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Military Rule in the Gambia: an Interim Assessment

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Military Rule in the Gambia: an Interim Assessment ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 17, No 5, pp 917± 940, 1996 Military rulein The Gambia: an interimassessment JOHNA WISEMAN On22 July 1994 the political system ofthe small West African state of The Gambiawas subjectedto anabrupt and dislocative change. On that day a group ofvery young junior of® cers fromthe Gambia National Army ( GNA) staged a coup d’ Âetat whichsucceeded in overthrowing the government of Sir Dawda KairabaJawara andhis People’ s ProgressiveParty ( PPP)whichhad ruled the countrysince independence in 1965. 1 Beforethe coup Jawara hadenjoyed the distinctionof being the very last of that generation of African leaders who had ledtheir countries to independence in the 1960s to remain in power. 2 Since independencethe Gambian political system hadexhibited a levelof continuity whichwas uniquein the region. Although control of government had remained continuouslyin the hands of Jawara andhis party, the country had experienced anunbroken run of multiparty politics in which opposition parties competed (ratherunsuccessfully) for power in a regularseries offree andrelatively fair elections.While the operation of Gambiandemocracy was certainlynot without ¯aws,it was realenough, and President Jawara hadestablished an international reputationas adefenderof human and civil rights. 3 Withthe exception of a failedcoup attempt by members oftheparamilitary Field Force (this was before thecreation of the army) in 1981, in conjunction with discounted urban elements,which had been defeated with the assistance oftroops from neighbour- ingSenegal, 4 theGambian political system hadalso been markedly stable. It was thusrather ironic that, at a timewhen the regional trend was awayfrom authoritarianismand towards the restoration of multiparty civilian rule, the Gambianpolitical system was movingin the opposite direction and experiencing militaryrule for the ® rst time. The armyand the coup The GNA is arelativelyrecent creation and a shortexamination of itsbrief history is highlyrelevant for any explanation of the new role of the army in Gambian politics.Before independence it was decidedthat the very small size ofThe Gambia,coupled with its economic backwardness and poverty, made the establishmentof an army an expensive irrelevance. It was acceptedthat peren- nialGambian fears ofdomination by Senegal, which, apart from the coastal strip,completely surrounds the smaller country, could best be dealtwith through diplomaticrather than military means, if only because the Senegalese armed JohnA Wiseman,Department of Politics,University ofNewcastle,Newcastle UponTyne, NE1 7RU, UK. 0143-6597/96/050917-24$6.00 Ó 1996Third World Quarterly 917 JOHN AWISEMAN forces wouldinevitably be vastlysuperior to anythingThe Gambia could create. Internalsecurity was leftin the hands of the Gambian Police, including a paramilitarywing known as theField Force. Followingthe 1981 coup attempt the Gambian security forces wererestruc- tured.The participation of elements of the Field Force in the attempted overthrowof theJawara governmentled to itbeingdisbanded, although loyalist members wereco-opted into the new structures. Another closely related outcome ofthe events of 1981, and armed Senegalese participation in sustaining the government,was thecreation in 1982 of the Senegambian Confederation. 5 The initialdevelopment of the GNA was as acomponentof aconfederalarmy which was dominatedby theSenegalese. At thesame timea Gambiangendarmerie was alsocreated. Inthe period of its existence the Confederation failed to resolve the tensions inherentin its unbalanced composition. The Senegalese sought to establish greaterunity but this was resistedby the Gambians seeking to protect their sovereignty vis-aÁ -vis theirmore powerful neighbours. For the Gambian govern- mentthere was alwaysa ®nedividing line between the inescapable need for cooperationwith Senegal and the constant fear ofbeingtotally overwhelmed by thelatter, and in effect being reduced to thestatus of aprovincialadministration ina greaterSenegal. In December 1989 the Senegambian Confederation was formallydissolved. The end of the Confederation meant the end of the confed- eralarmy and the withdrawal of Senegalese troops based in The Gambia. This left the GNA as anindependent force for the ® rst time.The Jawara government thenturned to Nigeria to replace the Senegalese training and command func- tions.By the time of the 1994 coup the GNA was 800strong but the senior commanderswere seconded Nigerians. In 1992the gendarmerie were integrated withthe police and given the title of Tactical Support Group ( TSG). On22 July 1994 soldiers from the GNA tookcontrol of key installations, includingthe airport and radio station, and marched on government centres in Banjul.Coincidentally a USwarship,the LaMoureCounty ,was mooredoff the coastin preparation for joint training exercises withthe GNA.PresidentJawara andseveral of his senior government colleagues, including Vice-President SaihouSabally, boarded the ship, from where Jawara appealedto the rebellious troopsto returnto barracks.When this appeal was rejectedby therebels Jawara requestedthe assistance ofthe US marines to crush the coup. The US govern- mentturned down the request for direct intervention but allowed the La Moure County totransport Jawara andhis ministers to safetyin Senegal,from where the oustedpresident moved on totheUK. 6 Bythe evening of 22July,Radio Gambia announcedthat government was inthe hands of the Armed Forces Provisional RulingCouncil ( AFPRC)ledby Lt Yahya Abdul Aziz Jamus JunkungJammeh. Asubsequentannouncement named the rest ofthe AFPRC as LtsSana Sabally, SadibouHydara, Edward Singhateh and Yankuba Touray (all were later pro- motedto the rank of Captain). Theseizure of power was achievedwithout apparent bloodshed, in spiteof the factthat Jammeh claimedthat he and his supporters had ` encountereda lotof resistancefrom the TSG’andthat ` wecame under® re¼butwe never returned any® re becausewe did not want to shed any Gambian blood’ . 7 Certainlythere 918 MILITARY RULE INTHE GAMBIA werewidespread reports of gunshotsbeing heard from within the army barracks andaround State House but it isdif®cult to reconcile AFPRC claimsof signi® cant armedresistance with the lack of any serious injury. It is notimpossible that Jammeh mighthave exaggerated the level of resistance to put his own actions ina moreheroic light : hehas subsequentlyrepeatedly stressed howhe risked hislife to ` save thecountry’ . Onealternative explanation which is widely believedin TheGambia is thatJammeh was protectedby `Jolamagic medicine’ , whichcaused bullets to bounce off him or to turn to water in mid-air. 8 Theapparent absence of bloodshed is alsoexplained by the fact that, unlike in1981, Senegalese forces didnot intervene to support the Jawara regime.In 1981over 30 Senegalese soldiers had been killed in TheGambia. No doubtthis weighedheavily in Senegalesedecision making in 1994,but it was primarilythe earliercollapse of the Senegambian Confederation which made Senegalese militaryintervention unlikely. Although Gambian civilians had mixed feelings aboutthe coup it is certainlytrue that they were extremely relieved by the fact thatthe high levels of death and violence which occurred during the 1981 coup attemptwere not repeated in 1994. Althoughthe absence of signi®cant armed resistance to the 1994 coup-makers helpsto explain why the attempt succeeded, it does not explain why the coup occurred.Explanations of military intervention are alwayscomplicated by the secrecy andconfusion surrounding the actual events, and by the inevitability of participantsseeking to present their actions in themost favourable light possible as partof the process ofattempting to legitimise the seizure of power. This is certainlythe case withthe 1994 coup in The Gambia. In the days following the coupYahya Jammeh madea numberof speeches inwhich he sought to justify theactions of the military and to persuade both internal and external audiences that the new AFPRC regimewas worthyof support, or at least should not be opposed.Predictably his reasoning was similarto that presented by many other coupleaders in other African states wheremilitary intervention had occurred in thepost-independence period. Jammeh’ sprincipalline of vindication was to presentthe action of themilitary as havingbeen necessary toprotectthe national interest,which had been subverted by theprevious regime, whom he accusedof `rampantoutrageous corruption’ and ` randomplundering of the country’ s assets tobene® t afewpeople’ . 9 Inits place he promised ` anewera offreedom, progress,democracy and accountability’ . Atthis stage Jammeh adopteda fairly conciliatoryattitude towards the ousted president, saying that ` weallknow that weowe it to him that the name of The Gambia has reachedthe international leveland we respect him’ and that ` wehavenothing against him ¼ fromtime totime we will need to consult him’ . Theproblem at that stage, according to Jammeh,was that` thepeople who were behind him misled him, were corrupt, didwhatever they wanted to do because he was toolenient’ . Jammeh even emphasisedthat his harsh criticism of members ofthe Jawara governmentwas notuniversally applicable when he said that ` thereare some goodguys in the PPP ¼weare notpainting all members ofthe PPP governmentas bador corrupt’ . Shortlyafterwards Jammeh appearedto underline this perception of the mixed qualitiesof theousted government when he appointedtwo ex- PPP ministersto his cabinet:Bakary Dabo became Minister of Finance and Fafa M’baiMinister of 919 JOHN AWISEMAN
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