule of any of The Gambia’ s professionalassociations. In an open letter to the AFPRC itscurrent president, Dr SALCeesay andtwo past presidents unreservedly condemned the coup and called,perhaps unrealistically, for an immediate return to civilian rule. 37 The medicsalso criticised the human rights abuses ofthe regime, particularly the denialof medical care todetainees, in no uncertain terms. Gambianlawyers, both individually and through the Gambia Bar Association (GBA),havecontinued to act as aconstrainton military authoritarianism. Like theirmedical colleagues they strongly opposed the seizure of power by the military.In a statementsigned by its President and Vice-President, Surahata Semega-Jannehand Ousainou Darboe, the GBA saidthat it ` unequivocally condemnsthe usurpation of thereign of powerby unconstitutionalmeans bythe military’and went on to attack the ` spateof unlawful arrests anddetentions, wrongfuldismissals, and unwarranted interference with the freedom of ex- pression’ .38 Subsequentlythe judiciary continued to push for as rapida demili- tarisationas possibleand worked, where possible, to defend the legal rights of thosedetained by the regime. Initially the AFPRC seemed reluctantto interfere directlywith the administration of justicebut by late1995 the situation appeared tobe changing. Following the enforced ` retirement’of Chief Justice Braimah Omosun the AFPRC appointeda SierraLeonean lawyer, Omar Alghali, to thepost ofChiefJustice. At his swearing in ceremonyAlghali was toldby Jammeh that `youhave an enormous task ahead of you because the administration of justice is notsatisfactory’ . 39 Afewweeks later four Gambian lawyers attached to the SupremeCourt were ` retiredprematurely’ by the AFPRC.40 Evenmore ominously OusainouDarboe, the GBA Vice-Presidentand a prominentdefence lawyer of thoseaccused by the regime, was placedin detention without charge. Simul- taneouslythe regime introduced a newpiece of legislation, Decree 57, which was backdatedto the date of the coup, and gave the Minister of the Interior unlimitedpower to order the arrest anddetention without charge of any person `inthe interest of thesecurity, peace, and stability of TheGambia’ . 41 Under this 927 JOHN AWISEMAN decreeapplications for a writof habeascorpus werenot permitted, as had previouslybeen the case inthe Gambian legal system. Theabove developments exacerbated the climate of fear whichhad been promotedin June 1995 by the establishment, under Decree 45, of a newsecret policeorganisation, the National Intelligence Agency ( NIA),and,in August, by thereintroduction, under Decree 52, of the death penalty. While, in truth, the lattermove did not lack a levelof popular support, the establishment of the NIA, withvirtually unlimited powers of surveillance and arrest was seen as amajor changein theGambian way of life. The overtly political character of the NIA was clearfrom the wording of the decree, which stipulated that the new body was designedto ` obtainand provide the Government with information relating to actionsor intentions of persons which may be a threatto state security’ and to `takeadequate precautions to protect the state against actions which may underminethe Government’ . 42 Sinceits establishment the NIA has signi®cantly changedthe climate of politicaldiscussion in thecountry, which in thepast had beenremarkably free andopen. The death penalty had been abolished as recently as April1993, largely as aresultof the personal initiative of Dawda Jawara in theface ofconsiderable popular support for capital punishment in cases of homicide.43 Injustifying the need for the reintroduction of thedeath penalty the AFPRC cited` aphenomenalrise in¼ treasonableoffences ’ .44 Theview that `treasonableoffences’ have increased re¯ ects asense ofinsecurityon thepart of thegovernment leaders and, quite possibly, an expanded view of what might constitutetreason. Sincethe coup there have been widespread arrests ofperceived political opponentsof the regime. Although many of those arrested have been released followinga periodin detention (and, in many cases, rearrestedon a numberof subsequentoccasions), the number in prison at any given time has beenon the increase.In October 1995 large numbers of supposed PPP sympathiserswere detainedfollowing claims that they had been planning an anti-government demonstration.Rather disturbingly there have been increasing allegations regard- ingthe use oftorture on political detainees. Duringits time in of® ce AFPRC rulehas becomeincreasingly authoritarian, althoughthe levels of oppressionhave not reached those set bysome ofAfrica’ s morenotorious military dictatorships. This authoritarianism has notgone unchal- lengedby Gambian civil society although the ability of the latter to act as a constrainton regimebehaviour has beenlimited by anincreasingwillingness on thepart of the AFPRC tocurtailthe extent of civilliberties which existed for three decadesunder the Jawara regime.In a periodwhen the political situation in most Africanstates has beencharacterised by aresurgentcivil society, with the latter ontheoffensive against authoritarian regimes in aquestfor democratisation, the reverse appearsto have been taking place in TheGambia, where civil society is verymuch on the defensive.

Governmentand administration Sincethe coup government decision making has beenlocated ® rmlywithin the ® ve-man AFPRC.Sincethe fall from power of SanaSabally and Sadibou Hydara 928 MILITARY RULE INTHE GAMBIA ithas beenincreasingly focussed on Yahya Jammeh himself,who has person- allydominated the AFPRC:hissecond in command Edward Singhateh is not regardedas havingan independent power base andhas retainedhis position (untilnow) by means ofpersonalloyalty to Jammeh.The Council rules through themechanism of militarydecrees, of whichthere have been over 70 so far and whichcannot be challenged by the Gambian courts. During the Jawara period provincialadministration lay in the hands of the Divisional Commissioners operatingin each of The Gambia’ s ®veDivisions,which represent the adminis- trativedemarcation of the up-river rural areas awayfrom the Bajul/ Serekunda urbancoastal areas. Undercivilian rule Divisional Commissioners were civil servantsappointed by the president. The AFPRC has retainedthe basic structure ofprovincial administration but has replacedthe civilian administrators with militarypersonnel in anattemptto establish tight control of therural areas. The `traditional’rural administration of chiefs and village headmen ( seyfolu and alkalo)has beenretained. Gambian traditional leaders have not enjoyed any signi®cant political autonomy in the post-independence era andthe AFPRC have followedthe practice of theJawara regimein suspendingand sacking chiefs and headmenthey disapprove of. 45 Aswithmany other military regimes in Africa a majorityof appointmentsto ministerialrank within the cabinet have gone to civilians. Members ofthe AFPRC havemonopolised sensitive security-related cabinet portfolios such as Defence,Local Government and the Interior but Jammeh’ scabinetshave been predominantlycomposed of civilians. In the immediate aftermath of the coup (followingthe arrest orescape intoexile of many of Jawara’ sministers)most cabinetpositions were ® lledby promoting permanent secretaries toministerial rank,while deputy permanent secretaries becamepermanent secretaries. Since thencabinet membership has beensubject to rapid turnover and change with Jammeh appointingand sacking ministers at will on a frequentbasis. While a majorityof cabinet appointments have gone to technocrats, a smallnumber havegone to political ® guresfrom the Jawara regime.As notedearlier, senior cabinetpositions went to PPP heavyweightsBakary Dabo and Fafa M’bai, althoughboth were subsequently sacked and M’ baiwas arrested,while Dabo ¯edthe country. In July 1996 Mrs NyimasataSanneh-Bojang, formerly a signi®cant member of Jawara’ sgovernmentand a PPP MP,was sackedfrom her positionas Ministerof Health, Social Welfare and Women’ s Affairsand was arrestedand accused of misappropriationof $100000 and other offences. 46 Mrs Sanneh-Bojanghad been appointed in November 1995 when she hadreplaced anotherwoman minister, Mrs CoumbaCeesay-Marenah, who had been sacked for` sabotageand foot dragging’ . 47 Ceesay-Marenahhad originally been ap- pointedto replaceMrs FatoumattaTambajang who had close kinship links with SanaSabally and who was sackedfollowing the January 1995 ` coup’. Yahya Jammeh has showna markedpropensity to appoint women to ministerial posts andthere have usually been about four or ® vewomen in the cabinet, which is considerablymore than in the previous administration. While it is possiblethat thismay represent a beliefin the desirability of womens’ advancement on Jammeh’ spart,a morelikely explanation would be that he sees womenas less ofa potentialchallenge. 929 JOHN AWISEMAN

Forboth men and women cabinet ministers their hold on of® ce has often provedto be ephemeral.One of themain features of cabinet membership under militaryrule is thatit has beensubject to frequentabrupt change, with dismissal usuallybeing followed by a torrentof abuse and accusation (and, frequently, arrest) fromJammeh. A similarpattern can be seen insenior civil service appointments.Indeed, few positions in public life in The Gambia are secure frominstant arbitrary dismissal. In March 1996 Pa ModouN’ jie,the Principal oftheMuslim High School, was sackedafter some ofhis students were involved ina minorriot in Serekunda. The previous month the committee of theGambia FootballAssociation ( GFA)weredismissed by the AFPRC followinga rather disappointingperformance by the national soccer team(the Scorpions) in a tournamentin Mauritania. Muchmore disturbing to many Gambians was theunexplained murder of Ministerof Finance and Economic Affairs Ousman Koro Ceesay inJune 1995. Ceesay hadbeen in of® ce sinceMarch and had been given the unique status of `honorarymember of the AFPRC’.Hisbattered body was discoveredin a burnt-outcar nearthe village of Jambur, which is situatedclose to the Yundum barracks.While of® cial investigations into the death have produced nothing (six monthsafter the murder Ceesay’ s familydenied government claims that an investigationwas actuallytaking place), many Gambians believe that Koro Ceesay was murderedpersonally by a memberof the AFPRC afterhe discovered dubious® nancialdealings by members ofthe regime. Although the case ofKoro Ceesay is extremeit is symptomaticof the way in which government and civil serviceappointments have been made and unmade. The pattern has beenone of arbitraryand frequent change dependent upon the whim of theChairman of the AFPRC.Withthe legislative branch of government(previously the elected House ofRepresentatives) being replaced by the issuing of unchallengeable military decrees theexecutive branch has beenreduced to a confusedand insecure arena inwhich unpredictability dominates the participants.

Legitimising the present: deligitimising the past

Havingseized power Jammeh andhis AFPRC facedan immediate problem of tryingto establish some formof legitimacy. While this problem is facedby all incomingmilitary regimes in Africa it was particularlyacute in The Gambia, wherethe population had experienced nearly 30 years ofunbroken, relatively democraticcivilian rule and took a certainpride in being one of the few states inthe West African region to have avoided military government. One of the mainways in which the new regime attempted to legitimise itself was to deligitimisethe previous regime, retrospectively by establishing a series of commissionsof inquiryto investigategovernment malpractice and corruption in theJawara era.Deligitimisation of the Jawara periodwas notthe sole purpose ofthe commissions but it was animportant one. Beforeexamining the ® ndingsof thesecommissions several factors related to theirfunctioning need to be outlined. Unsurprisingly, individuals summoned to appearbefore the commissions have been those perceived as beingmembers of, orhaving close connections with, the ousted regime. Although rumours (some 930 MILITARY RULE INTHE GAMBIA wellsubstantiated) of corruption within the current membership of the AFPRC circulatewidely in Banjul and further a® eld,it wouldbe outof thequestion for theserumours to be investigated in the current period. Many of those being investigatedby the commissions are presentlyin exile and unable to appear in personto answer the charges made against them directly. This applies in particularto senior ® guresin the ousted regime such as SaihouSabally, Bakary Darbo,Lamin Kitty Jabang and, of course, Jawara himself.In spite of theabove quali®cations and having witnessed a numberof thesessions oftheproceedings ofseveral of the commissions (and I haveno reason to believe that these were exceptional),I wouldconclude that they were conducted in acalmmanner with astrongemphasis on the due process oflaw.Sittings are heldin publicwith no restrictions(other than limits of space) onwhocan attend. I didnot witness any soldierspresent at any session. The proceedings have been presided over by civilianlawyers with defence lawyers present, including several recruited from SierraLeone and Ghana, 48 andwere calm and non-intimidatory in style.Sessions are conductedthrough the medium of theEnglish language with translation into indigenousAfrican languages when required: because most cases involvedelites whotend to be ¯ uentin English little translation was actuallyrequired. There weremany cases ofindividuals attempting to shift responsibility to others, for exampleministers and civil servants blaming each other for dubious decisions. Giventhe traditionally rather chaotic nature of theGambian bureaucracy and the poorstate of much record keeping, the presentation of evidence based on departmental® les was oftenrather confused and inconclusive. Inspite of the above reservations and quali® cations it would have to be concludedthat the commissions did unearth considerable evidence of corruption andmaladministration during the Jawara period.Most of the malpractice involvedvarious combinations of prominent PPP politiciansand ministers, senior civilservants and major ® guresin the Gambian business community; a grouping whichin thepast had been commonly referred to as the` BanjulMa® a’. 49 Among themethods used for personal enrichment were: (1)non-payment of taxes and duties by members ofthe regime and their associates overlong periods and involving large sums; (2)non-repayment of government loans; (3)serious irregularities over the allocation of valuable plots of land in the greaterBanjul area, including multiple allocations to important individuals andtheir families and a selectivefailure to enforce regulations on land use; (4)government employees working for regime members inapersonalcapacity; (5)serious overpayment of travel expenses for government members onover- seas trips; (6)the widespread existence of ` ghostworkers’ and ` ghostpensioners’ , 50 (7)straightforward theft of state funds. Althoughin some cases itis dif®cult to assess theculpability of particular individualsit is apparentthat there was ahighincidence of personal enrichment byelites at the expense of thepublic purse during the Jawara period.The effect ofthe evidence produced by the commissions of inquiry has retrospectively reducedthe perceptions of legitimacyaccorded to theJawara regime:in common 931 JOHN AWISEMAN parlance` theychop all the money’ . Clearlythe mechanisms of government accountabilitywere de® cient in the pre-coup period. However, under military rulemechanisms of accountability have all but vanished.

Foreignand economic policy Sincethe end of the colonial period Gambian foreign policy has exhibitedtwo majorgoals. First has beenthe desire to maintain independent sovereign statehoodfor the territory within the context of a perceivedpotential threat of assimilationby the relatively powerful (by Gambian standards) neighbouring stateof Senegal. Second has beenthe attempt to manipulate the external environmentby using The Gambia’ s statusas anindependent state in theglobal communityto gain funding from foreign sources to® nance` development projects’and, in reality in some cases, personalenrichment by government elites. Interms ofoperating this creative usage of dependency, President Jawara was extremelyadept and enjoyed considerable success. Considerablefunding was obtainedfrom Western states, especially during the Cold War, as aresultof Jawara’ sidenti®cation of The Gambia as apro-Westernstate. His anti-Soviet stancealso produced considerable development aid from the PRC. In addition ®nancefrom the more conservative Gulf states was obtainedthrough the projectionof the Islamic identity of The Gambia despite the maintenance of a secularstate. Thechange from relatively democratic civilian rule to military rule posed obstaclesto theoperation of this policy especially in the context of thepost-cold warworld. Western powers reacted negatively to thecoup and ® nancefrom this sourcewas dramaticallyreduced. The EU halvedits ® nancialassistance pro- grammewhile there were also massive reductionsin aid from the USA andthe UK,althoughsome fundingthrough NGOsdidcontinue. In September 1994 Japancompletely stopped its aid to The Gambia. The AFPRC regimefaced the problemof ® ndingalternative sources ofexternal funding following reductions fromits traditional ` developmentpartners’ . InNovember 1994 full diplomatic relationswith Libya were restored after 15 years ofhostile relations (according toa wellplaced informant this ` cost’the Libyans £ 10million). Financial aid fromthe Gulf states was littleaffected by the coup and both Kuwait and Saudi Arabiaannounced that they would continue to assist TheGambia. Probably the mostsigni® cant development in external relations since the coup has beenthe establishmentof close ties with Taiwan. In the middle of 1995 full diplomatic tieswere formally established and early in 1996 the Taiwanese opened an embassy inThe Gambia for the ® rst time.Because ofits current dif® culties in itsrelationship with the PRC Taiwanappears extremely anxious to expand its internationaldiplomatic support network: it recently also established diplomatic relationswith Senegal. (Taiwan has nosigni® cant economic interests in the region.)The development of friendly relations with Taiwan inevitably led to a correspondingdeterioration of The Gambia’ s long-termties with the PRC, with thelatter withdrawing all its assistance. The new relationship with Taiwan has provedto be ® nanciallyrewarding for The Gambia (and, according to unof®cial reports,for individual members ofthe AFPRC).Inanagreement signed in August 932 MILITARY RULE INTHE GAMBIA

1995by the two governments the Taiwanese made a loanof US $35million availableto the AFPRC andalso agreed to assist inrice production projects, to providesecurity training programmes and to donate 5 000sets ofmilitary uniformsand boots to the GNA.Thelatter amounts to more than six uniforms and pairsof bootsper soldier! Since 1995 relations with Nigeria have become more cordial,with The Gambia standing in almostcomplete isolation in votingagainst thesuspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth at the Auckland summit in November1995. Interms ofdomesticeconomic policy the AFPRC has announcedno signi®cant changeand members ofthe regime have constantly pledged their support for `free-marketcapitalism’ .The major negative economic impact of military rule has beenon the tourist industry which, after groundnut growing, is themost importantsector in the Gambian economy and a majorearner of foreign exchange.51 Followingthe November 1994 ` attemptedcoup’ the British govern- mentadvised travellers that The Gambia was an` unsafe’destination and, as a resultof this, most of the major British tour operators withdrew from the country.The Danish and Swedish governments offered similar advice. Although theof® cial advice was changedin March1995, tourist numbers for 1994± 95 fell toaround one third of 1993± 94 numbers causing the closure of many ofthe hotels and mass unemploymentamong hotel staff andworkers in tourist-associatedoccupations (woodcarvers, taxi drivers, shop workers, guides, tailors,etc). For the 1995± 96 season some ofthemain foreign operators decided torecommenceoperations in TheGambia but some decidedto stayout until the politicalsituation became clearer: early® guresfor 1995± 96 suggested a partial recoveryof the tourist industry but arrivals were still considerably below pre-coupnumbers. Inthe light of the economic problems facing The Gambia the decision taken inDecember 1995 by the AFPRC tobuild a hugearch in Banjul, Arch 22, in commemorationof the coup which brought them to power (at a costof $1 millionor $6million depending on whichsource one believes) must be regarded as, atleast, economically irresponsible (some mightsay obscene).Jammeh suggested,totally ingenuously, that the arch would be amajortourist attraction. Theidea that European tourists deciding on thedestination for their ` wintersun’ holidayswould be positivelyin¯ uenced by theprospects of viewingan archbuilt tocelebrate a militarycoup is as improbablea notionas onecould imagine.

Returnto democracy? Sincethe coup the major public issue inThe Gambia has beenthe question of areturnto democratic civilian rule as promisedfrom the beginning by the AFPRC. Muchpublic debate has beenfocused on thetiming of therestoration. At apress conferencein Senegalin late September 1994 Jammeh was quotedas sayingthat militaryrule would be retained for ` fouryears’ but, following an outcry, he later claimedthat he had been misquoted and that he had really said ` foryears’ .In lateOctober the AFPRC announcedits Programme of Recti®cation and Transition toDemocratic Constitutional Rule, which outlined a fouryear transition period endingin 1998. This proposal was heavilycriticised both domestically and 933 JOHN AWISEMAN internationally.Within The Gambia the civil society groups discussed earlier unitedto condemn the period as toolong. Internationally the proposed period of militaryrule was denouncedby Britain, the USA, theEU, theCommonwealth, theAfrica Commission for Human and People’ s Rightsand many others. In responseto this universally negative reaction Jammeh thenannounced in late Novemberthat he was establishinga NationalConsultative Committee ( NCC) to examinethe timetable and indicated that he was willingto reconsider the question.The NCC consistedof 23 members appointedby the AFPRC: it was chairedby Dr Lenrie Peters, the renowned Gambian writer and medical doctor, andincluded representatives from the trade unions, religious groups, women’ s groups,professional associations and leading traditional chiefs. In December 1994 the NCC begana ®veweek period of nationalconsultation which involved holdingmeetings in all parts of the country. For the most part this process ran smoothly,although in Upper River Division the Divisional Commissioner, CaptainMusa Baldeh,expelled the NCC representativesbecause he thoughtthey werebeing openly critical of the existing four year proposal. In late January 1995 the NCC reportedto the AFPRC andrecommended that the transition period bereduced to two years fromthe time of the coup because this had majority supportwithin the country and in the international community. 52 In February Jammeh acceptedthe reduced timetable but rejected the further suggestion that aninterim civilian government be established in the intervening period. Al- thoughmany Gambians viewed the two year period as overlong,the solution appearsto have enjoyed popular support. Thearrangements for a returnto democratic rule continued but they did so veryslowly. In April 1995 a ConstitutionalReview Commission ( CRC) was establishedunder the chairmanship of a Ghanaianlawyer, Justice Gilbert MensahQuaye, and began open public hearings. The Canadian government providedthe CRC withcomputer technology (additional funding and technical assistance forthe transition has beensupplied by the British and US govern- mentsand foreign NGOs, althoughJammeh has persistentlyclaimed that more fundingis needed 53).Animportantsubtext in muchof thepublic debate was the questionof a legalminimum age for presidential candidates. This issue was of interestbecause many believed that Jammeh mightwish to stand in a presiden- tialelection, and those who advocated a minimumage of 40 clearly had this in mind.In the event a minimumage of 30 forpresidential candidates was adopted! The CRC submittedits recommendations to the AFPRC inDecember 1995 but noneits ® ndingswas madepublic until March 1996. In the intervening period the AFPRC hadgiven itself a free handto accept, amend or reject the CRC recommendationswithout any public consultation. The following month the AFPRC announcedthat the elections were postponed inde® nitely and then in May announcedthat they would take place in September (presidential) and December (legislative). As thedetails of the new constitution and the electoral arrangements were slowlyannounced in a piecemealfashion many aspects ofboth caused concern amongthe Gambian population. Many features appeared to have been designed tomake participation as dif®cult as possible.The deposit required from parlia- mentarycandidates had been raised from D200 to D2 500 and for presidential 934 MILITARY RULE INTHE GAMBIA candidatesfrom D2 500 to D7 500. Furthermore, to ` save’one’ s depositit was nownecessary togain at least 40% of the vote: this raised the bizarre prospect ofeven some winningcandidates losing their deposits in tightly contested constituencieswith more than two candidates. Taken in combination these measures meantthat to participate in an election on a nationalbasis wouldcost apoliticalparty well over D100 000: by Gambian standards this is ahugesum ofmoney which could preclude all but the wealthiest from participating. The newdemarcation of constituency boundaries appeared to beblatantlyrigged: for example,while Fuladu East contained an estimated 40 000 voters, ® vecon- stituenciesin the Fonis (Jammeh’ shomearea) hadaround 14 000 voters betweenthem. One very odd omission from the constitution was anyreference toalimitationon thenumber of terms thata presidentcould legally serve. In all theprior public debate over the constitution, perhaps the only issue onwhich therehad been virtually total consensus was thatin the future no individual shouldbe allowed to remain in of® ce formore than two terms, as Jawara had doneunder the 1970 constitution which contained no such limitations. Many Gambiancommentators also expressed grave doubts over the impartiality of the ProvisionalIndependent Electoral Commission established by the AFPRC. Inaddition to the continuing problems and delays concerned with the timing ofthe election and the details of constitutional electoral arrangements, further doubtsconcerning the attitudes of the AFPRC leaderstowards the meaning and contentof democracy were created by various public statements made by the youngsoldiers. As far backas September1994 Jammeh launcheda generalised attackon the role of politicians who he said ` couldnot be allowed to interfere anddivide the people, thereby creating confusion’ . 54 Onmany occasions AFPRC members asserted thatformer PPP `militants’could not be permitted to form a futuregovernment. Subsequently these attacks on politicians from the pre-coup periodwere extended to include the former opposition parties and their MPs, who weredescribed by Yankuba Touray as `opportunistswho were never interested inserving their constituents’ . 55 Jammeh alsoasserted that,if the military were notsatis® edwith any future government, then ` thesoldiers would return to rescue thepopulation’ . 56 Thesesorts ofstatementssuggest that, at very least, the AFPRC expectedto have an unchallenged veto over which individuals and groups mightcontest an election and that, whatever the outcome of the election, the militaryreserved the right to reintervene if they felt disposed to do so. The arroganceof these views is dif®cult to square with any notions of freely contestedelections which determine the composition of thenational government onthe basis ofthe expressed choices of the electorate. On numerous occasions statementsby Jammeh andhis supporters continued to cast doubton whether evencontrolled elections would take place. In February 1996 Jammeh argued that` itis upto the people to say whetheror notthey want elections’ : 57 this was inspite of the fact that he had agreed over a yearearlier to hold the elections andthat considerable preparation had already been undertaken. In casting doubt onthedesirability of electionsJammeh was constantlysupported by theJuly 22 Movement.The latter purported to be an ` apoliticaldevelopment NGO’ but in practiceit represented a groupof civilian supporters of Jammeh andthe AFPRC whosemembers hadbene® ted from military rule. In many ways it can be seen 935 JOHN AWISEMAN as aGambianequivelant of the notorious Association for a BetterNigeria (ABN).58 Theview of the July 22 Movement was encapsulatedat one of its meetingsby the statement that ` theaim of conducting an election is tochoose theright person but since we’ ve already had such a personas theHead of State ¼weare nolonger interested in elections that would create con¯ icts’ . 59 In a publishedstatement the Movement suggested that ` themain yardstick to use at thisjuncture to allow Jammeh toremain in power in the absence of elections whichI am sure hewould have won if he was interestedis toform a massive combined,conclusive, consolidated force of un¯ inching and unsurreptious { sic} solidarityto say noto elections for a periodof ® veyears’ . 60

Conclusion: soldiers withouta difference

Sincecoming to power the members ofthe AFPRC haveannounced with endless monotonythat they are `soldierswith a difference’. Nopublic statement or speechis completewithout several repetitions of thisphrase. Given the disrepute intowhich military rule has fallenin Africa it is hardlysurprising that Yahya Jammeh andhis colleagues would seek todistance themselves from other militaryregimes in the eyes oftheir fellow Gambians. The days when military rulewas thoughtby some tobe conducive to political stability and economic developmentare longgone. To what extent does AFPRC rulein The Gambia replicatepatterns observable in other African states whichhave experienced militaryrule? Militaryrule in Africa is nota uniformphenomenon. Military regimes do not followa singletrajectory which can be easilydemarcated from civilian rule, but exhibitsigni® cant differences from state to state and, in some cases, fromone regimeto another within the same state. 61 Nevertheless,it has beenpossible to observewidespread common features of military rule even though these are not replicatedexactly in all cases. Ina signi®cant number of ways the rule of the AFPRC re¯ects broadercommonalities of military rule. Withvery few exceptions military government in Africa has notbeen totally militarisedand civilians have continued to play a prominentrole, but not a dominantone. In the Gambian case thiscan be observed in twoways. First, the regimehas madeconsiderable use ofthe technocratic and administrative skills ofcivilians within government: most cabinet positions have been held by civilianswith only the key security-related posts being reserved exclusively for soldiers.Although there has beena rapidturnover of civilian cabinet members, thosesacked tend to have been replaced by other civilians. Second, in common withother African military rulers, the AFPRC havetried to encourage and constructsupport groups among the civilian population as awayof buttressing theirrule and making it appear less overtlymilitaristic. In The Gambia the July 22Movementrepresents a typicalexample of thisessentially clientelist phenom- enon.In return for state patronage the Movement gives the impression of a popularpublic (civilian) support base forthe regime which camou¯ ages the latter’s relianceon coercive power. Incommon with most other African military regimes, AFPRC rule in The Gambiademonstrates the promotion of the corporate interests of the army in a 936 MILITARY RULE INTHE GAMBIA contextof evident factionalism within the military elite. As shownearlier Jammeh has attemptedto strengthenhis support within the armed forces through thedistribution of a varietyof material bene® ts tothe troops but, at the same time,has alsodealt ruthlessly with opponents, real or imaginery, within the of®cer corps.Both tactics can be seen as partsof a two-prongedattempt to reducethe prospects of asuccessful counter-coupsuch as has occurredin many otherAfrican states. The greatest threat to any military regime comes from withinthe military and Jammeh’ suse ofboth reward and fear (carrotand stick) reproducesa commonpattern among African military rulers, recognising both a sharedset ofmilitaryinterests and a divisionof interestswithin the military elite. Despitethe occasional use ofradicalrhetoric, military regimes in Africa have arecordof economic conservatism and the AFPRC is noexception to this fairly generalpattern. Although Jammeh expressedhis desire for ` TheGambia to be countedamong the ® rst threemost modern countries in theworld’ 62 (thecountry is currentlyplaced in 162 nd place, out of 174, in the UNDP’sHumanDevelop- mentIndex) the regime has notdeveloped any macroeconomic policy aimed at improvingGambian economic performance or ensuring a moreegalitarian distributionof wealth and resources withinthe country. Members oftheregime haveroutinely expressed their support for ` capitalistfree enterprise’but have not elaboratedon the relevance of this doctrine for the large majority of Gambians whoare engagedin small-scale peasant agriculture. Although the hostility of mostWestern donors to military rule has resultedin a downturnin external fundingfrom those sources, the response of the regime has beento seek to secure newexternal patrons (principally Libya and Taiwan) rather than question thefundamental structures of Gambian dependency. In all fairness onewould haveto recognise that the weakness of the Gambian economy places severe restrictionson the range of options available to any government but increased militaryspending and the building of triumphal arches seem aless than appropriateresponse to the problems of economic underdevelopment. As indi- catedearlier the one decisive impact of the introduction of military rule was to bringabout a sharpdownturn in the tourist industry which was thesole successful exampleof economic diversi® cation achieved in recent decades. Analltoo familiar feature of militaryrule in Africawhich can clearly be seen inThe Gambia is theintensi® cation and expansion of the authoritarian aspects ofthestate. At anof®cial level this has includedsevere andrepeated attacks on theindependent press andother critical segments of Gambian civil society, the establishmentof the NIA andthe re-introduction of the death penalty (to deal with `treasonableoffences’ ), andthe widespread use oftorture and imprisonment withouttrial of suspected regime opponents. Legislation rests solelyon the promulgationof military decrees whichcannot be challenged by the courts. At anunof® cial level the new authoritarianism is seen inthe growth of arbitrary violenceand petty predation in¯ icted on civilians by members ofthe armed forces.Speci® c regionalcases ofmilitary rule increase fears ofescalating authoritarianism.The disastrous experiences of rule by very young soldiers in Liberia(under Samuel Doe) and Sierra Leone (under Valentine Strasser) are too closeto home for The Gambia. Whileit would be unduly pessimistic to predict a repeatof the Liberian and 937 JOHN AWISEMAN

SierraLeonean experiences in The Gambia the conclusion of this examination ofmilitary rule there is that,rather than being ` soldierswith a difference’, the AFPRC inThe Gambia is, to alargeextent, replicating the pattern of militaryrule observablein therest ofAfrica.It remains to be seen whetheror notThe Gambia has movedfrom being the most stable and democratic state in WestAfrica to an extendedera ofinstability and oppressive rule.

Notes Theauthor wishes togratefully acknowledge funding for repeated research visitsto The Gambia fromthe BritishAcademy, theNuf® eld Foundation and the Research Committee ofthe University of Newcastle upon Tyne.The current situation in The Gambia makes itimpossible to acknowledge the help given to the author bynumerous Gambians withoutendangering their physical safety. Forthe present time theymust remain anonymous. 1 Forearly accountsof thecoup see JohnA Wiseman &ElizabethVidler, ` TheJuly 1994 coup d’ etat inThe Gambia: theend of an era’ , Round Table,no333,1995, pp 53±65; Ebrima Sall, ` Gambie: le Coupd’ Etat dejuillet 1994’ L’AfriquePolitique ,1995,pp 181± 192; Peter daCosta, ` TheGambia: outwith the old’ , AfricaReport ,Vol40, No 1, 1995, pp 48± 51; Zaya Yeebo, Stateof Fear in Paradise: The Military Coup inThe Gambia and its Implications for Democracy ,London;Africa Research andInformation Bureau, 1995. 2 Jawara hadacquired this status following the death of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Co Ãte d’Ivoire inDecember 1993and the peaceful oustingthrough the ballot box of PresidentHastings Kamuzu Bandaof Malawi inMay 1994. 3 Fora statement ofJawara’ spositionsee AlhajiSir Dawda Kairaba Jawara, `TheCommonwealth and Human rights’ , TheRound Table ,No321, 1992, pp 37± 42. 4 Forthe fullest account of the1981 coup attempt, see ArnoldHughes, ` Theattempted coup d’ etat of27July 1981’, inHughes (ed), TheGambia: Studies in Society and Politics ,BirminghamUniversity African Studies Series, 3,1991, pp 92±106. In his introduction to the volume Hughes shows considerable prescience when heconcludes by asking` inseeking to protectitself fromfurther subversion by the creation, for the ® rst time, ofa regulararmy, has theGambian governmentcreated theinstrument of its future overthrow?’ (p 5). The viewthat the creation of the army was, at thetime, designedprecisely to prevent what it ironically eventuallyproduced was sharedby other writers. TijanM Sallah,for example, wrotethat ` thedecision to create anarmy forthe ® rst time inThe Gambia’ shistorycan onlybe interpreted as anattempt toadopt measures tocurb any future breach ofdomestic tranquility’ . See Sallah,` Economicsand politics in The Gambia’ , Journalof Modern African Studies ,Vol28, No 4, 1990, p 639. 5 Fora discussionof the Senegambian Confederation and its eventual dissolution, see ArnoldHughes, ` The collapseof the Senegambian Confederation’ , Journalof Commonwealth and Comparative Politics , Vol 30, No2, July 1992, pp 200±222. 6 Itis likelythat the US marines couldhave defeated thecoup with little dif® culty. However, events in The Gambia occurredjust as UStroopswere invadingHaiti tooust the military regime there.It was clearly thoughtin Washington that The Gambia was toomarginal to US interests tojustify concurrent armed intervention. 7 Publicstatement byJammeh, reportedin the DailyObserver (Banjul),25 July 1994. 8 These explanationswere reportedto the author by many informants in The Gambia inApril 1995. 9 DailyObserver ,25July 1994. 10 Dabowas subsequentlyaccused ofparticipationin the October 1994 coup attempt. GambiaWeekly (Banjul), 18November 1994. M’ baiwas accused ofcorrupt practices duringhis tenure of of® ce inboth the Jawara and the AFPRC governments. DailyObserver ,24April 1995. 11 Itis possibleto speculate onapossibleconnection between experience inthe ECOMOG force inLiberia and subsequentcoups in bothSierra Leoneand The Gambia. MaxA Sesay makes thepoint that both the coup inSierra Leone,led by ValentineStrasser inApril 1992, and the subsequent Gambian coupinvolved soldiers whoshared this experience. See Sesay,` Civilwar andcollective intervention in Liberia,’ Review ofAfrican PoliticalEconomy ,No67, 1996, pp 35± 52. 12 See JohnMukum Mbaku, ` Militarycoups as rent-seekingbehaviour’ , Journalof Political and Military Sociology,Vol22, Winter 1994, pp 241±284. 13 Fordetails see StevenRadelet, `Reform withoutrevolt: the political economy of economic reform inThe Gambia’ , WorldDevelopment ,Vol20, No 8, 1992, pp 1087±1099. 14 The Point (Banjul),28 November 1994. 938 MILITARY RULE INTHE GAMBIA

15 DailyObserver ,7December 1994. 16 GambiaWeekly ,18November 1994. 17 New Citizen (Banjul),3 February1995. 18 Fora discussionof EbouJallow’ s accusationssee Focuson Africa ,Vol7, No1, January± March 1996, p 18. Jallowalso released anopen letter `Tothe Gambian Press andthe international media’ inwhich he gave hisversion of the affair andprovided details of a personalaccount allegedly held by Jammeh ina Swiss bank,including the account number. (I am gratefulto Arnold Hughes for supplying me witha copyof this, andother, documents.) 19 DailyObserver ,19December 1995. 20 GambiaDaily (Banjul),10 February 1996. 21 Jammeh originallyannounced that a universitywould be established in The Gambia forthe ® rst time. This scheme was abandonedand replaced witha more modestarrangement wherebySt Mary’ s Universityin Halifax,Canada, agreed torun a universityextension programme in The Gambia. Whenthe programme beganin November 1995 many places remained un®lled because ofa lack ofgovernmentfunding. See Daily Observer,14November 1995. 22 Fora usefulaccount of theGambian press see Adewale Maja-Pearce, `Thepress inWest Africa’ , Index on Censorship,No6, June/ July1990, pp 44±91. 23 AlieuBadara N’Jie, `Ajournalist’s personalexperience ofthe army takeover’, DailyObserver , 25 July 1994, p 15. 24 The Point,19September 1994. The events surrounding the Foroyaa trialwere con®rmed bythe author in interviewsin The Gambia inApril 1995. 25 Fordetails of the deportation see thepublished interview with Kenneth Best in AfricaReport , January± February1995, pp 8±10. 26 WeekendObserver (Banjul),30 December 1994±1 January1995. 27 DailyObserver ,14May 1996. 28 Indexon Censorship ,No3, 1996, p 107. 29 Foraccounts of Gambian trade unions,see DavidPerfect, `Organizedlabour and politics in The Gambia: 1960±85’ , Labour,Capital and Society ,Vol19, No 2, 1986, pp 168± 199; and Arnold Hughes & David Perfect, `Trade unionismin The Gambia’ , AfricanAffairs ,Vol88, No 353, 1989, pp 549±572. 30 DailyObserver ,28July 1994. 31 DailyObserver ,12October 1994. 32 DailyObserver ,27October 1994. 33 The Point,31October 1994. 34 The Point,7November1994. 35 Ibid. 36 The Point,3November1994. 37 Publishedin The Point,10November 1994. 38 The Point,3November1994. 39 GambiaDaily ,20October 1995. 40 DailyObserver ,9November1995. 41 Decree 57,text published in Ibid. 42 WeekendObserver ,14±16 July 1995. 43 Sinceindependence 87 deathsentences hadbeen imposed by thecourts but Jawara hadused his presidential powersof clemency inall butone case. 44 WeekendObserver ,18±20 August 1995 (emphasis added). 45 InJanuary 1966, for example, the AFPRC sacked three seyfolu,compulsorilyretired three more andreinstated onewho had previously been suspended by the PPP government. 46 West Africa (London),No 4110, 29 July± 4 August1996, p 1172. 47 GambiaDaily ,11October, 1995. 48 Therecruitment ofsigni® cant numbersof lawyers fromother West African states hadpreviously taken place duringthe trials ofthose accused ofparticipating in the 1981 attempted coup. 49 Theterm `BanjulMa® a’ appears tohave been borrowed and adapted from Nigeria, where frequentreference is made tothe supposed ` KadunaMa® a’ .Fora discussionof the` BanjulMa® a’ see JohnA Wiseman, `The roleof the House of Representatives inthe Gambian politicalsystem’ ,inHughes The Gambia, pp 80±91. 50 Paymentto ` ghostworkers’ and ` ghostpensioners’ is acommonform of bureaucratic corruptionin a number ofAfrican states. Underthis contrivance corrupt of® cials divertconsiderable sums ofmoneyto themselves bypretending to make of®cial paymentsof wages andpensions to people who do not exist or who have previouslydied. Evidence produced before the Commission in Banjul in October 1995 indicated that senior civilservants had received hugesums ofmoneythrough ` ghostpayments of pensioners’ while more junior civilservants had received smaller amounts. 51 Fordiscussions of theGambian touristindustry see, Naomi Brown,` Beachboysas culturebrokers in Bakau Town,The Gambia’ , CommunityDevelopment Journal ,Vol27, No 4, 1992,pp 361±370; Peter UCDieke, 939 JOHN AWISEMAN

`Tourismin The Gambia: some issues indevelopment policy’ , WorldDevelopment ,Vol21, No 2, 1993, pp277± 289; and Dieke, ` Thepolitical economy of tourism in The Gambia’ , Review ofAfrican Political Economy,No62, 1994, pp 611±627. 52 Afulldescription of theactivities of NCC,itsrecommendations and Jammeh’ sresponsecan befound in Report ofthe National Consultative Committee onthe Armed Forces ProvisionalRuling Council’ s Programmeof Recti® cationand Timetable for the Transition to Democratic ConstitutionalRule in The Gambia ,Banjul,1995. Thereport indicates a clear majorityin favour of a longerperiod of militaryrule in Western Division,which is Jammeh’ shomearea. 53 Withouttight controls there is areal dangerthat foreign assistance forelections can simplybecome anew avenue forpersonal accumulation by state elites; inpractice anew typeof `rent’. 54 DailyObserver ,29September1994. 55 GambiaDaily ,5January1996. 56 GambiaDaily ,29March 1996. 57 GambiaDaily ,5February1996. 58 Fordiscussions of the ABN,see AjayiOla Rotimi& JuliusO Ihonvbere,` Democraticimpasse: remilitarisation inNigeria’ , ThirdWorld Quarterly ,Vol15, No 4, 1994, pp 669±689; Peter MLewis, `Endgamein Nigeria? Thepolitics of a faileddemocratic transition’, AfricanAffairs ,Vol93, No 372, 1994; Emeka Nwokedi, `Nigeria’ sdemocratic transition:explaining the annulled 1993 presidential election’ , Round Table, No 330, 1994;and Ian Campbell, Nigeria’s ContinuingCrisis: TheQuest fora Democratic Order ,London:Research Institutefor the Study of Con¯ ict andTerrorism, 1995. 59 GambiaDaily ,12April 1996. 60 The Point,29April 1996. 61 Forexample, theRawlings regime inGhana has beenquite different from that of Acheampong,just as inNigeria theAbacha regime is quiteunlike that of Obasanjo. 62 GambiaDaily ,2February1996.

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