CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: A COLLECTION OF KEYNOTE ADDRESSES, GUEST LECTURES, AND CONFERENCE PAPERS WITH POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THREE PLENARIES COVERING THE TOPICS: 1) REIMAGINING THE STATE 2) LOOKING BACK TO LOOK FORWARD – REVITALIZING INDIGENOUS INSTITUTIONS 3) NEW APPROACHES TO JUST AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT The Oromo Studies Association 33rd Annual Conference Proceedings

A New Frontier: Ushering in Lasting Change in Oromia, Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa

July 26-28, 2019

Rift Valley University – Conference Hall

Finfinnee, Oromia

Editorial Committee: Kulani Jalata Robera Tasissa Biftu Yousuf Galan Wako Merertu Kitila Siyade Gemechisa Lello Guluma Dear Readers,

The Oromo Studies Association (OSA) hosted the 33rd annual academic conference in Finfinnee, Oromia on July 26-28, 2019 – the first time in the organization’s history to host a conference in the heart of Oromia. Hosting the OSA annual conference in Oromia provided a historic and unique opportunity to bring together local and diaspora scholars, students, activists and the larger community at a special transitional time in which Ethiopia is facing immense challenges with reforming and democratizing.

Themed A New Frontier: Ushering in Lasting Change in Oromia, Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, the conference served as an institutional platform for renowned and budding scholars to present evidence-based policy considerations and recommendations for entering a new frontier in the country that reimagines governance, the economy, the environment, institutional infrastructure, and the study and use of indigenous knowledge. The conference presentations were divided into three plenaries: 1) Reimagining the State, 2) Looking Back to Look Forward - Revitalizing Indigenous Institutions, and 3) New Approaches to Just and Sustainable Development. The conference served as a forum among scholars and experts for constructive debate about how to reimagine just and sustainable systems that advance peace, democracy, self-determination, development and justice through public policy and law.

Following the conference, keynote speakers, guest speakers, and most of the conference presenters from each of the three plenaries voluntarily submitted papers with policy recommendations to be included in the 33rd OSA Conference Proceedings. The Editorial Committee is proud to share this collection of policy papers with OSA members, supporters and interested institutions and organizations. Our main objective is to not simply memorialize the presentations from the conference, but to provide interested institutions, organizations, scholars and students with access to diverse and enriching perspectives and policies regarding how to reform and reimagine a diverse, multinational federal state that is democratic, just, sustainable, peaceful and incorporative of indigenous knowledge. Please note that the views and opinions of the authors do not necessarily state or reflect that of OSA.

We acknowledge the peaceful protest movement of the youth generation, the qeerroo and qarree, who, together with their counterparts throughout the country, held onto a vision of democracy, justice and equality and made the ultimate sacrifice that has brought us into this new era in Oromia and Ethiopia. We commit OSA to addressing this opportunity created by the youth and to carrying forward this project of producing and sharing our collective knowledge to reimagine and ultimately contribute to transforming Oromia, Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.

Sincerely, Kulani Jalata Table of Contents

Keynote Speakers 1. Dr. Mohammed Hassen, Georgia State University – The Road Traversed by the Oromo Studies Association Since 1986...... 1 2. Dr. Bonnie Holcomb—Reimagining Power: The Challenge of Centering the Dominated Majority of Ethiopia...... 6 Guest Speakers 3. Dr. John Markakis, University of Crete - Solving Ethiopia’s Governance Challenges...... 18 4. Mr. Kalundi Serumaga, The Marcus Garvey Pan-Afrikan Institute - Let the Daylight Finally Come...... 27 5. Dr. Sandra Shell, Rhodes University – Two Oromo Children of Hope: The Braided Biographies of Tolassa Wayessa and Bisho Jarsa...... 41 6. Dr. Ayele Gelan, Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research – Putting a Spotlight on Ethiopia's Economic Idiosyncrasies...... 53 Plenary 1: Reimagining the State – Discourses on Multinational Federalism, Integrating Democratic Indigenous Institutions, and Urbanization and Identity 7. Dr. Bekele Gutema, Addis Ababa University – Multination Federalism and the Notion of Identity...... 76 8. Obbo Getachew Gudina Dinagde, Council of Constitutional Inquiry – An Indigenous Unwritten Constitution: Examining the Gadaa Governance System in Light of Modern Democratic Constitutional Principles...... 92 9. Dr. Getahun Benti, Southern Illinois University-Carbondale – Targeting of Oromo Towns and the Prospects of Development in Oromiya...... 108 10. Dr. Mekuria Bulcha, The Nordic Africa Institute – Discourses for and Against the De- Oromization of Finfinnee...... 119 11. Dr. Tekleab Gala and Dr. Lucas Boakye, Chicago State University – Monitoring the 32 years of Addis Ababa Urbanization from Space...... 139

Plenary 2: Looking Back to Look Forward - Revitalizing Indigenous Institutions

12. Dr. Abiyot Eliyas Anbacha, Norwegian University of Life Sciences – Borana Women’s Indigenous Social Network, Marro: Building Household Food Security...... 159 13. Dr. Aliimaa Jibriil Huseen and Garramaa Yaadataa Bultoo, Qaaccessa Mammaaksota Olaantummaa Dhiiraa Ibsan: Godian Horroo Guduruu Wallaggaa, Aanaa Guduruu Irrati Kan Xiyyeeffate...... 165 14. Dr. Abebu Oljira Gemeda and Dr. Dereje Fufa Bidu, Jimma University – Using Oromo Folk Institutions for Women Empowerment...... 174 15. Dr. Alemu Disassa Mulleta, Adama Science and Technology University – Persuasive Discourse Strategies in Jaarsumma, an Indigenous Method of Conflict Resolution among Arsi Oromo...... 192 16. Obbo Lemessa Wakgari, Mettu University - Exploring Problems and Prospects in Revitalizing Gadaa: The Case of Odaa Doggii...... 207 17. Rev. Dr. Benti Ujulu Tesso, Evangelical Church of Hannover and Friedrich Schiller University – The Significance of Revitalization of Gadaa and Oromo Indigenous Religion in Achieving Lasting Change in Ethiopia in General and in Oromia in Particular...... 222 18. Obbo Asnake Erko, Global Council of Waqqeffanna – The Revitalization of Waqqeffanna and its Importance in Transforming Values of Humanness and Peace...... 239 19. Obbo Muluken Kassahun Amid, Mettu University School of Law – Incorporation of the Oromo’s Gadaa System into Ethiopia’s and the Oromia Regional State’s Constitutions...... 250

Plenary 3: New Approaches to Just and Sustainable Development 20. Dr. Asebe Regassa, Dilla University – The Political Economy of Gold Mining in Ethiopia: Exclusion, Discrimination and Local Resistance Against MIDROC Laga-Dambi Gold-Mine, Southern Ethiopia...... 266 21. Dr. Marco Bassi, University of Palermo – Relativistic International Development and its Potential for Implementing Self-Determination in Ethiopia: Policy Recommendations...... 281 22. Dr. Moa Megersa, Jimma University – Indigenous water treatment knowledge by Konso communities...... 294 23. Dr. Oli Bachie (University of California) and Dr. Worku Burayu (The University of Arizona Cooperative Extension)– Utilizing Local and Global Knowledge for Sustainable Agricultural Production: Lessons from Oromiya and the American Low Desert...... 304 24. Dr. Sabine Tröeger, Universität Bonn – Pastoralist Societies in Lower Omo- Dynamics in Societal Transformation...... 319 25. Obbo Hirko Wakgari, Addis Ababa University - Youth Unemployment in Ethiopia: Demographic and Policy Perspectives...... 331 26. Dr. Dereje Tadesse Birbirso, Haramaya University - Qeerroo Movement, Gadaa Didactics and Critical Pedagogy: Application and Implications for Collective Critical Action for Change...... 348 Keynote Address The Road Traversed by the Oromo Studies Association since 1986 Mohammed Hassen Before the formation of the Oromo Studies Association (OSA) in 1986, there was a decade long gestation period. The seeds of Oromo studies were planted during the 1970s with the formation of the Union of Oromo students both in Europe and the United States. Oromo nationals who were lucky enough to be beyond the reaches of the long arms of the Ethiopian state gathered annually to discuss about powerlessness, rightlessness and denial of the most basic democratic rights - the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness - not to mention the arbitrary arrests, torture, confiscation of property and the endless detention of Oromos and other peoples in Ethiopia in numerous jails. Though modest, both unions decided to be the voice of the voiceless Oromo people. Both student unions established their own journals, which were devoted entirely to exploring the Oromo experience under successive Ethiopian regimes. Both student unions took serious interest in Oromo history because their people were considered as a people without history, even though, there are no people in the world without history. Both student unions also focused on the development of the Oromo language, that was “denied any official status as it was not permissible to publish, preach, teach or broadcast in” that language in Ethiopia up to 1974. The next important step in advancing the journey towards the realization of what was then only a distant dream was in 1979 when Bonnie Holcomb, Dr. Hamdessa Tusso, the late Sisai Ibssa and Lube Birru started the tradition of presenting papers on Oromo studies at international conferences in the United States. In those days, it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to present scholarly papers on the Oromo issue, as the field was dominated by Ethiopianist scholars, and their expatriate supporters, who did everything possible to silence scholarly voices about the Oromo. The 1984 Berlin conference, which was organized by the Union of Oromo students in Europe, attracted scholars from the USA, several European countries and even from the Horn of Africa. At that conference, Oromo and expatriate scholars emphasized the importance of having a scholarly organization that will chart the road map for the ownership and control over Oromo historical narratives, while at the same time deconstructing centuries old anti-Oromo myths, prejudices, untruths and negative images about the Oromo in Ethiopian historical and non- historical literature. The establishment of OSA in 1986 The Oromo Studies Association was established in the United States in 1986 by Oromo and expatriate scholars. Its establishment was an event without drama, and it took OSA two to three years to capture the imagination of the Oromo Diaspora in the US and Canada. Nevertheless, its establishment was an important landmark because the organization consistently generated, disseminated and promoted knowledge about the Oromo not only at its annual conferences, but also at African Studies Association annual conferences, at the conferences on the Horn of Africa as well as at several other scholarly organizations conferences. In short, OSA members have an unrivaled record of promoting scholarship on the Oromo, at many international scholarly meetings in North America, Europe, Africa and even in Australia for the purpose of informing and educating the world about the Oromo people.

1 OSA is an independent international scholarly organization, and a non-profit organization. It is an interdisciplinary, scholarly organization, whose members promote and foster with much more vigor and rigor, studies on the Oromo and other people of Ethiopia so that their yearning for democratic governance, respect for human rights and social justice will be better in the future than what they had endured in the past. OSA has remained an academic organization free from political sanctions and restrictions to promote Oromo-centered scholarship. That scholarship is drawn upon by many in the pursuit of several dimensions of freedom for Oromo and other people of Ethiopia – freedom for basic human dignity, freedom to be citizens who are respected rather than subjects to be abused with impunity, freedom from unlawful killings, freedom from arbitrary arrests, freedom to have the right to decide on resources – freedoms of which Oromo and other conquered people have been deprived of in all the decades of OSA’s existence. The main objectives of OSA include (but are not limited to): (1) to serve as the umbrella organization in guiding, developing and promoting serious scholarship on the history, economy, health, education, politics and welfare of the Oromo and other people in Ethiopia, and (2) to foster understanding between the Oromo and other people in Ethiopia. OSA membership is open to all Oromos and non-Oromos regardless of their beliefs and political views. Consequently, OSA members include Oromos, Americans, Canadians, Europeans and many other nationals. From 1986 to 2005, OSA organized annual conferences at universities in the USA and Canada. Since 2006, it has added midyear conferences, held in several cities in the USA and one in Canada. Since 2015, the midyear conferences were held in Europe at such prestigious universities such as the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich (2015), the London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE (2016), the Oslo and Akershus University College of Applied Sciences (2017), and again at LSE in London in 2018. Altogether, OSA has organized thirty-two successful annual conferences. Several of the papers presented at OSA conferences have been developed into articles and book chapters by their authors. Annual and midyear conference programs and activities were designed specially to provide cultural and social opportunities for the Oromo Diaspora while simultaneously enhancing, enriching and expanding the frontier of Oromo-centered knowledge. There is valid reason for focusing on the creation of such knowledge. This is because, for far too long, the Oromo as a people have been defined by the Ethiopian ruling elites, who depicted the Oromo as a people without history and civilization, thus consigning Oromo cultural heritage to the dust bin of history for the purpose of (1) belittling the Oromo way of life, religious and democratic political institutions; (2) breaking the Oromo in body, soul and spirit so as to dehumanize and reduce them to a condition of helplessness and dejection and (3) undermining Oromo national identity. OSA’s important achievement was in 1993, when it launched The Journal of Oromo Studies (JOS), a peer reviewed journal. From 1993 to 2006, OSA published a single-issue or double volume each year. However, when Professor Ezekiel Gebissa was JOS Editor, he ably produced two separate issues of JOS each year for several years, which was an admirable achievement. Twenty-five issues of JOS were published regularly since 1993. OSA’s limited income is generated from annual membership dues, registration fees, and occasional donations by some of its generous members for supporting guest speakers, and the support of a few

2 universities for its annual conferences. In short, without any consistent financial support from any institution, it was a remarkable achievement for OSA to have published its journal on time for twenty-five years, which makes JOS, arguably one of the most successful journals in the Horn of Africa. Though modest, this achievement reflects the commitment of OSA members and the dedication of JOS editors and the contributors of articles by a small group of Oromo and non- Oromo scholars. JOS has published articles on diverse issues ranging from the crises of governance, human rights violations, indigenous farming knowledge, customary laws in Ethiopia, Meroitic/Oromo continuity, comparing Oromo and ancient Egyptian philosophy, the Invisible actors, the Oromo system of time-reckoning, Oromo cosmology and conception of the natural order, interpretations of deliberative democracy, to Oromo theory of knowledge and other dimensions of Oromo life. JOS has also published articles on non-Oromo issues. These issues have been studied from multidisciplinary perspectives by scholars who are trained in various fields ranging from the humanities and social sciences to mathematicians, medical doctors, scientists and engineers who apply their sophisticated methods to studying society and culture. The Library of Congress and several university libraries in North America as well as a few European universities subscribe to JOS. I know for certain that OSA has been sending free copies of JOS to Addis Ababa University, the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Jimma University, Haromaya University. In June 2008, OSA sent numerous digitalized CDs of all previous issues of OSA journals to be distributed freely to all the universities and colleges in Ethiopia. In November 2014, OSA paid for the shipping to Jimma University of hundreds of books, theses, and dissertations, donated by the widow of the late Dr. Paul Baxter, my mentor and dear friend, who produced scholarship on the Oromo both in Ethiopia and Kenya. He also presented papers at OSA annual conferences and was a recipient of the OSA Lifetime Award. I hope the OSA Board of Directors will take initiative for collecting donations of funds from its members for the purpose of shipping between 500 to 600 copies of the previous issues of The Journal of Oromo Studies to all the colleges and universities in Ethiopia. If a few minds are changed after reading JOS articles at different universities in Ethiopia, probably ignorance about the negative image of the Oromo in Ethiopian historiography and literature will be reduced. Sociologist More states that, “Ignorance has many forms, and all of them are dangerous", which may be true for many countries, including Ethiopia. To mitigate the danger of ignorance, it is important to create an intellectual climate in which the young men and women of Ethiopia will be able to learn each other’s authentic history, not grotesque distortions; truths, not falsehoods; cultural achievements, not primitiveness; and Cushitic language speakers’ achievements, not only Semitic ones. I believe the road to a peaceful democratic Federal Republic of Ethiopia lies not in ignorance, prejudice and destructive hatred (the harvest of past injustice) but in knowledge-building, mutual understanding, trust, tolerance and respect for each national or ethnic group’s cultural achievements. So far, I focused on OSA’s achievements across three decades. However, during its intellectual journey, OSA faced challenges. What is more, OSA must expand its scholarly endeavor beyond the Oromo issue. First, there were times when OSA was challenged by internal conflicts. Such conflicts are not limited to OSA. Afterall, conflict is inherent in human society as it is part and parcel of life

3 itself. Any living and functioning organization is bound to have conflicts; only dead organizations have no conflicts. OSA, as a living and vibrant scholarly association, had and will have “its share of misunderstanding, conflict and ideological clashes amongst its members.” Let me quote a few words from the OSA Newsletter of October 1992, which I was editing at that time. “For us this conflict is like a family quarrel. Members of a family may quarrel on some issues and yet they remain a healthy functional family. For us, OSA members are members of one family who agree to disagree on some issues and still work together. OSA members realized that things they agreed upon were far greater and more important for production of knowledge that renders the Oromo as visible actors in Ethiopia”. In 1992, the overwhelming majority of OSA members realized that they can make a difference in the production of knowledge about the Oromo, only if they are united in purpose, in action, and avoid the mindset of my way or the highway. They realized that they had a moral responsibility and a scholarly duty to work collectively, responsibly, courageously and consciously, neither dramatizing conflicts of the moment nor exaggerating family misunderstandings as irreconcilable disagreements. That was how OSA members faced the challenges of the early 1990s collectively and bravely through democratic elections of their leaders. For your information, from 1990-2019, OSA members democratically elected 22 of their presidents, which is one of the keys for OSA’s continuing success. Second, over the years, Oromo and expatriate scholars deconstructed the distortions of Oromo history, society, economy, language, and culture. Now, there is an urgent need for scholarly exploration about the relationship between the Oromo, the Amhara, the Hadiya, the Harari, the Kambata, the Sidama, the Somali, and other people of Ethiopia. This is crucial as it is through knowledge that a bridge of understanding and tolerance can be built between and among people. It is also through knowledge that we will be able to overcome the bitterness of the past and see intellectually beyond the past injustice, and envision a better future for all the people of Ethiopia - a democratic future based on respect for human rights and democratic governance - in which the flowering of languages and the renaissance of cultures in Ethiopia will be nurtured, allowing diverse people to exercise their democratic rights without impinging upon the rights of others.

Looking Forward: Policy Recommendations

First, for three decades, it was loyalty to the canons of the scientific method that guided JOS publications. This is because only solid academic scholarship stands the test of time. JOS publications must continue with the same tradition of excellence, while handling contentious issues objectively, rigorous commitment to truth based on solid data that provide insights into complex issues. Second, members of OSA widely believe that the multilayered knowledge we now possess about the Oromo gadaa system, produced over time by many OSA members, including Professor Asmarom Legesse and many others is one factor that made it possible to elevate awareness and understanding necessary for UNESCO to make an informed decision to inscribe the Oromo gadaa system as an intangible cultural heritage of humanity in November 2016.

4 Oromo scholars must intensify production of knowledge about the gada system for facilitating UNESCO’s inscription of the gada system as a tangible heritage of humanity. Third, OSA has great potential in expanding knowledge not only about the Oromo but also about their relationship with the other peoples of Ethiopia for emancipating minds seeking freedom, justice, dignity and human rights. Production of knowledge about the other peoples of Ethiopia will be an investment in the future wellbeing of the Oromo and other people of Ethiopia. Fourth, traditional Oromo enemies, who lost power since 1991 are currently returning to power with their strong anti-Oromo prejudice nourished by a historical desire for undermining Oromo national identity. Under the circumstance, Oromo scholars must double and triple production of knowledge about Oromo identity that grew out of rich and sophisticated democratic heritage so that there will not be a turning back to the days of anti-Oromo prejudice. Finally, OSA must continue holding its conferences in Oromia in the future. As stated in the 2019 conference theme announcement, “by holding its annual conference in Oromia in 2019, OSA extends its platform and celebrates the opportunity for local scholars, experts and other intellectuals in the region, both Oromos and others, to participate in the production of knowledge in the new political opening.” The theme announcement further noted that, “This year there is a special call for academics and researchers from other groups long marginalized by the Ethiopian state to participate and collaborate by sharing experiences and vision for ushering in lasting change in Ethiopia, Oromia and the Horn of Africa”. OSA must take the lead in production of knowledge while encouraging scholars from other long-marginalized groups to do the same for the purpose of building bridges of understanding and mitigating the danger of ignorance between the Oromo and other oppressed people in Ethiopia. In short, it is my hope that OSA will continue holding its conferences in Oromia, which will increase production of knowledge which will be an important investment in building the bridge of understanding between the Oromo and other people of Ethiopia.

5 Reimagining Power: The Challenge of Centering the Dominated Majority in Ethiopia

Bonnie K Holcomb – Keynote Remarks Oromo Studies Association 2019 Annual Conference July 26, 2019, Finfinnee/Addis Ababa, Oromia

Greetings It has been 46 years since I left Oromia with a plan to come back. Let’s see if you can understand my Afaan Oromo after all these years; Ashammaa, ijolay Oromoo! Jirtuu?? [response: Jirraa!] Ijolay Sidama, jirtuu? Ijolay Somali, jirtuu? Ijolay Konso, Jirtuu? Ijolay Ethiopia, Jirtuu? Ijolay Qeerroo, Jirtuu? Ijolay Qarree, Jirtuu? Baga jiradhaa!

I thank the brave qeerroo (young men) and qarree (young women) who have opened the way for me and many others to come to Oromia. It means a lot for me to be here and I would not have come under other circumstances.

The power of the resistance movement that originated from the dominated once- conquered regions and groups in the country has awakened Oromia and many other parts of Ethiopia. The Qeerroo-Qarree have vindicated my conviction that Oromummaa (Oromo-ness) is too powerful to suppress forever. I think that the reason you succeeded at creating this opening is because you have drawn on Oromo cultural wealth to conduct a peaceful campaign to bring a brutal and violent state to collapse. I have always believed that it was possible for Oromo and others who have been dominated in Ethiopia to draw from that deep wellspring of strength and vision to build a different future for everyone in the region.

My message to the youth, and about the youth, is that the youth of Oromia and from other parts of Ethiopia can and should now play a leading role in building a multinational, federal democratic republic of Ethiopia. Currently Ethiopia does not function as a multinational federation, but it can, and it must. Today, I want to explore with you a vision for how that can happen and what I see is the role of the youth as activists in that process and of the Oromo Studies Association’s (OSA)’s role and the role of scholars generally in supporting them.

First, I thank particularly Kulani Jalata, OSA President, a Qarree herself, and OSA for inviting me to explore with you this topic Reimagining Power: the Challenge of Centering the Dominated Majority in Ethiopia. Let us reimagine power in Ethiopia together, not as coming from the barrel of a gun or from the ability to employ brute force and weaponry, but rather, coming from the spirit and the conscious demand of an active populace determined to build new political and economic relationships.

We might have thought that we knew what power consists of, i.e., the ability to control others through coercion and access to Western technologies and the ability to acquire wealth and to gain and protect privilege. What has been revealed in the Qeerroo fii Qarree movement is that there are vast reserves of power that have lain invisible to the outside world that are as yet

6 untapped for national well-being and development. Youth are positioned to draw on these other sources of power: the power of organization, the energy of a new generation, the power of culture, the power of ancient wisdom, the power to produce wealth from the earth, the power of siqqee to heal and repair.

Now it's time to go to the next stage. People who have been long marginalized have opened the space for a transition and are poised to move into it. We are standing at an historic juncture. We scholars of OSA are ready to assist to build an alternative type of society to replace what has collapsed. In this undertaking, we will undoubtedly encounter strong forces who want to salvage, rebuild and upgrade the state that has just fallen. But that system needs to be dismantled and replaced for the good of all. For this next stage you, the youth, stand at the juncture of history between the past era of top-down domination and the future era of decentralization. You are also juxtaposed between two worlds. On the one hand, the connection that you have with rural producers (who some refer to as “peasants”) is critical. You still have active relationship and understanding with them. Your roots are there, you are grounded there. On the other hand, the connection you have with forces in the international community, including knowledge of global issues and technologies, is also critical. Your future will be engaged with both worlds.

From what I have seen so far, the people who had the right vision, the right strategy, and developed the right tools for how to change the country for the good are the youth. In the Oromo case, the Qeerroo and the Qarree. However, there are several individuals and groups who would now say to you, "Thank you for your courageous efforts and sacrifices removing the old regime from its position. It’s something we couldn’t do. We appreciate this opening. This is good for us. We'll take it from here." Well, I am here to thank you for creating an opening. It is the political opening that I stepped through to be here with you today. But I am here to encourage you to take the struggle from here yourselves. Take the lead; let us scholars and others know how we can best help you to create a transformed society.

It's appropriate among Oromos for youth to take a leading role as the society adapts to change. Qeerroo are doing what the Gadaa expects of you. The Qeerroo have stepped into an age and culturally appropriate role that Gadaa assigns to young people. They are given the task to venture out, to take responsibility for valuable assets – usually the family herd, the livestock – and to learn the lay of the land. They encounter the danger or the opportunity that is out there, assess the circumstances, bring the information home to a settled population and then prepare to step into the role of leadership. Oromos have always set great store by the youth and given them a great deal and expected a great deal from them in return. This is true for this generation as well.

Let me introduce myself. The older people listening may know me, the younger people do not. I am an anthropologist and a friend of the Oromo. I have seen glimpses of the breathtaking potentiality of an ancient culture that deserves to be elevated, studied and put into practice alongside major world philosophies. After my first experiences with the Oromo, I have lived through a lifetime witnessing Oromo efforts to seek peace but to be unfairly painted negatively, ridiculed, demeaned, sidelined and often dismissed as a people.

7 People often ask me, “How did you become interested in the Oromo?” I first heard about the Oromo from a missionary who was a friend of my father. He had come to raise money for their mission in Ethiopia and we invited him for dinner at our house after church. I was in high school. This man referred to the people as “Gallas.” He told us that American missionaries were invited by Haile Selassie to Christianize the “Gallas”. He and his wife responded to that call. I was curious about the people, and he told us that there wasn’t much written about them. He told me that if I was interested to learn about the “Gallas” I should take anthropology courses in college. I was surprised when he told me that he and his wife were not learning the language of the people but the language of the government, Amharic. He said they had no choice. Learning Amharic was required for missionaries. This was in 1966. He explained to me that this was the direction of the future: all people would eventually learn Amharic and the other languages would fall away.

I went to college, where I studied anthropology. When I graduated, I was a political activist. I had been involved in the 1960s student movement in Pennsylvania. I traveled to Oromia as a young anthropologist. I was the age of qarree. I was interested to meet these people, who I knew to be “Oromo.” I first stayed with missionaries, these friends of my fathers. We fought. I moved into other living arrangements. But at the time, I was involved in every part of Oromo life, going around the local area, learning the culture and the language. One day during my first few months in Oromia under the shade of a big tree after harvesting xaaffi, I was given the name Qabannee by Oromos in the country. They asked me, "Where is your father?" I said, "Well, in this country, God is watching over me. I have always loved the name they gave me, Qabannee Waaqayoo. Nobody recruited me to an Oromo cause. My research assistant and the local population in the Horo Guduru and Ambo areas had been exposed to the consciousness raising of Machaa Tulamaa Self-Help Association. They thought it was natural that someone would be interested to learn about Oromummaa. They did teach me. The rural producers welcomed me and I was exposed to the beauty of the culture and the life-affirming power of the ancient traditions that brought daily life into focus.

I was also exposed to the injustices which the Oromo experienced daily. If I had gone to another place, I might have responded the same way seeing injustice, but I happened to be in Oromia. I experienced there the power of mutual respect, deliberation, and the constant work of keeping peace through finding balance. I felt it and engaged in it. One day two young men intervened when they saw that I was having problems with an associate. "We see that you're having a problem. We're going to help you take care of it." At first my response was, "Do I know you?" This was my introduction to the shared responsibility of everyone to keep the peace.

I lived with the power of drawing sustenance from the land and intimate understandings of the weather, the wild animals, the pollinators, the seeds, the soil. I observed the power of strong relationships that bound the community together, the deep deliberations. I taped the discussions and went over the recordings later so that I could understand the real sophistication involved in coming up with brilliant inclusive, balanced and fair solutions. I was privy to all that.

8 On the other hand, traveling with Oromo hosts, I witnessed the stark realities of the advantage enjoyed by Amharic-speaking settlers, of Ethiopian Orthodox churches built on hilltops that owned large forested properties where everyone in the district had to be buried under force of law. I watched while the priests replaced Oromo names with Amhara names for local children at baptism and how they behaved and spoke with contempt for the culture that I was learning, even questioned me about why I would want to learn it. I saw the way the system seemed to be rigged to suppress the Oromo. I observed that people who could speak Amharic accepted fees for every sort of government-required service. I saw the enormous productivity of the farms’ agricultural output mixed with livestock rearing and I then watched as three quarters of the produce was taken away for “obligations” to the land-lords and authorities, which included the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. I saw the discrepancy between what butter and grain sold for in the rural market and its price in the cities when I visited there. I saw that those who were becoming wealthy from Oromo produce demonized Oromo as “pagan”, “backward”, “alien”, “outsiders.” I saw the Oromos’ disadvantage in the courts, the markets, the businesses, the government offices. I saw the exorbitant amounts charged to get things translated to “facilitate” connections with the authorities, to meet the “law” or to appeal to stay out of prison for behaviors that amounted to living one’s life as an Oromo. One such offense was treating people as equal rather than behaving obsequiously in the presence of a person considered powerful. I myself was taken into custody in a local police station, accused by the police chief of “breaking the law” by trying to learn the Oromo language in the marketplace. The police chief did not speak Afaan Oromo. He informed me that white people were supposed to learn only Amharic, the official language. The Protestant missionary, who had learned Amharic, bailed me out.

I departed Oromia 46 years ago in 1973, having been exposed to a great people and a beautiful, sophisticated way of life that I deeply appreciated through experience with Oromo primarily in the rural areas. I had also been exposed to great injustice. My perspective was a view from below.

In the US, I prepared to return to Oromia and completed study in anthropology, but the Dergue came to power and refused entry into Ethiopia for what they deemed “imperialist” research. In graduate school through my course of theoretical and practical study, I subjected my experience to analysis and concluded in my course papers and seminars that the Oromo experience in Ethiopia was a sort of surrogate colonialism carried out by Africans with the assistance of European superpowers. I compared it to Portuguese surrogate colonialism in Africa, put into practice in league with powerful European superpowers. I concluded that Ethiopia, rather than achieving an independence from Europe, was more correctly viewed as the first example of “neocolonialism” in Africa.

In the universities, in policy circles, even socially, I encountered in diaspora the stark divide between privileged Ethiopians who carried their attitudes toward those marginalized from the conquered areas of Ethiopia like the white supremacists in America carried their attitudes toward black Americans. The line of discrimination was not race, however, but language and culture, so it was not visible to others. I encountered a politics of domination conducted by a privileged Ethiopian elite everywhere, including a scholarship of domination in academia and practices of domination in international policy and diplomatic circles.

9 I eventually found Oromos who had come to the US to study or escape imprisonment by the Haile Selassie or the Dergue regimes. Some of them were part of the Ethiopian Students Union of North America (ESUNA). I met Sisai Ibssa, an Oromo from Bacho, who had been expelled from the ESUNA for asserting that Oromo were colonized subjects of Ethiopia. He and I had come to the same assessment independently. We began to collaborate. We gave papers at conferences. We wrote The Kindling Point series (1984-2002). We were founders of OSA to encourage scholarship free of domination.

We published The Invention of Ethiopia in 1990. In that book we identified three key features that remained consistent among successive Ethiopian regimes concluding that:

“Understanding the relationship of the imperial powers and Abyssinia is primary to understanding the nature of Abyssinia’s assisted conquest and of the Ethiopian colonialism that followed. Due to the place that has been carved out for Ethiopia as a junior partner of imperialist nations and a colonizer within the international sphere, and also in order to maintain its prescribed position in the world economic order, each successive Ethiopian regime has had to face and successfully made three basic requirements to retain power. Each must 1) maintain an alliance with an imperial superpower, 2) provide an adequate basis for the growth and protection of the Abyssinian settler class, 3) maintain control over a colonized majority within the empire. Confronting the same basic challenges has led to this use of such remarkably similar devices to retain power that those devices can be identified as basic components of the Ethiopian dependent colonial formula” (1990:9).

These features keep that peculiar type of dependent colonial system intact. A major issue at stake in the historical moment we are in – an announced transition to democracy -- is whether these features will be altered, overturned, dismantled or whether they will be replaced or transformed. We stand at the brink of the third transition that I have witnessed in my lifetime. The other two, in 1974 and 1991, closed quite quickly.

Looking at Ethiopia now, what has changed since the publication of The Invention of Ethiopia? My observation is that the fundamental relations of production have not changed. Of course, there have been a lot of changes at the top. Libraries of books have been written, and articles published extolling changes have come to Ethiopia. The changes that have been made have been superficial from the point of view of the producers. In the view from below, which is from my vantage point, structural way the state relates to the producer remains intact. Now is the time for that arrangement to change. The Dergue and the TPLF regimes altered surprisingly little about the centralized structure of the state, despite different styles and rhetoric. Its central features still relate to the vast majority of producers in a way that first gave advantage to a settler class that has now grown into an urban elite. Patterns of privilege and patterns of exploitation persist.

A large majority of the population continues to be subjugated by a tiny minority. Sisai and I argued in the 19080s that this sort of dominance was only possible because of the external supply of coercive and administrative support, advice, and technical support received by the

10 Ethiopian state from global superpowers. This formula is still at work, and the minority has grown from a settler advantage to an urban elite.

This group of privileged urban elites has largely favored a centralized state model and has opposed sovereignty in many forms for the groups that make up the dominated majority, whether in the form of land rights, granting of federal working language status for once-conquered peoples, decentralization of the economy, language autonomy within the Orthodox church, local determination of physical infrastructure, release of monopoly controls on marketing, access to capital etc. Fundamental shifts that would bring the dominated majority toward the center prompt objections from this group. For Ethiopia to become a just, inclusive and democratic society. The majority primary producers in the country need to become free of that domination. The requisite component parts are in place for such a change to take place. The driving force is the Qerroos/Qarre. They are vast motivated, energized labor force and are well positioned. They are educated. They still have connection with producers, and many of them are the first-generation to be educated. The material resources are present. These resources fuel the bulk of the country's foreign exports already. The momentum is present.

A system of multinational federalism is drawn up in the 1995 Ethiopian constitution but the country has not lived into that arrangement. Qeerroo have advocated that implementing federalism will make an honest country out of Ethiopia. It is called the “Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia”! But currently Ethiopia is not functioning as federal, it is not democratic, and it is not a republic. The majority of the population is rural yearn for a multinational arrangement. They are farmers and herders. Agriculture occupies 85% of the population of Ethiopia. Six percent are pastoralists who make their entire living from livestock rearing. The many nations with impressive legacies, cultures, and languages what multinational federation. Their children are seeking prosperity and demanding access to opportunity. They cannot be suppressed by force anymore. If they are, there will be a disastrous outcome. At this point people from the periphery have managed to overthrow the state. They just laid bare the structural arrangements and revealed the actual rather than the purported dynamic of this country.

The success of the peaceful resistance rested in their understanding of the real relationships among the sectors of the country, especially the concentration of the country’s resources in the center, the Finfinnee/Addis Ababa metropolitan area. Non-violent civil disobedience, in the form of road closures and market boycotts, focused on the choked the surplus extraction mechanism which moves most key resources from the producers in the rural areas to the center. Road closures effectively cut off the import and export business concentrated in the center. When the five entryways to the capital were blocked, it became apparent that all telecommunication, water supply, electricity, processing and produce are nearly monopolized in the capital and only a few other cities. Addis Ababa serves as the engine driving the entire economy. Everything ground to a dramatic halt. Note that many of the services mentioned here pass through several villages and towns which have no access to those services.

11 The resistance also revealed that local government primarily serves as conduits to the center and does not really function much otherwise. People just stopped obeying them. This widened the opening, revealing sources of power that have gone unrecognized and that have always carried the state along. In those long-neglected areas indigenous institutions have continued to function, peace has been kept, productivity has continued. There's been a huge amount of pain absorbed but they've continued to function and are still accessible. This is our area of interest. These long-neglected rural areas are the dominated area where the vast majority have carried the burden. It is their children who demand change.

How does the dominated majority come into the center? It starts with re-centering on the rural areas bringing youth and producers together. The youth, as the catalyst can initiate, making the first moves, and offering the key contribution. By assisting with organizing the producers, they can assess the baseline capacities, bring assets together and play a critical germinating role. If we are exploring a vision of a decentralized Ethiopia, we want to look at redistributing the opportunities and redirecting investment into the rural areas where the vast population resides.

There is no need to make Addis Ababa any bigger than it is right now. There is no need to bring more people in. There is no need to invest in another skyscraper, another road, another massive venue, another hotel with a bigger lobby, another industrial park when residents in the dominated majority – who are also officially citizens of Ethiopia – are without roads, clinics, emergency services, or even a motorbike to get them to help. Opportunities need to open up in the rural area providing massive numbers of new jobs for the youth. They are already educated, or they can be retrained, in urban planning, engineering and entrepreneurship. They are positioned and motivated to offer and to build creative local design for new road networks, neighborhoods, water supplies, sewage, energy supply, electrical power, telecommunications, community centers, libraries, schools and performance venues.

The process could start at the regional state level. A progressive state government could send and train youth. This morning at this conference we heard the first mention of some kind of national service. The grandparents of these Qerroo-Qarree were out in the 1970s with the Zemecha service introducing land reform. A start from the grassroots could be promoted with the youth playing a critical role in facilitating and pushing producers to be recognized and legitimized. The regional government could break the monopoly on access to markets, open doors for new middlemen to compete, and could start to authorize all kinds of local enterprise.

So how to do that? I suggest that youth consider initiating producer-centered development. These can be launched specifically through the creation of forums that create producer cooperatives. These are the kinds of solutions that could benefit all across the country. Historically dominated, marginalized and invisible farmers and herders of livestock could be brought into the center, first into the center of the deliberation and then into the center of the decision-making and implementation and could enable producers to share deliberate, decide, and then benefit from the fruits of their labor. It is a matter of economy. It is a matter of shared prosperity. It is a matter of justice.

12 Scholars and agricultural specialists need to reimagine the potential of this currently suppressed sector of producers and start respecting them as actors. We all need to reimagine the whole of Oromia and of Ethiopia in a way that includes this vast majority as the beneficiaries of what they have produced and will continue to produce. The way I see it, the Qeerroo-Qarree and other youth across the country who led this resistance, who demanded a halt to land confiscation and call for rights of free speech, are intimately connected to these dominated producers. They are positioned to lead with a vision, to safeguard the rights and interests of the producers within the regional state. This is empowering the producers through decentralization.

Let us take an example. Ethiopia has the largest livestock herd in Africa. It is the fifth largest herd in the world behind the United States. The United States, the land of cowboys and the open range, is ranked fourth. This is huge. Ethiopia is only one spot behind the United States. So what happens to those products? Who benefits?

Let's look at just one aspect: milk. That's an area where Ethiopia’s huge livestock herd becomes very relevant. At the rural level, a single family will have a couple of cows, maybe up to 20 cows, depending on how well off the family is. They all produce milk. Right now, milk processing plants are in Finfinnee. Producers collect the milk and take it to Finfinnee, where it is semi-processed, pasteurized and distributed. Then that milk will be sold everywhere.

I was in Jimma last week. There is plenty of milk produced around Jimma. But the milk that we drank in Jimma was processed in Addis Ababa. The milk sold in Dire Dawa comes from Finfinnee. Mind you, the farmers in Jimma, Arsi, Haraghe, Wollega, etc., all raise livestock and produce milk. It doesn’t make sense for the milk produced in Salaalee, Tulu Bolo, Metehara, Adami Tulu, Dheeraa and so on, to be processed in Finfinnee/Addis Ababa. The farmers in these areas in partnership with their educated sons and daughters can themselves process milk and other livestock products and market it without the need for intermediaries. The farmers in the highlands of Arsi and Bale in partnership with their educated sons and daughters (Qeerroo- Qarree) can process their barley and supply malt to domestic and international beer manufacturers. The Borana, Somali and Afar pastoralists can process livestock products and set up meat processing factories in their respective areas, in partnership with their educated sons and daughters. The idea of creating local producer cooperatives among the producers of cattle, barley, coffee, milk, honey and other products shifts the arrangements and shifts the beneficiaries.

Livestock products such as milk are perishable, so the current challenge is transport. When you have a big cooperative, you can manage the local agro-processing industry. Locally- based and producer-owned processing plants who in turn distribute their products to local, regional and international markets create multiple opportunities, stimulate local economies and improve local livelihoods. The model I am suggesting would work well here as a cooperative for the farmers as the producers would supply people in their vicinity and cut out the middleman. The milk would be fresher. The producers would receive greater benefits of the fruits of their labor.

13 Consider the meat. All that huge livestock population in Oromia, Somali, Afar, and the Omo Valley zones could be used to improve the livelihood of producers in their respective regions. Producers cooperatives can organize the people, fatten animals in location, slaughter them locally, process the meat locally, ship in refrigerated cars, trucks, or aircraft directly to reach domestic and international markets. The current practice of transporting livestock from Afar, Somali, Borena and Guji overland traversing thousands of kilometers to the Addis Ababa Metropolitan area is not only inefficient because the cattle lose weight, but it is preventing residents in these areas from benefiting from their resources. We could go on with barley malt. We could go on with hides and skins. There are too many examples. Chat, bees, grains. There is a big potential in agro-processing and agriculture across the country. You just need to look at these matters in light of their potential to bring prosperity at the local level.

I will summarize here just to say, I think we need to see real changes in attitudes in order to adopt local empowerment. And this includes Oromos too. Educated Oromos need to adopt genuine respect for producers. The producers are the carriers of the ancient culture. Those were the people who taught me what Oromummaa was all about. Those were the people who were carrying and applying the deep understandings about sustainability when I was there. These producers have not, since I was there almost 50 years ago, had the opportunity to directly determine how their interface with Western technology would take place. They have been dictated to. They have been told to one thing or another with little or no discussion. They have been told to adopt technologies and techniques developed elsewhere, without regard for context or the local ecology. They have been sold fertilizer and they have been considered to be backward for rejecting it. In retrospect their rejection of fertilizer and the associated dependency was not at all backward.

Centrists of all national backgrounds seem to believe that everything can be done from above. This is a plague of Oromos too. If they are in charge, many are happy to settle for a centralized system. I have found that, at base, even those elites and intellectuals who are calling for change in this country to benefit the poor and the marginalized in their hearts believe that the producers are backward. They actually believe that producers are not capable of handling the kind of institutions necessary to manage their agriculture, their bees, their livestock, and profit from it. They are mistaken and misguided in this view.

There seems to be some sort of ideological block or obstruction. If you ask elites, "Do you think the rural farmers can successfully organize themselves as producer cooperatives? Can they control or direct the marketing of coffee internationally?," they respond saying, "That's a crazy idea!" Even when talking to me, they call farmers “simple people.” I don't understand why these intellectual elites are not putting forward the kind of program or proposing quickly to start organizing now while the opening is here. I have had this discussion with so many educated elites from Oromia and from Ethiopia and other neighboring areas, and what I find is that their idea of progress, their idea of change, is limited to a change that they themselves can control and administer. They do not demonstrate real faith in the rural population.

14 Even farmers have expressed the frustration they feel with those whom they sacrificed to send to be educated with the hope that they would come back and help the producers. The educated elites come home considering these producers to be backward. Because the people don't respond to market forces, they are considered to be, as I said, “simple.” Elites arrive with new ideas. The producers ask all kinds of questions. The producers won't say ‘yes’, they won't say ‘no’. They'll simply ignore the program, and maybe even sabotage it, if they determine that it is not in their best interest. The agricultural extension agents say, "You have to use these fertilizers to increase productivity. We'll give you fertilizers for free for a couple of years. Then you have to pay for it. If you can't afford it, they will give it to you on credit. And if the crop fails, we'll just come and take your cows, your ox and your goats, and your sheep. And leave you in absolute destitution." Are these people backward for refusing this kind of dependency? This approach is what the people are resisting. It is not simple. It is not illogical. They are not allowed to refuse or they will be coerced. It was required that they use fertilizers. They have not been heard or engaged to deliberate about the way things have been arranged from the center.

My suggestion is that there be a focus not in the urban centers that are usually considered to be the engines of growth, such as Hawassa, Finfinne/Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, Adama. I think the focus for development going forward should be small towns or the rural market centers where the majority of the people in this country assemble to exchange their produce. These have great potential to provide the sort of engine for a decentralized economy that will thrive. That is where you find the producers who have been sidelined and dominated by the urban elites. That is where life goes on keeping communities together. We all know those markets. And if the producer cooperatives are established there, they will provide a venue for deliberation and a platform for the producers to define their best interests. These could become true engines of change. And there are enough resources to fuel development.

If the young people who are looking for jobs, who have education and who need to be absorbed in the economy begin to participate at these local venues, there are many possible forms of engagement that can lead to development. Deliberative assemblies where producer demands and ideas are explored give the Qeerroo and the Qarree the opportunity to apply themselves and share their knowledge of the wider economic and market contexts. Here they can unleash their untapped potentialities in service of rural localities and in the service of producers who have invested in the education and training of their youth.

One observation: the fact that rural areas have been ignored and sidelined for so long means that planners and entrepreneurs do not have to deal with despoiled urban failed systems. They can start fresh with city planning and start with a nearly clean slate with infrastructure. The approach that I propose requires shifting the bulk of resources, which are now applied to rehabilitate despoiled and overly-congested urban centers, to spaces where the rural majority in the country resides. I think this approach would probably absorb more population in meaningful engagement and provide more jobs than needed by the current cohort of Qeeroo-Qarree. With the youth from around the country, there is opportunity for creating something that is really quite different.

15 There are a lot of reasons to endorse the building of producer cooperatives and to start to work in this direction. It provides opportunities for youth to contribute and play a role in bringing their newfound skills to place at the service of the producers. The producer cooperative model provides the platform to absorb, engage and reward the Qeerroo and Qarree and their counterparts from other regions who respond attentively and constructively to meet the producers’ demands. The cooperatives provide a vehicle to transform the public space while re- arranging the relations of production in the country. Such an approach can introduce a giant step toward peace and stability. My personal opinion is that security officials who are directed by and ultimately accountable to central state authorities rather than to the local people see it as their role to quash local initiative before it can flourish. In order for local enterprise to take root and blossom, an important first step would be to protect these first beginnings by endorsing some form of snap elections conducted solely for the purpose of electing local security officials whom everybody voted for and trusts to support the local decision-making. When you have a police chief who has the confidence of the population, people can proceed with creative planning.

This proposal for pursuing producer cooperatives creates local venues that allow the people to consider and tap into revered cultural principles during consultation, discussion, argument and debates, applying culturally appropriate criteria to specific development proposals. Gemetchu and Aneesa have created a fabulous book released at this conference which makes clear the kinds of principles with which the producers will be making deliberations about what is in their best interest. Oromo knowledge contains notions of human capital, of economic capital, of natural capital, of cultural and temporal capital. And they can apply these sophisticated ideas in the same way they applied them when wise producers sat to explain these things to me in the 1970s. A program of introducing producer cooperatives requires an approach of providing venues where young and old discuss together how to apply the notions, knowledge and culture, such an Abba Biyyumaa in the Oromo case (custodianship of the collective resource base) and such as local equivalents in Gambela, Amhara, Somali and Southern nations. Such a process allows for the unfolding of local self-determination of federated entities throughout the country. This is not geographic federalism. This is not an administration from a center trying to control more efficiently the outlying areas. This calls for a process of generating new engines of change in the now marginalized areas to be coordinated through a horizontally negotiated and organized federal network such as the one provided in the current Ethiopian constitution that begins, “We the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia…”

Taking a global and historic view, the region thrived on decentralized production with vast networks of de-centralized trading patterns. The centralized state has extinguished extensive trade and trade routes and stopped the movement of goods in all directions east, west, north, and south through the regions that are now marginalized. To envision the revival of extensive direct trade relations among neighboring peoples draws on roots of a Cushitic confederacy that runs very deep in this region.

Looking forward, a decentralized and sustainable economy is in keeping with the direction that even gurus of modern corporate policies, such as Michael Porter at the Harvard

16 Business School, have indicated in a search for creating shared value. Some thought leaders are pointing out that existing approaches to business have despoiled the environment in which they've operated, quickly extracted wealth and left destruction in their wake. With this reassessment, business planners are looking for new sustainable formulas for maintaining the environment for sustainable development. The Oromo have created such a way to maintain productivity. Their approaches deserve careful scholarly study. In this light Oromo notions of earth care are progressive.

I am arguing that it is a good time for Ethiopia to embrace and encourage the development of the lifeways of Oromo and others, accepting the positive contribution. Recent history of the region tells us that the Oromo, the Somali, the Afar, the Sidama and other dominated groups cannot be controlled by force of arms or by separating them from their lands. Making a majority of people subject to extreme exploitation is a recipe that goes against the natural order of things. These currently marginalized peoples and their traditions are steeped in and committed to establishing and maintaining peace with balance through elaborate and effective mechanisms.

This is OSA’s first conference in Finfinnee/Addis Ababa. Let us enjoy the moment together. Let me close by reiterating OSA’s role in a vision for reimagining power and centering these peoples who make up the dominated majority in Ethiopia. OSA was grounded in engaged scholarship from its founding. There is a role for OSA and OSA scholars to play in supporting social and political transformation that is underway – carrying out research, analysis, bringing exemplary and comparable cases and experiences from elsewhere to the attention of all actors and offering input and feedback on programming under consideration. There is also a great need for advocacy to highlight the shift toward participatory democracy, peace and justice. The current formula for Ethiopia is kept in place by Western and other support. The old narrative has very effectively supported centralization. As that narrative shifts, the West can be encouraged to embrace central components of a new approach which promises to de-escalate conflict, rely on political solutions, adopt sustainability within a new economy and acknowledge a proven route to stability, for engaging local people.

Together we realize that there is a wealth of challenge and opportunity for scholarship, policy and advocacy in this promising opening. Let the Oromo and all the other marginalized people rise to this challenge. I do call upon scholars in particular to engage in this process.

Thank you, President, Kulani, and all.

17 Solving Ethiopia’s Governance Challenges

John Markakis

Ethiopian historiography has long featured a claim to exceptionalism based on the country’s many distinctive features in the African context: a state whose roots go back to antiquity, a literate culture, the only place in Africa where Christianity survived as a native faith and a surplus producing agricultural economy that sustained a sophisticated class stratified society. Not least among these is the unique confrontation with European imperialism in the nineteenth century, following which the legendary Christian state on the northern plateau, also known abroad as Abyssinia, went on to build its own empire in the Horn of Africa, doubling its size and population in the process.

The Ethiopian Empire was created the same time Western imperialism invaded and divided Africa, and for the same reason: the seizure and exploitation of material resources. In Ethiopia’s case the coveted resource was fertile land to relieve the pressure of population on the exhausted land of the northern plateau. Accordingly, most of the best land in the newly conquered territories was confiscated and given to land hungry northerners who flocked there. Land without the labour to work it is useless. This labour was forcibly extracted from for the people who lived on the land, turning them into serfs on their own land, trapped in a quasi-feudal system of land tenure.

This proved a fateful development. While Abyssinian society was largely culturally homogeneous, the empire was highly heterogeneous. The massive expropriation of land forged a nexus of class and ethnicity, whose explosive repercussions have marred Ethiopia’s political life to this day.

Ethiopian historiography glosses over what is plausibly the most distinctive feature, the fact that the Ethiopian Empire did not dissolve in the past century when all its contemporaries in Africa did, to allow the subjugated population of the annexed regions to determine their own political future. Instead, Ethiopia’s imperial rulers embarked on a mission of nation-building intended to produce a homogeneous society by eliminating cultural differences among its subject. The chosen template for the envisaged nation was

18 none other than Abyssinian culture, and the chosen method was the assimilation of the rest of the non-Abyssinian population.

This greatly reinforced the destabilizing potential of the class/ethnicity nexus, as was immediately manifested in rising militant resistance of the part of the people threatened with cultural deracination. To overcome it required a highly centralized highly authoritarian system of rule based on force provided by a huge military and security apparatus, the largest at the time in black Africa. The military was employed primarily to suppress internal political opposition, and inevitably it became highly politicized and inclined to intervene in public affairs.

*

The legacy of the past weighs heavily on the present, manifested in recurrent political crises, three of which I personally witnessed in my professional relationship with this country. All sprung from the same source, all aspired to find solutions to age old problems and all failed. Failure each time led to regression with practices that had failed in the past and were condemned to fail again.

While studying and recording this historical process, I sought to fathom the reasons for repeated failure which fall into two categories. Basic was the failure to recognize and address the root causes of social conflict and political instability. Related to it was the resort to technocratic and institutional reforms imposed from the top and were unrelated to the nature of the problem. Will it be different this time?

This will depend on whether the search for solutions focuses on the real causes of the problems, and the measures taken to remove them are the result of innovative, independent thinking related to the realities of Ethiopia’s situation. Moreover, it will depend on whether reform is a top down process, or the result of broad consultation involving all sectors of society. By way of contributing to the search, I will highlight four root causes that need to be confronted if meaningful reform is to be achieved: they are the ownership and control of land, the nationality conflict, the structure of the state, and the design of a future political system.

19

* Land is the country’s most important resource, and the fundamental, perennial cause of conflict throughout Ethiopia’s modern history. Control of it is of vital concern to those who live off agriculture; three quarter of the population. Control of land is also of vital concern to the state, partly as a source of revenue, but mainly as the means of exercising its authority over the rural population. Every regime in the past used a different approach to maintain this control; from the quasi-feudal arrangement of the imperial regime, to the nationalization cum collectivization of the Dergue, retained in a modified form by the EPRDF.

Every regime in the past also had its own approach to foster economic development based on agriculture. Before its collapse, the imperial regime was moving towards a free market system; by contrast the Dergue promoted collectivization, while the EPRDF initially tried to modernize small scale agriculture and, having failed, switched to large scale commercial agriculture based on imported capital and technology. These schemes, along with the funds to implement them, were imported from abroad. They came as packages with the ‘once size fits all’ prescription. Little prior thought was given to their suitability in Ethiopia’s highly varied environment. Crucially, they were forcefully imposed without prior consultation with the peasantry, whose life was repeatedly turned upside down with schemes such as collectivization, villagisation, resettlement, agriculturally led industrialization, and land leasing for plantation farming.

Unsurprisingly, all these schemes failed miserably. Failure was variously attributed to environmental and technical problems, as well as the alleged backwardness and stubbornness of the Ethiopian peasant. The latter points to the cardinal reason for failure; the passive resistance of the peasantry, a weapon honed over centuries of oppression and exploitation, manifested in non-cooperation, delay, sabotage, subversion, undermining and ultimately thwarting the imposed scheme. .

It was not long after I first set foot in Ethiopia in 1965 that I became aware of the land issue. The echoes of the first student demonstration with the slogan Land to the Tiller that had shocked a lethargic imperial regime a few months earlier were still in air. The

20 students were keenly aware that the quasi feudal land tenure system was a ticking bomb in the foundations of the state. Have the tillers ever got control of the land? Over half a century later, the state still owns and disposes it as the ruling elite see fit.

The most glaring example of this is the ongoing plunder of land in the lowlands. Given the technology of the time and the administrative limitations of the imperial state, the scorched lands on the flanks of the plateau were considered uncultivable and were spared the expropriation that was visited on the southern plateau. That omission is being corrected with a vengeance now. Imported technology and capital are turning the neglected lowlands into the promised land of the country’s future development. Huge tracts of land are declared vacant and offered for exploitation to foreign and domestic capital. The hapless people who live there are displaced without compensation, and crammed into ‘villages’ without any means of earning a livelihood. The ultimate cruelty is the promise of work in the plantations, when the much claimed advantage of large commercial agriculture is the use of capital intensive technology.

Are the rural masses ever to have the privilege of participating in making the decisions that affect their lives? Will they attain it through land privatization, the only system talked about currently, which has already made great inroads by stealth under the EPRDF? Is this the only solution imaginable? Is the goal to throw the peasantry to the mercy of the free market, to turn food producing peasants into food consuming urban proletarians and a source of cheap labour, or to help them hold on to the land?

*

Land is a purely class issue; control over the means of production. Confronted as such, it could transform the political equation by uniting the rural people to protect their common interests. This has not happened because the land issue is invariably perceived though the nationality filter, the issue that divides and neutralizes them.

Nationality is not a problem in itself. It has been made into one. As the Nigerian scholar, Claude Ake, put it, asking an African why he belongs to a tribe is like asking him why he has five fingers. What is more natural? Tribe is the template upon which African society

21 is organized – its economy, society, polity and culture – and has been for ages. It provides a framework for identity and solidarity, as well as economic, social and political organization. Neither colonialism nor independence has provided an alternative. The attempt to supplant tribe with the nation-state, as Basil Davidson (1992) presciently wrote, proved ‘a curse and a burden for the black man.’

The ‘nation state’ became the idol of the miniscule, westernized, urban elite that inherited state power with independence, and made ‘nationalism’ the new faith imported from the West. The pursuit of ‘nation-state building’ was facilitated by a campaign to cleanse Black Africa from the blight of ‘tribalism’: led by no other than Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. There was a mundane reason however for turning ‘tribalism’ into a cultural evil and a political crime. It was to undermine traditional authority and neutralize political opposition from customary leaders. Africa’s kings, sultans, paramount chiefs, lawmakers, religious leaders, diviners and medicine men were the target of the campaign that proved quite successful. Nevertheless, this hardly affected the currency of tribalism since it became the political capital of the ruling elite and remains the most potent force in political life throughout the subcontinent.

The politicization of nationality in Ethiopia was sown by the imperial regime, and was greatly reinforced subsequently by the attempt to impose a national identity on the many nations that live within the country’s borders. The attempt failed but not before it contributed to the collapse of the imperial and military regimes. By the end of this tumultuous period, every self-respecting nationality in Ethiopia had its own ‘national liberation front.’

*

The EPRDF which emerged from this crucible was itself a coalition of ‘national liberation fronts.’ It moved boldly to resolve the problem by rehabilitating nationality, abandoning the quest for a homogeneous Ethiopian national identity, and restructuring the state in order to unravel the class/nationality knot. It chose federalism as the model for reform. This was nothing new. Federalism has a long history in the Horn, where it has been the persistent political demand of subordinate and oppressed groups in every

22 state of the region. It appeared first in the 1950s in the form of the Eritrea-Ethiopia link, and subsequently in Kenya, Sudan, Somalia as well as Ethiopia.

Has federalism served the purpose? In fact, it has failed everywhere, and was followed by the longest wars in Africa fought in the Horn, and the breakaway of Eritrea from Ethiopia and South Sudan from Sudan. Federalism failed because it was used as political ploy to manipulate and deflect opposition, and nowhere did it provide a share of state power to those who demanded it. The EPRDF delegated administrative responsibility to the regional states, without even the illusion of decision making power. The center’s exclusive control of power over the regions remained intact. This lopsided relationship made a mockery of the very essence of federalism.

Nor did the EPRDF reform improve the position of traditional authority in the least, since the regional states were administered by the regime’s political agents. Traditional leaders were labeled ‘feudal’ and shunned. Advisory councils of chiefs were formed in pastoralist areas, but they were perceived as a bribe for those who were appointed to them and were ignored both by the administration and the people.

The EPRDF brand of federalism is a perfect example of what has been called ‘seeing like a state’ (J.C. Scott, 1998); the pursuit of modernity through uniformity, standardization, regimentation, monitoring and policing of citizens. Since federalism presumably is intended to accommodate diversity, the ‘once size fits all’ dogma, typical of how the state ‘sees things’, turns the concept into an oxymoron. In the early 1990s, the constitutions of the regional states were drafted by the centre. They were identical and were distributed to the regions with one line at the top left blank followed by the instruction to ‘fill in’ the name of the regional state.

The EPRDF’s crude manipulation of federalism satisfied no one. Worse yet, it fuelled tribal clashes in various parts of the country, which now a graver threat to the state’s survival than ever before. How can this be averted? Worryingly, the debate at present remains focused on where the balance of center–periphery power should rest, with diametrically opposing views firmly held. The need for federalism to reflect and integrate diversity, the very reason for its existence, is not on the agenda.

23

Yet it is imperative to ask why Ethiopia’s immensely rich and colorful patrimony should be sacrificed on the altar of modernism. Why should every part of the federation have an identical profile sterilized to cleanse it of ‘tribalism’? Why should customary rules, familiar and preferable to the people, not be used along with national law? Why traditional authority systems – Gaada in Oromia, the Sultanate of Aussa in Afar, the Anyawa kings in Gambela, the clan chiefs in Somali, and many other institutions that command popular respect cannot be integrated meaningfully in local government.

*

The design of the political system is the mother of all issues: it incorporates all the rest, and will decide how they will be addressed. A reformed political system is part of regime change; however, the present crisis has not produced definitive change yet. This offers a rare opportunity to reflect and debate and hopefully agree on how to shake off the legacy of the past and move forward to cross the political frontier (Markakis, 2011). Failure to grasp this opportunity will have dire consequences.

Every crisis in the past produced a new leader – Menelik, Haile Selassie, Mengistu, Meles – a messiah upon who hopes for liberating reform were focused. Each of them forged a rigidly authoritarian personalized regime based on force, betraying all hopes. The current crisis has produced an aspiring messiah also. Does that suggest Ethiopia is ungovernable otherwise?

Of course not, people say. Elections have been scheduled for 2020 and will bring democracy. Even though they have a lamentable history in Africa, elections still inspire a pathetic faith. They were introduced in Ethiopia in the 1950s by the imperial regime, and have been staged more or less regularly under its successors with various brand names – imperial democracy, peoples’ democracy, popular democracy. The popular brand currently is liberal democracy that has its own history in Africa, where it functions as a façade for all types of misrule: keeping political scientists in business classifying types of ‘hybrid democracy’.

24 Liberal democracy is the opium of the westernized elite, the urban minority that rules Africa. ‘The debate on democracy among African scholars is threatening to become an unabashed celebration of liberalism’ noted the Tanzanian scholar, Issa Shivji (1991) ‘This is where the first pitfall of the debate on democracy lies. So long as it remains imprisoned within the four walls of liberalism, I dare say, The Debate has not begun - it may be a Diversion but not a Debate.’ Reduced to its institutional minimum of periodic elections, liberal democracy is not a representative system. It is a reliable tool of minority rule that excludes the rural masses, entertaining them periodically with theatrical performances called elections. Elections in Africa are not taken seriously by anyone, event democracy’s fervent promoters from the West. Witness the praise heaped on the ‘democratically elected government’ of Ethiopia by Barak Obama following the 2015 elections, which the regime ‘won’ by 100 percent of the vote.

Is this farce to be repeated in 2020 as planned? Predicted to involve over 100 political factions, nearly all of them ethnically based, can it rationally be expected to accomplish anything other than to inflate tribalism, the political capital traded by the ethnic entrepreneurs now queuing up to register for the elections. Cannot the long suffering Ethiopians not look inward to devise systems and institutions that can take root in their country’s soil, to serve its entire people, in the cities and the villages, the highland and the lowland, recognizing and respecting their differences?

*

The present crisis is unfolding somewhat differently from previous episodes. While the EPRDF regime has essentially collapsed more than one year earlier, there is still no definitive regime change. This opens a rare window of opportunity to reflect on what went wrong in the past and to debate on what needs to be done to attain a government system that would be consensual, legitimate, accountable and stable; something unknown in Ethiopia’s modern history.

This cannot be left to politicians. Nor can it be left to the westernized urban elite, a small minority that has misruled the country to date. Their training has deprived this class of the ability to think independently, outside the box imposed by the modernity dogma, and

25 to relate empathetically with the rural masses, the overwhelming majority of the population they seek to ‘modernize.’

What has been called the ‘decolonization of the mind’ is imperative for the production of knowledge based on Ethiopia’s reality – history, culture, custom, traditional systems of authority, rulemaking and conflict resolution. This is not to reject universal values that are the inheritance of all humankind. It is to ‘naturalize’ them by adapting and integrating them into the native patrimony. An ‘African solution’ the Ugandan scholar Mahmud Mamdani explains is a ‘contextual’ solution: ‘Context is not opposite to universal value or standards. Context is an understanding that any concrete situation is an outcome of multiple processes; historical, political, economic, social, moral and so on’ (Mamdani, 2014).

______

References Davidson, B. (1992). The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State Issa Shivji (1991). The Democracy Debate in Africa. (Review of African Political Economy) Mamdani, M. (2014). African Union Commission of Inquiry Report on South Sudan. Markakis, J. (2011). Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers Scott, J.C. (1998). Seeing Like a State.

26 Let the daylight finally come.

Kalundi Serumaga

“That is why I saw it was foolishness for me, the chief mutaka of Buganda to sign an agreement, which gives away the country, while its owner, the Kabaka, was not there; that would have brought ridicule when the Kabaka returned.”

-Joswa Kaate, “Mugema” (head of the “Nkima” {Monkey} clan) explaining his refusal to append his signature to the British treaty on conquest acquiesced to by a number of notables in the Kingdom of Buganda, in 1900.

Introduction

This paper is a follow-up to the presentation made at the 33rd annual conference of the Oromo Studies Association (OSA) held in Finfinnee between July 26th and 28th, 2019.

I was given the honour of being invited as a guest speaker to deliver a presentation on the first day of the conference. This was in my capacity as a cultural activist and research fellow at the Marcus Garvey Pan Afrikan Institute. The presentation, titled Let The Daylight Finally Come, sought to provide an analogous discussion between the Oromo story, and the situation in the Kingdom of Buganda, where I am from.

I would first like to once again express my extreme gratitude to the OSA Board and conference organizers for their kindness in considering the proposal I submitted as being worthy of a conference presentation before such a high-level gathering. This includes gratitude for the gracious hospitality I received.

This paper will not just present the essence of the conference presentation itself, but it will also present the wider insights gathered during the trip through interactions with Oromo intellectuals and activists.

Overview

The aim of the presentation, which now gives rise to this paper, was to highlight three intertwined issues that emerge from the facts of the existence of Oromia, as well as the history of the struggles of the Oromo against colonial erasure, and what this can mean for stability in the country and the wider region.

As put forward at the time of the conference: “The talk [was] directed towards broadening the work of recovering hitherto degraded and marginalised African knowledge and political heritages which are more required than ever, to help overcome the crisis of Western-style governance that Western political knowledge has universalised as the norm, but is now failing.”

First, we need to lay out the question of the value of such discourse, in the face of what I have argued is an effective, although slow-motion death of capitalism since the 2008 global credit crunch from which the global economy has never fully recovered. This is creating a

27 growing human crisis at a global level. What is clear is that western epistemology has no answers to this crisis, and yet solutions must be found.

This discourse therefore, is a question of reclamation and recovery. This does not just mean territory and buildings, but of those human values that founded organized human society, and that offer the best chance of helping humanity survive the current economic, social, environmental crises affecting the whole planet.

Among the world’s human communities, African ones are the ones that have retained the most of the original knowledge and insight of the human archetype. This, ultimately, is not surprising, given that the actual historical record shows that of course the very first humans, and organized human societies began in Africa before migrating to other parts of the planet in the successive waves of development.

At the Marcus Garvey Pan Afrikan Institute, this intellectual and academic challenge is what we call Restorativity – the rediscovery and re-Centering of native knowledge principles to see how it can be applied to address contemporary problems. Restorativity is a question spanning philosophies, practical knowledge, and spiritual values that are held within native communities either through individuals or traditional institutions.

Second, and following on from that, is the challenge of how to address the way history on African matters is conceptualized and managed. The point made here is that the aforementioned universalization of Western values systems has made the task of recognizing that there is even an African story to tell in the first place a huge political, academic and epistemological challenge.

The question is: how does one tell one’s story, when there is no acceptance that one even has a story to tell?

This is a challenge of two parts. First, we need to bring a sense of order to how the histories of Africans are written, by which we mean to break away from the academic and political traditions of misrepresenting Africa for the justification of colonial and other exploitative agendas, as has been the dominant practice.

Second, the African historians and other scholars will have to continue turning to the growing body of African-oriented fundamental overarching themes in order to transcend the strictures created by standard histories and readings of Africa. In particular, we shall have to use these methods to move beyond the intellectual trap of constant disputation with Western methodologies, and focus in the real point of our scholarship, which is to study ourselves so as to understand ourselves better.

The foundational perspective to this approach is summed up best by Cheikh anta Diop, founder of African oriented history:

“Ancient Egypt was a Negro civilization. The history of Black Africa will remain suspended in air and cannot be written correctly until African historians dare to connect it with the history of Egypt.”

-Cheikh anta Diop, The African origin of civilization: myth, or reality?

28 In this particular (Oromo and Buganda) instance, there is even a greater significance of this point. In his thesis regarding the cultural unity of black Africa, Diop expands on the arguments regarding the blackness of the Ancient Egyptian civilization, to explain how all African communities spring from a common civilizational root.

Oromo culture and history before the 1899 conquest then serve a particularly important role in this examination. In listening to explications of it, Oromo culture and native knowledge function as evidence of this underlying cultural unity. Furthermore, they function as a receptable for knowledge that could clearly have also once existed among other communities, but has since been lost. Oromo stands both as lasting remnant evidence of a wider African civilization, as well as a template for how restorativity may be conceptualized.

Much of this emerges from just one text: The Sacred Knowledge Traditions of the Oromo of the Horn of Africa, which the authors Dr. Megersa and Dr. Kassam, presented at the conference.

After this new framework has been established, we need to get into the actual histories of various Africans themselves so as to establish their actual histories with the purpose of using that history for the issues outlined above.

The points of interest in these histories are summarized in the challenge put to African historians by the Afro-Jamaican historian Chancellor Williams:

“How was the art of writing lost by one of the first peoples to invent it? . . . Study the migrations. How and why did a once great people with a common origin splinter off into countless little independent societies and chiefdoms from which 2,000 different languages and dialects? . . . Study the migrations. What caused the brother-against-brother internecine wars, hatreds, slavery and mutual suspicion among the various Black societies? . . . Again, study the migrations!”

-Chancellor Williams, The destruction of black civilisation: great issues of a race

29

Facts about Buganda: Introduction and Brief Background

Foundation

Buganda, at least under the current dynasty, traces its origins to perhaps some time in the 1300s. The kingdom is believed to have begun as a conglomerate of six clans that eventually settled on a dynastic system of a head of all the clan heads becoming the head of state also.

Current narratives document Buganda as emerged alongside other similar polities in the region out of either the older empire of Bunyoro-Kitara, or the kingdom of Busongora. In reality, these narratives seem to be iterations of a body of people known as the Chwezi.

What we can be sure of is that Buganda is part of a historical phenomenon of Kingdoms rising in the Great Lakes region over a particular period of time. What we are unsure of is why they came into existence, and also what exactly their previous existence was, before it was abandoned.

As mentioned, it is precisely those gaps that make the unfolding study of the history of the Oromo most critical.

Through the usual narratives of expansion, conquest, and assimilation, Buganda has risen to over fifty clans, and covers a much wider area.

Current status

Buganda is recognized only as a “cultural” entity within Uganda under current constitutional arrangements. This is a repudiation of the federal status it, and a couple of other similar kingdoms, held under the 1962-1966 post-colonial federal constitution.

30 This issue remains a point of serious contention between Buganda and the Ugandan government. In particular, Buganda played a critical role in mobilization for the war that propelled the current Uganda government into power, on the understanding that the federal constitution would be restored.

The key moment in Buganda history is the 1900 imposition of a military defeat, solemnized in a 1900 treaty signed between British military commanders and some Buganda notables, through which it became a vassal state of the British Empire.

This “treaty” was preceded by a very bitter civil war driven largely by warlords loyal to rival British, German, French and Arab powers. These powers had gained important footholds and influence in Buganda in the preceding decades through evangelization and induction of converts to their respective religions, who they then eventually turned into armed militias.

Having conquered Buganda in this way, Britain was able to utilise the same Christian militias to occupy and invade neighbouring territories and in this way create the state known today as Uganda.

The new colonial period was then characterized by three struggles. The first was the struggle by elements of the conquered societies to regain their independence by demanding a return to the pre-conquest arrangements. In particular, a critical demand was a restoration of native authority over the land, in accordance to tradition.

The second was a struggle by the products of the emerging colonial society who also nevertheless wished for the ending of the colonial system, and for African independence. The difference was that they were not necessarily -in fact definitely not- in favor of “traditionalism” advocated by the earlier initial movements and voices.

The third struggle was simply to maintain colonialism.

This therefore, became a conflict of knowledge and values that has followed the debate about African progress up until today: what is, and what should be its philosophical basis? “African history” , as currently conceptualized and taught in the mainstream? The accompanying disputations surrounding the teaching of the subject? Or a contribution to the development of a wholly new African history methodology?

Governance

Buganda was traditionally governed by a system made up of a justice system, quasi- parliamentary system, and a government executive. None of this is possible under the current highly centralized Ugandan governance system.

The justice system began at the village level and rose through a series of tiers that also therefore form the levels of administrative units: village, “parish”, county, district and overall state. In fact, the names of these administrative units mainly coincide with the name for the court operating at that level. This means that the concept of justice, and the obligation to deliver it, sits at the very heart of the Buganda concept of governance.

The parliamentary system is known as the grand Lukiiko, a council made up of notables from all branches of the public administrative structure.

31

The society was comprised of a vast network of extended families all organized into a network of fifty-two interconnected clans’ lineages of descent. Buganda society is made up of fifty exogamous clan lines. Each line holds a totem as its identity. These are usually items identified with nature, and most often an animal, contact with which is taboo for the clan members. Clans are themselves governed by a hereditary leader from household to homestead to lines from one homestead, to branch to tree to “fireplace” to “rooftop” level. Clan hereditary officials are called “Bataka”, a word rooted in the word “ttaka”, which means “land”. The overall clan head is the “Mutaka wa kasolya” (the “rooftop-level” leader). The clan is also the locus of the practice of native religion.

32

KASOLYA (“Rooftop”)

ESSIGA (“Hearthstone”)

MUTUBA (“Tree” – lit. Ficus natalensis)

LUNYIRIRI (“Line”)

LUGGYA (“Yard/Homestead”)

NJU (“Home/house”)

All came under the authority of the executive ultimately in the form of the Kabaka, head of state, and Sabataka (“head of all the clan heads”). Our current Kabaka is Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II, the 32nd to hold the throne.

However, apart from the throne (“Namulondo”), there are a number of other offices that constitute the overall office of the executive:

33

• Namasole – technically the third highest office. Upon installation, the mother of the Kabaka (or whomever may have inherited her spirit presumably, if she was no longer alive), acquires this title. In effect, the office functions as a court of appeal, and the officeholder is a member of any war council.

• Nnalinya Lubuga – this is the office in charge of maintaining the Kabaka's authority, and also keeping order in the capital, and other palaces of the throne. It is occupied by a sister to the Kabaka.

• Ssabaganzi – this is an office concerned with the internal management of the personality of a Kabaka, including mediating in domestic disputes that may emerge in his household. It is occupied by the male siblings of the Kabaka’s mother.

• Katikkiro – This is the principal executive office of the Kabaka. Roughly analogous to what we know today as a Prime Minister. He (there have been no women) heads government business by running a cabinet, and speaks in public on behalf of the Kabaka.

• Kiweewa – this is the title given to the eldest son of the Kabaka. By custom, this person cannot become a future Kabaka himself. He does have other ritual role he performs on behalf of the throne.

• Omujaasi/Mugabe – Head of the armed forces during war time.

• Gabunga – Head of the lungfish (Mmamba) clan, and also head of the once very large water-borne section of the armed forces.

Additional information on this area will be the subject of a wider study to respond to the request made by Dr. Aneesa Kassam and Dr. Gemetchu Mergersa.

Critical issues

a) Land:

The terms of the 1900 defeat-treaty included measures regarding the ownership and occupation of land in Buganda. Roughly half of the defined land area was deemed to be the property of the British Crown, which in practical terms meant the colonial state. The other half was divided up among those individuals and organizations that had assisted in the colonial conquest, including the British Anglican Christian Church, the Roman Catholic Church and a large number of Christian warlord families. As the Kabaka had been captured in battle and exiled as a prisoner of war, the British-allied Baganda Anglican warlords installed his infant son on the throne, and then left some of the land under the ownership of the office.

This meant that alongside the Pacific-region Kingdom of Tonga, a British colony between 1900 and 1970, Buganda, and later the rest of Uganda were the only two colonies in the British Empire in which a certain form of land ownership was exclusively for a type of native. But as mentioned, the critical point was that rights to land ownership and management were removed from clan authority.

34

Nevertheless, this new system of ownership has now since been weaponized against ordinary Africans under the aegis of the IMF-backed neo-liberal policies imposed after the current National Resistance Movement ruling organization seized power over three decades ago.

Economic struggles over land ownership, autonomy over agricultural production, and access to credit, were the cornerstones of the anticolonial movement right from the beginning of the conquest.

Economic policy at the coming of independence was therefore a reflection of those historical struggles. In particular, measures were put in place to finally fully legalise the African co- operatives movement and to also create credit facilities for African farmers.

The 1986 arrival of the current Ugandan government saw a reversal to all this. On behalf of their Western backers, this government oversaw the dismantling of the cooperative-based agricultural production and marketing system, combined with the elimination of local and state-owned banks, combined with the easing of import controls on food imports and the imposition of mass migration has turned land ownership and use into an area of major crisis and contention.

Large-scale eviction of entire villages are being carried out by regime-crony backed foreign and domestic business entities. Usually, the grabbers base their claim on the colonial-era distribution of land, but also flout all current laws aimed at protecting ordinary people.

This has led to a further decline in agricultural production, loss of a sense of belonging, rapid unplanned urbanization, and high unemployment.

b) Autonomy in production, governance and therefore cultural values

Uganda’s constitution is based partly on the political dynamic that brought the current government to power. Like many parts of post-European colonial Africa, the constitutional arrangements put in place at independence did not survive the decade after independence.

This was because many of these constitutions were obliged to make some level of recognition of the complex ethnic realities that the soon-to-be independent country was inheriting from the period before colonization. In other words, much as they had been conquered, the indigenous native communities, and critically, as in the case of Buganda, their home-grown governance and political institutions had continued to exist, sometimes invisibly, and had managed to preserve their native identities.

Independence was therefore, among other things, an argument between these two incompatible strands of African nationalism. On the one hand, the modern, Western-inspired type that sought to show that Africans could also manage and build modern Western-style states, and on the other, the native argument for a much bigger involvement of native values and perspectives in the driving of the independence project.

This tension is the reason why, for example, Kenya had a federal arrangement with the entire coastal area in deference to the Coastal ethnic groups, how Zambia had an internal federal arrangement with the Barotse Kingdom.

35 In Uganda, as elsewhere, this matter was resolved violently. In 1966, the Prime Minister Milton Obote organized a military coup that abrogated the independence constitution, and abolished the constitutional recognition of the native kingdoms, principally Buganda.

These steps bred resentment that eventually took root in the form of a civil war between 1980 and 1986. The current President Yoweri Museveni basically worked in alliance with native nationalists to drive a war that saw the collapse of the second Milton Obote government that had seized power in the wake of the collapse of the post-Amin governments in 1979.

Politics being what it was, the promise of a return to federation as per 1962-1966, was not fulfilled. Instead, some legal recognition was made of the existence of “traditional leaders” resulting in a constitutional halfway house in which these institutions are highly visible culturally but have very limited statutory powers.

For example, some of the official buildings and areas of official land owned by the 1962- 1966 federal Buganda government were returned to the throne, and the constitution made recognition of the territory called Buganda, but at the same time reserved the right to make its own district demarcations within it, regardless of the traditional indigenous districts.

As a development of this, the central government has gone on to create even more districts in the whole of the country, something with the (intended, we maintain) effect of undermining the identities rooted in the pre-colonial regions that became Uganda. Since 1993, Uganda has moved from having less than forty districts, to over one hundred and ten.

c) Kampala Master Plan: a particular case

In the middle of this, however, the new government also reserved for itself the right to call Kampala the capital city of Uganda.

36 The background is that before and during the colonial period, Kampala was the capital of the Kingdom of Buganda, while Entebbe was the colonial capital of Uganda. At the time of independence, however, Kampala was being used as the temporary Ugandan capital due to a lake-based sleeping sickness epidemic that caused the colonial government to temporarily evacuate many of its offices further inland. To be sure of this, under the terms of the post- colonial 1962-1966 federal constitution, the state of Uganda used to pay the Kingdom of Buganda a nominal one shilling annually as rent for occupying seven hills in the city.

Under the new dispensation, brought in by the continuing 1986 government of president Yoweri Museveni, the first step was the official argument for the need for “modern” planning to build a “modern capital city”. This meant expanding the boundaries of the city. However, since the city was deemed to not to be part of the Buganda region, and yet is totally surrounded by districts that are, this amounts to an encroachment. If Kampala, as part of “Uganda” expands, then this means taking land away from Buganda. It also exacerbates the aforementioned crisis around land values and use that is leading to mass displacement,

The logical thing to do would be to first resolve the duality about whether or not to fully recognize the various historical ethnic entities, before making new plans. This symbolizes the illogicality at the heart of our political processes.

Buganda’s argument remains the same: that no meaningful development can take root in Africa, if it ignores the cultural groundings of the people.

As the founding Vice -Chancellor of the Marcus Garvey Pan-African Institute, Professor Dani Wadada Nabudere explained:

“African children must be made aware of what we have achieved as the world’s first civlisation to regain our self-respect and dignity, and to retrieve our culture from destruction from the machinery of ‘European progress’. This does not mean turning our backs on modern developments. It means that modern development has to be reshaped to accord with the African self-image based on his own heritage. Any notion of ‘progress’ or ‘modernization’ that does not start from a people’s culture is tantamount to genocide.”

The challenge therefore is that, as with the Oromo situation, an actual native nation is hidden inside the known state granted recognition by the international community and treated in conformity to the general principles of international law rooted in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. This absence of recognition places the hidden nations at a major political and cultural disadvantage, and makes them vulnerable to accusations of : “tribalism”, “sectarianism”, “agents of disunity”, “enemies of progress” and “promoters of backwardness”, which are then used to justify all manners of oppression against them.

Origins of the current crisis: What is driving this?

To coin a word: “Developmentality”, which we use to mean the grand illusion of modern growth offered to Africans over the last two centuries. This refers to an official mentality of pursuing “Development” for its own sake, and for which all violations and sacrifices to existing social and political arrangements were justified.

This is coupled with a modernist incomprehension as to why there may be a different vision of the future, which leads to conflict.

37

In our own analysis, the trigger is now the post-crash Western economies in the main seeking to secure cheap foodstuffs supply for survival and for profit. Western food production has been reduced to the business of converting around six or seven products into mass consumable edibles.

The UK Guardian newspaper cites a recent report by the US-based Environment Working Group, which identifies the Arkansas-based Tyson Foods corporation as one “which supplies the likes of McDonald’s and Walmart”, and in doing so slaughters 35 million chickens and 125,000 head of cattle every week. This, according to the report, requires five million acres of corn a year for feed.

At present, the average American consumes about 95 kilos of meat a year. The Guardian goes on to report that: “According to the US Department of Agriculture, beef and pork production is forecast to grow significantly over the next decade, driven by lower feed costs and healthy demand. By 2025, the average American is expected to eat 219lbs of meat a year.”

The American writer Manuel Garcia Jr will not even refer to this as food, but as “food-like media” whose purpose is to deliver “artificial food-like substances that are largely a media of corn or soy flour (refined carbohydrates) heavily doped with salts, trans fats (hydrogenated vegetable oil) and high fructose corn syrup (sugar)” into the human body.

This is the basis of the profits in the food industry. Such “foods” are now cheaper and more readily available than naturally produced and harvested foods in most parts of the industrialized world by design.

This basically means that the kinds of “modernist” government ruling Africa will continue to see land in Africa from the point of view as a utility for the servicing a “developmentalist” agenda. In these circumstances, ordinary people, communities as well as the cultural architecture that comes with that are seen as an obstacle to be removed, by force if necessary.

This is the common situation and common struggle for the Oromo and Buganda. The historical trajectory is to move us off our lands. The destruction of our native cultures, knowledge and institutions is a prerequisite for that.

Lessons and ideas: Policy Recommendations

We share a common history and destiny.

Some areas of focus may be:

i) Spread of “mainstream” indigenousness as a concept, by which I mean reframing the existence of our experiences as a majority experience, and not the experience of hidden minorities in remote areas. Indigenousness should be normally characterized.

ii) Building a movement, or coalition of native Africans, starting with the Greater Kushitic identity of the Horn and Great Lakes region. The underlying links between the peoples

38 in the Horn and the Nile valley require greater exposition through academic collaboration. iii) Principal among these, is language. I have already mentioned some of the difficulties experienced in discussing our knowledge system using a language that has no words for some of its concepts. This also works in respect to the taxonomies and other classifications imposed on our discourse. In a private conversation, writer Ngugi wa Thiongo explained it this way : ”However you word and flesh it out, African languages are the key to revival and flowering of Knowledge. Languages are the primary or natural hard-drive. We want to draw from and build on the information, memories and dreams already in the hard drive and connect to other languages and cultures. Colonialism trained us to throw away or disconnect with the primary hard drive. Secure the base, is the title of one of my books, and I have no copyright on these ideas.”

The problem is that a large amount of the available and “accepted” literature on this subject is written directly by Europeans for their ultimate attention. The actual fact is that, as with the Oromo experience, there are vast areas of knowledge, conceptualization and taxonomy within our cultures that are simply beyond the reach of European culture and language. The challenge then will be how to capture them adequately, if we are to persist in using European languages for our own discourses.

We need to be mindful that not every item, or concept in human existence will, or must have a European or English language word to capture it. European academic thinking has the tendency to either transmute meanings, or simply decide that they are not important. It is necessary for us to begin learning each other’s languages, and producing knowledge using them. For example, European colonizing literature and academia interpreted the office of Kabaka as “king”, and has insisted on maintaining this conceptualization. In fact, it is inadequate. It is for the same cause that many of these other offices are underdocumented. iv) A Joint Task Force aimed at lobbying global and regional bodies (eg: UN, AU, ECHR) for a change in policy regarding the mischaracterization of nations as “tribes” on the African continent, and a re-ordering of all the legislative and policy processes that erase our inherent indigenous nationhood.

39

REFERENCES

Chancellor Williams, The Destruction of Black Civilization: Great issues of a race from 4500 BD to 2000 AD. Chicago Press, 1974.

Cheikh anta Diop, The African Origin of Civilization. Myth or Reality. Edited and Translated by Mercer Cook. Lawrence Hill and Co., New York, 1974.

Cheikh anta Diop, The cultural unity of Black Africa: the domains of patriarchy and of matriarchy in classical antiquity. Third World Press. Chicago, 1978.

Manuel Garcia. The Pathology of the Processed Food Industry – Counterpunch Magazine, February 22, 2013.

Gemetchu Mergersa and Aneesa Kassam. The Sacred Knowledge Traditions of the Oromo of the Horn of Africa. Fifth World Publications, 2019.

Nabudere, D. W. The Crash of International Finance Capital and its Impact on the Third World. New edition published by Pamazuka Press, London and Fountain Publishers. Kampala, 2009.

Ngugi wa Thiongo. Secure The Base. Seagull Books. Chicago, 2016.

40 TWO OROMO CHILDREN OF HOPE: THE BRAIDED BIOGRAPHIES OF TOLASSA WAYESSA AND BISHO JARSA

OROMO STUDIES ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE: JULY 2019 Sandra Rowoldt Shell In our understanding of the African slavery experience, accounts of who the enslaved were, how and by whom they were enslaved, and their experiences from capture to the coast are seldom found. For the most part, we have to rely on third party accounts of the slave routes—what travellers, missionaries, soldiers or administrators have written. However, a recently published book Children of Hope1 tells the story of a group of 64 Oromo children who were enslaved and then liberated between 1888 and 1889 and in which each child told his or her own life story from cradle to the coast. I have selected the stories of just two of these Oromo children to examine as exemplars for the whole:

• One child, a boy named Tolassa Wayessa, was enslaved and then liberated in Sep- tember 1888

• The other child, a girl named Bisho Jarsa, was liberated eleven months later in August 1889. While these two children shared the general experience of capture and liberation, they present an interesting set of dichotomies. • Their homes were some 300 kilometres apart. • They were captured by different groups of people at different times. • They travelled by different routes and each was eventually taken to a different slave port, eleven months apart. • Both were rescued and liberated by crews of the Royal Navy aboard different ships which ferried them to Aden. • Both were taken in by the missionaries at the Keith-Falconer Mission of the Free Church of Scotland at Sheikh Othman, an oasis some twenty kilometres north of Aden. Their lives thereafter were synchronized in time and place for at least a decade, before a deci- sive bifurcation. • Tolassa took himself home to Oromia. • Bisho decided to make South Africa her home.

TOLASSA WAYESSA In the decades following the passing of the Abolition of the Slave Trade Act in 1807, the British parliament mandated their Royal Navy to act against vessels engaged in the oce- anic slave trade, with the right to search suspect vessels. On 16 September 1888, H.M.S. Os- prey, a British warship policing the waters off Raheita in the Red Sea, intercepted three slave dhows and liberated a consignment of 183 Oromo slave children (ninety-one boys and nine- ty-two girls).2 The Osprey skipper, Commander Charles Edward Gissing, and his crew con- veyed the children to Aden. Approximately half of the children were identified as Muslim and the authorities in Aden placed these children with local Muslim families. Others were offered to and accepted by the Roman Catholic mission caring specifically for orphans (as

41 Oromo liberated children were regarded). A number of the remaining Oromo children were placed in the care of the Free Church of Scotland’s Keith-Falconer Mission at Sheikh Oth- man, just north of Aden. Tolassa was about thirteen years old when the team of missionaries and interpreters interviewed him shortly after he arrived at the Keith Falconer Mission at Sheikh Othman in Yemen. He told them he was born in a village called Jimma where he had lived with his fa- ther, Wayessa, and his mother. Hatatu. He did not mention having any brothers or sisters but did say that his father owned four slaves and a large piece of land on which he farmed about twenty oxen, fifteen sheep and a horse. Tolassa’s family were relatively prosperous in those days.3 On the day that he was abducted, Tolassa was playing outdoors close to his home when three men appeared and asked if he had seen a stray horse. He said he had indeed seen a horse and indicated the direction in which it had gone. However, the strangers made him feel uneasy and he was suspicious of their motives so he discarded his covering of animal skin and ran as fast as he could towards the safety of his home. But the men chased him, easily caught up with him, smothered his mouth with their hands and carried him off into the forest. The three abductors took Tolassa to a place called Godawarabessa, which is a place not listed under this spelling in the many gazetteers consulted but possibly Werabēsa, de- scribed only as “a populated place” situated north of Finfinne. The journey from Jimma to Godawarabessa took approximately two weeks. There he was sold to a group of slave mer- chants who took him to the slave market at Billo (possibly Bilo Boshe). According to Tolassa’s narrative, there was fighting between the neighbouring tribes at that time which froze the slave market at Godawarabessa and prevented the merchants from selling him there. Instead, they took him to a place called Kau where they sold him to a man from Gudru, a town which hosted a thriving slave trade and supported substantial local slavery in its environs. The Gudru man who had purchased Tolassa took him to Ajubi on the other side of the Abayi River (the Blue Nile) and sold him to the Atari slave merchants. Tolassa ran away from the Atari merchants after they threatened to sell him to the dreaded Bulgu (the men eaters). The Bulgu—analogous to the western bogeyman—populated various myths and legends among the Somali, the Oromo and other East African peoples. The Atari and other slave traders frequently used such scare stories to discourage the children from trying to escape. Tolassa was recaptured, and the traders punished him for his attempted escape by chaining his feet for six days. From the evidence of the children’s narratives, chaining was not the norm in their experience nor, it seems, in the experience of other enslaved Oromo children at that time. One of the missionaries primarily responsible for the care of the liberated Oromo children wrote: We do not hear of clanking chains and heavy yoke-collars, nor of the sharp crack of the slave driver's whip. These are not requisite. The victims are helpless chil- dren, incapable of resistance, and, moreover, it is to the interest of the slave own- ers to preserve their living merchandise in good condition.4 The Atari merchants then took Tolassa on the long journey from Ajuba/Juba to Ancharro. There he joined some of the other Oromo boys who would eventually travel with him to Lovedale. The Atari merchants took him along the road from Ancharro to Bofa where they sold him to a group of Adal merchants. The Adal or Danakil/Dankali merchants dominated the external Ethiopian slave trade at the coast and controlled the export of human cargoes

42 across the Red Sea to the Arabian mainland. They were not slave raiders themselves, relying instead on the inland abduction forays of the Atari and Sidama (i.e. “Abyssinian”) merchants from whom they purchased child slaves close to the points of embarkation. From Bofa, it was a considerable journey to the important slave trade nexus of Aus- sa—now Asaita/Asayita. Historically, Aussa was the seat of the Aussa Sultanate, the princi- pal monarchy of the Afar people and by extension, the most wealthy and powerful political unit in the region. Tolassa’s route comprised a long and arduous first passage from home to the Red Sea through testing and rugged terrain. With the Danakil Desert dominating this territory, this is one of the hottest, driest and least hospitable areas on the planet. The region has two redeem- ing features: access to the sea and therefore to oceanic trade routes; and an abundance of salt, a key trade commodity for nearly two millennia and, when cut into bars or amole, as a core unit of currency. Having reached Raheita, the slavers put Tolassa aboard one of three slave dhows5 headed for Jeddah. These dhows were intercepted by the HMS Osprey on 16 September 1888. Sadly, this interception ended with a show of force by the British when one of the dhows, the Al Kathora, ignored instructions issued by the gunship to drop their sails. Charles Edward Gissing, the Commander of the Osprey, ordered his men to use their Gardener machine gun to warn the dhow captain, Ali Kira Mahomed. Tragically, the firepower did not only dismast the dhow but killed the captain and four slaves. Commander Gissing and his crew rescued Tolassa along with the other Oromo children and took them aboard the Osprey which was bound for the British-controlled Yemeni port of Aden. The newly established Free Church of Scotland’s Keith-Falconer Mission at Sheikh-Othman, a short distance north of Aden, agreed to take in and care for a large group of the Oromo children (including Tolassa). The children did not thrive at Sheikh Othman. The first known photograph of the Oromo children, taken in September 1888, shows the children shortly after their transfer on foot from Aden. Their small stature, thin limbs and ragged clothes reflect the rigours of their first passage ordeal. Commander Gissing wrote of his shock at the sight of the “small ebony skeletons” carried aboard his ship.6 At the Mission, the health of the Oromo children deteri- orated and the emaciated children displayed little resistance to the new infections they en- countered. Their recent trauma and ordeals had severely weakened the children and within a short time after their arrival, a missionary reported that “sickness broke out among them.” Many of the children succumbed to lingering scurvy, whooping cough, bronchitis and, most significantly, a virulent and recurrent strain of malaria. By Christmas that year, one-fifth of the first group had already died. Fortunately, Tolassa was one of the children who survived.7 Eleven months later, on 5 August 1889, a second ship of the British Royal Navy in- tercepted a cluster of slave dhows off the port of Tadjourah. This time, the crew rescued and liberated fourteen Oromo slave children and took them to Aden. From Aden, these children joined the earlier group at Sheikh Othman raising the number of liberated Oromo children at the Mission to sixty-four: twenty-two girls and forty-two boys, including Tolassa.8 Concurrently with Menelik’s rise to power, the southern regions were on the cusp of what came to be called bara beelaa (or bâraa balliyyaa) by the Oromo—the “cruel days” or the “time of suffering.” This materialized into the worst drought and famine in Ethiopian his- tory extending from 1887 to 1892, peaking in 1890-1891. Crops died, food was at a premium, plagues of locusts, army worms and rats swarmed across the country and the cattle died. The human population of Ethiopia was similarly crushed. Famine, cholera, bubonic plague and associated diseases took hold and thousands died. Many starved to death. Conditions contin- ued to deteriorate until the drought eventually broke in 1892. By that time, observers reported

43 that between one third and one half the human population of Ethiopia had died. Many Oromo children were orphaned, among them a young girl named Bisho Jarsa and her two brothers. Of the group of sixty-four liberated Oromo slave children of whom Bisho was one, a third of the children had lost either one or both parents.9 Bisho Jarsa was born around 1875 and was fifteen or sixteen years old when the mis- sionaries interviewed her at the Keith-Falconer Mission. She and her two brothers were full orphans. Her parents, Jarsa and Dingati, both died at the same time “during the prevalence of a sickness which carried away a great many people.” According to her narrative, “[the] fam- ine was over all the land at the time.” By the middle of May 1889, the “cruel days”10 of famine and the onset of human diseases had begun to creep in on the coat-tails of drought and failing crops. As early as 1888, starvation, bubonic plague, cholera, typhoid, smallpox and a host of other diseases had begun to make inroads. Bisho’s parents succumbed to one of these. After the death of her parents, one of Bisho’s father’s slaves took care of her. He sent her, in the company of an unnamed man, to buy food in a mountainous, forested sub-region called Gobu (Goba), inhabited by the Javi people. While in Gobu, the unidentified man sold Bisho to a merchant “for corn.”11 Throughout the region, people were forced into desperate measures to escape starva- tion. Under these dire circumstances, some parents and guardians had little option but to re- sort to selling their children into slavery. Such a transaction reduced the number of family mouths to feed. It also resulted either in cash, allowing for the purchase of scarce food sup- plies, or in a direct exchange for food, as in Bisho’s case. Travelling Atari slave merchants bought Bisho and took her to the highland area of Ancharro in the Warakalla country in northern Ethiopia. There they sold her to another slave merchant who sold her again to a group of Adal traders, a syndicate which dominated the slave trade near the Red Sea coast. The Adal merchants took her via Dawe to the coastal Tadjoura, one of the ports at the heart of Ethiopia’s external slave trade. Bisho’s first passage (i.e. her time from capture to the coast) encompassed at least 1,131 kilometres. This route took her at least thirty-eight days—an average distance of twen- ty-seven kilometres per day. In addition, she spent a further six weeks (forty-two days) in captivity at Tadjoura. The total time she spent on the road or in captivity, therefore—that is, the length of her first passage—was a minimum of eighty days. At Tadjoura, Bisho was put aboard a dhow, set to sail alongside five other dhows loaded with slaves, bound for the Arabian slave markets across the Red Sea. However, their short voyage was even briefer than planned. Soon after sailing out, they spied an English gunboat. Two of the dhows turned around and headed back to shore, including the one carry- ing Bisho. All the slaves aboard the two dhows had to disembark and were kept in captivity for a further six weeks before they set sail once again. The Royal Navy was, however, keeping a close watch on all vessels leaving the coast around Tadjoura and intercepted the two dhows. They rescued and liberated fourteen Oromo children (nine boys and five girls, including Bisho) held on board. Again, the Navy took the liberated Oromo children to Aden where they joined the earlier group of children at Sheikh Othman. The Foreign Mission Committee of the Free Church of Scotland had to make a major decision regarding the children’s well-being. They needed, as a matter of urgency, to transfer the children to another Free Church institution in a healthier, non-malarial climate. They were also keen that the children should remain on the African continent. Their logical choice was the Church’s flagship mission school, Lovedale Institution in the eastern region of the Cape

44 of Good Hope, South Africa.12 On the night of 24 July 1890, the Oromo children, along with Alexander Paterson and Matthew Lochhead, embarked on the mailship Rio Grande of the French shipping line Mes- sageries Maritimes. They sailed into the harbour at Port Louis, Mauritius on 12 August 1890. To reach the east coast of South Africa meant trans-shipping to the Conway Castle, a steamer of the Castle Mail Packets Company’s Castle Line. The Conway Castle docked in East Lon- don on Wednesday, 20 August 1890 and they travelled by train, then by ox-wagon, to Lovedale, arriving on 22 August 1890.13 When the Oromo children arrived at Lovedale, they constituted a body of sixty-four foreign pupils who had to acclimatize to being part of a much larger body of scholars in an established educational establishment of around 730 students. They had to adjust to a new environment, new languages, new customs and a new curriculum. Tolassa, Bisho and the other Oromo children settled into the new ways at Lovedale remarkably quickly. They were relieved to discover that their new diet contained several foodstuffs they recognized. Many of the foodstuffs had also formed part of their regular diet in Oromoland—corn, pumpkins and the Eastern Cape’s local sour milk (amasi). The climate was, as anticipated, far healthier than at Sheikh Othman. The Eastern Cape is a non-malarial, sub-tropical area, and Tolassa and Bisho thrived.

TOLASSA AT LOVEDALE They both achieved a measure of excellence at their studies at Lovedale with Tolassa winning the Science Prize in the Second Year class. He went on to achieve a second class pass in his matriculation exam in 1897.14

BISHO AT LOVEDALE Meanwhile, Bisho was also achieving well academically at Lovedale. In 1892, Bisho was in Standard III and ranked first in a class of 25 children (girls and boys), scoring 94%. There were eight Oromo children in that class, of whom six scored in the top ten. At Lovedale’s prize-giving that year, she was awarded not only first place in class but also the class Bible Prize. In the following year of 1893 in Standard IV, Bisho achieved 93%, tying with fellow Oromo, Dinkitu Boensa.15 In this class of fifty-one students, eight were Oromo and five of these scored places in the top ten positions. Bisho was consistently among the top ten in class.

LIFE AFTER LOVEDALE After earning his Teachers’ Elementary Certificate, Tolassa left Lovedale in 1898. By May 1899, he had travelled to East London, where he was working as a photographer's assis- tant16 and later as a waiter in the same town. On 11 October 1899, the Anglo-Boer (or Sec- ond South African) War broke out. Within months, Tolassa signed up to serve in the British army and by 1900 he was a transport driver with the forces under General Sir Redvers Buller in Natal (now KwaZulu Natal). Whilst serving under Buller, Tolassa wrote two letters to Lovedale recording his wartime experiences:

Acton Homes, Natal, Jan. 22, 1900 … It is going on for four days since we came here and on three of those days we have heard nothing but the sounding of cannon and the hissing of bullets over- head. Yesterday and the day before yesterday 12 cannon were in action. To-day there are more of them in action. It is said that 322 men are killed and wounded

45 today. Of course, we do not know exactly how many are killed on the side of the Boers. It is said that their trenches are full of dead. In every engagement the Boers are being driven back farther and farther. Before yesterday they shelled the posi- tion where we were and killed one man, wounded about half-a-dozen others and killed a number of transport horses and mules. It is easy to speak about war, but it is very hard to look on dead and wounded men. I did not like to look at the man who was shot by the shell of the Boers. The shell knocked through his breast and came out at the back. … Our transport is in the fighting line, while the transport belonging to other regiments keeps about half a mile from the regiments. Being under cover of the guns a number of our mules were shot. I cannot tell you all that is going on just now, but I will tell you some time, if I return safely.17 Later, in July 1900, Lovedale received a further letter from Tolassa. The first letter was writ- ten at Glencoe, and continued the story of his experiences after leaving Acton Homes: The two terrible battles were that of Spion Kop, when we had to retire during a dark and rainy night across the Tugela, and that of Colenso at the relief of Lady- smith. At Hussar Hill and Colenso I was very nearly blown to pieces by shells. The one at Hussar Hill was a 40 pound shell, and at Colenso a shell from a 15 pounder long range gun. At the relief of Ladysmith my regiment was the second to enter the town, and I tell you the town was in a very bad condition. The sol- diers were just like moving skeletons. How these men, who were scarcely able to handle a rifle or carbine, kept out the Boers is really wonderful. After the relief of Ladysmith I was transferred to the Special Ammunition Column of the Royal Ar- tillery. We were stationed at Ladysmith about one month; at Elandslaagte over a month; and now my column is here at Glencoe. Dundee, Glencoe and Hadding Spruit were taken with scarcely any fighting. We are leaving for Newcastle per- haps to-day or to-morrow.18 Tolassa continued in a letter later written from Newcastle in Natal: Coming from Glencoe we passed a number of Boer prisoners, who were captured between that and Newcastle. These poor Boers were very downcast. At one place while they were passing a line of thirty outspanned waggons, all the native occu- pants of the waggons gave them three cheers.19 Towards the end of 1901, he wrote to the Lovedale missionaries saying he had quit military service and had returned to the Eastern Cape. He also told them that he intended on returning to Oromoland via India, using his own resources.20 Of the sixty-four Oromo children who had arrived at Lovedale in 1890, fifteen had died by 1902, the year the twenty-five year old Tolassa Wayessa set off to return home. By 1902, only five other Oromo had been successful in their attempts to return home independently, all of them young men:

• Amanu Figgo • Galgal Dikko • Gamaches Garba • Nagaro Chali and • Nuro Chabse.

All five had returned independently and separately during 1901.

46 Three months later Tolassa wrote from Zanzibar telling them he had sailed on 9 Janu- ary 1902 from East London aboard the S.S. Kaiser and had arrived in Beira on 20 January.21 Two days later he sailed on from Beira to Zanzibar where a steamer took him on to Bombay (today’s Mumbai). From Mumbai, he travelled north to “Broach” (now known as Bharuch), an ancient town in southern Gujarat, about 310 km north of Mumbai, where he remained for a year. There is no hint in his letters to the missionaries of what drove him to visit India—nor Bharuch in Gujarat in particular. As the sources are silent, it is tempting to believe that he may have heard about the recent pioneer Protestant missionary efforts in this region of India from the missionary Gebru Desta who had taken care of all the Oromo children at Sheikh Othman in 1889-1890. Gebru Desta led a peripatetic missionary life and kept frequent written and personal contact with many of the Oromo as they grew to adulthood. Tolassa was cer- tainly in correspondence with the missionaries at Lovedale and also with the Reverend Dr John Cameron Young, Medical Missionary at Sheikh Othman. But there is no clue in any of this correspondence why he was visiting Bharuch nor any indication as to what he was doing there for the best part of a year. Eventually, in July 1903, he reached Aden and returned to the Keith-Falconer Mission at Sheikh Othman where he visited the Reverend Dr John Cameron Young, then Medical Missionary of the Keith-Falconer Mission at Sheikh Othman. Young wrote to Lovedale on 15 July 1903 reporting Tolassa’s visit. He added that Tolassa intended to return to Ethiopia on 16 July 1903 and that he hoped to make contact and spend some time with his friend from Lovedale, Nagaro Chali, by then a colporteur with the British and Foreign Bible Society in Harar, before proceeding to Finfinnee/Addis Ababa.22 Sometime between 1903 and the beginning of 1907, Dr Young erroneously reported to the Lovedale missionaries that Tolassa had died. Happily, George Clerk, who was Chargé d'Affaires with the British Legation at Finfinnee/Addis Ababa was able to correct this infor- mation in a letter dated 28 February 1907 written to Liban Bultum, one of the other Oromo still in South Africa. Clerk was able to assure Liban that, far from being dead, Tolassa was very much alive and working as an interpreter for Captain Brian England in Finfinnee/Addis Ababa.23 The London-based International Railway Trust and Construction Company (Lim- ited) formed in consequence of sensitive trade and contractual negotiations among the French, British and Ethiopians towards the development of an Ethiopian railway network and had appointed Captain England to take charge of its agency in Abyssinia. The initial contract for the construction of a railway line linking Djibouti and Finfin- nee/Addis Ababa was awarded to a French company in 1897 but they were soon short of funds, so the British lent several sums in return for some control of the line. There were con- tinued disputes between the French and English as both struggled for ultimate domination. Under these circumstances, linguistic issues assume considerable importance, not least in as- suring mutual comprehension. Suddenly, given the delicate nature of these contractual agreements, the significance of Tolassa’s role as interpreter to Captain England ratcheted up several diplomatic notches. By 1910, the work was over and Tolassa had left the service of Captain England. Liban Bultum, who successfully negotiated the repatriation of the Port Elizabeth group of Oromo to Ethiopia in 1909, wrote to the Lovedale missionaries in 1910 with further information re- garding Tolassa:

Tolassa Wayessa, who returned some years ago, has a good position in the Ger- man Legation. Wayessa's father and mother were dead before he reached Abys-

47 sinia; but he found an old woman who used to live with his parents when he was child. Through her help he has been able to recover all his father's property—with the exception of four slaves belonging to his father, which another man claims.24

While retaining ownership of his farm in Tibe, Tolassa settled in the neighbourhood of the German Embassy in an area called Kebena, one of the oldest neighborhoods in the eastern part of Finfinnee/Addis Ababa where he owned a house on a piece of land of considerable size. Here Tolassa married a woman by the name of Getenesh Woldeyes and raised a family of two boys and one girl. Tolassa’s descendants believe he died in Finfinnee/Addis Ababa during the late 1930s. Tolassa’s two sons both died young, before their sister, Desta Tolassa Wayessa married Terefe Negero in 1944. Desta therefore inherited the large piece of agricultural land in Tibbe (Tibe) from her father on his death. The farm stayed in the possession of the family until the Derg overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie. In January and February 1975, the Derg began a general process of nationalization of privately held commercial assets and financial institu- tions and followed with the nationalization of urban land and secondary domestic properties. The most radical announcement followed in March with the land proclamation by which all forms of private ownership of property (including rural and agricultural land) was prohibited. Tolassa’s farm, along with all other privately-owned land in Ethiopia, was nation- alized and taken over by the state without compensation.25

Genealogical table of the family of Tolassa Wayessa

A.1 Wayessa married Hatatu B.1 Tolassa Wayessa married Getenesh Woldeyes C.1 Alemayehu Tolassa Wayessa (m); birth - death? C.2 Tefera Tolassa Wayessa (m); birth - death? C.3 Desta Tolassa Wayessa (f) (1928 - 1998) married Terefe Negero Gurmu, (1918 - 1998) in November 1944 D.1 Hirut Terefe Negero (f) married Berhanu Disasa Doti E.1 Kuleni Berhanu (f) married Kaleb Mamo F.1 Yoadan Kaleb (f) F.2 Theodore Kaleb (m) F.3 Adoniah Kaleb (m) F.4 Yoab Kaleb (m) F.5 Beniah Kaleb (m) F.6 Nehemiah Kaleb (m) F.7 Yocabed Kaleb (f) F.8 Azariah Kaleb (m) E.2 Hawani Berhanu (f) E.3 Doé-e Berhanu (f) E.4 Dinsry Berhanu (f) married Michael Yemesgen F.9 Solen Etsub Michael (m) F.10 Mi-aa Michu Michael (f) D.2 Ezra Terefe Negero (m) married Martha Tasissa Ebba E.5 Etsehiwot Ezra (f) D.3 Meheret Terefe Negero (f) married Feleke Bojia Asseku E.6 Rediet Feleke (f) married Jacob Wiebel F.11 Raphael Wiebel (m) E.7 Luladay Feleke (f)

48 E.8 Fisseha Feleke (m) D.4 Dawit Terefe Negero (m) E.9 Bezawit Dawit (f) E.10 Yadel Dawit (m) D.5 Amaha Yesus Terefe Negero (m) D.6 Estifanos Terefe Negero (m) E.11 Alpha Estifanos (f) E.12 Azaria Estifanos (m) D.7 Tsega Berhan Terefe Negero (f) D.8 Berouk Terefe Negero (m) E.13 Emmanuel Berouk (m) D.9 Mahteme Silasse Terefe Negero (m) E.14 Edna Mahteme Silasse (f)26

Tolassa has left a fine Oromo legacy spread across at least three continents. Today, he has descendants living in Finfinnee/Addis Ababa, Canada and London, England.

BUT WHAT OF BISHO JARSA? Bisho, one of the few Oromo women to pursue an academic training at Lovedale, left in 1902 to take up a teaching position in Cradock, a small inland town in the Eastern Cape. She left before achieving full certification, but continued to work towards this while teach- ing.27 The following year, in August 1903, Lovedale polled the Oromo, distributing ques- tionnaires nation-wide asking if they would wish to return home if offered an assisted pas- sage. Bisho decided rather to continue pursuing her teaching career in South Africa28 and shortly thereafter married a fellow student at Lovedale, Frederick Scheepers, a missionary of the Congregational Union in 1911.29 They had two sons and two daughters including Dimbiti Bisho Scheepers, born 6 November 1913. During this period, Bisho contracted diabetes, and her sight began to fail. When Frederick died in Uitenhage on 1 June 1920 at the age of forty-nine years, Bisho was only forty-five years old, but totally blind.30 Recently-widowed, blind and the mother of four young children, Bisho had to rely on the generosity of the church and the friends of the Con- gregational Union for their support. Dimbiti was only six years old when her father died, but as she grew, she followed in her mother’s footsteps and became a primary school teacher. On 12 November 1933, at the age of twenty, she married a twenty-eight year old Cradock car- penter named David James Alexander in the Cradock Congregational Church. Their first son, born in Cradock on 22 October 1936, was Neville Edward Alexander. Neville attended the Dominican Convent in Cradock and later began his tertiary education at the University of Cape Town. The university awarded him an Alexander Humboldt Stiftung scholarship to continue his studies at Tübingen University in Germany where he achieved his doctorate in German literature. He emerged not only as a radical social activist but also as one of South Africa’s respected intellectuals. He believed passionately in education, linguis- tic diversity, justice and equality in light of which he spoke out vehemently and frequently against the waves of xenophobia meted out by South Africans against “foreign nationals.” He had clear personal memories of his grandmother, Bisho, from his childhood in Cra- dock. As she grew older and her diabetes robbed her of her sight, Bisho reverted to speaking in her mother tongue, Afaan Oromoo. Neville recalled how his younger sib- lings were disturbed by her murmuring in a foreign tongue. They ran to their mother,

49 Dimbiti, asking: “What's wrong with Ma? What’s she talking about ... what's she say- ing?” Dimbiti would respond soothingly, “Don't worry about Ma ... she's talking to God.”31 The principles and biblical values which he imbibed from his mother and grandmother percolated through his entire life, far beyond his embrace of atheism. One of the most pro- found of all maternal influences in Neville’s life was the focus on the value of education. From her earliest days at Sheikh Othman, Bisho (and many of her peers) recognized that the key to their future lay in education. This belief matured at Lovedale where Bisho decided that her own hard work in the classroom would open the doors to an independent life and self-sufficient future. In effect, her education would be her own personal liberation. As a BBC interviewer in November 2011 reflected:

The strongest parallel he can draw between his life and that of his grandmother is the role of schooling. “Her real liberation was not the British warship but the ed- ucation she later received in South Africa.”32 They knew it was up to them to carve out their lives for themselves, to be totally self-reliant. Despite the profound trauma of their experiences, not one Oromo child ever exhibited a trace of victimhood. They never forgot that trauma but refused to see it as an obstacle to their fu- ture. Far from it. That trauma inspired them to use their courage, fortitude and sheer hard work to liberate themselves from any shred of a dependency mindset, and to forge ahead in- dependently, using their own personal initiative, recognizing and maximizing every oppor- tunity that came their way, to achieve their life goals.

CONCLUSION

These stories of Tolassa Wayessa and Bisho Jarsa give voice not only to details of their own lives but are representative of a group who are rarely heard.

• Firstly, they were children when they related their stories to the missionaries and the voices of children are generally discounted in the history of the powerful. • Secondly, they had been enslaved children, and the voices of slaves recounting their first passage experiences have rarely been recorded let alone survived. • Thirdly, they were enslaved Oromo children in a country where the Oromo voice was seldom heard or recorded or allowed to be transmitted.

Most importantly, these were authentic Oromo voices speaking across the centuries, telling their own life stories, and in so doing, confirming the history of the oppression of the Oromo people, beginning in the late nineteenth-century. For nearly 150 years in Ethiopia, that history has been suppressed—silenced—and the national narrative became one of denial that the op- pression of the Oromo had ever taken place. The voices of the sixty-four Oromo children, recorded in 1890 and published by Lovedale Press in 1891, cannot be denied, cannot be re- futed—nor can they be ignored. They have destroyed the national narrative myth forever.

The children’s narratives have also changed and extended our understanding of the historiog- raphy of slavery and the slave trade of the Horn of Africa in the late nineteenth-century. Their stories provide some much-needed empirical relief for one of African history’s persistent enigmas: the first passage in African slavery. But primarily they also told of the extraordinary resilience and determination of the Oromo children of Lovedale, our Oromo Children of Hope.

50

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS I believe, in planning our future, we should derive considerable inspiration from that resilience, self-reliance and sheer determination. It is thanks to these courageous Oromo chil- dren—who believed in themselves and never gave up hope—that I have had the privilege of telling their stories and to be the conduit through which they could speak to the Oromo peo- ple today, particularly to today’s Oromo youth. Since the significant, memorable and profoundly moving OSA conference held in Finfinnee in July 2019, I have received countless personal messages from young Oromo, par- ticularly those leading Oromo youth groups throughout Oromia and beyond, telling me that they have been inspired by the motif of the “Children of Hope” and are using this as the on- going motif to drive their own movements today. If today’s Qeerroo and Qaarree could draw inspiration from the concept of the “Chil- dren of Hope” on a wider scale, using this phrase as a guiding motif, I believe this would comprise the fullest possible recognition of, and realization of, the valuable message and legacy of the courageous and resilient nineteenth-century CHILDREN OF HOPE. Their suffering and survival against all odds will not have been in vain.

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1 Sandra Rowoldt Shell, Children of Hope: The Odyssey of the Oromo Slaves from Ethiopia to South Africa (Ohio, OH: Ohio University Press, 2018; Cape Town: UCT Press/Juta, 2019; Finfinnee/Addis Ababa: Shama Books, 2019). 2 Shell, Children of Hope, 103-108. 3 The following paragraphs on Tolassa’s experiences are drawn from “Tolassa Wayessa,” in Matthew Lochhead, Short Biographies of the Galla Rescued Slaves, Now at Lovedale with an Account of Their Capture (Lovedale: Lovedale Press, 1891), 35-36. 4 Lochhead, Short Biographies, 6. 5 The three dhows were the Al Kathora (captained by Ali Kira Mahomed), the Bakheita (captained by Sala-din Ibrahim) and the Al Heshima (captained by Ibrahim Ali). 6 “Arrival of our Sixty-four Galla Girls and Boys at Lovedale: Another Picture.” Free Church of Scotland Monthly (1 November 1890): 334. 7 Lochhead, Short Biographies, 10. 8 Shell, Children of Hope, 104-109. 9 Shell, Children of Hope, 38-41. 10 Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World (London; New York: Verso, 2001), 127. 11 “Bisho Jarsa” in Lochhead, Short Biographies, 42-43. 12 T. M. Lindsay, Letter to James Stewart, Christmas 1889. University of Cape Town. Manuscripts and Archives. James Stewart Collection. BC106: 254.15. 13 Shell, Children of Hope, 123. 14 All Cape school leaving exams were moderated by the University of the Cape of Good Hope (today’s University of South Africa). Lovedale Institution. What Becomes of those who pass Through Lovedale? (Lovedale: Lovedale Press, [1900]). Cory Library for Humanities Research. 15 Dinkitu Boensa was one of four princesses among the Oromo girls. Her father was the royal leader of Garjeda in the Gindo country. 16 He worked as photographer’s assistant to a local photographer named Mr Scott. 17 “Letter from a Galla boy.” Christian Express (1 March 1900): 35. 18 “Letters from the Natal front.” Christian Express (2 July 1900): 99. 19 “Letters from the Natal front,” 99. 20 “Lovedale News” in Christian Express (1 January 1902): 4. 21 “Lovedale News” in Christian Express (1 April 1902): 52. 22 “Lovedale News” Christian Express (1 September 1903): 132. 23 Cory Library for Humanities Research. Rhodes University. MS 8814. Letter from George Clerk, H.B.M. Chargé d’Affaires, Finfinnee/Addis Ababa to Liban Bultum, 28 February 1907. 24 “Lovedale News” Christian Express (1 October 1910): 171. 25 Husen Ahmed Tura, “Land Rights and Land Grabbing in Oromia, Ethiopia” Land Use Policy 70 (January 2018): 247-255. 26 My thanks to the descendants of Tolassa Wayessa, particularly those living in Finfinnee/Addis Ababa today, for supplying these details 27 Cory Library, MS 8796. Letter: Bisho Jarsa to the Principal, Lovedale, regarding possible return to Ethiopia. Cradock: 15 March 1903. 28 Bisho Jarsa, Repatriation questionnaire response, 1903, MS 8796, Cory Library. 29 Oral interview, BBC with Neville Alexander, How an Ethiopian Slave Became a South African Teacher [online resource] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14357121. 30 Frederick Scheepers, Cape Estates Death Notice Index 1834-1951, MOOC 6/9/1757, Ref: 2599, 1920, Western Cape Archives Repository. 31 BBC interview, “How an Ethiopian Slave Became a South African Teacher” (November 2011). 32 BBC interview, “How an Ethiopian Slave Became a South African Teacher” (November 2011).

52 PUTTING A SPOTLIGHT ON ETHIOPIA’S ECONOMIC IDIOSYNCRASIES

Ayele Gelan, Economic Public Policy Research Program (EPP), Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR), PO Box 24885, 1309 Safat, Kuwait, [email protected]

Abstract

Ethiopia’s economic idiosyncrasies have received hardly any attention at all levels in Oromo or Ethiopian studies. The fact that Ethiopia is a desperately poor country seems to have caused researchers to gloss over the issue, with tacit understanding that Ethiopia’s economic problems are “well known” and hence don’t deserve any in-depth study. However, the root cause of the lack of social progress in Ethiopia can be found deep-seated in varieties of lopsided patterns of economic development. It’s not just that Ethiopia’s economy has numerous structural imbalances, but the imbalances are interrelated, forming synergy and keeping the economy at a low-level equilibrium poverty trap. In this paper, I argue that Ethiopia’s political and economic reform are very unlikely to succeed unless the authorities address a few critical bottlenecks. No matter how much the authorities may try to perfect the art of economic policy formulation, standard policy prescriptions are unlikely to pull the country out of the current quagmire of the poverty trap. Proceeding to standard economic policy reforms without addressing the fundamental imbalances would be analogous to trying to erect a high rise building without bothering to properly clear debris and conduct necessary excavations on the site. This paper will identify a few peculiarities in the Ethiopian economy then proceed to an in-depth discussion of the ramifications of each idiosyncrasy in turn.

53 1 INTRODUCTION

In a nature documentary series, Wildest Africa, the third episode was devoted to Ethiopia. In that episode Ethiopia was depicted as Land of Extremes, a unique blend of natural environments as well as a mesmerizing topography and diverse flora and fauna- many of them found nowhere else in the world. Little did the producers of that documentary know that Ethiopia’s social and economic landscapes are at least as unique and extreme as its natural environment. The peculiarities of the country’s social domain have been vastly documented, often portrayed in divergent and diametrically opposite viewpoints of Ethiopian history.

Ethiopia’s economic idiosyncrasies have received hardly any attention, at any level, in Oromo as well as Ethiopian studies. In Ethiopian historiography, it has been customary to throw everything to do with economic matters under the rubric “Ethiopia is a poor country”. This comes with tacit understanding that Ethiopia’s economic problems are well known and hence the topic doesn’t deserve any in-depth analysis.

The fact is, however, the root causes of the lack of social progress in Ethiopia can be found lying deep-seated in varieties of lopsided patterns of economic development. It is not just that Ethiopia’s economy has numerous structural imbalances, but the imbalances are interrelated, forming synergy among themselves and keeping the economy in a low-level equilibrium poverty trap.

Clearly, the economic imbalances are at least partly derived from political and social imbalances in the country, but there is no acknowledgment of this dynamic in most Ethiopian studies. There seems to be caused by some logical fallacy in Ethiopian studies, manifested in an established linear and sequential thinking that addressing political and historical injustices would come first then sorting out economic malaise would follow.

In this paper I argue that Ethiopia’s political and economic reform is very unlikely to succeed unless the authorities pay enough attention to the country’s economic peculiarities. No matter how the authorities try to perfect the arts of economic policy formulation, standard policy prescriptions are unlikely to pull the country out of the current stalemate in the poverty trap. Proceeding to standard economic policy reforms without addressing the fundamental imbalances would be analogous to trying to erect a high rise building without properly clearing debris and conducting necessary excavations on the site.

This paper will concentrate on three top idiosyncrasies of the Ethiopian economy: (1) the low wage curse, (2) center-periphery imbalances and (3) urban- rural imbalances. The paper is structured in that order, providing an in-depth analysis of each of these idiosyncratic features respectively and examining their influence on the direction of Ethiopia’s ongoing economic reform. The discussion in this paper heavily borrows from Gelan (2018).

54 2 IDEOSYNCRACY #1: THE LOW WAGE CURSE

2.1 How Low is the Wage Rate in Ethiopia?

In Ethiopia’s Low Wage is a Curse, not a Blessing (Gelan 2018, pp.190-202) it was established that Ethiopia is an exceptionally low wage economy. The salaries of an elementary school teacher and a chief high school principal in Nairobi are about eleven and thirteen times the salaries of their counterparts in Addis Ababa, respectively. Ethiopia’s non-mandatory minimum wage currently stands at less than US$17 per month, which miserably compares with statutory minimum wages of US$120 in Egypt and US$148 in Kenya. Yet the cost of living in Ethiopia is slightly higher than that of Kenya; in a world index with New York as 100, Nairobi and Addis Ababa were put at 47 and 49 respectively.

This analysis was taken further in a recent report entitled Made in Ethiopia: Challenges in the Garment Industry’s New Frontier (Barrett and Baumann-Pauly, 2019), which established that Ethiopia’s factory workers were paid on average US$26 per month. This was compared with statutory minimum wages of thirteen other countries from different parts of the world. It’s not only that Ethiopia was situated at the bottom of the list but also Ethiopia’s figure was about a 1/4th of the next two low wage countries, Bangladesh and Mynmar, each with US$95.

2.2 A Blessing Turned into a Curse

The role of domestic market size in economic development was articulated as early as the1960s. The focus of balanced growth theory was synchronized investments in different sectors of the economy with a view of expanding the size of the domestic market (Nurkse 1961). With the advent of the structural adjustment program of 1980s, sponsored by the World Bank and IMF, the focus shifted entirely from interconnections between components of the domestic sectors in developing economies towards the external sectors, namely production for exports.

In the latest decade, however, the pendulum has shifted toward the recognition of the position held by development economists during the post-independence years. The intellectual backing for the latest thinking is rooted in the endogenous growth theory (Romer 2011). Even some of the multi- lateral agencies have begun to actively encourage developing countries to adopt policies that enhance domestic demand (UNIDO 2017 and UNCTAD 2013).

It seems Ethiopia is stuck with the bankrupted excessive export orientation mostly promoted by the Bretton Woods agencies, the World Bank and IMF. The unfortunate reality of this misguided development strategy has been that Ethiopia neither has succeeded in promoting exports nor in developing domestic markets.

We keep hearing regrets expressing that Ethiopia has remained poor although it is blessed with natural resources. However, it is rarely recognized that Ethiopia is also blessed with another resource: a large population! Multi-lateral agencies, donors, and policy practitioners regularly complain that Ethiopia’s population is growing too fast and is becoming a burden on the economy. There’s no denying that unfettered population growth can lead to pressure on public services, e.g. education, health, housing etc. However, what seems to be lost in this argument is that a large population also means a big market size. The undue emphasis on population growth as a burden

55 seems to have hidden the positive element in the demographic narrative – turning the blessing to a curse!

It should be noted that Ethiopian authorities adopted many costly endeavors simply because of their overzealous commitment to the export-oriented development strategy. Farmers had to be evicted from their ancestral lands to give way for flower farms or industrial parks, both meant to produce exportable products.

The authorities had to entice foreign firms to come to Ethiopia promising cheap labor. The authorities designated cheap labor as Ethiopia’s comparative advantage. It seems the authorities were oblivious to the fact that, by committing themselves to offer labor at such excessively cheap or almost free rate to foreign firms, they effectively killed the domestic market – the purchasing power of residents.

2.3 Labor Income Share in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Labor income occupies a central place in domestic demand based economic policies. It is becoming increasingly common to stress the role of labor income in determining performances of domestic markets. Lavoie and Stockhammer (2012) presents interesting discussions on theories and policies on wage-led growth. The motivation for shifting attention to wage-led growth in recent years lies in the increasing recognition that profit-led growth policies of the previous decades led to catastrophic failures. The envisaged trickle down has remained unrealized. Inequalities in the developed world and poverty in developing countries have become rampant.

Why profit-led growth will not lead to sustainable growth can be partly understood by the manner in which income generated gets circulated in the domestic economy. Wage and nonwage incomes (profits, interests, dividends, and rents) constitute the total income of households. The bulk of wage income goes to poor households (low-income group) while non-wage income goes to rich households. Wage earners spend a very large proportion of their incomes on goods and services, boosting domestic demand.

The non-wage income earners, on the other hand, allocate a good proportion of their income to savings, which in the jargon of circular flow of income is referred to as “leakages”. Savings are referred to as leakages because they represent the amount of income that has been diverted away from continuous circulation in the economy, away from being spent on goods and services, and deposited with domestic or foreign banks.

It is the job of government policy to minimize leakages and maximize spending. This does not mean governments actively engage in discouraging savings but, rather, they promote investment, so that which has leaked out is injected back into the economy. The trick is to make sure that total spending is unaffected while the composition of spending may vary: (1) investment spending (on capital goods) by business owners, and (2) household spending (on consumer goods and services).

Since there is no guarantee that savings will always be converted to investments, government policy should ensure that enough income would be allocated to wage earners who are more likely to spend on goods, so that demand for goods and services will remain strong. The share of labor income in GDP, that is to say, in total income of the country, indicates the extent to which

56 government actively protects the welfare of households, thereby ensuring demand for goods and services would remain vibrant.

Guerriero (2012) computed the average share of labor income in GDP using panel data for covering many countries in the world spanning over two decades. The findings were presented in two categories: adjusted and unadjusted, the adjustments being excluding or including self- employment. Labor income share in GDP is the lowest in Africa (38% unadjusted and 58% adjusted). The highest share was observed in Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) where it reaches as high as (57% unadjusted and 76% adjusted). In general, in developed economies, the share of labor income in GDP is higher in developed countries than in developing countries.

This brings us back to facts we already know that developed countries have much more solid and sound wage policies. The motivations for wage policies in advanced economies are many-fold. The first one is related to social objectives, ensuring that citizens get decent wages for decent work, and their welfare is protected. The second source of motivation lies in economic rationales, rooted in the circular flow income discussed earlier: the recognition that consumer spending is an engine of growth.

It would be interesting to know the relative position of Ethiopia. Unfortunately, Guerriero (2012) analyzed the panel data by grouping countries into continents. In her follow up study (Guerriero 2019), which included updated panel data utilizing country by country comparisons, Ethiopia was not included in that panel data. However, it is possible to resort to indirect methods and extract information regarding how the situation in Ethiopia would compare with that of other countries in the world.

Figure 1. Changes in labor share in GDP 2005-2017 (Ethiopia vs. Africa Average)

This is done by using labor income as share of GDP, which is regularly reported by the International Labor Organization (ILO). In the ILO dataset, we find relevant data for both Ethiopia and the average for Africa. Given that we already know how Africa compares to the rest of the

57 world, then knowing the relative position of Ethiopia compared to African average would give us information on the position of Ethiopia’s labor income share in GDP relative to the rest of the world.

According to the ILO database (ILO 2019a), labor income share in Ethiopia’s GDP was 49% in 2005; slightly higher than the corresponding figure for Africa (46%). During the period between 2005 to 2017, there was a secular downward movement in labor income share in Ethiopia, reaching 44% in 2017. On the contrary, labor income share in the rest of Africa has actually slightly increased, particularly between 2008 and 2017 (Figure 1).

ILO (2019b) stated that labor income share they report is comprehensive, covering employment and self-employment income. Therefore, it should be underlined that the 44% labor income share in GDP for Ethiopia covers both the compensation of employees (for employed work force) and the imputed share of labor income for the self- employed labor force. This would mean that this estimate covers estimated labor income of the entire agricultural labor force as well as the rural and urban informal sectors in Ethiopia.

2.4 The Anomaly with Ethiopia’s Wage Structure

Ethiopia’s low wages have attracted the attention of the international community. This has given rise to background work on finding a solution to Ethiopia economic malaise. For instance, the ILO initiated a Request for Proposal for consultancy on background studies on the minimum wage in Ethiopia (ILO 2017). The Capital Newspaper reported that “the Ethiopian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs drafted a labor proclamation to establish a Commission to set a minimum wage. The proclamation will not set a minimum wage rather establish a Commission that set a base wage across time depending on the economy, cost of living and other factors in order to avoid the hassle of revising the proclamation repeatedly.”

There seems to be a consensus among donors, multilateral agencies and the Ethiopian government that Ethiopia’s low wage curse could be done away with by simply introducing a standard minimum wage, which would be legally binding across all sectors. Clearly, this indicates that the authorities are oblivious to the peculiarity of Ethiopia’s wage structure. The minimum wage serves as a mechanism to deal with normal situations, but Ethiopia’s wage situation is rather abnormal and hence minimum wage regulation would not go anywhere near fixing the problem.

I will devote the rest of this section to illustrate how tricky it would be to address Ethiopia’s wage troubles by introducing a minimum wage. I will do so using diagrammatic expositions (Rutkowski 2003).

It would help to start with an ideal wage distribution situation; a society in which wage distribution is not biased in any direction. Figure 2 shows such a wage distribution. The vertical axis represents the proportion of the work force, and the horizontal axis shows wage rates. In this ideal case, the wage structure is represented by a normal distribution in which the average wage is just in the middle, with half of the population earning more than the average wage and the remaining half less than the average wage. In the case of normal wage distribution, all measures of central tendency overlap (mean, mode, and median are equal). The distribution is normal, equally tailing out to the left and to the right, that is to say, no degree of skewedness to use a statistical jargon.

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Figure 2. Ideal Wage Distribution

Even this normal social policy concerned with equity requires the introduction of a minimum wage, so that those who are left behind can be pulled up, closer to the average wage. Hence the authorities can introduce a binding minimum wage (shown by the red vertical line) below which it would be illegal for any employer to pay. That way the authorities would solve the problems of equity and fairness. Therefore, the legally binding minimum wage becomes effective.

As indicated, the ideal case can serve only as a point of reference, since such an ideal wage distribution does not exist in real economies. It is often the case that wage distributions are skewed to the right, that is to say, longer tailing out to the right, implying much greater than half of the workforce earn low wages and smaller proportion of the work force earn higher wages. Such a typical wage distribution that applies to most economies is displayed in Figure 3.

As stated before, the vertical axis represents the proportion of the workforce and the horizontal axis denotes the wage level. The green vertical line represents average wage, this time average being represented by the mode (the amount of wage received by the highest proportion of workers). In such a rightly skewed wage structure, the arithmetic mean gives a distorted measure of average wage. Large wages received by a few (the right tail of the distribution) gets a bigger weight and hence the mean is much greater than the mode, a deceptive average. The third measure of average, median, that is to say the level of wage that divides the wage distribution into two equal halves, would be greater than the mode but less than the mean. As before, the red vertical line represents a hypothetical level at which a normal society with the typical wage distribution (Figure 3) would set a legally binding minimum wage.

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Figure 3. Typical Wage Distribution (Right Skewed)

Figure 4. Ethiopia’s Extremely Skewed Wage Distribution

Unfortunately, the case of Ethiopia is not normal. In order to compare and contrast with a normal case, Ethiopia’s wage distribution is displayed in Figure 4. From our discussion earlier, Ethiopia’s wage distribution is extremely skewed to the right. The majority of the work force receive an

60 extremely low wage, while a negligible proportion of the work force falls in the high-income category. Notice that Ethiopia’s average wage (the green vertical line in Figure 4) is slightly lower than the minimum wage level in a normal economy (depicted in Figure 3).

In Ethiopia’s Low Wage Is A Curse, Not A Blessing (Gelan 2018, p. 194), it was shown that Ethiopia’s average monthly wage was $65 which is considerably lower than the corresponding monthly average wages of most African countries (e.g. Uganda $106, Egypt $174, Tanzania $216). It was also shown that Ethiopia’s minimum wage (not legally binding) was $17, sharply contrasting with legally binding minimum wage rates in Egypt ($120) and Kenya ($148). It follows that Ethiopia’s average wage is about half of Egypt’s minimum wage and considerably lower than 50% of Kenya’s minimum wage (ibid., p. 193). It is this reality that is mimicked in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Ironically, cost of living in Ethiopia is the highest in the East African region, e.g. Addis Ababa’s nearly two times that of Cairo (ibid., p. 195).

The ILO as well as Ethiopia’s Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, who are preparing the groundwork for the introduction of a legally binding minimum wage in Ethiopia, seem to be unaware of the reality on the ground, of the immensity of the matter they are dealing with. The wage structure is stuck extremely skewed to the right, while the average wage is situated so close to zero. This renders the whole idea of trying to introduce a minimum wage an utterly meaningless exercise. If the authorities insist with introducing a minimum wage, then definitely they would end up doing something strange.

The bottom line is that the authorities should introduce a minimum wage enough to meet subsistence requirements, that is to say a living wage. The Global Wage Coalition sponsored a study on the case of horticulture in Ziway, 164 km South of Addis Ababa (Melese, 2017). It was estimated that the living wage in Ziway would come to EB 3,367/month (US$116/month at the current exchange rate), which is greater than Ethiopia’s average wage reported earlier (US$65/month). In the context of Figure 4, we would be required to draw a vertical bar (position of minimum wage) to the right of the vertical green line in Figure 4. But a minimum wage is supposed to fall way below the average wage. What else can be done?

Ultimately Ethiopia is supposed to have a wage structure that aligns with its neighbors. Ethiopia cannot afford to continue with a business as usual scenario, as the odd one out in the region. In that case, an appropriate wage policy for Ethiopia would be to revamp the entire wage structure. This would mean pushing the wage structure (curve) to the right. This is shown in Figure 5, which is plotted synchronizing Figure 3 and Figure 4.

The upper graph replicates the typical wage structure of a normal economy (as in Figure 3). The lower part presents a modified version of Ethiopia’s wage structure. The pre-reform distribution is drawn as in Figure 4. The post-reform curve presents a wage distribution similar to the one portrayed against the typical distribution curve for a normal economy. This implies that Ethiopia’s wage reform would mean pushing the old wage curve to the right, as well as broadening and flattening it so that it would have a similar structure to a typical distribution for a developing economy. In that case, Ethiopia’s average wage would be equal to (or comparable to) those of neighboring economies. It is then and only then that Ethiopia can introduce a sensible and legally binding minimum wage, say at M, which is equal or comparable to that of its neighboring countries.

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Figure 5. Proposed Wage Reform

At this juncture it is appropriate to ponder over whether or not it would be realistic for Ethiopia to undertake and implement wage reform at this scale, that is, revamping the entire wage structure. For instance, Ethiopia’s wage reform would mean, at the very least, doubling the salary of every employee. As noted earlier, Ethiopia’s average monthly wage is US$65/month, a third of that of Tanzania’s! So if trebling is daunting, doubling becomes a must. The point is this: can Ethiopia afford to accomplish this daunting task? The challenges come from two directions: (a) a strain on the government’s budget, and (b) inflationary pressure. I will briefly discuss each of these.

2.5 Costing Ethiopia’s Wage Reform

The budgetary implication comes in terms of increasing the salaries of government employees as well as provisions of labor subsidy to the private sector for a limited period of time. It would help to have a sense of magnitude about how much it would cost. In 2013, only 10% of Ethiopia’s workforce was in paid employment; the remaining proportion of the work force being self- employed, either in rural farming or informal activities in rural and urban areas (UNDP 2018). In nearly a decade and a half (1999 to 2013) the proportion of employment increased by just 2% and much of that incremental increase occurred in the public sector, with the relative proportion of private sector paid employment marginally declining from 4.3% in 1999 to 4.2% in 2013. Now given that the size of the workforce in paid employment is relatively small, perhaps Ethiopia is better off implementing a wage reform now when it is affordable than wait till latter when the proportion of the workforce in paid employment would rise to larger proportions, say 20% or 30%.

A rough estimate of the budgetary cost of Ethiopia’s wage reform is provided in Table 1. The World Bank estimates that Ethiopia’s working age population was about 53 million in 2018. About

62 82% of the working age population was estimated as employed or actively seeking employment (labor force participation rate). The size of the labor force, defined as employed or unemployed, was about 43 million. Only 10% of the labor force were in wage employment as discussed earlier. Hence the number of employees receiving wages, and whose wage need to be increased, would be 4.3 million.

As noted earlier, the average monthly wage was estimated to be US$65. Here the budgetary cost was calculated by assuming that the government would not only increase public sector wages but also provide support to the private sector, whose labor cost would escalate as a consequence of a wage reform. Suppose the wage reform continues to happen for a duration of 12 months, that is to say, the economy would adjust and stabilize within this period. Furthermore, suppose that the wage reform implies doubling the monthly salary of every wage earner. Applying these assumption the total cost of the reform would come to $3.4bn.

Table 1. “Back of envelope” calculation of budgetary cost

Descriptions Data Source Working age (15-64) 52,630,311 World Bank 2019 (WDI) Labor force participation rate (%) 82.3 World Bank 2019 (WDI) Size of labor force 43,314,746 Employees (%) 10.0 UNDP (2018) Employees (number) 4,331,475 Average salary per month ($) 65 Gelan 2018 Average salary per year ($ bn) 3.4

This rough estimate provides a sense of magnitude, a starting point to contemplate revamping Ethiopia’s wage structure. Ethiopia has wasted scarce resources, several times this amount, on mega, costly, and adventurous projects over the years. In my opinion, what Ethiopia cannot afford is not so much the cost of wage reform, but carrying the crippling low wage burden, with all of its ramifications in terms of weakening the economy.

In any event, the cost reported here could be rather simplistic. This requires dynamic computable general equilibrium modeling, which is left for future research. This would also reveal the inflationary effects and feedback mechanisms through which more realistic costs and benefits of the wage reform could be estimated, as well as revealing inflationary outcomes.

Regarding inflation, as long as the wage reform and agricultural production supports are properly planned and sequenced, inflationary effects would not necessarily become such an overwhelming concern. After all, inflation is a full employment phenomenon, but Ethiopia has plenty of unemployed human and natural resources that can be employed, and outputs of goods and services can be boosted without any daunting efforts.

3 IDIOSYNCRACY #2: CENTRE-PERIPHERY

The extent to which Ethiopia’s growth policy has led to rampant inequalities can by no means be overemphasized. The inequalities are manifested in two dimensions: interpersonal and

63 interregional. The wide gaps in interpersonal inequalities can be indirectly addressed through varieties policies, including those discussed in the preceding section. In this section, I will concentrate on interregional inequalities, inequalities between places! Centre-periphery pattern of development is one way in which inequality between place are often manifested.

The role and functions of the megacity in a country would critically depend on the extent to which it dominates the rest of the cities in the urban hierarchy. The case of Addis Ababa is discussed in detail in Addis Ababa: An Enigmatic City (Gelan 2018, pp. 203-2012) and the discussion in this section heavily borrows from that article.

I will use two indicators to illustrate the issues. The first one is related to what is termed as Zipf’s Law (Zipf, 1949), which in the context of urban hierarchy stated as: “..the population of the city on top, the mega city, is expected to be: about two times the population of the second largest city, and three times that of the third largest city, four times that of the fourth largest city, and so on. City rank size distributions in most countries may not exactly fit to this analytical frame but they do closely follow this pattern of distribution”.

Table 2 displays how Ethiopia compares with other countries which are selected from different continents. In order to maintain comparability, data was obtained from the same source (https://Www.Citypopulation.de) for all countries reported in Table 2. According to this source, Addis Ababa’s population was about 10 times the size of population in Adama, the second largest city in Ethiopia in 2015. There was no country in the world whose a megacity has that much times the next largest city of that country.

Table 2. Largest city to second largest city population ratios (2015)

Country/Cities Ratio Africa: Ethiopia - Addis Ababa : Adama 10.1 Rwanda - Kigali : Gosenyi 6.8 Tanzania - Dar es Salam : Mwanza 6.2 Uganda - Kampala : Nansana 4.1 Kenya - Nairobi : Mombasa 3.4 Nigeria-Labos:Kano 3.3 South Africa-Johannesburg:Cape Town 2.3 Egypt - Cairo : Alexandaria 1.9 Congo - Brazzaville : Pointe-Noire 1.9 Ghana - Acra : Kumasi 1.0 Rest of the world: UK - London:Birmingham 7.8 France -Paris:Marseille 2.6 Russia -Moscow:St Petersberg 2.3 USA -New York:Los Angeles 2.1 Germany - Berlin:Hamburg 2.0 Source: Compiled by Gelan (2018. p. 2005) using data from Thomas Brinkhoff: www. City population.de

64 Addis Ababa’s population was reported in the database used for this study as 3.2 million in 2015. It is highly likely that the actual size of Addis Ababa’s population was much higher. For instance, World Bank (2019) reports 4.5 million for 2018. In that case, the gap between Addis Ababa and Adama is likely to be much wider. It is likely that Addis Ababa’s Zipf ratio would be somewhere near 15.

Centre-periphery patterns of development hinders economic development in many ways. In the context of Ethiopia, where the dominance of the megacity takes such an extreme lopsidedness, the relationship between the center and the periphery becomes parasitic rather than symbiotic. On the one hand, the center being that much far from the periphery, then the latter would be starved of markets. In other words, the periphery cannot benefit from the big market the megacity offers because of transportation cost piles up per unit distance. Districts beyond a certain distance threshold would simply loose out from the market benefits.

On the other hand, the central government taxes all citizens regardless of where they live, including those that reside in the periphery, to provide and maintain services offered to the megacity. For instance, according to Ethiopian Electric Power (2014), Addis Ababa gets about 60% of total electricity generated and distributed in Ethiopia. The population of Addis Ababa could be maximum of 5 million, which is about 4.5% of Ethiopia’s 110 million population. This means that 4.5% of the population is allocated 60% of power generated while the remaining 95% of the population is condemned to survive on the remaining proportion of 40%. In a study conducted by Addis Ababa Institute of Technology (2012) it was reported that about 50% of the vehicles with ET plates circulate in and around Addis Ababa (p. 121).

It is unclear the extent to which the existence of extraordinary pattern of center-periphery pattern of development happening in the economy known by the authorities. It should be known that market forces always favor agglomeration. There is always a tendency for dominant cities to become even more dominant if matters are left to market forces. It is the duty of policymakers to damp down the power of agglomeration. There is always a tug of war between market forces enhancing forces of agglomeration and causing concentration, on the one hand, and public policy discouraging concentration but encouraging forces of dispersion.

The fact that Ethiopian authorities seem to be uninformed or ill-informed about the complex center periphery relationships means they actually work hand in hand with market forces, reinforcing agglomeration, and contributing to worsening center-periphery relationships. This amounts to adding fuel to an already raging fire.

4 IDIOSYNCRACY #3: URBAN-RURAL RELATIONSHIPS

Ethiopia’s economy is beset with a plethora of inequalities. The low wage curse is one way through which interpersonal income inequalities are manifested. Centre periphery is only one dimension of inequalities, inequalities between places and hence by extension between communities of people who live in the central and peripheral locations. This section is devoted to discussion on inequalities between urban and rural areas.

These encapsulates three variants of inequalities. First, urban and rural areas are geographically separate and hence inequalities between them can be seen as a variant of regional inequalities.

65 Second, economic functions of urban and rural areas are distinctively different, industrial and agricultural respectively. Hence, urban bias in economic development is an expression of bias in favor of urban sectors (industry and services) and against rural sectors, mainly agriculture. Third, urban and rural households belong to distinct socioeconomic groups, and often sociological groups. Urban bias, therefore, implies inequalities of income and opportunities between rural and urban residents.

In spite of pious words reserved for agricultural and the rural sector, urban bias has remained a characteristic feature of the Ethiopia’s economic public policy, starting from the imperial era all the way through the present day. The EPRDF regime had a sensible start when agriculture-led development strategy (ALDI) was adopted. A dramatic shift to industry occurred prematurely without registering any meaningful achievement with ALDI. This proved to be a deadly policy blunder. It is possible to get away with policy mistakes with any other sector, but not with agriculture, the consequences of mistakes become apparent in a short while.

4.1 Structural Transformation

In the context of a developing country like Ethiopia, economic development involves two changes concurrently happening. First, the size of the economy expands, and this is measured by annual growth of the GDP. Second, the structure of GDP changes from predominantly agricultural, rural and traditional sectors to industrial, urban and modern sectors. It is this shift in the structure of the economy that is termed as structural transformation.

Figure 6. Structural Transformation in Ethiopia (1981-2018) (Source: World Bank 2019).

66 Changes in the size and composition of Ethiopia’s GDP for the 38 years (1981 to 2018) is displayed in Figure 6. The size of Ethiopia’s real GDP (that is after accounting for inflation) expanded by an average of 5.5% per annum. This is a weighted average of the 1.3% during the last decade of the Derg regime (1981-1990) and the rosy growth rate of 7% for the nearly three decades of the EPRDF era (1991 – 2018). Whether Ethiopia’s GDP has really grown at the rate implied in the government official statistics is questionable (Gelan 2018, pp. 65-73).

Now we turn our attention to the changes in the component of the GDP, i.e., the status of Ethiopia’s structural transformation during the period. This is shown by the relative changes in the different components: agriculture, Industry, services, and manufacturing (which is separately reported although it is also included in industry).

It proves useful to start with manufacturing, the line just above the horizontal axis. This line is almost flat, indicating that no structural transformation has occurred in the Ethiopian economy as far as the share of manufacturing in Ethiopia’s GDP was concerned. It is extraordinary that the relative position of manufacturing in the Ethiopia has remained at the level it was nearly four decades ago, stuck at 6% of GDP!

The story is about the same when we examine the relative share of industry. It too stayed stagnant for much of the period, 10% all the way from 1981 to 2010 and then the line curved upwards. Why sudden upward changes from 2010 onwards? The reason is “construction” is included in industry. In a desperate attempt to show some growth record, the EPRDF government shifted gear to developmental state model, through which a series of mega construction projects were launched an implemented. Consequently, the share of industry rose from 10% to 19% in just eight years.

However, we know construction is a means to an end. For instance, it is not enough to just build roads. Goods need to be produced to move over those roads, otherwise, the roads themselves would wear and tear and the government has to return to it for maintenance. Therefore, infrastructural development through costly construction projects would be a deceptive way of achieving structural transformation.

Last, but by no means least, are changes in the relative positions of services and agriculture, which happen to have shaped up into mirror images of each other. In 1981, agriculture and services had 63% and 27% share in Ethiopia’s GDP respectively. In 2010, agriculture and services achieved parity, each 45% share in GDP. From then onwards, the two sectors swapped positions, with services on top and agriculture below. By 2018, agriculture reached its lowest point ever, 33%, while services climbed up to 47%.

During the entire period, agriculture and services have simply swapped positions and industry, particularly manufacturing has remained stagnant, except for the construction induced shift. In a nutshell, one cannot seriously argue that any meaningful structural transformation has occurred in the Ethiopian economy during the last three decades.

One of the important features of structural transformation is rural-urban migration. For this to occur, the urban sector has to have an absorptive capacity, that is to say ability to create jobs for excess supply of labour force from rural areas. The rural labour force can be realistically called excess or surplus, if and only if productivity in agriculture has increased in a substantive way so

67 that those who remain in rural areas can produce enough to feed themselves (their families) and produce marketable surplus to feed those who just got released (new rural-urban migrants) as well as those that were already in urban areas. It is these sequences that would yield a healthy and substantive structural transformation.

The share of rural and urban areas in total population of Ethiopia as well as the relative shares of agriculture, industry and services in total employment are displayed in Figure 7. It proves useful to start with changes in rural and urban population between 1991 and 2018. In 1991, 13% and 87% of Ethiopia’s population lived in urban and rural areas, respectively. The corresponding shares in 2018 were 21% and 79%. This means a rural to urban demographic shift of 8% in twenty- seven years.

Now let’s turn our attention to changes in sectoral employment composition (World Bank 2019). The share of agriculture in total labour force was 78% in 1991 and 66% in 2018, a shift by only 12%. It should be noted that the share of agriculture in GDP declined by 30% (from 63% in 1991 to 33% in 2018). Thus, output per agricultural worker has continuously declined during the period. Employment in industry and services has increased by each by 6% during the period. However, the shares of industry and services in GDP increased by 9% and 20% respectively.

How can we explain the disproportionately larger increase in the share of service GDP than the corresponding increase in the share of service sector employment? Does this necessarily imply large increase in labour productivity in the service sector? This is not necessarily the case.

It seems what is happening in the Ethiopian economy is something akin to Baumol cost disease or simply Baumol effect (Baumol and Bowen 1966). Baumol effect is familiar in advanced economies whereby “the rise of salaries in jobs that have experienced no or low increase of labor productivity, in response to rising salaries in other jobs that have experienced higher labor productivity growth. This pattern seemingly goes against the theory in classical economics in which real wage growth is closely tied to labor productivity changes.”

In the case of Ethiopia, it seems some service sector employees, possibly government sector employees, are paid disproportionately higher salaries, but not in response to productivity gains anywhere elsewhere in the economy.

4.2 Cost-Price Squeeze in Ethiopian Agriculture

The anomalies encapsulated in the process of Ethiopia’s structural transformation can be expressed a unique way; the so-called cost-price squeeze that has been taking place in the Ethiopian agriculture. Cost-price squeeze is widely reported to occur in most farming communities, even in those that get massive doses of support from their governments in developed economies (Czyżewski, Matuszczak & Miśkiewicz 2019, Shield 2010, Moss 1992).

The cost-price squeeze in the context of Ethiopia is explained using vertical hierarchy of market relationships between urban and rural areas within the Ethiopian economy and linkages with the world economy. This relationship represents not just commodity flows but also power relationships between actors in the nodes. By far the most important imbalance in power relationship happens within the domestic economy - between urban traders and rural producers.

68 The rural producers are mostly connected to the world market through mediations of urban traders (see the direction of the arrows connecting the circles).

Figure 7 depicts the relationship between rural and urban in the domestic economy as well as those between the domestic economy and the global economy. This structure is adapted from a strand of dependency theory model concerned specifically with terms of trade and unequal exchange, often referred to as Singer-Prebish hypothesis (Toye & Toye 2003).

Starting from the import side, the economy of urban sectors largely depends on importing from the rest of the world, and then re-exporting to rural areas, in addition to goods and services produced in urban areas. Importers in Ethiopia enjoy enormous oligopolistic power, after all importers of each product are very few in number but they face millions of buyers, rural and urban resident households and businesses. The cost of imported goods often keeps on rising year-on- year.

Even when the prices of imported items fall due to cost reducing innovations elsewhere in the world, the importers would not pass on gains to farmers at the same rate of reduction they encountered at the origin of goods. Lack of competition means increasing their own profit margins becomes their priority. For instance, the price of fertilizer has been rising over the years. The matter got from bad to worse when the government completely withdrew fertilizer subsidies many years back, leaving farmers at the mercy of oligopolistic firms that import and distribute fertilizer to rural producers.

In any event, increase in the cost of fertilizer and other inputs means cost of agricultural production has been rising rapidly, not just dictated by world market prices but also margins set in the oligopolistic market. The imperfect import market affects not just agricultural input prices but also prices of consumer goods supplied to rural as well as urban residents, causing additional inflationary pressure and hence deterioration in welfare of households. This completes the process through which costs of agricultural inputs put pressure on producers’ margins, that is to say, the squeeze from below!

Now we turn out attention to rural exports, that is output markets for rural products. Urban traders buy from rural households. A few urban traders meet with millions of rural producers in agricultural product markets. As in import markets, when few buyers deal with many sellers, then we have buyers’ market, an oligopolistic market structure. Buyers have greater power in determining output prices. What urban traders buy from rural exporters, they dispose of in domestic urban markets or export them to the world market. Exporters have limited options to influence prices in the world market, where prices of agricultural products tend to be extremely volatile. The higher the volatility, the greater the risk. However, that does not mean exporters would bear the risk that they encounter in the world market. Their margins are often left intact. Whatever risk comes their way, the traders would pass it onto the powerless farmers.

69

Figure 7. Cost-price Squeeze

In domestic market, urban traders encounter extremely low purchasing power of urban residents. As discussed earlier, urban households earn extremely low wages. The non-wage earners are few in number and how much they would spend on food has a biologically determined upper limit. Consequently, in urban market, traders have a limited room for maneuver as far as increasing food prices are concerned. They fix prices at the level that guarantees survival of their business, keep their own margins relatively intact and then decide how much they would pay to the farmers. In a nutshell, the consequences of volatility or rigidity in the agricultural output market is ultimately born by the farmers. This completes the price squeeze, that is the squeeze from above!

The essence of the cost-price squeeze into agricultural producers margin is that farmers carrying the entire burden that is to say the consequences of imperfect market structure in input and output markets as well as the ultimate consequence of weak and limited market size imposed by the low wage curse. The only way to get out of this quagmire is to devise public policy that would enhance agricultural productivity through technological improvements. Innovations in agricultural production would reduce cost of agricultural production. This has to be coupled with improving purchasing power of urban residents by implementing a comprehensive and far reaching income policy reforms.

5 CONCLUSION

I have made a modest attempt to explain the Ethiopian economy has extremely peculiar features which is nearly impossible to find in any other developing economy. The uniqueness of the

70 Ethiopian economy lies in the extreme depth and breadth of structural imbalances that otherwise exist in most developing economy in moderation. For instance, most developing countries are characterized by low wages. However, it was explained in this paper Ethiopia’s low wage is like no other.

The current non-binding and non-statutory minimum wage of $17 was about one-eighth of the binding and statutory minimum wage in Kenya. This would still be acceptable if cost of living in Ethiopia is considerably lower than that of Kenya, but that is not the case. In fact, cost of living index for Addis Ababa is higher than the corresponding figure for Kenya. Ethiopia’s minimum wage is about a third of the budget required to purchase to meet the biologically minimum daily calorie. The peculiarity of Ethiopia’s low wage cannot be explained by imbalances in income distribution either. Except for negligible proportion of work force employed by foreign non- governmental organizations, all most all work force survive with exceptionally low wage.

Almost all modern sectors of the Ethiopian economy are clustered in and around Addis Ababa. This has given rise to exceptionally peculiar lopsidedness in economic development. Ethiopia portrays an extreme type a center-periphery pattern of development. The powerful force of agglomeration means Addis Ababa has been literally sucking resources towards itself. This has gained momentum over the years.

Ethiopia’s structural transformation has literally been stalled. The change in sectoral composition of industries display a shallow pattern of structural transformation, with sharp declines in the share of agricultural in the country’s GDP, with no associated increment in the share of manufacturing. The Ethiopian economy has experienced a classic case of pre-mature de-industrialization, direct transition from agricultural to service sectors, by-passing the manufacturing or industrialization stage.

In order to explain Ethiopia’s economic idiosyncrasies and provide insights, it was essential to confine the analysis to only three of existing anomalies. Otherwise, there are many other peculiarities in the Ethiopian economy. For instance, there are extreme imbalances between big and small business. Similarly, Ethiopia’s financial sector operates in somewhat bizarre arrangement, unique to Ethiopia.

6 POLICY RECOMMENDATION

There are compelling reasons for the authorizes to undertake a thorough study on the Ethiopian economy and generate a solid evidence-base that will facilitate the groundwork for a comprehensive economic reform program. In doing so, the focus should be on identifying binding bottlenecks in the country’s economy. Such a study would end up creating a longer list of peculiar features, paying specific attention to the ones identified and discussed in this paper.

The authorities would need recognize the fact that the Ethiopian economy has unique features and deeply entrenched imbalances. The policy implication for this is that before formulating economic policy reform packages, it is important to facilitate the groundwork by undertaking pre-requisite measures to remove the structural imbalances. Some of the imbalances can be dealt with in a straightforward manner. For instance, the authorities would need to swiftly move to formulating and implementing a comprehensive income policy.

71 It was clear from the discussions in this paper that Ethiopia cannot deal with its low wage curse by using a minimum wage law. Ethiopia’s wage reform should come in the context of a comprehensive income policy, moving the wage curve to the right, that is to say, increasing wages and salaries of all wage earners.

The authorities should target addressing the country’s lopsided pattern of growth, reduce the center-periphery imbalances, and counteract the forces of agglomeration. This may not require a separate policy of its own but synchronizing a range of policy instruments built into designs and implementations of development programs. For instance, this may include offering tax, subsidy, and other incentives to influence business locations away from Addis Ababa to the peripheries, etc.

The Ethiopian economy is experiencing pre-mature de-industrialization. The sooner the authorities become aware of this development and put in place measures to reverse this trend the better. This trend can be reversed by using a range of policy instruments and incentives to influence investment decisions away from services to manufacturing or the productive sectors.

The cost-price squeeze farmers have faced needs immediate attention. The key issue here is recognizing the existence of extremely imperfect input and output market structure adversely affecting farming households. There is a strong case for government intervention to indirectly influence the power relationships in the markets or directly through price support systems in input and output markets.

72 References

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75 Multination Federalism and the Notion of Identity Bekele Gutema Addis Ababa University Abstract Federalism is understood as a system of institutional power sharing suitable to manage diversity. It is constituted by a holding and coming together of forms of federation. The differences between the two depends on the nature of entities that form the federation. Nevertheless, if it is based on right principles and is made appropriately democratic it is a system that while managing differences can enable the society to be a just and democratic one. Identity has become important than ever before as a result of changes that took place in the understanding of human and peoples’ rights. Although identity has always been important, it is the failure of multicultural societies to handle differences and respect the rights of minorities that pushed identity politics into the forefront of political discourse and praxis. In Ethiopia we are at a time when we have to take a departure from the homogenizing and hegemonizing practices of the late 19th century and 20th century and try to structure economy and governance in a manner that is able to address the interests and concerns of our diverse population based on justice. The recognition of identity and the practice of a democratic federalism can go a long way in establishing justice, good governance, harmony and foster solidarity among Ethiopia’s different communities. The chapter will analyze the contemporary literature on the notions of federalism and identity and undertake a deep analysis of the practice of multination federalism in order to contribute to the task of establishing a federation that both meets the aspirations of the Ethiopian peoples and the realization of an Ethiopia in which the rights of its peoples are respected and can thrive in harmony. An understanding of group and individual rights that understands the concepts not as contradictory, but complementary will significantly enhance our understanding of federalism and identity and contribute to creating a harmonious society that can appropriate modern ideas of federalism and identity and reappropriate Ethiopian values of peace, unity and development. Key words: Federalism, identity, individual rights, group rights, justice, peace

Introduction Multination federations became necessary after the realization of the fact that, today there are many multicultural societies. It is a form of government in which power is divided between the central government and the federated states for the purpose of sharing power equitably between the central government and the constituent units. Its acceptance depends on both moral and pragmatic grounds. By avoiding dominance from the center it can enable freedom to groups that

76 vie for authentic identity and cultural revival beyond formal equality. It can be made to promote individual freedom. It is in its intention of limiting the tasks of the central government to prescribe policy that it promotes the sharing of power between the center and the constituent units. By clearly and cleanly separating the functions of the central government and the federated states it can create a conducive atmosphere for a properly functioning democratic federal state. If it succeeds in this it can avoid dictatorship, because a dictatorship cannot be a federation. Identity politics is about the politics of recognition for societies that are multicultural. The attempt to build nations through integration and assimilation can no more work today in view of the end of the idea of empire and revolutions that have taken place regarding peoples’ rights and human rights. The homogenizing approaches and narratives of the 19th century are no more acceptable to the diverse groups that are today found in many multicultural societies. In this situation, what is wise, in my opinion and the opinion of many scholars who are for the politics of identity, is to accept diversity as a given and look for ways of appropriating it in an enriching way. That way could be by instituting a multination federation in which no group is marginalized and where substantive equality can be established in the form of sharing power and resources equitably depending on the concrete situation of a given country. With this understanding the chapter discusses federalism, the different dimensions of identity and how it relates to individual and group rights. By drawing on the literature on the subjects and an analysis of the contemporary situation an attempt is made to clearly understand what the concepts are and show how they could be useful in establishing a democratic society in which no group or individual is marginalized.

Federalism Like many concepts of social and political philosophy federalism has a long history. Its origin can be traced back to the 17th and 18th centuries. Its origin has to do with the knowledge of the limitations and adverse effects of centralized states on the rights of the constituent units of the state. The person who is considered to be the father of federalist thinking, Johannes Althusius wanted autonomy not for an ethnic community, not a certain region of a country or something similar, but a small town called Emden, in Lower Saxony in Germany. It was an autonomy aimed at securing certain rights from the provincial governor and the King. The two practiced different denominations of Christianity. The provincial governor was a Lutheran, while the king was a Catholic. It was an autonomy against domination by the two institutions of the state and from that time on wards the idea of federalism has been evolving as one of the important concepts in political philosophy. Federalism has the purpose of safeguarding against practices even within a democracy that could impinge on the rights of the one or the other group of people depending very much on the kind of situation that we are talking about. Its importance has increased in the 21st century for various reasons among which the self-awareness of people to define themselves and want to survive is the main one accompanied by other factors like the collapse of empires, the human rights revolution and democratization processes. There are coming together federations like that of the USA, Australia, and Switzerland. Here independent states give up some of their powers in certain areas with the purpose of attaining some goal like security, economic development, etc.

77 Holding together federations like that of India, Ethiopia, Belgium, Canada, etc. lead to the emergence of a federal state out of a centralized unitary state to avoid conflicts or total break-up. Federalism must guarantee relations based on a constitution that clearly defines relations between the central government and its constituent units. In this it differs from majority rule which takes into account only votes not the concerns and interests of the constituent units of the state, hence the idea of self-rule for the constituent units and shared rule for things that can be handled commonly in accordance with the bargain. There are various ways of understanding federalism. The word comes from the Latin term foedus which means an agreement or a covenant. So, when considered on the basis of its original meaning and usage it means that a government by federation is a government based on bargain as it will be enshrined in a constitution. What makes it different from other kinds of bargain is that it is based on trust drawn from bargain and institutionalized in a document to which parties have agreed to uphold in view of the purposes it is supposed to serve, i.e. coming together or holding together. Federalism tries to ensure balanced relationships between the powers of the central government and that of the states that establish the federation. In the first place it is the desire to limit the powers of the central government that necessitates federalism. Some may ask whether democracy cannot handle this issue and question the necessity of a system that could undermine the authority of the central government. Democracy is based on majority rule, irrespective of the size of the majority and more importantly, in many cases the dominant values and norms of the majority or a historically dominant group. In a democracy therefore, groups are dominated and undermined with regards to particular interests. In other words, the fact that decisions are made by the central government based on majority, does not take into account the interests of groups which vary from issues of language, culture, belief and the desire for self-rule than being ruled from the center. These and other reasons that will be raised in the process of the discussion underline the shift to federalism particularly in the 21st century. Federalism, hence involves the exercise of two different legal systems in the same country. Considered from a unitarist perspective this may appear strange, but they are the solutions it suggests for the domination of the central government that this could be justified not only politically but also morally. There will be two legal systems with their corresponding institutions. As a result it imposes two types of loyalty on the citizens. The citizens will have duty and obligation to the federal state and also their own states. This need not involve a contradiction because the federal system itself is established through a bargain that delimits the authority of the central government. The agreement needs to be crafted in such a way that one does not impose its will on the other and that their relations depend on the laws of the agreement which are not to be violated by the parties, i.e. central government and the state. It does not have the character of an agreement that can be adjudicated by courts, but only in accordance with the agreement reached when the structure was designed and hence enshrined in the basic document of foundation. It must be based on an agreement that while guaranteeing individual freedom tries to make sure that groups are not marginalized. As W. H. Riker and A. Føllesdal wrote, “Prominent defenses of federalism draw on ‘organic’ conceptions of political or social order to promote individual flourishing; or to secure local autonomy, co-operation, peace, justice, human rights, economic prosperity or other values within, among or beyond the constituent subunits (2007: 618).”

78 It is in order to look for guarantees against domination by the central government that does not want to recognize differences and the need for autonomy that federalism became necessary originally. At present the kind of changes that occurred with regards to the understanding of peoples’ rights is phenomenal. There is an unprecedented change with regards to the consciousness of different groups, ethnic, religious and others on their uniqueness and individuality. It became continuously clear that such demands for recognition could not be addressed by centralized unitary states. But on the other hand recognizing this became increasingly necessary in view of the fact that groups vying for recognition could be a challenge if recognition is denied. Not recognizing such demands now is simply impossible because it is no more realistic to control such demands with sheer force alone. It affects the loyalty of the group demanding for recognition. The loss of the loyalty of groups poses a serious threat to the legitimacy of the central government. One may understand this as a historical phenomenon that could only be achieved as a result of advances made regarding peoples’ rights. It is also indicative of the metamorphosis that the state went through during the 20th and 21st centuries. Earlier the idea of the sovereignty of the state had preponderance over peoples’ rights. But the institution of peoples’ rights through different universal and regional covenants, revolutions in human rights, a high degree of consciousness among nationalist and other groups and the long struggles made by different organizations, political, civic, etc. has led to the current situation. It should of course be noted that the issue is not one of undermining the sovereignty of the state. It is a call for a sovereignty based on solid foundation to which all people in the state can relate positively if a proper recognition is given. By recognizing peoples’ rights and promoting their interests the state creates a condition for it to be a legitimate state. In changed times it is wise to recognize and realize peoples’ aspirations for self-definition and self-assertion on the one hand and then build the authority of the state on legitimacy drawn from citizens, not force. It can be seen as an issue of reciprocity that has been made possible by historical phenomena that are in the process of transforming people into citizens from being subjects. It is based on these points that federalism has attracted the interests of philosophers and particularly political philosophers. Philosophically moral grounds can be invoked to justify federalism. Federalism fosters freedom and liberty for both groups that are and feel unfree and disenfranchised by unitary governments. Its purpose is to limit a ubiquitous government that not only involves in many activities that impinge on peoples’ rights but also tries to tell them what is right and what is not. Particularly when the unitary government does not allow its different constituents certain practices (social, economic, cultural, etc.) there by becoming a threat to their survival as a group with own identity. In this sense it can be seen as promoting both individual and group rights. The quest for a federal arrangement by groups, ethnic or otherwise, presupposes the recognition of the state. Such a demand presupposes recognition of the state, common interests with the other compatriots and a quest for a common political order. The quest for autonomy and a federal state should not be interpreted as a loss of interest in a common polity with the other groups. It is the desire to live under the same state but with a differentiated citizenship meant to manage some of their own affairs on their own that lies at the core of the demand for federalism. In other words as it is mentioned by many it is an issue of shared rule and self-rule, instead of just being ruled by the center. That is where its moral foundation lies.

79 Federalism actually enhances democracy in a more important sense by instituting, as it were, self-rule and shared rule. From the perspective of the ruled this is preferable in the sense that it puts limits on the role of the central government, so that it rules not by mere majoritarian idea but in accordance with how it is laid down in the bargain. This is necessary because of matters that just can’t be left to majority rule. Some of the things that groups hold to be so dear to them might appear trivial to the majority. Questions of cultural authenticity and revival, the continuity of heritage, the place and role of languages and resources are very important ones that need to be handled in a way that empowers groups. Federalism creates a mechanism by which the interests of the central government and that of its constituent parts can be addressed in accordance with agreements that give to each their fair share of power and resources. The idea of shared rule, which is concerned with overarching problems of governance, is important in this respect. It is an idea that invokes the notion of loyalty expected from all members of the polity and many things could be derived from this. In terms of the defense of the country, and contributing in all the required forms to the common wealth is what inheres in the idea of shared rule. Shared rule takes care of so many concerns as they are stipulated in the constitution and other laws of the state that have to apply to all the constituents of the federal state. On the other hand self-rule enables the constituent states of the federal state to manage their own affairs on the basis of laws meant for this purpose. The very purpose of instituting federalism is this purpose with the understanding that democracy alone wouldn’t allow for a differentiated citizenship. Self-rule is vital, as mentioned earlier on, in terms of guaranteeing the rights of the concerned group and individuals in the group in a manner that the one does not impinge on the other. Problems that could have just been glossed over in a democracy could get closer attention. Issues that are vital to cultural authenticity, cultural revival and identity will get the opportunity to be addressed. The idea of self-rule has to base its implementation on the principles of self- determination which encompass political, social and economic issues. A centrifugal tendency that sows the seeds of separation and the undermining of the state are contained in such a structure from its very inception. It is an illusion to assume that a federal system is a perfect system that functions without challenges and delivers what is promised without undermining sovereignty. There are a lot of challenges, particularly from the centrifugal and centripetal tendencies/forces at work in such a system. There will be competition between these forces to undermine each other. However, the point is, if there is an alternative to federalism in multicultural societies like ours. We have to take note of the fact that, “the international order has decisively repudiated older ideas of a racial or ethnic hierarchy according to which some peoples were superior to others, and thereby had the right to rule over them (Kymlicka 2001: 37).” In our case, for instance, we should not forget the long struggles of the different peoples of Ethiopia for justice and equality that can only be addressed through a federal arrangement. What would be useful in this situation is primarily to stick to the spirit of the document of foundation/constitution which is the result of bargain by the founders. Furthermore actors need to be committed to make the structure function. If there is good will and a commitment to make it work, rather than putting stumbling blocks in its way, the likelihood that it will create a harmoniously working system is there. But if those who are entrusted with the task of making the system work give it only a lip-service and use every incident to claim that the arrangement does and cannot function then we can be sure that federalism is doomed and can create conditions for a worse scenario. The success of any system depends on the action of humans, agents supposed to make it function. If it is not animated by conscious and wise human

80 activity no system functions of its own accord. Humans can make it work or can destroy it altogether. If we want shared rule and self-rule to function and provide us with conditions that will enable us to grow, it will be up to us to create favorable conditions that will enable it to function. With regard to the federal system instituted by the EPRDF in Ethiopia, right when the system was just over a decade old, David Turton said, “… ethnic federations are most likely to fail, not because they are too ethnic, but because they are not sufficiently federal” (2006: 22). It appears that the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) had no choice other than adapting a federal system to address the conflicts between the state and constituent ethno-national communities in the early and mid-1990s. When one looks at the hurdles that the system is facing right through its existence and particularly in the last four years and the way the EPRDF government intervened in the running of the federated states one cannot fail to notice the prophetic nature of Turton’s assessment. The causes for demonstrations in Oromia, the largest of the states forming the Ethiopian Federal system that started in November 2015 are nothing but about the inability of the central government to take its hands-off the issues that should come under the jurisdiction of the Oromia government, i.e. self-rule. land grabbing whether in the form of the expansion of the city of Addis Ababa into the surrounding Oromia region or that of displacing farmers from their ancestral land in the name of investments are simply indicative of the fact that the central government did not want the region (s) to practice self-rule. People’s demands have been about respecting the Constitution and stopping the arbitrary interventions of the Federal Government in the affairs and administration of the regions. The demand from the people was that we need federalism in deed, not in name. That is why it is right to say that there is no system that functions automatically. People are responsible to make it work or not. If institutions of the central government for whatever reasons: narrow group interests, or the historical reasons that certain elites do not want to lose the position of hegemony that they held for generations and give lip-service to federalism how can it be expected to succeed? We cannot blame the ordinary people and activists who demand justice and to be administered in accordance with the covenant. Here again Turton’s verdict over a decade earlier about the challenges that could face the Ethiopian federation precisely explains the kind of problems that Ethiopia has been facing through demonstrations first in Oromia that then spread to the Amhara region and costed the lives of thousands of people as a result of the government’s inability to establish a rule of law and constantly resorting to brutal force. It is in the following words that Turton foresaw the problems that could be threats to the Ethiopian federation. …the principal threat to the Ethiopian federation comes from three closely related features of the EPRDF rule over the past thirteen years. These are: 1) the failure to separate party and state; 2) the continuation of the ethos of ‘hegemonic control’ that has characterized Ethiopian political culture since the late 19th century; 3) the failure to appreciate the complexity of local cultures and the attitudes, interests and aspirations of ordinary people (ibid: 25). The paradox is, on the one hand a unitary government in Ethiopia will not be acceptable to many people in the Ethiopia of the 21st century, while on the other elites who had real power, do not want to move any length from the ethos of ‘hegemonic rule’ that has been there for generations. The ethos of ‘hegemonic rule’ lurk behind the rhetoric on diversity, federalism and the politics of difference. In fact what Markakis also pointed out in his, “Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers”

81 (2012) is this very point. What Turton called the ethos of ‘hegemonic rule’ is reflected in what Markakis called the highland and lowland peripheries. According to him despite the power devolution rhetoric the ethos of hegemonic rule continued unabated. Reviewing Markakis’ book A. Yemaneab wrote, The much heralded EPRDF’s federalism has been long on words and short in deed. Under EPRDF when it comes to the question of political power, the center still dominates the periphery… Regardless of ideology or professed commitment to lofty ideals of socialism and federalism none of the governments to date have resolved the fundamental questions of sharing political power equitably between center and periphery and integrating the periphery with the center (2012:116).

Identity The notion of identity gained importance during the last few decades because of phenomena that are associated with the demands of different groups for recognition. In philosophy identity can be considered from different angles and attempts are made to explain what it means, when it is said that something is identical with itself. The notion of personal identity through time, identity as it is understood with regards to different things, the criteria and correct understanding of identity; scholars’/philosophers’ positions on perdurance and endurance are some of the points that are central to the philosophical discussion on identity. It is not my purpose here to engage in the kind of philosophical debate mentioned above. In addition to the points mentioned, the notion of identity has become the focus of contemporary political discourse and practice. The collapse of ideologies which appeared to be eternal gave way to new phenomena on the social and political scene. The collapse of the idea of empire and the undermining of the preponderance of the state over its subjects gave way to the realization of peoples’ rights and identity. Countries with diverse ethnic and cultural communities started to realize that it is no more possible to suppress peoples’ identity in the name of the nation. This moved the idea of identity to the center of the political discourse. My focus is on the notion of identity as it is discussed in political philosophy. It has to be understood that in metaphysics the concept of identity can be applied to persons, objects, events, and the like. Such discussions in metaphysics are abstract and hardly play a significant role on the notion of identity as it is understood in political philosophy. The terms and themes to which identity is applied in political philosophy are identities as relating to nations, ethnic groups, and others. The notion of identity is concerned with markers that distinguish a given group irrespective of whether the group is a nation, a religious group, a class or a group with some kind of traits and so on. Talking about the identity of a group involves pointing out criteria with which the group is known and that separates it from other groups. The criteria might not be static and may evolve through time and history. A number of factors play different roles in shaping the criteria for identity, and further, identity is formed in the kind of relations, interactions and even contradictions that a group has with others. This points to the fact that a multitude of factors: subjective and objective, internal and external, etc. go into shaping the identity of a group.

82 Relations with others that might not always be the result of the group’s choosing play a role in determining the identity of a group. In other words, it can be said that a range of both subjective and objective factors play roles in crystalizing a given identity. We can thus talk of subjective and objective identity. Subjective identity is about how one feels of himself/herself as belonging to a certain group. What are the characteristics by means of which a group identifies itself? As members belonging to a group do we reflectively accept the attributes that our group is said to have and are ready to endorse it? It is by giving a pride of place to the attributes that the group claims to have that one ascertains one’s belongingness to a group. Subjective identity is based on how somebody relates to something that he or she considers to be. That is why it is said to be a reflective matter. Considering what one takes oneself to be he/she reflectively relates to this thing that is supposed to underlie the group’s whatness. Subjective identity is the type of identity that is important in the politics of identity. Its importance in mobilizing members of the group around issues that are considered necessary for the group depends on this. It is a factor that is important for the group’s survival as a group. According to thinkers like J. Griffin, A group gives an important place in its life to things that constitute its identity. The sense of what a group is and wants to be depends to a considerable extent on subjective identity. Our cultural narratives are important in the way we lead our lives. Loosing cultural membership is a far-reaching harm that has a detrimental effect on our lives (2008). On the other hand objective identity refers to a wide range of criteria encompassing biological as well as social criteria. There are attributes that depend on biological factors of descent although this could be controversial. It may, for instance, be necessary to invoke the idea of chromosomes in order to determine gender. In addition to such factors we can also invoke social criteria of having a certain place in a given society. What is the place of a certain class or a certain ethnic group (socially, politically, economically, etc.) in a given society? What roles did it play historically in that given society? What are the objective characters that determine the place of different cultural communities in that society? These are some of the points that can be used in exploring the idea of objective identity. In the realm of identity politics there are criteria that are often used as characters that determine what a nation/nationality is. In the leftist literature, criteria by means of which nations can be identified have been developed. The criteria by which a nation can be identified include a common history, a common language, a common psychological make-up and a common territory. When we look at each one of those criteria they appear to be objective criteria. When one appeals to such criteria to determine the identity of a nation then one is using an identity that can be established objectively. Identity Politics The fact that the notion of citizenship changed over the last several decades led to the emergence of identity politics. A new set of phenomena started to emerge globally depending on the changes that started to occur and this led to the change in the understanding of citizenship. Despite many years of nation building, around the end of the 20th century many societies were still multicultural owing to a variety of factors. The way in which citizenship was understood led

83 to a political situation of apathy with regards to voting and other civic responsibilities in the West. There was a proliferation of nationalist movements in other parts of the world. What led to the proliferation of nationalist movements was the feeling that the kind of citizenship that has been established was not one that gave recognition to groups that differed from the dominant group. Instead of recognizing them for what they are, it rather required of them to change to ways that have been dubbed national/universal/normal. This demonstrated the point that even if basic institutions may be there and based on formal justice, the way citizens, (i.e. differentiated citizens) are treated and what they feel about those institutions is important. The attitudes that they had towards the institutions is important. It is impossible to have a stable democracy in a situation where citizens feel that they are marginalized and the institutions do not recognize their uniqueness. In other words there came onto the socio-political scene a situation where there emerged competing forms of identity (ethnic, religious, etc.) rather than respecting and obeying what is taken to be national/normal. What was taken to be national actually turned out to be the values of a dominant/hegemonic group and that was why groups started to demand nuanced/differentiated citizenship and hence a politics of difference/identity. According to W. Kymlicka, …the health and stability of a modern democracy depends not only on the justice of its basic institutions, but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens: eg: their sense of identity, and how they view potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethnic or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from themselves; their desire to participate in the political process in order to promote the public good and hold political authorities accountable; their willingness to show self-restraint and exercise personal responsibility in their economic demands, and in personal choices which affect their health and the environment. Without citizens who possess these qualities democracies become difficult to govern, even unstable (2002: 284- 5). The question, therefore, is what are the institutions of democracy and constitutional freedom if the citizens do not take them as their own and enable them to function equally for all? They are only what they could be if citizens are ready to make them function properly. But for the citizens to make them function, citizens must see that their interests not only as citizens per se but also with their differentiated identities and interests are represented. Democracy can only function properly with the support and engagement of responsible and concerned citizenry. In a situation of today we can have responsible, engaged and concerned citizenry if the citizenry does not feel marginalized. It is only when the otherness of its different constituents is respected rather than being marginalized by the interest of a hegemonic group that the citizenry can be engaged. A citizenry that can cooperate and function with self-restraint in the use of common resources is one which is fully recognized with its identity. In order for democracy to be able to function, the citizenry’s ability and willingness to trust the institutions of democracy and their sense of justice is important. In other words, rendering possible civic virtues is of paramount importance. One way of rendering these civic virtues is by giving a pride of place to their identities. Our identity defines as with our multiple relations within our group and thereby also tells us where we differ from others. What rational ground do we have to deny such an identity by means of which we define and understand ourselves? Alasdair MacIntyre shows the points in which identity is anchored clearly in the following way. He said,

84 I am someone’s son or daughter, someone else’s cousin or uncle. I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one that inhabits those roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my tribe, my nation a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity (1981: 220). The usual model of citizenship that appeared to be absolutely and eternally true has been challenged with the realization of the fact that many societies are multicultural. When civic virtues and active political participation started to be at the center of the idea of citizenship, the idea of citizenship as based on rights was challenged. Focus on common rights that assumed formal equality before the law and so on were also challenged in the light of events of the last decades of the 20th century, because now cultural diversity and group-differentiated interests/citizenship can no more be ignored. This is what necessitated identity politics. In the face of demands for recognition, appeals to common rights could not strike a chord among many without whose cooperation it is impossible to establish a stable and functioning democracy. Scholars like Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, I. M. Young and others contributed significantly in political philosophy to the establishment of such concepts as politics of difference, identity politics, multiculturalism, differentiated citizenship, etc. The concepts fundamentally reflect that the idea of citizenship can no more be based on common rights alone as they were understood earlier on. As Kymlicka wrote, Modern societies are said to be characterized by deep diversity and cultural pluralism. In the past, this diversity was ignored or stifled by models of the ‘normal’ citizen. Anyone who deviated from this model of normalcy was subject to exclusion, marginalization or assimilation. Thus non-white groups were often denied entry to Western democracies or if admitted were expected to assimilate to become citizens; indigenous people were either shunted into isolated reserves and/or forced to abandon their traditional life styles (ibid: 327). The politics of difference is about promoting the ideal of authenticity. The idea of authenticity demands from citizens that they say yes to their very being. Their very being in terms of their culture in its various manifestations assumes that there is no hierarchy of cultures. Cultures of dominant groups establish themselves as ‘normal’ through unjust means. It is only through effective discrimination that a group can establish it superiority. Once established in this way they force those outside of the dominant group’s culture to abandon their ways and assimilate to the ways of the dominant group. Such phenomenon lead to self-denial on the part of those who are forced to assimilate. As I. Berlin says, forcing others to assimilate is against authenticity or one’s proper way of being. He said, Cultural frontiers are natural to men, spring from the interplay of their inner essence and environment and historical experience…our culture is our own; cultures are incommensurable; each is as it is, each of infinite value, as souls are in the sight of God. To eliminate one in favor of the other, to subjugate a society and destroy a civilization, as the great conquerors have done is a monstrous crime against the right to be oneself, to live in the light of one’s own ideal values (1991:38).

85 The politics of difference requires that the unique identity of a group cannot be undermined in any rational way. Such uniqueness need not be subject to assimilation to the ways of the dominant group. Apart from the interests of the dominant group or the politics of hegemonic rule there is no overriding philosophical, religious or whatever reason that necessitates this. During the time of building empires such an idea could not be challenged because force used to decide everything. We can talk of nation building as it happened in the 18th and 19th centuries. Such type of nation building happened largely by destroying nations through genocide and similar means. Despite attempts by many to destroy diversity, we see that many countries are still multicultural. Today, in this multicultural milieu, it is virtually impossible to resort to such a practice. In other words the politics of difference is a process by which groups want to refuse self-denial and thereby reject second-class citizenship. When a dominant group forces others to abandon their ways and adapt the ways of the dominant group the underlying reason is that the culture and values of the dominant group are superior to that of the other groups. Such an assumption cannot be justified in any way, save force. As Amy Gutmann says, within the framework of liberal democracy by treating individuals ‘equally’ without taking into account their differences it is impossible to have a stable society. She said, “Liberal democracies … cannot regard citizenship as comprehensive universal identity because (1) people are unique, self-creating, and creative individuals… (2) people are also “culture-bearing” and the cultures they bear differ depending on their past and present identifications” (1992:6-7). That is why recognition and the politics of difference become important at this point in time. The absence of the hierarchy of cultures points to the dignity that humans have in their own very being irrespective of demography, color, gender and whatever other markers that a group may have. Human dignity is based on respecting the rights of individuals in their totality including what make the self what it is. Moreover it also refers to the point that recognizing the specific needs of individuals belonging to specific cultural groups. This can be looked at from a different perspective as well. While the denial of diversity/recognition to different groups may lead to impoverishment and the culture of monologue, recognition of diversity will lead to an enriching situation whose driving force could be the dialogue between the diverse groups. Again as Gutmann says, The liberal democratic value of diversity … may not be captured by the need to preserve distinct and unique cultures over time, which provide each separate group of people with a secure culture and identity for themselves and their progeny… the democratic value of diversity can be connected with the values of expanding the cultural, intellectual, and spiritual horizon of all individuals, enriching our world by exposing us to differing cultural and intellectual perspectives, and thereby increasing our possibilities for intellectual and spiritual growth, exploration and enlightenment (ibid: 9). The other point is the ethical dimension of the struggle for recognition. The diverse groups in a multicultural society vie for recognition. The demand for recognition is not about undermining nationhood or dominating others. It is actually about co-existence as equals because, short of domination, that is the only way which can guarantee peace. In view of the fact that domination cannot be sustained peacefully today, co-existence with equal rights requires mutual/reciprocal recognition of the different ethnic/cultural communities. Such recognition and mutual respect can constitute a threshold for more understanding and unity based on respect.

86 It is necessary to draw lessons from history and realize that we have reached a stage where it is no longer possible to do away with differences. Without undermining the importance of unity for a country or society, we have to imagine a unity that is constituted by diversity. The mental attitude that if we do not ignore differences and promote only unity, that the unity of our country will be undermined has to be overcome. We need to reconsider and rethink some of the ideas that we have thought to be absolute truths. What is absolutely true in the social sciences and social matters in general is that there is no absolute truth. We have to be able to create a condition where not only one segment of Ethiopians take responsibility for unity, but where all or most can take responsibility for the unity of our country. The way to do this is to act in such a way that all have a stake because they are recognized and are given the chance to play their respective roles. This would require weighing the difference between seeking cooperation in democracy by force or through consensus. It appears that in matters concerning identity coercion has run out of steam. Consensus, however, can be built if we are ready for mutual recognition. In order to do this we have to reflect upon how our different identities are formed. Identities are formed through attributes, as said earlier on, that are both subjective and objective. It is what we have formed in our diverse relations with each other and with our environment. As Habermas says, In multicultural societies the coexistence of forms of life with equal rights means ensuring every citizen the opportunity to grow up within the world of a cultural heritage and to have his or her children grow up without suffering discrimination because of it. It means the opportunity to confront this and every other culture and to perpetuate it in its conventional form or transform it; as well as the opportunity to turn away from its commands within difference or break with itself-critically and then live spurred on by having made a conscious break with tradition, or even with a divided identity (1992: 132). The politics of identity has attained an important place in Ethiopia today. Ethiopia is a country with diverse ethnic and cultural communities. Ethiopia’s attempt at nation building out of these different cultural groups through integration and assimilation, which was violent to a considerable degree, came to a halt with the end of the cold war and the coming to power of the EPRDF. The EPRDF came to power with a vision about Ethiopia that is significantly different from its predecessors. Before the 1990s there was a proliferation of nationalist movements that were struggling for the recognition of their ethnic or cultural group. Some had programs for independence, while others were striving for establishing a democratic Ethiopia in which all cultural and ethnic groups are recognized. It is this phenomenon that set in motion what is known as ethnic politics by some. Taking a departure from a century old unifying narrative and action by successive regimes the current government wants to keep Ethiopia together, but with recognition of their identities. Here I don’t want to go into the details of this or the assessment of its progress. It seems important to me to see how the proponents of an Ethiopia where we should not talk about differences and proponents of an Ethiopia where diversity must be recognized confront each other. In the opinion of the proponents of unity, which is the mind-set of the 19th century, what has to be emphasized is unity rather than differences, because if we don’t do that our unity and the survival of our country will be challenged. They see the struggle for recognition as a ploy by elites from different ethnic groups to come to power. Their rhetoric is not in tune with the times.

87 It is a homogenizing and hegemonizing discourse that does not strike a chord in the 21st century where revolutions in peoples’ and human rights are taking place in front of our own very eyes. In addition to the concern for continuity and unity it may be necessary to think of the history in which this unsuccessful nation building happened. It cannot be considered in isolation from the injustices and marginalization that took place over several generations. A denial of the injustices and the need to continue in the same old ways with the politics of hegemonic control cannot be sustained anymore. The proponents of identity politics see the situation differently. They say that the events of the last decades of the 20th century have already brought the homogenizing tendency to a grinding halt. The act of building a nation by destroying many nations could no more be sustained. The time of empire has come to an end and the only way for a future Ethiopia must be a democracy where nobody feels marginalized. The struggle between these opposing visions about Ethiopia is clustered around the understanding of the past, the questions of individual and collective rights, the politics of difference and similar points. The differences on the said points are so protracted that it could not so far allow for a meaningful dialogue between them. The proponents of the idea of unity in which diversity should not be mentioned ignore many of the points raised above in this paper about the notion of identity. For them it is a requirement for many ethnic/cultural groups to engage in self-denial for the sake of the unity of Ethiopia. This is important in their opinion, because this is the only way in which Ethiopia can stand. It is important to understand the worries of this group of people. Leaving aside the points that are ideological, their worries come from taking the narratives about Ethiopia as absolute truths. Partisan narratives about Ethiopia’s history and its peoples that give no role whatsoever to its diverse peoples are taken as absolute truths. Believing such narratives according to them avoids division and will go a long way in forging Ethiopian unity. It is a concern and fear about an uncertain future that motivates these people to deny the politics of difference. In simple terms, what they say is that while we could achieve unity, peace and democracy through the recognition and promotion of individual rights, why should we venture into uncharted waters that could jeopardize the continuity of our country? Their fear is not without reason although it may not take us to the level of recommending self-denial to communities that are outside of the hegemonic group. One important point that they miss is that the forces that are vying for recognition are so numerous and strong that it is impossible to stop them by the kind of obsolete rhetoric. They simply want to ignore what is happening around the world with regards to peoples’ rights, the human rights revolution and that no country could remain insulated from the winds of change that have started to blow starting during the last few decades of the 20th century. Today it is really obsolete and politically incorrect to say that only those who accept the idea of a common citizenship are right. During the election campaign of 2005 the elites in the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) tried to demean those who were organized around the politics of identity. Expressions like we are humans before we are Oromos or Tigreans, etc. were quite common. What they forgot was that they spoke a language that others did not speak or at least a second language for others. Behind the narrative of common citizenship lurk the language, culture and values of the historically dominant group. Many have been denounced, incarcerated and killed for saying yes to their identity. Now what we need is a narrative the recognizes

88 differences and works towards a goal that can constitute Ethiopia on a new foundation of equality, mutual respect and a unity that does not marginalize any group. The proponents of identity politics are associated with progressive forces that demand justice and authenticity. They are forward looking, while those with the unity mind-set are backward looking. We want unity, but it should not be a unity that forces us into self-denial by requiring us to change our beliefs, cultures, etc. for the sake of unity. The philosophical underpinnings of their conceptions are important. They reject the hierarchy of cultures. They realize the inappropriateness of destroying one culture in the name of an allegedly “higher” cause, viz, something spuriously considered to be normal. What the important contemporary political philosophers like C. Taylor, W. Kymlicka and many more advance, supports their ideas. I. Berlin’s assertions that, “cultures are incommensurable; each is as it is each of infinite value, as souls are in the sight of God” can be used to justify their approach. It is not necessary and easy to dismiss the fear of the forces of unity as it is also not to reject the aspirations of people or groups vying for authenticity. One way of handling this could be to address the way in which individual rights and group rights are understood as the direct opposites of each other. It is not wise and correct to think of individual rights and group rights in terms of an ‘either-or’ dichotomy. It is necessary to respect individual rights, but respecting individual rights should not mean suppressing collective rights. Collective rights must also be respected for reasons that have been discussed above in this paper. It is wise to think of both as complementary rather than opposites. The fears associated with ethnic federalism must be addressed genuinely by making it work for all. How could injustices of over a century be redressed without instituting a federal system that can take care of the interests of its diverse population? As David Turton says, …it is not ethnicity itself which makes ethnic federalism prone to conflict and violence, but the failure to implement the federal model in a way that responds to the expressed needs and interests of ordinary people. Put differently, ethnic federations are most likely to fail, not because they are too ‘ethnic’, but because they are not sufficiently federal (2006:22). No country is ‘created’ to remain the way it was made. We have witnessed many countries that broke up into their own constituents. Eritrea got independence from us only less than three decades ago. Our choice of a federal system is a good indication that we want to stay together. But today, we can stay together if we are able to establish a just society in which no group is marginalized because of its identity.

Conclusion The politics of identity is here to stay for some time to come because of the human rights revolution, the resulting developments in a ‘rights consciousness’ and its association with democratic and progressive forces. Ethiopia might have gone some length in recognizing diversity, although time will tell whether it is being practiced in the right way to solve the problems of equality, democracy and authenticity. What we should ask ourselves is the question whether identity could be rejected for a long time to come. The fear of its consequences is an

89 appropriate one. But the drive and demand for substantive equal rights cannot be suppressed. Many people are surely interested in democracy. But what kind of democracy can work in multicultural societies? Can we ignore diversity for a long time to come? I don’t think that this is possible. It is here that research in the social sciences and humanities can be helpful. Diversity is not the making of anybody. It should not be seen as a curse. It rather is a given and as such a virtue that if understood and used properly can enrich our societies. Research in this regard, learning from the experiences of others and trying to understand it properly will be useful to create societies in which nobody feels marginalized. Research in this direction can be helpful in bringing together elites that take diametrically opposed views on this. Research on this can go to the roots of the understanding of identity and can change the attitudes of those who say that it is the making of elites. Peoples’ demands to live in accordance with their culture and values should not be seen as the elites’ ploy to seize power and use resources. Even if there may be such elites the truth about identity can teach such elites the proper lesson. That is why a multidisciplinary research in this regard is very important at this point in time. In our case what necessitates federalism is our diversity. Such diversity points to the intercultural relations between our different communities. In such a situation, it is important to know how to handle intercultural relations. Intercultural relations assume equality, reciprocity and mutual respect from our fellow citizens with whom we have linguistic, cultural and other differences but also are united through different threads. In such situations the development of an intercultural competence among our politicians and the public at large is an imperative. Intercultural competence means accepting others as equal with us and handling our relations on the basis of understanding, mutual respect and tolerance rather than condemning practices that appear as not normal from our own perspective. Our philosophical and political convictions are our own. The debate between liberalists and communitarians, for example, has a long history. The way such differences should be handled must be in a democratic way of engagement rather than denouncing the convictions of others as abnormal.

90

Bibliography Appiah, Kwame, Anthony. 1992. In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. Berlin, Isaiah. 1991. The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Griffin, James. 2008. On Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gutmann, Amy. 1994.”Introduction” in Gutmann, A. (ed.) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Habermas, Juergen. 1994. “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State” in Gutmann, A. (ed.) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Kymlicka, Will. 2006. “Emerging Western Models of Multination Federalism: Are they Relevant to Africa?” in Turton, D. (ed.) Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: James Currey Ltd. Kymlicka, Will. 2002. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. London: Duckworth. Markakis, John. 2011. Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers. Suffolk: James Curry. Riker, H., W. and A. Føllesdal. 2007. “Federalism”, In Goodin, R. E., Pettit, Philip and Pogge Thomas (eds.). A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwll. Taylor, Charles. 2001. Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Taylor, Charles. 1994. “The Politics of Recognition”. In Gutmann, A. (ed.) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Turton, David. 2006. “Introduction”, in Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: James Currey. Yemaneab, A. 2012. “Review of Ethiopia: the Last Two Frontiers by J. Markakis.” 2011. The Ethiopian Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. VIII No. 1, pp. 113-116, June 2012

91

An Indigenous Unwritten Constitution: Examining the Gadaa Governance System in light of Modern Democratic Constitutional Principles

Getachew Gudina Dinagde

92 Introduction

Ethiopian constitutional history shows that the country’s written constitutions have been adopted from foreign countries and imposed on the society and continued without actually serving citizens as a democratic constitution. In principle, a constitution should reflect the history, culture, and values of the people it is meant to serve. A constitution is a document in which the aspirations of the people are expressed. It is a consensus document which enables citizens to choose their leaders, it establishes the government, and it identifies and limits the power of the government. In a federal government, a state constitution should reflect the values, cultures and traditional governance system of its people. But it should not necessarily be uniform to national or other sub-unit constitutions.1 A federal constitution is an incomplete framework document in that it does not prescribe all constitutional processes and arrangements. Rather it leaves “space” in the federal system’s constitutional architecture to be filled by the constitutions of sub- national units.2 In this connection, the Gadaa System accommodates basic principles of a democratic constitution such as: the election of a leader through a democratic process, limitations on the power of leaders, identification of the term of office of leaders, identification of three branches of government institutions and their powers, and the processes of amendment of laws.3 Owing to the assimilation and a homogenous nation building strategy in Ethiopia,4 the system has not been utilized in the country’s legal system. As we understand, the history of the Ethiopian constitution, the failure to use the Gadaa indigenous governance system including other nations, nationalities and people’s values into the formal constitution of the country, resulted in conflict within society and a breakdown of the system as whole. The imitation of the monarchy system by Oromo Gadaa leaders, such as Gibe states, also contributed to the weakening of the Gadaa system among the Oromo themselves.5 Recently, in the Oromia National Regional State where the Gadda System is in practice, the regional constitution has not accommodated the Gadaa indigenous governance system as a formal or informal source. Practically the people in this research area (the Borana people) prefer their indigenous governance system rather than formal laws to engage social, political and economic issues. Furthermore, the failure of Ethiopian legal studies to acknowledge the Gadaa system as a democratic constitutional governance system resulted in the dismissal of Gadaa as a Democratic Constitutional Governance vehicle of Oromo people which accommodates its basic principles, values and elements. If the legal system incorporates the tested and practiced indigenous governance system owned by the society itself; it will bring peace and consensus to society, build democracy, and enhance sustainable development. The study shows that Gadaa embodies modern democratic constitutional principles, values and elements, explores its significance of incorporation in the modern constitution of the country, and finally seeks to fill the existing research gaps and recommendations for better accommodation.

93 2. Operational Constitutional Principles, Values and Elements Embedded in the Gadaa Indigenous Governance System 2.1 Supreme Laws under Gadaa Governance System As most customary laws are unwritten, laws under the Gadaa governance system are not written and arranged in a series of documents. They are found in practice in the day to day life of the people. As Marco Bassi pointed out that a society’s norms are not necessarily codified in an explicit, logical form, they can also be expressed in a systematic or metaphorical way. ‘Societies who have not codified rules have also laws in a sense that they have rules that breaking of such rules are punishable’.6 Among the Borana Oromo there are certain norms and principles in which people engage with political, economic and social relations. These principles are practically operational but not written or codified in a series of documents. Since the exact time of the formulation of these principles is unknown, it is assumed that they were formulated during the creation of the Gadaa system and used as guidance in the same way as the highest laws. Some principles which are considered as the highest law and superior to other laws under the system are: separation of state and religion, citizen participation, equality, accountability, regular elections, checks and balances, separation of power among traditional institutions, rule of law, limitation of office to a single term, and functional division of classes and generations. These are operational principles used in the system as a constitution. Although there is no written rule of procedure for the amendment of such laws in the Gadaa system, these principles are not amended easily as subordinate laws. Other laws which will be discussed below are amended easily by the Gumi (general assembly) if necessary every eight years through deliberation. 2.2 Separation of State and Religion under the Gadaa Governance System In the Gadaa system laws are the result of human deliberation and not a gift of God. These laws are enacted, amended or repealed by the authorized body known as Gumii or Chaffe (national assembly). Aberra Degefa stated that, ‘the categories of Borana aada-seera are known as Seera Yaayyaa shanani (the five Yaayya laws)’.7 The first one is Seera Namaa (law of human beings). Under these categories family laws, laws related to mutual assistance (buusa gonofa), laws regulating payment of gumaa in case of murder, Laws of guddifachaa or moggaasuu are included. The second category of laws is seera hori (cattle, sheep, goats, camels). The third category of laws is known as Seera golaa for horses (fardaa), mules (gaangee), donkeys (hare). Among the Borana, they are considered as the vehicles of Gadaa authority. The fourth category has to do with stars and counting of time and is referred to as seera Yaayyaa Babboo Gaalessa. Seera alloo fi aloola is the fifth category which has to do with the environment, plants (biqiltoota), trees (mukkeen), forest (bosona) and wild animals (bineeyyi bosonaa).8 They are subordinate to the highest laws and principles, and can be amended or repealed by the Gumii Gayyoo (National assembly) every eight years. Natural laws are supernatural, immutable and beyond discussion.”9 We can conclude that the Gadaa System separated religion from state and realized the principle of secularism which is one of the fundamental principles in modern democratic constitutional governance systems. In the same way custom and law have their distinctions in the system.

94 2.3 The Principles of Rule of Law in the Gadaa System The rule of law may be defined or explained in different ways but the common understanding is that all people including leaders are subject to the law of the country. The leaders’ practices must be according to rules and regulations. It means that no individual, whether a leader or a private citizen, stands above the law. It is thus a core democratic principle, embodying ideas like constitutionalism, which is the practice of the rule of law and limited government.10 The rule of law protects fundamental political, social, and economic rights and defends the citizen from the threats of tyranny and lawlessness. Democratic governments exercise authority by way of the law and are themselves subject to the law’s constraints. “There are no leaders whose position is so exalted that they stand above the law.”11 Aberra Degefa stated that, “it is their holistic worldview and, their respect for truth and laws which make the Borana a law- abiding society not fear of punishment. Among the Borana, what makes both the ruling and the ruled obey and enforce the laws is the free will and commitment of everyone.”12 Laws are strict in Borana, such that any person has the obligation to obey them. During my field research, when I interviewed Abbaa Booruu Dirree Guyyoo, he told me that governance in Borana beginsfrom two peoplebased on the rule of law. He said in his words: “Namni lama ta’ee adeemu tokko keessaa itti gaafatamaadha, namni sadii ta’ee adeemuu wal hin dhabu.Sadan keessaa lama yoo wal-dhabe, tokkichi walitti araarsuu qaba. Literal meaning; if two people are walking together, one among them is a leader. Three people walking together cannot quarrel with each other, since one among the three has the obligation to reconcile them.” Additionally he said when three people are walking together and two of them quarrel with each other in any matter, the third person cannot take sides. If he sides with either one, he committed a crime and his punishment will be more serious than those who quarrel with each other. According to Abbaa Booruu Dirree Guyyoo, walking on the street has its own rule that pedestrians have to walk in line rather than walking parallel. The person in the front is the leader of them and if they are asked by another person the front walker responds by representing the followers. The person in front may be the oldest among them or a person who has a responsibility and known in the society, because, his main obligation is reconciling both parties and bringing peace among them.13 That is the main principle of securing Borana peace and harmony (Nagaa Boranaa) by which all citizens are subject to its laws. The other expression of the rule of law is that the leaders’ role (whether executive, legislative or judiciary) has to exist within the limits of rules and regulations. If there is a violation of rules and regulations by leaders there has to be accountability to laws which protect the citizen and public interest from such a tyrannical act. In the Gadaa system, leaders are subjected to laws. Before they take over power they exemplify the people’s values and culture, for a long period of time. They also exemplify how to lead the people and how to resolve public matters within the range of their mandate. If they violate people’s values, culture, rules and regulations their punishment will be serious and even capital punishment may be imposed upon them based on the severity of the crime they committed.14

95 2.4 The Principle of Popular Sovereignty in the Gadaa Governance In Gadaa system, the people are the ultimate source of the government body and the leaders are elected representatives of the people. In the system popular sovereignty is ensured in a sense that the people participate in the decision-making process of the leaders directly or through their representatives. The leaders’ powers and duties are limited by laws which are enacted by the legislative branch. The Gadaa system (Oromo constitution) is designed and formulated by Oromo people themselves. Subordinate laws are enacted, amended or repealed through direct democracy and representative democracy. The people have the right to uproot (Buqqisuu) their leaders when they fail to exercise their responsibility according to given rules and regulations. ‘Leaders cannot impose their decisions or their wishes on the group rather by virtue of their office, acquired through specialized training, these leaders are called up on to clarify what is the custom or law on the subject under discussion.’15 2.5 Democratic Participation under Gadaa Governance System People’s participation is one of the core elements of a democracy as there is no democracy in decision making with the exclusion of the citizen. Democratic participation can be expressed in different ways. In the Borana Gadaa governance system, the people participate in the law making processes in Gumii Gaayyoo (the national assembly), clan assemblies and meetings for pastoral coordination through direct participation or by their representatives16All adult male members of the community have the right to participate in the meetings and the decisions are made through participatory discussions. One of the main significant elements of participation in democratic governance is the right to participate in the leadership of the government through election. In the Gadaa system, for the purpose of governance, the people are divided among five gogessa and each gogessa is authorized to lead the country for 8 years only. One party has a chance after one Gadaa cycle (40 years), which means the member of that party who was born out of the designated age range cannot be Hayyuu Aduulaa or Hayyuu Medhichaa. Since there are different structures in the system at different levels, a person who has the personal capacity to serve society and cannot participate in Hayyuu Aduulaa or Hayyuu Medhichaa has a right to be Huyyuu Garbaa, Makkalaa, Jallabaa and other sub clan level administrative structures which are possible for any party at any Matured age range.17 All social, political and economic activities of the people, from top Gumii Gayyoo, to the bottom linage level are decided through democratic participation and there is no imposed democracy in the system. 2.6 The principle of Accountability (Buqqisuu) One of the major principles in the Gadaa system is the accountability of elected leaders to the people they represent. Hayyuus (Gadaa Officials) appear before the highest legislative organ called Gumii (Assembly) and the people judge how well the leaders have executed their duties and responsibilities.18In the system, there is no leader who is above the law. As we have discussed above, the leaders’ powers and mandates are already identified by the highest law. They are then expected to exercise their duties according to the given rules. If the hayyuus leadership is inadequate, the Gumii will remove them from office or penalize them.19 There are different forms of penalties imposed up on Gadaa officials who abuse their power based on the seriousness of their crime. They may be required to pay cattle which may be used to

96 support the poor in the community, or can be used for sacrifice during certain public ceremonies. The prime Abbaa Gadaa is also appraised by the Gumii and if he violates his authority, his punishment may escalate up to the death penalty. Therefore, the Hayyuus including the Abbaa Gadaa exercise their power carefully because they are well trained and have exercised the culture and rules from their early childhood. If they violate this principle, the penalty imposed upon them will affect their future descendants in that they cannot hold Gadaa office because of their parent’s history.20 There is also a process of Buqqisuu (literally uprooting), from their power before the end of their term of office. All elective representatives who assume a position of political authority are responsible to Yuuba Ballaa (the people) and the Gumii (national assembly) which have the power to oversee their duties. 21 The Yuuba-Ballaa (the people) and the Gumii (national assembly) exercise their overseeing power before the term of office begins because there is a large gap of years between their election as leaders of their lubaa (party) and their assumption of power as leaders of all people. In addition, the overseeing process is undertaken during the leader’s term office. 22 2.7 Free, Fair and Periodic Election in the Gadaa Governance System Fair, free and periodic elections are an internationally recognized human right. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, under article 21, states that the will of the people should be the bases of the authority of the government and the will of the people should be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be universal and equal suffrage. The Oromo Gadaa indigenous democratic governance system organizes the Oromo people into clusters known as Gagessaa in Borana which have five Lubaa (parties). Each lubaa, in its generation settings, leads its cluster for eight years. 23 In a given lubaa (party), a boy born dabballee (1st Gadaa stage) is elected democratically by the party when he enters into Kuusaa (4th Gadaa stage). These elected representatives after the passage of social or political responsibility and after they become experienced, over take political power to lead the people at Gadaa stage (6th Gadaa grade). In the Gadaa system, periodic elections and the allocation of time for elected leaders is the main significant factor. The term of office of the elected leaders is limited to eight years. The place, day and time for beginning and ending of the term of office is known to the public. 2.8 Minority Rights under Gadaa Indigenous Governance System Minority rights in a majority rule are a significant element of a modern democracy. Majority rule, only by itself, cannot express democracy without the realization of minority rights. As we have seen in Francesco Capotorti’s definition, ‘minority is a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position.’24 In the Gadaa governance system, a numerically inferior group that lives among Oromo people have two alternatives: a) to live peacefully with its own identity without adopting Oromo culture and governance system, b) Adopting Oromo culture and living on equal footing with Oromo people.25 In this regard, there are two kinds of adoption known as Moggasaa and Guddifachaa in the Gadaa system. Moggasaa is a process of adoption into a clan level. The adopted individual or group could be most likely non-Oromo. In this case, the adoption is undertaken by the Abba- Gadaa on behave of his clan.26

97 All rights and privileges of the Oromo people also belong to the adopted person and no discrimination is made between them. The other kind of adoption is known as guddifachaa in which the process is undertaken between biological parents of a child and a foster parent. Here, the adopted child has the rights and privileges of a biological child of the adopting parents. This process is, of course, incorporated in the formal civil law of Ethiopia. As Bonayyaa Diido said, “a person who was from Konso ethnic background who was adopted into the Borana Culture was elected in the Gadaa Council at one time”. From this fact, we can understand that any ethnic group who lives with Oromo people has the right and privilege which belongs to the Oromo people without any discrimination. Thus, protection of minority rights in Oromo society is an old history in which there is no discrimination based on ethnic, professional status or other markers. 2.9 The Rights of Women in the Gadaa Governance System The rights of women are fundamental human rights which are recognized in different international instruments. In the Gadaa governance System, men and women have a functional interdependence. One of the institutions in the Gadaa system is known as the Sinqee institution. Under the Sinqee institution married women who left their own families and communities to live with their husbands’ families and communities, are protected from abuse. The Sinqee institution allowed women to control essential political, social and economic assets. 27 The Sinqee is a special stick which married women receive on their wedding day and it is given as a symbol that she has been married and should be respected.28 Sinqee is also called Waddessa in the western region of Oromo, but its function is similar to those in Borana and Asrii/Bale Regions of the Oromia. The Sinqee (the stick in this case) has many purposes for married women as they carry it during various ceremonies and use it as a symbol of religious and political engagements. The Sinqee also signifies their respect and acceptance both in front of society and their God. The Oromo women who organized under the Sinqee institution protected themselves from criminal violence together by carrying their Sinqee stick, showing their respect.29 For instance ‘they use Sinqee during religious ceremonies to pray to God and when the women face violence by their spouses or other men, as well as in times of political instability and war as a means of cultural defense to protest the violence or conflict.’30 During Jilaas (celebration ceremonies) women build Galmaas (halls) and a person who is the organizer of the ceremony is called Abbaa Jilaa and his wife is Hadh Jilaa.31 The wives of Gadaa Officials are respected as equal to their husbands.32 The wife of Abbaa Gadaa Fiixee (prime Abbaa Gadaa’s wife) is considered as first lady of the president or prime minster of a formal government in the modern system. A married woman is considered as a part of her husband’s clan and if her husband violets her right, his clan has the responsibility to settle the case. In the instance a husband divorces his wife, his clan has the responsibility to help and solve her economic or social problem.33 In the settlement of a dispute, the case of women is given priority over other cases. For instance if a woman comes to elders while they are meeting to settle another case, they interrupt the ongoing case and assign her a person among them who will inquire why she came here. She is expected to speak truth because she made an oath by Dhugaa Waaqaaf Lafaa (by the name of

98 heaven and earth). No need of other witnesses that her testimony is admissible and valuable. Accordingly elders call the suspected person and ask him whether he committed the crime and give the final decision without delay. It is not very difficult to settle disputes there, since speaking untruth is seen as Aada-malee (out of norm) in a society and its consequence may be harmful to the social life of that person.34 According to Qabballee the formal law cannot protect their right as the Borana Customary law concerning sexual crimes committed against women. In case of sexual crimes committed against women, the formal law enforcing bodies ask the victim whether she has witnesses but such kind of crime is not committed in public because of the nature of the crime and it is very difficult to bring witnesses. Gadaa system divides labor based on gender during the formation of the system with rational, logical, scientific and reasonable factors. That is, factors associated with the nature of the task, the ability of the performer, profession and other internal and external conditions. Based on this fact women are excluded from generational and age assignments in the field of leadership, at this time which may be one weakness of the Gadaa system. In contrast, there is the inclusion of women by other civilized societies where women participate in leadership roles. Since the Gadaa System is dynamic, can be simply amended and fits with modern circumstances, it is not difficult to think that women will eventually come into leadership in the system. 2.10 Limitation of Office to a Single Term In modern democracies allowing an individual leader to be elected again to the same office is a common practice. But in the Gadaa governance system this practice is strictly prohibited. Gadaa classes (lubaa) succeeded each other through time scheduled in eight year increments. Each class (luba) prepares his candidates before the power transfer ceremony has taken place. 35 This time arrangement is strictly protected by the people- for a party to transfer power and decide who will take control. We know that a leader who is in power has carefully kept track of time until the transference of his power to the next leader, so the passage of more time or holding power for extra time other than that scheduled is culturally seen as a shame towards the class as well as the leaders in office. According to Tuchii the consequence is very bad. So bad that it may bring conflict among the society and results in a penalty by the general assembly on the class who held power after the allotted time. Once the Gadaa leaders have completed their term in office, they must leave the military and governmental function to the incoming group. Gadaa officials who completed their term office then participate in the general assembly as advisors and act as judges to resolve disputes until the age of their complete retirement. 2.11 Separation of power under the Gadaa Governance System The Gadaa system organized indigenous principal institutions which are identified and separated by their degree of power in the system. These indigenous principal institutions are the generational organization (Gadaa council), the national assembly (Gumii), Kora-Jarrolee and the Qalluu institution.36 Shared power is a basic feature of the Gadaa system in which power is shared among different political groups that stand in concordant relationship with each other. Power is distributed among these institutions horizontally on the same footing, not above or below each other.37 The Gumii (general assembly) is authorized as a legislative body; the Hayyus

99 and Abbaa Gadaas are executive bodies and, the kora-jarrole (elder’s council) is judicial bodies. The ritual leadership is known as Qalluu institution. 2.12 Gumii (The National Assembly), the Legislative Power Gumii (the National Assembly) is the highest political organ. 38Gumii means, mass of people,’39 or assembly of the multitude.40 The place where the general assembly is held is called Gayyoo in Boranaa, therefore it is known as Gumii Gayyoo (General assembly at Gayyoo). The Gumii Gayyoo is composed of five Gadaa councils (Raabaa Dorii, Gadaa, Yubas (Yuba one, Yuba two and Yuba three), the Gadaa leaders, age-sets and clan representatives.41 It is a supreme political body with supreme governmental power. Its power is held in the authoring of new laws as well as the repealing and amending of existing laws; it has also the power to evaluate the reports and performances of Gadaa leaders in office. 42 The Gumii Gayyoo is organized every eight years- after four years of the inauguration of Abbaa Gadaas in office.43 This time arrangement is purposefully ordered as it cannot overlap with the time of inauguration (Ballii Wall irraa fudhuu). This is because the laws and the performance of Gadaa leaders have to be evaluated mid-term and if there are any problems, the Gumii will take corrective measures.44 Before the meeting of Gumii- Gayyoo (general assembly) there are other meetings at different clan levels, they try to resolve and exhaust matters rather than bringing issues directly to the general assembly. 45 All members of Borana clans are allowed to attend the assembly and are entitled to speak and be heard. 46 2.13 The Executive Power (Elective Leaders) In the Borana Gadaa system the executive power is in the hands of hayyuu Aduulaa (Aduulaa council) and their assistants (hayyuu Medhicha and hayyuu Garbaa). These are elected representatives of the people in Borana and their mandate is leading the Borana in whole for their term in office (eight years), including exercising and protecting aadaa Borana (Borana Culture).47 The three elected councils organize Kora Gadaa sadanii (tripartite meetings) including Hawwatuu and Konnitu (the two sub-moieties of Gona Gadaa council) if necessary for common decisions. The Abba Gadaa in office leads the Warriors (raabaa dorii), where there is a war. The Abbaa Duulaa (the chief war) is elected by the appointment of the Abbaa Gadaa from the Gadaa class or from the raabaa doorii grade during war. The Abbaa Duulaa (war chief) is not elected automatically or if there is no war and there is no war chief that stays in power for a long period of time just like the office term office of Gadaa leaders. Warriors who protect the Borana from enemies are those in the Raabaa Gadaa grade. If the age designated for this stage is not reached one cannot be warrior. This principle is to protect the governance system from being put in the hands of military power. As we know in the formal government, war generals stay in power for unlimited periods of time, at times resulting in dictatorial governments. This is one of the unique aspects of democracy in the Gadaa governance system. 2.14 The Justice System in the Gadaa Governance System The conflict resolution mechanism and organizational structure in an indigenous governance system is different from place to place. The Borana people organized their own indigenous institution for dispute resolution. The most known, dispute resolution process among the Oromo people is known as Jaarsummaa (elders’ institution). The institution which settles dispute in Borana is known as kora jarrolee (council of elders). 48

100 A person who will act as a judge is a yuubaa (retired Gadaa leaders). Since Yuubas are also acting as advisor in Gumii-Gayyoo and they are well experienced of aadaa- seeraa (customary law), they manage the disputes raised among the people and settle through reconciliation or negotiation. 49 There are special cases which couldn’t be brought before judicial institutions because of their confidential nature. For example, Bonayyaa Diido said in his words “Dubrii yoo guraachoofte hiriyyatu ilaala; dhirsafi niitiin yoowal-dhaban gasatu ilaala (if unmarried girls became pregnant, it is seen by age-mates and if conflict arises between spouses, it is settled by clan.)”50

Conclusions Modern democratic constitutions are evaluated using accepted values and principles embedded in the system and their practical implementation in a given country. Democracy as a value means that people will do anything to protect it as it is a part of their culture and a way of life. Democratic values can be achieved in two ways. First, democracy can be achieved through a formal process of learning or schooling which entails a structured school curriculum where members of a given society are required to learn. The second way is through an informal process of the transfer of values of democracy to make it a way of life among a given people whereby democratic values are passed down from one generation to another. This way of learning democratic values can sometimes be achieved through a non-deliberate process during the early stages of one’s socialization in which democracy becomes a day-to-day practice of a given society.51 Although democratic rules are different from one another, there are some common accepted essential principles of a modern democratic constitution. In a modern democratic constitution, values and principles of democracy are found in a written constitution or in other written documents. Yet, having written values and principles in a constitution or other instrument alone does not amount constitutional democracy or constitutionalism. It is evaluated by practical functions of such values and principles in a given country. The Gadaa indigeneous governance system guides the Oromo people and regulates political, economic, social and religious activities of the people. It promotes the principles of equality and freedom. In the system, laws are not expressed in written form but they are in practice, mirroring modern democratic constitutions which embody democratic principles and values internalized by the people over a long period of time. These principles are used in the Gadaa system- equivalent to modern democratic constitutions, so that the institutions and individuals are able to regulate political, economic, social and religious activities. Laws in the system are classified into different categories according to their nature and are arranged hierarically. The laws are not rigid by nature, but ratherthey are dynamic and can be amended or repealed to respond to changes in society by the rules and procedures within the national assembily through eight years. Recommendations Although the Gadaa system is registered at UNESCO as a World Intangible Heritage in 2016, there is no law at the Federal or Oromia National Regional State levels which incorporates the Gadaa governance democratic principles and values. The state constitution has to take into

101 account the uniqueness of the environment and peculiarities of the society in which it is to function. To ensure constitutionalism, it is very important to incorporate and acknowledge the Gadaa system in the constitution of the Regional State to benefit from the people’s well tested original and functional values and principles in Gada system. Incorporation of people’s culture and values in a constitution is also the expression of democracy. Since a constitution is the aspiration of the people, they perceive themselves as the owner of such a constitution. It brings peace and sustainable development and also helps to build a democratic society. So the following points should be considered as recommendations.

• Since the Oromo and particularly Borana people prefer to use the Gadaa indigenous governance system rather than the formal state system, and it is functional in that society even today, the Oromia National Regional State Constitution should accommodate and acknowledge Gadaa for local governance. • Since the Gadaa system’s values and principles are unwritten and are mainly transferred through oral means termed as arga-dhagetti, they should be written in a well-structured manner and be easily accessible. This can be done by The Oromia Culture and Tourism Bureau or by the newly established Oromo Cultural Center. This helps researchers and others access to further knowledge and use it as a source of data for their research. They can also be a reference for other parts of Oromia where Gadaa principles and values are exercised. • To protect Gadaa values and principles, there should be laws which acknowledge this indigenous governance system. At the same time, there should be a seat reserved for Gadaa councils in the caffee Oromia.

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1 Dinan, J.(2007). Patterns of sub national Constitutionalism in Federal Countries: A paper presented at a workshop on sub-National Constitutions in Federal states at the VIIth world congress of the international association of constitutional law in Athens, Greece, June 11-15 2007; Available at Heinonline/http://heinonline.org 2 Tarr, G.A. (2011), Explaining sub-national constitutional space, Penn state Law Review, 115:1133-1149 Available at htt://heinonline.org 3Asmarom Legesse,(2006), Oromo Democracy; An indigenous African political System: Asmara, The Red sea press,Inc. 4Beekan, C.V. (2007), constitutional protection of ethnic minorities at the regional level: African Focus , 20 (1-2 ): 105-151 5 Mohammed Hassen. (1994). The Oromo of Ethiopia: a history: The Red sea press, Inc. 6 Ibid 7 Aberra Degefa Nagawo, (2013). The Impact on Offenders of Rivalry Between the Formal Criminal Justice System and the Indigenous Justice System: Experiences among Borana Oromo in Relation to the Crime of Homicide; The Danish Institute for Human Rights Denmark’s National Human Rights Institution 8IbId 9Interview with Abbaa Booruu Dirree Guyyoo 10 Waldrom, J.(2008). The concept and rule of law: New York University Law School; Public law and Legal theory research paper series ,working paper No 08-50 11 Ibid 12 Aberra Degafa Nagawo,(2013). The Impact on Offenders of Rivalry Between the Formal Criminal Justice System and The Indigenous Justice System 13Interview with Abbaa Boruu Dirree Guyyoo 14Interview with Galmaa Inchinni, 50 Borana Zone Taltallee Woreda Marmaroo Kebele

15See Asmaram Legesse,(2006): Oromo Democracy: an indigrnous African Political system, Asmara, The Red Sea press inc. 16Ibid 17Jaatanii Diida Haroo (2015). Jaarraa* Haaromsa Aadaa fi Seenaa Boranaa: Kitaaba sadeessoo (V-3B) p404 18 See Asmaram Legesse,(2006). Oromo Democracy 19 Ibid 20Interview with Galma Incinnii, 50, Borana zone, Taltallee woreda, Marmarroo Kebele 21Asmaram Legesse,(2006). Oromo Democracy: an indigrnous African Political system, Asmara, The Red Sea press inc. 22 Ibid 23 Ibid 24 Majority Rule/ Minority Rights: Essential principles. /Democracy Web. From essential principles history (http:// democracy.web.org/node/36 24 Interview with Bonayyaa Diidoo 24 Mohammed Hassen, (1994). The Oromo of Ethiopia: a history, 1570- 1860; Cambridge, Cambridge University press. 24ibid 25 Interview with Bonayyaa Diidoo 26 Mohammed Hassen, (1994). The Oromo of Ethiopia: a history, 1570- 1860; Cambridge, Cambridge University press. 27 Asafa Jalata and Schaffer, H. the Oromo, Gadaa/ Siqqee Democracy and the liberation of Ethiopian Colonial subject 28 Interview with Achuu Konsichaa, 19, Borana Zone Areeroo, woreda Mataa Gafarsa kebele. During my field research she was celebrating the 71st power transfer ceremony at yaáa jilaa by carrying her sinqee. She said that sinqee in her hand indicates that she is married woman. 29 Tolo, M. (2009). Wayyuu- Women’s Respect and Rights among the Arsi-Oromo. Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Eds.Ege et al. Trondheim 30Ibid

106 31 Interview with Achuu Konsichaa, Areero 32 Interview with Qabballee Bonayyaa, Borana Zone, Yabello Town, kebele 02. She is the family member of Gadaa officials. She said that Diimaa Areeroo Godana who was a member of Gadaa council in the past is her uncle and she has good well knowledge about the Gada system. 33 Interview with Bonayyaa Diidoo 34 Interview with Qabballee Bonayyaa 35Asmarom Legesse,(2006). Oromo Democracy:An Indigenous African political sytem, Asmara, The Red Sea press Inc. 36Ibid

37 Ibid 38Helland, H. (1996). The political viability of Borana Pastoralism: A discussion of some features of the political system of the Borana Pastoralists of south Ethiopia. In Baxter et al. eds. Being and becoming Oromo; Historical and Anthropological Enquiries; Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstituet 39 Bassi,M. (2005). Decisions in the shade:Political and juridical prcesses among the Oromo Borana, Asmara, The Red sea Press Inc. 40 Asmaram Legesse (1973). Gada: three Approaches to the study of African society 41Asmaram Legesse,(2006), Oromo Democracy 42Aberra Degefa Nagawo (2015). justice that heals and restores 43 Aberra Degefa Nagawo, (2013). The Impact on Offenders of Rivalry Between the Formal Criminal Justice System and the Indigenous Justice System 44 Interview with Abbaa Boruu Dirree Guyyoo 45 See Aberra Degefa Nagawo, (2015) 46 Ibid 47See Asmaram Legesse,(2006), Oromo Democracy 48 See Aberra Degefa (2015). Justice that heals and restores 49Interview with Tuur Duubaa, 41 Borana zone Areroo Woreda, Fillee kebele 50Interview with Bonayyaa Diidoo 51Stiftung, K.A. (2011). Concepts and Principles of Democratic Governance and Accountability:A guide for peer educators

107

Targeting of Oromo Towns and the Prospects of Development in Oromiya

Dr. Getahun Benti

Southern Illinois University - Carbondale

[email protected]

108 Targeting Oromo Towns for Land and Power At present time, the Oromo people of Ethiopia are being attacked by various Amhara extremist groups advocating for the restoration of archaic institutional infrastructures created by Emperor Menilek II in the 1880s (after his conquest of Oromiya, the Oromo land) that persisted until the military coup of 1974. Though on the surface the military ended the crown rule, they failed to dismantle the oppressive structures that the imperial system created. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) - which ousted the military regime in 1991 - instead sought to create a federal system that would offer retribution for the nation’s past wrongs. Theoretically, federalism would grant autonomy to the country’s multiple ethnic groups; in practice however, the actual power remained in the hands of the TPLF. From the very beginning, Amhara extremists saw TPLF’s federal platform as well as the political aspirations of Ethiopia’s diverse ethnic groups as the antithesis to their imperial ambitions; in this way, the ongoing reform and its leadership act in their mind as a final assault on the governance of the Menilek II era.

In recent times, Oromiya has become the epicenter of political violence perpetrated by extremist Amhara groups mainly due to its natural resources, but also because of its people unifying against tyranny and oppressive systems. Moreover, an unsubstantiated fear of Oromo political domination still persists in Ethiopia following the ousting of the TPLF in 2018 emboldened anti- Oromo forces - forces which are determined to recapture Oromo land which they lost in 1975. During Menilek II’s reign, he confiscated Oromo land and then redistributed it amongst his officials; as a result, this transformed the people into serfs. He then settled the Amhara people (and their collaborators) in military garrisons and pre-existing towns, thus changing the demographics of Oromiya. Politically, Menilek created a system largely dominated by his followers until it was toppled by the military in 1974. Once in power, one of the most radical measures the military government took was the nationalization of rural land in 1975 and the dismantling of land-based oppression that was in place since the conquest. Years later, the TPLF in power did not significantly alter the military government’s land policy, instead devising a new means of enriching itself through grabbing and commercialization of Oromo lands (particularly in urban areas and their surroundings). Its ill-fated Finfinnee-Oromiya Special Zone Integrated Master Plan was a typical example of TPLF’s land grabbing; this brutal policy forced the eviction of hundreds of thousands of Oromo farmers. This would then provoke massive uprisings Oromiya-wide resulting in a political crisis that ultimately weakened the TPLF’s grip on power, and bringing the Oromo closer to the political center with the appointment of an Oromo prime minister.

Anti-Oromo forces have been emboldened by the instability following new political developments since 2018 that propelled Abiy Ahmed to power and the current siege on Oromo towns is a move to force the Oromo people into submission, reinstate political domination and resuscitate an empire that has been dormant for decades. To do this, there are three central objectives; the first is to regain control of the land they lost during the military regime. The second is to recapture the political power which they lost under the TPLF reign. The third is to suppress any political aspirations from anyone advocating for Oromo nationalist ideals (or a more just society for all peoples of Ethiopia). Since an all-out military campaign and re-conquest of Oromiya by force is not militarily or politically feasible, Amhara extremists look instead to control its towns first and use them as launching pads to annex the entire state. Furthermore, a combination of the coming to power of an Oromo prime minister, the unity shown amongst the

109 Oromo people during the protests, and the emergence of a galvanizing pan-Oromo movement led by the Qeerroo has frustrated the imperial ambitions of Amhara extremists. Politically, the prime minister’s cautious reforms have forced extremists to take action; a reluctance to immediately abrogate the constitution and abolish the federal structure, a perceived indifference to their imperial aspirations, and his inability to halt Oromo Nationalist dialogue seem to have brought this on. As a result, many extremists engage in incessant provocations and interventions in Oromiya’s internal affairs, one such example being the creation the Addis Ababa Baldaras Council. The veiled objective behind this council is primarily to act as a means to rid Finfinnee of all Oromo influence, which would be particularly critical in a capital city. Furthermore, the establishment of the council acts as part of a larger plan to rob the Oromo people of land that bears significant cultural and historical value built over time. This includes changing the names of the towns as witnessed over the last 150 years; in my article defending the right to Oromo ownership of Finfinnee, I argued that cities are centers where civilizations began and human achievements passed down to succeeding generations.i The wider implication of my argument was that a nation that does not have control over its towns is similar to a blind person without a cane, bound to stay in the dark ages and become vulnerable to servitude by its enemies. The conclusion is that the Oromo must have full control of their towns to be in charge of their destiny without interference from disruptive outside forces.

The Challenges The Oromo face multiple challenges accrued from long years of domination under successive regimes. These challenges are multidimensional and act to slow down the efforts of the people to move forward and lead their society into the future. The complex nature of the current transition and the uncompromising nature of extremist/interventionist adversaries have further complicated the journey ahead. The two main challenges are political and economic, both of which are intricately intertwined and need to be addressed simultaneously and meticulously. The political challenge has the effect of threatening the state’s security and function, while potentially damaging the Oromo identity and survival as a linguistically and culturally cohesive society. Anti-Oromo groups could not reconcile with changes taking place in the empire since the 1974 revolution that overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie I. As such, they fiercely opposed the institution of ethnic federalism in 1991, which came with a new set of freedoms for the Oromo including autonomy, and the use of Afaan Oromo as a recognized working language for education and civil purposes. Moreover, they were agitated with the Oromo adoption of the Latin alphabet (compared to the Ge’ez script which serves as the base for the Amharic alphabet), even when proved to be linguistically appropriate for Afaan Oromo. They viewed the use of one’s own language not as a basic human right, but as an affront to their hegemonic domination after Menelik’s conquest. Realizing that they could not reverse the three major Oromo gains in 1975, 1991 and 2018, Amhara and other anti-Oromo extremists turned to “urban warfare” - looking to relentless acts of terror to take over Oromo towns. Using Oromo towns as launching pads, their ultimate plan is to destroy Oromiya’s autonomous rule, destabilize the state, and create a situation that would return the people back to imperial-era serfdom. Put simply, their fixation to control Oromo towns is the first step towards a broader Oromiya recolonization project.ii The instability that followed the collapse of the TPLF regime acted to embolden the anti-Oromo Amhara extremists. As previously discussed, these forces demanded the suspension of the

110 Ethiopian constitution, the dismantlement of ethnic federalism and the restoration of the imperial-era type unitary government with all its institutions. When this did not happen, they resorted to provocative and interventionist strategies into the affairs of Oromiya, a state they determined to be a major obstacle to their imperial ambitions. They sent colonists to the rural areas and squatters to towns of Oromiya; once there, they provoked the town administrations to remove the illegal squatters and then mobilize protests falsely accusing the Oromo of evicting the Amhara. They agitated tirelessly to turn Finfinnee into a major battle ground. Despite Oromiya’s historical and constitutional interests in Finfinnee, the extremists (led by Eskender Nega, the self-declared leader of Addis Ababa Baladara Council or Baldaras) are hell-bent on cleansing the Oromo from the city. They plan to do this mainly through detaching Finfinnee from Oromiya, and then declaring it an independent city-state fully controlled by them (under the administration of the Amhara state). In a country that has a constitution and should adhere to the rule of law, Eskender has openly created an illegal city council and defied the authority of the mayor and his administration. Likewise, the extremist Amhara National Movement (ANM) has followed the lead of Eskender (allegedly in coordination with him) and been agitating Amhara residents in several Oromo towns to take control. The Amhara diaspora and their multiple extremist media outlets (both inside and out of the country) are doing their part in fueling the anti-Oromo movement abroad. That being said, the siege on Oromo land is the most pressing challenge as they target elements critical to the existence of the state of Oromiya and the survival of the Oromo as a people. Since these challenges are political, the solution should be political too. The first and most important resolve (that should not be compromised under any circumstance) for the Oromo is to take full control of their state and stop all illegal outside interventions. Once this is done, the government of Oromiya must protect the rights of its minorities while said minority groups have to respect the constitution of Oromiya. Doing this would deny Amhara extremists the justification for intervening in Oromiya in the name of their fellow people. Oromiya’s ruling party should then assert its authority and protect its people from all subversive, interventionist and destructive Amhara extremist forces in the region who are impeding Oromiya’s efforts at growth and development. Lastly, Oromo governance should remedy the extremist incursions into Oromiya by developing the state to self-sufficiency through fully mobilizing its human and material resources. Prospects of Growth for Oromiya Oromiya has greater growth prospects than any of the states in the federation. Firstly, it has a large and productive population (including a considerable educated class). Second, it is rich in natural resources (including deposits of essential minerals).iii Third, the state is the largest coffee producing region in the empire; over three-fourths of Ethiopia’s export products originate in Oromiya. Fourth, within Oromiya’s borders there are enormous river systems with the potential to generate power and irrigate its vast arable land. Finally, the timely Oromo resistance to TPLF rule has presented the opportunity for a just and responsible government in which the people can hold their leaders and government accountable. How can these prospects be translated into actual development? Who can translate them? In Western societies, national and urban growth have mainly been driven and shaped by forces of industrial capitalism. In the absence of a class of people who have accumulated enough wealth to lead a capitalist model of economic development, only the state can take the lead and translate these prospects into actual growth. In this context, the state of Oromiya has to coordinate a

111 comprehensive and integrated rural-urban development plan that is based on knowledge and scientific management. It does not mean that the state should continue controlling the economy for perpetuity; it should only lead the way until the private sector is strong enough to take development initiatives. Defining Development Western scholars and policy makers argue that development is basically reserved for the developing countries; for developed countries the concept of development is considered to be a “modernisation paradigm.”iv The definition of the term varies based on the society and era, as well as the type of development and the circumstances. Country leaders and ruling parties also define development differently based on their political persuasions and ideological inclinations.v In speaking to the difficulty of having a universal definition to development, Dhammika Herath states that: Like most other concepts in the social sciences, 'development' does not entail a commonly agreed upon meaning, context or programme of action. It is defined in different ways depending on the time, space, context, professional and organisational interests of the one who does the business of defining. The meaning of development has also undergone a remarkable transformation over the course of history from the Enlightenment concept of 'Progress' to encompass a great variety of human needs.vi In a book chapter on “Development”, Amaresh Dubey and Sonalde Desai, argue that: In a broader sense, the term ‘development’ is often used to refer to the gradually unfolding process as societies go from a simple to a more complex form of organization. However, development is more commonly used to denote material or economic advancement; in this sense, it is often referred to as economic development. In this common usage, development would mean an increase in the standard of living of a nation which, in turn, invariably has a comparative connotation. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the constitutive features of development are still hotly debated. vii I a concise article titled “What is Development?”, Sid Israel defines development and its purpose as: … a process that creates growth, progress, positive change or the addition of physical, economic, environmental, social and demographic components. The purpose of development is a rise in the level and quality of life of the population, and the creation or expansion of local regional income and employment opportunities, without damaging the resources of the environment. Development is visible and useful, not necessarily immediately, and includes an aspect of quality change and the creation of conditions for a continuation of that change.viii

In the pure economic senseix, these definitions provide a good understanding of development and its impact on changing people’s living standards. Though they provide practical insights to the multi-dimensional nature of development as it applies to people’s lives, the authors still fail to define development in the modern sense. In the West, development since the 1850s is the result

112 of three major processes: industrialization, urbanization and globalization. These processes can have far-reaching consequences (including the reorganization of societies) but development as a whole still has to be sustainable and, as Sid Israel concluded, should create “conditions for a continuation of … change.” In the western world, development came as a dialectical and natural process guided by forces of industrialization. In developing nations where the forces of industrialization are absent, development instead depends on initiatives mostly in non-industrial economic sectors. Simply stated, any development plan should be comprehensive and must coordinate the growth of rural and urban areas in an integrated manner. It requires the mobilization and exploitation of material and human resources in an organized, coordinated and sustainable fashion through investing in physical and social infrastructures, as well as in public utilities and enterprises. The development of human resources should be central to planning; for this, the role of the state is critical in investing in, building, operating and executing public enterprises and infrastructures.x Planning should also include nurturing and supporting private businesses and entrepreneurs (whose contributions are instrumental to the growth of any nation). Any plan should ensure “…robust long-term economic growth” and increase “commitment to sustainable development policies.”xi In a comprehensive rural-urban development, the urban side promotes the creation of an economy assisted by modern technology, the creation of a reliable and productive urban population, and of modern social services for the well-being of both regions. The rural side implies the creation of an orderly society engaged in the production of food and industrial raw materials for its urban counterpart. Aspects of modernization in towns ought to trickle down to the rural areas, so urban planning should include a progressive urbanization of the rural areas. This could be done in two ways: the first is through population transfer from rural areas to towns. This allows for the coming together and concentration of skills or creative minds to speed up the process of Oromiya’s development. As a caveat however, this would have to be carefully planned so that said population could be absorbed into the urban labor market without Oromiya losing control over its towns.

The second way of urbanizing the rural areas is through expansion of modern urban services to the countryside. Either way, cities are central to both planning and development of modern societies; they act as centers of creativity and civilization.xii Louis Wirth, member of the Chicago School of Sociology and one of the scholars that helped shape the study of American urban sociology, provides an insightful description on the importance of cities to humanity as follows:

The city is a favorable platform from which to view the changes that go on in society, for in the urban community virtually all the forces that affect mankind find expression, and it is from the cities that the major innovations in social life are diffused.xiii

From an applied economics perspective, Emery Castle, Jun Wu and Bruce Weber summarized the significance of cities as “remarkable human inventions, [where] most of the people and wealth of a nation are [concentrated].”xiv Similarly, the two renowned scholars of urban studies, Lewis Mumford and Peter Hall, have also documented that the rise of civilizations from the ancient times into the modern era was only possible because of towns.xv

113 Towns are not only developed spaces, but they also function as places where strategies for the development of all areas are formulated (and where planners and developers can be trained to do so). They are centers where policy recommendations are generated by professionals, scholars and stakeholders - the following recommendations outline a few ways towards development in Oromiya: a. Strategic planning: aims to target long-term objectives. According to Leslie Stein, strategic planning is a “logical form of making decisions and the basis of a consensual future,[that] has become increasingly important because of the need for ‘sustainable development’, which requires careful analysis of all of the social and environmental aspects of development.”xvi Strategic planning lays the ground for a “robust long-term economic growth”xvii through mobilization of human, financial and material resources towards development. b. Agricultural revolution: design an agricultural development policy, develop arable lands, create food self-sufficiency, and then promote food exports to generate revenue to subsidize investments in other areas; promote the production of export cash crops (especially coffee), spices, oil seeds; produce agricultural raw materials for local industries. c. Industrial revolution: promote industrialization by mobilizing local entrepreneurs and creating necessary material and legal conditions to attract foreign investors; growing primary industries (extraction of raw materials i.e. mining, farming, fishing, forestry, etc.) and secondary industries (construction, expanding the energy sector in all its forms). As part of this strategy, coordinate agricultural and industrial revolutions in such a way they that feed into each other or are mutually dependent. Trade: promote trade within Oromiya (intra-state, regional and international). In addition, for local consumption the agricultural and industrial objectives must be planned to highlight the production consumables - textile, leather, metal, plastic, ceramic, petroleum products, food items dairy products sugar, soap, oil and several locally produced items - that can promote trade. d. Tourism and Service Industry: Oromiya has several tourist attractions which are yet to be exploited; because these attractions have not been cultivated, the accompanying service industries are also not developed. The tourism sector not only attracts tourists and promotes the establishment of services for them, but the sector also adds dynamism to growth in all other sectors (including the production of agricultural/industrial consumer goods, the building of roads, and transportation/communication services). It has the capacity to promote an all-round development of the state. e. Infrastructure: includes physical and social service infrastructures – roads, railways, bridges, transportation and communications, healthcare, education, public facilities. All should be designed to support a sustainable economy. f. Education: expand quality-based primary, secondary and tertiary education. Oromiya should have a strong voice in structuring the curriculum to serve its development strategies. Moreover, Oromiya should be able to open specialized institutions to train its own professionals so that they have sufficient training to run Oromiya’s development needs. Education should focus on the development of human capital through the training of high and mid-level professionals; engineers, architects, urban planners, doctors, teachers, technicians,

114 mechanics, etc. This plan should also include sending students abroad for special development-oriented training (in fields like architecture, urban planning, urban geography, urban land use, and urban economic development). In addition to actively participating in designing development plans, these returning students will relay that information to the experts in the specialized institutions mentioned above; over time, this domestic sharing of information will offset the cost of sending additional students abroad. g. Migration: While moving the urban population to towns is highly recommended, it should be carefully planned and executed. Until towns are capable of absorbing the incoming population, the state has to plan on “rural development interventions” to monitor population overflow. When people are concentrated in only a few towns, the government has to plan for “interurban flows of population and occupational skills”xviii to minimize the burden and prevent the rise of undesirable urban social conditions and economic problems. Conversely, opportunities in the rural areas have to be created so that there isn’t an influx of migrants to the urban areas that cannot be absorbed into its labor market. Since people are still required to maintain the operation of rural-based development projects, the government has to plan on the modernization of rural economic activities and improvement of rural life through providing urban-based modern services (electricity, water, modern transport and communications, healthcare and education) – or in short what I call the urbanization of the rural areas. Building Institutions through participatory decision-making processes Every development project should be institutionalized and designed to be sustainable for years; the decisions affecting the establishment of these institutions must involve all stakeholders (including the Oromo people or their rightful representatives). All Oromo political parties (no matter what policy or ideological differences they have) need to participate in the decision- making process. The ruling party should not be allowed to dictate decisions that affect the nation long-term, nor should a winning party be allowed to terminate development projects from previous administrations. Participatory decision-making would ensure the continuity of institutions, and that all parties involved would own these institutions regardless of their position in government. Conclusion The Oromo have been victimized for over a century and a half by forces who took their land and dominated them politically. Even though the politics of the empire have shifted positively since 2018, supporters longing for the Imperial era have not; they persist in trying to reimpose the old system and take back control. They continue to intimidate and terrorize the Oromo by threatening to take over their cities and re-conquer the whole of Oromiya. This paper has presented a number of plan recommendations to confront the challenge head on and avert a looming quagmire. Through knowledge-based development projects, the aim is to make Oromiya self-sufficient economically, and a stronger society able to meet the challenges from interventionist forces. The proposals are ambitious but are intended to woo the input of experts; though they are written chiefly from an urban historian perspective, they hope to spur debate among academics, scholars of development studies, economists, politicians, policy makers, urban planners, and the Oromo community as a whole. In initiating these debates, the goal is to lay a solid foundation for the growth of towns in Oromiya by creating a national-

115 professional consensus among the Oromo. Once this is established, they can empower those in positions of leadership to execute the development of their state and towns with a sense of national responsibility and pride. Lastly, this paper has sought to offer some policy prescriptions to the governance of Oromiya that would allow it to gain full jurisdiction over its land, and to control its own destiny, devoid of the political threats of the extremists.

116 References i Getahun Benti, A Nation without a City… iiThe anti-Oromo groups have also fomented hostilities between the Oromo and their natural neighbors and blaming the unfortunate consequences on the Oromo. In two instances, one in the Oromiya Zone of the Amhara state and another in Matakal region of the Beneshangul-Gumuz state, the extremists sent armed murderers and killed hundreds innocent civilians. iii For instance see, Ministry of Mines Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the World Bank Group, Strategic Assessment of the Ethiopian Mineral Sector, Final Report, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/490391468029355059/pdf/891390REVISED002602 01400FOR0WEBF002.pdf (accessed 04/11/2019). iv Dhammika Herath, “The Discourse of Development: has it reached maturity?” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 8 (2009) 1451. v For instance, the late prime minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, pursued the politics of revolutionary democracy and adopted developmental economy. vi Herath, 1449. vii Amaresh Dubey and Sonalde Desai, “Development”, Key Concepts in Modern Indian Studies, eds. Gita Dharampal-Frick, Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach, Rachel Dwyer, Jahnavi Phalkey Published by: NYU Press, (2015). viii Sid Israel, “What is Development?” https://www.sid-israel.org/en/Development-Issues/What- is-Development (accessed 05/26/2019). ix Simply defined, development implies increasing food supply, providing shelter, health care and protection, raising the levels of living, and expanding the range of economic and social choices available to individuals. “What is Development?” http://kokminglee.125mb.com/economics/development.html (accessed 05/26/2019). For the 1960s definition of development for third world countries, see Dennis A. Rondinelli, “Administration of Integrated Rural Development Policy: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Developing Countries”, World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Apr., 1979) 390; https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009995 (accessed: 04-05-2019). x See for instance, James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane and Beth Cole DeGrasse, The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, RAND Corporation (February 2007) 214-5, 232. xi Anita Kiamba, “The Sustainability of Urban Development in Developing Economies”, Consilience, No. 8 (2012) 20; https://www.jstor.org/stable/26188711. Accessed: 04-05-2019 xii See Benti, “A Nation without a City …” xiii Louis Wirth, “Urban Communities”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 47, No. 6 (May, 1942) 829 (accessed, 25-04-2019.)

117 xiv Emery N. Castle, Jun Jie Wu and Bruce A. Weber Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy Vol. 33, No. 2 (Summer 2011) 179. xv Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961; Peter Hall, Cities in Civilizations (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998). xvi Leslie A. Stein, Comparative Urban Land Use Planning: Best Practice (Architecture / Urban & Land Use Planning), (Sydney University Press, 2017), 10. A chapter on “Strategic Planning”, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1zrvhq9.7, accessed 05/04/2019. xvii Anita Kiamba, “The Sustainability of Urban Development in Developing Economies”, Consilience, No. 8 (2012), 20 [20-25]. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26188711. Accessed: 04-05- 2019. xviii Richard Rhoda, “Rural Development and Urban Migration: Can We Keep Them down on the Farm?”, The International Migration Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring, 1983) 35.

118 Vicious Turns in the Addis Ababa Versus Finfinnee Conflict

Mekuria Bulcha

Abstract The tension between Habesha elites who wish to see Ethiopia as a centralized unitary state to keep Addis Ababa as a monolingual city and the Oromo people who have struggled to make Finfinnee the capital city of Oromia has taken a new turn since September 2019. The turn was reflected in the hostility which met an Oromo rally which was organized to welcome the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) on 15 September 2019. Surprisingly, the hostility was directed, not only against the supporters of the OLF in the rally, but also institutions which bear Oromo names and individual vendors who speak the Oromo language. Thereby, the logical necessity of sharing Finfinnee/Addis Ababa as both Oromia’s capital and seat of the government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, with both Amharic and Afaan Oromoo as working languages, is rejected by the Amharic-speaking mobs. In order to explain the political ideology underpinning the anti-Oromo action taken by Amharic-speaking groups on 15 September 2019, this paper gives: (a) a historical trajectory of the numerous turns in the conflict over Finfinnee between Ethiopia’s ruling elites and the Oromo people dating back to 1887, the starting date of the construction of Addis Ababa by Menelik II. Putting the conflict in relation to the Ethiopian capital in a historical perspective, it explores the sociolinguistic, socioeconomic, and environmental impacts which its foundation had on Oromo communities who resided Finfinnee for over a century and (b) examines the several turns which the conflict over Finfinnee took under the reign of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) since 2003. It describes, albeit in passing, the physical violence perpetrated by the TPLF regime against Oromo youth and discusses in detail the contents of hostile Amharic-speaking commentaries and narratives that will refute Oromo indigeneity and Finfinnee’s history and territorial identity, and denies them the right to their capital city. The paper discusses the attempts that had been made to de- Oromize Finfinne/Addis Ababa and suggests an alternative bilingual model that bridges and minimizes the existing linguistic and administrative fault lines. It raises the point that the recognition of Oromo sovereignty over its capital city and the respect for their rights to exercise their culture and the use of their language as solutions for the current controversy between the Ethiopian state and the Oromo nation.

Introduction In the nineteenth century, the plains of Finfinnee constituted one of the destinations of the annual predatory expeditions of Sahle Sellassie, the king of Shawa. There were several reports written by European travelers, diplomats, and missionaries who described the predatory excursions conducted by Sahle Sellasie to loot cattle, capture children and women for domestic slavery, and the Red Sea slave market. A detailed report by the British envoy Captain W. Harris who followed Sahle Sellassie on one of his predatory expeditions in December 1843. Captain Harris gives a vivid description of how a single predatory expedition could over a day turn a panoramic scene he had witnessed from the top of the Entotto hills in the morning into an inferno of scores of burning villages by late afternoon and returns with thousands of lootings and hundreds of women and children as captives.1

The Battle Over Finfinnee

119 Initially, the battle over Finfinnee between the rulers of Ethiopia and the Oromo people started when Menelik conquered the district in the late 1870s. Menelik left his previous capital Ankober and establish a camp on Mount Wachacha, west of Finfinnee in 1878-1879. In a couple of years, however, he moved to the nearby Entotto range overlooking the vast Finfinnee plains inhabited by the Galaan, Gulallee and Abichuu Oromo from the north in 1881. Entotto proved to be an unsuitable site for a capital and Menelik and his wife Taytu turned their eyes to the Finfinnee plains in the south. But since the Oromo were still in control of the plains, they had to stay on the mountain. By the middle of the 1880s, the subjugation of the Oromo in the region was completed and Menelik and his wife Taytu descended from Entotto and visited Finfinnee. Taytu built a house in 1886 above the hot springs (hora) of Finfinnee. The following year, she left Entotto and settled in her new house. The foundation of Addis Ababa was laid the same year and the imperial capital was then built on the ruins of Oromo villages and farms of the plains of Finfinnee. The celebration of Hora Finfinnee Annual Irreecha festival was banned following the following the completion of the imperial capital in Finfinnee(The cultural festival was revived after nearly one and half century on 6 October 2019). Pankhurst wrote that “at that time, i.e. 1886-1887, the following portions of land were allocated at Finfini, in some cases to important personalities of state, in other cases to groups of servants, or soldiers.” It is important to note here that among the 32 recipients of land from 1887-1891, 27 were important personalities of the state including Empress Taytu, nine Rases, seven Dajazmaches, three Fitauraris, and all of them had large retinues of servants often soldiers who were allocated land and settled in Finfinnee.2 The allocation of land to these personalities and groups meant the eviction of thousands of Oromo households. Many of the uprooted Oromo households moved to the south and southwest within the Oromo territory. In short, the foundation of Addis Ababa in 1887 led to the political, socio-cultural, and linguistic de-Oromization of the area which has continued until now. The Oromo reaction to the early phase of the de-Oromization of Finfinnee was expressed in a short poem titled “No more standing on Intottoo.” Composed by an anonymous author probably a decade, or two after the occupation of the district by Menelik, the poem tersely depicted the loss of freedom and control over their economic resources as experienced by its inhabitants and describes the damages done to Oromo social and political life with the foundation of Addis Ababa. Summarizing the political damage incurred by the Oromo following the conquest of Finfinnee and the reconstruction of Addis Ababa in 1887 by Menelik, the poet states in two concise, but effective lines as follow.

Tullu Daalatti irratti No more gathering on Daalattii, Yaa’iin Gullallee hafee where the Gullallee assembly used to meet

The Gulallee Gadaa assembly ceased to meet because Menelik camped on the very site where it convened traditionally for generations. The Gadaa (democratic) system itself was abolished and was replaced by an alien authoritarian regime. The poet, who obviously was a native of Finfinnee, narrates figuratively about Oromo social and economic activities that had vanished and the life that was silenced following Menelik’s occupation of his ancestors’ land. He laments,

Gafarsatti dabrani No more going beyond Gafarsaa, qoraan cabsuun hin hafee to chop firewood.

120 In the above poem, firewood is used figuratively. It is not just the activity of gathering firewood which had ceased, but the family fireplaces for which firewood was collected were also extinguished. Families who used to gather around those hearths and led happy family and community lives which the British diplomat Major Harris described in 1843 as the “beautifully secluded valley of Finfinni [Finfinnee]” with “cozy hamlets” were gone.3 The communal life which resonated across “the thickly populated plains”4 described by Harris in 1843 as “the very picture of peace and plenty,”5 and the life of the Oromo peasant who “pursued his peaceful occupation in the field” and whose “wife and children carolled blithely”6 in his farmstead in the “smiling valleys of Finfinni” were visited by “the hand of wrath” and were either destroyed, or evicted and silenced. Indeed, it was not just the family and communal life of the indigenous inhabitants of Finfinnee which was debilitated by the conquest, but also the source of their livelihood. In fact, the main focus of the short poem below concerns the consequences of the conquest on the livestock, the mainstay of the Oromo communities. It states,

Hurufa Bombi irratti, No more pasturing calves, jabbilee yaasuun hafee on the meadows of Hurufa Bombi. Finfinnee loon geessani, No more taking cattle to Finfinnee, hora obaasuun hafee to water at the mineral springs.

The people of Finfinnee had no calves to pasture on the meadows of Hurufa Bombi, not only because the conquerors have looted their cattle, but also evicted them from their land and homes. Menelik followed the traditions of his predecessors - he did not pay his soldiers salary but, as Bulatovich noted, promised “a unique opportunity to win fame and get livestock and prisoners.”7 Menelik himself took ten percent of the livestock and human captives taken in the raiding expeditions.8 However, to go back to the conquest of Finfinnee in the early 1880s, “The vast herds of cattle which grazed untended” which Harris wrote about were looted. The poet summarizes the plunder of their herds and the economic misfortune which the conquest brought on the inhabitants of Finfinnee asserting,

Bara jarri dhufani The year the enemy came, Loon keenyaas ni dhumani our cattle were decimated.

It was not only the agriculturally rich district which was destroyed by “the hand of wrath,”9 but also the natural environment was another negative dimension of the conquest of Finfinnee. The poet bemoans figuratively the destruction of what Major Harris called the “large share of natural beauty” which Finfinnee had by asserting,

Inxooxoo dhabatanii No more standing on Intottoo, Caffee gad ilaalun haafe, to look on meadows blow.

In 1843, Harris described the Finfinnee site “Meadows of the richest green turf, sparkling clear rivulets leaping down in sequestered cascades, with shady groves of the most magnificent juniper lining the slopes, and waving their moss-grown branches.”10 Within a decade and half the magnificent junipers lining the slopes of the Entotto hills, the groves that lined the banks of the Gafarsaa, Qacanee, Qabanaa, Laga Xaafoo, etc. rivers, and the forests in the adjacent districts were gone. The conquest violated, not only human rights, but also the environment. Writing about Finfinnee, the Catholic missionary Martial de Slaviac wrote, “One sees the prodigious sycamores able to shelter, under the pavilion of its foliage, more than a thousand persons.”11 He adds, “Such was the former station of Mgr. Taurin at Finfinni,

121 outskirts (sic.) of the capital, Addis Ababa, now in mourning for greenery.” He noted that ‘gigantic confers which, for four hundred years, prospered under the wing of the Oromo generations, [are] carbonized [burnt] and tumbled down, from 50 meters of height, like the steeples of a cathedral whose base had been sapped by a mine.”12 Thus, the harmonious relationship between humans and nature which was maintained by Oromo laws and tradition, and was described appreciatingly by nineteenth century travelers such as C. W. Harris, the French brothers Antoine and Arnauld d’Abbadie, and the Dutch traveller J. Schuver, regarding Oromoland was violated. Foreigners who visited Finfinnee a decade after its conquest wrote about the extensive deforestation that turned a large region around Menelik’s capital into barren tracts of land. A British traveler H. Vivian wrote in 1901 that while travelling to Addis Ababa, he could scarcely see a tree for a couple of days. He noted that “The Abyssinians are most improvident in the matter of wood, cutting down forests in a haphazard way and never troubling to replant.”13 He stated that the “consequences of this are already felt at Addis Ababa; wood is now brought hither from a distance of sixteen miles.”14 He concluded that “it is certain that in a very short space of time, Menelik will be obliged to shift his capital once more to the neighborhood of fresh woods,”15 and he did. Pressed by the problem of procuring firewood, Menelik started to build a new capital about forty kilometers at Ejeree to the west of Finfinnee. Empress Tayitu called the new town Addis Alem in 1900 (“New World”), another Amharic name instead of an existing Oromo name. However, persuaded by advisors and above all the belief that the newly introduced fast- growing eucalyptus tree will solve the wood problem, in 1902, he stopped the work on his new capital and decided to stay in Addis Ababa/Finfinnee. He embarked on the re- afforestation of the denuded plains and hills of Finfinnee with the eucalyptus tree “which now began to be extensively harvested”16and minimized the wood problem. The eucalyptus trees may have solved the firewood problem of Addis Ababa residents, but led to the intensification of Oromo exploitation and exacerbation of their eviction from the vicinity of the city. Menelik, his officials, and dignitaries whom he had granted land used Oromo labor to plant eucalyptus trees on the land confiscated from them. As the city continued to expand, the eviction of the Oromo population continued, and Finfinnee’s socio- linguistic and cultural heritage were de-Oromized. The Oromo poet concluded,

Edda Mashashan dhufee Since Mashasha came, Birmaadummaan hinhafee. freedom has vanished.

The poet makes Mashasha the villain who caused Oromo loss of freedom. Normally, he is a hero for the Amhara. Mashasha Seyfu (mentioned in the verse cited above) was a Dajazmach and one of the grandsons of Sahle Sellassie. It was he who, on behalf of his cousin Menelik II, occupied the Oromo territory north of Finfinnee in the late 1870s. The destruction which he brought to Finfinnee brought more harm than the dozens of Sahle Sellasie’s (r. 1813-1847) predatory expeditions conducted by his grandfather in thirty years. Finfinnee was occupied permanently by outsiders and its traditions, its political and military institutions, its economy and natural environment were destroyed, or confiscated by the conquerors. The rest of Oromoland and the Ethiopian Empire was colonized, controlled, oppressed, and exploited for more than a century from Addis Ababa.

The first phase of the de-Oromization of Finfinnee In most societies, personal and place-names are linguistic symbols. Therefore, a personal name often indicates the ethnolinguistic identity of its bearer. Toponyms often index the histories of territories. Therefore, names matter. No wonder that the question of name is part

122 of the contention over Finfinnee. De-Oromization of indigenous places has been an instrument for changing territorial identity. What is interesting to note here is that, in the drive to blur territorial identities and substituting Amharic names for Oromo place names to foster an “Ethiopian” territorial identity has been part of the policy of assimilation and Amharization. The conquerors also went on to change the identity of Finfinnee and renamed it Addis Ababa. The Oromo language was kept away from the city center, not by force, but a sort of linguistic apartheid. During the heydays of the imperial regime, one of the ethnic slurs used as weapons to de-Oromize Finfinnee culturally and linguistically was, “Gallinyaa [Oromo language] na gaari Piyaassaa ay gebam (Oromo language and a horse drawn cart have no place in the Piazza.”)17 The Piyaassaa (Piazza) was Addis Ababa’s fashionable city center in the imperial past. Thus, the Oromo were made to see themselves as strangers in their own country and were forced to stop using Afaan Oromoo in conversation in the city center. Pointing out the Amharization of modern urban spaces of the Ethiopian state, Towers (2009: 175) stated that “Oromo, or more specifically, certain features of Oromo being – language, names, culture, and religion – were specifically and systematically excluded.”18 It important to note that in most societies personal and place names are linguistic symbols. Personal names often indicate the ethnolinguistic identity of their bearers. Toponyms index a history of place or territory. They store knowledge about the place. When a conqueror changes place names, it is designed to delete the memories they carry and replace them by the memory carried by the language of the conqueror. Place names often refer to an indigenous population’s ancestry. In Finfinnee, Galaan, Abichuu, Gulallee, etc. are names of Oromo ancestors, traceable back to the twelfth century. They are also place names and locations of the political, cultural, and social institutions, belief systems and values which characterize the way of life inherited by their descendants. As noted above, Tulluu Daalatti was the location of the gadaa assemblies, and Hora Finfinnee was the site of Irreecha festival. They were places linked to the Oromo gadaa political culture and the Irreecha festivals which were practiced and passed from generation to generation in the past in Finfinnee. They were disrupted by Menelik’s conquest of Finfinnee in the early 1880s. To deny the Oromo the right to land, the imperial Ethiopian regime has “Amharized” Oromo place names such as Bishoftu, Adama, Ciroo etc. to Amharic names such as Debre Zeit, Nazret, and Asbe Tafari. However, as expected, of all places Finfinnee was affected most by the policy of Amharization. Almost all pre-conquest Oromo place names in the area were changed to Amharic ones. Among dozens of the Oromo place names which were erased and replaced by Amharic ones are Tullu Dalattii which is Arat Kilo (አራት ኪሎ) today, Caffee Araaraa which is called Sidist Kilo (ስድስት ኪሎ), Hurufa Boombii which is Jan Meda (ጃን ሜዳ), and Horaa which is Filwoha (ፍልውሃ). Other Oromo place names such as Caffee Muudaa, Sulula Garbi and Adaami were given religious Christian names such as Lidata (ልደታ), Tekla Haymanot (ተ/ሀይማኖት) and Rufael (ሩፋኤል).

The demise of the imperial regime Following the demise of the imperial regime in 1974, the military regime/Dergue which usurped political power proclaimed land reform in 1975, transferring both urban and rural land in the country from private to state ownership. The Oromo succeeded in reclaiming Oromo place names such as Bishoftu, Adama, and Ciroo. However, unlike with the Oromo towns mentioned above, the Oromo nation has not succeeded in re-claiming the pre-conquest place names in Finfinnee.19 The military regime created a new set of rural and urban associations called kebeles which collected rents and taxes from the people. In the urban areas, it collected land and house rents from urban dwellers and business owners, previously collected by landlords. The

123 revolution swept away the monarchy and feudal landholding system, but not autocracy, social injustice, cultural and linguistic and political suppression. Seeking change, the Oromo and several other nations and nationalities of the defunct empire formed national liberation fronts and fought the military regime. The nationalization of land and concentration of power in the hands of an authoritarian military regime did not make the farmer owner of his land or stop the appropriation his produce. As in the past, the use of violence guaranteed the appropriation of the peasant households’ produce. The appropriated resources were invested in the instruments of violence. Unable to meet the extractive demands of the regime, tens of thousands of farmers fled to the neighboring countries, or joined the liberation fronts.20 The imported arsenals of massive modern firearms did not help the rogue regime from being overthrown in 1991. A coalition of liberation forces dominated by the Tigrayan Liberation Fronts (TPLF), which had not only the largest fighting force, but also had the assistance of the West, particularly the US government formed a transitional government in July 1991. The leader of the TPLF, Mr. Meles Zenawi, was made the head of the Ethiopian state. After consolidating his political power and asserting his position as prime minister of Ethiopia, Meles assumed an autocratic posture which was not different from that of his predecessors and ruled the country with an iron hand for twenty one years until his death in 2012.

The TPLF regime comes to Finfinnee with New Conflicts The second round of serious conflicts over was ignited in 2003 when the TPLF-led regime decided to change the seat of Oromia’s government from Finfinnee to Adaamaa, about 100 km southeast of the capital. Led by the Maccaa Tuulama Association (MTA) and university students from all over Oromia, the Oromo opposed the decision. In a speech he made at a demonstration staged to oppose the removal of Oromia’s capital from Finfinnee to Adaamaa, Bekele Nadhi, the late Secretary General of the Maccaa Tuulamaa Association said that

The decision that Finfinnee [the Oromo name for Addis Ababa] is no more the Oromo capital is wrong. The Oromo claim over Finfinnee is historical and legal. Therefore, we demand that the decision be revoked. Until the decision is revoked, we will continue with our protest. If our protests will not change the situation, we will continue with the next phase of our struggle.21

The TPLF’s decision was seen by the Oromo as a blatant violation of their historical and constitutional rights to their city and territory. Article 6 of the Constitution of the State of Oromia of 1995 stipulates that Finfinnee is the Capital City of the Regional State of Oromia. Consequently, the Macca Tuulama Association (MTA) made a call in a press release it issued on 30 November 2003 to the Oromo people to resist the eviction. The response was quick and massive, particularly in the case of secondary school and university students who participated actively in the protest. The conflict was extended into 2004. The response of the regime was drastic in its detention of over 7000 of the demonstrators.22 When high school students staged demonstrations demanding the release of their compatriots, 11 of them were gunned down by security agents. Over 350 Oromo students were expelled from Addis Ababa University (AAU) alone.23 The civil rights movement, MTA, was also banned and its leaders were jailed and sentenced for many years of jail time. The Oromo protests were suppressed, but the hostility between the students and the TPLF was not totally silenced.

Meles Zenawi changed his mind

124 Following the 2005 elections in which the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) lost its seats and ‘mandate’ to govern the capital city to the opposition, however, the late PM of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, made a tactical turn and withdrew the decision to change Finfinnee’s status as the capital city of Oromia. The government of Oromia returned to its legitimate capital city. That, however, did not solve the dispute between the TPLF regime and the Oromo people over Finfinnee. The return of Oromia’s government to Finfinnee in 2005 did not resolve question of Oromo sovereignty over their capital city. The ban placed on the MTA association remained in place and its confiscated property has not been restored. Soon after the return of the government seat of Oromia to its capital city, the TPLF regime started to evict Oromos from their ancestral homesteads in Finfinnee and its surrounding areas in the name of development. It was reported by former EPRDF cadre and official in the Meles government, Mr. Ermias Legesse, that about 30,000 Oromo households were evicted between 2005 and 2014. He was a participant in the official meetings that made the decisions that led to Oromo eviction from their ancestral land. The official explanation for the eviction of Oromo households was to open space for the expanding city of Addis Ababa, but it turned to be a land grab that facilitated as an illegal source for the accumulation of vast wealth for the TPLF leaders and their supporters.

The Master Plan - Second phase of Finfinnee’s de-Oromization project Ironically, the first round of land grab that displaced about thirty thousand Oromo households from Finfinnee between 2005 and 2014 was not reported by the media. The land confiscated from the Oromo households did, neither satisfied Addis Ababa’s need of space for expansion, nor satiate TPLF leaders’ greed for illicit income from illegal trade in urban land. In 2014, the regime came up with yet, the so-called the Integrated Addis Ababa Master Plan (Master Plan hereafter) requiring 1.1 million hectares of land that would displace hundreds of thousands of Oromo households. The Oromo saw the Master Plan as a scheme designed to de-Oromize Finfinnee and the adjacent districts culturally and linguistically. Consequently, the controversy over Finfinnee took the second and most decisive turn. As soon as the information about the Master Plan reached the public sphere, the Oromo youth took the lead in carrying out a measure I had suggested a decade earlier, opposing the transfer of Oromia’s capital city from Finfinnee to Adama.24 They conducted Oromia-wide peaceful protests to stop the Master Plan, mammoth scheme, which if implemented, could evict millions of Oromos. As expected, the youth were faced by physical violence from EPRDF regime. What was not expected and surprised many of us was the discursive violence from a global Amharic-speaking social media. Ironically, it was not the physical atrocity perpetrated on the Oromo youth by the TPLF-led regime, but the massive Oromo self-defense which provoked their virulent discourse. While the physical violence used by the TPLF-led regime killed and maimed thousands of Oromo youth who opposed the Master Plan, the Amharic-speaking political elites in the opposition used verbal violence to misrepresent and silence the voice of Oromo resistance to the Master Plan. What surprised many observers most was the commentators’ representation of Oromo resistance to evictions from their land by the TPLF regime as an illegal and unacceptable Oromo claim to the land and their alleging the Oromo as opposing to urbanization and modernization. The commentators tacitly fomented the violence perpetrated by the special security branch called Agazi and the regular federal police forces against the Oromo youth who resisted the Master Plan as illegitimate. Ignoring the eviction of thousands of Oromo households from their ancestral homesteads (qeyee), many of the commentators condemned the Oromo youth protest against Master Plan as an expression of “tribalism” and

125 “racism.” Ironically, the protest was represented by many of the Amharic-speaking commentators, not as a collective act conducted in self-defense, or legitimate Oromo rights, but as an illegal act that was aimed at harming others and should be condemned. For example, I have examined more than half a dozen commentaries which the Amhara scholar Professor Getachew Haile wrote between 2015 and 2018 demonizing the Oromo youth who participated in protests conducted against implementation of the Addis Ababa Master Plan. Although it is estimated that over five thousand of the Oromo youth were gunned down, or beaten to death in the streets all over Oromia by the federal police and Agazi forces in three years, not a single word in his commentaries reflect sympathy for them, or even mention the atrocities perpetrated against them by the security forces of the TPLF-led regime. Apparently, what disgusted him most was the inability of the TPLF to suppress the Oromo resistance to the Master Plan rather than the atrocities it was committing. In a commentary published in the Ethiopian Media Forum, on 26 February 2016 during the protest against the Master Plan was very tense, the professor I have mentioned above wrote that the Oromo youths (qeerroo) were “killing people and burning churches like their forefathers.”25 He claimed that in the past their Oromo ancestors “had killed the indigenous people of Ethiopia and occupied the fertile land.” Likewise, the present Oromo generation “when they see some non-Oromo-speaking Amhara families in their neighborhood have killed them, saying long live Wayane.”26 Surprisingly, while making this false accusation against the Oromo youth who were opposing the implementation of the Master Plan, Professor Getachew did not provide the names, or locations of churches he posits were burnt and the names of Amhara families who were killed by qeerroo, or their Oromo ancestors. Needless to point out here, that it is embarrassing to hear an accusation made by a notable member of Amhara intelligentsia demonizing the entire Oromo nation without any evidence. While accusing the Oromo youth falsely as troublemakers, the Amharic-speaking commentators have generally been silent over atrocities committed by the TPLF regime against them. Their silence implicitly suggests that the Oromo have no reason to complain about being evicted by the Master Plan as if the source of their livelihood doesn’t matter. In fact, the Oromo youth are depicted as opponents of diversity, globalization, urbanization and multiculturalism and are driven by “narrow ethnocentric worldviews of tribal elites” and the Oromo protests against eviction as obstacle to “the natural expansion of the city of Addis Ababa.”27 During the expansion of Addis Ababa by the TPLF regime, tens of thousands of men, women, and children were evicted from their homes and their farmlands, and were literally turnined into the street without compensation.28 It is not difficult to imagine that the Oromo regard the commentators’ insensitivity and total lack of solidarity with the targeted victims of the Master Plan as alarming. Given what had happened to those who were evicted before 2014, to call a mega project that was intended to occupy 1.1 million hectares of land and evict hundreds of thousands of Oromo households a “natural expansion of Addis Ababa” is gross disregard for human rights in general and Oromo humanity, in particular. For those who entertain such a view, the problem was not Oromo eviction from their districts for the expansion of Addis Ababa, but the Oromo resistance to the Master Plan. In general, many of the commentaries were written as the TPLF regime intensified its crackdown on the ongoing peaceful countrywide Oromo resistance to the implementation of the Master Plan between the beginning of 2016 and the middle 2018. Oddly, no sign of solidarity with the Oromo youth, or families who were dying while resisting eviction by the TPLF regime was reflected in the commentaries. The silence of the commentaries on the TPLF atrocities is a disturbing story for many Oromos, reflecting the commentators’ lack of sense of solidarity with and sympathy for the Oromo youth who were being killed while defending human rights. The silence spoke loudly

126 as a tacit agreement to the implementation of the Master Plan regardless of its social costs – the eviction of hundreds of thousands of Oromo households –aborted by Oromo youths. If implemented, the Master Plan would destroy Oromia as a territorial entity. Oromo artists, poets, and political commentators described the Master Plan as a scheme that would cut apart and “kill” Oromia. Territorially, the project would cut out the Tuulama highlands which constitute the heartland of the Oromo territory. It would de-Oromize Oromia’s core, undermine, and paralyze its cultural and linguistic development. As I have pointed out elsewhere,29 the mammoth Master Plan was, indeed, a dagger pointed at the “heart” of Oromia figuratively expressed. The uprising which was triggered by the scheme among the Oromo at home and in the diaspora concerned, not only with the survival of Oromia as a contiguous geographical entity, but also the survival of the Oromo as a nation. It is no wonder that the Oromo youths were ready to make sacrifices and oppose the implementation of the project. The Master Plan constituted an attack on their identity and their future. Therefore, they were acting ignoring the atrocities of the Agazi security forces and the danger it meant to their lives. As has been expressed eloquently in poems, songs, and articles produced by Oromos at home and in the diaspora, the Oromo could not afford to let the TPLF regime to implement its anti-Oromo project. Oromo artist and media outlets, particularly Oromia Media Network (OMN), bolstered the sense of unity and sacrifice for a common goal, and music became an instrument with which Oromo sense of nationhood is manifested and strengthened. The entire Oromo nation rose in unison and could conduct protest demonstrations simultaneously in scores of cities, towns, and townships on a single day. To put the matter analogically, the Master Plan put the Oromo nation in the situation of a person whose life is threatened by an assailant pointing a knife at his throat. For the person to be paralyzed by fear may mean an immediate death. He must defeat fear and fight back for survival. For oppressed people, defeating fear is a crucial initial step to liberate themselves. Indeed, whether fought by an individual, or a community, self-defense will cost. The Oromo youths paid dearly to defeat the implementation of the Mater Plan. They made the dagger meant to divide Oromia into two parts an ineffective weapon. To achieve that victory, over five thousand Oromo youths laid down their lives. Tens of thousands of young men and women were put in prison and tortured. Thousands of young girls were raped. Many came out of prison maimed and decapacitated physically and psychologically. The Oromo people incurred a heavy loss to stop eviction from their land and protect their rights over Finfinnee.

Virulent Amharic words supplement police brutalities Many of the commentaries on Oromo resistance against the Master Plan mentioned above were not based on evidence, but a mixture of emotionally driven and basically false statements that are meant to vilify Oromo political activism. As the hope that the Master Plan would de-Oromize Finfinnee and the surrounding townships and villages was frustrated with time and the Oromo resistance became stronger, the Amharic-speaking commentaries turned into open vilifications of Oromo youth, characterizing them as “extremists” (ጺንፈኞች), “racists” (ዘረኞች), “mindless hordes” (መንጋ). Intentional distortion of the purpose of Oromo political activism and accusation of Oromo political activists as extremists and racists is, not only a heinous disinformation about the Oromo people, but also a wrong method to force them to give up the demand for the recognition of their collective rights and identity and support Ethiopian “unity”.30 The problem with the debate on the Oromo in general, and on Finfinnee, in particular, is that the audience has no chance to ask the commentators for evidence, or even care to verify the accusations against the Oromo people. This is the case with the streams of false information spread by Amharic-speaking media outlets such as the Ethiopian Satellite

127 Television (ESAT). It seems that many of the viewers, or readers do not even bother to know the truth, but also take the accusations as facts, and then regard the Oromo people as unwelcome intruders and killers. That is a serious mistake and a dangerous position to take as it only makes the city a dangerous place and the Amhara-Oromo co-existence difficult. Those who wrote negative commentaries about the Oromo protests did not look at, or had ignored the slogans carried by those who participated in the rallies against the Master Plan across Oromia. Otherwise, they could have avoided the malicious propositions they have been making about the protests and the Oromo youths. One of the Oromo slogans which were used everywhere was, “Finfinneen handhuura Oromiyaati! Oromian biyya keenya! Biyya keenya dhiifnee eessa deemna!?” (“Finfinnee is Oromia’s center! Finfinnee is ours! Oromia is our homeland! Where else shall we go, leaving our homeland?!”). The Oromo youth were opposing the eviction of Oromo households from Finfinnee. Nowhere in Oromia have the demonstrators been heard saying we will evict non-Oromos from any city, town, or village in Oromia. As far as I know, Oromo political organizations have never proposed that property ownership and citizenship should be determined by ethnicity, or language in Oromia. However, the commentators were bent on misinterpreting, and dismissing the Oromo protests as expressions of extremism and racism using misleading discourse and vulgar language instead of dialogical and logical arguments, advocating peaceful co-existence in the same city as equals.

Orchestrated hate speeches Those who follow the media will remember that accepting Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s invitation to exiled political organizations to return home, the leaders and members of Arbanyoch-Ginbot7 party returned to Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) on 9 September 2018 and were received by tens of thousands of Addis Ababa’s inhabitants with fanfare. No one had opposed the rally organized for their reception. The case was different when a faction of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) returned to Finfinnee a week later. Misled by commentators, organized Amharic-speaking youth groups attempted to prevent Oromos from entering the city to participate in a rally organized to welcome the OLF members and leaders. Many Oromos were stoned or stabbed to death and many more were wounded by opponents of the rally. As the Oromo youth retaliated, casualties were also incurred by the opponents of the Oromo rally. The rally also reflected the inevitability of change in Oromia and Ethiopia. However, the attack on Oromos and Oromo institutions indicated that there are elements who are not prepared to accept change. It is important to note that the hostilities were expressed, not only against the OLF as a movement, but also against institutions which bear Oromo names and individuals who spoke the Oromo language, but had nothing to do with the OLF. Although violence against Oromos and Oromo institutions may have not been coordinated by a political party, or organization, I do not think that the action took place suddenly on the spot. I believe that it was the result of a reckless rhetoric which media outlets such ESAT has been using to demonize the OLF for a long time in order to deny the Oromo people the right to homeland and language. The TPLF-led physical violence against the Oromo people abated in 2018 with the defeat and retreat of the TPLF leaders to Mekele. As reflected in social media, however, the verbal violence of Amharic-speaking commentators has continued with an unprecedented intensity, taking the most dangerous tone. The revival of the imperial past is being propagated, often explicitly by many Amhara and Amharized politicians, political activists, and political parties who demand the revocation of Article 39 of the Ethiopian constitution. Indeed, to strive for the revival of the imperial past is to ignore the feeling of those who have

128 suffered the violations of people’s rights under Abyssinian political and cultural domination over the last 150 years. Article 39 was decreed to satisfy demands made by those whose rights to language, culture, and self-rule have been violated in the past. It was accepted to avoid the alternative. That alternative was violent dissolution the state, a fate which many empires that had appeared and disappeared in the past in many parts of the world had met. It is important to note here that the provocative commentators and media outlets who spread lies to vilify the Oromo day and night are preparing the ground for a violent disintegration of the Ethiopian state. During the last three, or four years, the vilification of Oromo political activism as racism is promoted by journalists and political activists who use media outlets such as the Ethiopian Satellite Television (ESAT). The hostility has intensified since September 2018. Here, I am not pointing fingers at journalists, in general; I am talking about those whose “sacred” mission is apparently vilification of Oromo youths, Oromo politicians, and scholars. I have watched several programs on ESAT which entertain guests who demonize Oromo political activism as an acts of “racism” and fascism”.31 I will take a couple of “expert” contributions broadcast by ESAT to illustrate my point. The first was organized by a program called Awde Filsifna and was transmitted on 29 September 2018.32 The ESAT journalist had two scholars with Ph. D degrees as her guests and the theme for discussion was “The Value of Truth in Our Community”. The guests started their discussion with an account on the value which truth has in Ethiopian society. After a while, the focus of the discussion shifted to the controversy over Finfinnee/Addis Ababa. Scholarship and truth disappeared instantly from the discussion as it turned into an illogical, hateful, and condescending gibberish. Dr. Abraham Alemu who was one of the guests wove a groundless narrative to dismiss the Oromo claims concerning Finfinnee. He stated that there were very few Oromos, if any, on the site when Menelik built his capital city. He argued that while Addis Ababa is more “than 150, or 180 years” old, Oromia or Finfinnee only existed for 25 years. The fact that Oromia’s borders were marked 25 years, however, does not mean Biyya Oromoo or Finfinnee did not exist, or was not inhabited by Oromos earlier this date. Like many of the Amharic-speaking commentators, Dr. Abraham described the impossibility of Oromo claims to Finfinnee. Scoffing at their claim of indigeneity in Finfinnee, he stated that “some Oromo tribes might have driven their cattle across the district once upon a time, but that does not give them any right to it” (“ከእለታት አንድ ቀን የሆኑ የኦሮሞ ጎሳዎች ከብቶቻቸዉን በዚያ መሬት ነድተዉ አልፈዋልና በዚያ ምክንያት መሬቱ የኦሮሞ ነዉ ማለት ጨርሶ ተቀባይነት የለዉም”.)33 Moreover, suggesting implicitly that the Oromo were too “backward” to be associated with a city like Addis Ababa, he argued that the Oromo did not have the culture and resources to build a city. Here, there are two fundamental truths which Dr. Abraham had overlooked. To start with, he ignored the fact that none of the nations and nationalities of Ethiopia can claim an urban culture historically, except for the Adare of Harar. If the Amhara could build a city, there is no reason why the Oromo cannot do the same. The second truth he is denying is the fact that Finfinnee was and still is being built, by and large, with resources obtained from Oromo and other nationalities in the south. Be it timber, or stones which were and are used to build homes, offices and shops in Addis Ababa were and are harvested or quarried primarily in Oromia. In general, the commentator ignored the fact the livelihood of Finfinnee residents is dependent on food produced by Oromo farmers as well. Firewood as fuel and electric power depend on Oromia’s forests and rivers. In short, it is a travesty of sanity to posit the Oromo do not have resources to build a city. The other ESAT guest on the same program, Dr. Tedla Woldeyohannes, commented about the danger Ethiopia is facing, inter alia, the Oromo qeerroo who he labelled as a

129 “mindless mob.” It is important to note here that the self-discipline and sense of fairness exhibited by the Oromo people toward all non-Oromos amid the TPLF violence which took the lives of over 5,000 Oromo youth was extraordinary. Their conduct deserves admiration and their peaceful struggle against the murderous Agazi should not be distorted as an action of a “mindless horde” by hatemongers. The guest of the third show was a medical doctor called Zelalem Gizaw. He gave an interview on ESAT’s Yetsehafian Demitsoch (Voices of Authors) Show on 27 September 2018.34 He was invited to discuss the content of an article he wrote on what he called “Oromo Fundamentalism.”35 In the article, he labels Oromo political organizations as terrorist outfits that are comparable to the criminal organization called the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in the US. What Oromo people have always been demanding was freedom from oppression, respect for their language, culture, and the recognition of their identity. Obviously, this has nothing to do with racial hatred that defines the ideology of the KKK. In fact, Dr. Gizaw’s KKK analogy is the definition of his attitude against the Oromo. In his article, he calls on non-Oromos “to organize in a structured fashion and chase out the Oromo fanatics first from Addis Ababa, then from the whole of Ethiopia.”36 Although the statements about Oromo political activism are baseless and the call for the ethnic cleansing from Addis Ababa which Dr. Zelalem Gizaw was making were outrageous, the ESAT journalist had never objected his views during the entire show. In fact, she had repeated and sung his ignoble proposal of genocide on the Oromo in and outside of Finfinnee without any qualm. With open hostility toward the Oromo people, and disgraceful lack of knowledge of the Oromo and Ethiopian history, the journalist had broadcasted her guest’s unabashed vitriol against the Oromo. Many of the commentators mentioned in this article are engaged in sinister verbal violence against the Oromo. A sinister verbal violence which had started in tandem with the outbreak of the Oromo protests against the implementation of Addis Ababa Master Plan in 2015 was intensified following the return of Oromo political organizations to Finfinnee in September 2018. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that no people or community has been exposed to concerted insult and demonization since World War II as that to which the Oromo nation has been and is being experiencing during the last two years. The verbal violence against the Oromo has similarities with sinister hate which the abolition of slavery aroused against African Americans among white slaveowners of the US south. African Americans were accused falsely and lynched by White racists openly in public. The purpose was to deny the freedom they had won after 400 years of bondage and to ‘keep them in their place’ in slavery. Abyssinian elites tend to think that the vilification of Oromo political activists and scholars combined with distortion of history, or distortion of Oromo history will discourage and make them to give up the claim of their history and constitutional rights over Finfinnee. Historical records show that what often happens is the opposite. Unless restrained now, I think the ongoing concerted “verbal lynching” of the Oromo people by Amharic- speaking media would backfire and become a recipe for the violent disintegration of Ethiopia.

Barara and the struggle over Finfinnee The other truth which many of the commentators discussed in Dr. Gizaw’s paper concerns his denial about the historical and territorial identity of Finfinnee and indigeneity of its Oromo inhabitants. Distorting the history of the conquest of Finfinnee, the authors of a controversial paper “Addis Ababa is Barara” (አዲስ አበባ በረራ ናት፤ በረራም አዲስ አበባ) have argued that “Menelik did not take an inch of land from the Oromo” (“ምኒልክ አንድ ስንዝር የኦሮሞ ርስት መሬት አልወሰዱም”.)37 By that they mean, he reclaimed a medieval capital of his ancestors called Barara from the Oromo who had conquered it in the 16th and renamed it Addis Ababa. They posit that Barara was destroyed before Oromo arrival in the Shawa. They posit that the place and the name

130 “Finfinnee” did not exist on record, or collective memory and is invented recently by Oromo politicians. I will examine the narrative that gives the destruction of Barara historical precedence to Oromo presence in the region. The section examines data collected from written historical, ethnographic, linguistic and archaeological sources to prove that Oromo presence in Shawa preceded the foundation of the garrison town of Barara which was built by an Amhara in the 15th century on Oromo territory and was destroyed in 1530 by Ahmad Grañ, the Emir of the Adal Sultanate. The Oromo participated on both sides in the war between the Christians and Muslims in Shawa and destruction of Barara. Indeed, Barara was built in the 15th century by king Dawit. But, to posit that Menelik II did not take an inch of land that belonged to Oromos is to recite an unabashed distortion of history and tell a monumental lie. The truth is that history had repeated itself; Menelik built Addis Ababa on Oromo land as his 15th century predecessor Dawit had done. Indeed, Barara was one of the sites of the “roving capitals” of the Abyssinian kings between fourteenth the sixteenth century. Even the existence of the temporary royal camp of Barara did not precede the presence of the Oromo on the central Shawan plateau. There is no conclusive evidence that indicates the Barara camp site where Addis Ababa/Finfinnee is located today. That the Oromo were the inhabitants of the entire region long before the expansion of the Christian kingdom from Amhara Sayint to the Shawan plateau, however, has been demonstrated irrefutably by researchers including myself.38 Based on data on events categorized as (a) Ethnographic and historical evidence, or history of conflicts between Amhara immigrants and indigenous communities before the 16th century, (b) Oromo involvement in the Islamic and Christian wars of 1529-1543 in Shawa, (c) the Fra Mauro “testimony” of toponyms, and (d) linguistic evidence is presented below.

Ethnographic and historical evidence I will now turn first to the hagiographies of the Orthodox clergy and chronicles of the Amhara kings as sources of ethnographic and historical information. The hagiographies and chronicles contain records about contacts which the Christian settlers had with the indigenous communities confirming Oromo presence in Shawa centuries before the garrison town of Barara was built. The earliest record that mentions the identity of one of the pagan groups deals with the conflict was from the early 12th century and is about an Amhara predatory expedition to the territory of a people called Warjih. Tamrat notes that “A Muslim chronicle belonging to the region of eastern Shawa preserves the tradition that early in A.D 1128 the Amhara led an unsuccessful expedition in the land of the Warjih.”39 The Warjih repulsed the Amhara expedition. Tamrat writes that at that time, “the Warjih probably inhabited a more extensive area as far west as the foothills of the Shawan Plateau.”40 Further information about the conflict between the Abyssinians and the inhabitants of Shawa comes from the late 13th century and concerns the conquest of Muslim “sultanates, states, and commercial centers.” According to Trimingham, the principalities of Shawa, Dawaro, Gidaya (Gidaya is variously spelt and pronounced as Giddaa or Jiddaa) and Waaj were conquered, or were made to pay tribute by Yikuno-Amlak (1270-1285). He overthrew the Cushitic Zagwe dynasty in 1270 and restored the so-called Semitic Solomonic dynasty.41 He was the first Abyssinian king to establish Abyssinian hegemony over the Shawan plateau. Continuing the conquests started by Yikuno-Amlak and his son Widm Asferre, Amda- Siyon (r. 1314-1344) conducted campaigns in Galla agar (land of the Galla which, in fact, was Galaan) in 1332.42 According his chronicler, Amda-Siyon also attacked the Warjih in 1332 who were (and still are) the neighbors of the Galaan. In retaliation to his assault on their land, the Warjihs “laid waste the land of the Christians.”43 The Maaya were another Oromo group who had been intermittently in conflict with the Abyssinians over a long time. The resistance which met the Amhara conquerors and rulers intermittently between the 12th and 19th centuries from the Warjih, Maaya, Galaan, and others prove the antiquity and

131 continuity of Oromo presence on the Shawan plateau. The conflicts described above were apparently the cause for the displacement of large parts of the Oromo population from the Shawan plateau to the south in the 14th, 15th, and early 16th centuries. As I have discussed at length elsewhere, it was these displaced groups who had in the 16th century spearheaded the war against the Abyssinians which was misrepresented by Ethiopianist historiographers as the Oromo invasion of Ethiopia to return home to their former home region. Across the centuries, we find these Oromo groups on the Shawan plateau represented by the ethnonyms their ancestors had during the medieval period. In most cases, we find them in the same districts where their ancestors had lived as mentioned in Abyssinian chronicles and hagiographies, or Oromo oral history and the gadaa tradition. Most of them had also proliferated and branched out into scores of sub-groups while maintaining the ethnonyms of their ancestors.

Oromo and the Grañ wars of 1529-1543 in Shawa. The second evidence that falsifies the theory of “pre-Oromo Barara,” or “Oromo invasion of Ethiopia in the 16th century” is the participation of Oromo groups on both sides of the Christian-Islamic war in Shawa. Arab-Faqi wrote that, among the forces used by Ahmad Grañ against the Christian kingdom, was “a group recruited from a Muslim tribe called Shoa [Shawa] together with those of Gidayah [Jiddaa].”44 The Yejju (El Ejju) were another group who were recruited by the Muslim forces and fought the Christians. Arab-Faqi wrote “The El-Ejju people then furnished the Muslims with a large contingent of cavalry and infantry … [and] followed the jihadist force to Beta Amhara.”45Among those who were recruited by the Christians to fight against the forces of Ahmad Grañ were the Maaya. Despite their historical conflict with the Christian kings mentioned above, the Maaya were recruited in large numbers and were sent against the Muslim forces by the Christian king Lebna-Dengel (r. 1508-40). Pankhurst writes that the jihadists “encountered a force of over 3,000 Maya [Maaya] soldiers armed with bows and poisoned arrows.”46

The ethno-linguistic evidence Referring to Fra Mauro’s map, the authors of “Addis Ababa is Barara” write that “The map reflects with amazing manner the reality on the ground” (“ካርታው በሚያስደንቅ ሁኔታ መሬት ላይ ያለውን እውነታ ያንጸባርቃል”) and that the Oromo had changed the original names. I will start with linguistic analysis of the toponyms which appear on the map and in other sources cited by the authors of “Addis Ababa is Barara.” Names such as Sadai [Siida], and Bada Bedi, Badaqe and Menagesha which are taken from Fra Mauro’s map, or the works of Tamrat, Pankhurst and Vigano are ancient place names that existed in the region before the destruction of Barara. Except Menagesha, the names are not Semitic. They are Oromo. To begin with, Barara is an Oromo word which means “mercy, or the merciful”.47 As indicated by Kebede Galata funerary stelae are found in different parts of Ethiopia, but it is called Siida (Sidai) only in (Afaan Oromoo.48Badaqe in Tamrat, Badeqé in Breternitz and Pankhrst), or Badeqqe (in Vigano) which like Barara is mentioned as a medieval “city,” or “village” is an Oromo place name too. The correct spelling is Badaa Qe’ee.49 Bada (Baddaa) means highland, or a place on a highland or hill. The word is both a noun and an adjective in the Oromo language and is used as prefix to a place name denoting its altitude and prevailing temperature.50 The word qé e is a long vowel common in Oromo language and reads as qe’ee, or qeyee) has different shades of meaning such as home, homestead, a place for residence, a village, or a human settlement. Although about a fifth of the space in their article is given to the description of the Semitic languages, the authors of “Addis Ababa is Barara” do not tell which ones are Semitic, or Amharic. Ironically, “the reality on the ground” which the Venetian cartographer faithfully

132 had indicated on his map based on what he heard from visiting Abyssinian monks in 1464 refutes the theory that Barara existed before the “Oromo arrival in Shawa”.

Ethno-religious rites and archeological artefacts Religious rites, cultural artefacts, and records in historical document, including the Fra Mauro map which the authors of “Addis Ababa is Barara” have used as evidence, constitutes a third pool of information that refutes the plausibility of their theory about pre-Oromo Barara. Archaeological and historical data which were collected by Samuel Baker and Marco Vigano,51 and Hartwig Breternitz and Richard Pankhurst52 in search for the lost “city” of Barara reveal two layers of history - Abyssinian and Oromo. The Oromo layer is older than the first and links the present Oromo inhabitants of the Shawan plateau with their ancestors who lived in the same region centuries before the town of Barara was built. Focusing on Sidai [Siida], Marco Vigano and Samuel Baker note that “it is indicated on the [Fra Mauro] map as the siege of the Patriarch” and the name “simply translates as funerary stelae in the Oromo language.” They note that as confirmed through local informants during their first visit, “Oromo speakers were presumably settled here before the medieval town on the map took form.”53 They write that the objects constituted “pre-Christian funerary monuments, inscribed monumental stones, toppled and broken stelae,” and “deliberately broken millstones [which] were found in the numbers during the visit.” Apparently, the “deliberate” destruction was caused by conflict described by Professor Tadesse Tamrat as “bitter and gruesome.” Tamrat wrote that the conflict was between the Orthodox church and the “pagan clergy” because of “the insistence of the preachers on building their churches on the sacred places of the pagan clergy.”54 Tamrat does not tell us who the “pagan” clergy were, but we find them in the hagiography of Abuna Qawistos (who died in 1352). He wrote that Abuna Qawistos found “the people of Galan and Yay [Galaan and Yaayyaa] worshiping the devil at the foot of the kobal [probably a corruption of odaa] tree” chanting, “O people Galan and Yay, see what your god Qorqé [can] do.”55 This is an extraordinary piece of evidence refutes the false narratives concocted by the Abyssinian Orthodox clergy and reveals the truth. The records show that the Orthodox clergy were supported devotedly by the Christian kings.56

The name Finfinnee is an invention. The authors of “Addis Ababa is Barara argue that there was no place, or town called Finfinnee in history (“ፊንፊኔ የሚባል ከተማ በታሪክ አልነበረም”). To prove that they list relevant and irrelevant publications and claim that it is not mentioned in any of the sources they had consulted. Several of the sources they have on their reference list, however, mention Finfinnee. For example, the Ghanaian historian Kofi Darkwah who, includes a map with the District of Finfinni in his book writes, “an expedition conducted in September 1841 to the Finfinni district (where Entoto or Addis Ababa was later founded) returned with 14,042 cattle.” He adds that “In the campaign conducted in Finfinni district (..) the invaders were said to have killed 4,600 captured [Oromo].”57 Of course, he is not saying Finfinnee was a city, but a district and a site where the city of Addis Ababa was founded in 1887. It is not just the hot springs (Hora in Oromo, or Filwoha in Amharic) that was called Finfinnee, but the whole district. As indicated above, W.C. Harris58 who visited Finfinnee in March 1843 wrote about “beautifully secluded valley of Finfinni.” Martial de Salviac mentions in his book about a missionary station ran by Mgr. Taurin at Finfinni.59 The authors of “Addis Ababa is Barara” fake the consultation of some sources deliberately ignore the information recorded by others because they contradict what they want to believe. The late Professor Donald Levine, who was a friend of the Amhara elites, has stated in his well-known book Wax & Gold, that the

133 Amhara elite is skillful at deception. “With straight face and convincing manner, he will relate the most preposterous fictions.”60Epistemic violence, or deliberate obstruction of knowing is a trademark of Ethiopianist historiography. The epistemic violence committed by the authors of “Addis Ababa is Barara” is part of that tradition. They have fabricated half-truths and Barara denied facts about Finfinnee to prove that the Oromo were 16th century immigrants from somewhere to Ethiopia. Having analyzed (a) ethnographic and linguistic evidence, (b) Oromo participation in the Ahmad Grañ wars in Shawa in the 1530s, (c) and archaeological evidence, I have shown that the Oromo were the indigenous population of the Shawan plateau centuries before the foundation of the garrison town of Barara.

Finfinnee - Federalism and sovereignty Finfinnee is legally, or conventionally the capital city of Oromia. Article 6 of the Constitution of the State of Oromia of 1995 stipulates that Finfinnee is the Capital City of the Regional State of Oromia. A capital city is the seat of the government of a country, or a state. It functions often as a prime economic, cultural, and political center of the state. Regardless of what the constitution is saying, the Oromo have a common understanding about their homeland and capital city. What they have been saying from border to border in solidarity with the Oromo who were threatened by eviction was, Finfinnee is handhura Oromiyaati! (Finfinnee is navel of Oromia!), “Oromian biyya keenya, hirratt dhalanne eessa deemna?” (Oromia is our homeland, we are born in it, where will go?). They mean “the eviction of Oromos in and around Finfinnee is symbolically the eviction of Oromos everywhere in Oromia.” In addition, the Master Plan would destroy the Oromo state as a contiguous territory and the Oromo as one nation. Consequently, the Oromo youths died everywhere to stop its implementation. Although Finfinnee is the capital city of Oromia, the status of Oromo language did not change much from that of the heydays of the imperial times. Before 2017, none of Finfinnee’s schools were using Afaan Oromoo as a medium of instruction although it is the mother tongue of about 20 percent of the city’s children. Finfinnee’s Oromo inhabitants got their first elementary schools (two in number) that teach in Oromo language in 2017. Thus, while in the rest of Oromia, the medium of instruction and administration is Afaan Oromoo since September 1991, its capital city Finfinnee has retained its imperial garrison-town’s linguistic characteristics. Its Oromo inhabitants are still expected to drop their language and speak Amharic to participate in the life of the city and become its acceptable citizens. That means they have to use Amharic in business, schools, court hearings, and literary in all aspects of life. Although Oromo inhabitants of Finfinnee have become increasing self-assertive about their identity, many of them seem to still wear the Amhara mask to avoid harassment. However, awakened by the positive achievements reflected in the protests against eviction by the Master Plan and the negative incidents of mid-September 2018 mentioned above, a movement called Finfinnee Renaissance Association (FRA)61 was organized in October 2018 to re-Oromize Finfinnee’s Oromo inhabitants, particularly the youths who have announced that they have decided to have a voice in Oromo politics, and work to revive their culture and preserve their heritage. They stressed that their aim is not to suppress the right of non-Oromo citizens of Finfinnee, but to respect the Oromo right to their language, culture, and identity. Article 5 endorses that “All Ethiopian languages shall enjoy equal state recognition.” Article 39 endorses, inter alia ,that “Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to speak, to write and to develop its own language; to express, to develop, and to promote its culture; and to preserve its history.” Consequently, Amharic and Tigrinya are

134 recognized as the languages of administration, education, law, etc. in Bahr Dar and Mekele, respectively. This is not case in Finfinnee which is the seat State of Oromia. Coming back to the status of Finfinnee, I will underline the question of sovereignty. In Oromia, Article 47 (4) which states that “Member States of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) shall have equal rights and powers,” and Article 52 (b) which empowers states, inter alia, “To enact and execute the State constitution and other laws” have not been implemented. In other words, he government and state of Oromia have no power over Finfinnee, or failed to exercise it. That is not the case, for example, with the Amhara and Tigray States regarding their capital cities. They exercise full sovereign power over Bahir Dar and Mekele, respectively. Thus, the Oromo claim over Finfinnee is not a question of “interest” as indicated in Article 49(5) of the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution. It concerns sovereignty. The term “special interest” is misleading in double sense. First, it puts Oromia’s authority over its own capital city under question; to say to the Oromo you have “special interest in Addis Ababa” is like telling a family “you have special interest in your home.” The Oromo have historical and constitutional rights, not mere “interests” over Finfinnee. Secondly, the promised Article purports to offer is deceptive and cynical. It is deceptive, because 25 years after the adoption of the Constitution, the meaning of “special interest” remains equivocal. Whatever it may mean is not respected. Eviction is a violation of Oromo right as well as its interest. It is cynical because, the eviction of Oromo households which had started with the foundation of Addis Ababa 130 years earlier has accelerated during the last 25 years. Article 46 of the FDRE Constitution states “The Federal Democratic Republic shall comprise of States.” In many federal states, with multiple constituent nations and nationalities, a federal capital which is in one of the constituent states of a federation does not have sovereignty. The constituent state in which the capital city is situated has sovereignty. The federal government does not have a direct control over it. This should apply to Finfinnee’s/Addis Ababa’s relation to Oromia. Many commentators compare Addis Ababa with Washington D. C. which was founded on a neutral site with a compromise between the constituent states of a federation. The land was seized from Indians and ceded by the states of Maryland and Virginia. That is why it was not inside of any of the constituent state of the US. Another fact which those who compare it with Washington, D.C. miss is that, although the indigenous Oromo were evicted from Finfinnee, they are not outrooted as the indigenous Indians were from Washington and the entire region. When the 13 US settler colonies declared their independence from Britain in 1776, the indigenous Indian population of Maryland and Virginia were already wiped out and no one was left to claim the right to the land, or oppose the white settlers to build their capital city on it. That is not the case with Finfinnee. As the opposition to the transfer of Oromia’s capital to Adaamaa and the recent anti-Master Plan protests have shown unequivocally, the 40 million Oromos see Finfinnee as their land and capital city and are ready to defend it at any cost. Secondly, since Finfinnee is the capital city of Oromia, one cannot deny the fact that Afaan Oromoo is its legitimate language. Finfinnee/Addis Ababa is, however, also a city with a large Amharic-speaking population. Consequently, it should adopt a multilingual model to cope with the linguistic fault-lines. Although such a model is not without problems, the Belgians for example decided to combine unilingual and bilingual holding their country together as does Canada (Quebec- French speaking and the rest of Canada-English/French). While the constituent states of Wallonia and Flanders of the Belgian federal state are institutionally unilingual operating, respectively in French and Dutch, Brussels is bilingual. The bilingual model can be adopted to minimize the existing linguistic fault lines in

135 Finfinnee/Addis Ababa, particularly regarding working languages. I mean, besides Amharic, Afaan Oromoo must be a working language of the city. There are Amharic-speaking commentators who oppose the federal solution to Ethiopia’s political conflict based on a defunct colonial principle called the “right of conquest”62which I will describe in a moment. Buoyed with chauvinism, reminiscent of yesteryear’s garrison town naftanya mentality, one of the commentators stated that,

Qubee and Finfinnee will be the graves of Oromo nationalism. I think, Oromo nationalists who desire to live in peace in Ethiopia should distance themselves from the qubee alphabet and Finfinnee (“ቁቤና ፊንፊኔ የኦሮሞ ብሄርተኝነት መቀበሪያ ይመስሉኛል። የኦሮሞ ብሄርተኞች በኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ ተከብረው መኖር ከፈለጉ ከቁቤና ፊንፊኔ መራቅ አለባቸው).63

In 1898, Alexander Bulatovich wrote that “[Oromo] lands together with their population belong to the emperor by right of conquest” (emphasis mine). Bulatovich means there is no other reason, historical or moral, but only brute firepower that had legitimized the Abyssinian occupation of the south. Its simple logic is “might makes right.” The phrase if the Oromo “desire to live in peace in Ethiopia” suggests that they need Amhara tolerance to do so. In the past, it was believed that the forces of the conquering state, being stronger than those of the conquered were “legitimately” entitled to rule the conquered territory in question as they will. Sharon Korman notes that “the right of acquisition vested by conquest did not depend on the consent of the dispossessed state."64 That was how European colonies in Africa, Latin America, and Asia had functioned. However, the ethical implication of the belief that “might makes right” was questioned following horrors of World War II and the principle of “right of conquest” was rejected by the UN Charter, and the UN role in decolonization, the principles of self-determination, and universal human rights. This did not happen in Ethiopia. That is why “the right of conquest” is still lurking in the mind of the author of the article cited above. Leaving aside the naftanya bravado aside, in Oromia including Finfinnee, the knowledge of Afaan Oromoo must be counted as an asset for employment rather than a liability. In other words, an Oromo need not learn Amharic to seek a job here irrespective of who the employer is. It is a travesty that an Oromo is required to learn Amharic to qualify for a job in his/her own city and state. The problem of Oromo unemployment cannot be solved by teaching Oromos Amharic, but a policy that makes Afaan Oromoo a working language in Oromia including its capital city, Finfinnee. That Afaan Oromoo should be given priority as a working language in Oromia in general needs no argument.65 Lack of knowledge of the Amharic language should not be used as an excuse for the high rate of unemployment among educated Oromo.66 Naturally, federal employees working in the Amhara state are using Amharic. An Oromo who wants to work in the Amhara region (or other constituent states which use Amharic as a working language) should learn Amharic. But he/she should not be told that he or she must know Amharic to get employment in Oromia, including Finfinnee. Afaan Oromoo should be the working language of Oromia.

1 C. W. Harris, The Highlands of Æthiopia. 3 volumes (London: Longmans, 1944), Vol. 2: 185-198. 2 Pankhurst, R. in his State and Land in Ethiopian History, Institute of Ethiopian Studies and the Faculty of Law, Addis Ababa, 1966: 149. See also Naigzy Gebremedhin, “Approaches to the Housing Problems of Addis Ababa” (Thesis, Master of City Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 1967: 88, 3 Harris, Highlands, Vol..2, 189-192.

136 4 Harris, Highlands, Vol 2, 190. 5 Harris, Highlands, Vol 2, 189. 6 Harris, Highlands, Vol 2, 190. 7 A. Bulatovich, Ethiopia Through Russian Eyes: A Country in Transition, 1896-1898; translated and edited by Richard Seltzer (Lawrenceville, N.J: The Red Sea Press, 2000). 8 C. Prouty, Empress Taytu and Menelik II:. Ethiopia 1883-1910 (Trenton, N.J.: The Red Sea Press, Trenton, 1986), 206. As a relative and one of Menelik’s most trusted generals, Ras Tasamma, confided in 1899 to a French military delegation to Ethiopia, “Up to now I have made war to kill pillage and collect beasts [livestock] and slaves. Now, His Majesty Menelik wants no more of this kind of aggression.” The Ras was not telling his guests the truth. Pillage of the conquered territories continued until the Italian occupation of 1936. 9 Harris, Vol. 2, 192. 10 Harris, Vol. 2, 192. 11 M. De Salviac, An Ancient People … The Oromo: Great African Nation; translated from French by Ayalew Kanno (East Lancing, Mich.: Ayalew Kanno, 2005), 120. 12 Ibid., 120 13 Cited in R. Pankhurst, State and Land in Ethiopian History (Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies and the Faculty of Law, 1966), 150, 152. 14 Pankhurst, State and Land, 152. 15 Pankhurst, State and Land, 152. 16 Pankhurst, State and Land, 153. 17 Towers, L. “Formal Schooling, Identity and Resistance in Ethiopia.” Thesis, Doctor of Philosophy (University of Sydney), 2009, 175. 18 Towers, L. “Formal Schooling,” ibid. 19 One gets the feeling that Minneapolis in the US has preserved more American Indian place names than Addis Ababa has done with Oromo names. 20 See Mekuria Bulcha, Flight & Integration: Causes of Flight from Ethiopia and Problems of Integration in the Sudan, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 1988, for a detailed description of the consequences of the draconian policy. 21 Mekuria Bulcha, “Struggle over Finfinnee is Struggle for Oromia” translated from Afaan Oromoo by the author. Gadaa.com (April 2014, published May 2014) [online resource] http://gadaa.com/oduu/25546/2014/05/26/struggle- over-finfinnee-is-struggle-for-oromia/ (accessed January 20, 2020). 22 Among those who were killed were Kabbada Badhasaa, Morkataa Edosaa, Gaddiisaa Hirphaasaa, Jagama Badhanee. 23 “Suppressing Dissent: Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in Ethiopia's Oromia Region.” Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2005 [online resource] https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/05/09/suppressing-dissent/human- rights-abuses-and-political-repression-ethiopias-oromia (accessed January 20, 2020). 24 Mekuria Bulcha, “Greater Addis Ababa in the Making: Stop them or Keep Quiet and Perish” (December 2003) Voice Finfinne [online resource] http://www.voicefinfinne.org/English/History/MB.html (accessed January 20, 2020). 25 Getachew Haile, “የ1884 ዓመተ እግዚእ የበርሊን ኮንፈረንስ እና የ1882 ዓመተ ምሕረት የዲማ ኮንፈረንስ ተመሳሳይነት” (“Similarities between the 1884 Berlin Conference and 1882 Dima Conference”), Ethiopian Media Forum, 26 February2016. 26 Ibid. 27 Teshome M. Borago, “Is Ethiopia still a Rwanda in slow motion?” Ethiomedia, 9 October 2017. 28 This insider information is reported in Ermias Legesse’s book Ye-Meles Trufaat (The Legacy of Meles). Ermias Legesse was a cadre of the EPRDF and held official post in Meles Zenawi’s government and had participated in urban affairs concerning Finfinnee/Addis Ababa. 29Bulcha, M. “From a Student Movement to a National Revolution: A Struggle with an Independent Oromo State in Sight. The first version was presented at the Oromo Studies Association (OSA) 2016 Mid-Year Conference, London School of Economics on April 2 – 3, 2016. This version is prepared for the website Oromia Today on request.

30 ”አዲስ አበባን የግሉ ሊያደርግ የሚሰራ የፖለቲካ ቡድን የትም አይደርስም፤ ዶ/ር ሲሳይ መንግስቴ በአ.አ.ዩ የፌዴራሊዝምና የሰብዓዊ መብቶች መምህር, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CgKJ6RlyElA 31 The ESAT’s ESAT Daily and lately its outgrowth “Ethio 360” with Ermias Legesse in the forefront who has been using these terms to vilify the Oromo movement for fundamental human rights. The concerted vilification of the Oromo people on these media outlets cannot be covered in this short paper. The question it raises is serious and legal and not political or sociological. The case should be dealt with in the court of law. 32 Dr. Tedla Woldeyohannes and Dr. Abreham Alemu, “Awde Filsifna”, ESAT 29 September 2018 [online resource] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mH08A8D7bq0

137 33 Alemu, A. & Tadla Woldeyes. On “The value of truth in our community”, ESAT Awde Filsfina. 29 September 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mH08A8D7bq0 34Zelalem Gizaw, “Oromo Fundamentalism” ESAT, September 27, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=69DffsANJkE&t=2537s. (accessed on June 27, 2019) 35 Zelalem Gizaw, “Oromo Fundamentalism”, Dire Tribune, 26 September 2018. 36 Zelalem Gizaw, ibid. 37Amhara Professionals Union, “አዲስ አበባ በረራ ናት፤ በረራም አዲስ አበባ ናት” (“Addis Ababa is Barara; Barara is Addis Ababa”), 2017: 3. 38 Guluma Gemeda, “Barara is not Addis Ababa” (22 November 2018) Kichuu Info [online resource] https://kichuu.com/barara-is-not-addis-ababa/ 39 Tamrat, T. ibid. p. 42 40 Ibid. p. 43. 41 Trimingham, S.J. Islam in Ethiopia, London: Frank Cass, (Third impression), 1976: 58, 62. The Zagwe kings who were of Agew origin – a Cushitic ethnic group – “sought legitimacy for their rule not in the old Agew social order, but by making themselves patrons of Orthodox Christianity” 42 Trimingham, S.J. ibid. 43 Pankhurst, R. ibid. 1997: 41. 44 Basset, M. R. translated in Tamrat, ibid. p. 125, fn. 1. The Hargaya are not Oromo. 45 Hassen, M. “The Pre-Sixteenth Century Oromo Presence Within the Medieval Christian kingdom of Ethiopia,” A River of Blessings: Essays in Honor of Paul Baxter, edited by David Brockensha, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994: 52 46 Cited in Pankhurst, ibid. 1997: 184, 186 47 See Gragg, G. Oromo Dictionary, Michigan: African Studies Center, Michigan State University, 1982: 38. See also Guluma Gemeda 48 Galata, K. Soodduu – Megalithic, Addis Ababa, 2017. 49 Grag, G. ibid. 1982: 30, 50 Breternitz, H. Pankhurst, R., “Barara, the royal city of 15th and early 16th century (Ethiopia): medieval and other early settlements between Wechecha Range and Mt Yerer: results from a recent survey”, Annales d'Ethiopie, Volume 24. 2009: 209-249. For example, there are two such places, Baddaa Diggaa (Diggaa highland) and Baddaa Tuqaa (Molehill), outside my home town Naqamtee. 51 Vigano, M. and Baker, S. “Sadai, Stelae Town. Ambanegest, Mountain of Kings”, November 2016: 2. 52 Breternitz H. and Pankhurst, R. ibid 53 Vigano, M. and Baker, S. ibid. 54 Tamrat, T. ibid., 1972: 181. 55 Ibid. p. 184 56 Tamrat, T. ibid. p. 237 writes that “On one occasion King Zar’a Ya’iqob received reports that the local people of a small district in Mugar practiced pagan worship sacrificing cows and sheep for the serpent god inhabiting a tree. He immediately ordered that a church be built on the site.” 57 Darkwah, R. H. K. Shewa, Menilek and the Ethiopian Empire, London: Heinemann, 1978: 192. He cites Captain C. W Harris letter written on 27 November 1841 to the British Foreign Office from Shawa. 58 Harris, W. C. ibid. 1844: 89-90. 59 De Salviac, Ancient People, 112. 60 Levine, D. Wax & Gold, Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture, Chicago University Press, 1972: 250. 61 Finfinnee Renaissance Association. 17 October 2017, https://oromianeconomist.com/2018/10/17/oromia- finfinnee-waldaa-haaromsa-finfinnee-%E1%88%80%E1%88%AE%E1%88%9D%E1%88%B3- %E1%8D%8A%E1%8A%95%E1%8D%8A%E1%8A%94- %E1%88%9B%E1%88%85%E1%89%A0%E1%88%AD-finfinnee-renaissance-association/ 62 አውድማ ”ወቅታዊ ትንታኔ ከአዲስ አበባ” Awedema, May 26, 2020 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8_SqDii6Rgk 63 Yared Tibebu, ሪ በል ኦሮሞ! 5 January 2020. www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ga8r0SIZYp0 64 Korman, S. The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in International Law and Practice. Oxford University Press. 1996: 127 65 Dr. Worqneh Gebeyehu on Finfinnee. Finfinnee Renaissance Association [online resource] https://www.facebook.com/FinfinneeRA/videos/2192709394276664/ (Accessed on December 10, 2018). 66 Abraham Qajela, “አፋን ኦሮሞ የኢትዮጵያ የሥራ ቋንቋ የመሆን ግዴታነትና የእራሱ በሆነው በኢትዮጵያ ፊደል የመገልገል ተገቢነት”,

138 Monitoring the 32 years of Addis Ababa Urbanization from Space Lucas Boakye1, Tekleab Gala1,* Department of Geography, Chicago State University, Chicago, IL. USA *Corresponding author: [email protected] Abstract Globally, there is a dramatic shift from rural to urban population, particularly in developing countries. The rapid Addis Ababa urbanization over the last 32 years and its subsequent socio-economic and environmental impacts, are causing massive public uproar and political instability. The objective of our study was to use remotely sensed landsat satellite data to identify and quantify the Land Use and Land Cover (LULC) types, as well as detect and analyze patterns of LULC changes from 1985 to 2017. Maximum Likelihood Algorithm (MLA) of the supervised image classification was used to map LULC types which consisted of Agriculture, Grass/Bare land, Lakes/Ponds, Scrublands, Settlement/Urban areas, Vegetation and Wetlands for 1985, 2003 and 2017 images. Overall accuracies and kappa statistics of the maps ranged between 84% - 87.6% and 95.7% - 94.4%, respectively. Agriculture is the dominant LULC type in the study area, though the compositions of the remaining LULC types have changed since 1985; with the exception of Lakes/Ponds, and Wetlands. Settlement/Urban areas has grown by 546%, which increased at the expenses of agricultural and vegetation areas, exposing farmers to loss of massive farmland and woodlands. Additionally, the changes characterized by the transformation of Agricultural lands into Grass/Bare lands and Scrublands, were evident as the environmental impacts of the urbanization. With one of the world highest fertility rates and massive rural-to-urban migration, Addis Ababa urbanization is unsustainable and likely to continue for the foreseeable future. It is therefore, critical to adapt sustainable urban planning, which involves consideration of Compact City, Secondary Cities, and Edge city designs to mitigate the adverse impacts of the rapid Addis Ababa urbanization.

Keywords: Change Detection, Urban Growth Model, Remote Sensing, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

1. INTRODUCTION According to World’s Urbanization prospect of the United Nations (2018), the shift of human population from rural to urban living is growing rapidly. The urban population jumped from 750 million in 1950, to 4.2 billion people in 2018 (i.e., constituting 55% of the world’s population). The rate is expected to grow to 68% (i.e., 5 billion people) by 2050, and developing countries constitute 90% of this urban population growth. Ethiopia’s accelerated urban population growth is reflective of this phenomenon. According to the Central Statistics Agency, Ethiopia’s urban population is projected to nearly triple from 15.2 million in 2012 to 42.3 million in 2037, growing at about 5.4 percent a year (Bimerew, 2015). Especially, Addis Ababa, the largest city in Ethiopia, is witnessing massive influx of people and urbanization thereof. Principal driving forces of the urbanization are natural growth (birth) rate, redistricting rural towns into cities and rural-to-urban migration (ORAAMP 1999; CSA, 2007; Teller et al., 2011; Bimerew, 2015). Addis Ababa’s birth rate (i.e., 36.5 births/1,000), is relatively high even among the cities of developing countries (CSA, 2007), whereas the merger of many Oromian smaller towns into a city (i.e., gerrymandering) is causing both numerical and spatial expansion of Addis Ababa (Teller et al., 2011). Almost half of Addis Ababa’s population growth is attributed to rural-to-urban migration. The migration is triggered by rural "push" factors

139 consistently higher than the opportunities, services and amenities the city can provide (ORAAMP, 1999; Bimerew, 2015). As a consequence, the phenomenon is exerting immense pressure on the city and resources of the surrounding Oromia regions. For instance, heightened demand of land for residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other uses is causing various environmental issues (Kassa, 2014). Common environmental issues include, but are not limited to, deforestation, expansion of impervious surfaces, erosion and shrinking fertile agricultural lands. Additionally, the phenomenon has caused significant areas of the city to become dominated by crowded and slummy settlements, which suffer from problematic housing; poor portable water, limited electricity supply and sanitation; and rampant environmental pollution, poverty and social unrest (Gumbo, 2010). Moreover, the city itself is unsustainably and unbearably being affected by widespread unemployment, severe shortage of public amenities and reduced transportation services for its residents. Therefore, the main objective of this study was to use archive Remote Sensing (RS) data and geospatial technologies to understand the urbanization of Addis Ababa in the past 32 years. Several studies have deployed remotely sensed data for mapping urban Land Use and Land Cover (LULC) types and changes, to understand sustainable urban growth planning for cities in developing countries (e.g., Mallupattu and Reddy, 2013; Rawat & Kumar, 2015; Hassan et. al., 2015; Cheruto et al, 2016).

2. MATERIALS AND METHODOLOGY 2.1. Study Area: Addis Ababa Addis Ababa, was founded in 1887 and became the capital city of Ethiopia between 1889 and 1891. The city was founded on a land originally recognized by an indigenous name known as “Finfinnee.” Ever since then, the city has evolved into the country’s military, economic and political hub, including the current triplet status. It is the capital city of both the country as well as Oromia regional state. It is also the diplomatic capital of Africa as it hosts the headquarters of the African Union, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and many other continental and international organizations.

Figure 2.1. Shows the study area (Addis Ababa)

140

Addis Ababa is located in the geographic center of the country and also described as the heart of Ethiopia (Figure 2.1). Geographically, it is located on Latitude 9° 01' 29.89" N and Longitude 38° 44' 48.80" E (ERA, 2005; CSA, 2007). According to ERA (2005), topographically, it is located in the foothills of the Entoto Mountains, which stands out 3,000m (9,800 ft) above sea level. The city itself has an average elevation of 2356 meters and occupies 526-kilometer square (203 miles square) land area. Climatically, the annual mean temperature of Addis Ababa ranges between 7°C - 24°c, May being the hottest month while December is the coldest. On average, Addis Ababa receives 1,165mm of rainfall annually, although the precipitation varies considerably from month to month. The main rainy season is June to September, whilst, occasional rain also falls from mid-November to January and from February to May.

2.2: Data Acquisition and Description This study used remotely sensed imageries of 1985, 2003 and 2017 to monitor 32 years of Addis Ababa Urbanization from Space. The imageries taken by a sensor mounted on Landsat thematic mapper (Archive level 1) have 30m * 30m spatial resolution and 185km * 185km swath width. The images are of high quality, and were taken in the period of January to February as this is a clear sky season in the region. The images were acquired from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) after being pre-processed for their systematic and terrain distortions, and geo- rectified and spatially referenced into UTM’s spatially reference system. Detail specifications of the data are tabulated in Table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1: Specifications of Landsat Thematic Mapper TM Images Year Date of Image Sensor Cloud Image Swath Width Spatial Acquisition cover Quality Resolution (mm/dd/yyyy) (%) 1985 01/02/1985 Landsat 4-5 0 9 185km*185km 30mx30m Thematic Mapper (TM) 2003 01/12/2003 Landsat 7 0 9 185km*185km 30mx30m Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus (ETM+) 2017 01/08/2017 Landsat 8 0 9 185km*185km 30mx30m Operational Land Imager (OLI)

3.2: Land Use Land Cover Mapping The image classification was conducted based on the LULC categories developed by Anderson et al. (1976). Accordingly, seven major LULC types were visually identified in Addis Ababa and surrounding Oromia zone for image classification. The identification was

141 accomplished using high resolution historical and current images via Google Earth Pro. The following table specifies the identified LULC types in the study area:

Table 2.2: Specifications of the major LULC types identified in the study area Role LULC Categories Descriptions No. 1 Settlement or Lands modified by human settlement including cities, towns and Urban Areas other infrastructural facilities such as road network. 2 Vegetation Areas Lands dominated by density populated trees and shrubs. 3 Agricultural Lands Lands modified crop cultivation such as teff, corn, maize, beans and other crops. 4 Grass/Barren Lands covered by low vegetation (grasses) or no grasses. It is also Lands land of gravel pits, pavement, soils or other earthen material etc. It is a vast portion of land (infertile) where plant growth may be sparse, stunted and/or contain limited biodiversity. 5 Lakes/Ponds Lands covered with inundated open water areas mainly lagoons, ponds, lakes and reservoirs (dams). 6 Wetlands Lands in transition zones between inundated ponds and surrounding uplands where a hydrologic characteristic produced unique ecosystems. It occurs where the water table is at or near the surface of the land and could either be forested or emergent (non-forest) wetland. 7 Scrublands Lands covered by extremely dispersed trees, bushes or shrubs. It is land areas that are degraded and/or not fertile enough for vegetation growth.

Maximum Likelihood Classifier (MLC) algorithm of the supervised image classification method was applied for producing the LULC maps of the study area. MLC is the commonly used classification algorithm and involves selecting training sites for each LULC classes and developing the probability density function of Digital Number (DN) of each training site. MLC evaluates the brightness values of every pixel on the image and assigns pixels to LULC classes based on their highest likelihood of membership to categories. The probability density function (p) for a training site Wi is given by: 2 ̂ 1 1 (푥−휇̂) 푃 (X|Wi) = 1⁄ ⅇ [− 2 ] (2휋) 2휎̂푖 2 휎̂푖 Where ⅇ = the natural logarithms, x is the brightness values, µ = the estimated mean of the values of the class and 휎 = the estimated standard deviation of the values in the class. For a multispectral image, the n-dimensional density function is given by:

1 1 푇 −1 P(X|Wi) = 푛 ⅇ [ (푥 − 푀푖) 푣 (푥 − 푀푖)] 1⁄ ⋅ 2 푖 (2훱)2|푣푖| 2 −1 Where Vi = the determinant of the covariance matrix, 푣푖 = inverse of the covariance matrix, 푇 (푥 − 푀푖) = the transpose of the vector (푥 − 푀푖) the mean of the vectors (푀푖) and variance matrix (Vi) for training sites of each class. Therefore, the maximum likelihood decision of X is a member of Wi when: 푃(푥|휔푖) ⋅ 푃(푤푖)≥푃(푥|푤푗) ⋅ 푃(푤푗)

142 Where i and j are possible training sites of LULC classes under consideration.

The mapping accuracies of the image classification was performed using stratified random sampling method for 150 randomly selected points in ERDAS Imagine software. It was stratified such that each LULC types has at least 20 randomly selected points for evaluation. The 150 random points were ground truth data referenced from high resolution Google Earth pro for comparison with produced map. Four statistical indices were used to evaluate the accuracies of the map produced: Error matrix, Producer and User accuracies, and Kappa statistics. Error matrix is the ratio of correctly classified pixels to the total number of pixels. Producers accuracy is the proportion that a land cover of an area is as correctly classified as the ones produced on the map. User accuracy is the probability that a land cover mapped corresponds to it on the ground, respectively. Error matrix, Producer and User accuracies are expressed as a percent ranging from 0 – 100%; and 100% signify perfect while lower percentiles mean bad mapping accuracy. On the other hand, The Kappa analysis is used to measure how the accuracy of map is above and beyond the accuracy expected by chance (Cohen, 1960; Congalton, 1991). KAPPA statistics would produce an index ranging from 0 to 1 is computed as:

표푏푠ⅇ푟푣ⅇ푑 푎푐푐푢푟푎푐푦 − 푐ℎ푎푛푐ⅇ 푎𝑔푟ⅇⅇ푚ⅇ푛푡 퐾푎푝푝푎 = 1 − 푐ℎ푎푛푐ⅇ 푎𝑔푟ⅇⅇ푚ⅇ푛푡

Before, the LULC map production, the classified maps were smoothed from noises of ‘salt and pepper’ appearances also known as speckles. Most common smoothing operation, a majority filter (Mather & Koch, 2011) was deployed with 7 X 7 filter window to ‘clean up’ the image and making it visually attractive. Finally, smoothed images were clipped into appropriated sizes the study area.

3.6: Change Detection and Analysis Change detection consisted of making a comparison of change between ‘from’ and ‘to’ class for each pixel over time (i.e., 1985 versus 2003 and 1985 verses 2017 LULC maps). Several change detection methods are available, e.g. image ratioing, image differencing and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) (Bayes, 2012; Rawat et al., 2013; Hussain et al., 2013; Friehat et. al., 2015). In this study, change detection were made using post-classification detection technique in IDRISI Land Change Modeler (LCM) (Friehat et. al., 2015). LCM produces various graphs and maps such as but not limited to cross-tabulation, change from-to map, gains and losses, important for detecting and analyzing LULC changes (Eastman, 2012).

CHAPTER IV: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 4.1: LULC Map of Addis Ababa and Peri-urban Oromia Zone 4.1.1: Historical LULC Types of Addis Ababa and its surrounding Oromia Zone Addis Ababa and its surrounding Oromia zone is stretched over 4,326 km2. And according to the classification result of the 1985 image (See Figure 4.1a & 4.1b), seven LULC types were identified in the region. These are: Agriculture, Grass/Bare land, Lakes/Ponds, Scrublands, Settlement/Urban areas, Vegetation and Wetlands. The dominant LULC type of the area was Agriculture, which stretched over 3,372 km2 (i.e., 77.9%), followed by Vegetation, which occupied 759 km2 (i.e., 17.5%) and Settlement areas was 115 km2 (i.e., 2.7%). The

143 remaining less than 2% of the landscape was covered by Grass/bare lands (i.e., 1.4%), Lakes/Ponds (0.4%), Scrublands (0.06%) and Wetlands (0.02%). Similarly, the classification of Landsat 2003 image of Addis Ababa and surrounding area discovered the same 7 LULC types (See Figure 4.1b). Still the dominant LULC type of the area was Agricultural land, and it was stretched over 3,232 km2 (i.e., 75%) of the study area, which is 40 km2 less than the size in 1985. This was followed by Vegetation areas, which occupied 516 km2 (i.e., 12%), whereas Settlement/Urban areas expanded over 276 km2 (i.e., 6%) of the landscape. Agricultural, Vegetation and Settlement lands combined constituted 93% of the landscape, and the remaining four LULC types covered only 7%. Accordingly, Grass/Bare land covered 5%, while Scrubland covered 2%, Lakes/Ponds (0.34%) and Wetlands (0.04%).

144

Figure 4.1. Classified LULC Map of Addis Ababa and its surrounding Oromia Zone: Left is 1985 and Right is 2003

145 4.1.2: Contemporary LULC Types of Addis Ababa and its surrounding Oromia Zone, 2017. In 2017, Agriculture land is still the dominant LULC type and covers areas which stretch over 2,961 km2 (i.e., 68.40%) (See Figure 4.2), followed by Settlement/Urban areas 743 km2 (i.e., 17.14%) and Vegetation lands 331 km2 (i.e., 7.7%). Vegetation LULC type, which ranked second in 1985 and 2003 classified images, was overtaken by Settlement/Urban areas as an indication of massive urbanization. Agricultural land, Settlement/Urban areas and Vegetation lands constitute 93.24%, whiles the remaining four LULC types covers only 6.76%. Grass/Bare lands covered 185 km2 (i.e., 4.3%) of the study area, Wetlands also covers 1.1 km2 (i.e., 0.03%), Lakes/Ponds occupied 10 km2 (i.e., 0.23%) and finally Scrublands occupied 95 km2 (i.e., 2.20%). The historical and contemporary LULC types inventories have detected and mapped typically heterogeneously complex Ethiopian (Kassawmar et al., 2018; Miheretu, & Yimer, 2018), as well as related East African highlands (Cheruto et al. 2016). For instance, the seven LULC types that are found in the study area are similar to the forested land, Bareland, Grassland, Cropland, Shrubland, and Urban built up areas found by Miheretu and Yimer (2018) on Gelana sub-watershed, Wollo region, North Central Ethiopian highlands. Similarly, it is also consistent with the seven major LU/LC classes i.e., developed areas, agricultural lands, lakes/ponds, forest lands, scrublands grass/bare-land (Cheruto et al., 2016) inventoried on highlands of Makueni County, Kenya, East Africa.

146

Figure 4.2. Classified LULC Map of Addis Ababa and its surrounding Oromia Zone in 2017.

4.2: Validation of LULC Maps Accuracies Table 4.1 summarizes the results of the classification accuracy assessments. Accordingly, there was an overall mapping accuracy of 84.0% and Kappa Statistics of 0.88% for the classification of 1985 image. Similarly, the overall accuracy and Kappa statistics of the 2003 image were 91.77% and 0.89%, respectively, whereas for the 2017 image, they were 95.7% and 0.95%. With overall classification accuracy ranging from 84% to 95.7%, the resulting LULC maps were deemed accurate. Additionally, with the overall Kappa statistics ranging from 0.88% to 0.94%, the agreement between the classified images and actual LULC types on the ground is satisfactory. In general, the progressing increments of the accuracy indices (i.e., from the 1985 to 2017) perhaps indicate uncertainty and challenges associated with constructing historical reference data. The validation results of the LULC maps were comparable with the results of Friehat et al.., (2015).

147 The most accurately classified LULC types are Settlement/Urban areas and Lake/Ponds. Both had the producer and User accuracies of 100%. These mapping accuracies of Urban/Settlement areas may have to do with a unique attention applied in selecting the training sites and classifier-training from this area as it was the main theme of the study. On the other hand, the superior accuracy of Lakes/Ponds could be due to conspicuous spectral absorption of open waterbodies at visible and near infrared regions of electromagnetic spectrum. Agricultural lands and vegetation areas also mapped with superior Users and Producers accuracies (i.e., 84% to 94%), respectively. The accuracy of scrublands, wetlands and bare/grasslands were least (see Table 4.1) indicating of the impact of diversity in these LULC types’ categories and spectral heterogeneity thereof. According to Choodarathnakara et al. (2012), mixed pixels and spectral heterogeneousness would pose challenges to remote sensing data classification for LULC mapping.

Table 4.1. Summary of error matrixes for the classified images of 1985, 2003 and 2017. Year LULC Categories Producer User Kappa Accuracy Accuracy Vegetation 83.3% 93.75% 0.93 Settlement/ 100% 100.0% 1.00 Urban Areas Agriculture 92.0% 88.46% 0.80 Grass/Bare Lands 72.7% 72.73% 0.70 1985 Wetlands 100.0% 70.0% 0.68 Lakes/ 100.0% 100.0% 1.00 Ponds Scrublands 72.73% 80.00% 0.78 Overall accuracy 84.0% Overall KIA 0.88 Vegetation 83.3% 93.75% 0.98 Settlement/ 100% 100.0% 1.00 Urban Areas Agriculture 92.0% 88.46% 0.80 Grass/Bare Lands 72.7% 72.73% 0.70 2003 Wetlands 100.0% 70.0% 0.68 Lakes/ 100.0% 100.0% 1.00 Ponds Scrublands 72.73% 80.00% 0.78 Overall accuracy 91.77% Overall KIA 0.89 Vegetation 83.3% 93.75% 0.93 Settlement/ 100% 100.0% 1.00 Urban Areas 2017 Agriculture 92.0% 88.46% 0.80 Grass/Bare Lands 72.7% 72.73% 0.70 Wetlands 100.0% 70.0% 0.68 Lakes/ 100.0% 100.0% 1.00

148 Ponds Scrublands 72.73% 80.00% 0.68 Overall accuracy 95.7% Overall KIA 0.95

4.3: Change Detection Figure 4.4 shows massive LULC changes from 1985 to 2017. According to this finding, out of the Addis Ababa and Surrounding Oromia zone’s 4326.4 km2 landmass, 1220.7 km2 experienced LULC types changes, in one form of the other. Conversely, LULC change was not detected in 3105.6 km2 of the landscape. In general, 28% of the landscape has changed during the study period, while the remaining 72% has not unchanged.

Figure 4.3. Map of Changed and Unchanged areas during the study period (1985 – 2017)

Table 4.2 shows specific LULC types changes. Accordingly, while Wetlands and Lakes/Ponds have experienced infinitesimal change (i.e., combined less than 0.05% of the change), the remaining LULC types have significantly changed during the study period (1985 – 2017). The largest proportion of the land transformation was due to Settlement/Urban areas,

149 which accounted for 41% of the changed landscape followed by Vegetation areas (i.e., 28%). Changes in Agricultural lands, Grass/Bare lands and Scrublands accounted for 27%, 8% and 6% of the land transformation, respectively. Settlement/Urban areas, Scrublands and Grass/Bare lands experienced gains in the land. Settlement/Urban areas have gained land from 115 km2 in 1985, to 276 km2 in 2003 and 743km2 in 2017, which increased by 140, 169% and 546%, respectively. Additionally, Scrublands and Grass/Bare lands have gained land from 2.4 km2 and 59 km2 in 1985, respectively to 86 km2 and 202 km2 in 2003 and 95 km2 and 185km2 in 2017. The fivefold increase Settlement/Urban area is a typical urban growth rate for developing countries (Habila, 2018, Oyugi et al., 2017; & Hassan et al., 2016). Habila (2018) documented Abuja and metropolitan area growth of 467% over 28 years (i.e., 1988 – 2016), while similarly, Oyugi et al (2017) reported Urban/Settlement area growth of 238% over 22 years (i.e., 1988 – 2010) for Nairobi and its environs. Equally, Hassan et al. (2016), reported a 213% increase of Islamabad, Pakistan in 10 years (i.e., 1992 to 2012), all indicating the similar and relative accelerated urban growth rates in developing countries.

4.4: Change Analysis Between 1985 and 2003 the largest changes (i.e., 175 km2) in LULC types was a conversion of Vegetation areas into Agricultural lands, followed by a conversion of Agriculture lands in return into Grass/Bare lands (i.e., 151 km2) (Figure 4.4). Moreover, Agriculture lands have been converted into Settlement/ Urban areas by 128 km2 and scrublands by 66 km2. Similarly, between 2003 and 2017 Agricultural lands and Vegetation areas continued losing lands to other LULC types. While Vegetation continued losing lands to Agriculture (i.e., 141 km2), it was Agriculture which dominated the conversion by losing lands mainly to Settlement/ Urban areas (i.e., 400 km2) and Grass/ Bare land (i.e., 58 km2). Settlement/Urban areas have also taken lands (i.e., 107 km2) from what had been Vegetation areas in 2003.

150

Table 4.2. LULC Changes that occurred between years 1985, 2003 and 2017. LULC Types 1985 2003 2017 Change in Area (1985 to Change in Area (1985 to Total Area Area Area 2003) 2017) Change Km2 Km2 Km2 Km2 % Km2 % % Vegetation 759 516 331 -243 -32% -428 -56% 28% Settlement/ 115 276 743 161 140% 628 546% 41% Urban Areas Agriculture 3372 3232 2961 -140 -4% -411 -12% 27% Grass/Bare Lands 59 202 185 142 242% 125 214% 8% Wetlands 1.12 1.8 1.1 0.67 61% -0.02 -2% 0% Lakes/Ponds 17.3 12 10 -4.9 -31% -7.2 -42% 0.5% Scrublands 2.4 86 95 83.6 3483% 92.8 3858% 6%

151 ´

Agriculture to Grass/Bare Lands Agriculture to Scrublands 0 6,00012,000 24,000 36,000 48,000 Agriculture to Settlement/ Urban Areas Kilometers Vegetation to Agriculture

Figure 4.4. Spatial distribution and analysis of Major LULC changes a) between 1985 and 2003 and b) between 1985 and 2017

152 4.5. Drivers of LULC change This study found three major drivers of land transformation: urbanization, agriculturalization and environmental degradation. Urbanization is the main driver of the LULC changes in the past 32 years. It is responsible for the conversion of 459 km2 Agricultural as well as 171 km2 Vegetation areas, indicating a clear sign of urban encroachment into surrounding physical environments. The second major driver of the LULC change is agriculturalization. It has taken 275 km2 of Vegetation areas, signifying the activities of displaced farming communities. Farmers displaced by urbanization are cutting trees and clearing lands to place under crop production. Lastly, the third major driver of land transformation is environmental degradation. During the study period, 132 km2 of Agricultural and 70 km2 of Vegetation lands transformed into land showing signs of environmental degradation and/or perhaps fallow lands left for recuperating its degraded fertility. Several studies have also demonstrated similar impacts of urbanizations, particularly on Agriculture and Vegetation areas (Habila, 2018, Friehat et. al., 2015; Prakasam, 2010). For instance, in an effort to monitor LULC changes of Abuja, Habila (2018) showed the conversion of Agricultural lands into Urban built-up areas and Degraded lands. Similarly, through 40 years LULC change studies of Kodaikanal Taluk, India, Prakasam (2010) detected a transformation of vast Agricultural lands into built-up areas. Moreover, with a twenty-five year (1985 – 2010) observation of LULC changes in northeastern Illinois, Friehat et al. (2015) found loss of Agricultural lands to Chicago urban growth; all indicating deleterious impact of urbanization on agricultural land use.

4.6. The economic, Social and Environmental Implications of Addis Ababa Urbanizations Addis Ababa city and its surrounding Oromia zone are experiencing rapid urbanization, which involves massive construction activities (Young, 2014). The city is facing extraordinary pressure to meet rapidly growing demands for housing and infrastructure, which have caused various environmental problems. For the construction, the city is acquiring materials such as aggregates, gravels, sands, concrete and clays by mining the landscape and leaving behind environmentally degraded excavated lands, pits and quarries. These are huge scars on the environment causing devalued aesthetic, loss of biodiversity, change in natural topography and drainage (Tarekegn & Gulilat, 2018). Emission and aerosols from construction and mining sites are also responsible for air pollutions and some respiratory diseases. According to Tarekegn & Gulilat (2018), in 2017 fiscal year alone, more than 800,000 Addis Ababa residents were stricken by respiratory diseases from the air pollution. In addition, increasingly expanding impervious surfaces associated with urbanization is causing various flood hazards. Impervious surfaces reduce percolation (infiltration) and increase the surface run off (i.e., reducing run-offs concentration time to affect the frequency as well as intensity flooding). According to Birhanu et al., (2016), there is a 10% to 25% increase in peak flow of the rivers in Akaki catchment. The increased flooding from peak flow is causing the erosion of unsealed roads and embankments, overflow, sedimentation and clogging of sewerage systems, and disruptions to energy and other utility supplies. Moreover, encroachment into agricultural lands is undermining the productivity and food security of the farmers surrounding the city (Derara, 2016). Farmers of surrounding Oromia zone are known for producing surplus agricultural products to feed the city in particular and the country in general. According to the household food security assessment conducted (Derara, 2016), for the farmers in Becho Woreda, surrounding Oromia zone, found that 38% of

153 households are now experiencing food insecurity due to shortage of farmland, lack of grazing land and poor soil fertility. Furthermore, unplanned urbanization is guilty of widespread peri-urban slums. These slum houses are often built on riverbanks, risking flood hazards and exposure to shortage of reliable and secure potable water, sanitation and waste management services. According to Bimerew (2015), the slum population in Addis Ababa suffers from various community health issues such as, but not limited to, Tyhoid, Diarrhea, Cholera, and other parasitic diseases. In August 2016, a cholera (Acute Watery Diarrhea (AWD)) outbreak was reported in Ethiopia, the majority of the cases were reported in this communities of the capital, Addis Ababa. Last but not list, the rapid growth of Addis Ababa city is blameworthy of de- indigenization process in central Ethiopian highland. The Oromo people of Ethiopia, the indigenous population of the highland, is increasingly being pushed further away as the city grows. This phenomenon has caused social instability and recently brought widespread civil unrest and violence. According to the 2016report of Amnesty international, protests reverberated hundreds of towns across Oromia, Ethiopia largest region, in 2015. The protest was in response to a master plan that aimed at the de-Oromization of the region. It was also aggravated by resentment built from an already existing stark rural-urban inequality, acute competition over land, land grab, evictions and the social exclusion of Oromos over years (Fleischman and Peck, 2015).

4.7: Policy Recommendations In a country where 82% of the employers are the government, the status of Addis Ababa will continue to draw people from all throughout the country. Additionally, 80% of the country’s population lives in the rural area, and the relative economic opportunities of the city will likely attract considerable rural-urban migration in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the ongoing and anticipated rapid urbanization calls for the following recommendations: sustainable urban planning, Secondary Cities, Compact City, and Edge City.

4.7.1. Sustainable urban planning: Urban planning is a process of the design and development of urban land uses; such as residential aria, business (commercial) districts, industrial zones, open space and recreational, and institutional and public building. Conversely, sustainable urban planning is concerned with the planning exercised without compromising intergenerational equity of resource distribution. Sustainable urban planning defuses burdens on public infrastructure and utility facilities, and advances access to services, activities, and public spaces, and suppresses stresses on the ecosystem. Hence, it is critical for Addis Ababa to adapt an urbanization process that will curb risks of environmental and resource deteriorations identified in this study.

4.7.2. Secondary cities (sub-national city): In the urban hierarchy, secondary cities are cities that follow after primate city, which is disproportionately the largest city in the country. Addis Ababa is a primate city, as it is a leading city with a population of nearly 5 million, while the second populous city is Dire Dawa that inhabit 0.5 million people. Secondary cities have various values, especially in developing countries where primate cities are experiencing massive movement of rural-to-urban population migration. Secondary cities host localized production (i.e., manufacturing of agricultural produces), deliver service and facilities and connect rural and urban areas (i.e., intermediary

154 city), thereby providing employment and economic opportunities for the local population. According to world population review (2019), there are nine second tier cities in Ethiopia (i.e., Dire Dawa, Mek'ele, Nazret, Bahir Dar, Gondar, Dese, Hawassa, Jimma and Bishoftu) with population range from 100, 000 to 0.5million. These cities are mostly sub-national cities (i.e., capital of regional states) or charter cities (e.g., Dire Dawa), which if revitalized would diffuse pressure on Addis Ababa’s untenable urbanization process.

4.7.3. Compact City In this study, myriad environmental and social deteriorations in the surrounding Oromia zone were blamed on reckless and rapid horizontal expansion of Addis Ababa. Hence, Addis Ababa planning needs to consider a compact city design and development. The compact city design emphasizes efficiency through development of a high density and transit-oriented urban land uses. This city layout would also enhance the city municipal’s ability of conducting infrastructural development and provision of services (e.g., health, education, etc.) and utility supplies (e.g., electricity, water supplies, sanitation, etc.). Given the financial and resource limitations facing the city, it is critical for Addis Ababa to consider the compact city design for its efficiencies.

4.7.4 Edge cities Edge cities are located in the peripheries of a major city. They often consist of their own commercial, residential and work centers, which stand as functionally independent urban center. Edge cities are becoming a preferred destination for headquarters of world-renowned companies due to relatively cheap land values and public safety. Additionally, the relative larger spaces of living, higher green space to building ratio and high quality of life have made edge cities a magnet for affluent residences. The Oromia zone has various towns surrounding the city of Addis Ababa, which can be developed into edge cities. Hence, the urban planning of Addis Ababa and surrounding Oromia zone have to work hand-in-hand to developing these towns into edge cities and dispel the pressure on Addis Ababa.

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157 World Population Prospects (2019 Revision) - United Nations population estimates and projections. Available online: http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ethiopia- population/

158

Borana Women’s Indigenous Social Network, Marro: Building Household Food Security Abiyot Eliyas Anbacha, PhD and Professor Darley Kjosavick, PhD Norwegian University of Life Sciences [email protected]

159 Borana Women’s Indigenous Social Network, Marro: Building Household Food Security

Pastoralist societies, including that of the Borana, are known for their strong social networks, which perform functions related to their members’ livelihood. This paper explores the role of marro, a women’s social security network, in accessing resources to overcome household food insecurity in Borana, southern Ethiopia. As members of communities living with various uncertainties, pastoralists engage in different types of informal social support institutions for survival (Dahl, 1979). A few of the many networks are Rendille, the age-based resource distribution network in north Kenya (Sato, 1997); Mutual Help of Maasai of Tanzania (Gray & Mueller, 2012); the Stock Friend network of Turkana (Vries et al., 2006); and Kinship Support busagonfa of Borana (Tache & Sjaastad, 2008). These networks are used to overcome household food shortage, alleviate food insecurity, smooth consumption, and meet other basic needs (Aktipis et al., 2011; Kazianga & Udry, 2006; Stavropoulou et al., 2016). The food sharing culture among pastoralist women in particular is primarly in place to overcome household food shortage (Stavropoulou et al., 2016). In addition, women’s networks increase access to resources (Khalif, 2010). These social networks determine the degree to which communities can reduce vulnerabilities such as household food shortage, and increase opportunity for their members (Moser 1998). Despite the significance of social security networks, they remain largely invisible in policies and programs focused on building food security and reducing poverty (Agrawal et al., 2009). This is in part due to limited availability of research on the role of these networks. Further, it is impossible to understand these systems in isolation from cultural contexts which demonstrate the daily experiences of women and men in building household food security in their communities. Better understanding of the networks enables the creation of structured programs on the basis of local understanding, which in turn builds trust and meets the needs and priorities of women and men. This makes the networks evolve and grow, thus strengthening the community (Moser 1998). Borana people are well-known pastoralists belonging to the Oromo ethnic group, living largely in southern Ethiopia, as well as in northern Kenya. They speak Afan Oromo, a language belonging to Cushitic family. Borana people’s culture is constructed around complex social networks that help the Borana people to share available resources, ensuring survival during hard times (Tache & Sjaastad, 2008). Some of these networks are gender-specific, exclusively for women. Marro is one of these networks, as men have no direct access to it. By focusing on Borana women’s social network, this study aims to fill the existing knowledge gap on the role of social networks in building household food security in this community. The study was conducted in two communities with different production systems: pastoral and agro-pastoral. The purpose of this research was to investigate the nature of marro, the types of resources shared, and the role of shared resources in ensuring household food security. In this study, data were collected across both communities via individual and group interviews, focus group discussions, and field observations. Results revealed that marro involves a network in which all women participate, regardless of differences in production system, age, or economic status. Within the institution of marro, women share different resources to overcome household shortages. Marro is empowering women through a culture of sharing. It is supported by the Oromo saying ‘ollaa fi duddaan dhaabbatu,’ meaning your neighbors and your backbone make you stand up straight. The women in the study area utilize marro in different ways, but not having a marro is considered an insult. All women have marro, but their participation differs. The majority of women use marro occasionally when the need arises, while a significant number of poor and older women depend on it for daily survival.

160 I am an old woman and I cannot go to market to collect firewood and fodder. You see this boy [indicating a small boy sitting on her lap]? I am taking care of him. He is my neighbour’s son and his mother went to the market. She will come with sugar and salt. This is how we live in Borana. My marro young women are helping me to providing things I need, and I also help them in taking care of kids, cleaning the house, and providing tea when they come back from outside. (An old woman from an agro-pastoralist community)

I am a very poor woman and I do not have cattle. I provide labour for my neighbours, in exchange for which I get the items needed for my household daily. I depend on this relation regularly. (A poor young woman)

Group discussions revealed that although poor women are more dependent on marro, they usually have less expansive marro than rich women. In Borana, having expansive marro is a sign of respect, while not having marro is a disgrace. Therefore, every woman wants to have strong and expansive marro. The discussants further explained that women in rich households build strong and expansive marro by investing more resources in the relation. Those who invest more will in turn get more support in times of their need. The discussants strongly emphasized that investment is vital for the smooth functioning of marro, noting that a lack of resources would make marro inactive and dormant. This is similar to findings from a previous study in Kenya (Oba, 2001). One of the discussants described how her economic situation negatively affected her marro:

I had wide marro in the past; however, a drought in 2011 that killed my cattle limited my participation in marro. Household poverty prevented me from investing in my marro. Since then, most of the time I only receive resources rather than giving to my marro women, which further reduces my relation. I have already lost some of my previous marro women. (A poor middle-aged woman pastoralist)

While economic status is vital for marro, generosity (toltuu) is the other important asset determines the expansiveness of a woman’s marro. The proportion of a woman’s marro is determined by her economic status combined with her generosity. This means that a rich but hamtuu woman (someone who does not want to share her resources with others), has limited marro. Marro is established at different levels between neighbouring households as well as between distant households, in separate locations, that are engaged in different production systems. The latter demonstrates marro as a bridging relation, established between distant households with different livelihood systems, to mobilize and share resources between different locations in order to ensure survival. The former resembles the bonding nature of a social security network used to mobilize resources between neighbours in a village. The aforementioned saying, ‘olla fi dudan dhabatu,’ indicates the importance of villagers and neighbours in the life the society. This system of marro enables households to access resources available within their own communities to meet household needs, particularly food requirements for survival. Bonding marro provides households in crisis with immediate and regular support as indicated in the qualitative information. In marro, women share various types of resources which can be categorized as food items, labour, and cash. Food items are the most frequently shared resources in marro to overcome household food shortages. With increases in droughts that have caused the death of Borana cattle, many men have lost their position as breadwinners, shifting to women the

161 responsibility of ensuring food for the family. Women engage in different activities for providing food for their family (Anbacha & Kjosavick, 2019). In the same way, through marro women share food items such as grains, beans, tealeaves, sugar, salts, milk, meat, bones, yoghurt, oil, and others to ensure survival. Although women share food items in normal circumstances, sharing increases during crises. Borana women share not only from their surpluses but also during shortages. In Borana culture, if food is available in one household, the people in the next household will not have empty stomachs. Without being asked, the women in the household feel responsibility and share with their neighbours. Through this system, women in households experiencing food shortage can access the food that they need. Similarly, if a woman has a visitor but she does not have food to give the guest, she sends a messenger (ergamtuu), usually a child, to her marro woman, to request sugar, tealeaves, or any other foodstuff she needs for her guest. The marro woman gives what she has, not only from her surplus but also from limited resources. She does this both to help the woman and to maintain a positive image in the eyes of the visitor. Labour is the second commonly shared resource in marro relations. Labour sharing increases during childbirth, hut making, child naming, and different ceremonies and crises. In the Borana culture, after giving birth a woman is entitled to rest for seven weeks (49 days). During this period, she is not allowed to exert herself in any activity including food preparation, taking care of children, going to the market, collecting firewood, fetching water, washing clothes, or other chores. This applies to all women irrespective of economic status, age, and presence or absence of someone to help her in the household. If she has someone such as a mother-in-law or other women relatives, the burden on her marro decreases; otherwise, her marro women are responsible for all of her household activities. Women also highly depend on the culture of labour-sharing when making their hut. In hut-making, some go to forest, others bring grass, and others prepare mud. Currently in Borana, many are sending their children to school which reduces the amount of labour available within the household. In this case, labour- sharing among the women contributes significantly to overcome the labour shortage. Borana women also share cash in their marro. Although cash was not part of the resources shared in early times, following the current livelihood transformation that increases women’s access to cash, women started to share cash in marro. The commoditization of milk and milk products and the engagement of women in petty trades have increased women’s access to cash (Anbacha & Kjosavick, 2019). This provided an opportunity for marro to use cash as a resource to be shared. Cash in marro is shared both as gifts and as interest-free loans. Further, if a woman has borrowed money but cannot pay her loan back for genuine reasons due to hardship, she will get debt relief from her marro. In general, resources shared in marro directly or indirectly contribute to the improvement of household food security. According to the discussants, the primary objective of sharing resources in both bonding and bridging forms of marro is to overcome household food shortages. The shared resources, particularly food items, are never sold or changed to other forms, but are made available with the aim of increasing food availability for distressed households. Although the role of marro relations was not originally in place simply to overcome food shortage, today Borana women are applying it to tackle the food problems and ensure survival. However, increases in drought frequency and other calamities are decreasing the availability of resources shared in marro. Similarly, the low attention given to social networks, particularly that of women in the area, limits the roles these network plays in ensuring survival. In order to improve the performances of marro, we recommend: • Improving women’s access to resources, such as provision of credit and other important resources • Increasing attention given to such networks when designing development programs and projects

162 • Reducing the impacts of droughts and other calamities that hinder availability of resources shared in marro Marro serves as the glue holding women together for mutual empowerment, and deserves greater recognition. Marro is an excellent example of ways community members can relate to each other. It reinforces collective responsibility, mutual caring, and mutual responsibility to come out of crises. These values are missing in today’s world of individualism, where many exploit each other for individual benefit. If used to its full potential, this network of mutuality will be essential in holding us together, not only for survival, but also for nation-building.

163 References Anbacha and Kjosavick (2019), The dynamics of gender relations under recurrent drought conditions, a case study of Borana pastoralists in southern Ethiopia.Hum Ecol47, 435- 47. Agrawal, Arun, Kononen, Minna, and Perrin, Nicolas (2009), 'The Role of Local Institutions in Adaptation to Climate Change ', (paper No. 118: Social development working papers ). Aktipis, C. Athena, Cronk, Lee, and Aguiar, Rolando de (2011), 'Risk-Pooling and Herd Survival: An Agent-Based Model of a Maasai Gift-Giving System', Hum Ecol 39, 131- 40. Dahl, Gudrun (1979), Suffering Grass: Subsistence and Society of Waso Borana (Stockholm: Department o f Social Anthropology, U n iv e rs ity of Stockholm). Gray, Clark and Mueller, Valerie (2012), 'Drought and Population Mobility in Rural Ethiopia', World Development 40 (1), 134–45. Kazianga, Harounan and Udry, Christopher (2006), 'Consumption smoothing? Livestock, insurance and drought in rural Burkina Faso', Journal of Development Economics, 79 (2), 413-46. Khalif, Zeinabu Kabale (2010), 'Pastoral Transformation: Shifta-war, Livelihood, and Gender Perspectives among the Waso Borana in Northern Kenya', (Norwegian University of Life Sciences). Moser, Caroline (1998), 'The asset vulnerability framework: Reassessing urban poverty reduction strategies', World Development, 26 (1), 1-19. Sato, Shun (1984), 'The Rendille Subsistence Groups Based on Age-system', African Study Monographs, Supplementary Issue, 3, 45-57. Stavropoulou, Maria, Holmes, Rebecca, and Jones, Nicola (2016), 'Harnessing informal institutions to strengthen social protection for the rural poor', Global Food Security. Tache, Boku and Sjaastad, Espen (2008), 'Mutual Assistance and Poverty Reduction among Borana Oromo: The Institution of Buusaa Gonofaa', (Norwegian University of Life Sciences). Vries, Danny, Leslie, Paul W., and McCabe, J.Terrence (2006), 'Livestock Acquisitions Dynamics in Nomadic Pastoralist Herd Demography: A Case Study Among Ngisonyoka Herders of South Turkana, Kenya', Human Ecology 34 (1), 1-25.

164 QAACCESSA MAMMAAKSOTA OLAANTUMMAA DHIIRAA IBSAN: GODINA HORROO GUDURUU WALLAGGAA, AANAA GUDURUU IRRATTI KAN XIYYEEFFATE

QORATTOONNI: ALIIMAA JIBRIIL HUSEEN (PhD)

fi

GARRAMAA YAADATAA BULTOO

165

Qabiyyee Dhiheessaa

• Seensa

• Seenduubee

• Ka’umsa qorannichaa

• Kaayyoolee qorannichaa

• Malleen qorannichaa

• Qaaccessa qorannichaa

• Argannoo

166 1.1 Seensa

Uummanni Oromoo uummata saba guddaa aadaafi seenaa isaatiin beekamudha. Seenaa uummanni kun ittiin beekamu keessaa tokko bulchiinsa dimokiraasii kan ta’e sirna Gadaadha. Yeroo sirna Gadaan bulaa turetti seenaa, duudhaafi amantii ofiitiin jiraataa ture. Sirni Gadaa hundee seenaa, dinagdee, siyaasaafi amantaa Oromooti jechuun eera (Asmarom, 1973). Dhiibbaawwan kallattii adda addaatiin uummata kanaafi aadaa isaarratti taasifamaa tureen aadaafi duudhaan sun laafaa dhufeera (Dirribii, 2012, f. 108)

Sirni Gadaa dhiiraafi dubara utubaa (pillars) lamarratti hundaa’uun ibsa: Protection and reproduction are foundational bases to gadaa parallel to which female and male arrangement, assignation and organization take place (Gemetchu, 1998). Male is bestowed for protection & female represents reproduction (Ginbar, 2016).

• Dubartoota akka fakkeenyaatti ka’an:

1. Seenaa Haadha Salgan Booranaa: (Matcha-Tulama Account)…

2. Seenaa dubartii Karrayyuu

3. Seenaa Qaallittii Dalloo/ Aayyoo (of Arsi)

4. Dagatte (Haadha Abishee Garbaa of Horroo Guduruu Wollaggaa)

5. Waaqee of Jimmaa Gibee Oromoo Gadaa (Gadaa Hullee)

6. The Legendary Woman, Akkoo Manooyyee (Gujii, Booranaa, Arsii, Karrayu) (Ginbar, 2017)

Afoolli haala jiruufi jireenya darbee kan ibsu daawwitii seenaa, qaroominaafi guddinaa kan ittiin xiinxallu, gara fuula duraatti kan dhufu kan ittiin tilmaamnu hambaa afaan saba tokkooti, (Abarraan, 1999fi Wasanee, 2007). Afoolli seenaa, aadaafi duudhaa hawaasa tokkoo ibsuuf humna guddaa waan qabuuf, qorachuun tursiisuun daran barbaachisaadha.

Akaakuu afoolaa keessaa tokko mammaaksi koobaa dubbiiti. Mammaaksi fakkaattii dubbii dhiyeessuudhaan ergaa bal’ateefi dheerate dabarsuuf kan fayyadu, hambaawwan aadaa Oromoo

167 keessaa tokko (Wasanee, 2007, f.7). Kanaaf, Oromoon mammaaksaan ilaalcha, amantaa, bu’aa ba’ii jireenyaa, gaddaafi gammachuu, aadaafi duudhaa isaa dhalootaa dhalootatti dabarsa.

➢ Akkasumas, Oromoon ilaalchaafi amantaa dhimma korniyaarratti qabus mammaaksaan ibsata.

➢ Kunis garaagarummaafi walitti dhufeenyaa dhiraafi dubaraa, olaantummaa dhiiraafi gadaantummaa dubaraa tokko tokkoon yoo qorataman mammaaksi waa’ee koorniyaa waan jedhan qaba.

➢ Haaluma kanaan, qaaccessa qabiyyee mammaaksa Oromoo olaantummaa dhiiraa ibsan Godina Horroo Guduruu Wallaggaa, Aanaa Guduruutti xiyyeeffachuun qorannoo gaggeessinee jirra.

1.2 Ka’umsa Qorannichaa Uummanni Oromoo saboota bara dheeraaf gaanfa Afrikaa keessa jiraachaa jiran keessaa tokkodha. Uummanni kun duula garbummaa kallattii adda addaatiin itti duulame keessa darbee har’a gahuun eenyummaa isaaf bu’uura kan ta’e afoola ta’uun isaa kan waakkatamu miti. Waggoota hedduuf garuu cunqursaa alagaa jalatti kufuun afaan isaa, eenyummaa, aadaa, amantiifi sirna bulchiinsa isaa irratti dhiibbaan gaggeeffamaa tureera. Kanarraan kan ka’e aadaafi eenyumman saba Oromoo baay’een dagatamaa dhufaniiru.

Mammaaksi Oromoo qoratamee akka dhaloonni irraa barachuu danda’utti kaa’uun barbaachisaadha. Keessumaa, maammaksonni aadaa hojii jajjabeessan, guddina ogummaa harkaarratti dhiibbaa qaban, safuu barsiisan, obsa mul’isan, cimina dubartootaarratti xiyyeeffatan, gadaantummaa dubartootaarratti maammaakaman, hamilee dubartootaa miidhan irratti kan dalagaman xiyyeeffannoo argachuu qabu.

1.3 Kaayyoolee Qorannichaa Qorannichi kaayyoolee asiin gadii irratti xiyyeeffata:

➢ Mammaaksota Oromoo olaantummaa dhiiraa ibsan tarreessuu.

➢ Qabiyyee mammaaksa Oromoo olaantummaa dhiiraa ibsan xiinxaluu (qaaccessuu).

168 ➢ Mammaaksota Oromoo olaantummaa dhiiraa ibsan qaaccessuun bu’aafi miidhaa isaan qaban adda baasuu.

1.4 Malleen Qorannichaa

Malli qorannoo kanaa qorannoo akkamtaa yoo ta’u ragaaleen iddattoo irraa argaman qaacceessuuf gosa ibsaa gargaaramuunidha. Sababani isaas odeseffannoo argame gadifageenyaan ibsuuf gosti qorannoo ibsaa filatamaa waan ta’eef.

Maddi ragaalee qorannichaa qaama dhimmi isaa ilaallaturraa kallattiidhaan funannachuun kan argamedha. Kunis manguddootaafi namoota aadaafi seenaa uummatichaa beekaniifi hojjettoota Waajjira Aadaafi Turiizimii Aanaa Guduruu irraa ragaaleen bifa barreeffamaatiin argaman kanneen akka kitaabilee, baruuleefi waraqaa qorannoo sakatta’uun raawwatamee jira.

1.4.1 Mala Iddattoofi Iddatteessuu Akaakuu iddatteessuu jiran keessaa, iddatteessuu miti-carraatti dhimma bahame jira. Sababni isaas ragaalee qorannoo kanaaf fayyadan kan argaman namoota nuti kaayyeffannee akka iddattootti filannerraadha. Haaluma kanaan, gosoota iddatteessuu miti-carraa keessaa iddatteessuu akkayyoofi darbaa dabarsaatti fayyadamneerra.

1.4.2 Meeshaalee Funaansa Ragaalee Ragaalee qoranichaaf barbaachisan funaanuudhaaf meeshalee funaansa ragaalee jiran keessaa afgaaffii, marii gareefi sakaata’a dookimentii fa’i.

Walumaagalatti, ragaalee kunneen gulaaluun, qabiyyee isaaniin qoqqooduuniifi yaadolee walsiman walitti fiduun qaacceffamaniiru.

1.5 Qaaccessa Ragaalee Ragaaleen madda garaagaraa irraa guuraman akka asiin gadiitti qaacceffamaniiru.

“Abbaan manaa utubaa manaati”

Xiyyeeffannoon mammaaksa kanaa oggansa dhiirotaa jajjabeessuu…

169 ➢ gaggeessuummaa dhiiraa olkaasuun akka isaan milkaa’aniif jajjabeessuu

➢ oggansa dubartootaa immoo qeequun dhiibbaa geessisuu

➢ Garuu, dubartoonni maatii keessattis ta’e oggansa keessatti akkasumas, qabeenya to’achuu irratti gahumsa akka qabanidha.

➢ Mammaaksonni akka kanaa immoo yeroo dheeraaf dubartoota irratti miidhaa geessisaa turaniiru.

➢ Hamma biiftuun lixutti deemi, hamma abbeen

➢ jirutti booni.

➢ Mammaaksi ta’e jedhamee warreen dhiirota olkaasuuf, dubartoota immoo gadi qabuuf kan mammaakamedha malee …

➢ Dubbartoonni daa’immaan guddisuuf cimina kan qabaniifi, garaa laafina kan qaban ta’uun ibsama.

➢ Yaada kana kan deeggaru mammaaksi “Haadhaafi gabaa irraa waa hindhaban” jedhu

➢ haati daa’imman isheef ofwareegdee guddisuu akka dandeessu ibsa.

➢ Niitiin dhirsi mana hinjirre du’a gahii fardaa dhaqxi.

➢ Dhugaa jiru waliin yoo ilaalamu dubartoonni hundi akka yaada mammaaksa kanaa miti.

➢ Kanaafuu, mammaaksi kun hawaasichi haalaafi ta’ii yeroo sanatti ta’u irratti hundaa’uun kan yaada isaanii ittiin ibsatan ta’uu nama hubachiisa.

➢ Mammaaksota gootummaa dhiirotaa faarsan:

➢ Garaa dhiiraa hinbeektu galaa dhiiraa nyaatti.

➢ Dhiira garaatu boo’a.

➢ Dhiirri goota malee dhoota hinqabdu.

➢ Haadha dhiiraafi midhaan beekanii irraa goru.

170 ➢ Dhiirrii dhirsa hinqabu kan liqeesseef malee.

➢ Karaan dhiiraafi qeerransaa qaxxaamura.

➢ Walumaagalatti, mammaaksonni olitti eeraman gootummaa dhiiraa ibsuun, dhiirota daangaa biyyaa eegsisuufi adamoo bineensotaatti ergaa kan tureefi xiiqiidhaan roorroo alagaa maatiifi biyya isaa irraa akka ittisuuf gahee guddaa kan taphate yoo ta’u …

➢ dubartoota immoo gootummaa akka hinqabneetti...

➢ dhiirotaaf carraa jajjabinaafi jagnummaa

➢ dubartootaaf garuu hirmaanna isaan qaban akka xiqqaatuuf dhiibbaa godheera.

➢ Mammaaksota Olaantummaa dhiiraa ibsan:

➢ Dhiirriifi Leenci yeroo galan (dhufan) hinbeekan

➢ Gabaabbatuyyuu abbaa warraatu garaarraa taa’a.

➢ Qal’attuyyuu dhiirri keessi migira (sibiila)

➢ Dhiirriifi sibiilli qal’oo hinqabdu

➢ mammaaksonni kunneen olaantummaa dhiiraa ibsuun dhiirotaaf carraa milkaa’inaa kan uumaa turan,

➢ dubartoota irratti olaantummaa akka qabaataniif karaa kan baneef,

➢ dubartootaa garuu akka gadaantummaatti kan ilaalu,

➢ yaada dhiiraa qofaarratti hundaa’anii akka socho’aniitti kan ibsu yookaan ofitti amananii waa murteessuu akka hindandeenyeetti kan kaa’udha.

➢ Kunis dhiibbaa yeroo dheeraa dubartootarra hawaasaan gahaa ture ta’uu nama hubachiisa.

➢ Qabiyyee Mammaaksota Oromoo Dubartoota Ceepha’anii

➢ Dhiiraaf qotiyyoo; durbaaf boojjitoo.

171 ➢ Dubartiin Beekaa Deessi Malee Beektuu Hinqabdu

➢ Dubartiin jaartummaa malee jaarsummaa hinbeektu

➢ Mootummaan dubartii gorroo olitti

➢ Mootummaan dubartii karra cufaa oolcha halkan banaa bulcha

➢ Mammaaksonni dubartoota ceepha’an kun dubartoonni ofitti amananii akka hinhoogganne,

➢ qabeenya isaanii hinto’anne,

➢ misomaa irratti hinhirmaanne gochaa kan turanidha.

➢ Haata’u malee, dhiibbaa yeroo sana dubartootarra tureen kan dhufedha.

1.6 Argannoo Mammaaksota qaacceffaman keessatti:

• Ilaalcha hawaasaa ture keessatti dhiirri beekaa, jagna, gaachana maatiifi ogganaa cimaa sammuu cimaa qaban akka ta’anitti ilaalamuu;

• Dubartoonni immoo faallaa kanaan ilaalamuu isaanii;

• Ilaalchi turan kunneen milkaa’ina dubartootaa irratti dhiibbaa geessisaa turuu isaanii;

• Kun immoo guddina dinagdee, hawaasummaafi kkf irratti dhiibaa geessisaa turuun bira ga’ameera.

172

173 Using Oromo Folk Institutions for Women Empowerment

Abebu Oljira Gemeda and Dereje Fufa Bidu (Ph.D) Department of Oromoo Folklore and Literature, Jimma University e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

ABSTRACT The largest proportion of African women live in rural indigenous communities. Therefore, empowering them at the grassroots level would be fruitful. The exploration of their culture is vital as a means to empower them. Oromoo culture exhibits elements that encompass gender equality and powerful women’s institutions: Addooyyee/hiriyyee, siiqqee, cibiree, and others. The institutions have built-in values and belief systems that help with the actualization of women's empowerment and equality. Though colonialism and modernization weaken Oromoo women's institutions in many localities, they are resourceful establishments to revitalize and empower women at grassroots. The study recommends the exploration of similar institutions in various African cultures to learn from and bring about gender equality from the grassroots. Important terms: gender, gender balance, empowerment, human rights, indigenous institutions, liminality, Oromoo, Gadaa, siiqqee, ateetee, addooyyee, ingiccaa, cibiree, etc.

INTRODUCTION Gender equality became a sensitive development issue after the 1995 conference in Beijing. Women immensely contribute to development. However, reproduction and associated health issues restrain their engagements. Diebolt and Perrin (2014) argue that the gender gap indexes (GGI) and human development indexes (HDI) are positively related, while GGI and total fertility rate indexes (TFRI) are inversely related. Gender inequalities and a large fertility rate characterize weaker economies, like Ethiopia. These result in cultures’ constructions of women images, defining their roles, limiting their rights, and accesses to powers and development benefits. The imbalance between men and women is witnessed in their accesses and rights to power and opportunities; both sexes variably benefit from resources and opportunities.

Accordingly, gender studies have become a sought-after topic in scholarship and social actions, especially in developing countries. However, problems and solutions can vary depending on cultures; they justify perceptions about natural provisions, image constructions, and access. Aneesa Kassam and Alemayehu Diro (2006) and World Vision (WV) Kenya (2004/5) have reported the importance of understanding peoples’ traditions to succeed in fending off female genital mutilation. This article aims to describe Oromoo women’s institutions and to illuminate their roles to empower women. The institutions are equipped with values, adjunct, and mechanisms to help in empowering. It tries to excavate the values enshrined in the institutions to protect and defend women and the ways they capacitate them. The institutions are believed to maintain the networks and enforce the implementations to cover all in their own ways. The deep-routed values preserve rights and devise ways to make the network operate to ascertain equity and equality.

174 In gender studies, Africa in general and Oromoo, in particular, are severely criticized. Debsu (2009) contends, “women constitute … ‘the most marginalized of the marginalized’ … and experience unfair treatment.” Similarly, UN (2006), Research Directorate of Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2011), Ethiopian Society of Population Studies (2008), and various NGOs claim that Ethiopian women face serious problems. These and other organizations constitute frameworks and legal documents, organize bodies, outline aims and plans, budget funds, and make efforts to bring relief to women and improve their lives. They do action researches, write reports and document to produce experiences, define terminologies, and hold conferences. However, changes are scanty (Pathfinder International 2010, WV 2004/5). The failure may begin at planning in ignoring indigenous cultures (CARE Ethiopia 2011 – 2016, Oxfam Ethiopia 2012-13 reports) to blame them at the end (CARE East & Central Africa 2006 report, p. 5). ACORD Ethiopia and DCA (2017: 1) argue women make 50% of Ethiopia’s population, but “long-established cultural, economic, and institutional constraints” hamper their roles and contributions in development, and deny them decision-making power. The report presents Boorana women as traditionally dominated, excluded from Gadaa, severely exposed, and adversely affected in all aspects. It is as such that indigenous cultures, their values, and structures are depicted by various international organizations.

A culture can be judged by the opportunities it provides or denies to its citizens. We must basically evaluate the partiality or fairness reflected in its values between members or groups of the citizenry. To study the freedom groups enjoy or the suppressions they suffer, we focus on members to examine. We can focus on the commonly marginalized groups: women, children, adoptees, captives, the elderly, disabled people, etc. or social occasions reflecting disparity. Cultural practices can have reasons to understand to find alternative mechanisms. Female genital mutilation in Oromoo and other people in Kenya involves elders to realize existing problems and analyses replacement. The ritual processes are used to teach girls social and family responsibilities to prevent illnesses such as HIV/AIDS, which is endemic to the region. This has to be encouraged, as Østebø (2009) argues, “Efforts to strengthen human rights should be done with great cultural sensitivity and with an aim to both reveal and incorporate “traditional” notions of human rights into the discourse.”

Kumsa (1997) argues that Gadaa excludes women from politico-military structures. Women are married in the Gadaa grade as sources of life and they’re generally considered ‘innocent and peace- loving’. They have developed socially sanctioned, ritually powerful, and politically engaging institutions at all ages. The deep sex division considers crossing boundary intolerable. But truth and justice are the core values to make gadaa egalitarian and inclusive. The two domains remain functionally interdependent and inseparable. Women create their groups to get powers and fight injustice. Women have been refuting dominations, violence, and abuses, and maintaining their rights and health in variable forms (Kumsa 1997, Østebø 2009). They have established positive images. The article tests the Gadaa system by exploring women’s causes and struggles; distinguish their successes and experiences to call for cultural sensitivity in redressing gender inequalities, if any.

Theoretical and Methodological Underpinnings Theoretical frameworks shape research approaches. They are a set of tools to redefine in specific contexts. Gender study theories originate from two perspectives. The diversified feminist theories are mostly from Western cultures that call on serious reassessments to apply to other contexts (Connelly, Li, MacDonald, and Parpart 2000). Africans have different perceptions about women;

175 they have different pictures and reserved differing powers. Thus, the prevailing abuses may have different natures and variability. Their modes of lives are also different, so to apply the same ethics and principles to redress women’s issues in African cultures would be challenging. These differences make theories of western origins less relevant to African cultural studies.

The other challenge is the anthropological or folkloric cultural interpretation of theories. Some are developed out of African cultures. Turner’s (1969) ‘social drama,’ following the initiation of van Gennep’s (1909) Les Rites de Passage, is relevant in the pursuit of understanding the roles and powers women have in Oromoo. It is processual in nature. Turner (1967) adds symbolic interpretation from the data of African Ndembu community. Symbolic meanings of actions, issues, materials, or others are determined in relation to their cultural contexts by members of the community to differ from those of Freudian. Structural functionalism has also produced Gluckman (1911 – 1975), who in The Licence in Ritual (1956) argues to “… start from the empirical fact that African rituals are frequently organized to exhibit rebellion and protest, and to emphasize the conflicts which exist between those who participate in the rituals.” In other words, women’s rituals reverse existing cultural traditions to portray the image of reversal. The frameworks of these theories help to explore Oromoo women’s institutions; describe their ways, roles, and functions; and interpret their places, powers, and opportunities in the umbrella institution, Gadaa system, and the Oromoo.

The primary data for the research were collected for over a decade from multiple sources, observations, interviews, and focus group discussions. The roles women play, ways they express themselves, instruments and resources they use, and their rights were witnessed in practices from within gadaa rituals and social interactions; so were some women-only rituals and practices. Available and organized occasions were observed; cultural experts were identified and interviewed; discussions were conducted. Secondary data include studies on women’s institutions, powers, and rights from Arsii (Østebø 2009, Qashu 2009, Teso et al 2016), Gujii (Debsu 2009), and wider Oromoo (Kumsa 1997) and Aneesa Kassam and Alemayehu Diro (2006); other relevant data from Boorana (Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development ([ACORD] and Dan Church Aid [DCA] 2017, Legesse 1973, 2006), Tuulama (Aboma 2002), and Macca (Bartels 1983, Gemechu Beyene and Tolera 2006), represent the subject and the society to analyse women’s roles, powers and rights in Oromoo traditions. Some of the data were also gained from the online video-sharing platform YouTube. These originated from the TV broadcasts on siiqqee (Macca and Tuulama dialect; it is siinqee in Arsii, Gujii, Boorana in the east and south parts) institution and qanafaa and other practices.

ANALYSES OF OROMOO FOLK INSTITUTIONS FOR WOMEN EMPOWERMENT Girls and women play essential roles in culture creation, modifications, and changes. They solely architect their own systems, other times mastermind men to create, and still involve. They have powers either to motivate or hinder men’s actions. Men are not the sole history makers, but written history distorts this fact. Likewise, Oromoo women are active participants in the generic institution – Gadaa System, even though they have a limited involvment in its leadership. They also have parallel institutions to exclusively assemble and protect their rights and maximize their roles. Teso et. al (2016) disclose the Arsii understand woman as “Waaqa diqqoo (small god)” in maintaining peace and sustaining genealogy. Indeed, the Oromoo believe they are blessed through women for

176 procreation, which makes them the real custodians of Gadaa system. This does not mean everything is even for women. Sometimes other cultures interfere with indigenous values to force or encourage members to disregard them. Whatever, women struggle more to prove their equal rights at all levels through the indigenous traditions enshrined in Gadaa and the extended institutions of addooyyee, siinqee, qanafaa, and cibiree.

1. 1. EQUALITY AND BALANCE AT EARLY AND LATE AGES The Oromoo use symbolic representations to show the sameness of the two sexes at early and late stages of human development. The first gadaa grade of eight years is named dabballee. The members remain anonymous and their hair remains uncut to mark their identity. Both boys and girls are referred to as isii (she) in pronoun. They are only nursed, nurtured, and cared for (Legesse 1973). Boys and girls end the first gadaa grade with gubbisa or maq-baasa (naming ritual). Their hairs are shaved and they are given names. After transition from dabballee to gaammee, their similarity continues throughout the second grade. Hair style remains the same for both sexes. It is shaved at the centre in circular shape to mark their gadaa grade. The hair style is a mark of identity. But they begin to be oriented about gender differences; they play together identifying their gender roles. They reflect the social spaces for their genders on their play grounds. The girl is referred to as isii (she) and the boy as isa (he). Biological differences begin to contribute for the social construction of gender. The two sexes are oriented about gender and start to play their expected roles. This is before getting initiated into their respective groups. At the end of the grade, teenage girls stay at home, are trained to help mothers in domestic activities, and to acquire essential wisdom. They are required to be curious and attentive listeners. They are desired to be calm and cool to understand and critically analyse what they are observing before taking actions. Girls have to be able to interpret what they have seen and heard. They have to follow their mothers to learn activities and home management. The mother is the primary role model for the girls to acquire proper skills and wisdom. On the other hand, teenage boys take animals out for pastures or look after crops; they are required to be strong, resilient, active, and determined to be competent at looking after the animals and crops. They have to be physically built and capable to withstand physical challenges. They have to be free from illnesses. They have to endure long walks. Physical capability calls for orientation-variability as the boys become stronger and more resilient than the girls to face the hardship of finding pasture for the livestock.. This conceptualization allows children to realize gender equality and sources of variability. Children are brought up adapting to the belief men and women are created equally, but physically vary for the purpose of doing different activities to live and serve their society. This biological difference helps to maintain genealogy and society; both remain mutually interdependent; they have to cooperate, marry, raise family, and live together. One cannot be complete without the other. None is better nor more independent. This realization maintains the need for maintaining equality and equity and facilitates for equal access to opportunities and strengthening the bargaining powers of women. Likewise, during the late ages, after exiting from the gadaa grades, men abandon their maleness and reunite with the women. Members are named gadamoojjii, to mean those who are retired from Gadaa. They sit to pass urine, a symbolic representation for female gender. Their sitting indicates men become finally the same to women. On the other hand, the biological factors that make men and women different also diminish. Menstrual cycle stops, so do the constraints that emanate from giving birth and rearing children. The reliefs allow women to have more roles in Gadaa (will be discussed in detail later). While the roles of men diminish with age, those of women continue and increase.

177 After their sons come to power, men relinquish Gadaa, but women continue to render services, especially in rituals. It is an indication of gender equality. Therefore, equality indicators of the two sexes at early and late ages show two important things. The natural variability cannot be changed, but can be adjusted to duties and responsibilities and turned to opportunities. The natural variability has limited impact on early and late ages. Birth, child-delivery, and other constraints have little impact on women during these ages. In relation to gender equality, their natural variation underscores that female and male become different in choosing feasible activities to their natural provisions. At these ages, their contribution to the economy is insignificant. Male and female seek symbiotic relationship from each other. Indeed, in Oromoo culture, the common perception is that the female is more important to the male than vice versa.

1. 2. WOMANHOOD AND EMPOWERING INSTITUTIONS 1.1.1. Institutions of Girlhood Oromoo girls acquire power from knowledge and group membership to enforce their interests, defend themselves and their rights, and achieve life goals. The two sources of power are mutually interrelated; one can be acquired through another. Knowledge can help to establish an institution having integrity, laws, rules, and values to maintain unity of members providing rights and responsibilities. Girls acquire knowledge, wisdom, skills, arts or creativities from mothers, peers, family, and the community at large. Same sex groups are vital; it can be acquired personally or through a mother. A girl can establish or belong to her own peer group; these are made up of close kin and neighbours to help her stay informed; she can also learn from her mothers and mother’s group members. Girlhood is described as qananii (pampered, adorable, precious, valuable, lovable, etc.). This concept is initiated from and strongly associated with the relationship of a mother and a daughter. A girl is strongly attached to her mother. The two maintain strong psychological and emotional relationship. Mother is her primary role model and teacher about life and culture. The daughter carefully follows and imitates her mother to learn the ways of doing things and social interactions. Following her mother, she could be good at what her mother does. To advise a young man in search of wife the saying, “Haadha ilaalii intala fuudhi (Observe the mother and marry her daughter),” originates from and confirms this nature of internship. A wise and skilful mother produces a daughter of her type and vice versa. The relationship between the mother and her daughter grows into wider social relations, interactions, and networks. The mother has her own intimates, associates, and social networks (that we are going to discuss about later). Their members can also have their own daughters. The mother of one is by extension the mother of all; so are the daughters. All the mothers share responsibilities to educate and develop the awareness of all the girls. They have to make them a good and strong generation. The concept of qananii becomes the base for linking the wider networks. It also involves the concepts of motherhood. These include humbleness, kindness, caring, sharing, understanding, etc. and incur reciprocal emotions and feelings from the other end. The reciprocity helps girls to be well cared for in the society. The kind deeds of her mother extend to and rescue the daughter in the faces of problems and dangers, even if the power of protection can come from her father and brother. If a girl from one community is mistreated by members from another, it is considered as though her group has been mistreated. . It is considered infuriating and leads to serious and irreconcilable conflicts between groups.

178 Girls also establish strong learning and practising peer groups, named addooyyee/hiriyyee. This helps to inform, care for, and defend them. It is the name for their sisterhood group to encourage, educate, protect, and empower them. They create strong, affectionate, and powerful attachments among themselves and interact with other groups. They carry out domestic and other activities with each other in this peer group on a daily basis. This helps them learn from one another, encourage each other, defend and safeguard each other. Quarrels and disagreements are rare, if not none, among members. The saying, “Durbi maaliif wal hin loltu (why do girls not quarrel)?” is the question one asks. “Mutaa waliif hin ergistu (they don’t lend their needle to one-another),” is the response from another. Needle is a typical and personal instrument of girls. One must have her own for basketry; no one expects to borrow. No girl likes to give her own to another whatever the degree of their love. Little resources and reasons open ways for quarrel between members. Addooyyee members take an oath to trust each other. They keep no secrets among themselves. Nothing is shame to share, but to hide. They discuss on issues honestly and faithfully among themselves to solve, teach, understand, envision, etc. This makes their love relationship stronger and opens ways for the wider society. Addooyyee/hiriyyee plays multiple roles in the lives of Oromoo girls. Secret issues including biological and physical changes and desires are shared and discussed in addooyyee. These are feared or untouchable to discuss with mothers. Among many things, it helps to teach about making and appropriating early romantic life, paving ways to get exposure to female-male interactions as wadaaja (friendship), and making the best out of it without affecting the future married life. Members are taught to control themselves and avoid intercourse in tempting situations since virginity at marriage is required to build a future family. Weddings, other annual and life crises rituals, and activities assemble addooyyee members together to teach and learn from each other to create awareness and contain to act responsibly in the interactions. Subjects they discuss include interacting with the general public, identifying kin, and dealing with strangers.. Moreover, they escort and guard a departing member on the eve of her marriage. Addooyyee members negotiate and facilitate the marriage for their members. They develop intimacy and interact rightly with other groups in and outside their communities. These bring about understanding and garner support in fulfilling future interests and achieving life goals. Besides, addooyyee facilitates for a member to marry to a person of her choice. Members can refute if a girl is unhappy with a proposed marriage; they facilitate for her to marry a person of her choice through alternative marriage system named aseennaa, hawwii or other (Beyene and Tolera 2006). In hawwii, the girl negotiates with the man; in aseennaa, she enters into a viable man’s home without his prior knowledge. Gadaa law dictates the man to marry if a virgin girl comes to his home through a prescribed procedure. He must negotiate with her parents, fulfil the marriage laws, and make her his wife. This becomes the most appropriate and successful marriage. She becomes an ideal wife and gives birth to brave and wise children. Declining is catastrophic. If her marriage is rejected and she is chased out of the home, she curses him not to have mercy in Gadaa. She would say, ‘Gadaa ana hanqiftee, gadaa kee hanqadhu! (You have failed me in my Gadaa and let you fail in yours).’ The curse continues unto seven generations (interview with Turaa Adal, an expert in Macca Gadaa laws, June 2006 & 2010). Girls play significant roles in their communities. They are socially sanctioned for two things: durbummaa (virginity) and sirba (song skills). Virginity is highly valued, respected and cared for as gadaa law dictates. Turaa Adal explains a person who takes virginity unlawfully commits one of the

179 most heinous cubbuu (sin/crime). “Unless it is cleansed through ritual process, apologetically paying its gumaa (sacrificial price) to purify, it destroys one’s homestead. Nobody is allowed to take virginity twice. This is inexcusable. It has ownership, belongs to someone else. It is intended for its ownership and has to be for him. The girl seals the marriage tie with it. It symbolizes the sacrifices women make to the family to whom they are married. This is tantamount to the blood sacrifices men make to defend their father land to pass over to their offspring. This person has abused it.” Girls also empower and contribute to the undertakings of rituals and ceremonies. They organise in groups and interact with members of their communities. Ingiccaa (can be named variably) is annual celebration of girls. Girls come together, pull wet grasses, sing, dance, and greet families once or twice in a year. They do likewise on other rituals, ceremonies and social events. Their art is supported by dibbee (drum), which is their trademark and powerful instrument. They organize, discuss, decide and communicate their decisions, feelings, emotions, and desires with their art to their parents, lovers, and society. They also inspire members of their communities for desired actions and discourage against undesirable ones. Their drum and songs are powerful and its essential to listen to them carefully. The subject matter of their songs are diversified and multiple: about the bravery of their group, their love and affection, the looming separations due to marriage, the badness of halagaa (outsider) to separate them, their choices, and preferences in marriage, etc. They also take part as essential members in different other rituals. Ritual objects, like ulfaa (sanctified items such as iron from God – bakakkaa), are sanctified to be carried only by pure virgin girls. Girls are so powerful in the arts and creation of songs and dances. They provoke, influence and mastermind men for actions. They praise bravery and insult cowardice. They tempt, entice, and evaluate the authenticity and degree of the claims of brave acts members of their group make. This is to prove the authenticity before accepting and praising. It influences men who love praise and hate insult. Acts of bravery create stages for songs. The girls and the men love the stage equally. On these events, girls create songs and perform. They get an opportunity to be appreciated for their creativity and performances. They become known and remembered for their creative arts. This becomes a source of pride for the girls. Therefore, they always aspire to perform on the platforms and for the creativity to gain renown for themselves and for their groups. Girls use their art and creative skills to denounce cowards who incur shame upon their communities. They reject marriage requests coming from such groups. Cowards become despised as soddaas (in- laws). The songs retain a scar on the reputation of their genealogy for generations unless erased with brave actions. It is equally shameful for the girls if they fail to be creative. Gadaa rituals such as bokkuu initiations buttaa, ofkaltii, etc. (which occur once in eight years) are among the stages where their songs contribute and intensify the occasions. They also have more roles in these to contribute to gadaa system and its embellishments. Wedding is another important stage where such creative songs and dance outshine. Especially the one sung by the bride who departs on marriage and her addooyyee members about her departure is quite emotionally strong as a work of creative art. In conclusion, girls are strongly attached to their addooyyee/hiriyyee groups and to the community. They teach and encourage each other. They make each other creative in the arts (like songs and dances) and in skills and knowledge of other arts and crafts that boost their generation. Girls share information among their members to keep each one informed and up-to-date. They inculcate determination and perseverance in the minds of members. Girls facilitate the future lives of their members. They are known in resolving problems. They make their interactions with other members

180 of their communities better. They defend their members from attacks. They protect each other. These are some of the ways in which they empower their members to have impact in the society.

1.2.2 Marriage and Establishment In Oromoo culture, marriage is at the core of a person’s life. It makes one of the major subjects of prayers at rituals. The Oromoo strongly desire for both girls and boys to be mature to marry. Inability to marry is considered a result of some kind of curse. All marriage types undergo ritual processes as discussed by Turner in betwixt and between: the liminal period in rites de passage (1967: 93-111). For the girl, it begins at her parents’ home; she is then taken to the groom’s family where they remain in limbo for five days. The liminal period ends with a head shaving ceremony and an assembly of the close kin of the groom. The bride and the groom shave the head of each other alternatively to spill some blood. Shaving marks a transformation into womanhood for the bride and manhood for the groom. Bleeding symbolizes the feelings of love, sharing, and caring for people. Here it shows the wish that one desires to receive from the other as husband and wife. The husband needs to receive the feeling of kind heart from his wife and vice versa. Bleeding also symbolizes the desire for procreation. The wife has to give birth so that their homestead will remain intact in the future. They need to be productive. Having children proves the successfulness and the blessedness of the marriage. After shaving, members are introduced to the bride before the occasion turns into festivity. On the other hand, marriage needs great care; the two parts need to study each other prior to marriage. It has strong and strict laws in gadaa system. Marriage sustains even after the death of a partner through dhaala (a kin inherits the widow of the deceased) (Beyene and Tolera 2006). It helps to maintain affinal bonds between clans, provide a social father for the children, male labour for the family, and protection for the property. Parents supervise a newly married couple to help them in adapting to married life. Problems of naivety are handled with discussions, advices, and flogging; an elder from close kin can also be assigned to tutor the couple. Divorce is only allowed in two cases. One is if bad omens threaten the partners’ future lives together. Another is if a wife flees the husband and lives somewhere else. Solutions have been devised for other types of problems to maintain the marriage and continue family life. Oromoo practise six marriage types depending on urgencies, preferences, prestige, agreements, and material wealth of the parties, etc. Naqata/kadhaa (betrothal) is the most common type. It undergoes a long negotiation processes and consent among concerned parts. Wedding is serious, fabulous, and participatory. The ritual stresses relationships and role assignments to the couples. In this exogamous society, the bride emotionally and creatively sings mararoo, heellee or baye bayee to express her despair, helplessness, melancholy and agony. It becomes heart-breaking to hear from her mother, sisters, addooyyee members, and relatives. Qashu (2009) states Van Gennep and others describe the split with childhood, addooyyee members, flirtatious moments, changing a family, clan, and village for another are emotionally and psychologically unbearable when expressed with sad melodic rhythms. Wedding day is a difficult rite of passage for the bride as she departs her home, family, and peers to be part of an unfamiliar environment and uncertain future. She passes into womanhood leaving her joyful youth behind. The descriptions of Beyene and Tolera (2006) and fieldwork observations support these emotions. It is understandable that changing, adapting, and becoming comfortable with uncertainty is a major source of worry for the bride. Her addooyyee members support and comfort her during such an emotional period.

181 Wedding is ritualised as a ceremony that fosters fertility, prosperity, peace, and understanding for the couple. Children are desired as they are considered gifts from Waaqa (God) to tie two souls and two clans together. As Qashu (2009) says, children take the father’s lineage and connect it to the mother’s lineage perpetuating and enduring the link between the two. Such undertakings and values establish and pave ways for a stable life for women and family in Oromoo culture. The mother gives siiqqee to the bride and blesses her by holding one end while the daughter holds the other end symbolizing their tie. The siiqqee remains a powerful and protective instrument throughout her life. The tie also transcends this to womanhood. The Oromoo honour and sanction siiqqee, symbol of women power which surpass any other power. This is a transfer of power of reproduction and continuity of generations.

1.2.3. Womanhood and Siiqqee Institutions The marriage process defines the future role of a woman: womanhood is the identity of a wed woman. Siiqqee/ulee is a stick empowered during a wedding ritual and enriched with elaborate ideas. The girl leaves her birth place and family for those of her husband emerging from girlhood into womanhood. She changes roles, relationships, interactions, etc. Her manners, interactions, and expressions are reserved, restricted, refrained, etc. She must cope with uncertainty, loneliness, alienation, frustrations, physical fragility, spiritual strength, etc. . The value given to girlhood in society, the honour given to virginity and sanctity, the source of her pride and expression of her identity gradually fade on the wedding day. She is on the verge of losing her respects. This diminishes her confidence. Since her parents have already negotiated on it, she cannot retract her steps. These changes complicate her world, and frustrate her. The importance of siiqqee lies here; it is believed to fill this gap. The bride sacrifices her virginity to seal the agreement of negotiation to strengthen her position in the new family. The generic stick is for defence. Siiqqee is ritually more powerful; it represents a woman as a person during this liminal stage. Kumsaa (1997) states it is fragile and named ulee laaftuu (soft stick). The context and manner of bequeathing and receiving ignite power to the object, which can be realised emotionally and legally. The daughter is valuable and emotionally attached to her mother. The mother negotiates giving her daughter to an outsider (halagaa). Negotiation takes a long time and departure looms gradually. On departure the bride sings mararoo/baye bayee/heellee to express her despair, feebleness, and loneliness. The mother can neither stop giving nor defend her daughter from the possible mistreatment by the outsider; this provokes guilt feelings in her. Siiqqee is a symbolic replacement of a mother’s help and a daughter’s physical weakness. It symbolically protects against violence or abuse. Blessing is endowed with powers of love and affection from the mother’s heart and symbolizes a more powerful defence. Blood spilling also add respect and power for her. The bride spills her virginity and the groom slaughters rakoo. The animal sacrifice and blood shedding legitimizes the marriage. In siiqqee tradition, the sacrifices empower the bride to negotiate her place in the new family and community. This makes siiqqee – the soft stick – possess a strong power of protection after which institution is established to defend rights and truth. Siiqqee can stand between man and man, man and Waaqa (his Creator), and earth and sky for the peace of the world for human being. The Oromoo believe women are gods and through whom men are blessed. Siiqqee is a symbolic representation of marriage law. The woman holds siiqqee, the man holds horooroo (man’s version). These bind the man and the woman together. She puts hers at boroo (innermost) and he puts his on balbala (gateway) of their house. If quarrel occurs, the wife escapes

182 to the innermost, not outside, of the house. If the husband follows her there, the law stands for her and he becomes a criminal for offending this law. If she runs out, he maintains the right to follow and punish her. The physical boundaries express places and rights in marriage, which the couple must respect. . Denying respect is considered the same as denying the rights of the other person’s space. This is equal to denying someone of their right to exist and as such it dismantles the agreement of their union. This is human and natural law (seera Waaqaa lafaa), cosmic metaphysical order, named safuu. After wedding, siiqqee receives serious attention and care. It is empowered by the virginity the bride spilled on the homestead of the clan she got married to – source of liminality. Virginity is sacrificed for siiqqee. With siiqqee, wedded women create and build an institution in the existing social system. This turns out to be what Kumsa (1997) says “the siiqqee institution functioned hand in hand with the Gadaa system as one of its built-in mechanisms of checks and balances.” It is sanctioned with love, sacrifice, and truth. It organises women around a common objective. It helps them teach each other on the ways of establishing themselves in anew marriage. Women are married, taken from their parents’ quarters to their husbands’ (alien [halagaa]) quarters, which are different from their previous adaptations. They come into a new group, new environment, new behaviours, and a slightly different way of life. They are considered as outsiders, so they may lack protection and a sense of belonging. Experienced members host, help, guide, and teach new members to adapt, ease anxiety, and establish relationships under siiqqee. Siiqqee brings women together as a law and principle. It guides, organises and empowers them. Siiqqee is a womanhood institution that organises women in the vicinity of the community where they lead a married life. . The group to whom they are married can also facilitate ways to organise them. They associate, develop intimacy, and come together to acquire power to support each other. They defend members’ rights to develop a strong sense of belongingness. Members also learn and teach each other the ways of the alien groups to cope with the new environment. Further, as a group of women from different backgrounds, they learn arts and crafts from one another and become economically strong. Siiqqee creates women’s stages, provide protections, devises means of adaptations to new situations, roles, and human relations. Siiqqee has many inbuilt and protective institutions that it accommodates and assembles women around itself. It has ateetee, wijjoo, qanafaa and rakoo to gather, defend, and protect women and their rights from different potential abuses and abusers. Ateetee is a ritual to assemble women occasionally, seasonally, and annually to pray for peace and generosity during scarcity or to give thanks to Waaqa during abundance. Qanafaa is a pattern breastfeeding women tie on their foreheads or necks to fend off rape and similar assaults.

1.2.3.1. Roles of Siiqqee Institution Siiqqee, the stick, symbolises women’s rights. It helps women to establish their institution, which, in turn, helps them create unity among themselves to ensure power. The unisexual institution avoids men and gives women privacy. It helps them to be organise, unite, and teach each other. Privacy helps them to develop confidence and avoid feelings of shame and shyness. It also minimises feelings of loneliness, maximise exposures to different points of view, develop a sense of cooperation, etc. In siiqqee, the women impart skills, wisdom, knowledge, experiences, and information to empower themselves socially, politically, economically, and religiously. They teach and learn about laws, rights, roles, and responsibilities from each other. They share what they can and must do in reaction to events, in the faces of difficulties, and in different contexts. They teach

183 each other how to discharge their responsibilities and maintain their rights in cases of attacks and denials of rights. They learn the manners and perform ritual prayers in reactions to natural events, and resolve conflicts and stop wars between different groups.

a. Teaching Responsibilities A married woman shoulders responsibilities for her home and family. She has to secure resources, manage effectively and efficiently, and distribute the resources to all members of her family fairly for the required period. The resources may be generated either by herself or her husband or both. But the wisdom of management is required from her. The Oromoo family is extended. New couples live with his parents, brothers, and sisters. Depending on whether the husband is the first, second, third or other child, different responsibilities are ascribed to the woman. She is required to know and meet them. Siiqqee institution helps new members to identify and execute such varied requirements and discharge responsibilities. It helps them know their roles, actions, and relationships in the new family and community. Young girls face a number of oddities in the new family and community as they are exposed to new norms, values, and customs. They find themselves in new and demanding situations. Their siiqqee helps the new recruits to adapt and to adjust to the new environment. In fact, the primary responsibility lies on the members of the new family, especially the mother-in-law. She trains her in home management, income generation and control, property management, and some of the aspects of human interactions. But these are inadequate to expose to subjectivity and various other problems. Experienced siiqqee members can open-mindedly help to develop awareness about the distinct behaviours of the families and communities and despicable issues for the mother/father/sister-in-law to discuss, but not so among women of similar age. These could include the roles, responsibilities and duties she should suppose in the new family and community. Siiqqee institution is ideal for women to teach, inform, safeguard and develop awareness to empower the new recruits to be good wives, daughters/sister-in-laws or members of their new community.

b. Defending Rights Siiqqee defends women’s rights and protect them from abuses and violence. It is a powerful symbolic object to defend and protect them. It is a socially sanctioned and spiritually powerful practice that enforces the laws enshrined in gadaa laws. If a member of the institution faces violence and abuse, she takes her siiqqee and begins iyya siiqqee (siiqqee screaming). All women in the vicinity take their siiqqee and go out with her. Hearing her voice, her neighbours follow suit passing the screaming to the next door. They join together to call out every woman in the villages. In this manner, all women who could hear the screaming and have the information go out by interrupting their normal life. They never go back home until peace is restored through deals and ritual processes. This disrupts normal life and male-female interdependence. Abuse of woman creates disorder, disturbs the peace, and violates safuu practically and metaphysically. The peace and order of Waaq, the core value of Oromoo political and religious thought, is disturbed. Neither men nor women want such a catastrophic outcome (Kumsa 1997). With this they force men to send peace agents to settle the case quickly in which the offender is punished seriously to the satisfaction of the women. If this is not done immediately, the women take refuge in the neighbouring clans, which may go up to wage war on the clan of the offender. No one can afford the severe costs of lives and properties of war. No

184 one wants to abuse or attack his wife or any other women to face such consequences. Therefore, siiqqee is an ideal institution to defend women from abuses and violence at grassroots’ level.

c. Assembling for Ritual Prayers The concept of considering siiqqee as ulee laaftuu is associated with woman’s biological and natural gifts. The Oromoo believe that the physically weak are spiritually powerful. The elderly and the young are weak due to age, while women’s delicacy is due to spilling bloods of virginity, menstruation, and delivery at the homestead of the clans of their husbands. The sacrifices of women for their communities or nations make them the most powerful and respected. They are also feared for their liminal powers. The Oromoo also consider the sacrifice made by women as a sign of blessings: “We are blessed through our women. They are wet. Women are gods.” Their bloods symbolize life, reproduction, procreation, and continuity of generation and life. Women are believed to bring peace; Waaqa (God) is believed to respond immediately to their calls and prayers. They have a vital place in ritual performances. Women actively participate in gadaa rituals (like buttaa). Their siiqqee plays a vital role in the Gadaa system and its rituals. Along with abbaa gadaas, women take part in these rituals holding siiqqee and ulumaa’ee [Clausena anisata Hook.f., De Wild. & Staner] as sisters, wives, and mothers. In some places, they are said to have two gadaa periods: once with their husbands and another with their brothers. In the third, they accompany their sons on marches to undergo different gadaa rituals. Women gather to pray for peace and resolutions when problems prevail in society: for fertility, rain, peace, health, harmony, etc. They conduct birth and other rites such as ateetee at the beginnings of dry and wet seasons. They pray for families and women in problems. Women have large roles both in inciting and resolving conflicts. They initiate a peaceful process to resolve conflicts, and provide a powerful service in prayers and rituals. Besides, women participate in rituals to transform or integrate ‘individuals into groups and reaffirmation of social arrangements’. This is their effective integration into society in gadaa rituals. Women are also distinct by womanhood rituals, ululating at birth or okee at marriage, and socially constructed division of labour. Women in Arsii Oromoo sing the following ritual songs on beseeching rain and prosperity: Ejersa jaboo, Ejersa1 the strongest, Jaboo lafa gaaraa, The strongest at the top of the hill, Waan jabaatellee, In difficulties, Waaqnu nu gargaara, Waaq will reach for us, Mee araaraa! We pray for His mercy on us! Waan aadaa keenyaa, Of our culture, Siiqqeefi boraatii qabannaa, Siiqqee and boraatii2 we hold, Waaqa keenya mootii kadhannaa! We pray to our Waaqa the Lord!

Siiqqee takes an important part as ulee laaftuu symbolises its ritual powers. This is women’s ritual song to underscore one of the basic beliefs of the Oromoo. It seeks for peace and unity of the people. When people cooperate and make peace among themselves, Waaqa (God) is nearby to respond to their calls. Peace and cooperation pave the way for success. Women play leading roles in restoring

1 Olea europea (formerly known as Olea africana) 2 A pillow made of wood. This is also given to the bride on her wedding along siiqqee.

185 this peace. They hold siiqqee, boraatii, etc. assemble at the ritual sites (top of the hill under Ejersa tree and other times at course of the river) and sing praise songs to Waaqa. The song calls for such kind of unity, peace, and ritual so that Waaqa will respond to their calls. Here we understand the reason for why women hold siiqqee in ritual performances.

d. Resolving Conflicts and Stopping Wars Siiqqee is a powerful instrument to enforce the rule of law. Its power is realized when it ends or stops war and resolves intensified conflict. The women take out their siiqqee in a group to demand for the ending of hostility and animosity. They resolve conflicts that sustain between different parties. They request each party to be present one at a time at the negotiating table. If one declines, the women curse the absentee. The women’s curse is believed to cause costly sacrifices, which will manifest in the life of the individual. These are true to life and not fabricated. Nobody wants to face such sacrifices caused by the curses. The effect of the curses serves to show the powerful role women play in peace-making. Siiqqee institution also has a strong and remarkable power to stop wars. When the warring parts go to the battlefield, the women take their siiqqee and stand in their ways. They tie white cloth on the top part of their siiqqee to symbolize the peacefulness of their purpose and intentions. In this case, even if the the group of women are members of the enemy; they are respected and listened to. In seeing off respectful men to the battlefield or a long journey, the women stand on two lines facing one another and form a roof with their siiqqee; they then bless the men as they head to battle. While the men are passing under the siiqqee roof, the women say the following blessings: Cabsii gali, cabdee hin hafiin; Defeat, do not be defeated; irra aani, jala hin aaniin. Be victorious, do not be subdued. Women anoint war going heroes, bless, and hand spears over to them. On their return from battlefield, they award the men with necklaces for their successful return which is known as the kudhaa (welcome back home) ceremony. This reception is celebrated. Women come together to ululate their happiness. Girls accompany them with songs and dances. This reception ceremony becomes strong, powerful, and extended. On the contrary, for emotional persons that disrespect their demands by going to the battlefield or leave for another similar journey without their consent, the women put down their siiqqee in front of the men’s path so that they step on them and pass. If the men choose to step on the women’s siiqqee, the women say the following curse in seeing them off: Cabii gali, cabsitee hin galiin, Be defeated, do not defeat. Jala aani, irra hin aaniin. Be subsided, do not supersede.

The consequences are immediate given the general perception about women: ‘women are gods.’ The blessing is desired; the curse is disliked or feared; both are contagious. No one wants to be cursed; no one undermines women. This fact makes women respected and listened to. This way, women can end conflict or war between different groups. They can also instigate conflicts and war in cases of abuse. They push the men from their sides to fight back. In such cases, they know the costs of conflict and the suffering it incurs upon them. So they act rationally, cautiously, and only choose this option when they have no other alternatives. These acts underscore the power of siiqqee to instigate and stop conflicts and the respect and prestige siiqqee enjoys in Oromoo.

1.2.4. MOTHERHOOD IN GADAA SYSTEM

186 Motherhood has an institution named cibree, which comes from cirfuu (western Oromoo dialect) or cibruu (eastern or southern dialect). A son who approaches Gadaa stage, performs the ritual. Before undergoing the ritual process of assuming power, the son fulfils what his mother requires of him. Then he prepares her for a ritual undertaking called haadha cirfuu. It has a long process. The son kills ewe and fulfils all necessary items and the mother prepares feasts at her home. He buys new clothes for her to wear. Two men in gadamoojjii and a cibree woman are invited to witness the performance. The mother is seated on wet grass. The son divides her hair at the centre into two. He makes one side fall to the left and the other to the right. Then he dyes butter on the separated part carefully to reach her head. Then he says: Dhaloota: Ka’i! Sit up! Haadha: Danda’ee hin ka’u. I cannot sit up. Dhaloota: Maaliif? Why? Haadha: Quufaafuu, akkanatti quufi! Because of overeating, overeat like me! Dhaloota: Ka’i? Sit up! Haadha: Danda’ee hin ka’u. I cannot sit up. Dhaloota: Maaliif? Why? Haadha: Badhaadhaafuu, akkanatti badhaadhi! Because of richness, be rich like me! Hulluuqi gadaa kee; dhala keetti haa go through your gadaa peacefully, darbu, raagi! let your children inherits it! Have longevity! … (Bidu 2015: 140).

The blessing of the mother, as we can see from her response in the dialogue, shows the efforts of the son to satisfy his mother and the degree of her satisfaction. It portrays the place of motherhood in the heart and mind of the Oromoo considering the sacrifices she has paid in bringing up her children and maintaining the continuity of the lineage and the gadaa system. This is the most prestigious accolade one can achieve in the gadaa system. The fact that she is cibiree makes her highly respected in the society. The hair style distinguishes her permanently as an identity marker. Being cifree/cibree enables her to check the rightfulness of a number of rituals. She also becomes part of the Gadaa group in power; she stays away from home with the Gadaa class in power. She can carry and build hats for the ulfaa (respected ritual items). She has complete immunity to act in whatever ritual and can go wherever with the gadaa class in power. She is free of the burdens of childrearing and home caring to attend any ritual, even if the ritual is distant from her home. Cifree/cibree institution is respected for various reasons. Their members are considered luminal beings. They treat issues of the community cautiously, fairly, and rationally. They work relentlessly to help and benefit their communities with all their powers. They have overcome and defeated subjectivity. They have learned about paying sacrifices for the wellbeing of their offsprings and their communities. It is the proof that they have shown that made them eligible to become cibirees. As cibrees, they can now render that service at large as they have completed rearing and bringing up children as mothers. Those who become abbaa gadaa (gadaa leaders) are expected to perform this ritual and make their mothers cibirees. They have come to be eligible for the title through the sacrifices their mothers have made to gadaa. They have brought them up and enabled them to reach the gadaa leadership level. At childhood, the mother is always around to help children; she is the caretaker; she covers for the absence of the father. She is as lafa (earth), always around to provide, help and take care. She is generous and tolerant in wrong doing. Mother is the base for their lives, to mould the identities of

187 children and their wellbeing. Father goes far away as Waaqa (sky/God). His contribution to wellbeing is invisible. He is thanked regularly for nothing. Therefore, the concept of haadha cirfuu/cibruu and its accolade emanates from this conception of the difference between mother and father in the gadaa system.

1.2.5. GADAA SYSTEM’S MAINTAINING WOMEN’S RIGHTS. Theoretically, Oromoo culture exhibits good features of gender equalities. Equality begins with the use of the same reference pronoun at the primary stage to show sameness and inculcate gender equality in children’s minds. As luminal beings, women can enforce their rights and powers. Addooyyee/hiriyyee, Siiqqee/siinqee, cifree/cibree and linked rituals and values (ateetee, wayyuu, wijjoo, safuu, hooda, seera Waaqaa lafa, etc.), their liminality and contributions to gadaa empower women to exercise rights and express themselves. These institutions and conceptions organise women to learn, do activities, perform rituals, fulfil their desires and needs, and fight injustice and stand in unison for their rights. Mechanisms of their protection, defence, and promotion are established to detect and expose marital, domestic, and other abuses. Addooyyee/hiriyyee organises girls under its umbrella to acquire power, knowledge, and skills. This empowers them and helps defend their rights. Normally girls accept marriage proposals their parents have negotiated on their behalf. But the availability of different types of marriage preserves their rights to make their choices. They can devise strategies to resolve the case. They communicate to her parents to reject or arrange another marriage with a man of her choice. Addooyyee also helps girls learn lessons that can empower them economically to generate incomes in the future. Stitching, sewing, embroidery and the like household activities can be learned from and done with each other. Women come under siiqqee institution. The couples reside with the man’s parents forming extended families. Kinship, marriage, and friendship create complex and tense social relations. They link two clans in marriage, establishing serious and complex relations between in-laws. They also shoulder family responsibilities in such complex relationships. Siiqqee creates bridges, maintain, and helps in discharging these responsibilities. Women also need time to manage and decide on resources. They perform domestic activities and like having a number of children, but are free from laborious and “dangerous” ones like foora (satellite camp). Women are entitled to gadaa, birth, marriage, and independence gifts and inheritances as property rights and economic empowerments. Land and water resources are communal. Siiqqee and cibiree are respected and treated carefully. No one can act against or react emotionally to them; neither do the women be emotional in igniting conflicts. Conflicts lead to the loss of lives and property. Holding siiqqee, women can freely travel in enemy territories to stop war and facilitate discussions and peace deals. Contrarily, women can instigate conflict to reverse conquest, loss of resources, and statuses. They sing provocatively to do this as the proverb “Kan nadheen ergite, waraabessa hin sodaatu, (a messenger of women does not fear hyena)” shows. Besides, outsiders mistreating of females is intolerable and leads to a rapid outbreak of conflict. Women anoint war going heroes, bless, and hand them their spears while wishing them success. When warriors come back to their home, they are received with celebrations and they are awarded with necklaces for their successful return for the kudhaa ceremony. The values attached to females’ institutions empower them in Oromoo culture. The cibiree remain logical and rational for humanity. They are fair to all.

188 Men are required to maintain and control gadaa leadership. They elect camp leaders, age-groups, and classes and engage in warfare to defend the country, the people, and the resources. Women take part in rituals and achieve Gadaa grades through their husbands. Some myths and fables reflect women’s incapability in administration, politics and military; but they are newly feigned to rationalize, demonstrate and justify the concentration of power at men’s hands. Women know their legitimizing roles to use them ritually in prayers for empowerment. Policy Recommendations 1. The Oromoo must excavate the true essence of gender relations from their original indigenous culture. 2. Change and transformation must be internal to the culture. Organizing, educating and empowering women in economic, social, political, and cultural sectors to ensure gender equality must be in their own ways, by their own means, and to their own interests. Empowerment must be integral to the culture and their systems. Women must take their rights and equalities, they must not expect from outside or male hegemony. They must make or break their leaders by contextualizing and indigenizing their organizations. 3. External institutions must support women in rekindling their traditions, galvanizing their members at grassroots by their own ways, promote their skills and knowledge to devise their ways and make or break their leaders to ensure gender balance.

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191 Persuasive Discourse Strategies in Jaarsummaa, an Indigenous Method of Conflict Resolution among Arsi Oromo Alemu Disassa Mulleta (PhD) Adama Science and Technology University E-mail- [email protected] This study is a critical analysis of persuasive discourse strategies of elders in Jaarsummaa, an indigenous method of conflict resolution among Oromo. Twelve actual Jaarsummaa sessions were audio-recorded from West Arsi Zone of Oromia Region and analyzed using a rhetorical appeals analysis which is based on the Aristotelian Theory of Persuasion. Results of the analysis revealed that the elders predominantly made credibility appeal or Ethos to build a trustworthy image as mediators and lead disputants to reconciliation. Among the major persuasive discourse strategies of the elders are affirming the positive worth of disputants, making direct requests, claiming neutrality, forecasting negative consequences, using emotive languages, using collective voice, telling anecdotes, blessing and prayer for reconciliation, and using proverbs and sayings. Besides, the elders used face- saving strategies such as honorifics and inclusive pronouns to create a positive communication atmosphere in the sessions. To legitimize their persuasion, the elders often appeal to societal norms, religious values and government discourse. In short, Jaarsummaa involves complex discursive practices which have scientifically proven values in cleansing a sense of enmity and persuading disputants to come to reconciliation. So, giving it due attention in the legal policy of the country as complementary to the formal justice system may largely reduce the caseload of formal courts and ultimately improve the service in the legal system. Integrating elements of this indigenous practice into the modern curriculum could also help in preserving the system and promoting its contribution. Keys: Jaarsummaa, persuasive discourse, Arsi Oromo, traditional conflict resolution

1. Introduction

Traditional community elders’ mediation is an indigenous method of conflict resolution whereby elders of a given community voluntarily or upon the request of disputants mediate parties in dispute. This method is still commonly practiced in preference to litigation among many traditional societies in Africa (Macfarlane, 2007; Ellickson, 1991). Among many traditional African Societies, elders are acknowledged as agents of peace because of their knowledge of norms and customs of their societies and their lived experience and skill in resolving disputes (Deng, 2003). The situation in Ethiopia is not an exception to what has been described above. Kohlhagen (2005:10) confirms that, "in Ethiopia, the art of mediation and conciliation have already been practiced for centuries." In many regions of the country, especially those far from regional centers, indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution are more dominant than the formal government court system (Macfarlane, 2007). Studies so far conducted in the area revealed that there are well established indigenous institutions of conflict resolution among several ethnic groups of Ethiopia (Alula and Getachew, 2008; Tarekegn and Hanan, 2008). The present study attempted to analyze the discourse of Jaarsummaa, a traditional community elders' mediation among Arsi Oromo of Ethiopia. Jaarsummaa has been used across all Oromo clans for centuries. In the traditional Oromo society, almost all types of conflicts, including homicides, have been resolved through

192 Jaarsummaa which is carried out by the institution of Jaarsa Biyyaa “community elders” also called Jaarsa Araaraa “elders of reconciliation”. Among Oromo society, as it could be true in other traditional societies as well (Malan, 1997), elders have moral responsibilities to settle disputes and establish peace in their community. They either resolve it on the spot or fix a date, usually weekends or holidays, to mediate disputants (Asefa, 2001; Lewis, 1988). Knowledge of cultural norms, honesty, patience, neutrality, experience and skill of persuasion, genealogical seniority, and economic status (sometimes) are often considered as criteria to select elders for mediation (Dajane, 1991). The elders are often selected on ad hoc basis, but among some Oromo clans such as Arsi Oromos of my study area, some elders are chosen by their clans and lineages to permanently give Jaarsummaa service. These elders officially take oath to genuinely serve their community. In the case of spousal dispute mediation, both parties select their own elders (Dejene, 2002). Usually a minimum of five elders can conduct a mediation session according to the local elders. The number of elders can go up to twenty based on severity of cases to be mediated (Araba and Berhanu, 2008; Asefa, 2001). Among many Oromo clans, the institution of jaarsa biyya is usually hierarchically organized based on neighborhood and patriarchal kinship line.

2. Statement of the Problem Scholars assert that communication is the crux of the mediation process because mediation by its very nature is often a complex discursive practice that demands good skill of managing the often competing and incompatible interaction of disputants (Silbey and Merry, 1986). However, although Jaarsummaa has been used as a major tool of conflict resolution by the Oromo people for centuries, little is known about its communicative features. Most of the research that has been conducted in this area up to this point (Dejene, 2002; Mamo, 2006; Araba and Berhanu, 2008; Lewis, 1988) has primarily focused on the evaluation of the legality of the resolutions produced by elders, criteria used to select elders, and the description of the procedures of Jaarsummaa. To the best knowledge of the researcher, no attempt has been made to critically analyze the actual interaction of Jaarsummaa with the aim of describing the subtleties and complexities of discourse strategies that elders use to persuade disputants to come to reconciliation. Even at international level, studies in the area of discourse of mediation are few (Szmania, 2004). This study is, therefore, meant to fill in this knowledge gap. It aims at critically analyzing the actual discourse of Jaarsummaa among Arsi Oromo and identifying the major persuasive discourse strategies used by the community elders to bring reconciliation between disputants. Studying community-based elders' mediation from discourse perspective is essential for getting good insights into its mode of communication. 3. Research Design and Method The current study draws on discourse analysis as its theoretical framework and methodological path. Scholars define discourse from various perspectives, but in this study, the term ”discourse” refers to social action that people accomplish through language and other means of communication. There are various approaches to discourse analysis and the decision as to which set of analytic procedures to use depends on the practical research situations we are in, the type of texts to be analyzed, and the research questions to be answered (Rogers, 2004; Fairclough, 2003). Among the several approaches to discourse analysis, the current study employed a top-down approach to discourse analysis called rhetorical appeal analysis which is based on Aristotelian Theory of Persuasion.

193 3.1 Population of the Study The Oromo People are the largest ethnic group living in Oromia, the largest regional state in Ethiopia. According to the Central Statistics Agency of Ethiopia, by 2014, the projected population of the region was nearly 32,816,000 of which 87 per cent are rural inhabitants (CSA, 2013). It covers a total area of 363,136 square kilometers which accounts for about 34.3% of the total land of the country. The region is divided into 20 administrative zones and 12 especial city administrations. The people speak Afan Oromo ‘the language of Oromo’, which belongs to Eastern Cushitic language family and which is the fourth widely spoken language in Africa. The Oromo people are known for their traditional age-set socio-political system of government called Gada System. They are divided into several clans among which Arsi Oromo is the largest (Jeylan, 2004).

W. Arsi ,Study site

Fig 1- Map of the study area (Africa- Ethiopia-Oromia- Arsi) The Arsi Oromo are believed to be descendants of Barentu, one of the two moieties of Oromo (Asmarom, 1973) and they occupy the whole of the present Arsi and Bale zones and some parts of East Showa, West Hararge (Abas, 1995; Jeylan, 2005). They have elaborate moiety systems and kinship structure organized along patriarchal genealogy. Arsi is subdivided into two major moieties called Sikko and Mando. The Sikko is further divided into five clans: Bullala, Wacaale, Jaawi, Waaji and Ilaanni. Likewise, Mando is divided into seven clans: Raayyaa, Kajawaa, Hawaxxuu, Utaa, Waayyuu, Harawaa and Biiltuu (Hussein, 2005:26). Kinship social structure of Arsi Oromo in ascending order includes, warra "family”, balbala ”lineage”, gosa ”clan”, and Arsooma ”Arsihood”. Paternal kinship structure is very important for Arsi Oromos, because in public gatherings, an individual is often referred to by the name of his clan or lineage rather than his personal name. A conflict between two individuals from different lineages or clans is also considered as a conflict that occurs between lineages or clans rather than a mere interpersonal conflict. Usually, members of the same clan or lineage live together in a village. 3.2 Data Collection The data for this study was collected from three districts of West Arsi Zone in Oromia Region: Arsi Nagelle, Shalla, and Kofale which have relatively well functioning institution of Jaarsa Biyya. Twelve actual Jaarsummaa sessions were audio-recorded and partially video- recorded. In addition, twelve local elders selected through snowball sampling were interviewed; field notes of personal observation were taken; informal discussions were held

194 with some local elders, and various literatures were reviewed to obtain data on the broader socio-cultural context of Jaarsummaa in the target society. More of ethnographic approach was used to gather the necessary data. The researcher stayed in the research site for six months (on and off) and used a chain of contact persons starting from his home university. 3.3 Ethical Consideration Since mediation by its very nature is highly personal, the researcher first talked to all parties personally and obtained their oral consent before recording the sessions. The elders and the workers in culture and tourism bureaus of the three districts, especially those from Arsi Nagelle district, were immensely helpful in accessing the required data and getting the consent of the subjects. To keep the anonymity of the participants in the recorded Jaarsumma Sessions (JSs), only the first two or three letters of their names have been used in the transcription and analysis. 3.4 Preparation and Analysis of Data Three Jaarsumma sessions (JS), two spousal dispute cases and one land dispute case were selected for detail analysis. Out of the three cases, only one spousal dispute JS which best reflects the whole process of Jaarsummaa in the target community has been transcribed in its totality using standard orthography and translated into English language. The remaining two cases were summarized. The translation was done with the support of two English Language teachers from the study area by using translation procedures forwarded by Graedler (2000). Mediation as a method of conflict resolution often relies on persuasion as a main strategy to lead disputants towards resolution. The analysis of the persuasive discourse strategies of the elders in Jaarsumma has been conducted by using a top-down approach to discourse analysis called rhetorical appeals analysis which has been developed based on Aristotelian Theory of Persuasion. According to Aristotle’s theory of persuasion, one can effectively persuade his audience by using mainly three types of appeals: ethos, pathos and logos. The Ethos, also called credibility appeal, refers to the way a speaker or writer construct his/her identity in relation to his/her audiences. Quoting Aristotle, the same scholars assert that “persuasion can be achieved only by those speakers who appear to be positive character for the audience” (Anthony and Gladkov, 2007; Duke, 1990). The pathos or Affective appeal, refers to the strategies of putting audiences into certain emotional states. “Persuasion is effected through the audience when they are brought by the speech into a state of emotion for we give very different decisions under the sway of pain or joy, liking or hatred” (Aristotle, 1929, cited in Anthony and Glaskov, 2007:122). Rational appeal, logos, is the third type of appeal that can be made by proving the truthfulness of something through telling stories from one’s personal experience, forecasting negative or positive consequences of an event, and drawing on socially agreed upon principles and norms and using statistical facts (Anthony and Glaskov, 2007).

Although there could be variations in the use of specific appeal types across genres, Anthony and Glaskov (2007) confirm that the three basic appeal types discussed above exist in all types of persuasive texts. The same scholars claim that a top-down structural analysis of discourse called rhetorical appeals analysis can be used as a best tool to identify the three appeal types. They also assert that any kind of persuasive text can be analyzed by using persuasive appeals analysis.

Appeals are identified through careful analysis of the persuasive roles of segments of texts or how the speaker or writer use language to influence his audiences to behave or act in a certain

195 manner in a given context. Since Jaarsummaa is a discursive practice in which disputants voluntarily take part to resolve their disputes with the help of community elders, its outcome is primarily determined by the elders’ skill of persuasion. Hence, persuasive appeals analysis can serve as best tool to analyze the persuasive strategies that the elders use in Jaarsummaa.

During analysis, the researcher repeatedly listened and read through the whole transcript of the selected JSs. Then three different font colors were used from Microsoft Word window to identify and highlight excerpts which illustrate the three appeal types. Each line of the transcript was numbered to refer readers to the body of the transcribed JS (L-20- line twenty) while the sound files were labeled indicating the case number, the cassette number, the side of the cassette, and the minute at which the excerpt is uttered as: (C1-Ca 1- S1- 20’), C1 – Case one, Ca 1- Cassette one, S1- Side one, 20’ – uttered around the twentieth minute. 4. Result and Discussion

4.1 A Brief Description of Jaarsummaa Procedure The analysis revealed that Jaarsummaa among Arsi Oromo clan is a ritualized and institutionalized social practice which involves communicative events that usually occur in a predictable pattern. It has its own registers and participants with more or less fixed roles. The elders usually carry out Jaarsummaa under gaaddisa ”shade” of a big tree, sitting in a circle which is wide enough to accommodate all the participants. The number of elders in a session varies based on the seriousness of the case, but Jaarsa Walttajii 'the middle elder' (ME) who is appointed (permanently) from among the elder clan of the locality, and Qora lamii ”the two facilitators” also called “speakers'' (Mamo, 2006) are crucial members JS. In the current study, the facilitators were assigned from the two major clans of the area: Utaaa ”the elder clan” and Waayyuu “the younger clan” often based on their rhetorical skill. They are referred to as Qora Utaa (Qu) and Qora Waayyuu (Qw) or simply Utaa and Waayyuu. A Jaarsummaa session begins by assigning the two facilitators who introduce the case of the day, allocate turns, scrutinize and approve the decisions of the middle elder at various stages of the session with the help of other elders of the session. Disputants are separately referred to as himataa “plaintiff” and dachaafataa ”defendant”. Analysis of the rhetorical moves of the recorded sessions revealed that Jaarsummaa among Arsi Oromo has four major phases: Opening (Dubbii kaasuu) in which facilitators introduce the case, Hearing (Coka) in which disputants present their case turn by turn, Discussion (Gunguma) in which elders alone discuss and propose reconciliatory decisions, and Reconciliation (Araara) in which elders persuade disputants to accept the decisions. The phases appear in almost predictable sequence. 4.2 Analysis of the Elders’ Persuasion Strategies

Results of the analysis of the recorded JSs reveal that elders of Arsi Oromo use various persuasive discourse strategies to help them make credibility, affective, and rational appeals. The major persuasive discourse strategies utilized by the elders have been presented in the following sections with illustrative quotations.

4.2.1 Making Direct Request The elders in the recorded JSs made direct requests for the disputants to accept the reconciliatory decisions proposed in the session. The following excerpts of elders of husband side (EHs) in the recorded JSs can illustrate the elders’ use of this strategy.

196 EHs: Hebano [wife’s clan] is also right. Someone [wife in dispute] has gone to them for help. The girl [wife] is also right. Now you will give me back the girl. I will handle everything. I will shape my son. Now you will give me back [the wife]…(L-815-818) EHs: Now give me back the girl, you Hebano [wife’s clan]. You deserve the truth/justice …Give me back the girl. We will handle our son [husband]. We have already convinced him…(L-830-2)

In the above two excerpts taken from Case 1, the elders of the husband side made direct request to the elders of the wife side to give them back the wife. According to Aristotelian theory of persuasion, making such type of request is regarded as a strategy of making affective appeal or pathos (Anthony and Glaskov, 2007).The speakers’ also recognized the wife and elders of her side as victims and the husband as assaulter by giving dhugaa “truth” for the former. Dhugaa is the ultimate result that disputants aspire to get in Jaarsumma among the Oromo people. Such strategy of showing understanding can help a mediator in building trustworthy image (Roberts, 2008) and make credibility appeal.

4.2.2 Claiming for Impartiality

Scholars claim that impartiality of mediators is one of the major requirements for the success of a mediation session (Roberts, 2008; Silbey and Merry, 1986). In the recorded JSs, the elders employed various strategies to directly or indirectly construct their image as credible and trustworthy persons. One of the major strategies that the elders used to show their impartiality was praying to Waaqa “Sky God” to help them speak truth. The following excerpts from some of the recorded JSs illustrate this:

EHs: May God reconcile these Arsi [the disputants]. May He also help us speak the truth…(L- 529) EWf: May God help us speak the truth. “In the morning, when a person goes for Jaarsummaa, he goes alone. But when he comes back home, he becomes two. If he speaks the truth, he will come home together with that truth. If he lies, that lie will go home with him” as the saying of Oromo People goes (C2-Ca1-S1- [40’-41’]).

ME: May God help us speak the truth. May God save us from slip of the tongue [lying]… (C5-Ca1-S 1- 35’). Ewf: You people, may dhugaa ‘the truth’ be the winner [prayer]… (C2 Ca 2- S1 24’)

Speakers in the above excerpts prayed to God to help them speak truth or refrain from lying, or “slip of tongue”. They emphasized on speaking the truth, by mentioning the fact that telling lies leads to guilty conscience. In the expression of the last speaker, which is often considered as cultural saying, the term dhugaa “truth” has been given animate attribute. The saying in the utterance of the third speaker also presupposes a struggle between “truth” and another entity, most probably its opposite, “falsehood”. The speaker expressed his wish for “truth” to win. In general, the elders’ prayer or their claims for speaking the truth and their wish for the reconciliation of the disputants have helped them persuade the disputants by making credibility appeals or Ethos. Through their speeches, the elders also positioned themselves as impartial, good-willed, and trustworthy persons. Roberts (2008) considers such intervention strategy of mediator as indirect way of building credibility. The same scholar claims that mediators can achieve credibility by openly mentioning their commitment to impartiality at the very outset. In addition to the above indirect strategies, the elders also made direct claim for their impartiality. For example, elders of the wife side in Case 2 made the following statements in their attempt to prove their impartiality:

197 Ewf: We never accompanied her [the wife] when she went to court for appeal. We believed that this in-law [husband] and the girl [the wife] are equal for us… (C2-Ca1-S2- 10’) ME: …These elders equally serve both sides [they are impartial] … (C2-Ca3-S3- 0-1’).

The first speaker from the wife side clearly indicated that the elders of the wife side refrained from backing the wife when she took the case to court. The speakers claim that they did so because of the love and respect they have for their son-in-law. The second speaker, the Middle Elder in Case 2, directly mentioned that all elders in the session serve both parties equally and impartially. The elders in the remaining cases also tried to show their impartiality using various strategies. In general, almost every speaker who took turns in the reconciliation phases of the recorded JSs employed various strategies to directly or indirectly reveal their impartiality. Showing empathy and impartiality, according to Lovenheim and Guerin (2004), is a strategy of building trust and creating cooperative attitudes among disputants. This in turn has helped the elders to make credibility appeal.

4.2.3 Forecasting Negative Consequences

Forecasting the possible negative outcome of a certain action or behavior of audiences helps a speaker make rational appeal and urge the audience to take another action to avert the negative consequences. With regard to this, Roberts (2008) and Wolski (2002) assert that suggesting options for settlement and telling parties about possible negative consequences of opting for litigation by rejecting the proposed solutions is among persuasive discourse strategies of mediators. In the recorded JSs, the elders utilized such strategy on several occasions. They often threaten disputants with possible negative consequences they may encounter if the disputants resist the decision of the elders. For instance, in the reconciliation phase of Case 1, one of the elders of the wife side EWs threatened the husband as follows:

EWf: …The government also forbids adultery. Not only adultery, the government forbid us even not to marry more than one wife. It made us live like protestant [as monogamous]. In the previous time, one can marry a second wife if he has enough income. As you can see yourself, going here and there had already affected your economy. You can see that. We also can see that… (L-891-7).

The speaker in the above excerpt stressed that the adultery that the husband is believed to have committed and which the speaker described as ‘running here and there’, is forbidden by the government. The elders imply in the excerpt above that the husband may face legal punishment if he continues committing adultery by disregarding the elder’s decision . The speaker also indicated that such practice had so far caused economic repercussion on the life of the couple. Here the speaker attempted to persuade the husband by making rational appeal or logos. For instance, in Case 3, some elders repeatedly raised the death of the former wife of the disputant and the possible conflict that might happen between his children to threaten and persuade the husband to accept their decision. The following excerpt illustrates this:

… Do you want these children to fight each other? Don’t you know that it was God who had taken their mother? This could happen to anyone…God had left these children with you for some reason. Why don’t you be afraid of Him? You are leading these families into conflict. …. If you opt to go to court also, you will be forced to give half of the plot of your land to these children. Do not trigger the boy and bring even the worst thing to yourself... (C3-Ca2-S1- 15’-20’)

The speaker of the above excerpt threatened the disputants with possible punishment of God if they refuse to accept the elders’ decision. He also threatened the father with possible negative consequences if he opts for formal court by refusing the elders decision. In short, the

198 above speaker made rational appeal or logos by forecasting possible negative consequences in persuading the disputant to accept the elders’ decision.

4.2.4 The Use of Collective Voices

In the JSs of the target community, elders come to final decisions after making thorough discussions and debates. Decisions are communicated to disputants only after all elders of the session accept and approve them. Once they reach a consensus, the elders use collective voice to persuade the disputants to accept their decision. The elders’ use of collective voice is realized through the use of collective pronouns and phrases while communicating the decision to the disputants as illustrated through the following excerpts:

ME: The girl [wife] will also come back to us. We will give the girl for Dawe. What we are doing here is just writing the agreement…(L-1098-1100) EHs: Now you come back to us [accept what we say]. This fire [wife] is ours. The anger will disappear gradually. Give us back the girl. Let him manage her. Come back to us [accept what we say]. We will make reconciliation. (C2-Ca 3-S2-28’) El: Now these people had divided the land for you. They asked you to give the plot to the son. They have decided against you. Accept this decisions made by your family. Accept it whole heartedly. (C3-Ca2-S1- 0-1’)

In the first excerpt, the speaker used the expressions “we” and “these elders” to indicate that the decision was made unanimously. The speaker in the second excerpt also used similar pronouns “us”, “ours”. Similarly, the speaker in Case 3 used collective noun “these people”, “they had said”, “they had decided”, “your family” to indicate that the decision was made collectively. The cooperation of the elders could make disputants accept the proposed decision easily because it minimizes the suspicion of the latter about the fairness of the decision. It leaves no or little room for the disputants to justify their objection to the elders’ decision. It may also serve as a strategy of showing the validity of the decisions made by the elders and making rational appeal to disputants. Roberts (2008) describes using co-mediators as one strategy that mediators could use to promote the credibility of their decision.

4.2.5 Telling Anecdotes In the Jaarsummaa discourse of Arsi Oromo, elders often tell relevant or related stories from their personal encounters. The stories often reflect what the narrators or the character in the story did or faced when he/she was in a similar situation with that of the target disputant. Scholars consider storytelling as one strategy of legitimizing one’s claim or argument. According to van Leeuwen (2008), stories serve this function in two ways: by punishing the deviant character with an unhappy ending and rewarding the good character who behaves in line with the social norms of the society with a good ending. Lovenheim and Guerin (2004) also claim that anecdotes and humor serve as tools to relieve tensions during mediation session.

4.2.6 The Use of Honorifics

Honorifics are words, titles, or different grammatical forms that communicate respect or status difference. In different dialects of Afan Oromo, plural pronouns are used to address singular entity to show respect for the addressee. However, whether plural pronoun references are indigenous features of Afan Oromo, or not, is still doubtful. In the recorded JSs, the elders used honorifics when they addressed the disputants. For example, they begin their questions by saying “Ta isinbaradhu” instead of saying “Ta si bradhu”. Here the plural pronoun “isin” meaning ‘you’ (plural/honorific) instead of “si” ‘you’ (sing) has been used to

199 show respect for the disputant. All elders who forwarded clarification questions to the disputants used similar grammatical structure to politely address the disputants.

Showing respect for someone in an interaction can help a speaker persuade his audience by making credibility appeal. Thus, the proper use of honorifics in the interaction of the recorded JSs has helped in creating a smooth and positive communication between the two sides and in facilitating the reconciliation process. The use of honorifics, of course, is the reflection of an established cultural norm of the Oromo people.

4.2.7 Blessing and Praying for Araara 'Reconciliation'

In the recorded JSs, the elders repeatedly gave their blessings and prayed for araara ‘reconciliation' to come. In most cases, Jaarsummaa sessions commence with prayer and blessing. Again almost every speaker who took turns in the discussion and reconciliation phases of the recorded JSs started his speech with prayer for araara ‘reconciliation’. Below are sample excerpts from cases recorded for the current study:

EWf: …May God reconcile these children…(L-867) EHs: My ‘son’ AB [husband], may God bring reconciliation between you [couples]. May He who brought you together [God] from the beginning reconcile you…(C2-Ca 1-s1-33’). El: I also come to you GM’s father. May God reconcile you …(C3-Ca 1-S 2- 43’).

Through their prayer and blessing, the above elders expressed their wish for the reconciliation of the disputants. They repeatedly mentioned the term araara “reconciliation”. This repeated prayer for reconciliation by the elders of both sides could help pacify the disputants and psychologically influence them to accept the elders' decision and come to reconciliation. Implied in the prayer/blessing of the elders is also the fact that reconciliation is something that can be achieved with the will of God. Here the elders constructed their identities as messengers who are there to accomplish the will of God. This type of positive self- presentation could help mediators build their credibility in the face of the disputants (Silbey and Merry, 1986). It could also serve the elders as one way of legitimizing their actions by appealing to supernatural power. According to Aristotle’s persuasion theory also, positioning oneself as fair and helping character could help the speaker persuade his/her audience by making a credibility appeal (Biber, Connor and Upton, 2007). The use of blessing and prayer could also help mediators to make affective appeals by putting disputants in positive emotional state.

4.2.8 Affirming the Positive Worth of Disputants Affirming the good qualities of disputants was also one of the persuasive discourse strategies that the elders used in JSs to cool down the emotion of disputants and lead them to reconciliation. According to Biber and his colleagues, a speaker or a writer can present himself/herself as a person of good intention by making positive comments about his/her audiences because, “it takes good will to notice and appreciate the good deeds of others “ (Biber et al.,2007:131). In the recorded JSs, the elders had made positive comments about the personalities and past deeds of the disputants. For instance, one of the elders of the husband side in Case 1 described the behavior of the wife as follows:

EHs: This girl [wife] has done nothing wrong. You Arsi [elders in the session], this girl gives for the hungry, for the satisfied one, for the sick. Whenever she drinks coffee, she always calls the Showa [other clan] and the Arsi. She invites all her neighbors… (L- 758-761)

200 The speaker described the wife as an innocent, sympathetic, sociable, and generous person who equally respects all her neighbors and generously shares what she has with them. Similarly, one of the elders on the husband side affirmed the positive qualities of the husband as follows:

EHs: GA [husband] also didn't mean to intentionally cause trouble. He has lack of awareness… no one exceeds GA naturally and economically … both DA and QA [husband's brothers] are not better than GA…(L-696-698)

The speaker compared the husband with two of his brothers and positioned him as capable and hardworking person who is economically and personally better than his brothers. The speaker also reformulated the husband's mistakes as something that he committed due to lack of awareness rather than intentionally committed fault. The wife's father in Case 1 also described the couple’s life positively by saying “If God has given them both children and cattle. They have no problem at all…” (L-953-954). The speaker clearly indicated that the couple has been cherished with children and cattle. This kind of positive positioning can help disputants develop positive self-image which in turn helps them forget their anger or conflict stories. In general, speakers in the above excerpts tried to persuade disputants by making both credibility and affective appeals. Therefore, in accordance with Aristotle’s persuasion theory, the elders appreciate the past deeds of those in dispute to make a credibility appeal

4.2.9 Giving Advice and Expressing Care

In the reconciliation phase of the recorded JSs, the elders also gave advice to the disputants and expressed how much they care about their wellbeing. The following excerpts illustrate this:

ME: You own these properties jointly. If you face some problem, sell these animals on agreement. Discuss on everything to make decisions. That is how it should be. You boy also accept what is said. Stop it there. Talking over and over again has no use…(L- 1104-06). In the excerpt, the speaker emphasized that both the husband and the wife have equal right over their common properties. He advised them to discuss and make decisions jointly regarding their common properties. The speaker also advised the husband not to repeat his previous faults. By showing care and giving advice, the elders in the recorded JSs have made credibility and affective appeals which in turn persuaded disputants to accept the proposed resolutions. When mediators show compassion to the disputants, the disputants can easily develop trust in the mediators. This in turn can help facilitate the reconciliation process. Such intervention strategy of mediators is called norm educating (Deng, 2003; Wolski, 2002; Silbey and Merry, 1986).

4.2.10 Using Proverbs and Sayings The use of proverbs and sayings is very common among Oromo elders in general. Scholars affirm that cultural sayings and proverbs can serve as important tools in resolving conflicts (Agbaje, 2002). Agbaje (2002:237), who conducted a study on the use of proverbs in conflict resolution among Yoruba society in Africa, states that "Any kind of penetrating comment on behavior may be made in the form of a proverb and used to warn or advise or bring someone to his senses…" It is possible to deduce from this quotation that using proverbs and sayings help mediators change disputants’ mind set by making affective appeal. In the recorded JSs, the elders used various proverbs and sayings in the discussion and reconciliation phases to manage the communication of the sessions and lead disputants towards reconciliation. The

201 analysis of the contextual meanings and communicative purposes of some of the proverbs and sayings used by the elders has been discussed below. i. Jabbiif dubbii maraa hindhawatan (L-522) (One shall not complicate an issue as one shall not tie a calf with repeated knots)

In this proverb, jabbii literally “calf” symbolizes the Case being mediated while repeated knots refer to the disputants’ and the elders’ speech. According to this proverb, if one ties a calf with repeated knots, one will face difficulty to unknot the rope and release the calf. While the person is struggling to untie the knot, the calf may hurt itself. Similarly, if disputants or elders of one side talk too many negative things about each other, it makes the reconciliation process very difficult. The ME used this proverb to warn the participants not to complicate the issue by raising unnecessary questions or criticisms about each other.

ii. Dubbii gara nyaattee hidhabanii, biraa deebi'anii (L-690-1) (One has always some more things to say about an issue under discussion, but one needs to stop it somewhere) One of the elders in Case 1 has used this proverb to make elders of both sides to stop discussing too much about the disputants problem and gear the discussion of the session towards reconciliation phase. The speaker used this saying because he realized that digging further into the problem might widen the gap between the two sides and make the reconciliation process difficult. iii. Utubaa manaa haga dhiibaniif haga dhiisan qaba (L-994) (A pillar of a hut shall be pushed to a certain limit) Traditionally, when a hut is built, the roof and the wall are built separately. After the construction of the wall is finished, a group of people pick up the roof which is separately prepared and put it on the finished wall. To help the group put the roof on its right position, some people stand inside the wall, insert the pillar into a hole at the center of the cone-shaped roof of the hut, and pull or push it to the upright position. According to this proverb, if we push the pillar of a hut beyond its limit, the roof may tilt to one side and the pillar may not support the roof properly. This saying was used by the ME to stop the elders of the wife side from blaming the husband further and aggravating the situation. Through this proverb, the elder made a rational appeal.

iv. Dammaaf soddaa hinduudhatan (L-1001) (One shall not strongly tighten the rope that holds a bag of honey on the back of pack animals. Likewise one shall not talk to his in-laws harshly or firmly)

This proverb has almost the same communicative purpose with the preceding proverbs. The ME used this proverb to advise the elders of the wife side and the husband side to respect each other or to talk to each other with some respect like in-laws. One’s in-law is considered Wayyuu ‘highly respected’ according to the Oromo cultural norm. The speaker used the proverb to stop raising too many negative things about each other as this may increase the gap between the two and make the reconciliation process difficult.

v. Abjuu sodaatanii, hirriiba hindhiisan/hindhaban” (L-887-8) (One can’t abandon sleeping for fear of [horrible] dream)

This proverb was used by one of the elders of the wife side in Case 1 to express his intention for the return of the wife to her husband. In this proverb, abjuu “dream [horrible]” refers to the possible abuse the wife could face from her husband whereas hirriiba ‘sleep’ refers to the

202 reconciliation of the couple. The speaker used this proverb to indirectly persuade the wife to accept the elders’ decision. It was a way of putting psychological pressure up on the wife and making her accept the resolution.

vi. Madaan huuban hodhan hinfayyuu (C2-Ca 3-s2-31’) (A wound stitched with its dirt never heals)

This proverb was used by one of the elders of the wife side to convey a warning message. In this proverb, madaa “wound” symbolizes the dispute whereas hodhuu “stitching” and huuba “dirt” symbolizes the mediation process and the wrong or unclear information respectively. Through this proverb, the speaker has indicated that if the mediation is done based on wrong or unreliable information, it won’t last longer. The proverb presupposes that the elders of the husband side had tried to hide some truth. So, the speaker used this proverb to persuade the addressees to speak the truth so that a lasting solution could be sought. In short, several sayings and proverbs have been used by the elders in the recorded JSs as major tools of educating norms and gearing the communication of the sessions towards reconciliation.

4.2.11 Procedural Intervention Strategies In addition to the above discursive strategies, the elders in the recorded JSs also used procedural intervention strategies to bring reconciliation between disputants. One of these strategies is venting the conflict emotions of disputants by allowing them to narrate their conflict stories turn by turn without any interruptions in the hearing phase of JS. Interrupting disputants, especially by the other disputant, is punishable. Scholars assert that such strategy could help disputants let out their conflict emotion or anger smoothly or “get things off their chest” (Roberts, 2008: 166). According to the same scholar, when they are listened to attentively, disputants may feel that their problems and complains are given recognition and respect. Consequently, they develop trust in the elders and accept the final resolutions forwarded by them. In the hearing phase, the elders also avoid unusual facial expressions, emotional utterances, and cross-examination questions which may indirectly approve or disapprove what the disputants tell to the session. Avoiding such discursive practices might have helped the elders to avoid creating sense of competition between disputants and triggering negative emotion which could have negatively affected the process and the outcome of Jaarsummaa.

Various ritual practices held at the end of the reconciliation phase could also be mentioned as non-verbal strategies used by the elders to make affective appeals. Most of the JSs recorded for this study were concluded with rituals such as hugging each other, kissing ones shoulders/knees, spitting on ones palms, drinking from same container at a time, and eating together. Davidheiser (2006:5) claims that ritual practices which involve “stylized apologies or pleas for forgiveness, the sharing of food or drink, or other symbolically significant activities” are used to conclude the peacemaking or conflict resolution process among many societies. Intervention strategies which focus on the substantive aspect of the interaction of a mediation such as rephrasing, reformulating, focusing and commonly used by mediators in the western culture, were rarely used in recorded JSs. This is true mainly because Jaarsummaa, unlike the mediation in the western culture, does not allow direct interaction between disputants. The communication of disputants in Jaarsummaa session is directed towards the elders.

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5. Summary and Conclusion

As discussed above, the elders in the recorded JSs have used various persuasive discourse strategies in their attempt to convince disputants accept the reconciliatory decisions. Among discourse strategies commonly used by the elders include: making direct request, forecasting negative consequences, claiming for impartiality, using collective voice, telling anecdotes, using honorifics, blessing and prayer for reconciliation, affirming positive worth of disputants, and the use of proverbs and sayings.

Through these strategies, the elders made one or two persuasive appeals at a time. They predominantly made credibility appeal by positioning themselves as guardian, norm educators, agents of peace, compassionate or goodwill persons. The elders also affirmed the positive qualities or personalities of the disputants and this in turn helped the elders persuade the disputants by avoiding instances of communication which may threaten the face or public self-image of the disputants. According to Griffin (2000), face saving communication strategies are important tools that mediator in any culture must use in order to carry out their activities effectively. The elders also threatened the disputants with possible negative consequences such us undesirable outcomes of litigation if they opt for formal court disregarding the proposed reconciliatory decision. Positioning themselves as agents of peace who execute the will of God and threatening them with possible punishment of God were also among the persuasive discourse strategies used by the elders.

In general, positive presentation of self and the Jaarsummaa program is the major persuasive discourse strategies of the elders of Arsi Oromo. However, various procedural intervention strategies used in JSs such as venting the conflict emotion of disputants, avoiding cross- examination questions and testifying in favor of one side also contributed a lot in bringing reconciliation between the disputants.

From the results of the analysis presented in the preceding section, one can reasonably conclude that Jaarsummaa as an indigenous mechanism of conflict resolution draws on complex discursive and procedural intervention strategies which have scientifically proven values in cleansing the sense of enmity and persuading disputants to come to reconciliation. These indigenous persuasion strategies of the elders of Arsi Oromo are in congruence with Aristotle’s theory of persuasion. Again, although Jaarsummaa as a method of conflict resolution best functions in collectivist culture where people share common cultural values and norms, mediators in western society can learn a lot from the discourse strategies or rhetoric skill of elders in Jaarsummaa discourse. 6. Policy Recommendation With the pretext of modernization and cultural assimilation, indigenous method of conflict resolution had been relegated in the justice system of Ethiopia for decades (Fiseha, Gebre and Fekade, 2011). Most of the codes of the modern legal system of the country were also prepared based on the western cultural values and practices (Mulugeta, 1999). However, Article 34 (5) of the 1995 constitution of Ethiopia allowed legal pluralism to encourage the use of indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution alongside modern court. Nevertheless, the attention given to revitalizing and utilizing indigenous mechanism of conflict resolution is still in its infantile stage in Ethiopia. The practical support given to indigenous institutions of conflict resolution is minimal. Hence, giving due attention to Jaarsummaa and related indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution in the legal policy of

204 the region/country can significantly help in improving the quality of service in the justice system by reducing the case load of modern courts. Integrating elements of these indigenous practices into the educational curriculum of the region could also help in preserving the systems and promoting their utilization in a sustainable manner.

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205 Fiseha Assefa, Gebre Yntiso and Fekade Azeze .(2011). The state of knowledge on customary dispute resolution in Ethiopia. In: Yntiso Gebre, Fekade Azeze and Assefa Fiseha (eds). 2011,pp. 21–36. Graedler, A.L. (2000). Cultural shock. Retrieved December 6, 2006 from: http://www.hf.uio.no/iba/nettkurs/translation/grammar/top7culture.html Griffin, E. (2000). A first look at communication theory (4th ed.). Boston: McGraw- Hill. Jeylan Woliyi Hussein. (2004). A cultural representation of women in Oromo society. African Study Monographs, 25(3), 103-147. Jeylan Woliyi Hussein .(2005). The function of African oral arts: The Arsi Oromo oral arts in focus. African Study Monograph, 26(1), 15-58. Kohlhagen, D. (2005). Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and mediation: The experience of French-speaking countries" How to Make ADR Work in Ethiopia, A Course held on 17 and 18 April at the EACC. Addia Ababa. Lewis, H.S. (1988). Values and procedures in conflict resolution among the Shoan Oromo. In Beyene Taddese (ed) Proceedings of Eighth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University, 673- 678. Lovenheim, P. and Guerin, L.(2004). Mediate, don’t litigate strategies for successful mediation: USA: Nolo. Macfarlane, J. (2007). Working towards restorative justice in Ethiopia: Integrating the traditional conflict resolution system with the formal legal system. Cardozo, Journal of Conflicts Resolution, Vol.8, 487-509. Malan, J. (1997) Conflict resolution wisdom from Africa. African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD). Mamo Hebo .(2006) Land, local custom and state policies: Land tenure, land dispute and land dispute settlement among Arsii Oromo of Ethiopia. Kyoto: Shoukadoau Book Seller. Mulugeta Ayalew .(1999). Anthropological approach to Ethiopian law: Legal pluralism, and the nature and status of customary law in Ethiopia. LL.B. Thesis. Addis Ababa University. Roberts, M. (2008). Mediation in family disputes principles of practice (3rd Edn.). UK: Ashgate Publishing. Rogers R. (2004). An introduction to critical discourse analysis in education. London: Laurence Erlbaum Associates. Silbey, S.S., and Merry, S.E. (1986) Mediator settlement strategies. Law & Policy, Vol.8.(1),7-32. Szmania, S. J. (2004) "Beginning difficult conversations: An analysis of opening statements in Victim Offender Mediation/Dialogue." Unpublished PhD Dissertation: The University of Texas at Austin. Tarekegn Adebo and Hanan Tsadik .(eds) (2008). Making peace in Ethiopia: Five cases for traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution. Addis Ababa: Master Printing press. Van Leeuwen, T. (2008). Discourse and practice new tools for critical discourse analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wolski, B. (2002). Mediator settlement strategies: Winning friends and influencing people. Bond Dispute Resolution News, Volume 12 ( ).

206 Exploring Problems and Prospects in Revitalizing Gadaa: The Case of Odaa Doggii

Lemessa Wakgari (MA) Lecturer at Department of Oromo Folklore and Literature

Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities Mettu University, Mettu, Ethiopia

E-mail: [email protected]

ABSTRACT: The primary aim of this ethnographic research is to explore problems and prospects in Ilu Gadaa revitalization. To get data from the society of interest, interviews, focus group discussions, case studies and direct observation methods were employed. Data gathered from the field were analysed qualitatively in line with the societies’ perspective and in a manner the science of ethnographic study permitted. Thus, data from the field show that Ilu Gadaa that had weakened for more than 133 years is in the process of revitalization. Accordingly, in 2015 five Gadaa parties were established in Ilu Abbaa Boor. However, in the revitalization process, the Gadaa system is facing several problems; for instance, the electoral process for the Gadaa leader is not according to gadaa law. Next, the institution lacks a budget. It is dependent on a government fund. Besides, the impact of Globalization and modernization are other problems. Moreover, the impact of Christian and Muslim religion is another challenge. Lastly, the studied people have little knowledge of Gadaa system. Contrary to this challenge, the reviving Ilu Gadaa contributed a lot for registration of the Gadaa by UNESCO in 2016. This is due to the fact that Ilu gadaa is considered as active Gadaa among the western Oromia. However, in the revitalization, Gadaa is changing its originality because of the aforementioned factors. So, the researcher recommended that different individuals, government, stakeholders, NGO’s, and educational institutions have to engage further research on Ilu Gadaa.

Key words: Gadaa, revitalization, problems, prospects, OdaaDoggii.

1. Introduction

Scholars agree that like other African societies, the Oromoo people have their own socio- political, cultural, and religious philosophy that distinguishes them as a nation (Gemechu, 1993; Mohammed, 1994). Among these, the Gadaa system is a fundamental one. Gadaa is an institution, which guides Oromoo in socio-political, economic, religious, and in all aspects of life. According to Asmarom, (1973) Gadaa has three interrelated meanings: “it is the grade during which a class of people assumes politico-ritual leadership, a period of eight years during which elected officials take power from the previous ones and the institution of Oromoo society”.

Scholars that had studied the Gadaa system confirm that it is a unique, participatory, and egalitarian system of governance developed by the Oromoo people. Accordingly, Gadaa Melbaa (1988) indicates, that the Gadaa system has served as the basis of democratic and egalitarian political system for the Oromoo. Under it the power to administer the affair of the nation and the power to make laws belong to the people. Dirribii (2011) stated that the Oromoo Gadaa System

207 is one of Oromoo people’s contributions to black civilizations. Still, some sources show that, it is difficult to know the exact time and place for the origin of Gadaa. However, other sources show that the Gadaa system has been in practice since at least before the 16th century and was well functioning in the 16thcentury (Asafa, 2012; Alemayehu, 2009; Makuria, 2012).

In the development of Gadaa, there are two major historical events. These are the interruptions of Gadaa and the revivals of Gadaa. The first indicates the deteriorating condition of Gadaa because of external and internal pressures, and the latter designates reorganization of the Gadaa system in a new form. The first challenge, which some sources reveal for the disruption of Gadaa system, was the expansion of the Christian kingdom and Muslim Sultanates in Ethiopia that led to the interruption of Gadaa (cinna Gadaa) from 756-1116 among some clans of the Oromoo. Although Gadaa leaders like Abbolee, Habroo, CangareeKorboo, Harruu Maaruu, and Namoo Dooyyo attempted to strengthen Gadaa in 12thc, the prolonged Christian-Muslim conflicts (13- 15thc) pushed the Oromoo below Awash River (Alemayehu, 2009; Geremewu, 2012).

However, beginning from the second half of the 15th century (1450), the Oromoo reformed their Gadaa (haaromsaGadaa) by strengthening their military capacity and fought 12 Buttaa wars (1522-1608) to liberate their territories. This made the Oromoo the strongest power in the Horn of Africa from the 16th to the 19th century. The second round of problems that challenged and disintegrated Gadaa appeared at the beginning of the 19th century. These include the formation of Oromoo Monarchies (mootii), especially among the western Maccaa and Menelik II’s incorporation of Oromoo land into Abyssinia through intensification of Christianity and Islam. Accordingly, the systems began to decline and crumble gradually in the second half of the 19th century (Tesemma, 2002; zelalem, 2012). However, Gadaa is currently revitalizing in the 21st century. Different Gadaa centres are reviving in some parts of Oromiya. Among the reviving Gadaa centres, Odaa Doggii, is the least studied one.

1. 2. Statement of the problem

Some Oromoo intellectuals believe that any attempt to study Oromoo history and culture needs to look into the Gadaa system. Dereje Hinew (2012: 82) endorsed this idea saying that “The socio-economic, political and religious lives of the Oromoo were highly intertwined which would be incomplete without investigating the origin of Gadaa system.” In fact, it is essential to any person who wants to study the Oromoo culture to look into the Gadaa system. Depending on this reality, different scholars from various disciplines conducted research on the Gadaa system. Most of them studied Gadaa from the perspective of their fields of studies. Yet, some studies on the Gadaa system mostly show social and political aspects of it.

Regarding problems and prospects in Gadaa revival, there is still a shortage of literature. Recently, Dula and wondachew (2017) studied the Ilu Gadaa system focusing on its decline and restoration. Still, this research did not examine problems and prospects in Ilu Gadaa revitalization. Additionally, Busha et al, (2016) studied historical and political significance of Gadaa system. This study also does not address problems and prospects in the revitalization of Ilu Gadaa. Generally, although a significant number of anthropological and historical studies have been done on the Oromoo Gadaa system, few attempts were made to understand revitalization of Gadaa in line with problems and prospects in its revitalization. However,

208 revitalizing Gadaa centres are facing different challenges. Therefore, this research was conducted in order to fill this gap by answering the questions posed in the section below.

1.3. Research questions

-What are the major challenges in the Ilu Gadaa revitalization?

-What is the role of the Ilu Gadaa centre in maintaining the tradition of the Ilu Oromoo?

-What are the major activities performed by the current Ilu Gadaa leaders?

-What are the prospect/ futurity of the reviving Ilu Gadaa?

-What is change and continuity in revitalizing Ilu Gadaa?

1.4. Objectives of the study

1.4.1. General objective of the study

The general objective of this study is to explore problems and prospects in revitalization of Ilu Gadaa at Odaa Doggii.

1.4.2. Specific objectives

The specific objectives of this study are to:

 Identify the major challenges in Ilu Gadaa revitalization  Describe the role of Odaa Doggii in maintaining tradition of the Ilu Oromoo  Assess the major activities currently performed by Ilu Gadaa leaders  Aanalyse the prospects/futurity of the revitalizing Ilu Gadaa system  To look at change and continuity in revitalizing Ilu Gadaa

1.5. Methodology

1.5.1. Research Design

This study employed an ethnographic method, which needs fieldwork to get first-hand information from the informants who have knowledge of the topic under study. Additionally, some historical data are used. It is designed to provide a framework for the collection and analysis of data. Hence, the data collected from the field using in-depth interviews, focus group discussion, and observation is analysed from the emic point of view. Thus, to investigate the stated problems and to achieve the research objectives, a descriptive research design is employed. This research design is accomplished by using a qualitative research approach.

1.5.2. Sample and sampling techniques

209 The researcher used a purposive sampling technique, “A type of non-probability sampling in which the units to be observed are selected on the basis of the researcher’s judgment about which ones will be the most useful or representative.” (Earl Babbie, 2008). By purposive sampling, first Ilu Abbaa Boor zone Culture and Tourism Office was consulted. They also informed the researcher about knowledgeable persons. Then, the researcher determined from whom the adequate and authentic data can be acquired. In this case, the researcher consulted peoples from various occupations and statues; Gadaa leaders, elders who have knowledge of Gadaa, school teachers, and some experts from culture and tourism office. Afterward, three districts were selected as suitable areas for the study; they are: Mattu, Yaayyoo, and Hurrumu. . The researcher designated ‘Yaayyo’ as a centre for the research; and used the other clans, such as the Mattu, Hurrumu, Doorani, Nonnoo, Buree, Buunno, Coora, and Suphe as representative samples. Because, formerly, these groups were the major clan assemblies at Odaa Doggii by representing salgan Ilu called ‘warra sagalee salgan mataa afurtamii shani’. Thus, these community elders of the area are used as the representative of all Salgan Ilu Gadaa system by purposive sampling technique.

1.5.4. Instruments of data collections

1.5.4.1. Interview

Interviews have been used as a primary data collection method in this study. In this case, both structured and semi-structured interviews were used. The researcher conducted interviews with key informants until adequate data required for this research was collected. Through interviews, different informants who have knowledge of the Gadaa system were interviewed at their workplace and home. Especially, Gadaa leaders, experts from the Culture and Tourism Office, and generally informed persons of the community from different ages and status were interviewed until adequate data were gained.

1.5.4. 2. Focus Group discussion

Focus group discussions were carried out with selected informants that were representative of various ages, status, and Gadaa leadership. Two Focus Group Discussions were conducted. In FGD1, eight people which included two women, three community members, one Gadaa leader, and two young were enquired. Within FGD2, one Abba Gadaa, three Culture and Tourism office experts, and four knowledgeable elders were involved. The participants were asked about their perceptions of Gadaa. In this case, elders who have knowledge of the Gadaa system in the past and new Gadaa leaders were involved in the discussion. Gadaa leaders were allowed to speak freely with each other as well as with the Oromoo community that has been selected for this study. Using this method helped the researcher to crosscheck and triangulate the data.

1.5.4.3. Observation

In ethnographic fieldwork, observation is essential. In this case, the researcher observed the activities of a few Gadaa leaders during an actual Gadaa assembly. Additionally, the current statues of the revived Gadaa centre Odaa Doggii/ Dirree AbbaaAlangaa was observed. By this

210 method, the researcher found that the Ilu Gadaa centre (OdaaDoggii) is being well promoted and conserved.

1.5.4.4. Case Study

For this method, two cases of community conflict that were solved by the Gadaa council (customary court) were assessed. This method helped the researcher to identify the performance of the current Ilu Gadaa system. It was also used to evaluate the significance of the Gadaa system in conflict resolution by comparing it with the current government court.

1.6. Method of Data Analysis

The data obtained from the different research instruments were translated and presented. In doing so, both the data obtained from field were analysed and interpreted qualitatively. In short, the overall data collected were analysed and interpreted qualitatively, and finally conclusions were drawn from the analysed data. The analysis was conducted from the people’s knowledge, tradition perspectives, and in line with the principles of ethnographic research.

2. The Study area

Before proceeding to a discussion on the topic of the paper, it is essential to note that the term Illu Abbaa Boor is not current. At present, the zone has been divided into Bunno Beddellee and Ilu Abbaa Boor. Since these societies have a common culture, lore and language, the term Ilu Abbaa Boor was used for both zones to simply describe the research site. Ilu Ababor Zone is located in the South-western part of the regional state of Oromiya. It covers the western part of the region and lies between 340 52’12’’ E to 410 34’ 55’’E longitudes and 70 27’ 40” N to 90 02’ 10” N latitude. The zone is surrounded by two regional states and three zones of the Oromiya National Regional State. The zones and regions bordering Ilu Abbaa boor are: Gambela Region (west), Jimma Zone (east and southeast), Wellaga (north and west), East Wellega (northeast), and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region (south).

2.1. Derivation and appellation of the name ‘Ilu Abbaa Boor (a)’

According to the oldest definition, the name Ilu Abbaa Boor is said to have come from two Oromoo words, “Ilu" and "Abba Booraa". Thus, ‘Ilu’ is the name of a clan, and “Booraa” was the horse name of Chali Shono, who founded the ruling family of the area. However, modern studies show Ilu Abbaa Boor as the correct name of the province rather than “Ilu Abbaaa Booraa”. According to my informant (Imam Abdu), before Menelik’s conquest, the names of this region were known as araddaa Makkoo Bilii, qabiyyee laaftoo Guuyyee. The name of this area changed to Ilu Abbaa Boora, when king Shewa (Menelik) conquered the area. Many scholars noted that the name Abba boor comes from the horse name of Caalii Shono. However, other informants claim that the name Abbaa Boor was not the horse name of Caalii but a name given to him as a sign of respect. Thus, according to the Ilu Oromoo naming tradition, if the name of a person is Caalii, he is awarded the name of Abbaa Boor. At this point, there are similar names given to individuals in this area.

211 Operational definition of some terms

Abbaa boor The name of a former I/A/B leader (Caaliishoonoo)

Abbaa Duulaa Military commander, a position of war leader

Abbaa Gadaa A leader of one Oromoo Gadaa term (eight years period)

Bokkuu A symbol power of Abbaagadaa (sceptre) made up of olive tree

Doggii Salgan Ilu Gadaa assembly centre found in Yayyoo district

Gadaa Indigenous Oromoo socio, political, cultural and religious institution

Ilu One of the Tumme clan who occupied formerly Ilu current Ilu A/ boor

Koodoo Ilu local Gadaa center found in Mattuu district, Koodoo Hirriigandaa

Odaa A type of respected tree (Sycamore) considered as Oromoo national symbol

3. Result and discussion

Results

As Asafa(2013) stated, Since there are many external and internal forces that directly or indirectly stifle the development of Orommummaa by undermining the restoration of Gadaa, what should genuine Oromoo nationalists do? The finding of this research shows that the revitalizing Ilu Gadaa system is facing several challenges; they will be discussed in detail below. On the other hand, the future of the Gadaa Ilu seems bright since good opportunities are also available.

3.1. Impact of Globalization, modern education and modernization

Modernization brings changes in the attitude and behaviour of local people. As a result, they forget their own culture and copy from imported cultures that are perceived to be modern.. However, according to Manger Amit (2015), the primary goal of modernization is maximizing development. Thus modernization provides benefits to local communities but it also affects society in other ways too. Accordingly, Oromoo parents have been sending their children to the urban centre in search of quality education, which is often far away from rural communities. Although education does not directly side-line their folk culture and instruments, it changes the entire cultural value system in which their identity is rooted.

In Ethiopia, due to the dominance of Abyssinian culture in education, Oromoo children are unwilling to learn. . It is only in recent times that certain elements of Oromoo culture began to be integrated into students’ textbooks. Besides, children are spending the better part of their day in schools in which a foreign culture to the Oromoo is taught. As a result, there is less opportunity among the Oromoo children to understand their traditional culture in which Gadaa system is reflected. Here, Oromoo children are losing their culture due to two major reasons: the first is

212 the influence of globalization, which carries out western culture, and the second is the influence of Abyssinian culture, which denies Oromummaa. The first impact is common for all children over the world. However, the second point had a great impact on Oromoo culture.

The acceptance of modern technology is a demand of the modern era and it is one of the unquestionable product of the current world. Due to acceptance of such products by the communities, the origin of traditional culture (Gadaa system) is losing its value and significance gradually. The young are interested in western culture instead of their own culture. They are losing interest in their own culture because they are familiarizing themselves with modern technology (television, CD, DVD, Cell Phone, etc.) that tend to promote western culture. Younger generations are under the influence of western culture, which has alienated them from their traditional culture in which their real identity (oromummaa) is hidden. Next to this, the colonization of Oromoo by the Abyssinia has negatively affected Oromoo culture to a greater extent.

3.2. Colonial Legacy

One of the challenging issues is that Ethiopia is a heterogeneous society. Before colonialism, different peoples, empires, tribes and kingdoms inhabited the territory known as Ethiopia today. These peoples have different cultures, traditions, and religions. The colonialists did not consider these divergent issues but went ahead and welded them together as one country. Until recently, where the only cultural show was performed in Ethiopia, there had never been attempts to nationalize Oromoo cultural heritage. Bear in mind that there are some people either Oromo or alien who still have a negative attitude toward the Gadaa system. This is inherited from the Ethiopian colonialism.

In the past, Gadaa tradition and all Oromoo culture was considered as backward and uncivilized. Due to Abyssinian regime, it couldn’t develop well until today. Until now, this negative outlook couldn’t be erased from some people’s minds. This had an impact both directly and indirectly on the revitalization of Ilu Gadaa. In Ilu Abbaa Boor, Qaalluu institution disappeared during the past regime. Formerly, three well known Qaalluu of this area were: Qaalluu Abbaa Caffee, Qaalluu Maallimoo Suuttaa and Qaalluu AseelloBongaa. However, Qaalluu institution disappeared from Ilu Abbaa Boor around 1942 by the proclamation of Haile sellasie. So the disappearance of such institution had great impact on Gadaa. This is due to colonialism of Oromia by Abyssinia.

3.3. Current Government system impact

As aforementioned, traditionally Salgan Ilu Gadaa had 56 seats (teessoo); however, in Gadaa revitalization process the seat decreased to 48. It is difficult to know from where the number has emerged. However, we can assume that there are 24 districts in Ilu Abbaa Boor. From each district, two people were selected to make up48 seats in total. This is caused by an influence from the government on the Gadaa system. They have to know that Gadaa is an indigenous Oromoo governing institution, which contributed a lot to the modern government. Generally, rather than imposing current parliamentarian system on Gadaa, the reverse is better. This problem might be emerging from pressure by the government but, the governing party have little

213 knowledge of Gadaa. Besides, there is also the influence of government on Gadaa leaders to achieve their propaganda.

The government body needs to be acknowledged by the society. Following this, currently a few Gadaa leaders are blessing government saying ‘mootummaa Gadaa keenya nuu deebise kana galanni haa ga’u’ means thanks to government who revive our Gadaa. This seems that, Gadaa system is revitalizing by the model work of government. One of my informants said that, we (the Gadaa leaders) are blessing the current government; however, we know each and everything in the system. When Gadaa revitalization were made at Odaa Doggii in 2015, there were unnecessary writings and announcements that promoted the government. The reason seems to be that the government wanted to appear as though it had a great impact on preserving the Gadaa system.

3.4. Lack of budget/Financial problem

The other challenge of Ilu Gadaa is the lack of budget. In Oromoo culture, people provide Gadaa leaders with necessary materials like food and drinks. Now Gadaa leaders have no budget as an institution. Peoples are also not helping them according to custom. Gadaa leaders expect all things from the pocket of the government, even to move from place to place in order to participate in Gadaa activities, like conflict resolution, rituals, and to partake in any societal issue. Great economic contribution is expected from concerned bodies to create an independent Gadaa institution. The government has to support the institution since it is believed that Gadaa could bring peace, development, and prosperity in this country.

3.5. Lack of Galma / Caffee ( Hall )

The other problem is the lack of an assembling centre/galma. Traditionally, Odaa is the Gadaa centre for Oromoo. Nowadays there are no such respected trees in the area the study was conducted. But, the people are using other trees instead of Odaa. However, the respect for Odaa and other trees is different. If we construct a house in the place of Odaa, it would not be authentic. The Oromoo attitude towards Odaa is different from a house. A house has its own significance and philosophy in the Oromoo tradition. The Oromoo have great respect for Odaa. In Oromoo tradition it is taboo to lie under Odaa. The truth can only be revealed under the Odaa tree. So it may not be compatible to build a house in the place of an Odaa tree. In regard to this, Yaayyoo elders claim that the past regime saidthat Yaayyoo have to be the capital city of Ilu Abbaa Boor. Their argument in regards to this point is that Yaayyoo is the centre for all the clans of Ilu Abbaa Boor. They also relate this idea with the Gadaa centre itself. Ilu Gadaa centre Odaa Doggii was established in Yaayyoo based on its fair distance for all Ilu Oromoo. All clans that are found on the boundaries of Ilu Abbaa Boor are far from Odaa Doggii which is a three-day journey on foot. The knowledge system in Gadaa could create proper environment and place for the society, but the past government as well the current one could not develop such like an environment. So the originality has to be respected and priorities have to be given for the societies’ needs. In summary, the informants claim that Mattuu is not a centre for Ilu Abbaa Boor Oromoo.

214 3.6. Low level of Gadaa knowledge

The third problem is a low level of knowledge (lack of awareness) about Gadaa system. As aforementioned, the Gadaa system has been interrupted for more than 133 years in Ilu Abbaa Boor. Due to this case, it is difficult to reconstruct the knowledge of Gadaa in a few years. It can take a long time, even up to a century, as current generations have no experience of it. Additionally, the current generation don’t know their Gadaa grades and classes. They did not want to give ear to elders. Thus, knowledge of Gadaa did not transfer from father to child or from one generation to the next in the context of Ilu Abbaa Boor. When Gadaa revitalization occurred, the elected Gadaa leaders were made up of only adults. This is comparable to constructing a house from top to bottom. So they have to grow children in Gadaa rather than electing elders who are dying members of the society. Therefore, this is a great obstacle for the sustainability of the system. However, teaching the society through different media channels is important. In addition to this, the families have to grow their children according to Gadaa system.

3.7. Christian and Islam religion impacts

Christianity and Islam played a major role in weakening the Gadaa system. “Islam is introduced to Ilu Abbaa Boor by traders and religious scholars. In fact, we do not have the exact time when Islam came to Ilu Abbaa Boor. Nevertheless, the Muslims of Ilu Abbaa Boor trace their Islamization to many years back before the conquest of Menelik” (Yasin, 2009: 91The Oromoo of Ilu Abbaa Boor had a strong attachment to their traditional religion even after their conversion to Islam. These societies did not internalize this religion completely, but they did it out of fear for the others and the system of that time. Now, most of Ilu Abbaa Boor Gadaa leaders are followers of Islam ; however, they still participate in Gadaa activities. This implies that the people of Ilu Abbaa Boor are nearer to their traditional culture.

This is not to say that Islam had no impact on Ilu Gadaa; however, compared to other religions it is did not have significant influence. The second religion of concern is Orthodox Christianity.. Orthodox Christianity was introduced to Ilu Abbaa Booras the result of Menelik’s conquest of 1889. As mentioned in Yasin Mohammed (2009), “starting from Tasaamma control of the region 1889-1936 more than one hundred twenty Orthodox Church were established all over Ilu Abba bor”. However, due to strong resistance of the people and domination of Muslim religion, orthodox Christianity could not spread well into Ilu Abba Boor. They also failed to teach the Bible deeply, so even followers of Orthodox Christianity lack the foundations. However, due to the support of the government system of an earlier time, both religions still harm the Ilu society in all aspects of life.

Nowadays the most powerful religion weakening the Gadaa system is Protestant Christianity. . In history, this religion was introduced to Ilu Abba boor around 1920s by missionaries from Germany with local priests of Wallagga. The secret to the success of this religion is in the fact that they teach people through their own language so they can internalize it as part of their culture. Now, protestant churches allow different things to be performed in the church, such as: to sing a song holding grass, siiqqee, Bokku, caacuu, and any other aspects of Oromoo culture. Subsequently, to cheat the people’s heart, some of their singing styles and songs are also

215 according to Oromoo cultural music. However, they consider some rituals practiced in Gadaa system as sin.

My informants confirmed that majority of the s people in the study area are being cheated by this religion. For example, some followers of protestant religion are reluctant to participate in Gadaa activities. They are internalizing an external religion imposed on them. However, Oromoo traditional religion did not totally disappear, it is still there in Galma Qaalluu in Ilu Abbaa Boor. The elements of Oromoo traditional religion could not be erased from their mind. When Gadaa was revitalized at Odaa Doggii /laga seenaa many Oromoo Ilu Abbaa Boor participated in the ritual and displayed their affection for Gadaa revitalization. However, some aforementioned problems still exist and bring some changes on Gadaa tradition.

3.6. Change and continuity in Ilu Gadaa revitalization

Even though change is unavoidable in the case of cultural revitalization, keeping the originality must be considered. Among the changes made after the Ilu Gadaa revitalization is the forbiddance of Dhaala (Wife Inheritance). Dhaala is a marriage between a woman and the brother of her deceased husband. The reason for Dhaala in Oromoo Gadaa culture was to preserve the children of a deceased man within the family and save them from mistreatment by the stepfather to whom the widow may marry. Wife inheritance has historical significance in Gadaa system. In addition to this inheritance, marriage had a great advantage in protecting the property of the deceased person and the new husband considers his brother’s children as his own because of having blood relations. According to my informant, when the Gadaa system was in a process to be registered by UNESCO as intangible cultural heritage, wife inheritance was raised as a problem on the grounds that it neglected women’s rights.

Hence, the Gumii proposed to reject wife inheritance from Gadaa law. However, some groups like Borana and Guji refused to accept the new law and defended the idea of Dhaala, while other groups like Ilu Abbaa Boor Gadaa leaders accepted the new law. Everybody can understand how those who have deep knowledge of Gadaa stand firm in support of their traditional culture. In spite of this, the new Gadaa leaders are changing in response to global pressure. It is better to convince the importance of Dhaala to those who want to modernize rather than simply accepting their ideas and change Gadaa laws. The next point is about religion. According to Gadaa laws, a follower of a foreign religion could not be elected to be Abba Gadaa. Oromoo culture and Oromoo religion cannot be exercised separately. However, when Gadaa-revitalization was made at Odaa Doggii, the elected Gadaa councils and even the Abbaa Gadaa himself were followers of a foreign religion to the Oromoo. Following the Oromoo religion is a key requirement to be Abbaa Gadaa. We cannot reject the law today. Such a change leads to a deviation from the tradition of Gadaa law.

Now, some Gadaa rules were broken in Ilu Gadaa because of an attempt to modernize Gadaa (Gadaa ammayyeessuu). They do not understand the concept of modernization. We cannot modernize Oromoo Gadaa system by breaking its rule of law. If they can bring any technological advancement to the system, like a writing system, using a computer, or a communication channel like media and telephone, it can be used to simplify their work and improve Gadaa activities..

216 Changing the rule can’t be modernization rather than degradation. Despite the above challenges of Ilu Gadaa, its futurity will also be discussed below.

3.7. Prospect of the revitalizing Ilu Gadaa

Even though the revival of Oromoo culture in terms of language, tradition, and religion requires a great effort, it is now beginning to revitalize. Starting from1980’s Oromoos got an opportunity to develop their own culture, language and history through their own effort. We could not deny the history; for instance, Macca and Tulama self-help Association (MTA) started a struggle that lead to the rise of the Oromoo Liberation Front (OLF). Despite internal and external challenges nowadays, it is time for the Oromoo to develop their culture. Different individuals and institutions are currently contributing to the study and development of Oromummaa. Recently, many Oromoo scholars and nationalists are engaged in a campaign to raise awareness about the revival and renaissance of the Oromoo Gadaa System.

Based on this, we can predict the continuity of Ilu Gadaa system. The revival of Gadaa and Irreecha Malkaa Soor allowed the Ilu Oromo to learn more about their culture and identity. Most families are interested in their tradition and some started teaching their children about Gadaa. So what will the Gadaa be tomorrow? To answer this question Ilu Abbaa Bor’s culture and tourism office is fulfilling its responsibility; the nine elected Gadaa leaders (salgan yaaii abbootii Gadaa Aanaalee) are teaching the society about Gadaa system. The researcher also observed Gadaa leaders discussing with members of the society on the futurity of Ilu Gadaa system. They are also teaching their communities and maintaining the ardaa jilaa centres like OdaaDoggii.

They are also discovering other local Gada centres that are not known to the public. Different societal issues are now being solved at Gadaacourt. Galma/caffee abbootii Gadaa was also proposed to be constructed. Different institutions are supporting the revival of Ilu Gadaa. For example, Mattu University allocated one hundred thousand fifty budget to begin constructing a road to Odaa Doggii. In addition to all this, ardaa jilaa’s like malkaa soor/Odaa Maaruu is preserving and promoting. Furthermore, the Gadaa system is currently registered by UNESCO as an intangible world cultural heritage. Therefore, it can attract many tourists to this country. This can generate income for local peoples. Generally, all the ideas that were mentioned show that even if different challenges are faced, the revitalization of Ilu Gadaa is a good opportunity on hand. Since, Gadaa is the pillar of Oromummaa. Oromummaa and Gadaa are two sides of the same coin. So to develop Oromummaa, we have to support Gadaa revitalization.

4. Conclusion and policy recommendation

4.1. Conclusion

This study is conducted on the revitalization of the Gadaa system in general and on Ilu's Gadaa revitalization in particular. The study assessed problems and prospects in the process of revitalization.. The study comes up with different concepts which concern Ilu’s Gadaa system; the way Ilu Gadaa developed formerly, the gradual weakening of the system, its current revitalization process, and problems and prospects in its revitalization are clearly stated by data gathered from the knowledgeable informants of the study area. First, the study shows that the

217 name ‘Ilu Abbaa bora’ is not correct and has to be written as ‘Ilu Abbaa Boor’. Similar to other Oromoo groups, the Oromoo of this area were governed by the Gadaa system for a long time. After being separated from Odaa Bisil, they developed their Gadaa centre at a place called laga seenaa / OdaaDoggii in Yaayyoo district. Accordingly, the former nine Clans who are known as salgan Ilu were the primary developers of the Ilu Gadaa centre.

In Ilu Gadaa every clan had its own araddaa Gadaa. There was a clan who made their law at Odaakoodoo and the law made at Odaa koodoo was ratified at Odaa Doggii by the guidance of Abbaa Boor in front of the public. This is similar to current federalist systems. There are also checks and balances in Ilu’s Gadaa system. As it is known for a long time, the Gadaa system was gradually weakened by different external and internal pressures. Among the major factors that weakened the Gadaa systems are: the introduction of Christianity and Islam to the Oromoo, MenelikII’s conquest of Oromiyaa by force, conflicts between Oromoo clans and among Gadaa leaders, and the formation of monarchy (mootii) in western oromiyaa. In the case of Ilu Abbaa bor, Menelik’s war leader RasTasamma’s conquest of the area which created conflict between the Gadaa leaders was the main factor for the weakening of the Gadaa system. After the conquest, the Christian orthodox religion was imposed on the people by force; it baptized Oromoo peoples and their lands.

Both Islam and Christianity had affected the Gadaa system. However, salgan Ilu’s Gadaa system which had been declining for more than 133 years is currently revitalizing in the 21st century. As mentioned by Wallace (1956) in theory of revitalization movements, “if revitalization does not take place, anomie will continue to increase and the process of cultural worsening can lead to cultural breakdown”. The same theory can work for Oromoo Gadaa revitalization. If Gadaa revitalization does not take place, Oromoo culture, language, and religion may disintegrate, because Gadaa is inclusive of all Oromoo life. Different factors contributed for the revitalization of Ilu Gadaa. In this case, an establishment of Gumii abbootii Gadaa Oromiyaa and the restoration of Irreecha Malkaa soor in 2007 E.c were the major factors.

However, in the revitalization process, many challenges were observed. First, assigning Gadaa leaders is a problem. Those elected failed to fulfil the criteria to be Gadaa leaders. Most of them are followers of foreign religions and they are government workers. Subsequently, the institution lacks a budget. On the side of religious impact, the disease of Ilu Gadaa is currently protestant religion. Protestant religion is entering in this society’s heart through the teaching of the Bible in afaan Oromoo. Another problem is the fact that the people have little knowledge about Gadaa. It is difficult to reconstruct Gadaa knowledge in this society. However, the Ilu Abbaa Boor culture and tourism office is trying its best through different mechanisms. Giving awareness to the public is their major task. They are constructing roads and galma at Odaa Doggii and studying Ilu Gadaa system. These are among noble prospects of the system. Overall, the Ilu Gadaa system that has been revitalizing since 2015 is showing a good beginning. However, it needs some adjustment in order to keep its originality. Based on the identified problems, the researcher recommends policies in the following section.

218 4.2. Policy Recommendations

Despite the fact that Gadaa system is revitalizing in some parts of Oromiyaa, the finding of this research indicated that, the way it is revitalizing has problems. Therefore, it needs the attention of different bodies.

 Government, non-governmental organizations and all Oromo people should support the revitalization of Gadaa system among the rest of Oromo groups like wallo and RayyaAsebo.  During a Gadaa revitalization process, the government should not put its hand in the system. The election of Abbaa Gadaa (gadaa leader) should follow the traditional one.  Followers of foreign religions as opposed to waaqeffataa should not be elected as Abbaa Gada  Government as well as local people should support Gadaa leaders both in kindness and cash because they are working to bring peace in this country.  When we talk or plan for Oromoo cultural revitalization such as Gadaa, it is relevant to start at home/national level. (i.e. cultural nationalization before cultural globalization).  Ilu Abbaa boor zone culture and tourism department also has to continue studying and promoting Gadaa revitalization through different mechanisms, like media coverage, in order to give awareness about Gadaa system to the public.  Odaa Doggii (ardaajilaa) has to be respected and promoted, and Odaa has to be planted at that place  establish the necessary conditions that will enable the Gadaa leaders to play the proper role in the re-establishment of the Gadaa system on national and local levels  promote the development of the Gadaa system at all levels and work on social and cultural integration of Oromiyaa  coordinate and harmonize different outlooks between those who understand the Gadaa system differently and closely work with Gadaa supreme leaders to clarify misunderstandings in the future  Launch projects aimed at improving the Gadaa system  Cultivate and protect the Gadaa culture all over Oromiya by encouraging popular arts like,literature, and drama etc.  Encourage Oromoo youth to participate in the newly established gumii Gadaa (the revived Gadaa) and encourage them to learn and follow the age set Gadaa principles by enabling them to progress into the Gadaa party functions.  Continue the re-established Ilu siiqqee institution and safeguard women’s rights and abolish all practices that discriminate against women’s equality with men.  independent (free from gov’t influence) Gadaa institutions have to be established  There is the need for the legal protection of the Oromoo intangible cultural heritage.  Government should incorporate programmes relating to traditional cultures, heritage and folklore in the education curriculum at all levels.  Government should develop legislative protection for traditional culture, heritage museum, archives, and libraries.  Government should provide training in the use of ICT for documentation, digitization and preservation of cultural heritage.  Hence, all the Oromoo people have to revitalize the Gadaa system once again.

219 References

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AsafaJalata. (2012). Fighting against the Injustice of the State and Globalization: The AfricanAmerican and Oromoo Movement, second edition, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

______. (2013). Oromummaa: Oromoo Culture, Identity and Nationalism, (Atlanta: Oromiya Publishing Company).

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220 ______. (2002). "Bribing the Land": An Appraisal of the Farming Systems of the MaccaaOromoo in Wallagga,

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221 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REVITALIZATION OF GADAA AND OROMO INDIGENOUS RELIGION IN ACHIEVING LASTING CHANGE IN ETHIOPIA IN GENERAL AND IN OROMIA IN PARTICULAR A Paper presented by Rev. Dr. Benti Ujulu Tesso to the 33rd OSA Conference held at Rift Valley University from 26 -28 July 2019 in Finnfinne

Introduction In the last four decades, Ethiopia went through two political changes, (in 1974 and 1991) but both changes failed mainly due to the lack of incorporating indigenous cultural heritages. The cultures of many nations within Ethiopia including that of the Oromo were suppressed. For instance, the significance of Oromo cultural heritage, the Gadaa System was ignored or despised by the actors of the change. Currently, Ethiopia is in the process of another political change. However, this intended change can be lasting only if the actors of the change learn from past mistakes and are ready to adopt the useful indigenous knowledge of the Ethiopian peoples at large and the Oromo in particular. The Gadaa System of the Oromo is holistic that used to guide the political, economic, social and religious life of the Oromo. However, this important cultural heritage was deteriorated due to the colonization of the Oromo by Abyssinian Emperor Menelik II, the introduction of new religions (Christianity and Islam) and other socio-economic changes in the last two centuries. Only the ritual practice of the Gadaa continued within some Oromo clans such as Borana and Guji. Due to this fact, a large part of the Oromo people living today speak of the Gadaa history without having the experience of how it functions in practice. While appreciating the Gadaa as a precious cultural heritage invented by their forefathers, the Oromo people also need to critically evaluate and discuss how to revitalize and utilize it in the 21st century. Revitalization of Gadaa is helpful not only for the Oromo but also for other nations who belong to the Kushites including Afar, Agaw, Hadiya, Kambata Kimant, Konso, and many others. I argue, that the two main branches of the Gadaa, namely its political wing and its religious wing need to be revitalized. Since many scholars such as Asmerom Legese (1973 and 2001) and others have published works on the positive aspects of Gadaa political wing, this article will give a short critic of the political wing of Gadaa and suggests few points that need to be considered when revitalizing it. And then the article mainly focuses on the revitalization of the religious wing of the Gadaa system so that it fits the contemporary Oromo situation. At the time, the Oromo were being governed by the Gadaa system, the Oromo people were having only one religious institution, I call Oromo Indigenous Religion (OIR) that used to play a significant role in influencing the lives of the Oromo. However, today there exist other religious institutions in Oromia that influence the lives of many Oromos. Therefore, a revitalized Gadaa needs to incorporate the new religions such as Christianity and Islam. How these new religions can be incorporated will be discussed in this article. Before incorporating the three main religions into the Gadaa System, the Oromo need to be aware of the modern theory of religion and religious history that may help to bring attitude change. Therefore, the article discusses the modern theory of religion and a brief history of religious evolution with special focus on that of Kushites religion from which the OIR originated. In the end, based on the analyses presented in the article, a final summary and a few policy recommendations for revitalization and adaptation of the Gadaa System are provided.

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The Revitalization of the Political Branch of the Gadaa System In order to revitalize the political branch of the Gadaa System, one needs to reform the administrative system (in Afaan Oromo referred to as Haaroomsa Bulchiinsaa), so that it compatible with modern systems of governance. Here, I would like to provide a few suggestions:

1. Gadaa should be inclusive: The Gadaa leadership is dominated only by men and one can say it is not inclusive, therefore it cannot be effective in the 21st century. The inclusive system must begin at the early stage and continue to its final stage. That means the training of the future leaders should be inclusive in such a way, that both young Oromo girls and boys have equal rights, responsibilities, and accountabilities. This means in the revitalized Gadaa System there should be not only Abbaa Gadada (male leaders) but also Haadha Gadaas (female leaders).

2. Gadaa lacks centralism: The Gadaa leaders are elected by their clans for their clans. This could be one of the many reasons for the division among Oromo clans and for weakening the Gadaa. The future Gadaa should have a federal form of government with a clear mandate and limited power.

3. Modern bureaucratic system: the elected political leaders of the Gadaa can be changed when their period is over, but there should be qualified professionals who perform administrative matters should continue so that the bureaucratic system can be functional.

4. The Yubaa Office: The advisory office of the Yuba should continue but they should not be an obstacle to the new vision. In another language, their involvement in leadership should be nominal.

5. Buttaa Ceremony: It is important to have buttaa (the festival of the transfer of power after 8 years) ceremony, but the period of this festival is too long and expensive. Therefore, there is a need to modernize the fest in such a way it will be economical and effective.

The Revitalization of the Religious Branch of the Gadaa System The introduction of a monarchical system to the Oromo in the 19th century, did not only destroy the Oromo democratic system of government but also systematically weakened or destroyed the OIR. Emperors and Kings who ruled the Oromo were converted to Christianity or Islam and began to suppress the OIR. The visit to Abbaa Muudaa was discontinued or forbidden and that led to the emergence of pseudo-Qaalluus (corrupted leaders). Observing the corrupted Qaalluus, the missionaries of the two new religions misunderstood, or purposefully demonized the OIR and began to destroy it. In the eyes of the missionaries, the Oromo were heathens, people without a God or who believe in the spirit of their ancestors. They described the OIR as syncretism (mixed religion), polytheism (belief in many Gods and Goddesses), worship of satanism and alike. To give one example, a German missionary Bauerochse (2006) describes the Oromo people as heathens who do not get satisfaction in their religion, because of it being syncretism. He even does not

223 hesitate to argue that translating the biblical God to Oromo Waaqa is wrong. He concludes that the Oromo ideas of God and the biblical God are not identical (Benti 2018).

Such assumptions motivated me to do research and publish a dissertation titled “Oromo Indigenous Religion (OIR) and Oromo Christianity (OC) Contradictory or Compatible? A Comparative Religious Study from a Theological Perspective”. My research disqualifies the wrong assumptions made by missionaries by finding many elements in the OIR that are compatible or identical to Christianity. Based on my findings I argue that:

• Religion is part of human culture. • No religion is free from syncretism. • All religions went through religious evolution (from polytheism to monotheism). • Kushites are the first to introduce monotheism. • OIR is a continuation of Kushites’ Indigenous Religion (KIR).

To support my argument in the next sections I will discuss theories of religion, religious evolution, elements of Kushites religion continued in other religions, and some facts about OIR being a continuation of the ancient religions of the Kushites.

Theories of Religion

There are many definitions of religion, therefore it is impossible to discuss all of them in this brief work. Rather, I would like to give a very short definition and a brief overview of different theories of religion. According to the Oxford dictionary, the word “religion” is derived from the Latin word “Re-Ligare” which means to rebind. This idea was supported by the Christian philosophers amongst others, Lactantius (about 313 A.D) and St Augustine (354-430 A.D.). Both accept the idea that religion rebinds human beings to God(s).

According to E.B. Tylor and J. Frazer, "(1) The essence of religion is animism; it's a spirit behind all things; (2) Every human being is animated by soul, or spiritual principle; (3) Natural movement influence by power of that spirit who exist behind natural phenomena and personified as Gods and Goddesses; (4) They belief that God and Goddesses have similar system with human governs, than arise belief of structure power of Gods and Goddesses; (5) The structure of power Gods and Goddesses arose awareness that actually Gods and Goddesses come from one God, than emerge monotheism" (Holik 2009 n.p).

Greetz (1966) defines religion as a system of symbols: such as pictures, objects, actions, events and relationships that give meaning to someone - formulate general order of human existence. A German Egyptologist Jan Assmann (2008:10) argues that a term “religion” is as much an invention brought into the world by biblical monotheism as the idea of oneness of God itself. There were no “religions” in pagan societies, only “cults” and “cultures”. Assmann (2008) citing Clive Staples Lewis and Ralph Cudworth Lewis notes that monotheism is not a contradiction of polytheism but its maturity stage or level. All Gods must be understood as manifestations or partial embodiment of one single power called one God. Therefore, one can define all religions as monotheistic due to their acknowledgement of one Supreme deity as origin or creator of the universe.

224 Kushites Indigenous Religion and its Evolution Religion or belief is one of the elements of human culture that attempts to answer difficult questions thus responding to human spiritual needs. The ancient people invented religious ethical codes and moral laws to keep social orders and justice between creatures and creator and to maintain peace of a given society. The society can have peace only if the environment is at peace. They further believed that behind all natural and manmade catastrophes are invisible spiritual forces. Therefore, one needs to make peace with these invisible spiritual forces through peaceful communication. To communicate with the invisible spiritual beings, such as divines, gods and goddesses, they invented religious ritual practices such as sacrifices, worships and festivals. Different societies who have different languages gave different names to the gods and goddesses. And the gods and goddesses are usually associated with places such as villages, cities, countries, planets etc. Such belief system is later named polytheism (belief in many gods). At the initial stage of religious evolution, there was tolerance and all religions co-existed peacefully. But sometime later, the Kushite Pharaoh Akhenaten of the 18th Dynasty introduced the notion of monotheism (belief in one god). He raised the god Aton (the sun shape Disc) to god over all gods. This new belief was rejected by people who understood it as contradictory to polytheism. This created a religious conflict that ended by the deposition of Akhenaten (who died in 1335 B.C.) from power (Joyce A. Tyldesley, 2005). During the first religious conflict, the polytheists persecuted the monotheistic group. But later, when the monotheists became powerful, they regarded polytheism as idolatry or a contradiction to monotheism and persecuted polytheistic religions in turn. As discussed above, all religions are monotheistic which passed through different stages. Jan Assmann (2008) notes that the ancient Kushites believed in three dimensions of Divine presence and the religious evolution went through three stages: the cultic or political, the cosmic, and linguistic dimension.

1. The Cultic or Political Dimension

The Egyptian/Kushites relate the divine presence to the concept of shape, the cult image of a deity and place of worship. There is a relationship between gods and places. All major Egyptian deities are lords of towns and cities. When the Greeks conquered Egypt, they changed the names of cities in order to make them pronounceable for Greek speakers. That means they adopted the Greek names of the Egyptian deities and added the suffix “polis”. In the Greek translation they renamed Thebes Diospolis (the city of Amun=Zeus); Dendera became Aphroditopolis (Hathor=Aphrodite); Shmun became Hermopolis (Thot =Hermes) and On (the city of the sun God Re) became Heliopolis (Re=Helios). The idea that deities represent places was not limited to cities but also to the country. For instance, the Gods Horus and Seth represented Lower and Upper Egypt, respectively, and later, Egypt and foreign countries. Later in time the sun God Re known as Amun-Re represented a unified empire.

Religious feasts are participated by all citizens of the cities and on the celebration day the gods left their temple and appear to the people. According to the belief of Kushites, gods are real power who used to live on earth, but due to certain tragedy they left the earth and began to live in heaven or the underworld. Only on the day of the feast heaven and earth unite; and God returns to mankind. This happens just because God takes the initiative. There is parallel belief in Christianity. The Christians also belief that sin separated God who was near to human and he came near through Jesus Christ.

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2. The Cosmic Dimension

The Ancient Indigenous Kushite belief defines the world or cosmos as a process not as a place. And all gods of places cooperate to maintain the world so that the process of cosmos remains ongoing. Thus, they came up with the idea of the solar circuits and observing the stars, planets in the sky and accumulated the knowledge of astronomy. The duty of maintaining the universe is given to the deities that are also known as manifestations of the cosmic as well as of the earth. The Egyptian cosmic manifestation is known in their language Kheperu (transformation). In this transformation, gods were given names of stars. For instance, the Sun god who is born every morning and dies every evening and reborn again.

3. The Linguistic Dimension

The linguistic dimension of the Egyptian divine presence is described by giving a name. According to their philosophy “name” is everything that can be said about a person. It is not just identification but also a linguistic representation of a person’s essence. The names of deities mean the sacred language of honoring them. At the Linguistic dimension stage, the Kushites began to praise or honor their gods, through their myths. For instance, the myths of the god Osiris depict human hope of overcoming death (Assmann 2008:20).

The invention of polytheism by ancient Kushites is a cultural achievement because the deities are differentiated and personalized by names and functions. It is also an articulation of a semantic universe that makes the names of deities translatable into different cultures. Through translatability the gods of different cultures and religions can be equated with one another. The translation work helps to define the functions of gods “in the maintenance of cosmic, politic and social order. The sun god of one group, culture or religion is the same as the sun God of another” (Assmann 2008:54). Assmann further notes that different nations worshipped deities under different names and forms which led to a belief in a “Supreme Being” known in the Greek language as Hypsistos which means “the Highest One”. The names of god(s) are different according to their functions but remain one in unity. For instance, the unity of gods of Kushites comprised other gods: one Zeus, one Hades, one Helios, one Dionysus, one god in all gods. The same Supreme Being is given different names (gods) in different cultures. For instance, “the lao (YHWH), the god of the Jews is proclaimed to be the god of time (Olam-Aion), appearing as Hades in winter, Zeus in springtime, Helios in summer, and “Habros lao” in autumn” (Assmann 2008:54).

Religious Elements borrowed from Kushites Religion Monotheism: As discussed above, the idea of believing in one Supreme God (monotheism) was introduced for the first time by the Kushite Pharaoh Amenhotep IV also known as Akhenaten. Due to this belief, Akhenaten was deposed from his position and replaced by his son Tutankhamun. Moses grew up in the house of Pharaoh and married to the Jethro, a priest of Kushites religion that might have borrowed the belief in one God from the Kushites and adopted into Judaism. And this notion was overtaken by Christianity and other monotheistic religions.

226 Mythology: Modern scholars argue that some Mythology of the KIR had influence on Christianity. Dr. Louis Menard, Hermes Trismegiste (IX) argued that “Egyptians in very remote areas believed in the immortality of man, with reward and punishment in the future state. They believed in the existence of good and evil powers in this life and were not without personal responsibility” (Murdock 2009:1).

Deities: D.M. Murdock (2009:1) quoting the Gospel of Mathew (2:15) that reads “out of Egypt have I called my son” notes that “For what is now called the Christian religion existed of old and was never absent from the beginning of the human race until Christ came in the flesh. Then true religion which already existed began to be called Christian”. Citing the Church father St. Augustine, retractions (1:13) Murdock further describes “the religion proclaimed by him to all nations was neither new nor strange”. That means the Christian doctrine was not foreign to the ancient Egyptians.

“In Osiris the Christian Egyptians found the prototype of Christ, and in the pictures and status of Isis suckling her son Horus, they perceived the prototype the Virgin Mary and her Child. Never did Christianity find elsewhere in the world a people whose minds were so thoroughly well prepared to receive its doctrine as the Egyptians” (Dr. James P. Allen quoted in Murdock 2009:28).

Thus, the theology of monotheism, immortality, God becoming human and the virgin birth existed in the Kushites religion long before other religions. The ancient Egyptians found the elements of their Kushite religion in Christianity, accepted Christianity and built the first Church building in 180 A.D. One can also find similar notions in the Oromo Indigenous Religion (OIR). The Oromo too believe in one God who created everything. One can also find the idea of immortality in the OIR, because they say when a person dies, his soul goes to Waaqa and lives there forever. The Oromo also tell a myth about their great ancestor known as Horo who is said to be Ilma Waaq (the son of God). They also have a belief in the miraculous birth of their first Qaalluu from a virgin and is called Ilma Waaq (son of God). Such belief is parallel to the Christian doctrine of incarnation. The OIR concept of divinities called Ayyaanaa is similar to the angels in Christianity and Islam. Thus, I argue that the OIR, Christianity and Islam have very similar world views. One needs only to have new lenses that see the common elements, rather than focusing on minor differences. I further want to argue that since the Oromo anthropologically classify as Kushites, their religion, the Oromo Indigenous Religion (OIR) is a continuation of ancient Kushites religion and I will give some facts as follows. Oromo and their Religion Originate from Kushites. The modern historians, linguistics, writers and religious scholars agree that all human races originally come from Africa. According to Jackson (2015:14), “the races of man are three in number; (1), the Negroid or Ethiopian or Black race; (2) the Mongolian, or Mongolian or yellow race; and (3) the Caucasoid or European or White race. This is the very latest scheme of race classification”. And the Oromo are the descendants of the black race known as Hamitic/Kushite and I will mention some facts that support my argument.

A) Historical Facts: Keane (1920) in his history book titled “Man Past and Present” noted that the Oromo are Hamitic/Cushitic and the Bantus of Africa are the decedents of Oromo

227 (Galla as he wrote). The Original home of Oromo is believed to be North-East Africa where they lived since mystical times (OCTB 2006:16).

B) Archeological finding: An Egyptologist Petrie (1896), who discovered monuments and compared it with contemporary Oromo, notes that the Oromo people are one of the southern peoples who reanimated Egypt during the 12th Dynasty (Petrie, 1896: 126-129). In another publication titled The Making of Ancient Egypt, Petrie (1939:125) compares the sphinxes of Ancient Egyptian Pharaohs of the 7th, 10th and 12th Dynasties with those of the contemporary Oromo and concludes that they look like that of the Gallas [Oromo] (Petrie 1939:125).

Figure 1: Petrie (1939:132) The Making of Egypt, Oromo types from Abyssinia. Photos from Petrie Museum of Egyptian Archaeology. Like the above Sphinxes, the Oromo Abba Gadaa or Abbaa Muudaa wear Kallacha on their forehead. The above Callee is identical with the callee that contemporary Oromo women wear on their heads.

C) Linguistic Evidence: Jackson (2015:25) notes that the primitive language of Babylonians belongs to the Cushitic/ Kushite and may be mixed with that of the Galla [Oromo] language. A French Egyptologist Jean Doresse states that he found the word “Oromo” in ancient Egyptian with consonants only (Doresse 2002, n.p). An Oromo poet and writer Tsagaye Gebre Medhin in his poem titled: „Ilma Madhaa Abbaa Gadaa “says the word Wal – in hieroglyphics means unity and this is similar to the Oromo current name and their meanings. For example, Wallo, united, Wallaggaa great unity. Walqixxee, Walisoo, Walmaraa, Waldiyaa, all come from Wal. Waliin deemna, Waliin nyaanna, Waliin marianna, Walii galla – means in unity or united.

D) Religious Evidence: The names of gods, people and symbolical objects of the contemporary Oromo resemble that of the ancient Kushites. Therefore, I argue that the Oromo Indigenous Religion (OIR) originates from that of Kushites. Ancient Kushite Egyptians had

228 many names for god(s) and religious objects that are parallel with that of the Oromo (www.egyptartsite.com/symlst.html read on 01.02.2014).

1. Names of God given to Human

KA: According to Kushites religion, ka is usually translated as "soul" or "spirit". The ka comes into existence when an individual is born. It was believed that the ram-headed god Khnum crafts the ka on his potter's wheel at a person‘s birth. It was thought that when someone died, they met their ka". A person’s ka would live on after their body had died. Some tombs included model houses as the ka needed a place to live. Offerings of food and drink would be left at the tomb entrance so the ka could eat and drink. The Oromo god Waaqa is derived from god Ka of ancient Kushites religion. Both Ka of Kushites and Oromo Waaqa are believed to be creators who put their soul or spirit in human beings. Thus, both believe that human beings have Ka (ayyaana) that never dies. Both Kushites and Oromo give the names of their Gods to human beings and some examples are: Ka / Waaqa: Karraayyuu, Kaarrasaa, Karrituu, Waaqayyo, Waaqoo, Waaqumaa, Waaqkennee, Waaqgaarii, Waaqjiraa Waaqlaatee. Amun: Amanaa, Amantee, Amantii, Amuumaa, Ammayya, Amanuu, Amaan, Amen. At the end of our prayers we say Amen which mean let it be. When Qaalluu speaks and people respond saying Amante, Amante and it means let it be. Ra: Raayyaa, Raaso, Raaga, Raggaatuu, Raggaasaa, Roobaa Ruufo. Osiris: (Asra Ora): Oromo, Orma, Horus: Horaa, Hortuu, Horoo, hormaata, Hordofaa, Hurruubaa, Hurrubee etc. Kush or Kuusaa and Horo or Horaa are well known Oromo names. I know a person whose name is Horaa Kuusaa, which might come from the name Kush and of their God Horus. According to Oromo myths the great ancestor of Oromo “Horo” is believed to be the son of God created in heaven and dropped to earth. Horo married to Hortuu and produced many children. The meaning of Horo and Hortuu in Afaan Oromo mean produce. Haberland (1963) says that Horo/Horus is said to be borne from a virgin and called ilma Waaqa (the son of Waaqa/God). The Oromo Qaalluu is also called Ilma Waaqaa. The mother of the Akhenaten, the Pharaoh who introduced the notion of monotheism for the first time is called Tiye, a name also given to contemporary Oromo woman. The wife of Akhenaten who was said to be the mother of Pharaoh Tutankhamun is called Kiya (Kiyyaa), which is very similar to the name of Oromo given to a female child and it means mine in the Oromo language. Though it needs further research, the name Tutankhamun as well as how he came to power indicate that he was an Oromo. His name Tutankhamun could be a combination of some Oromo words which have meanings. Tutan= mass; Kh= he; amun could be amanu= believe. Thus, in Oromo language it states: “Tutan kan Amanu” meaning “he who believes in the mass”. The reason he was given such a name was because his father, Akhenaton, wanting to introduce monotheism without consulting the greater population, was deposed from the

229 throne. Then the People replaced him with his 9-year-old son Pharaoh and renamed him Tutankhamun (King Tut n.p.).

2. Oromo Symbolical Objects The ancient Kushites and contemporary Oromos have similar political and religious symbols that represent different things and have meanings.

Was: is a scepter that the deities of ancient Kushites carry as a sign of their power and dominion. It is also seen being carried by kings and later by people of lesser stature in mortuary scenes. This object resembles that of the Oromo Bokkuu scepter that the elected Gadaa leaders carry as the symbol of their authority. It is also parallel to ‘Siiqqee’- a stick that the Oromo women carry as a symbol of their authority.

Ankh: is an object of ancient Kushites that symbolizes the eternal life. As a symbol of offering the breath of life, that a person needs afterlife, the Gods of the Kushites are often seen holding an ankh to someone's lips. This holy object of the ancient Kushites can be compared to the Oromo Kallacha not in shape but in it being the most sacred object the Oromo say originally came from heaven together with the Qaalluu.

Uraeus: is the serpent emblem found in Kushites/ Egyptian portrayals of royalty and deity. It is a symbol of divine authority, representing the goddess Wedjat as the all-seeing eye of Ra. It is the emblem of the Lower Egypt believed to protect the Pharaohs by spitting fire. According to legend, the Cobra was given to the pharaohs as a sign of kingship by the god Geb (www.symboldictiona-ry.net/?page_id=676 ). The Oromo Qaalluus also have serpents that symbolize the ayyaanaas. It is believed that the sacred serpent of the Qaalluu can identify a criminal. It also shows the strength of Oromo to protect their territories. The Oromo Qaalluu and the retired Abbaa Gadaas wear the Kallachaa made up of metal and skin of Cobra on their forehead. This is very similar to the objects the ancient Pharaohs wear on their heads to show their power.

Conclusion In this article I have tried to discuss that the last two political changes in current Ethiopian state failed due to lack of incorporating indigenous cultural elements on one hand and on the other hand due to imposing foreign ideologies on the Ethiopian peoples. The article also attempts to illustrate the significance of revitalization of the Oromo Gadaa., a common cultural heritage for all Cushitic speaking peoples of Africa. The great majority peoples in current Ethiopia such as Oromo, Afar, Sidama, Somali, Bejja, Kambata, Hadiya and many others belong to the Cushitic speaking people and share this significant culture. Therefore,

230 revitalization of the Gadaa (its political and religious wing) can be helpful in answering the socio-economic and political quest of the Ethiopian peoples, in alleviating poverty and establishing sustainable peace. Last not least, this article will be concluded with few points of policy recommendation that need to be considered in the process of revitalization of the Gadaa system

Policy Recommendations Here are two points of policy recommendations that need to be considered during Gadaa revitalization. 1. The Political Wing of the Gadaa

The old Gadaa System lacks inclusiveness. The female Oromo may participate in Gadaa ceremonies but were not included in all Gadaa grades. They do not participate in all trainings given at different age groups and are not elected as Gadaa leaders. Therefore, I recommend that the Oromo young girls and boys are equally trained and participate in political leadership. The new revived Gadaa should have not only Abbaa Gadaas (President) and Abbaa Duulaas (defense minister) but also Haadha Gadaas and Haadha Duulaas.

2. The Religious Wing Waaqeffannaa In the old Gadaa System the Oromo Indigenous Religion (OIR) served as a guard and preserver of Oromo cultural heritage and the Qaalluus (Priests) were advisors of the Gadaa leaders. However, currently Oromo people belong not only to the Oromo Indigenous Religion but are also members of Christianity and Islam. Therefore, the three Oromo religions, namely Oromo Indigenous Religion, Christianity and Islam should closely work together to promote Oromumma by developing and preserving Oromo culture. To do so there is a need of attitude change among Oromo adherents who belong to these three religions. There is a need of stopping religious competition, instead make religious trialogue, identify common and differing elements. And then celebrate communality, tolerate differences and agree on peaceful co-existence of all religions. Further they should develop a holistic theology that serve both soul and body of a person. The goal of their service must be preparing human beings not only for the life after death but also for the life before death. Their motto must be “Ora et labora”, which mean pray and work.

231 Bibliography

Assmann, J. 2008. Of God and Gods. Egypt, Israel, and the Rise of Monotheism. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press Bartels, L. 1983. Oromo Religion: Myths and Rites of the Western Oromo of Ethiopia. An Attempt to Understanding. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag. Bauerochse, E. 2006. Ihr Ziel war das Oromoland, Die Anfänge der Hermannsburger Mission in Äthiopien. Münster: Lit Verlag. Benti, U.T. 1999: Some of the Consequences of Mission Methods and Contextual Evangelism Among the Wallaga Oromo with Special Focus on The Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY) 1880-1974. Theses submitted as a partial fulfilment of the requirement of the Degree of Master of Theology in the School of Theology at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg. Benti, U.T. 2004. Amantii Afriikaa Durii. EECMY-Christian Education Ministry, Curriculum development (Textbook for Bible Schools). Finfinnee: WKWWMYI; Jaarmiyaa Hog- Barruu Asteer Ganno. Benti, U.T. 2011. In Waaqwayyaa, et, al (eds) Yaayyaa. Miidhaa Amantiin Kiristaanaa fi Islaamaa Aadaa Oromoo Irraan gahanii fi gahaa jiran. Bergen Noway: Gumii Waaqeffannaa Oromoo. pp 96-149. Benti, U.T. 2016. In Shafferd, et al eds. The Journal of Oromo Studies, Volume 23, Number 1&2. The Impacts of Oromo Christianity on the Oromo Struggle for Freedom pages 157-202. Trenton: New Jersey Benti, U.T. 2018 Oromo Indigenous Religion and Oromo Christianity, Contradictory or Compatible? A Comparative Religious Study from Theological Perspective. Dissertation for Doctoral Degree (PHD) at University of Hildesheim. Universitätsverlag Hildesheim and Georg Olms Verlag Germany. Berner, U. 1982. Untersuchungen Zur Verwendung Des Synkretismus - Begriffes. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Budge Wallis E.A. 1987. Egyptian Religion Egyptian Ideas of the Future Life. London: Arkana. Budge Wallis E.A. 2014. A History of Ethiopia: Volume I: Nubia and Abyssinia Dehn, U. 2008. Brauchen wir für den interreligiösen Dialog eine Theologie der Religionen? in Handbuch der Religionen. Christliche Quellen zur Religionstheologie und zum interreligiösen Dialog. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Otto Lembeck. Clefford M Banton - 1966. Religion as a Cultural System, books.google.com read on 19.08.2016 Guyyo, D.2009. Argaa Dhageettii. The Teaching of GadaaOromo. Nairobi: GOCHA. Haberland, E. 1950.

232 Das Gadasystem der südwest-abessinischen Völker. Inaugural Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktogrades der philosophischen Fakultät der Johann Wolfgang- Goethe-Universität zu Frankfurt a.M. Detmold/Lippe Deutschland. Haberland, E. 1963. Galla Süd-Äthiopiens. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag Heller, F. 1961. Erscheinungsformen Und Wesen Der Religionen, Edited by Schröder and Christel Matthias. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag Holy Bible 1978. New International Version (NIV) Colorado: The International Bible Society. Jackson, J.G. 2015 Ethiopia and the Origin of Civilization (quoted from extract of Essay-VI, Appendix, Book- I, History of Herdus, translated by Professor Georg Rawlinson, with the Essay and notes by Sir Henry Rawlinson and sir J.G. Wilkinson) Moore. USA. Jalata, A. 2005. Oromia And Ethiopia: State Formation and Ethnonational Conflict 1868-2004. Asmara: Red Sea Press, Inc. Jalata, A. 2007. OROMUMMAA: Oromo culture, Identity & Nationalism. Atlanta: Oromia Publishing Company. Joyce A. Tyldesley, 2005 Egypt: how a lost civilization was rediscovered, University of California Press, 2005 Lise Manniche, 2000. Akhenaten Colossi of Karnak (Cairo 6G: American University in Cairo Press,) Kean A.H.1920 Man Past and Present Cambridge: At the University Press Knitter P. in Dehn. 2008. Brauchen wir für interreligiösen Dialog eine Theologie der Religionen? in Handbuch der Religionen Christliche Quellen zur Religionstheologie und zum interreligiösen Dialog. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Otto Lembeck Knutsson, K.E. 1967. Authority and Change. A Study of the Kallu Institution Among the Macha Galla of Ethiopia. Göteborg: Elanders Broktryckeri Aktiebolag. Kroeber and Kluckhohn C. 1952 Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology, Harvard University Vol. XLVII -Nr. 1 Cambridge: Massachusetts USA. Published by Museum Legese, A. 1973. Gada Three Approaches to the Study of African Society. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. Legesse, A. 2001. Oromo Democracy: An Indigenous African Political System. Asmara: Red Sea Publishers. Levine, D. 2000. Greater Ethiopia Second edition, The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society. Chicago & London : The University of Chicago Press. Mbiti, J.S. 1989. African Religions and Philosophy. Second Edition. Malaysia: Heinemann Education Publishers. Mbiti, J. 1991. Introduction to African Religion Second Edition. Great Britain: Heinemann International Literature and Textbooks.

233 Melba, G. 1988. Oromia An Introduction. Khartoum: Publisher not mentioned Mugambi, J N K1995. From liberation to reconstruction: African Christian theology after the Cold War. Nairobi: EAEP. Murdock, D.M. 2009. Christ in Egypt, The Horus - Jesus Connection. USA: Stellar House Publishing Oromia Culture and Tourism Bureau (OCTB). 2006. History of the Oromo to the Sixteenth Century. Finfinne: OCTB Pals, D. L. 1996. Seven Theories of Religion. USA: Oxford University Press. Petrie 1939 The Making of Egypt, Oromo types from Abyssinia. Photos from Petrie Museum of Egyptian Archaeology. Rambo, L. 1993. Understanding Religious Conversion. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Tylor, Edward. B. 1871. The Primitive culture: Researches into The Development of Methodology, Philosophy, Religion, Art and custom Vol 1. London: Brandbury; Evans & Co Printers Waaqjira, Dh. 2007. Daanniyaa. Atlanta: Oromia Publishing Company. Waliggo, John Mary 1986. Making a Church that is Truly African in J.M Waliggo, A. Roest Crollius S.J. T. Nkermahigo S.J.-J. Mutiso-Mbinda (contributors) Inculturation: Its Meaning and Urgency. Uganda, Kampala: St. Paul Publications-Africa. Williams, Ch. 1987. The Destraction of Black Civilization. Great Issues of A Race From 4500 B.C. To 2000 A.D. Third Edition. Chicago: Third World Press. INTERNET WEBSITES Akalu W. M. 2014 Interview with Historian Jean Doresse About Ancient Oromian Civilization, available at https://mereja.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=17&t=89973, accessed on 02. January 2015 Ancient Eygptian Myths-Ka 2014 Ancient Egypt: The Mythology the Gods, the Myths the Symbols the Lands the Resources.Available at http: www.egyptianmyths.net › the Symbols/ accessed on 11.09.2014 Chernus, I. (n.y &n. p). Religion as a Cultural System: The Theory of Cliford Geertz. Available at: www.colorado.edu/ReligiousStudies/chernus/.../GeertzSummary Accessed on 20.02.2015. Diodorus Siculus (1st cent. B. C.) 2008 n.p Article titled "Organisation, Ranks and Titles" available at www.ancient-egypt- priests.com/AE-Orga-english.ht acccessed. accessed on 01.02.2014. Doresse, J. 2002 Special Report on the Long History of North East Africa, . Part 1: North East Africa's Ancient Civilization. Private Ethiopian newespaper's interview with Jean Doresse, a femous French historian who speciliazed in Egyptian and Ethiopian history. Available at: www.nairaland.com/944897/what-race- ancient-egyptians posted on Oct 10, 2013 Hills. B. 2015

234 Maat: The Ancient Egyptian Goddess of Truth, Justice and Morality (www.ancient- origins.net/.../maat-ancient-egyptian-Goddess-truth 27.05.2015, accessed on 01.11.2017 at 15:30 Holik, K.A. 2009 Natural Religion and Science Theory of Religions. Available at http://crcsjurnal.blogspot.com/2009/07/natural-religion-and-science-theory. Accessed on 15.08.2015. King-Tut-King Biography available at (https://www.biography.com/people/king-tut-95124469), Accessed on. Lichtheim. 1975. /Ancient_Egyptian_human_sacrifice Accessed 18.08.2017 available at http://rationalwiki.org/wiki. Mark.J.2017 Clergy, Priests & Priestesses in Ancient Egypt, Avaialble at https://www.ancient.eu/.../clergy-priests--priestesses-in-ancient-eg accessed on 18.08.2017 Waaqeffannaa 2012 Irreessaa available at www.waaqeffannaa.com/irreechaa/. Accessed on 30.09.2012.

235 Illustrated Figures

Gods of ancient Kushites carrying scepter and Ankha which resemble Oromo symbolical objects such as Bokkuu, Kallachaa and Siiqqe.

Figure 2: Osiris. Source: Wikipedia contributors. "Osiris." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 23 Sep. 2019. Web. 27 Oct. 2019.

Figure 3: Amun Source: Wikipedia contributors. "Amun." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 12 Oct. 2019. Web. 27 Oct. 2019

236 Figure 4: Isis Mery carrying Ankha Source: Wikipedia contributors. "Isis." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 20 Oct. 2019. Web. 27 Oct. 2019.

Figure 5: Isis Mery with her son Horus Source: Wikipedia contributors. "Isis." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 20 Oct. 2019. Web. 27 Oct. 2019.

Figure 6: Horus with Ankha Source: Wikipedia contributors. "Horus." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 24 Oct. 2019. Web. 27 Oct. 2019.

237

Figure 7: Akhenaten Source: Wikipedia contributors. "Akhenaten." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 20 Oct. 2019. Web. 27 Oct. 2019. “Akhenaten… was a Pharaoh of the Eighteenth dynasty of Egypt who ruled for 17 years and died perhaps in 1336 BC or 1334 BC. He is especially noted for abandoning traditional Egyptian polytheism and introducing worship centered on the Aten, which is sometimes described as monotheistic or henotheistic…… He was born to Amenhotep III and his Chief Queen Tiyee…. Pharaoh Akhenaten was known as the Heretic King. He was the tenth King of the 18th Dynasty….In 1335 BC Nefertiti, Akhenaten's wife and companion, is said to have disappeared and most likely died. His mother Tiye had also died as did his minor wife, Kia. That combined with the loss of his daughter made Akhenaten feel alone and depressed”. (https://www.crystalinks.com › akhenaten 27.10.2019)

Figure 8: Pharaoh Tutankhamun of 18th Dynasty Source: Wikipedia contributors. "Tutankhamun." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 27 Oct. 2019. Web. 27 Oct. 2019.

238

The Revitalization of Waaqeffannaa and Its Importance in Transforming Values of Humanness and Peace Asnake T. Erko Global Waaqeffannaa Council [email protected]

239 1. Introduction The Oromo people, like other human societies of antiquity, have not only acted instinctively. They have also acted consciously, and consequently they began to wonder about the creation of the universe. They began to ask questions like: who created the universe, and who created us? When we die, what happens to the energy that was our lives? Is there life after death? These and other questions were formed in the analytical minds of our Oromo ancestors. Ultimately, they had to get answers. The Oromo word amanuu, meaning belief, was the first code used by the Oromos at answering these questions. They believed that the entire universe, including both living and non-living things, was created by a supernatural force living beyond their comprehension. They called this supernatural force Waaqaa in Afaan Oromo, which is also a common term in other Cushitic languages. Eventually, from Waaqaa, developed Waaqeffannaa as the term for the Oromo people’s monotheistic religion which originated out of natural awareness. Even if the word Waaqeffannaa was introduced only in the last 20 years, Oromo’s belief in Waaqaa is not a new phenomenon. It is ancient. In this short paper, I will present the core values of Waaqeffannaa which can serve as the basis for the rules and laws of a society. The core values of Waaqeffannaa have the potential to transform the value of humanness and the essence of peace in Oromia and Ethiopia at large. The challenges Waaqeffannaa has endured, and recommendations regarding the current and future status of Waaqeffannaa, will also be highlighted.

2. Waaqeffannaa – A Brief Introduction Waaqeffannaa is an indigenous faith of the Oromo people in one Waaqaa, and it is one of several notable monotheistic and indigenous African religions. Followers of Waaqeffannaa believe in one supreme being called Waaqaa. They call him Waaqaa maqaan dhibbaa (Waaqaa with a hundred names) to show the pluralism of Waaqeffannaa. Gurraacha garaan garbaa leemuu garaa taliilaa is a phrase which means that Waaqaa has a black color, which in Oromo belief shows pureness as well as indicating that Waaqaa is beyond human comprehension. The many names of Waaqaa indicate the Oromo’s belief that the world has one common supernatural force, even if the name of religions differ. It indicates the Oromo’s positive recognition of and respect for other religions. Oromos believe that Waaqaa started his creation from water. There was pre-existing water called walaabuu (Uumee Walaabuu). The water of walaabuu was then divided into the upper water and the lower water (Gemetchu, 1994:15). The upper water divided into three: water, sky, and the heavenly bodies. The lower water divided into two: water and dry land. According to seera uumama (laws of creation), the creation of Waaqaa—both on earth and in the sky—is governed by the five basic laws, known as yaayyaa shanan. The five yaayyaas are: the laws of those in the sky and heaven, the laws for human beings, the laws for cattle, the laws for horses and mules, and the laws for wild animals and the forest. Waaqaa used 27 days to create everything in the universe including heaven and earth. Every creation has its own given ayyaanaa (spirit). The names of the days are named after the ayyaanaas.1 Oromos use a lunar calender in which the first 27 days have unique names and the last three reuse the first three names to complete the 30 days of lunar month. Waaqeffannaa has its own core values, such as safuu (virtues), laguu (vices), cubbuu (sin), nagaa (peace) and araaraa (reconciliation) (Getachew, 2008). Waaqeffannaa strongly teaches its followers to have safuu (moral judgment and humane respect) for all creation of Waaqaa and to strictly observe the laguu (social taboos) observed by the society. Safuu is laws of Waaqaa and cannot be amended. These are, for example: respect for Waaqaa; respect for Earth, nature, and other creations of Waaqaa; not to steal someone’s property; not to kill; etc. Laguu refers to social taboos in society. This can include foods people are forbidden

240 from eating and activities people are forbidden from doing. Laguu can be applied to enforce social taboos. Cubbuu is what is committed when one does not abide with the laws of safuu and laguu. A Waaqeffataa man or woman believes that, if one commits cubbuu, he/she faces its negative consequences here on Earth. However, if a person dies without purifying oneself from the cubbuu they have committed, it can be inherited by their offspring. This is unlike other dominant religions of the world, which believe that a sinner will suffer after death in Hell, as it has been called. Hence, according to Waaqeffannaa, safuu and laguu help to keep the balance of nature and the ecosphere on earth, if they are constantly observed. In Waaqeffannaa, regarding life after death: flesh disappears back to soil, blood to water, breath to air, and ekeraa (the spirit of the dead) goes to Waaqaa and lives in heaven (heaven being waaqaa, written in lowercase letters). Oromos refer to the place ekeraa goes to as iddoo dhugaa (place of the truth). The ekeraa visits the vicinity of the person’s family if it needs soothing, like daddarbaa (libation), to be given. After someone dies, the family of the deceased visits an eker-dubbiftuu (one with ability to talk to the spirit of the dead) and asks if the ekeraa needs anything. At this moment, the ekeraa appeals to the family to pay if there is any unresolved cubbuu the deceased committed, or if the ekeraa was challenged by Waaqaa upon arrival to the gate of heaven. Daddarbaa is a piece of food or drink which is sacrificed as a feeding to the ekeraa. Oromos also practice daddarbaa as a pay back to Earth for its feeding and carrying the creation of Waaqaa. It is a way of thanking Mother Earth. The sky is also called Waaqaa, connected to where Waaqaa lives. Waaqaa is considered male, and Dachee (Earth) is considered female. Other ancient societies also describe heaven as male and Earth as a female. For example, the Newgrange tomb in Ireland, which was built 5000 years ago, has a hole in the roof. The sun’s rays penetrate into the tomb via the hole to reach the chamber on the winter solstice every year, which falls around the 21st of December. It was believed that the earth was pregnant for nine months and gave birth during the summer solstice, symbolizing a change in nature and the season. As is the case with many indigenous religions in Africa, Waaqeffannaa has no written scripture as guidance for the religion. The principles of Waaqeffannaa are told orally (argaa- dhagettii) from generation to generation. The story about the scripture of Waaqeffannaa, as told by elders, is that the first holy book given to Oromo by Waaqaa was eaten by a cow. They say that that is why the Oromo read moora (the fat covering the stomach), and the ragaas (experts) study the strings on the fat in order to analyze what has happened, is happening, and will happen to society (Tesema, 2012, p. 91). In the Waaqeffannaa religion, there is no concept of Satan/the devil. There are no competing super powers the way that other dominant religions have God and the devil. Waaqeffataas believe that there is only one supernatural power, and that is Waaqaa. There is no other being that tempts people to cubbuu. Waaqaa does not want us to sin at all. However, there exists ayyaana hamaa (bad spirit). In Waaqeffannaa, there are no angels to serve as a mediating body. Rather, ayyaannaa is what connects people with Waaqaa. The relation and prayer are directed to father Waaqaa. As Tesema (2012) describes, “a follower of Waaqa does not need a prophet, saints, clergy, priests and bishops but depends on intermediary spirits known as Ayyaana to worship Waaqaa which operate at different levels of reality and apply to different kinds of phenomena” (p. 92). But the writer of this article argues that Waaqeffannaa has prophets raagaa (prophets) who could foresee the future using different mechanisms like observing stars, animal stomach fat, coffee cups, and different aspects. Waaqeffannaa has also priests, known as are qaalluu (male) and qaallitti (female), and clergy around them. But Waaqeffannaa has no Saints, however, and the prayer is direct to Waaqaa.

241 Waaqeffannaa is guided and led by a qaalluu. There are two types of qaalluus. The first is the one who first decended from Waaqaa,which Oromos believe to have been dropped in from Waaqaa, and the second is the one who inherited qaalluu power from a preceding qaalluu. It passes through kinship (gosa). A qaalluu is responsible for praying to Waaqaa and guiding the rituals during the Gadaa ceremonies. Gadaa is traditional democratic system based on age grade and covers the political, social and economic aspect of Oromo society. After the introduction of different religions to the Oromos, the term qaalluu became misused and corrupted. This even happened to many names derived from it, such as qaallichaa ( (which is associated with witchcraft). Qaallichaas are corrupted people who have misused the respect and acceptance of the qaalluu role/name to earn money. Qaallichaas are not a part of Waaqeffannaa. Rather, they use the name and earn money by trying to cheat people to believe that they can cure diseases, and that they can influence people’s fate. In the indigenous Oromo religion, qaalluu has nothing to do with qaallichaas, which were actually introduced during the interaction with other cultures. A qaalluu does not accept money for the prayer he practices (Tesema, 2012, p. 95). Nagaa and araaraa in Oromo have a deeper meaning than just peace and reconciliation. Nagaa is a peaceful atmosphere for both humans and nature. The wild animals and trees have the right to be in peace. No one can just walk out and cut a tree or kill a wild animal without due reconsideration and permission from elders and responsible groups. Likewise, Oromos believe that one cannot be in peace if their neighbors have no peace. So, they have a solution if peace is disrupted, which is araaraa. The apology and compensation will be paid not only to human beings, but also to nature (e.g., wild animals and the forest) if unnecessarily disturbed. Nagaa Oromo (Oromo sense of peace) has a connection with Nagaa Waaqaa, and for fear of their Waaqaa people abide with the Nagaa Oromo. So, for peaceful co-existence with the neighboring societies as well as among themselves, Nagaa Oromo plays a vital role. The respect as well as the understanding of the concept that any creation has the right to use their resources and live in peace is deeply indoctrinated in Waaqeffannaa religion. Wild animals have the right to get water even in the areas where water is scarce. People should fill a container accessible to wild animals with water and leave it to them during the night, especially in places where water is manually fetched from a deep well. During ceremonies and special prayers, there are basic symbols that people carry. Men hold kallachaa, while women hold caaccuu. Kallachaa is an item made of iron from lightening and is held or given to selected persons. It is inherited through generations for many years and passed over and the selected people carry and keep it. Another form of kallachaa is an item made of metal worn on the forehead of a Gadaa leader as an indication for leadership. Caaccuu is made of ilillaan (sea shells, as an ornament) and especially prepared for women to wear during ceremonies. During ateetee (women’s spirit) prayers, however, women wear callee (necklace of glass beads). Among the ceremonies of Waaqeffannaa, Irreechaa and Muudaa pilgrimages are just a few of many worthy of mention. During the Irreecha ceremony, Waaqeffataas walk to a mountain or river and pray while holding green grass. Muuda involves visiting a holy place or an Abbaa Muudaa/Ayyaantuu, who are qaalluu/qaallitti leaders. Today, Irreechaa is held annually at the end of September in Bishoftu, central Oromia, and the Muudaa pilgrimage to Ananjina in Bale is very popular, with millions taking part. The Muudaa of Sheik Hussien Bale is a mix of indigenous religion and Islam. As told in oral stories, Sheik Hussein was originally Oromo Abbaa Muudaa and then converted to Islam. However, is still visited by pilgrims from Muslim, Christian, and Waaqeffataa faiths. People have reestablished Irreechaa at Malka Ateetee (Atete River) and different places, and today it is seen as a means of reviving identity. Irreechaa, which was previously banned at different lakes and rivers, is now reemerging and seen as part of the Oromo national identity. Taking part in Irreechaa is

242 inclusiv; it is not only for Waaqeffataas. Any Oromo, regardless of their religion, can take part in the Irreechaa ceremony. Irreechaa was also used by qeerroo (Oromo youth) in recent years as a platform for taking oath during the peaceful struggle to bring about political change in Ethiopia. Many claim that Irreechaa is a tradition and it is not a part of religion. However, it is apparent that it is a prayer to Waaqaa, and religion and tradition are usually interrelated in Oromo and other societies. Abdaarii is prayer done under a holy tree. Every Oromo village has its own abdaarii tree under which they pray to Waaqaa at different occasions and in different seasons. Odaa (sycamore tree) is one of the sacred trees under which Oromos pray as well as hold araaraa and conferences for peace.

3. How Waaqeffannaa Was Targeted for Attack Before I strive to answer this question, I want to take a close look at colonial history. The word colony is originally derived from Latin, and it means “settlement and cultivation.” Indeed that is why the empire builders justified their colonial agenda in positive terms as a “civilizing mission.” During their struggle for liberation struggle, many African countries saw colonialism as the settlement of the Europeans. Liberation is seen as sending the colonizers back where they came from. Later on, they realized that colonialism goes beyond the mere physical presence of the colonial forces. Settlement intrudes not only on the land, but also in the mind. Settling on land is visible, whereas settling in the mind may not be visible, which makes it more challenging. For that reason, the colonial agenda goes hand in hand with religious conversions. The colonizers saw that if they control the mind, they can control the humans and natural resources. Jomo Kenyatta, for example, was the first president of an independent state of Kenya and the leader of its liberation struggle. He explained the ways the European colonizers used their religion to take African land and leave the Kenyan people in poverty and misery when he said the following: When the missionaries came to Africa, they had the Bible and we had the land. They taught us to pray with our eyes closed. When we opened them [our eyes], we had the Bible in our hand, and they had the land. A similar situation happened to the Oromo people. Knowledge is socially constructed. Knowledge and power are intertwined. What is true to one group is fallacious for others. Without proof, the colonizers claimed to have sound knowledge and strived to impose it upon us. This means that knowledge and power are two areas in which the colonized and the colonizers compete. The experiences of the Oromo people are similar to those of the aforementioned characteristics of other colonized people. The story about Oromos’ first introduction to the dominant religions (Christianity and Islam) varies. Most writers agree that the first forced conversion of Oromos to Orthodox Christianity was in 1878 by King Yohannes and then by Minilik II, whereas Catholic missionaries’ first contact with the Oromos was in 1843. The Protestant missionaries were introduced in 1889, whereas the first contact with Islam was in the 15th century by Ahmed Giragn, then reintroduced again in the 18th century (Benti, 2018, p. 83-133). Both Christianity and Islam came through two mechanisms: forced conversion, or a more friendly approach with eventual corruption. History indicates that Orthodox Christianity and Islam came to Oromia mostly through forced conversion, whereas the Catholic and protestant missionaries used a more friendly approach to achieve systematic conversion. When Orthodox Christian priests came following the conquering of the Oromo land, they mostly built their churches by cutting down Odaa trees and replaced them with their churches. This is why today we find that Orthodox churches in Oromia are mostly on the tops of mountains. Orthodox Christian leaders have destroyed and degraded Oromo tradition. Everything related to Waaqeffannaa was and still is seen by them as sinful act. Some

243 religious leaders even consider it devilish and dangerous. They have burned caaccuu and callee and have banned ateetee, Boranticha (a spiritual ritual), Irreechaa, and other Oromo rituals. As many writers agree, religion was used as means of conquering. As indicated by Abera, “During Menilek’s conquest, there had been a forceful introduction of Orthodox Christianity to the conquered peoples by the conquerors as a means of facilitating the full subjugation and submission of the newly conquered areas” (Abera, 2005, as cited in Tesema, 2012, p. 101). Even today, most imams, priests, and pastors perceive Waaqeffannaa rituals as sinful act which are cursed by their respective religions. They have based the success of their religion on destroying Waaqeffannaa. People had to devalue, curse, and degrade Waaqeffannaa to be converted and seen as good followers of their new faith. Oromos who practice their indigenous religion are often described as pagan in most of the scripts of churches, especially those of the Orthodox church. They define pagan as someone without religion who is cruel. Even today, this sentiment persists. Some priests refer to Waaqeffannaa as devil-worshipping, and to Irreechaa as a place for witchcraft. These religious leaders demean Waaqeffannaa rather than attempting to learn what it is. It is important to have government policy on religion that promotes respect of all religions for the peace and co-existence of a diverse society. We observe conflict in different parts of Ethiopia due to lack of clear policy and laws regarding respect of other religions when one practices their own religion. In developed countries, it is compulsory that anyone can practice their religion regardless of what the dominant religion is. Waaqeffannaa was deliberately dismissed by priests as worshiping trees, mountains, and rivers. However, Oromos use these environments only as places of worship, and they pray only to one Waaqaa—not to the trees, mountains, or rivers. Moreover, Waaqeffannaa is denied media coverage and is not invited to any official ceremony like other dominant religions for fear of repercussion from the Muslim and Christian religious communities. Very few journalists dare to write or present news or documentaries on Waaqeffannaa. Practicing Waaqeffannaa is still a struggle, and overcoming the prejudice from the dominant religions is far from being achieved. As such, it is necessary to organize Waaqeffannaa in a modern and structured way to protect it from more destruction and domination.

4.The Revitalization of Waaqeffannaa 4.1 Revitalization of Waaqeffannaa in Ethiopia Waaqeffannaa was banned by the successive monarchies and governments of Ethiopia since Oromia was invaded ca. 1880s. One had to be either Christian or Muslim to be buried in cemeteries. But Oromos in some parts of Oromia held onto their indigenous religion as well as their traditional democratic system, Gadaa, against all odds. There are some groups that have resisted conversion and maintained their indigenous religion, despite not being recognized by consecutive Ethiopian governments. These groups include some of the Tulamas in central Oromia, the Karayyu and Jille in the central east, the Arsi in Kokosa, the Boranas and Guji in the southern Oromia, and few others. In the majority of Oromia, however, Oromos have been converted to either Islam or Christianity. Some have become devout Muslims and Christians, while the vast majority became passive followers of their respective religions. The passive followers are symbolically converted to either of the dominant religions, but they practice Waaqeffannaa at their homes. They go to the churches or Mosques for socialization and to obtain burial places, but for all intents and purposes they practice Waaqeffannaa as their religion. Because they are registered as followers of the

244 officially recognized religions but hold or practice Waaqeffannaa as their faith, the statistical data from Oromia regarding religious affiliation does not show the real picture. This is similar to the situation in Nigeria, where the Yoruba society held their indigenous religion despite being converted to Islam or Christian, as described by Peel (2016). The Gikuyu people of Kenya believe in Nagai in the same way that Oromos believe in Waaqaa and that Yorubas believe in Orisa. Mountains and trees are places to worship for Gikuyu people, as Odaa trees, rivers, and mountains are for the Oromo. The Japanese belief about life after death is similar to Waaqeffannaa beliefs on this topic. The Japanese believe that one does not disappear after death; this is similar to the Waaqeffannaa belief that the ekeraa lives in heaven. Japanese also practice dhibaayyu (libation offering to ekeraa) in the same way the Oromos do. For many years, Waaqeffannaa was not recognized as a religion in Ethiopia and it was considered shameful to speak about this religion in public. No one even dared to say “I am Waaqeffataa” until recently. Previously, it was practiced underground to protect it and avoid mentioning it in public. It was after the Dergue government was overthrown in 1991 that the Ethiopian constitution allowed people to follow the religion of their choice. Following that, some Waaqeffataas started getting organized and registered Waaqeffannaa as an officially recognized religion. The first modern form of organized Waaqeffannaa was established when a group of Oromos organized themselves under Macha Tulama Association as “A Committee for Oromo History and Culture” in 1998. The group first worked on the revival of Oromo culture, and over time Waaqeffannaa became central to this subject. Then, in 2002, the committee was changed to “Waldaa Hordoftoota Amantii Waaqeffannaa,” which means Organization for the Followers of Waaqeffannaa. At the end of 2003, Waaqeffannaa was registered and got its permission from the government to officially operate as a religion. However, the then- government related every Oromo organization to opposition politics. As a result, in early 2004, Waaqeffannaa was banned again and the permission was revoked just 54 days after it was given. The reason given for the recall was that Waaqeffannaa was accused of working for the opposition political party, Oromo Liberation Front. It took time until Oromos again get organized, convinced the government that Waaqeffannaa has nothing to do with politics and got it registered for second time in 2009. Then another second group was registered in 2013. Now, many Galmas (worshiping places) are available in Oromia though still tough to be Waaqeffataa in Ethiopia due to all the prejudices.

4.2 Revitalization of Waaqeffannaa Outside Ethiopia In 2000, a group of Oromos were organized by Abba Liban Dabbasa Guyyo, and they established the Gadaa Oromo Cultural Heritage Association in the Nairobi sububrb of Dagoretti, Kenya. Dabbasa Guyyo and this author, along with other dedicated Oromos, wrote the first manual for the institution. The Association has done tremendous work in introducing Gadaa and Waaqeffannaa in abroad. Dabbasa’s interview on VOA and the clear introduction of Waaqeffannaa was key in beginning the reestablishment of Waaqeffannaa abroad. Students of Dabbasa who had resettled in Europe, the USA, and Australia started and registered Waaqeffannaa in their respective adoptive countries. Waaqeffannaa was first registered abroad in Bergen, Norway in 2008. Also, in 2008, followers of Waaqeffannaa from different countries together established Gumii Waaqeffannaa Addunya (Global Waaqeffannaa Council). Dabbasa Guyyo travelled around the world to reach out to similar indigenous societies like the Maya in Guatemala, Native Americans in the USA, and some indigenous people in Kyrgyzstan. He visited Guatemala, USA, Norway, and Kyrgyzstan to teach about

245 Waaqeffannaa, until he was kidnapped in Nairobi, Kenya in 2015. His whereabout remain unknown to this day. The Global Waaqeffannaa Council has been working on introducing further research on Waaqeffannaa as well as Gadaa. They publish books, videos, websites, and organize seminars to support their mission.

5. Why We Need to Revitalize Waaqeffannaa Knowledge is socially constructed, and it is power. Religion is also knowledge. Revitalizing Waaqeffannaa, which is the base of Oromo culture, is empowering the Oromo society. If a society has power, the people can speak freely, lead a good life, and struggle for their rights. As many recognized religions are valid to their followers, Waaqeffannaa is also valid to the Oromos. Oromo wisdom is kept in Gadaa and Waaqeffannaa. Waaqeffannaa promotes nagaa in the family, in the community, and between communities and the natural world. It is significant that Waaqeffannaa is practicing the Oromo safuu uumaaf uumamaa (ethics of the social and natural world); the balance of nature, the ecosystem, and harmony in competing societies. Waaqeffannaa promotes the idea of pluralism, and it can be used to harmonize competing religions and create a buffer zone. The role of Waaqeffannaa in promoting the rules and laws of the country is important. It is imperative to take into consideration the indigenous religion when one establishes the rules and laws of the society, since Waaqeffannaa is deeply inculcated in the day-to-day lives of the society. The concepts of safuu (virtues), laguu (vices) and cubbuu (sin) in Waaqeffannaa can be a base for the rules and laws of the society. Waaqeffannaa can play a vital role in the Oromo society as well as for the peaceful co-existence with other societies in the region. Oromos are also known for having an indigenous, republican system of egalitarian administration known as Gadaa. It is a comprehensive system ingeniously architected to guide the spiritual, ethical, political, social, economic, and military activities of society. If Gadaa leaders neglect safuu Waaqaa and seera Gadaa (Gadaa laws), they are persistently checked and balanced by the Ayyaantuus from the Qaalluu institution. The Qaalluus are regarded as the chief guardians of the unchangeable law of Waaqaa (seera uumaa), while the elected Gadaa leaders are serving the people, being the custodian of the seera Gadaa. These aspects of the two institutions are complimentary to one another. As indicated above, Waaqeffannaa ensures the wellbeing of Gadaa by upholding the Gadaa values. As Tesema (2012, p. 107) states: “The Oromo indigenous religion, Waaqeffannaa has been practiced as part and parcel of the Gadaa system and it involved different religious concepts, ceremonies, rituals, celebrations and above all it embodies the concept of Oromummaa (being an Oromo) — the Oromo national identity and citizenship. Consequently, since Waaqeffannaa is enshrined in the traditional Gadaa institution it has religious, socio-economic and political functions.” In addition to the aforementioned values, Waaqeffannaa can be used in mediation between Oromos with different religions. Moreover, Waaqeffannaa helps to preserve Oromo culture, tradition, wisdom, and history. The cultural value of Waaqeffannaa is vital for the Oromo people. It is obvious that colonizers destroy the indigenous values of the conquered people. One can ask why the colonizers focus on the indigenous values and religion of the people. It is because they know that the wisdom and power of a given people is held and kept in the indigenous culture and religion. The same is true for the colonizers of the Oromo people.

246 6. Who Can Contribute to Revitalize Waaqeffannaa? Oromo institutions such as the Oromo Studies Association (OSA), various universities, Gadaa institute, non-governmental organizations, and research groups, are vital in revitalizing Waaqeffannaa through the provision of research as well as support. The role of the government in reestablishing the institution of Waaqeffannaa is also important. As previously mentioned, the successive Ethiopian governments have used the government structure to destroy Waaqeffannaa. It is time to compensate for this and reestablish the value of the Oromo people. In addition, the role of dedicated Oromos in reestablishing Waaqeffannaa is crucial. Collecting data, analyzing, and researching Waaqeffannaa is very important to distinguish the core values of Waaqeffannaa from the intrusion of other elements like qaallichaa. Organized Waaqeffannaa institutions, together with concerned Oromos, should demand compensation from the Ethiopian government for the historical subjugation, destruction, and eradication of Waaqeffannaa. The successive Ethiopian regimes have systematically abolished Waaqeffannaa values, and have segregated, humiliated, and dehumanized Waaqeffannaa to the extent that people could not dare identify themselves as Waaqeffataas. It is also vital to include laws in the constitution of the country to protect indigenous religions like Waaqeffannaa. This is important because the dominant religions will continue to contribute toward the eradication of Waaqeffannaa unless protected by laws and regulations.

7. Policy Recommendations Some policy recommendations and consideration based on my above analyses: 7.1. Oromo holy days like Irreechaa, Boranticha, and others should be included in the national holy day calendar of Ethiopia. 7.2. The Ethiopian government should recognize the atrocities committed against Waaqeffannaa, and compensate by providing worshipping Galmas, cemeteries and graveyards. 7.3. Waaqeffannaa is an instrument to check and balance the power of Gadaa. Gadaa is a core value in Oromo tradition for peace as well as for co-existence of the society. So, revitalizing Waaqeffannaa is important for existence of Gadaa and should be given due place. 7.4. Society, and particularly those who believe in Waaqeffannaa, has respect for Waaqaa. Waaqeffannaa can be used as a method for taking oath in government offices such as in courts and when starting service in public offices. 7.5. Waaqeffannaa gives due place for nature and it can be used to preserve nature including forests, wild animals, and natural resources. 7.6. For a country heavily exposed to conflict like Ethiopia, peaceful co-existence is a main focus. Waaqeffannaa’s values like safuu, laguu and cubbuu forbids the society from breaking laws, and these values can be used in law-making and fact-finding (afarsataa). 7.7. For the peaceful and normal life of the society, respecting and giving due place for people’s religion is very important for psychological wellbeing. 7.8. People respect laws because there are consequences to committing crimes. The consequence can be punishment by imprisonment or payment of fees. But if someone takes an oath in their religion, they fear consequences higher than imprisonment or fees. Punishment of Waaqaa due to committing cubbuu persists over seven generations, according to Waaqeffannaa. In attempting to stop corruption and misuse of power, it is more powerful to use religion in addition to existing laws than to threaten with other methods of punishment.

247 7.9. Peace and reconciliation (nagaa fi araara) are very important concepts of the Oromo culture. The understanding of nagaa Oromo, through which every creation including insects, plants, and wild animals has the right to be in peace, is helpful for society. The peaceful habitat of any creation is not to be disturbed, and this is a right given by Waaqaa. This concept is related to Waaqaa’s creation (uumaa Waaqni uume), and is associated with cubbuu if it is not respected. If observed properly, Waaqeffannaa is important in keeping peace and reconciliation in society and in nature. 7.10. Irreechaa in Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) needs to be restored and given due place. In addition, a Waaqeffannaa worshiping place (Galma) should be restored in Finfinnee. 7.11. Waaqeffannaa should be protected by law from attack. The criminal code should be amended in such a way that one can be sued if one attacks Waaqeffannaa.

8. Conclusion The Oromo indigenous religion, Waaqeffannaa, is a religion which has existed since the existence of the Oromo people. The new religions based their existence on abolishing Waaqeffannaa. It is important to revitalize Waaqeffannaa to keep the balance of nature, to check and balance the Gadaa institution, and to maintain nagaa Oromo: peace between different religions and societies in Oromia. The Ethiopian government should reestablish Waaqeffannaa as repayment for destroying it for years. Knowledge is socially constructed, and indigenous religion is a form of knowledge. Because knowledge is power, strengthening Waaqeffannaa is working for the sustainability of Oromo people and empowering them.

248 Notes 1. Interview with Dabbasa Guyyo and other elders from Tulama and Arsi (voice record). 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid.

References Bantii, Dachaasaa. 2018. Jaatanii Jaatamaa: Jireenya Oromoo Waaqeffannaa. Finfinnee: Nuberite. Chemeda, Getachew. 2008. Waaqeffannaa (unpublished article on Waaqeffannaa). Erko, Asnake T et. al 2018. Waaqeffannaa: Dhugeeffannaa ummata Kuush ganamaa: Finfinnee: GWA. Kenyatta, Jomo. 1938. Facing Mount Kenya. Nairobi: Heinemann Kenya. Leellisaa Aadaa. 6413. Kudhaama Seenaa. Finfinnee: Oromiyaa. Maatii Sabaa. 2006. Daniyaa. Finfinnee: WADO. Megerssa, Gemetchu. 1994. Knowledge, Identity and The colonizing Structure: The case of The Oromo In East and Northeast Africa. London: University of London. Peel, J. D. Y. 2016. Christianity, Islam, and Orisa - Religion. University of California Press. Salviac, Martial De. 1901. An Ancient People-Great African Nation: The Oromo. As translated to English by Ayalew Kanno in 2005. Publisher Ayalew Kanno. Ta’a Tesema. 2012. Religious Beliefs among the Oromo: Waaqeffannaa, Christianity and Islam in the Context of Ethnic Identity, Citizenship and Integration. Jornal of EJOSSAH Vol. VIII, No.1.(87-111). Uistin, Liam Mac. 2007. Nowgrenge Knowth & Dowth. Exploring the Majestic passage Tombs of Ancient Ireland. Dublin: The o’Brien press. Ujulu, Tesso Benti. 2018. Oromo indigenous religion and Christianity: Contradictory or compatible? A comparative Religious study from a theological perspective. Hildesheim: Georg Olms verlag AG.

249 Incorporation of the Oromo’s Gadaa System into Ethiopia’s and the Oromia Regional State’s Constitutions Muluken Kassahun Amid Assistant Professor of Law, Mettu University Email: [email protected]

Abstract In federal countries having state constitution, the aim of architecting sub national constitutions, is not only targeted at ensuring the right to self-rule and celebrating regional diversities but also serves as laboratory of democracy for indigenous knowledge, values and institutions. In this regard, the Oromo’s Gadaa system is one of intangible heritages of Ethiopia, which was registered by UNESCO as world heritage for its contribution to modern democracy and human dignity. However, the norms and values of the systems are not sufficiently incorporated in the Ethiopian and Oromia regional state constitutions. Thus, this paper examines the principles of the Gadaa system that can be incorporated into the federal and Oromia regional state constitutions by following appropriate procedures. To achieve this intended objective, qualitative data were gathered from primary and secondary sources. In doing so, the author has critically examined literatures, relevant constitutions and then epistemologically interpreted his personal observations. The outcome of the study finds that Oromo’s Gadaa system has numerous principles that can be incorporated in the Ethiopian and Oromia regional state constitutions. For instance, democratic election process, sovereignty of the people, limited term office, division/separation of power and democratic institutions are the major attributes within the Gadaa systems which were prevent abuse of power, ensure democratic norms and human rights. Consequently, it seems imperative to incorporate the Gada system into the federal and Oromia regional state constitutions by making division within three government organs or/and giving recognition as a separate independent institution from government organs. This initiative shall be carried out through constitutional amendment procedures.

Key Words: Constitution, Ethiopia, Gadaa System, Oromia, Oromo

Introduction Constitution is a fundamental and basic law of any country in the world. It is common knowledge that architecting of the constitution should be based on socio-economic and political reality of the country. Undertaking this activity includes giving consideration to the interest of people, indigenous knowledge, diversity and history of the country.i By doing so, the constitution will represent a living document that serves across generations. Currently, the Gadaa system is one intangible heritage of the world. It is considered a symbol of Oromo civilization that regulates the socio-economic and political life of the Oromo nation. This Gadaa system is extensive and complex in its very nature, consisting of numerous institutions and a structure that is inextricably linked with the existence and growth of the Oromo people.ii However, the principles and rules of the system neither got much attention nor was incorporated in the legal system both at Ethiopian federal and Oromia regional state. The major aim of this study is to examine the rules and principles of the Gadaa system that can be incorporated into the Ethiopian and Oromia regional state constitutions. In order to do so, relevant data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. These include

250 examining relevant domestic and foreign laws, personal observations, looking at official videos recorded and uploaded on the websitesiii, referring nomination and subscription files of the Gadaa system to United Nations Economic, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO), and reviewing different literatures on the topic. Data were gathered via various instruments and were analyzed and interpreted within the basic tenets of the qualitative researcher paradigm. The current study tries to answer mainly the following questions: what is the status of the Gadaa system’s synergy with Ethiopian and Oromia regional state constitutions? What are the relevant principles and rules of the Gadaa system that can be incorporated into the constitution? And, how the Gadaa system institution and its respective principles and values can be incorporated into Ethiopia’s and Oromia’s regional state constitutions? Hence, this paper is not extended to discuss every aspect of the Gadaa system, rather it focuses on the main principles that can be incorporated, and the procedures to be followed in doing so. With the view of answering the research questions traced above and meeting the desired objectives of the issue under scrutiny, this paper is organized into five sections. Section one discusses experiences of incorporating customary laws in foreign countries constitutions, particularly the experiences of some African countries. In section two, the paper tries to address the concept of the Gadaa system and its status under the federal and Oromia regional state constitutions. Furthermore, section three analyzes constitutionally relevant and viable features of the Gadaa system. Section four on its part tries to show mechanisms of incorporating the Gadaa system into the federal and Oromia regional state constitutions. Finally, the paper wraps up by providing conclusion and policy recommendations in section five.

1. Incorporation of Customary Laws in the National Constitutions: Foreign Experiences Constitution, being the supreme and basic law of the country, establishes government organs and distributes power among them. Moreover, it provides a source of sovereign power within the country, regulates the relationship between state and citizens and serves as a social contract between citizen and state, guards fundamental rights and is taken as the symbol of sovereignty. Due to these facts, scholars often say that a constitution is the master plan of one country’s legal system which determines the socio-economic and political foundation of a given country.iv Consequently, designing and crafting a constitution should be done with a due care given its implications for nature of state (unitary or federal), system of government (presidential, parliamentary or semi presidential), legal system (such as common law or civil law legal system), economic and political ideology, extent and ways of accommodation of diversity ….etc. Cultural practices reflect the values and beliefs held by members of a community. Every social grouping in the world has its own cultural practices and beliefs that guide its members on how to live and behave. Hence, “culture is a social heritage which includes all knowledge, beliefs, customs and skills that are available to members of a social group”.v Cultural practices also serve as a source of individual and group identity. Within one social group, some cultural practices and beliefs are beneficial to all members (Such as alternative dispute resolution mechanisms) while others are harmful to a specific group such as women and children.vi In connection with this, harmful practices which affront the dignity of members of a society, when measured against modern acceptable standards of behavior and civility, are proscribed by different human rights instruments and domestic laws.vii In contrast, the beneficial cultural practices that contribute to the development of legal pluralism are incorporated in national constitutions. At this juncture, proponents and opponent of

251 such a system argue for or against the inclusion of traditional institutions and systems into the modern law of the country, especially in Africa. The proponents argue that the incorporation of customary laws in modern constitutions promotes internal legitimacy and ensures the respect and dignity of indigenous identity.viii It also restores the correct versions of traditional dispute resolution methods, which helps to have effective legal institutions derived from knowledge developed within the community. The opponents, on the other hand, argue that the incorporation of customary laws into domestic laws undermines the national unity due to unhealthy competition among different sect of community.ix In this effect, it hampers the efforts of the political elites to bring about legal uniformity. Besides, customary laws are inimical to modernization due to their inability to adjust with emerging socio-economic and technological advancements. Moreover, it creates division between the urban (to be governed by the western transplanted laws) and rural (to be regulated by the customary laws) population. Furthermore, customary laws de-link Africa from the rest of the world, especially from the western world and overlooks its own shortcomings (i.e., the gaps in them and the difficulty of ascertaining them).x Apart from such controversy, many African countries expressly incorporated the customary laws and institutions in their domestic constitutions. For instance, the constitution of Ghana recognizes the institution of traditional leadership. It gives a room for the national and regional houses of traditional leadership. Traditional leaders have a role to play on issues of development although they are forbidden from active participation in party politics.xi In Namibia, their Constitution requires traditional leaders to pay allegiance to and accept the authority of the modern state. It also gives mandates for Council of Traditional Leaders; whose responsibility is to advise the president on the control and utilization of communal land and on all other matters as may be referred to it by the president for advice. The constitution also requires traditional institutions to give support to the policies of the (central) government, regional and local authority councils in the performance of their duties and functions.xii Similarly, in Zimbabwe, the 1993 constitution provides some sorts of power for National and Provincial Houses of Chiefs. The National Council of Chiefs is also entitled to have ten (10) of its members form part of the one hundred and fifty (150) member National Assembly.xiii Traditional leaders are also represented in rural district councils. These traditional leaders qualify to stand elections on party political tickets.xiv In Botswana, the constitution regulates about House of Chiefs, which serves as advisory body to the National Assembly and the Executive. The House does not have legislative powers, but it must be consulted on certain specific Bills. Generally, above instance indicates that incorporation of customary laws and institution in national constitutions and system helps to promote legal pluralism, on one hand, and revitalize African values and traditions through integrating with modern laws.

2. The Gadaa System and Ethiopian Constitutions 2.1. Concepts and Features of the Gadaa System The word Gadaa represents more than one concept. Gadaa is a system of Oromos timekeeping or calendar. It is also the name of the sixth hierarchy in the system known as Gadaa group on power. The term has also been used to refer to the 8-years cycle in which each level stays on power. Besides, Gadaa stands to signify the whole system.xv Generally, the Oromo philosophy, art and calendar are based on Gadaa as an expression of Oromo civilization. The Gadaa system was practiced for the last five centuries starting from early 16th century.xvi Currently, major Oromo classes have established the centers of their Gadaa at several places

252 based on their territorial settlement. Accordingly, the Booranaa and the Gabraa Oromo established their Gadaa center at Gumii Gaayo and Areero in Booranaa zone, Gujii at Mi’ee Bokkoo and Nuuraa in Gujii Zone, the Tuulamaa at Odaa Nabee and the Karrayyuu at Horaa Samaa in east Shawaa zone, the Machaa at Odaa Bisil and Odaa Bulluq in West Shawaa and East Wallaggaa Zone, respectively, the Arsii at Odaa Rooba at Baalee Zone and The Ituu and Humbanaa at Odaa Bultum in West Hararge Zone.xvii Under the Gadaa system, Oromo society is organized into five Gadaa generation classes or sets. The recruitment to the membership of five Gadaa classes is based not on age rather on genealogical and generational descent. In the Gadaa system, there is a gap of forty years between a father and his son. According to the basic custom of the system, a son is admitted to Gadaa system, on the 40th year after the father joined the system. The naming of the five classes in the Gadaa system (Googessaa) varies from place to place.xviii The Gadaa system distributes power across Gadaa generations and down to community members and creates strong links between successive generations, and gives a sense of identity and continuity to the member of the community. Gadaa divides stages of life of individuals from childhood to old ages into a series of formal stages.xix The entire class progresses through eleven series grades. As soon as a child is born, he is recruited into the appropriate party, which is forty years behind his father and joins the first grade named Dabballee (0-8th year). The Dabballee are sons of Gadaa class who are in power as the leaders of the Oromo. At this stage, they perform light work and are confined around their parent’s home. Up on their 8th year, the Dabballee child undergoes naming ceremony and enters the 2nd grade (8-16) known as junior Gaammee/Gaammee xixiqqoo. The Gaammee are expected to look after calves in the immediate neighborhood of the village.xx At the age of 17, the junior Gaammee joins the 3rd grade/called senior Gaammee/Gaammee gurguddoo (16-24 years old). The senior Gaammee learn herding cattle’s and may now go long distances and take their family herds to river valleys in search of good pasture. During the last three years of Gaammee, they go from camp to camp, singing, feasting and collecting members of their class. This ceremony is called Walargii (to see each other) and Naachisaa means feast. The cohort of the 4th grade is referred to as Kuusaa and they are between 25 – 32 years old. Six members of the Kuusaa stratum are recruited and conditions are facilitated for them to acquire leadership knowledge and skills. These recruits form a group known as the Aduulaa council. In addition, assistants known as Jalabaa are appointed to help these recruits.xxi The members of the 5th grade or stratum are known as Raaba Doorii and they are between 33- 40 years old. This is the stage at which the members get married and establish their own families. At the end of the fifth grade, members of Raabaa Doorii make preparations to take up the role of administration. For instance, among the Karrayyuu Oromo, there is a system in which the Raabaa Doorii acquires enough experience from those who are in power by sharing responsibilities or by delegating some power to the latter.xxii The 6th grade or stratum is known as Gadaa and the age of the members is between 41-48 years. Members of the Gadaa stratum are those who are in power and render political administrative functions to the people. In the Gadaa System, political power is held by members of Gadaa grade. Nevertheless, members of the Gadaa stratum elect from among themselves executive members who govern the people by assuming political power.xxiii In the election process, the first election is made to identify a member who must take up the supreme power, that is, Abbaa Gadaa or Abbaa Bokkuu. The handover is made by organizing formal ceremony in which the outgoing Abbaa Gadaa/Abbaa Bokkuu hands an ostrich feather known as Baallii, to the elected Abbaa Gadaa as a symbol of political power. Gadaa assemblies,

253 whereby power is transferred during ceremonies and transition rites, take place in cultural spaces under an Odaa tree regarded as a symbol of the Gadaa system.xxiv Those elected officials of the party live in one village. The village forms a political center called Qaachaa among Gujii Oromo and Ya’a Gabalaa among the Karrayyuu Oromo. It is from this center that directions and orders radiate to other parts of the Oromo nation. The democratically appointment also administer day- to-day life, mediate disputes and take part in many of the rituals of the people. In the Gadaa system, once every eight years the legislative assembly is called into session. This assembly is the highest authority above all other institutions.xxv The national assembly (Gumii or Caffee) meet in the middle of the Gadaa period once every eight years to review the laws, to make new laws, to evaluate the men in power and to resolve any major internal conflicts. In the Gadaa System, the four grades following the Gadaa stratum are known as Yuuba 1, Yuuba 2, Yuuba 3 and Yuuba 4. The age of members of this grade is from 49 to 80. Members of the earlier Gadaa grade who were in power now assume the roles of advisory to the incumbent rulers and interpreting the laws. Members of the final stratum, grade 11 are known as Gadaamoojjii (81-88 years old) and those who complete this stage retire from the system and they are called Jaarsaa and remain so till their death.xxvi

2.2. Status of the Gadaa System under Ethiopian and Oromia State Constitutions 2.2.1. Traditional Institutions under the Federal and Regional States Constitutions The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (herein after, FDRE) constitution provides several guarantees on one hand and signifies its limitations/scope of enjoyment and exercise of cultural rights. The guarantee and recognition under the constitution, among other thing, includes the principle of non-discrimination based on culture (Preamble paragraph 2 and art. 25), indigenous culture serves as source of proud (preamble para. 3), and the right to conclude marriage and resolve family and personal disputes in accordance with customary laws (art. 34/4). Moreover, the FDRE constitution offers the rights of nations, nationalities and peoples to develop and promote their culture. Having common culture, also, serve as one parameter to define the concept of nations, nationalities and peoples are among the guarantees.xxvii The constitution, also, impose duties on the government to protect and preserve cultural legacies, to support the growth and enrichment of cultures and traditions that are compatible with fundamental rights and democratic norms.xxviii However, the FDRE constitution is silent on the role of traditional leaders and institutions, despite imposing on the federal and state governments the “duty to support… the growth and enrichment of cultures and traditions” that are not contrary to basic human rights and democratic norms.xxix The federal constitution has not said more than it already has on the question of traditional institutions since Ethiopians are too diverse to unpack it. In contrast, some state constitutions of the current federal Ethiopia have indeed attempted, though inadequate, to provide constitutional recognition to traditional leaders and define their roles. For instance, Article. 63 of the Afar state constitution recognizes a council of elders would be established. It is, however, silent on how this council is formed, the roles it plays and the place and status it has to have within the state government structure. Likewise, Article. 56 of the Somali state constitution states that there would be a council of elders and clan leaders without providing further details. The two state constitutions should, and indeed could, have gone further in terms of defining the composition and the role of traditional institutions and how they interact with the formal government structure. This is especially important considering how revered traditional institutions are in the Afar and Somali communities, and that the federal system is predicated on

254 providing constitutional space for the development of the traditions and culture of each community.

2.2.2. Status of the Gadaa System in Oromia Regional State Constitutions The Oromia regional state was established for the first time as a regional self-government during a transitional period, under Article. 3(1) of the proclamation No. 7/1992. Later, the 1995 FDRE constitution recognized as member states of the Ethiopian federation, according to Article. 47(1/4). The region had its own constitution since 1993, and it was replaced by the 1995 completely without any reference to the 1993 Constitution.xxx The 1995 state constitution of Oromia was revised in 2001. The latter is still in force/operational with little amendments. Almost above Oromia constitutions enacted at different times modeled the federal constitution and western philosophy of democracy, rather than the indigenous Gadaa system. Accordingly, the Oromia constitution provides similar provision within the federal constitution regarding promoting one’s own culture. Moreover, all previous and current constitutions of the Oromia regional state are noticeably silent on the Gadaa system, which is a highly esteemed traditional institution of the Oromo people. Perhaps the only indirect reference to the Gadaa in the federal constitution is the inclusion in the state’s flag of the Odaa (‘a symbol that refers to the tree’ under which Abbaa Gadaas leaders of the Gadaa system hold their meetings) and designation of regional legislative as Caffee (supreme legislative authority in the Gadaa system).xxxiThe Guddifachaa system is also incorporated under the federal and Oromia Family Codes.xxxii Otherwise, the word Gadaa is not even mentioned in the state constitution. It is unclear why the crafters of the state constitution failed to ensure the Gadaa systems’ constitutional recognition that it deserves. This is indeed strange since a few years ago the federal government and the Oromia governments clamored to have this institution registered by the UNESCO as ‘intangible cultural heritage’. Other countries, however, provide constitutional recognition to traditional leaders and institutions in their national constitutions. The South African Constitution, for instance, has a full chapter on traditional leaders.xxxiii In our case, the Gadaa being a cherished institution of the Oromo people did not get the constitutional attention it deserves. Moreover, the Abba Gadaa (heads of the Gadaa) had reportedly played a great role in calming down angry protesters and preventing inter-ethnic violence when the state was seized with public protests beginning from mid-2015. Recently, they are playing an active and paramount role in mediating the dispute between ruling party and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) officials. The non-recognition of the Gadaa system in the Oromia constitution is, therefore, an enormous oversight that needs to be immediately rectified.

3. Major Principles and Values of the Gadaa System to be synergized with Modern Constitutions The Gadaa system, which is practiced by indigenous Booranaa Oromo’s, represents a structure of two cross-cutting systems of peer-group structures. One of these basis’s itself on chronological age [the Harriyyaa system], while the other one basis’s itself on the genealogical ties of the Gadaa system.xxxiv The researcher observes many principles of the modern constitutions which are found within the Gadaa system and can have a paramount importance to redesign the regional constitution of Oromia. These include democratic election process, limited term office, division of power, sovereignty of the people and umpiring disputes by Qaalluu. Moreover, it serves as democratic institutions and legal frameworks to ensure justice and protect

255 the rights of vulnerable groups of society such as Siinqee for women, Gumaa for victims of crime, Moggaasaa for migrants/displaced/refugees and Guddifachaa to protect the best interest of child.

3.1. Democratic Election Process In the Gadaa system, the society has an opportunity to elect its representatives from eligible candidates for a seat at different levels including the post for Abbaa Gadaa. The election has been administered by Qaalluu council, which composes six men elected by general meeting of the clan every eight years. The Qaalluu council is an independent institution entrusted with the duty to monitor election process, the authority to convene electoral meeting, evaluates candidates presented to them and supervise peaceful transfer of power at the end of one Gadaa term office.xxxv Moreover, the council oversees and umpires the proper functioning of the Gadaa system. In so doing, members of Qaalluu council do not compete for political office of the Gadaa system in order to avoid the possible conflict of interest. Hence, descendant of Qaalluu lineage are prohibited from assuming political office of the Gadaa system with a view to avoid possible conflict of interests. Candidates for seat of Abbaa Gadaa expected to be a man, who commits no crime. In addition to this, he should be healthy, married, respectful to rules of the Gadaa system on top of this a man with leadership quality and knowledgeable.xxxvi Each candidate also takes a competitive campaign on their quality and how to serve the public. These features of the Gadaa system indicates the power is not a hereditary rather based on the competence and willingness of the people, which indirectly guarantees the ultimate power of the nation belongs to the people, neither the Abbaa Gadaa nor his cabinets. The Gadaa system has a check and balances its whole system such by respecting eight years rule whereby power sharing and balanced opposition of parties is in place to avoid exploitation, corruption and misuse of power.xxxvii

3.2. Limited Term of Office In many African countries, rulers stay in power across their lifetime (e.g., Muhamad Gadaafi of Libya) or removed by popular uprising or coup d’état (e.g., Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and more recently Abdul-Aziz Butoflika of Algeria). Still others amend the constitution to extend their term limit. In this regard, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance Article. 23 states that; ‘State Parties agree that the use of, inter alia, the following illegal means of accessing or maintaining power constitute an unconstitutional change of government and shall draw appropriate sanctions by the Union: 1. Any putsch or coup d’état against a democratically elected government. 2. Any intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government. 3. Any replacement of a democratically elected government by armed dissidents or rebels. 4. Any refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party or candidate after free, fair and regular elections; or 5. Any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government’

In our case, luckily, the Gadaa system is immune from such kind of challenges since the power is periodically transferred every eight years, peacefully and publicly. Accordingly, Abbaa

256 Gadaa and his cabinet members rules only for eight years on non-renewable term. Once they complete their term office, they transfer their power and titles to the elected incoming Gadaa governors. The time reckoning experts, called Ayyaantu who are in charge of keeping the unique Oromo Calendar by determining the ‘Gadaa Chronology’, have the duty to fix exact place and time for transfer of power every eight years.xxxviii Besides, the system has adopted a recalling procedure in circumstances of loss of confidence and when representatives are unable to perform their entrusted duties for whatever reasons. Such recalling procedures are called Buqqisuu (uproot).xxxix This procedure is guaranteed in almost all democratic constitutions including in Article. 12 of the FDRE and the Oromia constitution. By doing so, the system prevents abuse of power and further delegitimizes taking people’s power through force.

5.3.Division of Power Government power should be divided among different institutions both vertically and horizontally. Such divisions of power are aimed to avoid concentration of power, and thereby minimizes the risk of abuse of power. It is also necessary to ensure uniformity and impartiality, in the application of sanctions.xl This can be done through dividing government power into small institutions with the view of securing the right and freedom of citizens. Montesquieu describes the impact of the concentration of power on single person/body as, “there would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals”.xli In the Oromo Gadaa system, the power is highly distributed across age groups and generations (Gadaa Classes). As discussed earlier, every male member of society assume different power and responsibilities every eight years based on his Gadaa Grades. Political power under the Gadaa system is divided both horizontally and vertically albeit there are overlaps mainly on the legislative and judicial function by Abbaa Gadaa.xlii In order to minimize concentration of power in the single person, the power is distributed among various public officials such as Abbaa Gadaa/Bokkuu (head of the system), Abbaa Duulaa (command of the army), Abbaa Sa’aa (administration of public property), Abbaa Qaalluu/ Muudaa (concern with ritual life of Oromo people).xliii In this regard, the descendant of Qaalluu lineage are prohibited from assuming political office of the Gadaa system as they are responsible for Oromo rituals and serve as an independent election board and umpiring institution where dispute arises.

5.4.Sovereignty of the People Sovereignty is one of the criteria for the establishment of statehood. It is often defined as the ultimate owner of supreme power that subject to no other. Sovereignty in monarchical system it belongs to King/Queen, whereas in totalitarian/dictatorial government it falls in the hand of single/few individuals. However, in democracy system the ultimate power is in the hand of the people.xliv In later case, any law and government power are derived from the will of the people. Sovereignty of the people is eroded when their right to self-determination on their own matters is taken away from them by those who occupy government power or by force. Past struggles and revolutions around the world are mainly interrelated with claims for sovereignty of peoples. For instance, the USA independence struggle, France revolution, liberation struggle against colonization and the recent Arab world revolutions can be mentioned as an example .xlv The Oromo’s who have been ruled under the Gadaa system, fortunately, did not faces such kind of struggles between people and Gadaa rulers in power. This is due to the fact that the

257 system is open to public and controlled by people itself. This can be expressed through periodical elections of their leaders whereby peaceful transfer of power is made to elected officials, so people retain their ultimate power to oversee the conduct of elected officials through Gumii (Caffee), and the society delegates limited power to their leaders.xlviGumii (Caffee) is an institution in which the people exercise their sovereignty through Gadaa council. The Gumii meets once every eight years in the middle of Gadaa period to review the performance of Gadaa officials, to amend/proclaim law, if necessary and settle major disputes. Additionally, matters of public importance are discussed through public deliberation. Every citizen has the right to speak and to be heard in the assembly of multitudes. For instance, decisions over the use of common resources and settlement of disputes are reached thorough discussions and deliberation.xlvii Every participant is encouraged and expected to contribute his/her idea. Power is also fairly distributed among representatives of different moieties. Moreover, Abbaa Gadaa comes from one or the other moiety once he was elected and serves as head of entire society. If Abbaa Gadaa has conflict of interest on the dispute, he will be replaced by another Abbaa Gadaa for the purpose of resolving disputes since ‘no one is judged in his own case’.xlviii In the Gadaa system, the supremacy of the law is paramount and the equality of all before the law is sacrosanct. Even the Abbaa Gadaa, head of the Gadaa’s executive branch, if accused of violating laws and regulations could be impeached, tried and uprooted (Buqqisuu) from office before official tenure and replaced by a member of his class.xlix

5.5.Democratic Institutions of the Gadaa System Gadaa is a complex system that incorporates pivotal institutions such as Moggaasaa (naturalization), Guddifachaa (adoption), Araara (conflict resolution), Gumaa (reparation), Rakoo (marriage law), Waaqeffannaa (Oromo religion) and Siinqee (institution to safeguard women right).l These institutions serve as a body and procedures of conflict resolution and serve as mechanisms for dealing with social and political matters. For instance, Gumaa/reparation is an institution of conflict resolution in which a person who has inflicted loss or damage compensates the victim. Similarly, the Moggaasaa/naturalization system is a system in which any person or group who willfully decide to become a member of the Oromo would be granted such privilege. Such person would then have equal rights (political, social, economic, etc.) with any person who is an Oromo by birth. This emphasizes that the respect for diversity and equity is the core of the Gadaa system. Accordingly, all humans deserve to be treated with utmost respect without regard to human differences.li The other institution which were created within the Gadaa System is Siinqee .This institution has the role of making sure that the rights of women are duly respected. The word Siinqee signifies a thin stick which is given to an Oromo woman on her wedding day by her mother. Siinqee is an instrument to ensure the protection of women's rights and whenever these rights are transgressed or violated, women rally for demonstration carrying their Siinqee to demand in order their rights should be respected. In this way, the Siinqee institution in the Gadaa system promoted gender equality among Oromos.lii Moreover, the Gadaa system contributes to sustainable development of the community as it engages every member in social and economic development duties and regulates conservation of environment. In general, Gadaa has great contribution to environmental conservation and sustainable development by making laws that are favourable for the preservation of natural resources.

258 4. Incorporating the Principles and Value of the Gadaa System in the Federal and Oromia Regional State Constitution Democratic constitutions are a living document that serves across different generations. In such a case, the content of a constitution can be changed by inserting new provisions, modifying or deleting existing provisions of constitution. In some cases, it is even possible to totally revise or replace the previous constitution with a new constitution in order to comply with existing situations and demands of the people. In short, amendments or revisions of a constitution are a process by which constitutions adapt to changing circumstances by perfecting imperfections. At this juncture, the Gadaa system, which an indigenous democratic institution, has been neglected and not incorporated into the regional and federal constitutions of Ethiopia. Foreign experiences, however, demonstrate that indigenous institutions can be incorporated in a domestic constitution and other laws by giving formal recognition under the constitution. This can transpire independently and autonomously, on one hand and/or reserving position and seats within government organs, on the other hand. This kind of experience can also be applicable to incorporate principles of the Gadaa system in the federal and regional constitution, albeit the scope and manner of incorporation in each constitution can be varied. The federal and Oromia regional state constitutions provide the circumstances in which the contents of the constitution can be amended. However, they do not provide whether the content and structure of the constitution can be revised or not. In connection with this, amendment differs from revision based on the scope of the reform. In case of amendment, the scope is limited while in later case it undertakes large scale of reform. With respect to the Ethiopian experience, the nine regional states of the federation have revised their former regional constitution extensively through amendment processes since 2001. This emphasizes that there is no different procedure between amendment and revision of the constitution under the Ethiopian legal system. Hereunder, the author has discussed the mechanism and procedures of incorporating the Gadaa system into Ethiopian and Oromia regional state constitutions.

4.1. The Procedure of Incorporating the Gadaa System into Oromia Regional State and Federal Constitutions For Oromo, the Gadaa system is a traditional system of governance in which the core cultural aspects of the Oromo people and indigenous knowledge and wisdom are reflected. This institution guides the overall aspects of the social, political, economic and religious lives of the Oromo people who have been upholding it for centuries. It also serves as instrument of socialization, education, religious expression, peace maintenance and social cohesion by promoting the principle of equality and freedom. Besides this, it functions as a mechanism of conflict resolution, judicial administration, and enforcement of moral conduct and principle of peaceful co-existence with other ethnic groups. Apart from such reality, failure to incorporate the system within Oromia regional state constitution questions the legitimacy of the constitution itself among Oromos since it neglected the globally recognized symbol of Oromo’s civilization. This kind of problem can be rectified and revitalized through incorporating the principles and values of the Gadaa system in the regional constitution. It is clear that the incorporation of the Gadaa system in the Oromia constitution may need extensive reform of the current regional constitution. In this regard, Article. 111 of the 2001 revised Oromia constitution show the phases of modifying the constitution. However, the law is silent on who proposes the initiation. Instead of vividly indicating who shall do the initiation, the Oromia constitution gives the power of ruling the

259 initiation of constitutional amendment to the horizontal and vertically established government organs. On this basis, any proposal for constitutional amendment shall be submitted to ‘Caffee’ for discussion and decision if supported by one-third vote of members of ‘Caffee’ or a majority vote of regional government administrative council or a one-third of district councils in the region or a one-third of Kebele/Ganda councils in the Region’. The provision authorized the local governments of the district and Kebele/Ganda council to rule on initiation as alternative to regional government organs. Among the regional government organs, the legislature and regional executive council are empowered to rule on the initiation of constitutional amendment. In the case of legislature/Caffee initiation, Article. 23 of the Proclamation No. 153/2009 defines the organization, duties, conducts of the members and meeting procedures of the Caffee and empowers members of Caffee, the standing committee of Caffee and speaker of Caffee to initiate any laws. When the members of Caffee initiate the law, it should be supported by 20 other members of Caffee. Thus, once the initiation to incorporate principles and rules of the Gadaa system into Oromia constitution made by above organs, the next step will be discussion and deliberation by Caffee members. However, the law is silent about discussion and deliberation by public and by local government organs. This emphasizes that the constitution decentralizes the power to rule on initiation and centralizes discussion and decision to the Caffee. Then after, the proposal will be approved when [all] district councils approve by a two- third majority vote, and when the Caffee approves by a majority vote of three-fourths cumulatively (emphasis added).liii Accordingly, the unanimity requirement of all district council is associated more closely related with con-federal system of constitutional amendment. Thus, in order to incorporate the Gadaa system into the Oromia constitution, at the approval stage it requires all district councils of Oromia and 75 % of the Caffee members. Furthermore, the incorporation of the Gadaa system under the federal constitution can be done based on constitutional amendment procedures of Article. 104 and 105 (2). The procedure involves the two federal houses and six regional states for approval. In this regard, the Oromia regional state, in addition to approving the initiation by Caffee, it has multiple roles in persuading at least five other regional states and members of the federal houses to vote in favor of incorporating the Gadaa system in the FDRE constitution. Incorporation of the Oromo’s Gadaa system in the FDRE constitution does not mean that assimilating other Ethiopian cultures into the Oromo’s Gadaa system or to show hegemony over other cultures of Ethiopian society rather the system reflects the wisdom and civilization of indigenous African democratic system, which is recognized as outstanding globally intangible heritage. On top of this, government has a positive obligation to protect and promote the right to culture of citizens. Hence, the incorporation of customary institutions in the constitution is one of the ways to bear such responsibilities.

5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 5.1. Conclusions As the constitution is the master plan of one country’s legal system and serves as foundation for socio-economic and political foundation of one country, its design should be done with due care. Therefore, architecting the constitution should consider socio-political context of the country. This includes giving adequate recognition to traditional institutions and encouraging beneficial cultural practices to advance legal pluralism. That is why many African countries’

260 constitutions give formal and constitutional recognition to protect and promote indigenous knowledges and practices. The Oromo’s Gadaa system is among a traditional system of governance that reflects the wisdom and civilization of a democratic system, which is recognized as one of globally outstanding intangible heritage. It guides the overall aspects of the social, political, economic and religious lives of the Oromo people who have been upholding it for long period of time. Gadaa is an indigenous system of human development on the basis of which the Oromo welfare system is institutionalized, communal wealth is distributed, rules of resource protection and environmental conservation is enforced and all other aspirations are fulfilled. As discussed earlier, Oromo society is organized into five Gadaa generation classes or sets. The entire class progresses through eleven series grades. However, all previous and current constitutions of Ethiopia and the Oromia regional state are conspicuously silent on the Gadaa institution except the indirect reference to the Gadaa in the Oromia constitution in the inclusion of Odaa in the state’s flag and designation of regional legislative body/State Council as Caffee. This paper reveals that the values and principles that can be incorporated into regional and federal constitution. This includes free and fair election process under supervision of independent body of Qaalluu council and recalling system if elected person failed to perform his duty s/he peaceful transfer power up on expiry of non-renewable eight years term. In addition to this, there is a division of power and function among generations and different institution with the view of eliminating abuse of power by practicing participatory and deliberative mechanism of decision making by consulting the people. Furthermore, the system has established different democratic institutions such as Moggaasaa/naturalization to non-Oromo migrants, Gumaa /reparation for victims of crime, Guddifachaa/adoption to protect best interest of Child and Siinqee to promote women rights.

5.2. Policy Recommendations The principles and values of the Gadaa system can be incorporated into the Ethiopian federal and regional Oromia constitutions, either through formal constitutional recognition and/or reserving seat with appropriate position to them. This helps to celebrate diversity and promote and develop indigenous knowledge and institution, which in turn aid in testing the practice of legal pluralism. The process of such incorporation formally starts by owning the initiation which is followed by public deliberation and discussion and, finally, approved according to the procedure and voting requirements of the law. Hence, the organs and officials should be empowered to do so by incorporating the Gadaa system both at the federal and Oromia regional state tiers. To this effect, this paper offers us the following two options. In sum, separate offices, adequate budget, administrative staff, salary and other benefits should be allocated in order to empower them to perform their function autonomously and effectively.

Option Number One As the first option, this paper argues that the Gadaa system can be incorporated into all three wings of government to make effective division of power within each wing, and in a manner that confirms to parliamentary democracy recognized under Article. 45 of the FDRE constitution. This option is more suitable to incorporate into the Oromia regional state constitution. Accordingly, in the case of legislature, the Oromia Caffee (State Council) current unicameral structure should be redesigned into bicameral structure. To this effect, the current State Council will continue as it represents the political representatives directly elected by people

261 for limited term of office, whereby the new second chamber (upper house) should be established in a manner that represents the Oromo nations Gadaa system as a group. The second chamber should encompass Abbaa Gadaas’ who are elected from every angle of the Oromia region for non-renewable eight years as a term office of the Gadaa system. The eligibility to be elected for Abbaa Gadaa position should be regulated according to the rules of the Gadaa system, such as age requirement, competency, marital status and so forth. Chief Abbaa Gadaa and other officials of the chamber can be chosen from the elected Abbaa Gadaas by members of the second chamber. The second chamber of Abbaa Gadaa’s council power and function should focus on the matters affecting the group rights of Oromo and minorities of the region, to promote and preserve cultural rights and maintain peace and tranquility through alternative dispute resolution system. In terms of legislative function, it is better to make the house of review rather than house of initiation. The Abbaa Gadaa chamber entrusted to review and vote on laws initiated by the lower house of State Council. In this regard, the current designation of State Council as Caffee Oromia is more appropriate for the second chamber as it composes the real representatives of the Gadaa system. Besides this, the Abbaa Gadaa should have their own council at their own localities from where they are elected from. At local the level, they ought to promote the diversities of the Gadaa system based on local realities, and when it comes to the regional level in order, they ought to promote the uniform aspect of the Gadaa system as a nation. Similarly, the current regional executive is led by a President of the regional state, which acts as head of government and head of state at the regional level. This kind of power can be divided into the President of the region to act as regional head of government. He/she who is elected from the lower chamber of State Council comprises elected political representatives of the region. However, the power of head of state can be left to the politically neutral officials, Abbaa Gadaa. In such a case, the regional head of state who is elected from upper house/second Chamber of Abbaa Gadaa to act as symbol of the nation. At this juncture, the legislative and executive power may be fused. However, since the Abbaa Gadaa and its officials are members of executive and Caffee/Gumii within the Gadaa system, such a simultaneous position is relatively reconciled with both the Gadaa system of the Oromo nation and parliamentary democracy of the Ethiopian constitution. Furthermore, the above discussed democratic institutions of the Gadaa System can be incorporated into formal state organs in a manner to reconcile the tradition and government structures. For instance, the FDRE and Oromia regional state constitution recognizes the establishment of customary courts to entertain family and personal matters. Hence, the Oromia regional state can also establish customary courts based on the Gadaa principles. In this case, since the power and jurisdiction given to customary courts are limited to personal and family matter, it needs to re-imagine the constitution itself in a way that gives wide room for adjudicatory power of customary laws of the Gadaa system.

Option Number Two The second option recommends official recognition as a separate institution from the government organs. For instance, the South African constitution has a full chapter on the role of traditional leaders. Accordingly, their constitution provides recognition for the institution and status of traditional leadership. Moreover, the constitution stipulates that to deal with matters related to traditional leadership, the role of traditional leaders, customary laws and the customs of communities encourage establishing a system of customary laws at national or provincial

262 legislation. On its part, these provisions may provide room for the foundation of houses of traditional leaders and a council of traditional leaders. Likewise, the Ethiopian constitution can provide this kind of general legal framework in a manner that accommodates different customary institutions of the country as the whole, and the Oromia regional state constitution had better give official recognition to the institution of the Gadaa system, specifically, on the other.

iChristophe Van Der Beken (2012), Unity in Diversity – Federalism as a Mechanism to Accommodate Ethnic Diversity: The Case of Ethiopia, Zuerich/Muenster, Lit Verlag, p. 27. iiAsafa Jalata (2012), Gadaa (Oromo Democracy): An Example of Classical African Civilization, Journal of pan African Studies, Vol. 5 (1), p.126. iii See Gadaa system, An Indigenous Democratic Socio-Political System of the Oromo, (Retrieved from https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/gada-system-an-indigenous-democratic-socio-political-system-of-the-oromo-01164, accessed on 26 December, 2019) iv Constitutional Democracy, Center for civic Education, (Retrieved from https://www.civiced.org/resources/ publications/resource-materials/390-constitutional-democracy, accessed on 26 December, 2019) vN Wadesango et. al (2011)., ‘Violation of Women’s Rights by Harmful Traditional Practices’, p.13 Anthropologist. accessed on 17 March 2018. vi Different types of Harmful traditional practices practiced in different parts of the world. The commonly known harmful practices committed against women and children are female genital mutilation, child/early marriage, marriage by abduction (forced marriage), Polygamy, payment of bride price/lobola (Southern African countries), honour killings, dowry death (some Asian countries), Female infanticide before or after birth (China, India, and Bangladesh), Naka (forcing women to marry several times for the family to get money in India), Devadasi (temple prostitution), Trokosi (obligates families to render their daughters to the gods in fetish shrines, where they are forced to serve as sexual slaves), nutritional taboos, child delivery related practices, and Female inheritance issues/widowhood, forced feeding of women, and dowry price. (Ibid) vii Retrieved from http://arc-international.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Traditional-Values-International- References.pdf> accessed on 23 March 2019. viii Muradu Abdo and Gabreyesus Abegaz (2009), Customary Law Teaching Material, p.85. ix Id, p. 86. x Ibid xiThe 1992 Ghana Constitution, Art. 270-277. xiiMuradu Abdo et. al, Supra note 8, p.227. xiiiIbid. xiv Ibid. xv Nominations file of the Gadaa system to register in UNESCO Intangible heritage site (2015), p.3. xvi Ibid. xviiገዛህኝ ግርማ (2008)፤ የመስቀል ባህል አከባበር፤ ጫምባላላ ባህል እና ገዳ ስርዓት በዩኔስኮ የሰዉ ልጆች ወካይ የማይዳሰስ ባህላዊ ቅርስ ዝርዝር ዉስጥ በዓለም ህዝቦች ቅርስነት ለማስመዝገብ ህደት እና ጠቀሜታ፤ Shalla press, p.253. xviii The Oromo of Booranaa name these classes as: Fullaas, Daraara, Makullaa, Moggisaa, and Sabaqaa. The five major classes among the GujiiOromo who take power in every eight-years cycle refer to these as: Mudaana, Dhaalana, Roobalee, Harmufaa, and Haalchisaa while the Karayyuu refer to them as Roobalee (IIma Moggisaa), Birmajjii (IIma Sabaqaa), Meelbaa (IIma Nikusaa), Michillee or Dilboo (llma Mamaraa), and Haalachisor Dulloo (ilma Daraara). On the other hand, the Tulamaa and Machaa Oromo refer to the five classes as: Birmajjii, Horataa, Dulloo, Michilee and Roobalee; and, among the lttuu, they are known as: Horataa, Sabaqaa, Badhaadhaa, Daraaraa and Fadataa.(Id, p.270). xix Ibid. xxWarqinaa Abbaa Soorii (2008), Sirna Gadaa, p. 24. xxiIbid. xxii Ibid. xxiii Ibid. xxivገዛህኝ፤ Supra note 17, p.272.

263 xxv Ibid. xxvi Ibid. xxviiFederal Democratic Republic of Ethiopian (FDRE) Constitution (1995), Preamble para.2 & 3, art. 34(4), 39(2& 5). xxviiiId, art. 41(9) & 91(1). xxix Id, art. 91 xxxTsegayeRegassa (2009) “Sub-National Constitutions in Ethiopia: Towards Entrenching Constitutionalism at State Level”, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 3, No.1, p. 50. xxxi Revised Oromian Constitution, Megeleta Oromia,6th Year, Procl. No. 46/2001, Finfinne, Art. 3/2 & 46. xxxii See art. 197-213 of the Revised Oromia Family Code, Magalata Oromia, Proclamation No. 83/2003 and Art. 180- 196 of the Federal Family Code, Federal Negarit Gazetta, Proclamation No. 213/2000. xxxiii See Chapter 12 (Art. 270-272) of 1996 South African constitution. xxxiiiGezahegn, Supra note 17, p. 254. xxxiv Ibid. xxxvAsmerom Legesse (1973), Gadaa: Three approaches to the study of African Society, Free press, p. 206. xxxvi Ibid. xxxviiNomination file, Supra note 15, p. 7. xxxviii Bona Legesse (2013), Local Characteristics under Ethiopian and South African Constitution, LLM thesis, p. 33. xxxix Ibid. xlSileshi Zeyohanes (2009), Constitutional Law Teaching Material II (Unpublished), p.9. xliBrian Z. Tamanaha (2004), On The Rule Of Law; History, Politics, Theory, Cambridge University Press, New York, p. 52. xlii Bona, Supra note 38, p. 34. xliii Id, p.35. xlivየእትዮጵያ ህግ መንግስት ማብራሪያ (1998), p. 11. xlvBona, Supra note 38, p.35. xlvi Ibid. xlvii Ibid. xlviii In Latin this term quoted as ‘Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa’. It means ‘No one should be judge in his own cause’. (Bryan A. Garner (2004), Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed., P. 5345). xlixGezahegn, Supra note 17, p.256. l UNESCO nomination file, Supra note 15, p. 7. li Ibid. lii Ibid. liii Ibid.

Main References • Asafa Jalata (2012), Gadaa (Oromo Democracy): An Example of Classical African Civilization, Journal of Pan African Studies, Vol. 5 (1). • Asmerom Legesse (1973), Gadaa: Three approaches to the study of African Society, Free press. • Bona Legesse (2013), Local Characteristics under Ethiopian and South African Constitution, unpublished LLM thesis. • Bryan A. Garner (2004), Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. • Christophe Van Der Beken (2012), Unity in Diversity-Federalism as a Mechanism to Accommodate Ethnic Diversity: The Case of Ethiopia, Zuerich/Muenster, Lit Verlag. • Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopian Constitution (1995), Federal Negarit Gazette. • Gadaa system, An Indigenous Democratic Socio-Political System Of the Oromo, (Retrieved from https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/gada-system-an-indigenous-democratic-socio-political- system-of-the-oromo-01164, accessed on 26 December, 2019. • Muradu Abdo and Gabreyesus Abegaz (2009), Customary Law Teaching Material (Unpublished).

264 • N. Wadesango et. al. (2011), Violation of Women’s Rights by Harmful Traditional Practices, Anthropologist, Vol. 13. • Nomination Files of the Gadaa to register in UNESCO Intangible Heritage Site (2015). • Revised Oromia Regional State Constitution (2001), Megeleta Oromia, 6th Year, Proclamation No. 46/2001. • Sileshi Zeyohanes (2009), Constitutional Law Teaching Material II (Unpublished). • Tsegaye Regassa (2009), Sub-National Constitutions in Ethiopia: Towards Entrenching Constitutionalism at State Level, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 3, No.1. • Warqinaa Abbaa Soorii (2008), Sirna Gadaa. • የእትዮጵያ ህግ መንግስት ማብራሪያ (Unpublished) (1998). • ገዛህኝግርማ (2008)፤ የመስቀል ባህል አከባበር፤ ጫምባላላ ባህል እና ገዳ ስርዓት በዩኔስኮ የሰዉ ልጆች ወካይ የማይዳሰስ ባህላዊ ቅርስ ዝርዝር ዉስጥ በዓለም ህዝቦች ቅርስነት ለማስመዝገብ ህደት እና ጠቀሜታ, Shalla Press.

265 The Political Economy of Gold Mining in Ethiopia: Exclusion, Discrimination and Local Resistance Against MIDROC Laga-Dambi Gold Mine, Southern Ethiopia

Extended Abstract

Ethiopia aimed to liberalize the mining economy in the early 1990s by encouraging privatization and presumably to trickle down the income from the mining sector to other sectors through the principle of redistribution. Accordingly, MIDROC Laga- Dambi Gold Mine – the largest private gold producing company in the country – has taken over 485km2 of land in Guji (a zone in Oromia regional state) on a 20-year lease since 1997. Nevertheless, the company has followed an exclusionist and discriminatory approach against local communities both in terms of job recruitment as well as for the provision of social services. Over the last 20 years, local communities in Guji zone have been resisting such practices of the company were brutally crushed by the government. However, the protests against the mining company erupted again in May 2018 following the renewal of the license for another 10 years amidst media reports about severe health impacts on local communities. It finally forced the federal government to suspend the license in May 2018.

Therefore, this paper analyzes how local politics (questions of entitlement), mining micropolitics, and the national political economy are entangled and eventually produce different forms of contestation and negotiations. The paper argues that while the company’s exclusionist approach is rooted within the political formation of the state – that considers such territories as resource frontiers (full of resources but empty of people), it is also part of the national political economy under “developmental state”. The paper concludes that the interplay between local politics (resource nationalism), national political economy and mining micropolitics shape how mining companies operate and also how states formulate mining policies. The findings of the research show that local communities have been socially and economically excluded, marginalized and have become victims of environmental destruction. Rather than contributing to the economic development and social services in the area, MIDROC further exacerbated the impoverishment of local communities. In this regard, it is argued that this micro-level case study reflects the broader national level systemic resource appropriation that the Oromo and other marginalized societies have suffered under successive regimes in the country. The research finding further shows that the establishment of the company in the area did not have any multiplier effect on the local economy. Therefore, the project recommends that the government should address the people’s questions of economic and social service provisions in the short term, and design innovative mining administration and ownership for long-term sustainable utilization of the mineral for the benefit of the society and government. The fieldwork for this paper has been conducted over the last four years since 2016. Keywords: Political Economy, Exclusion, Local Resistance, MIDROC Laga-Dambi Gold Mine

266

Introduction

Mining industries are often considered as a panacea for addressing economic and social problems in developing countries because such projects are commonly thought to create job opportunities, enhance foreign currency earnings, and eventually contribute to other sectors of the economy through redistributive approaches. For developing countries where other sectors of the economy have not been yet developed, extractive industries are expected to boost national economic development. Besides, such industries could be a source of income for the local people residing in the proximity of the industries. Extractive industries also have a multiplier effect by opening up employment opportunities and improving local infrastructural development (Obeng-Odoom 2013).

Nevertheless, extractive industries have also become causes of conflict, socio-economic problems, and political unrest, depending on how such sectors are governed. Some scholars call it a “resource curse,” referring to the fact that despite the abundance of natural resources, many developing countries suffer from conflicts over such resources causing different dimensions of destruction. In central Africa, for example, the Democratic Republic of Congo is rich in terms of resources but one of the most impoverished and war-torn countries in the world (Obeng-Odoom 2013). In any case, natural resources such as minerals can be blessings or curses based on the broader natural resource governance and the nature recognition given to local communities in the management and utilization of these resources.

In Ethiopia, although extractive industries have not been given special attention in the economic policy of the country under the previous regimes, it has become among the promising sectors, particularly under the last two consecutive Growth and Transformation Plans (GTP I and II). Indeed, gold mining remained to be an area that successive regimes considered as a potential sector to boost the economy of the country. Under the imperial regime, for example, control over gold mining areas was not only a source of economy but it was also a symbolic representation of state prestige. From this perspective, extractive industries are presumed to be the solution for economic development in many dimensions (Regassa 2016). The discovery and operation of formerly Adola Gold Mining, which is now MIDROC Laga Dambi Gold Mine, was also

267 part of the imperial regime’s attention to use gold as part of state treasure that the military regime and partly the EPRDF government also sustained. Accordingly, MIDROC Laga Dambi Gold Mine PLC took over the gold site from the government- owned Adola Gold Mining Enterprise in 1997 through 20 years of the lease.

The Context

The gold mine near Adola and Shakiso has been the largest important extractive industry in Ethiopia since its opening in the 1930s. Adola Gold Mining was first discovered in the 1930s during the Italian occupation and was run by the imperial regime as the private property of the emperor. To signify the contribution of the gold resource to the imperial treasury, Adola town was also renamed as Kibre Mengist – literally to mean the prestige/honour of the state. It was an area from where the government extracted gold, accumulated wealth and power. On the contrary, in the public narrative, the name of the town (Adola and later including Shakiso) signified terror in the forcible recruitment of labor, the condition of penal servitude that prevailed in the labor camp, and the coercive measures taken against local people. Adola Gold Mine was considered a place of exile (punishment) as well as an area where people were being killed for the sake of creating strict control over the gold mineral (Bahru 2002; Mekonnen 2017; Dambe 2018). Because of the forceful recruitment of labourers, and due to the harsh conditions of penal servitude that prevailed in the labour camps at Shakkiso, Adola emerged as a dreadful area in the country. There has been a common saying that forced laborers used to express their grievance (hardship) as follows:

“Gifaa bili Adola Ansa bili akkafa Lela mini yimexali!”

This means ‘if the worst comes, I will be taken to Adola, if the lesser evil happens, I will be given spade, nothing more would happen’. Labourers were conscripted or voluntarily taken to labour camps established at some 20 kilometres to the south of Adola, now called Shakiso. Migrant workers increased in number from time to time and eventually established the town of Shakiso though there had also been settlement areas of such workers in nearby places including at a place called Goraa, Gay’o, Baddaa keessa,

268 Jiboota, Reejjii, Ceekataa, Daawwaa and Haya Diimaa (Mokonnen, 2017). Labourers came to the area from different parts of the country.

Soon after the liberation of Ethiopia from Italy in 1941, about 900 soldiers led by one of the prominent royal officials, Dajjazimach Kabada Buzunesh, was stationed in the area for both protection of the gold mining activities and general security reasons (Mekonnen, 2017). The government (both imperial and military) exclusively controlled the gold extraction and as a result, local people were forbidden from extracting gold. As a result, the practice of ‘abbaa follossaa’ (Abbaa follossaa was the name given to the local artisanal mining) was declared illegal (Damisee, 2000). Local people had the memory of death, displacement and all forms of exclusion under the military regime with regard to access to gold extraction. If people were found in the proximity of the territorialized area, the security personnel of the company would kill them. This practice continues to date under MIDROC Laga-Dambi Gold Mine.

The Political Economy of Laga-Dambi Gold Mine

Laga-Dambi gold mine has been a manifestation of the macro-political economy whereby state and state-affiliated companies expropriate resources through coercive power. Local communities and government authorities unanimously assert that following the transfer of the mining site to MIDROC Laga-Dambi gold mine in 1997, the company exercised uncontrolled coercive power without any sort of accountability for its impacts, patterns of recruitment, exercise of intimidation, torture, and killing of people in local communities. MIDROC’s excessive monopoly of power over local communities and their resources can be conceptualized within Ethiopia’s post-1991 politico-economic order that is highly controlled by TPLF/EPRDF party/government. Studies on land dispossession in Ethiopia’s pastoralist frontiers also show that private companies affiliated to the party were given administrative, financial and technical leverage in land acquisition, importation of materials, and production and export of outputs (Regassa et al, 2018). Likewise, the TPLF dominated government transferred the mining site to MIDROC PLC in 1997 without a transparent procedure to which neither local communities nor government authorities in Oromia were consulted. According to a former Shakiso district administrator, they were only ordered to restrict local

269 communities from trespassing into the mining site, which was actually not clearly demarcated.

Over the last 20 years, MIDROC has been producing gold from the area in huge quantity though the report from the company is still questionable about the amount. Some sources still citing the company’s report, state that it has been producing an average 1 amount of 4.5 tones of gold per year. A 2014 report produced by MIDROC Company revealed that from 1998-2014 alone, the company had generated 17,168,007,555 birr from the sale of gold and 80,671,938 birr from silver. This means the company had accumulated total revenue of 17,248,679,493 birr in 16.4 years and had been generating 1,051,748,749 birr per annum. Although the transparency of the company in reporting the exact figure of its production and revenue remains questionable, this income by itself is significant. While it requires empirical data to verify, undoubtedly, there is no district in the country comparable to Oda Shakiso in its capacity to generate 1.05 billion birr from gold and silver alone.

Despite being highly profitable, MIDROC’s contribution to local economic development, social infrastructure and environmental health has been insignificant. As it will be detailed later in this paper, although the company claims that it is detached from local communities, it is in fact severely impacting the people. Discussions of extractive industries’ contribution to local and national development depend on institutional arrangements and resource governance, which are highly influenced by the political and economic policies and on the patterns of state-society relations (Bebbington et al., 2018). In terms of institutional arrangement and approaches of resource governance, states and powerful non-state actors put in place structures and policies suitable for their interests. Likewise, the Ethiopian government’s privatization policy and the federal government’s monopoly of power in transfer and management of the mining site has given the MIDROC company a loophole to escape local level administrative control. Guji zone and Shakiso district administration officials claim that whenever they were asked to listen to local communities’ multifaceted complaints and grievances, MIDROC authorities would often respond to them by insisting that the company is answerable only to the federal government’s ministry of mining and energy (now ministry of mines

1http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Event/Africa/Ethiopia%2 0Extractive%20Industries%20Forum%202014/5a_MIDROC.pdf

270 and natural gas). The ministry, on the other hand had neither the political will nor sense of commitment to address local peoples’ questions. Rather, it has turned a deaf ear to the severe health, socio-economic, and environmental impacts (devastations) caused by the company for the last 20 years, and paradoxically renewed the license for another ten years in early 2018 leading to massive protest, which in turn brought down the company and the government to their knees. Despite opposition from some experts within the ministry against renewal of the license on the basis that proper impact assessment over the last 20 years has not been conducted, the then Minister (an OPDO member) and state minister (TPLF member) unilaterally decided to renew the license without consulting Oromia regional state and local communities. This clearly shows that it was a political decision without proper bureaucratic procedures.

Aspects of Exclusion, Discrimination, and Resistance

Exclusion and Discrimination against local communities

Extractive industries established in the form of enclosures are often exclusionist by nature. Enclosure, as a form of territorially designating a space for some purposes entails aspects of inclusion and exclusion, which in turn creates notions of asymmetrical power relations between those included and excluded (Hall et al., 2011). For example, enclosure in pastoralist areas excludes pastoralists from accessing water, pasture, and other resources, but privileges private actors or the state to access the resources. This is what scholars in the field describe as “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2003). The notion of accumulation by dispossession is relevant within the context of MIDROC’s extractive industry because by dispossessing local communities from their resources and by restricting them from accessing economic and cultural spaces, the company has accumulated both power and wealth.

MIDROC’s exclusion and discrimination of local communities can be described in different ways: 1) it restricted local communities from accessing resources in the concession site namely rocks (to extract gold), forest, water, and farmland; 2) exclusion from decision making on matters that affect their life (the local people have never been consulted before, during and after the land was transferred to the company, and neither

271 were they involved in decisions related to land appropriation for mineral exploration by the company); 3) Exclusion from employment opportunities in the company; 4) the overall socio-economic and environmental impacts of the company has resulted into further marginalization of the people.

Gold mining companies in other parts of Africa, such as Tanzania, provide diverse opportunities for the local people residing in the mining site (Smith and Kinyondo, 2015). On the contrary, this study shows that rather than contributing to the socio-economic development of local communities, the presence of MIDROC in the area has worsened the people’s lives in many ways (in terms of health, food security, biodiversity, access to cultural spaces etc.). From the principle of the multiplier effect, our interviews and field observations show that MIDROC has been an enclave production for the entire period of its operation. That means: ➢ Its workers were rarely interacting with local communities in terms of buying local products. For example, MIDROC’s staff do not buy livestock products locally due to their suspicion of the safety of the livestock in the vicinity of the company as the area is environmentally polluted with toxic waste from the industry.

➢ Local communities claim that the price of their cattle is twice less than the price of the same size and quality animal in the market from other places only because of its location. Merchants downgrade the price saying, “it is from Shakiso and is not of the same quality with those coming from other places”.

➢ MIDROC has been located in a geographically secluded area. The staff live in a staff compound in Shakiso town, located at about 5km away from the mining site. On the other hand, the workers do not have access to local communities during the work hours. Thus, there is no way for multiplier economies to be established in the locality.

➢ It recruits employees from other places without advertising/posting vacancies to the local people.

According to the report published by the company, the workforce of the company was 1,272, of which 860 were permanent and 12 were expatriates working at various capacities. MIDROC Gold also employs 109 employees on secondment basis from Trust Protection and Personnel Services PLC. In fact, the report does not show how many are from the local people and how many are from other regions. Data obtained from a household survey shows that the company employed only 33 people from the local

272 communities. Out of these employees from local people, the majority (22) were guards, two drivers, five janitors and four professional experts.

The following are the bases for the local people’s complaints in relation to employment opportunities: ➢ Initially, it started recruiting local people for guards and day labour through the strategy of “work for food.” The workers were only given meals for their labour. There was no payment in cash. ➢ Later on, the company began paying them salaries but very low compared to the workload. ➢ Local communities strongly complained that MIDROC follows strict discriminatory and exclusionist approach in its recruitment. They claim that job vacancies have not been openly and transparently announced in Shakiso. Rather, people were recruited in Addis Ababa and in some cases vacancies are announced in Shakiso after the deadline. ➢ Some informants also claim that there were differences in the amount of payment between local employees and employees from other areas on the same job position, similar qualification level, and experience.

One key informant describes the situation as follows: MIDROC discriminates local people during employment. Our children never get a proper job in the company. They employ our people only as guards and labourers. They finish all recruitment in Addis Ababa through a new company called Trust. This Trust company makes an announcement in Shakiso only after the deadline has already passed. There is no way to complain about such discrimination. Local government authorities were either unwilling or powerless in this regard. When we complain to the company even about the death of our livestock after drinking polluted water in the waste dam or being drawn into it, the company people never listen to us (anonymous informant, Dhibba Batte, March 16, 2019).

The other major area of complaint from local communities is related to Trust Protection and Personnel Services PLC. The local government authorities and community members do not know about this company but MIDROC always refers recruitment issues to it. That means, whenever people ask MIDROC about lack of transparency and inclusiveness, let alone affirmative action in recruitment, the company uses Trust as a strategy to escape from local pressure. An official in Shakiso district Social Affairs has the following today:

273

Some eight years ago, before the death of Mr. Alemayehu Atomsa, the ex- Oromia president, I personally wrote a letter to MIDROC asking for clarification about Trust company. I also copied the letter to Mr. Alemayehu. I finally had a meeting with the president, where MIDROC CEO was also invited. We discussed issues of recruitment, transparency problems, exclusion of local people, and many more. Mr. Alemayehu gave good directions, but after his death, everything was turned upside down. A lady from Trust company gave me a call once. She warned me like a military. She directly warned me to stop asking anything about the company. I couldn’t get administrative support from Oromia side and stopped it (Anonymous official, Shakiso, March 13, 2019).

From the above explanations, it can be understood that MIDROC lacks a package that supports local community employment. On the contrary, it doesn’t transparently recruit local community members on an equal basis through equal opportunities. According to a former MIDROC employee, who served as a guard for seven years, the company does not allow Guji guards to work in the inner sections of the company. Rather, the Guji guards were assigned to guard the outskirts of the concession sites. He specifically said, “We were employed to protect the company from our own fellow Guji men and women. They wanted us because we know the area, and also we are from the same community. In doing so, they created conflict within our community among clans, individuals, etc.”

Local Resistance against Impacts from MIDROC

In 2009, in response to the death of over 360 cattle as a result of toxic chemicals from the mining site spillage into a river, the Guji Oromo in nearby districts protested against the company but government security forces coercively responded to the popular demand leading to arrest of some 15 individuals.2 Soon after the protest, the company owner and higher government authorities from the federal and regional states arrived at the place whereby the CEO of the MODROC gold mine PLC pledged 15 million Birr (about 1 million US$) in compensation to the impacts or as part of corporate social responsibility – though the country does not still have clear policy framework on corporate social responsibility. Nevertheless, the company did not do anything practical to mitigate the problem of environmental pollution and its health impacts on local

2 Oromia-Ethiopia: Wikileaks – Govt’s Crackdown on Oromo on Behalf of MIDROC Gold During Shakiso/Guji Protests of 2009

274 communities. Local communities and government officials from Shakiso district argue that the company’s managers were not willing to listen to the voices of the people even during incidents that resulted in the death of a significant number of livestock.

As part of the nation-wide protest in Oromia regional state – one of the nine regional states of Ethiopia in the federal arrangement – there has been series of protests against the MIDROC gold mine’s environmental, health, and socio-economic impacts since 2014. A report from BBC and other local media outlets in December 2017 about children’s disabilities and miscarriages on pregnant women in the area associated with cyanide chemical went viral on social media and provoked social unrest and strikes. The unrest evolved into a popular movement leading to the suspension of the company’s license. Unfortunately, the company’s license was recently renewed for another ten years. My own observation of the area in January 2018 also confirms the health and environmental impacts related to gold mining. Following the popular uprising, the company and the ministry of mining and natural gas commissioned researchers to legitimize its claim that the extractive industry does not have any environmental and health impact. Arguably, the team of researchers whom the local people and other activists claim to have been bribed by the MIDROC had come up with conclusions that conform to the company’s own claim.

Nevertheless, local reaction and network of local communities, scholars, human rights organizations, and local government authorities reversed the balance of power and forced the Ministry of Mining to issue a statement on May 2018. As a result, the Ministry of Mining declared the suspension of MIDROC’s license until an independent team of researchers could conduct a scientific investigation and come up with convincing recommendations. This reversal did not come without any cost from the side of local communities. A confrontation between government security personnel and local youth led to the death of twelve individuals from the local communities in early May 2018.

The Reconfiguration of the Mining Frontier as a result of Political Reaction from below Intensifies

Rhetoric of economic development and improvement of local communities’ life on the one hand, and discourses depicting resource frontiers as ‘empty of people, but full of

275 resources’ have been used as legitimizing elements in the process of land appropriation in many developing countries (Regassa et al., 2018). Land appropriation, whether for large-scale agribusiness, mining, nature conservation, or logging, often entails violent forms of enclosure and exclusion (Lund 2011; Li 2014). Nevertheless, the process of transferring land to private investors, corporations, and state-owned firms converge the interplay between different actors whose interests, power constellation, and network reconfigure interactions, actions and practices related to land appropriation. Likewise, the transfer of the mining site to MIDROC gold mining company has converged the government, the private mining company, and local communities and different civil society organizations. The convergence espouses different perspectives on the territory, approaches to conducting mineral extraction, and on the rights of local communities to the resources. Exclusionist approaches by the company, coercive and militarized approaches by the government in curtailing dissent and the environmental and health impacts of the extractive industry, has resulted in a series of reactions from local communities. As the empirical data above shows, the government and the company have, at different times, been systematically employing various strategies to curb local reactions. While MIDROC’s grant of about one million US$ in 2009 was an approach of soft power to silence local movement, there was also cooptation of local authorities at the same time. Simultaneously, the government used coercive hard power by arresting, intimidating, and punishing people who were believed to have been involved in mobilizing the people against the company. Within the past year, the government again resorted both to persuasive as well as coercive approaches – through “scientific research” and military/police force respectively.

Nevertheless, the power of domination always reproduces the power of resistance, often leading to political settlements whereby local communities, activists, human rights organizations, critical researchers, and other pro-people actors converge through what Allan and Cochrane (2010) call assemblage of power. The assemblage in this particular case converged actors who are not necessarily spatially connected but discursively networked due to their common visions on the right of local communities.

Conclusion The extractive industry (gold mine) in Ethiopia has become a terrain of contestation between reactions from below and counter-reactions from above. The current state of

276 affairs in the resource (mining) frontier is produced and reproduced through continuous contestations between these two forces. MIDROC’s exclusionist and discriminatory approach at the micro-level mining practice cannot be separately understood from the macro-level political economy of the post-1991 Ethiopia in which the dominant party and its business affiliates (private or state) controlled resources of the country. While the exclusionist, exploitative and violent resource appropriation in the mining frontier has produced forces of resistance from local communities and their networks, the resilience, determination and power of reaction from below has further strengthened the coercive power and discursive strategies of the state and its private conglomerate to design different strategies of silencing local opposition. However, as the incidents since December 2017 have shown us, the political reaction from above failed to eradicate local resistance, nor could it make the state and the company smoothly implement their violent actions. Rather, it produced and empowered local resistance, enhanced creation of networks, and eventually led to the suspension of the license of the company – weakening the power of the “powerful.” Now, a new form of relationship has been created whereby the government has pledged to come to the negotiating table with local communities, their representatives, and scholars.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of the research, the following recommendations are provided:

Short-term (Immediate Action)

1. Economic Rehabilitation of Affected People: Many residents in the vicinity of the company have been facing serious economic, health, and social problems. For example, the lack of water services has exposed them to use polluted water with serious public health implications. Health problems also create a social and economic crisis. Therefore, they deserve immediate intervention in social infrastructure provisions. More specifically, families whose family members are sick or died due to factors related to toxic chemicals should be economically rehabilitated for losses they incurred over the last several years.

2. Compensation: In the future, the local communities need to get appropriate compensation for the health problems, environmental destructions, lack of social services, denial/restriction of economic opportunities, and eventually for the

277 deterioration of their social wellbeing as a result of the establishment of MIDROC Laga-Dambi Gold mine in the area. Therefore, different categories of compensation including environmental, economic, psychological and social rehabilitation compensations should be put in place.

3. Consultative meeting: There has never been a genuine and transparent consultative meeting with local communities both by the government and the company. Local inhabitants did not have an opportunity to express their grievances, problems, complaints, and interests. To establish a healthy relationship with local communities in the future, the government should make participatory discussions with all community members (not just with few representatives.)

Long-Term Action 1. Developing and implementing legal frameworks and corporate social responsibility: In Ethiopia, there is no legally binding corporate social responsibility guideline to make companies accountable for their impacts or to make them responsible for their actions. Therefore, there should be a guideline on transparent management of mining industries (production, distribution, and revenue). 2. Designing new mining administration: For the successful utilization of the natural resources for the benefit of the investors, government, and local communities, the administration of the company should be radically changed. Accordingly, the following structure is recommended.

➢ Establishing two Boards of administration: Any future owner of the site should: 1) Establish one board of administration to deal with its administrative issues as they relate to the company. 2) Establish a Joint Board of Administration constituting scholars, representatives of the local community, government authorities from Oromia (including district and regional authorities), and representatives from the company. ➢ Redesigning a new ownership approach: While encouraging investment is vital for the economic development of the country, it is also important to work for the benefit of the local communities. Thus, a new strategy should be designed to enable local communities to get some percentage of shares from the company. The details of this strategy can be studied further. Moreover, given the history of MIDROC Laga-Dambi gold mine, whose benefit for the national economy is not well known, it is also recommended that the government should be involved in

278 the operation through a joint venture. Alternatively, the government’s share in the company can be taken by the Oromia regional state.

3. Regulation: Develop clear guideline and legal frameworks on employment, revenue re-distribution, transparency, local community participation, workers’ right and safety, and company’s compliance with national and international laws and conventions. 4. Ensuring environmental and public health of the area: this includes cleaning the rivers and underground water, fencing the tailing dams and danger zones, and regular provision of public health education for local communities. 5. Establish community development fund: Companies are expected to pay royalty and profit tax to regional governments. There has not been any guideline/regulation that dictates Oromia government to re-distribute some percentages of the incomes collected from such companies to communities affected by the companies. Therefore, it is recommended that the government puts in place community development fund directly to be administered by board of trustees and to be utilized for the purpose of community development. Part of corporate social responsibility fund may also go to this community development fund.

References Alazar Yosef (1998). Gold Mineralization at Legadembi and Sakaro in the Megado Greenstone Belt, Southern Ethiopia. PhD Dissertation: Germany.

Bahru Zewde. (2002). A History of Modern Ethiopia, Addis Ababa University,. Dambe Turche (2018) Extractive Industries and Local People‟s Claim: The Case of MIDROC Laga-Dambi Gold Mine, MA Thesis, Dilla University

Bebbington, Anthony, et al, (2018) Governing Extractive Industries: Politics, Histories, Ideas. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Demisse Uddo. (2000) Environmental Impact of Gold Mining, MA Thesis. Ethiopian Civil Service University.

Hall, Derek, et al, (2011) Powers of Exclusion: Land Dilemmas in Southeast Asia. Hawa’i: University of Hawa’i Press. Harvey, David (2003) The New Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession. Sage Publishers.

279 Mekonnen Gutema (2017) An economic history of Adola gold Mine, Southern Ethiopia, MA thesis, Dilla University Obeng-Odoom, Franklin (2013) Resource curse or blessing in Africa’s oil cities? Empirical evidence from Sekondi-Takoradi, West Africa, City, Culture and Society 4:229-240

Regassa, Asebe (2016) “Development through dispossession?” A reappraisal of the Adola Gold Mine in southern Ethiopia, Horn of Africa Bulletin 28 (4): 27-31.

Regassa, et al, (2018), ‘Civilizing’ the pastoral frontier: land grabbing, dispossession and coercive agrarian development in Ethiopia, The Journal of Peasant Studies, DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2017.1420060

World Bank Group. 2015. Africa Socio-economic Impact of Mining on Local communities in Africa. Reprt No. ACS14621 [http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/958951468191636444/pdf/Mining-Study- June-2015-wcp.pdf. date of access: April 2, 2019]

MIDROC CEO’s presentation. 2014. MIDROC Gold Mine PLC Overview and Contribution. [http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Event/Africa/Ethiopia%20Extractiv e%20Industries%20Forum%202014/5a_MIDROC.pdf date of access: April 2, 2019]

280 Relativistic international development and its potential for implementing self- determination in Ethiopia: Policy recommendations. Marco Bassi Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of Palermo, [email protected]

These policy recommendations are based on the presentation I made on the occasion of the 33rd Annual Conference of the Oromo Studies Association (Finfinne/Addis Ababa, 2019). The theoretical and historical aspects have separately been presented in an open source article (Bassi 2019). In this introduction I am recalling the argumentations that are directly relevant to policy recommendations.1 My 2019 article builds on a previous essay especially dedicated to abuse of minority rights in Ethiopia (Bassi 2014). The main thesis was that the developmental ideology adopted by the ruling party was incompatible both with multi-party democracy and respect for minority rights, two elements that are instead strongly protected under the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE Constitution). The ruling party’s highly centralistic and undemocratic practice led to serious abuses of the rights of pastoralists, ethnic minorities, and small-holding farmers (Table 1). Special attention was dedicated to the livelihoods crisis that the construction of the Gibe 3 dam was likely to produce among the peoples living downstream the dam. The Social and Environmental Impact Assessment did not meet the standards required by their differential languages and identity, and their social, political and economic marginality. Given their disadvantage in the national arena, the environmental effects of eliminating the river’s regular flooding in a very dry area as well as direct large scale ‘grabbing’ of their territory for industrial irrigated agriculture cannot be compensated by gains in terms of standard development and salaried jobs. My 2014 article also challenged academic critics raised against the FDRE Constitution’s emphasis on self-determination of the ‘nation, nationalities and peoples’ of the country. In the process of designing new administrative boundaries along the prevalent native languages of the inhabitants, the idea of univocal identification of the administrative spaces with a single ethnicity prevailed. Some scholars consider this feature to be at the origin of the ethnic clashes along administrative borders that have produced large scale displacement of population, a problem that is still affecting Ethiopian politics. I have instead suggested that the introduction of multi- national federalism finds deep justification in the specific political history of the country (Bassi 2019), while its negative side-effects are not inherent to the adopted constitutional model, but are rather the consequence of ‘failed implementation of complementary key components of the FDRE Constitution, especially respect for fundamental political and minority rights’ (Bassi 2014: 47, 68). My 2019 article takes the move from realization that over a decade of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth above 10% did not prevent the emergence of inequalities and widespread discontent. This situation fuelled the Qeerroo’s protest, its harsh repression by the government

1 For further discussion please refer the full article: https://journals.openedition.org/aam/2319.

281 and the 2018 escalation of the protest at federal scale. At the crossroads between democratising or disintegrating (Lata 1999), the ruling coalition took the virtuous path that in 2019 led to Nobel Peace Award to the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali. It is therefore the right time to reconsider the ideological stands and the political practices that have so far prevented full implementation of the FDRE multinational and democratic Constitution.

Box 1. Official United Nations reports on serious minority rights violations in Ethiopia, delivered between 2006 and 2010

CRC. "Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the Convention. Concluding Observations: Ethiopia", United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child. Forty-third session, CRC/C/ETH/CO/3, 1 November 2006.

McDougall, G. "Implementation of the General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of March 2006 entitled ‘Human Rights Council’. Report of the independent expert on minority issues. Addendum. Mission to Ethiopia (28 November-12 December 2006)", United Nations Human Rights Council, Fourth Session, A/HRC/4/9/Add.3, 28 February 2007.

CERD. "Consideration of the Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention. Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Ethiopia", United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Seventieth Session, 19 February to 9 March 2007, CERD/C/ETH/CO/15, 20 June 2007.

CERD. "Consideration of the Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention. Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Ethiopia", United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Seventy-fifth session, 3-28 August 2009, CERD/C/ETH/CO/7-16, 7 September 2009.

CaT. "Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention. Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture. Advanced Unedited Version. Ethiopia", United Nations Committee against Torture, Forty-fifth session, CAT/C/ETH/CO/1, 1-19 November 2010.

(Source: Bassi 2019)

In the article I draw the parallel between early practices of international development, only aiming at achieving GDP growth, and the Ethiopian developmental policy. Both have produced similar negative side-effects, rhetorically implying wellbeing for all, but in practice marginalizing and dispossessing certain disadvantaged categories. Parallelism also involves the political field, due to the effect of strengthening the ruling party’s capacity to build political support mobilising the national resources, and of reducing democratic accountability by establishing de jure or, as in the case of contemporary Ethiopia, de facto single party systems. Strong international criticism against the early practices led to the emergence of alternative paradigms of development (Table 2) and to the adoption of new human rights instruments.

282 Table 1. Schematic representation of the main paradigms of development (Bassi 2019)

DEVELOPMENT MAIN DISCIPLINARY MAIN INDICATORS PARADIGM DOMAIN Economic growth Macroeconomics • GDP

Later: Later: • microeconomics + political • World Governance Index sciences

Social equity • Sociology • Human Development Index • Amarthya Sen’s theories

Environmental • Environmental sciences • Biodiversity, pollution and climate sustainability indicators

Beneficiaries’ active • Development studies • Emic and holistic indicators on role • Applied, engaged and militant conditions of life of specific Anthropology communities or social groups • Engaged and militant sociology

The critical review of this international process reveals that the corrective measures have progressively been informed by a growing ‘relativistic attitude’, defined as

giving consideration to the relevance of specific articulations of culture, formal or informal norms and local conditions, in ways that impact the implementation of development (Bassi 2019). The relativistic attitude is especially associated to third generation human rights (Table 2), consisting in a number of instruments of international law that recognise collective cultural and territorial rights, including customary institutions and norms. Such treaties and conventions establish procedures in development that give indigenous peoples and communities more control over the development choices that can affect their livelihoods. The expansion of human rights found expression in a broad range of best practices and voluntary guidelines in the field of responsible business, but also in binding internal directives and procedures adopted by international financial organisations, UN agencies, and in legislation by national government, especially in relation to prescriptions concerning the implementation of Social and Environmental Impact Assessments.

283 Table 2. Some selected human rights instruments backing the relativistic attitude in development (Bassi 2019)

CUTURAL DESCRIPTIVE (WEAK) NORMATIVE RELATIVISM UNIVERSALISM RELATIVISM Context and culture differences Context and culture Context and culture differences determine the development agenda differences are seen as are considered key factors of irrelevant to the development planning, with development process cross-cultural approach

FIRST GENERATION HUMAN RIGHTS • Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) • International covenants on civil and political rights (1966)

ECONOMIC GROWTH Respect for first generation human rights is considered a precondition for enforcement PARADIGM: of second and third generation human rights Good governance component SECOND GENERATION HUMAN RIGHTS • International Covenants Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) • Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)

SOCIAL EQUALITY SOCIAL EQUALITY PARADIGM: Third generation human rights were developed PARADIGM: • Human development (recognition to assure, under specific constraints, Basic needs of categorical inequalities) implementation of second generation human • Gender issues rights

THIRD GENERATION HUMAN RIGHTS • International covenants and declarations on tribal and indigenous peoples (ILO 169, 1989; UNDRIP, 2007 ) • Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005) • United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas (2018) • Procedural rights in development • Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa (2010) BENFECIARIES’ ACTIVE ROLE BENFECIARIES’ ACTIVE ROLE The economic growth PARADIGM: PARADIGM: paradigm has incorporated • Participatory rural development • Ethno-development and other procedural rights either in the approaches based on self- form of binding social and determination in development environmental assessments or • Self-reliance as voluntary guidelines and • Endogenous development responsible business • Communitarianism • Pastoral development (IFAD approach) MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT DECLARATION (MILLENNIUM GOALS) (2000) Economic growth + basic needs + women’s equality MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT DECLARATION (SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS) (2015) The relativistic approach is possible in relation to some of the goals

The relativistic turn in human rights and in international development is grounded on the notion of self-determination, exercised by groups at sub-national level, a feature that is shared with the

284 FDRE Constitution. However, in international law this process took place in conjunction with a shift in the legal implication of the concept, with a passage from the political emphasis on secession as part of the decolonisation process to providing differential institutional space and decisional capacity in development and policy, within existing States (Anaya, Lenoir and Rogers 2009: 58-79; Quane 2011; Waller 2018). Clearly, the international experience can provide useful inspiration for the policy turn that is today required in Ethiopia. The relativistic dimension of the FDRE Constitution, with strong provision for self-determination, is what was actually disregarded under the highly centralistic, technocratic and top-down developmental policy. Self- determination was only implemented through the process of defining ‘ethnic-based’ administrative spaces. Due to unbalanced relations of power within the ruling coalition, marginal groups were not in position to influence policy. The current political change in the country provides the outstanding opportunity to overtake the developmental ideology and to fully exploit the FDRE Constitution’s potential for promoting the relativistic approach to development, with attention for the different traditions, values and cultures of the country. Regarding the specific problems with farmers, pastoralists and ethnic minorities, third generation human rights and best practices in international development already provide indications for solutions.

Strengthening civil society and human rights Scholars have highlighted the mismatch between the formal principles that are internationally claimed and the political practice adopted by the ruling party. The FDRE Constitution introduced electoral liberal democracy in the country. It is very detailed in terms of protecting human rights. Experts of the UN have highlighted that the FDRE Constitution goes as far as to including the possibility to open cases at national level based on violation of international treaties to which Ethiopia is a party but that have not yet been adopted in national legislation (Ziegler 2005:11; McDougall 2007: 7,18, 27). There is therefore an urgent need to take measures that may allow the implementation of the constitutional principles. The establishment of effective multi-party democracy is of course the general precondition for all other components: third generation human rights cannot in fact be properly implemented without respect of the fundamental political rights, including freedom of association, of expression, of press, and independent judiciary. There is, however also a urgent need to dedicate specific attention to minority rights, and this in turn requires the establishment of a strong and independent civil society. In international development awareness has grown about the need to accompany economic growth with specific attention for good governance, with civil society providing a key pillar. This is the area where Ethiopia is clearly diverging from the liberal- democratic model. With the adoption of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 the government has strongly limited civil society’s independent action. Civil society organisations (CSOs) are the key instrument of expression for local communities and disadvantaged categories. They were crucial to the emergence of the development paradigm based on the beneficiary’s active role, and, given their capacity to relate to specific local contexts, are key to the implementation of relativistic development measure and approaches.

285 The revision of Proclamation No. 621/2009 is therefore a high priority. It needs to take place in conjunction with a radical change of the role assigned to CSOs in development and human rights, including:

• Establishing mechanisms to involve CSOs in systematic monitoring of human and minority rights • Strengthening CSOs and enabling them to engage in local processes for the protection of community’s collective and procedural rights.

Pastoralism Pastoralism is highly relevant to Ethiopia, both in terms of extension of the pastoral areas and because pastoral areas are highly affected by conflict and refugee flows. Despite explicit protections for pastoralists under the FDRE Constitution, the pastoral policy so far adopted by the Ethiopian government aims at eliminating mobile pastoralism (Bassi 2019). The Ethiopian pastoral policy runs opposite to the most advanced international policy recommendations. In the international arena pastoralists have not achieved the adoption of any relevant international declaration or convention, but a broad consensus is emerging in terms of what is required to support pastoralists, with a relevant component or relativistic measures (Bassi 2017). With specific reference to policy, in 2011 the African Union has adopted the Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa: Securing, Protecting and Improving the Lives, Livelihoods and Rights of Pastoralist Communities (AU 2010) (box 2).

Box 2. The African Union Policy Framework for Pastoralism

The African Union Policy Framework for Pastoralism builds on elements that are also considered in the African Union Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa, including transboundary and regional cooperation, acknowledgement of the legitimacy of indigenous land rights systems and institutions, the importance of informal land rights and the need to build an interface between customary and state institutions. The Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa is highly detailed on mobility, considered the prerequisite of pastoralism and the most appropriate livelihoods strategy. It acknowledges the problems created by various processes of rangeland expropriation and outlines a number of rights belonging to pastoralists, including (AU 2010: 7, 11, 14): • improving the governance of pastoral rangelands and thereby securing access to rangelands for pastoralists; • recognizing communal landholdings; • legitimizing traditional pastoral institutions and providing an interface between customary institutions and state-led systems, with special reference to conflict resolution, management of land, tenure, mobility, and interaction between pastoralists and other interest groups; • ensuring consent and compensation in relation to development projects and investment in pastoral Areas.

(Source: IFAD 2018a: 11-12)

In addition, IFAD has developed practical guidelines that are fully aligned with the African Union Policy Framework for Pastoralism and that promotes self-determination in pastoralists’ development (IFAD 2018b).

286 It is therefore crucial to deeply revise the country’s pastoral policy in line with the international indications, and to implement new projects keeping relativistic best practices into account.

Small-holding farmers The Ethiopian small-holding farmers have seriously been affected by land dispossession, without adequate compensation. At the individual level this took place either by effect of foreign, domestic and governmental investment in industrial agriculture and as consequence of the expansion of town and industrial development, especially in the area around Addis Ababa and in the surrounding portions of Oromia and in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region. Land grabbing also operated at collective scale, especially against agro-pastoral groups, at a degree that it is seriously threating the survival of whole identity groups, a problem that was addressed in the UN reports listed in Box 1. In evident contradiction with the protections contained in art. 40 (5) of the FDRE Constitution, the process of systematic large scale expropriation of collective land was made legal by the Preamble and art. 5 (3) of the FDRE Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation (2005). There is accordingly an urgent need to revise this proclamation, and to establish redressive mechanisms in line with both FDRE Constitution and international best practices. The global reaction against the impact of the post-2008 global rush for land led in 2018 to the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants. This is not a binding international legal instrument, but it provides key guidelines that good-willing governments can take up and accordingly legislate. Many of the articles contain relativistic measures that are highly relevant to the Ethiopian small-holding farmers (Table 3). Many of the relativistic principles established under this Declaration were already practised by some international organisations. The International Fund for African Development (IFAD) requires all actors funded by them to apply the FPIC in all projects likely to affect land access and/or use rights of communities (IFAD 2015). IFAD has also adopted a strong land tenure policy by which customary, informal and collective tenure of farmers must seriously be taken into account (IFAD 2008). In operative terms, the rights of small holding farmers can be promoted by establishing country level platforms on land issue, with strong participation by CSOs expressing the view of local farmers. This type of work can eventually be supported by the International Land Coalition, a global civil society association with specific experience in this field.2 IFAD is the most appropriate UN agencies to finance the required concrete activities in support of the farmers, as part of its normal international mandate in support of the rural poor.

2 https://www.landcoalition.org/

287 Table 3. Selected articles of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants

ARTICLES IN THE UN DESCRIPTIVE CONTENT RELAVANCE TO ETHIOPIA DECLARATION Art. 2, comma 3 Strong provisions for consultation of farmers It gives protection against land Art. 5 on social and before adopting and implementing legislation and grabs and the consequence of the environmental impact policy that may affect them construction of the Gibe 3 dam assessment It gives protection against land It establishes strong land rights, at both individual grabs, both to individuals and in Art 17, comma 1, 3, 4, and collective level, including customary land relation to large scale land and 5 tenure not currently protected by law. It explicitly dispossession of small agro-pastoral condemns eviction of farmers, including as a groups, especially in the South West Art. 24, comma 2 punitive measure or as a consequence of of the country legislation Relativistic approach ‘Peasants and other people working in rural areas who have been arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived Art. 17, comma 5 of their lands have the right, individually and/or It promotes restitution of land collectively, in association with others or as a community, to return to their land of which they were arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived […]’ Highly relevant to water pollution in relation to mining (for instance in It established the right of access to water and to Guji area) and industrial agriculture Art. 21, comma 1, 2 safe and clean water, and it provides for (for instance in the lower Omo and 4 restoration from chemical and poisoning of water valley or in relation to floral bodies industry in the highlands).

It qualifies the curtailing of the Omo River regular flooding as an abuse. Art. 23, comma 2 They protect traditional knowledge and medicinal plants. Relativistic approach Art. 26, comma 1, 2 They affirms right to enjoy the farming and 3 community’s own culture and freely pursue its cultural development Relativistic approach, by Art. 15, comma 4 and Food sovereignty is recognised establishing self-determination by 5 communities of farmers in agricultural development

Under the Sustainable Development Goals’ pressure to integrate development objectives with biodiversity conservation, due consideration should be given to the existence in Ethiopia of several subsistence-oriented agricultural, pastoral and agro/pastoral systems with high biodiversity value. They are based on local and indigenous knowledge and customary governance, including collective land tenure, in ways that are unique to Ethiopia. They often assure the conservation of both wild and agro endemic biodiversity. Specific attention should be given to them with the possibility to engage farmers in improving their livelihoods, without affecting the biodiversity and cultural value of their agricultural or pastoral landscapes. In line

288 with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants, this should be done by fully respecting the food sovereignty3 of the involved local communities. Agroecology and ICCAs/Territories of life4 provide tested and comprehensive approaches to achieve this goal. Several UN agencies and bilateral development cooperation can support such process, including UNDP, UNEP and FAO.

Customary governance The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO 169) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) are two key instruments of international law that legitimate customary institutions and customary law and establish their relevance in relation to development. In operational terms, they are given relevance in conjunction with procedural prescriptions, including the Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). Internationally, many local groups are developing ‘community protocols’, to enable external actors to properly apply the required procedures. In Ethiopia indigenous rights are not recognised. However, independently of the issue of indigeneity, Ethiopia has an extraordinary heritage of customary institutions. The FDRE Constitution already gives consideration to customary law. It also delegates to the decentralized institutions and governmental units the power to establish and implement policy. Nothing constrains such decentralised organs to better implement the constitutional provisions for self- determination by establishing their own governance and consultative mechanisms, in line with the core values of the various nations, nationalities and peoples of the country. In this sense the Oromo have already pioneered important experiences by involving gadaa leaders in governance related to development and to inter-ethnic conflict (Bassi 2010; Bassi 2012). This was also the case in the field of biodiversity conservation. During a EU funded project run by SOS Sahel- Ethiopia the juniper national forests in Borana have been protected with the direct involvement of gadaa elders (Tache and Irwin, 2003). In 2007, gadaa leaders of the Borana delivered with other elders and community representatives the Yaaballo Statement on the Borana Conserved Landscape, stating the intention to conserve biodiversity by demanding control over the development process (Bassi, Tache and Sora 2008, Bassi and Tache 2011). Gadaa expresses the deepest values of the Oromo (Megerssa and Kassam 2019), and where it is still operative it is the key institution regulating allocation of land rights and use of water. It operates through a diffused link to all relevant rural residential and socio-economic units. Actual decisions are collectively taken with full participation of all the concerned extended families, through an articulated range of thematic assemblies (Bassi 2005; Megerssa and Kassam 2019: 212-235). It is therefore possible to rely on gadaa as an advisory institution, with the ‘custodianship’ role of safeguarding the core Oromo values and key natural resources. More generally, in Ethiopia customary institutions can be involved in governance when dealing with policy, development and conservation initiatives that may affect the wellbeing of the Ethiopia rural communities. With their indigenous assembly institutions (Ayana 2019) or, where relevant, alternative institutional

3 Food sovereignty is a human rights developed by civil society in response to the global land grab. With art. 15 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants it has entered international law. It refers to self-determination in the field of agricultural development. Comma 4 of the same article provides the definition: ‘This includes the right to participate in decision-making processes on food and agriculture policy and the right to healthy and adequate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods that respect their cultures’. 4 https://www.iccaconsortium.org/

289 links, they can give visibility to marginal, disadvantaged, and otherwise ‘invisible’ rural communities.

Special case: Lower Omo Valley The construction of the Gibe 3 dam is seriously threating the survival of the peoples of the lower Omo Valley, due the following two side-effects:

• Downstream elimination of the Omo regular flooding. The correlated watering and fertilization — in a very dry areas — were the added environmental factor that was allowing the subsistence of dense population through pastoralism, flood retrieve agriculture, fishing, hunting and bee keeping. • The regularisation of water flow in the river bed also allowed the introduction of irrigation and the expansion of industrial agriculture. The government adopted a policy of large scale acquisition of the most productive territories of the peoples of the lower Omo valley, implying ‘grabbing’ of common land at massive scale, displacement and de facto forced resettlement. The Gibe 3 dam is already constructed. Its environmental damage is irreversible, but much can still be done in terms of social impact. The problem is that, given the economic, social and political disadvantage of these marginal peoples, solutions cannot easily be identified. The case demand special attention. It requires the mobilisation of international support, experts, think tanks and bilateral development cooperation agencies, starting from the definition of a method of intervention that needs to be based on the self-determination of the Lower Omo Peoples, as defined in terms in indigenous rights. As suggested by David Turton:

[…] a targeted and well funded programme of compensation, livelihood reconstruction and benefit sharing should be put in place. Amongst other things, this should focus on ways of integrating irrigated agriculture with subsistence herding. Above all, and given the knowledge, experience and expertise of the affected people, they should be the ones to take the lead in arriving at the most effective solutions and in planning specific strategies, with the government and NGOs playing a supportive and facilitating role. (2018: 61) The redressive solutions may imply a deep revision of the current plans, both in terms of the dam’s cost-benefits and of re-allocation of land rights between the investors, the government and the indigenous communities.

Special case: internal border issue Ethnic clashes related to internal administrative borders deserve priority attention by adopting a combination of measures. Each conflict responds to its own local dynamics. It is therefore difficult to identify a common solution. There are, however, certain general elements that can help the construction of peaceful local relations. Kjetil Tronvoll has highlighted a feature of the Ethiopian political culture that provided a faulty justification for disregard of minority rights as defined under international law. It consists in the idea that self-determination replicated at all administrative levels could protect the interests of the minorities by forwarding their demands through the formal governmental structure (Tronvoll 2000: 19). However, under conditions of absolute power exercised at regional and local

290 administrative level, communities that find themselves in situation of minority within each administrative space are likely to face harsh abuses. This situation pushed individuals and ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ into a life or death struggle for obtaining one’s own ‘ethnically’ connoted political space, or for being included in it. Clearly, the establishment of effective mechanism of enforcement of minority rights, with independent civil society and monitoring mechanisms, would in itself be of great help. As mentioned, each case of ethnic conflict needs to be addressed with ad hoc mechanisms of negotiation, but in the process due consideration should be given to customary territorial rights, and to abuses that took place in the process of demarcating the new administrative borders. The well documented case of the Borana section of the Oromo along the Somali-Oromo border in fact shows that the government did not take a neutral position, but sided with one or the other ethnic community on the ground of its own strategic military and electoral objectives. In result of this process, the Borana have been squeezed into a portion of their pre-1991 territory, and lost access to key economic and symbolic resources, including ritual grounds and the sacred tulaa wells of Eel Goof and Eel Laee (Bassi 1997; Adugna 2004; Tache and Oba 2009; Bassi 2010).

References Adugna, Fecadu. 2004. “Inter-Ethnic Relations between the Oromo and Somali: The Case of Borana, Digodia and Maarehan”, Master’s thesis, Department of Social Anthropology, Addis Ababa University. Anaya, S. James, James j. Lenoir, and James E. Rogers. 2009. International human rights and indigenous peoples. Austin: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business. AU. 2010. "Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa: Securing, Protecting and Improving the Lives, Livelihoods and Rights of Pastoralist Communities", Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (ed.). Addis Ababa: African Union. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/30240-doc-policy_framework_for_pastoralism.pdf Ayana, Daniel. 2019. “A Geo-Cultural Unit of Local Assemblies: Anchoring Democracy on Indigenous Cultural Institutions in Ethiopia”, Presentation at the 33rd OSA Annual Conference, Finfinne/Addis Ababa. Bassi, Marco and Boku Tache. 2011. “The Community Conserved Landscape of the Borana Oromo, Ethiopia: Opportunities and Problems”, Management of Environmental Quality, 22 (2): 174-186. Bassi, Marco, Boku Tache and Jatani Sora. 2008. “The Borana Conserved Landscape. An Action-Research Workshop, Yaaballo, Ethiopia, 21-23 July 2007”, Workshop Report, GPDI and GEMConBio project (CENESTA), Addis Ababa. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1164982 Bassi, Marco. 2005 (1996). Decisions in the Shade: Political and Juridical Processes among the Oromo-Borana. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press.

291 Bassi, Marco. 2010. “The Politics of Space in Borana Oromo, Ethiopia: Demographics, Elections, Identity and Customary Institutions”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 4 (2): 221- 46. Bassi, Marco. 2012. “Customary Institutions in Contemporary Politics, Borana Zone, Oromia, Ethiopia”, in K. Tronvoll and T. Hagmann (eds.), Contested Power in Ethiopia: Traditional Authorities and Multi-party Elections, pp 221-250. Leiden and Boston: Brill. Bassi, Marco. 2014. "Federalism and Ethnic Minorities in Ethiopia: Ideology, Territoriality, Human Rights, Policy", DADA Rivista di Antropologia post-globale, 2014(1): 45-74. http://www.dadarivista.com/Singoli-articoli/2014-Giugno/02.pdf Bassi, Marco. 2017. "Pastoralists are peoples: Key issues in advocacy and the emergence of pastoralists's rights", Nomadic Peoples, 21(1): 4-33. Bassi, Marco. 2019. "The relativistic attitude in development: reflections on the implementation of the Ethiopian multinational Constitution", Archivio Antropologico Mediterraneo, XXII, n. 21 (2). https://journals.openedition.org/aam/2319.

IFAD. 2018a. How to do. Engaging with pastoralists –a holistic development approach. Rome: International Fund for Agricultural Development. https://www.ifad.org/documents/38714170/41028748/Pastoralism_HTDN.pdf/a47903bb-939c- 4d54-9664-1ecebb96316a IFAD. 2018b. Toolkit: Engaging with pastoralists – a holistic development approach. Rome: International Fund for Agricultural Development. https://www.ifad.org/en/web/knowledge/publication/asset/40318876 IFAD. 2008. “IFAD Policy on Improving Access to Land and Tenure Security”. EB 2008/94/R.2/Rev.1, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Rome. https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/404ee0e8-a385-4ce7-a6a8-e26142cb87ea IFAD. 2014. Land Tenure Toolkit. Rome: International Fund for Agricultural Development. https://www.ifad.org/en/web/knowledge/publication/asset/39183199 IFAD. 2015. How to do. Seeking free, prior and informed consent in IFAD investment projects. Rome: International Fund for Agricultural Development. https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/beec86e1-270d-45a1-8786-4b749c9db733 Lata, Leenco. 1999. The Ethiopian state at the crossroads: decolonization and democratization or disintegration? Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press. McDougall, Gay 2007. "Implementation of the General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of March 2006 entitled ‘Human Rights Council’. Report of the independent expert on minority issues. Addendum. Mission to Ethiopia (28 November-12 December 2006)." United Nations Human Rights Council, Fourth Session, A/HRC/4/9/Add.3, 28 February 2007. Megerssa, Gemetchu, and Aneesa Kassam. 2019. Sacred Knoweledge Traditions of the Oromo of the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia: Fifth World Publications.

292 Quane, Helen. 2011. "The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: New Directions for Self-Determination and Participatory Rights?", in Steve Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds.), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, pp. 259-87. Oxford; Portland, Or.: Hart Pub. Tache, Boku and Ben Irwi. 2003. Traditional institutions, multiple stakeholders and modern perspectives in common property: accompanying change within Borana pastoral system”, Securing the commons, Working paper No. 4, IIED, SOS Sahel, Oxford. https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/9238IIED.pdf Tronvoll, Kjetil. 2000. Ethiopia: A New Start? UK: Minority Rights Group International. https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-downloads/download-148-Ethiopia-A- New-Start.pdf Turton, David. 2018. “Hydropower and irrigation development in the Omo Valley: development for whom?”, Antropologia Pubblica, 4 (1): 51-64. https://riviste-clueb.online/index.php/anpub/article/view/127 Waller, Marc. 2018. "Self-determination of Indigenous Peoples: Articles 3, 4, 5, 18, 23 and 46(1)", in Jessie Hohmann and Marc Weller (eds.), The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: a commentary, pp. 115-49. Oxford: Oxford UP. Ziegler, Jean. 2005. "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Right to Food. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food. Addendum. Mission to Ethiopia." United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sixty-first session.

293

Indigenous Water Treatment Knowledge by Konso Communities

Dr. Moa Megersa

Jimma University – Department of Environmental Health Sciences and Technology

[email protected]

294 Abstract

Water remains at the core of sustainable development for human survival. In particular, healthy freshwater systems are crucial for achieving objectives like ending poverty, overcoming inequality, realizing human rights for all, and spurring lasting economic development. However, the challenges that exist in providing safe water in a sustainable way prove to make it a difficult task in developing nations. These challenges cast doubt on Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target 6. The goal aims to ensure the availability and sustainability management of water and sanitation for all. One way of providing clean and potable water for people in need is through plant-based coagulants. These natural coagulants (especially those from Moringa oleifera Lam.) have been employed since ancient times in the treatment of drinking water; local communities of Konso have also used natural coagulants to treat turbid water at a household level for their drinking and domestic purposes. To collect information on these coagulants, multiple data collection tools were employed (semi-structured interview, observation, market survey, focus group discussion (FGD) and preference ranking) from the communities of Konso. From this, four plant species were specifically selected to be used for turbid water treatment: Maerua subcordata (Gilg.) De Wolf, Moringa stenopetala (Bakerf.) Cufod., Sansevieria ehrenbergii Schweinf. ex Baker and Sansevieria forskaoliana (Schult. & Schult.f.) Hepper & J.R.I.Wood. To then test the effectiveness of turbidity removal, we conducted a series of experiments on the potential of the four plant species to reduce low, medium and high levels of turbidity of water samples collected from the Gibe River. The experimental results were in agreement with the indigenous knowledge that all of plant species reduce the turbidity of water samples, but M. subcordata and M. stenopetala were specifically found to be the best natural coagulants. Plant based coagulants can be obtained at a low cost and serve as powerful water treatment agents in improving access to the rural water supplies in the developing world. Complementing traditional water treatment knowledge with a scientific water treatment approach could help to identify appropriate solutions for rural populations with difficulties in accessing purified water. Keywords: Extraction, Ethnomedicine, Medicinal plants, Water treatment

295 Introduction

There are about 250,000 to 400,000 known higher plant species on earth, of which more than 80,000 are medicinal (Joy et al. 1998). Sofowora (1982) reported that Africa has as many as 300,000 medicinal plants; the investigation of these plants and their uses has been practiced by all cultures for hundreds (if not thousands) of years (McDonald 2009). There is a considerable amount of indigenous knowledge that is linked to the use of traditional medicine in a number of countries (Farnsworth 1994). This indigenous knowledge explicitly refers to the knowledge, innovations and practices of local communities around the world (UNDP 2011) and as such, there is a growing appreciation of its value and potential benefits to modern industry (UNDP 2011). Beyond their use for human health and livestock treatment, plants have been used historically for water treatment; there is evidence to suggest that communities in the developing world have used plant-based coagulants as one strategy for purifying drinking water (Miller et al. 2008). This can play a vital role in a water sector that is currently facing the burden of providing more people clean drinking water through cost-effective means, and especially the rural poor who cannot afford traditional water treatment chemicals (Davy 2001). In many rural communities, conventional water clarification methods are often impractical because of the high cost of equipment and low availability of chemical agents (Wok et al. 1985). Natural plant extracts can be a viable substitute here as they have been used to purify water for many centuries; Egyptian inscriptions display the earliest recorded knowledge of plant materials used for water treatment (in addition to boiling and filtration), dating back to approximately 2000 BC (Fahey 2005). In recent years there has been considerable interest in increasing the usage of natural coagulants derived from plants (Ndabigengesere and Narasiah 1998). Of the many plant materials that have been used, the seeds from the Moringa oleifera plant have been shown to be one of the most effective primary coagulants for water treatment, particularly in rural communities (Ndabigengesere and Narasiah 1998). A comprehensive analysis of available plant species used for polluted water treatment in Ethiopia is still non-existent, despite its relevance for the development of point-of-use water treatment in rural areas. Therefore, the aim of this study is to use the indigenous knowledge of various plant species and apply it in the purification process in rural Konso; these plants will be tested with respect to their coagulation and flocculation ability, and the implied hypothesis is that one or more plants used for this purpose will be effective.

Materials and Methods

a. Study area

The study was conducted in the town of Konso, located in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Regional State of Ethiopia. The area is located within an altitudinal range of 1300–3140 m.a.s.l. Based on the 2007 population and housing census (CSA 2007), the Konso District has a population of 235,087, of which about 96% live in rural areas.

b. Medical services in the district As in many developing regions, the majority of people live in rural areas where modern health services are minimal (despite an increase in health services over the past ten years). The top ten diseases reported in the three study districts are respiratory infections, malaria, gastritis, intestinal parasites, dysentery, skin infections, anaemia, eye infections, tonsillitis

296 and urinary tract infections. Of these diseases, intestinal parasites and dysentery are waterborne (DHO n.d.).

c. Site selection

The study site was selected based on prior knowledge of traditional practices that use the locally available materials to purify polluted water (which is a very common practice in these areas).

d. Ethnobotanical data collection

Semi-structured interviews, observations, group discussions, and guided field walks (Martin 1995, Cotton 1996) were used.

e. Specimen collection and identification Preliminary identification was performed at the site, and voucher specimens were stored at the National Herbarium of Ethiopia (Addis Ababa University).

f. Preference ranking Preference ranking was conducted in order to evaluate the degree of preference for plant species to treat polluted water, following the standard protocol (Martin 1995). According to this protocol, six selected key informants were invited to rank the four-plant species that are used for water treatment. Values of 1 to 5 were used in this ranking (1 = least preferred, 2 = less used, 3 = good, 4 = very good, 5 = most preferred). Interviews and discussions were undertaken based on a checklist of questions prepared in English and translated into the local languages. Field observations were performed with the help of local guides to collect the plant species and outline the method of treatment. Before collecting the data, written permission was obtained from the district office. g. Coagulation test Plant materials from four species (Maerua subcordata, Moringa stenopetala, Sansevieria ehrenbergii, and Sansevieria forskaoliana) were used to evaluate the turbidity removal potential at Jimma University, Ethiopia. A practical test was conducted on natural surface water collected from the Awetu River in Jimma town. The initial turbidity of the river was 26 (low), 63 (medium), and 209 (high) NTU in the three experiments. The jar test apparatus was used in a coagulation experiment whereby 0.03 g/L of powdered plant materials were added to 1 L beakers containing the water samples at three turbidity levels.

h. Statistical analysis The normality of the data was checked. Accordingly, non-parametric (Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U test) analysis was used to analyse the difference between the turbidity removal effectiveness of the plant species. In both cases, the significance was considered at P<0.05 between the averages. The Stata software (Version 12) was used for all statistical analyses.

297 Results and Discussion

a. Profiles of respondents

A total of 50 informants (30 males and 20 females) were deliberately selected. Demographically, the informants were 48% Protestant (24 people), 34% Muslim (17), 12% Waaqeffataa (6) and 12% Orthodox (6).

b. Source of water and types of impurities

All respondents indicated a knowledge about the types of impurities, and that the major water pollutants in the area are pathogenic biological organisms, organic impurities and turbidity (turbidity-causing substances were reported by all informants). The quality of water is generally determined by informants via visual inspection. About 97% of the interviewees reported that the water they drink is of poor quality, and we observed evidence of this using onsite measurements. The results indicating extensive knowledge of turbidity-causing substances are in agreement with those of a local community in the Lavuvu catchment (South Africa), who know how water becomes polluted (Nare et al. 2013). The local community acceptance of the water used in the study areas (in terms of turbidity) is much higher than the recommended maximum limit of turbidity set by WHO, which is 5 NTU (WHO 2006).

c. Water treatment techniques applied in the districts

Local people in the study area used several different methods to purify their drinking water: boiling (25%), chemical disinfection with wuha agar (40%), and locally available plant-based coagulants (35%). Boiling is preceded by filtering and mixing the boiled water with salt, then cooling before drinking. Wuha agar, a chlorine-based solution, is widely distributed to the local people and therefore available for treatment of polluted water as well. Surface water treatment using naturally available materials was also widely practiced (Table 2), as many chlorine based solutions and plant materials were being used by local communities in the study area. Similar findings have been reported in other parts of the world where local people use chlorine-based chemical treatments and plant materials to treat turbid water. Despite those findings, boiling is still the most common household water treatment technique used by local people all over the developing world (Clasen et al. 2008). This is not environmentally sustainable however, as wood is the main fuel used for boiling and the process is a major cause of deforestation; this then acts as a contributor to greenhouse gas emissions in the long term (Clasen et al. 2008).

d. Plants used for water treatment in the study areas

In the study, there were four plant species (Table 2) reported to have coagulating potential for turbid water; the locals often prepare plant coagulants in different ways, and the potency and use of these plants varies by area. Similarly, local people in many parts of the world also use various plant species to treat turbid water. For instance, in Tanzania the seed powder from Vigna unguiculata (L.) Walp., Vicia faba L., and Parkinsonia aculeata L. are used to treat turbid water (Marobhe et al. 2007). As another example, women in rural areas of Sudan and India both use the seed of Moringa to treat drinking water (Saif et al. 2012).

298 Table 1. Plant species used for water treatment in rural Ethiopia. All four plants are wild-harvested, but M. stenopetala is also commonly cultivated in home gardens. Scientific name Local name Habit Part Condition Other use used Maerua subcordata (Gilg.) Gulfe (Konso), Korsegeba, Shrub Tuber Dried or Fresh Medicine DeWolf Aberngab, Beryab (Afan Capparidaceae Oromo) Gulo (Gamogna) Moringa stenopetala (Baker f.) Shiferaw (Amargna), Haleko Tree Seed Dried Medicine, Food Cufod. Moringaceae (Konso, Gamo)

Sansevieria ehrenbergii Chake (Afan Oromo, Konso) Shrub Leaf Fresh Drought Schweinfurth ex Baker fodder, rope Dracanaceae Sansevieria forskaoliana (Schult.f) Alge (Afan Oromo), Algita Shrub Leaf Fresh Drought Hepper & Wood (Konso)Algete (Amargna) Fodder Dracanaceae

299 Table 2. Preparation of traditional water purifiers. Plant species Preparation procedures Maerua subcordata The shrub has a tuber beneath the ground which is found at about (Gilg.) De Wolf 50-100 cm. Local people dig, wash, slice and use the tuber for water purification by mixing the coagulant into turbid surface water. One piece (which is about 50 cm long) can purify about 200 L of turbid water. It is used either in solution form or as a dry powder; local people use the solution form after grinding the dried tuber and mixing the fine powder with the turbid water. Moringa stenopetala The kernel is removed from the seed. The seeds are then ground (Baker f.) Cufod. on stone to a fine powder. The powder is then mixed with turbid water, making it so that the suspended matter settles. After settling, the water is decanted to another bucket and is now ready for drinking and other domestic purposes. Sansevieria ehrenbergii Fresh leaves are crushed using stone to release exudates. While Schweinfurth ex Baker adding the crushed leaves, the turbid water is mixed in. Finally, the suspended matter settles, and the water is ready for drinking. Sansevieria forskaoliana Fresh leaves are crushed using stone. The crushed leaves are (Schult. and Schult. f.) added to the turbid water and stirred for few minutes. Once the Hepper & J.R.I.Wood. suspended matter settles, the water is ready for drinking.

e. Preference ranking of plant species

Preference ranking of the four-plant species showed that M. subcordata clearly ranked first, indicating that it was perceived as the most effective for treating turbid water (Table 3).

f. Evaluation of coagulation activity

A coagulation test of the four plants showed that they though they all reduce turbidity, the effectiveness varied greatly between them. In particular, M. subcordata and M. Stenopetala performed well on the three initial turbidity levels of 26, 63, and 209 NTU. Figures 1, 2, and 3 present the overall results of the coagulation/turbidity analysis. A Kruskal-Wallis analysis showed a significant difference (H=12.97, p=0.01) between the turbidity removal effectiveness of the species at 26 NTU. However, the Mann-Whitney U test analysis illustrated only a minimal difference between M. subcordata and M. Stenopetala (H=3.97, p>0.05), although the M. subcordata reduced turbidity to standard drinking level water guidelines (5 NTU). At medium turbidity (63 NTU), the Kruskal-Wallis analysis also showed a significant difference (H=10.23, P=0.01) on turbidity removal potential among the species.

Table 3. Preference ranking of four selected medicinal plants used to treat turbid water; 5 = most preferred. Plants used Respondents (A-F) A B C D E F Total Rank Maerua subcordata (Gilg.) De Wolf 5 5 4 3 5 5 27 1st Moringa stenopetala (Baker f.) Cufod. 3 2 4 2 2 1 14 4th Sansevieria ehrenbergii Schweinfurth ex Baker 3 4 2 3 3 2 17 3rd Sansevieria forskaoliana (Schult. and Schult. f.) Hepper 3 3 3 3 4 3 19 2nd

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Figure 1. Coagulation test for removal of turbidity (initially 26 NTU) using a control.

Figure 2. Coagulation test for removal of turbidity (initially 63 NTU) using a control.

A Kruskal-Wallis analysis showed a significant difference (H=9.17, P=0.02) in the turbidity removal efficiencies of plant species at a high turbidity level (209 NTU). However, the Mann-Whitney U test analysis indicated an insignificant difference (H=0.78, p=0.37) between the turbidity removal efficiency of the powder of M. stenopetala and M. subcordata. Even at high turbidity, it was difficult to attain the permissible drinking water guideline using powder of M. stenopetala. In contrast, the powder of M. subcordata was able to reduce turbidity to the guideline level (5 NTU).

301

Figure 3. Coagulation test for removal of turbidity (initially 209 NTU) using a control.

Among the four coagulants, M. subcordata and M. stenopetala were more effective in removing turbidity from natural surface water than S. ehrenbergii and S. forskaoliana. Greater coagulant effectiveness was observed at a high turbidity level (209 NTU) when compared to low (26NTU) and medium (63 NTU) turbidities. Kihampa et al. (2011) have also reported that the performance of Solanum incanum L. was much better at high turbidity than low and medium turbidity levels.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

Of the traditional medicinal plants harvested from the wild, M. subcordata and S. forskaoliana were reported to be the most effective in treating turbid water. That being said, the traditional knowledge and laboratory experiments all agreed that though all plants reduced turbidity, the M. subcordata tubers specifically were found to be the best natural coagulant (a turbidity removal efficiency of about 98% was observed at medium and high turbidity). From this, we can deduce that a combination of indigenous knowledge with the scientific method is the best approach for identifying plant-based coagulants that can be utilized as a low-cost point of-use water treatment. The public water sector should thus consider these two plant species as an alternative solution to solve the societal water problem; the inclusion of M. stenopetala and M. subcordata plant based water purifiers would go far in alleviating the drinking water problem of Ethiopia’s rural communities.

Acknowledgments

I am very thankful for the financial and logistical support provided by the International Foundation for Science (IFS, W/5406-1) and the Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy. Lastly, I gratefully acknowledge the local people of the study area for sharing their knowledge with me.

302 References Clasen TF, Thao DH, Boisson S, Shipin O (2008) Microbiological effectiveness and cost of boiling to disinfect drinking water in rural Vietnam. Environ Sci Technol 42(12):4255– 4260. Cotton CM (1996) Ethnobotany: Principles and applications. John Willey and Sons Ltd., Chichester, U.K. Davy N (2001) Moringa as alternative to aluminum sulfate. In: people and system for water, sanitation and health, 27th WEDC conference 236-238 Lusaka. Fahey JW (2005) Moringa oleifera: A review of the medical evidence for its nutritional, therapeutic, and prophylactic properties, Phytochemistry 47:123-157. Farnsworth NR (1994) Ethnopharmacology and drug development in ethnobotany and the search for new drugs. Ciba foundation symposium 185 chicesters, UK: John Wiley and Sons, 42-59. Joy PP, Thomas J, Mathew S, Skaria BP (1998) Medicinal plants. Kerala Agricultural University Naya Prokash, Calcutta. Martin GJ (1995) Ethnobotany: A methods manual. Chapman and Hall, London, UK. McDonald I (2009) Current trends in ethnobotany. Trop J Pharm Res, 8(4):295–297. Ndabigengesere A, Narasiah KS (1998) Quality of water treated by coagulation using Moringa oleifera seeds. Water Res 32(3):781–791. Sciban M, Klasnja M, Stojimirovi J (2005) Investigation of coagulation activity of natural coagulants from seeds of different leguminous species, Acta Periodica Technol 36:81-87. Sofowora A (1982) Medicinal Plants and Traditional Medicine in Africa. John Wiley and Sons, Ltd. New York. UNDP (2016) Sustainable Management of Water and Sanitation, United Nations Development Program, Available:file:///C:/Users/dell/Downloads/6_Water_Jan15_digital.pdf. WHO (2006) Guideline for drinking-water quality: incorporating first addendum recommendations, 3rd edn. World Health Organization, Geneva. Wok G, Slabbert JL, Morgan WSG (1985) Toxicity and mutagenicity evaluation of water coagulated with Moringa oleifera seed preparations using fish, protozoan, bacterial, coliphage, enzyme and Ames Salmonella assays. Water Sa 11(1).

303 Utilizing Local and Global Knowledge for Sustainable Agricultural Production: Lessons from Oromiya and the American Low Desert

Oli Bachie1 (PhD) and Worku Burayu2 (PhD) 1University of California Agriculture and Natural Resources 2The University of Arizona Cooperative Extension Abstract

Indigenous systems of crop production in Oromiya have evolved over centuries of traditional and natural evolution and can serve as the basis for adopting new technology and practices. Implementation of new knowledge, technology and resources from one ecosystem into another would require an understanding of the local ecosystem practices and suitability for adaptability of any new system. Without access to external inputs, capital, and modern scientific knowledge, farmers have been producing indigenous crops and adjusting to changes in environmental conditions and cropping seasons. Both subsistence and advanced growers need to understand the changes in the local environment, how to adjust to condition changes and remain climate resilient to undertake sustainable food production and be able to feed the alarmingly increasing human population in Ethiopia. The purpose of our present review is to assess current practices, natural resource degradations, and the shortcomings of Oromiya’s farmers and their strategies coping with natural resources degradations, drought, food shortages and famine. The paper also gives important information on how the low deserts of America, particularly in Southern California and Arizona, have utilized available resources and converted deserts into a global food and feed belt. We will share the experiences of American growers and the farm industry and suggest how their advanced cropping system, climate smart farming and practices can be used to enhance Oromiya’s farming practices for sustainable food production and food security in the region and the nation at large.

1. Richness of Oromiya’s farmlands

Oromiya has a long history of agriculture and has substantially contributed to crop biodiversity. The region varies greatly in terms of topography, traditional groups, rainfall pattern, minimum and maximum temperatures, vegetation and soils. Land, soil, forest, and water resources of Oromiya (Figure 1) and its diverse climatic conditions make it one of the best naturally endowed regions, serving as the bread basket of the country, Ethiopia. Oromiya’s favorable climate allows it to grow diverse crops such as cereals, pulses, oilseeds, vegetables and root crops. Cereals are the dominant and most important crops in almost all crop production areas. Cash crops such as coffee and chat are widely grown and have a lion’s share in their impact on the economy of the country. In addition to cultivating annual crops, farmers practice mixed farming that keeps livestock on their farms for various economic and social reasons. The main reasons for keeping cattle are prestige or sign of wealth, income, social security, dowry, draught power, milk, meat and manure. Oromiya’s economic potentialities are in stark contrast to the abject poverty of its population and has not been fully harnessed for the benefit of Oromiya due to many political, economic and social factors. Most of the population lives off the land eking out a miserable existence with a terribly low standard of living. It is not the intention of this paper to elaborate all factors. This paper is intended to give a birds-eye view on utilizing local and global knowledge for sustainable agricultural production.

304

Figure 1. Naturally endowed Oromia land with soil, forest, and water resources. Gedo, West Shoa Zone (June 2019, Photo: Worku Burayu)

2. Experiences from Oromiyan farmers: Knowledge in resource conservation

More than 85% of Oromiya’s population is engaged in agriculture as a means of livelihood. Such strong reliance on agriculture as an economic driving force entails that natural resources of agricultural significance should be managed on a sustainable basis. Soil and water conservation are important among those natural resource concerns, and sustainability in terms of both resources implies utilization of soil and water without wastage or depletion, in order to have a continuous high-level crop production. However, agricultural sustainability in Oromiya is hampered with several factors including the pressure from a rapidly growing population and diminishing natural resources. To cope with such degradation of resources and productivity decline, smallholder farmers are forced to implement conservation measures. The focus of soil and water conservation efforts in Oromiya during the last decades have largely been on diagnosing crop performances under physical conservation structures such as stone terraces, soil bund and weir in the semi-arid regions and on Broad Bed Furrow (BBF) in the humid and sub- humid Vertisol soil areas. Several attempts have been made to evaluate the effects of components of crop management practices such as the effects of tillage, fertilizer management, or cropping sequence on crop yields in different locations of dryland areas. However, recently it was realized that the use of physical conservation structures to conserve soil and water and the outcome for components of crop management practices might not significantly improve the agricultural productivity of smallholder farmers where the land is fragmented, and land shortage is a chronic constraint.

What indigenous knowledge do Oromiyan farmers have? There have been many traditional soil conservation systems evolved by farmers of Oromiya over the course of time to suit certain environmental conditions and cropping seasons, even without access to external inputs, capital,

305 and modern scientific knowledge. These indigenous soil conservation systems generally are agronomic, vegetative or physical in nature.

2.1. Agronomic and vegetative techniques

Agronomic or vegetative techniques (Figure 2) include practices such as agroforestry, crop rotations, mixed cropping and trash lines. Farmers plant and maintain deliberately, trees to develop a microclimate that protects crops against extremes (Figure 3). Mixing agriculture with forestry techniques helps to control temperature, sunlight exposure, and susceptibility to wind, hail, and rain. This system provides a diversified range of products such as food, fodder, firewood, timber, and medicine while improving soil quality, reducing erosion, and storing carbon.

Figure 2. Vetiver grass as a means of erosion control and a trap for eroded soil around Bako- Tibbe, West Shoa Zone. The same plot of land in 2004 (left) and June 2019 (right) sustained by agronomic techniques.

Figure 3. Mixing coffee production with forestry techniques helps to control temperature, sunlight exposure, and susceptibility to wind, hail, and rain. Limu-Seka, Jimma Zone.

306 2.2. Crop rotations, mixed and multiple cropping

Crop rotations, mixed and multiple cropping (Figure 4) are traditional systems that are widely practiced in Oromiya. Farmers have successfully used the practice of growing different crops on the same land so that no bed or plot is allocated to the same crop in successive seasons, which is the main principle of crop rotation. Crop rotation is a practice designed to preserve the productive capacity of the soil, minimize pests and diseases, reduce chemical use, and manage nutrient requirements, all of which help to maximize yield. The practice of crop rotation builds better soil structure and increases the ability to store or sequester carbon on farms. Good crop rotations such as maize followed by legumes facilitate the conservation and addition of organic matter, restoration of soil structure and fertility and reduction of pests and diseases. In mixed cropping, two or more crops are grown in the same field in the same season. In most cases grains and leguminous crops are mixed. The fast-growing legumes provide soil cover early in season, shielding the impact of raindrops, fix atmospheric nitrogen, and thus help to maintain soil fertility. Through crop rotation, farmers can maximize land use while reducing the risks associated with single crop failure. Intercropping also creates biodiversity, which attracts a variety of beneficial and predatory insects to minimize pests and can also increase soil organic matter, fumigate the soil, and suppress weed growth. Multiple cropping systems involve growing many plants of different species in the same area, often in a way that imitates nature. By increasing plant biodiversity, multiple cropping systems promote diet diversity in local communities, are more adaptable to climate variability and extreme weather and are more resilient to pests and diseases. It also provides many advantages such as better soil quality, less soil erosion, and more stable yields when compared to monoculture systems.

Figure 4. Multiple cropping system whereby teff, wheat, barley and chickpea grown together on the same field to maximize land use while reducing the risks associated with single crop failure in West Shoa Zone around Ginchii (Danddii District).

2.3. Physical techniques

In some parts of Oromiya, earth bunds are used for slowing down runoff in maize and sorghum fields where they are usually constructed along the contour after planting the crop. A few farmers use stone bunds at regular intervals along the contour, particularly in Eastern Oromiya. Stone bunds retain or slow down run off and hence control erosion. In some other parts of Oromiya, traditional ditches are constructed using a ‘maresha’ orddaa plough pulled by oxen and made to dispose excess water and drain out of cultivated land, to the side of an artificial or natural waterway. A ditch may sometimes be dug on the upper side of the cultivated land (East Wollega,

307 West Shoa and Jimma) or as a crisscross (West and East Shoa) to act as a cut off drain to protect the field from the runoff coming from the higher elevations. Thus, traditional ditches drain excess water from the field, protect the soil from being washed away by runoff and reduce surface runoff generated within the cultivated land. In some areas, there are no primary till or pot holing practices. These are essentially a dry planting, slashing and burning systems. This practice involves slashing of the vegetation, leaving it on the ground to dry and burning the residue to leave a clean seedbed. Planting is then done without disturbing the soil, except for the planting holes that may be done with the pointed stick, followed by very early weeding using the slashes, a few days after the emergence of the crops (maize, sorghum, oat, wheat). The practice is common in Jimma, Wollega, IlluAbbabor and West Shoa zones.

2.4. Mulching and Trash lining

Mulch farming (Figure 5) maintains surface residues on tilled land. Oromo farmers recognize that plant residues are useful in conserving the soil, controlling water runoff, improving soil physical conditions and increasing soil fertility. In situ mulching was fairly commonly practiced in Jimma, Wollega, IlluAbbabor, and West Shoa areas. The practice has declined as a result of other competitive use of the crop residues such as feed for livestock, fuel and building materials in East Shoa, Hararghe and some parts of Arsii zones. Mulching, however, is still practiced in oats, wheat and coffee fields, in horticultural crops, and in areas of high rainfall. In sloping hillsides, maize and sorghum stover are sometimes used to make trash lines where both crops are growing, particularly to the western part of Oromiya, where it helps in slowing down the flow of runoff, and traps eroded soils. The technique is used both for erosion control and fertility improvement.

Figure 5. Combination of technologies (In situ mulching and introduced management with grass) as a technique to slowdown the flow of runoff and control erosion, and to build-up organic matter and fertility improvement in Jimma Zone around Limmu-Kosoo area.

308 2.5. The Dikee system

Cattle are enclosed in the typical Oromo barn (Figure 6) during the night from three to seven days based on the number of cattle (large number less days, small number more days), season (during the rainy season, only 2-3 days, and during the dry season, 4-7 days), topography (flat land less days, sloped land more days) and fertility status of the soil (relatively fertile soil less days). In such areas, manure from stall fed cattle is incorporated into the soil only by one-time plowing. The frequency of the tillage is decreased remarkably (mostly one to two times plowing) when using this system (Figure 7). This practice is still widely used in many districts of West Shoa, Jimma, Wollega, IlluAbbabor and some parts of East Shoa zones. In some districts of East Showa this system is rarely practiced due to the shifting purpose of using animal dung for fuel (cooking) instead of using the manure for soil fertility.

Figure 6. Typical Oromo Barn in Eastern Wollega Zone of Oromiya with protective home for herding man (left) and protective barn for cattle (right) where enough animal dung is used to add nutrients to the soil.

Figure 7. Plot with no animal dung (left) already plowed twice of the five to six plowing frequency compared to plot with animal manure that doesn’t require more than one plowing (right).

2.6.Water Harvesting

Water harvesting is defined as the redirection and productive use of rainfall, involving a variety of methods to collect as much water as possible out of each rainfall. Many water harvesting structures and systems are specific to the ecoregions and culture in which it has been developed.

309 This may involve collecting water from rooftops, from swollen streams and rivers during monsoon season, or from artificially constructed catchments. This ensures that farmers have a substantial amount of water stored up in case of drought or limited rainfall. The practice is very limited in moisture prone areas of Oromiya.

2.7. Coping Strategies

Farmers have developed a range of indigenous coping strategies, through trial and error, to combat their challenges and constraints. They have been changing crops and cultivars according to the type of season and follow several tillage practices (Figure 8) to improve soil fertility, conserve soil moisture, and control weeds. To minimize the effects of poor soil fertility, they practiced crop rotation such as using "Noug" (Guizotia abysinica) for black soil, adding farmyard manure for red soil, and allowing fallow for one to two years for red soil. When there was a moisture stress during planting, farmers planted Teff or other crops such as sorghum instead of maize. To conserve soil and to control erosion, they plowed along slopes and open waterways along the field (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Different tillage operation practiced based on the slope of the land in Oromiya, June 2019.

Allowing fallow period for some time and opening boraatii lolaa (waterway) are the common practices to reduce runoff (Figure 9).

Figure 9. Traditional run off and erosion control method whereby water way is opened across the teff field in Western Shoa around Babichii District.

310

July and August are the two months when weeds become more problematic. Hand weeding is a major method used to control weeds. Babbaqaa and slashing are also carried out for the late emerged weeds. A pickaxe is the main implement used to control weeds. Some important strategies include that farmers start practicing a number of tillages as soon as soil moisture is sufficient to ensure moisture infiltration and to encourage weeds to germinate. When weeds emerge, farmers plow them under to reduce weed seed pressure for the future crop. Farmers adjust the sowing time according to the crop, cultivar, and soil type and availability of moisture. Drought tolerant crops are grown as early as possible in low-lying areas that receive run-off. Sowing is delayed on drought prone soils until sufficient moisture is conserved. Farmers sow early in the morning or late in the evening to avoid soil moisture loss. In May, during the hottest period of the year, farmers try to prevent livestock from walking on the fields to avoid loss of conserved moisture by evaporation. Some farmers divert run off into established (sown) fields whenever possible, especially at the flowering stage. They overcome labor shortage partly through exchange of labor. Depending on the availability of rain, farmers change crop and variety sequence of planting. In expectation of insufficient rainfall, farmers plant maize and vegetables around riverbank to overcome food shortage. If rain comes late, they plant pulses such as chickpea and haricot bean instead of teff or wheat. They also practice dry planting for crops like sorghum and maize on limited plots of land 6-8 days before the expected rain day. To overcome labor and oxen shortage, farmers mobilize community labor (Daboo) for land preparation, weeding, harvesting and threshing.

2.8. Post-harvest technique

Farmers in Oromiya utilize a variety of traditional techniques to store crop seeds for later use. Maize, teff and sorghum are stored either inside the house on the roof where smoking keeps the seeds dry and reduces insect and disease damage or outside of the house to be used as seeds for the upcoming planting season (Figure 10).

Figure 10. Maize, teff and sorghum stored inside and outside of the house to be used as seeds for the coming planting season, Billo-Boshe, East Wollega Zone.

3. Current farming and land degradations in Oromiya

The traditional “slash and burn” or “slash and mulch” agricultural practice was sustainable and effective in restoring soil fertility for the prevailing level of crop yields and intensity of cropping. In the last few decades, however, the traditional shifting cultivation practice has changed due to demographic and economic pressures, leading to permanent, frequent tillage crop production systems, particularly on hill tops Figure 11) resulting in accelerated soil erosion. There has not

311 been much work done to curtail hillside farming and to encourage transformation of degraded hillsides into productive farmland. Accordingly, widespread gullies exist, and eroded soils are carried away through rivers (Figure 12). The intense population growth is making the challenge even more complicated. The strategy that subsistence farmers have adopted to provide nourishment to the growing family size is through expanding farmlands to mountain tops. In the Oromiya region, the highlands comprise about 44% of the total landmass and accounts for 95% of the cropped land (Erkossa and Ayele, 2003). The lands that Figure 11. Hill top farming with high erosion incidences, Tokkee, West Shoa zone (Photo: Oli Bachie) were traditionally left for grazing are now being used for crop farming. This has further intensifiedHilly deforestation farm l andand contributed, Tokkee to more soil erosion. The high rate of erosion is caused mainly by vegetation clearance and intensive tillage. The introduction of frequent tillage has triggeredWest drastic Shoa, changes July in 2019soil and water conservation indigenous technical knowledge and related farm activities.

FigureFigure 12 11. Erosion. Erosion caused caused gulley gully, (left) rendering, rendering land land use anduse anderoded eroded soil soilscarried away carriedby river away by river (right)

There are several repercussions of such agricultural land use changes and intensification, the most important once being accelerated soil erosion and the deterioration of soil nutrient status (FAO, 1986; Hurni, 1988, Worku et al., 2006a). Soil nutrient depletion arising from continuous cropping and frequent tillage along with the removal of crop residues, low external inputs and the shortage of adequate soil nutrient saving technologies have exacerbated resource degradation (Bojo and Cassels, 1995; Worku, 2002). Such progressive deterioration of biological and physical resources of the land has led to declining productivity and unsustainable yields of crops (Worku et al., 2006b). In some cases, poor harvest and even total crop failures are common occurrences, particularly in the semiarid areas.

312 4. Constraints and challenges of indigenous knowledge

Over the centuries, the people of Oromiya have provided a series of ecological and cultural services to humankind. The preservation of traditional forms of farming knowledge and practices helped maintain biodiversity, enhanced food security, and protected the natural resources to some extent. Although three systems of agricultural mechanization (manual power, animal- drawn implements and motorized power) are currently in use in Oromiya, techniques of production involve mostly simple implements, and traction is generally limited to draught animals. The traditional plough and hand tools such as the hoe, machete, pickaxe, shovel, sickle, etc. are the most widely used implements by smallholder farmers. Traditional conservation

Figure 13. Oromiya farmers still use old age simple tools as techniques of production which are inefficient & labor intensive, and traction is generally limited to draught animals tillage has been a major pre-occupation of subsistence farmers since time immemorial. While indigenous soil conservation methods still play an important role, they are highly location specific. Techniques of production involve simple tools; traction is generally limited to draught animals and the traditional plough and hand tools are ineffective and labor intensive (Figure 13). Some of these measures are difficult to mechanize, thus severely limiting the cropped land. Physical conservation practices alone have not been very effective where land is fragmented, and labor shortage is chronic problem. Agronomic and vegetative measures alone have not been very effective where marginal lands like steep slopes are put under cultivation as a result of land pressure. 5. Why do Oromo farmers favor traditional knowledge and resources?

The basis of food security in Oromiya is mainly land and family labor. Leaving a legacy of better land for future generations is one thing, but the short-term need to feed the present generation and to make a living is quite alarming and unprecedented in Oromiya today. An important reason for the poor adoption of new techniques in general is the inability of subsistence farmers to take risks, although the essence of farming is trying to improve the odds in the gamble against weather, pest, and disease. Such risks are also exacerbated because farmers mainly depend on rain-fed agriculture. Oromo farmers have no risk capital to gamble with, so their whole strategy is geared towards safety and the reality of feeding the present generation. Not unreasonably, short-term realities usually take priority. Certainly, there have been good new techniques such as conservation agriculture in crop production but there has also been crop production failure particularly in the dryland areas during the drought years. The priority of most forward-looking or innovative farmers is to avoid the risk of failure. Farmers would rather use their traditional farming system with a low-yielding variety, which gives some yield every year, than a new tillage system with improved variety and recommended fertilizer management, which will give

313 an increased yield most years, but none during bad years (e.g. the 2002 drought year in Oromiya). Even if the chance of an increased yield is nine years out of ten, it is still not an acceptable gamble for the small subsistence farmer, because in the tenth year, the year of failure, his family could starve to death. It is neither stupidity nor lethargy when the farmer sticks to his traditional management and old variety, but an acceptance of the realities of life. Thus, the perception of risk is probably the single biggest factor governing the implementation of any new techniques, and it is likely to remain so for a long time.

6. Global knowledge:

Experiences from American desert. The American low desert is a good example for Oromo growers to learn about how an ecosystem facing non-hospitable weather can be converted into a surplus global food production region through various technologies such as irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides and planting of improved varieties or species. A lot of food is raised in the American low desert using water from the Colorado River (Figure 14). The Colorado river, Figure 14. Colorado River Dam designed to provide irrigation the only source of irrigation, water & hydropower to the imperial Valley & surrounding regions. provides sustainable agricultural production complemented with sustainable local and global marketing for low desert farmers, ranchers, and the rural communities. One of the most sustainable characteristics about agriculture in the American low desert, just like in most of Oromiya, is the abundance of sunshine. However, the low desert also has a renewable resource for year- round: green house and improved outdoor growing that advances agricultural production (Figure 15). As a result of the irrigation water resource, one of the low desert regions, the Imperial Valley, has become a year- Figure 15. Improved farmingSome practices of in the the lowImperial desert USA valley (Imperial farms round crop growing region. It Valley, CA) provides two-thirds of the

314 nation’s winter vegetables, produces over 100 crop commodities that were worth the gross production value of $2.23 billion for the 2018 production year (Ortiz, 2018), ranking it the 8th in the nation for agricultural revenue.

Since water is the most limiting resource in the low desert, technologies that make efficient water use are promoted by policy makers, researchers, and communities. Water use strategies involve the use of not only irrigation but also the use of the most efficient irrigation methods such as drip irrigation systems, dense plantings, the use of mulches to prevent evaporation and the use of drought-tolerant varieties that are deep rooted, heat tolerant and that mature in short growing seasons. In Oromiya, sustainable farming could be achieved through replanting with native grasses to cover the ground, careful rotational grazing and the building of small check dams to slow the water down so it sinks in. As mentioned previously, the indigenous knowledge base and institutional arrangements in Oromia are proving inadequate in addressing the food demands of an alarmingly increasing population—the farming practices used in the American low desert could be a useful model to glean from.

6. What should be done to enhance agricultural sustainability, to reduce the impact of climate change and to secure an adequate and balanced food supply? The need to reconcile agricultural production and production-dependent rural livelihoods with healthy ecosystems should originate from widespread innovation to coordinate landscape and policy action for sustainable food production (Jackson & Jackson 2002). Current yields are relatively low, and implementation of existing technologies could double or even triple yields, with adequate investment, market developments and attention to good ecosystem husbandry (UN Millennium Project 2005). Therefore, there has to be strategic planning and initiatives taken by the government, farm institutions and individual farmers for agricultural development with a focus on adopting productive farming systems, diversifying crop commodities to secure sufficient and balanced nutrition. Zimmerer (2012) emphasizes that integrating the conservation of biodiversity by smallholder farmers with agricultural intensification is increasingly recognized as a leading priority of sustainability and food security amid global environmental and socioeconomic change. Because agricultural products are constrained by widespread resource degradation and inappropriate utilization or underutilization of available resources (a large number of rivers in Oromiya are potential irrigation water sources), agricultural sustainability will require investment in ecosystem management and beyond. Some of the recommendations to be implemented are as follows: ➢ Investing in irrigation infrastructure and maximizing the use of Oromiya’s water resources for agricultural production. It is estimated that only about 4% of arable land in Oromiya is irrigated, regardless of the rich rivers, lakes and other water resources Oromiya has. Instead of heavily depending on rain-fed agriculture, farmers in Oromiya need to tap into Oromiya’s water resources for irrigation. The region has many rivers such as Angar, Chogo, Suphee, Ejersa, Baredaa, Kono, Asattii and Jarmat, Gabar, Gembo, Danabaa and Abjar, Nashe, Amartii, Abuna, Boye, Asendabo, Gabate, Qorke, Qarsaa, Ambabo & Dade wata, Gudar, Abaya Fincha’a, Ganalee, Baroo, Awash, etc. and many lakes and ponds with the potential for irrigation. Combined with the suitable climate, this could make the region one of

315 the year-round food production regions. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations’ 2001 Report stated that meeting “future food demand must come from intensification of irrigation, rather than expanding cultivation to more fragile, hilly & degraded lands”, from increasing efficiency by use of external inputs and mechanization, and from maximizing the flow of natural resources to harvestable products. ➢ Enhance agricultural productivity through crop diversification and introduction of alternative crops. The UN Millennium Project (2005) stated that considerable investments will be required to rehabilitate degrading resources and ecosystems upon which food supplies, particularly of the rural poor, depend. That investment should include crop diversification to undertake risks and provide balanced food sources to citizens. ➢ Reduce soil erosion and improve productivity of farmers. Hilly side farming is prone to heavy erosion and should be reduced. Further, farmers can generate more income and elevate food security by producing avocados, mangos, breadfruit, fig trees, pineapples, olives, Date Palms, Moringa, Quinoa, etc. ➢ Use combination of technologies such as soil erosion reduction techniques (Terracing, contour planting, strip cropping, etc., and using reduced tillage/no tillage systems). ➢ Sustainability through soil health. Soil health promotes agricultural practices that are not only good for the farmer, but also good for the environment. Beneficial cropland management practices include cover cropping and conservation crop rotation. ➢ Integrating livestock & crops can be more efficient & profitable. Contrary to common assumptions, farmers and their communities often have strong economic and social rationales for supporting biodiversity conservation: to reduce production costs, raise or stabilize yields, improve product quality, protect their right to farm/herd/harvest wild products in and around their farms. ➢ Adopting agroforestry practices can provide shade and shelter to protect plants, animals, and water resources, while offering additional income; ➢ Move from wood biomass energy (fuel wood) to solar cookers, solar ovens & other renewable energy sources (hydropower, wind energy) in order to reduce firewood consumption and deforestation.

7. Conclusions Oromiya’s indigenous systems of crop production evolved over centuries of traditional and natural evolution and can be a basis for the adoption of new technology or practices. The incorporation of locally acceptable new technologies, appropriate soil moisture conservation measures, fertility improvement means, and proper agricultural implements are important to ensure sustainable crop production. These measures should be integrated into the normal crop- livestock husbandry concept, where care and improvement of land resources comes first with controlled degradation as part of the caring and improvement process. The coping strategies that farmers use to cope with natural resource conservation measures and crop related risks are valuable from an agricultural development perspective. For instance, farmers’ knowledge of soil moisture conservation means, soil fertility improvement strategies and removal of water logging measures provide a basis for building a technology that accommodates farmers’ indigenous knowledge. Participatory community-based approaches involving the stakeholders in planning and implementation are necessary in order to create a higher ownership attitude. Clear messages

316 on any new technique should be included in the normal extension packages and training of both village extension workers and farmers should be emphasized to improve their understanding and skills. Modern and new technique tends to be more acceptable to farmers if it serves multiple objectives and helps increase crop productivity. Indeed, for many smallholder farmers, resource conservation is an integral part of efforts to improve and sustain livelihoods. Improving productivity is then the underlying rationale. Finally, farmers accept new technologies when their strategies, indigenous knowledge and decisions are well taken into consideration.

Farmers, policy makers and other stakeholders must become knowledgeable about the existence and extent of land degradation and nutrient depletion and its contributory factors. It must be noted that the major causes of land degradation and nutrient depletion are soil erosion, intensive tillage, exhaustion of nutrients by crops and deforestation, among many other deleterious factors. Indigenous knowledge should integrate new knowledge, technology and resources from one ecosystem into another. For example, one potential solution is to introduce edible tree crops such as palm oil (Mexii) and olive trees (Ejjersa) in a way that reduces erosion in hilly areas. It is well documented that these tree crops grow well and produce edible oil and fruits under several tropical and sub-tropical regions of the world.

This paper outlined some strategic actions required to mobilize eco-agriculture initiatives on a scale that would have a meaningful impact on Oromiya’s agricultural production and ecosystem management. Implementation of such policies with government participation and support could transform old age traditional farming practices into modern farms capable of feeding the country’s citizens.

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References

Bojo, J. and Cassels, D. Bojo, J. and Cassels, D. 1995. Land Degradation and Rehabilitation in Ethiopia: A reassessment. AFTES Working paper No. 17. World Bank, Washington DC. Erkossa, T. and G Ayele. 2003. Indigenous Knowledge and Practices for Soil and Water Management in East Wollega, Ethiopia. Conference on International Agricultural Research for Development. Deutscher Tropentag 2003 Göttingen, October 8-10, 2003 FAO. 1986. Ethiopia. Highlands Reclamation Study. Final Report, Volume 1. FAO, Rome. FAO. 2001. Food and Agricultural Organization of United Nation (FAO). Conservation Agriculture: Case studies in Latin America. FAO Soils Bulletin No.70. FAO, Rome, Italy. Hurni, H. 1988. Degradation and Conservation of the Resources in the Ethiopian Highlands. Mountain Research and Development, 8 (No. 2/3): 123-130 Jackson D. L. and L. L. Jackson 2002. The farm as natural habitat. Reconnecting food systems with ecosystems. Island Press. Washington, D. C. Ortiz, C. Imperial County, Annual crop and Livestock Report. Office of the Agricultural Commissioner Sealer of Weights and Measures. Imperial County, CA, USA 2018. UN Millennium project. 2005. The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005. United Nation, New York, 2005 Worku, B., M. Tewodros, M. Hussein, D. Tollesa, and M. Birtukan. 2002. A review of tillage management research on maize in Ethiopia. In Proceedings of the second national maize workshop of Ethiopia, N. Mandefro, D.G. Tanner, and S. Twumasi-Afriyie (eds.). pp 12- 16. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Ethiopia Worku B., C. Sombat, S. Rungsit, M. Thongchai, and J. Sunanta. 2006a. Tillage System and Fertilizer Rate Effects on Sorghum Productivity in the Central Rift Valley of Ethiopia. Kasetsart J. (Nat. Sci.) 40 (1). Worku B., C. Sombat, S. Rungsit, M. Thongchai, and J. Sunanta. 2006b. Conservation Tillage and Crop Rotation: Concomitant Systems to Harmonize Tef [Eragrostis tef (Zucc.) Trotter)] Production with Sustainability in the Dry land Oromiya. Kasetsart J. (Nat. Sci.) 40 (2). Worku B., C. Sombat, S. Rungsit, M. Thongchai, and J. Sunanta. 2006c. Conservation Tillage and Crop Rotation: Win-Win Options for Sustainable Maize Production in the Dryland, Central Rift Valley of Ethiopia. Kamphaengsaen Acad. J. 4(1): 48-60. Zimmere K. S. 2012. The compatibility of agricultural intensification in a global hotspot of smallholder agrobiodiversity (Bolivia). https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1216294110

318 Pastoralist Societies in Lower Omo – Dynamics in Societal Transformation Dr. Sabine Troeger UNIVERSITÄT BONN Geographisches Institut Postfach 1147 - 53001 Bonn Email: [email protected]

The Lower Omo Valley, one of the most peripheral and likewise politically neglected regions of Ethiopia until 2011, has turned into a hotspot of societal transformation geared by natural, social, economic and cultural forces. This valley is home to 16 ethnic agro-pastoralist societies (inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List in 1980), which were formerly well adapted to the fragile semi-arid environment of the lowlands. The Lower Omo Valley today is highly impacted by irrevocable and fundamental changes in livelihood constellations caused by forces in a four-fold global to local scale gearing towards some ultimate and irrevocable societal transformation. Societal transformation: these are processes, which hold a strong grip on those ethnicities calling the Lower Omo Valley their home in terms of fundamentally re-defining the constituents of livelihood systems as of at present.

The paper elaborates on four perspectives of given environmental – natural as well as social and socio-political – constellations and livelihood frameworks in the Lower Omo Valley as illustrated by the figure below. The first two of these are documented by research findings from the years 2011 until 20181, which were undertaken with some exemplary communities of the Nyangatom ethnicity. The Nyangatom, one of the unique pastoralist ethnic groups of Ethiopia's south, situated in the Lower Omo Valley, numbering about 10,000 people has, like its neighboring pastoralist communities, ever since been guided by an ‘age-group system’. The system is constituted by five age-groups: children, youths, herders of 25-50 years, the political class of the ‘elephants’ aged 50-65 years, and the very old and wise men in the role of spiritual guides.

The referred to research findings elaborated on in participatory partnership with the named above Nyangatom communities unambiguously identify the Lower Omo Valley as altogether highly impacted by the global phenomenon of climate change, which threatens the pastoral communities by drought periods extending to five or even more seasons in succession. When starting the research in 2009 the pastoralists complained about failing rains, Belg rains, for at that time already more than four seasons, which later culminated in a food emergency in 2011 (Troeger et al. 2011). Some initiative aiming at decentralized climate change adaptation

1 Tröger, S. (2018): ‘Everything That Is Happening Now Is Beyond Our Capacity’ – Nyangatom Livelihoods Under Threat. In: Cambridge University Press & UNESCO: Indigenous Knowledge for Climate Change Assessment and Adaptation, Chapt. 15, pp 214 - 226, Cambridge. Tröger, S. (2018): ‘Committees’, a Promising Institution in Climate Change Communication and Adaptation? In: W. Leal et.a. (eds): Handbook of Climate Change Communication: Vol. 2, Chapt. 22, pp 341-355. Springer Verlag: Climate Change Management Tröger, S. (2016): Societal Transformation, buzzy perspectives towards successful Climate Change Adaptation: An Appeal to Caution. In: Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation. In: W.L.Filho et al (eds): Climate Change Management – Implementing Climate Change Adaptation in Cities and Communities, Integrating Strategies and Educational Approaches, Chapt. 19, pp 353-365. Springer Verlag; Climate Change Management Series. Tröger, S. (2016): ‘Everything That is Happening Now Is Beyond Our Capacity’ – Nyangatom Livelihoods Under Threat. In: W.L. Filho et al (eds): Climate Change Management Series, Chapt. 19, pp. 353-365, Springer Verlag. Tröger, S. et. al. (2012): Failing Seasons, Ailing Societies – Climate Change and Adaptation in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa. Tröger, S. (2011): Climate Policy Brief on Sustainable Land Management (2010). Ethiopian Civil Society Network on Climate Change, Policy Brief 3.

319 measures in the shape of community committees was subsequently captured by so called ‘experts’ from Addis Ababa and proved to be a failure in the longer run (Troeger 2016 & 2018). In addition to the dwindling pastures for their livestock were the pastoralists deprived of of more than one tenth of their grazing ground, i.e. about 100.000 ha, by the large scale investment in sugar production – Kuraz sugar corporation – which evicted the pastoralists especially from those grounds alongside River Omo, which had been ecologically the most favorable for grazing. In consequence, government policies enforced processes of villagization and subsequent sedentarization. The argument will draw the attention to two comprehensive conclusions of these research findings, to subsequently link these with regional forces in terms of villagization and sedentarization policies, which are taken as ‘dispositives’ as understood by Foucault (1977). Finally, present and pressing development perspectives are outlined, which highly challenge and tackle the field of environmental justice. Concluding the argument will promote sustainable and integrated development policies and will give policy recommendations with relation to given environmental challenges and will link these to the Large-Scale Investment Actor KURAZ Sugar Development Project (KSDP) in the Lower Omo Valley.

The figure titled ‘Societal Transformation’ depicts the above referred to forces in scales:

Societal Transformation ´Travelling Ideas´ in Scales - Lower Omo Valley/Ethiopia

s ition Global Climate Change ond e c Global Phenomenon with Tremendous am fr Regional & Local Impact Patterns al ic m ame co o ical fr nditio n olit ns o P c E National Government Policy Promotion of Sugar Industry s n Large Scale Investment in the Agency io it d Lower Omo Valley: 2011 n o c e Governance Strategies m Decentralization: the ‚committee‘ ra l f ra Local actors´ agency in resource ltu cu & livelihood management io- Soc E co Regional Dispositives of Power log ica Villagization, Sedentarization l fram e conditions and Irrigation

Local Shared Economic & Social Gains Equalized Profitability: Value Chain Development Concept: Sabine Troeger, modified from Theo Rauch (2003)

Scale I: Data from climate change research conducted in 2009 until 20102 leaves no room for doubt about the severity of ongoing, and with time further enforced, climate change impacts in the Ethiopian Lowlands. The Lower Omo Valley, located in these lowlands, is impacted by a climate change pattern characterized by considerably shortened Belg rains. The Belg is part of the customary rainfall pattern, which usually starts end of February/early March and lasts

2 The research made use of various assessment tools from ethnographic research. Research activities and the methodological approach were adjusted to the target groups including a clear distinction between gender and generational cohorts. The portrait drawn from the data is highly differentiated and takes various perspectives within the societies into account. The validity of the data was ensured by methodological triangulation.

320 until end of May or beginning of June, and which are the habitat pattern the pastoralists had adapted to for centuries. The eastern and southern regions of Ethiopia, demarcated by the Rift Valley, are highly dependent on this specific rainfall for their annual agricultural production as well as the migratory routes of their livestock. At the time of our assessment, the pastoralists discussed the spatial and quantitative changes of temperature, precipitation and floods. From their perspective, all the deviations started around the year 1989 and since then have shown a gradual decline. More severe changes were perceived to have started after 1998 and culminated for the first time in the year 2011, when large parts of the Horn of Africa were struck by one of the worst droughts in sixty years that translated into a severe food crisis. In July 2011, the United Nations declared a famine, but as early as January 2011, considerable heads of livestock had died, as reported by the people. But the drought that started in 2011, whether it was caused by global climate change factors or the effect of a very harsh La Niña event as suggested by IRIN News (15 July 2011), took place in the wake of four to five years of more or less failed Belg rains, as summarized to be a general trend by the diagram below:

Source: Troeger, S. et al. 2011: 34

‘Everything that is happening now, is beyond our capacity’, was the unisonous appraisement by the people whether young or old, as a result of our field assessment. The conclusion drawn by Moro, the Nyangatom women leader, summarizes our research findings (Troeger, S. et.al. 2012) and unambiguously indicates a livelihood configuration highly at risk, which goes hand in hand with a dissolution of beforehand sustainable codes of conduct, namely the indigenously established ‘culture of sharing’.

Taking the OSA conference in 2019 into consideration, a concordant climate change pattern demarcated the precipitation pattern of this passing year:

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Scale II: Turning now towards the national scale, the argument begins from the following statement: coinciding with the claim for decentralization together with the mainstreaming of participatory approaches in development practice, we can observe a shift in policies to advocate local actors and resource users to play a more active role in Natural Resource Management (NRM), which in many cases today means climate change adaptation (CCA). Decentralization describes the process by which bundles of entrustments, like regulatory and executive powers, responsibility and authority in decision-making, are transferred to local agents, which again calls for new institutions and processes of institution building.

These processes of decentralization come about in the shape of ‘committees’. Committees have mushroomed up in various development contexts all over Africa focusing environments of obvious global change, which force local actors to unanimously and fundamentally adapt to the irreversible changes in nature. Informed by the ‘Western’ ideal of democracy, the committees mirror the principal idea of equal representation and equal voice. The ideal of ‘participation’ has developed to be the counter-balance to the socio-political institution of ‘committees’, which again, following prominent discourses on participation, claims to ‘give people a voice’. The notion of ‘voice’ unambiguously links the concepts of ‘committee and ‘participation’ with the need for ‘communication’, true communication, which enables inter- subjectivity via a mutual exchange of people’s perceptions, interpretations and valuations, in short: social constructions. In summary, committees are taken to be the platform for participation in realization of the demand for ‘communication’ regarding ‘giving people a ‘voice’.

Corresponding with government policies in promotion of sustainable and decentralized community development in Ethiopia, a ‘committee’ has been established with the Nyangatom community in order to safeguard and control the recently established scheme of rangeland enclosures in support of climate change adaptation needs in terms of referred to propagated improved land use techniques. This committee was installed and realized by government employees, i.e.by ‘experts’ from Addis Ababa. But, the outlined and to our ‘Western European’ eyes, normal and customized ideal of democracy meets social constellations on the ground, which had known some means and ways of mutual consensus finding by their own constitution as such.

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Members of pastoralist communities interpret this system as follows:

“The elders used to manage the grazing land by telling the herders to shift from pasture to pasture. They sent young herders to check the condition of the grass, and then they decided on the migration paths. If someone was seen taking his animals to the forbidden areas, he would be punished. But punishment is not constant. It will vary from people to people and it depends on the severity of the action” (Soya Kurupa, man – 14th March 2015, approx. 42 years).

“The cultural management has no written rules and regulations, because once the elders pass the decision, no one will disobey. It is a management, where everyone has to obey. We have grown up with it, so we like it very much” (Moru Lomarle, woman – 12th March 2015, approx. 55 years).

Using village-level ethnographic data from the named pastoralist livelihood scenery, the case of the Nyangatom, the paper supports the following thesis: the formula of ‘transformative adaptation’, as propagated by e.g. the 5th IPCC- assessment report 2014 with some successful climate change adaptation in view, and subsequently multifold suggested by initiatives hailing processes of societal transformation, does not necessarily mean altogether a change towards a more resilient and sustainable development, i.e. towards the positive.

Data taken from semi-structured interviews conducted in 2015 and 2016 reflect on interpretations and perceptions by the pastoralists involved relating to this transformative impetus. They indicate ‘disagreement in the shadows’ as defined by Rancière (19993) and a disruption of processes of communication and mutual cooperation. Very obviously and supported by our findings we cannot but conclude: ‘means of communication, voiced or non- voiced, are to be taken to the open and are to be made understandable to all. Values and interpretations should not be disguised by any ‘disagreement in the shadow’ (Rancière 1999: 30). These new challenges do not meet ready-made answers and patented concepts. Surely, the institutional setting of committees in today’s understanding is to be questioned and adapted to given and culturally based frameworks of representation and according patterns of communication (Troeger 2018: 354).

By listening to the peoples’ voice, it became obvious that the modern idea of committees will not match the culturally established and believed in articulation of authority and representation. Seen from a western perspective, the articulated obedience might not appear ‘right’ and equivalent, but it represents customary regulations and a sense of belonging. Especially the emphasis on a fair, socially reflected and balanced execution of established rules and regulation contrasts the perception of today’s realization of power and authority.

To get closer to the meaning of ‘governance’ and ‘participation’ facilitated by processes of communication in given frameworks of the committee, the argument turns to the people, the ‘voices of the people’. Perceptions and interpretations are singled out in line with the perspectives of: ‘structural forces and governance’, ‘modes of ‘participation’ and ‘articulation of social correctness’4.

3 Rancière, J. (1999): Disagreement: politics and philosophy. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 4 The data was assessed during fieldwork in March 2015

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“I myself had the idea of establishing rules to govern our problems with the drought and the use of the pastures, but then I heard that the Woreda people are coming to establish the rules and regulations. And there were some people from Addis Ababa, who gave us some papers, which listed the rules. They asked the people to add on it, and of course, everything was clear, and nobody added anything on top of the by-laws, and the committee was selected from different age-groups” (Lobowa, approx. 42 years – 14th March 2015).

Quite in line with the general articulation of the ‘development narrative’ in Ethiopia, obviously no participation, which could indicate true ‘governance’, had been sought. One interviewee even claims initial own, self-determined ideas about necessary regulations, but he had no chance to promote these tentative frameworks of governance. No ‘freedom to articulate one’s own voice’ was given in this process of communication. This turned out to be an unambiguous top-down message, which had to be ‘swallowed’ by the people on the ground, this means by those, who in future would be the ones to realize these handed over regulations. Structural forces governed the information instead of true communication processes. No communication in the ideal sense was realized, which is even more emphasized by the following statements:

“Us elders, we were unsure whether to accept the new rules, but the Woreda people made us accept the idea of bye-laws” (Dida Lolibes, man – 11th March 2015, approx. 64 years).

“The leaders from the Woreda and the people from Addis made us discuss the question of the punishment for not following the rules. So, the discussions were led by the experts, and they were the ones to give a speech on the positive side of the new governance system and make the community accept the idea. Even me, I accepted it” (Ariapa Lokitibo, man – 14th March 2015, approx. 38 years).

The so called ‘participatory’ processes in the pastoralist communities did not only confront the people on the ground with readymade answers and new regulatory frameworks, but it excluded some members of the community completely from the wished-for democratic process. Thus, neither some ‘equal grounds of understanding’, nor any ‘freedom to articulate one’s perceptions’ and evaluations of the given social needs in terms of a fair and transparent handling of the new ‘structural forces’ in the shape of the climate change imperative was sought for:

“My neighbors in our settlement did not participate in the discussions. According to what I now know they are not happy with the decisions because they did not get any clarification on this matter like we did from the Woreda and the people from Addis” (Ariapa Lokitibo, man – 14th March 2015, approx. 38 years).

In summary, the obvious notion of ‘disagreement’ indicates a situation, when meant to be partners in communication do not necessarily contradict each other openly, but disagree in the shadow of claimed consensual modes of governance. On the surface, this consensual governance has reduced political conflict and disagreement (Swyngedouw 2011), but in reality, the partners in communication have not reached a common ground of understanding.

The example of the Nyangatom pastoralists in south Ethiopia unambiguously highlights given processes of communication to be by far not manifested in the open and freed from structural power. Communication in the committees was dominated by ‘experts’, i.e. the

324 agents of the government following the ‘development narrative’ as outlined above. The actors on the ground resisted the officially outlined principles and practices of climate change adaptation ‘in the shadow’: “We should take disagreement to mean a determined kind of speech situation: one in which one of the interlocutors at once understands and does not understand what the other is saying. Disagreement is not the conflict between one who says white and the other says black. It is the conflict between one who says white and another who also says white but does not understand the same thing by it or does not understand that the other is saying the same thing in the name of whiteness” (Rancière, 1999: X).

Essentially, this argument proposes that governing climate change had been characterized not only by disagreement, but climate change communication is to be understood as subcutaneous resistance, voiced quietly and under cover, answering in the end the ultimate failure in communication.

Scale III: The Lower Omo Valley, South Omo, is taken to be an environment of latent and open social conflicts; conflicts on various levels and with reference to diverse agents and contesting parties. The 16 agro-pastoralist ethnic groups find themselves in partly violent competition on grazing grounds and heads of cattle. These conflicts have largely been analyzed by anthropologists like David Turton (1985) and Jon Abbink et al. (2014).

Furthermore, the Lower Omo Valley has since 2011, turned into a region of high national interest. The local manifestation of the government owned Kuraz Sugar Development Project (KSDP), which again, opens ground for conflicts including human rights violations. About 90,000 people in the Lower Omo valley had been depending on flood-retreat farming for sorghum cultivation along the Omo (Turton 2010). In the more southerly parts of the Lower Omo, the areas flooded by the river were larger. The people on the surrounding plains were even more reliant on flood retreat farming than their neighbors in the north, as these practice rain-fed agriculture. Since the end of the floods in 2015, most groups in the northern part of the Lower Omo Valley are entirely dependent on rain-fed cultivation for crop-production, which leaves them highly vulnerable to climate change induced droughts, or solely dependent on corporation-controlled irrigation systems (Stevenson and Buffavand 2018). Furthermore, reductions in the river flows downstream of the sugarcane plantations are taken to reduce the availability of water – moisture in the soil – with damaging affects on the pastures for the pastoralists’ livestock, especially cattle and sheep, while goats are browsers and can partly feed on bush vegetation. Land clearance for sugar plantations has additionally restricted wildlife in vital habitats and cut people’s access to subsistence opportunities (Buffavand 2016).

KSDP operates on about 100,000 ha production sites of sugar cane, the formerly pastoralist ‘commons’, irrigated by water from the Gibe III hydrodam. The sugar cane is, or is in near future, processed in up to five sugar factories lined along river Omo and situated in pastoralist territories. What is happening in the Lower Omo Valley combines elements of different types of displacement. The scheme was planned and executed by the current regime in Ethiopia in collaboration with an Italian engineering firm and international financiers. In 2012, the South Omo Zone Agriculture Bureau promoted a ‘Villagization Plan’, which described how and in the course of the coming year the people would be moved into new villages (FDRE 2012). In the plan the benefits of Villagization are described as follows: growing new crops, such as sugarcane on irrigated fields would improve food security; providing people with schooling and medical services would improve their health; settling in planned villages would reduce conflicts that result from “mobility in search of water and pasture” (FDRE 2012: 5). “In the

325 case of land that relies on rain (for cultivation) 2 hectares would be appointed to each settler pastoralist, whereas those settling on irrigable land would be appointed 0.5 hectares each” (ibid: 8).

The expansion of the artificial irrigation in the Lower Omo Valley was made possible by the construction of the Gibe II dam upstream, the construction of which was started in 2008. In conjunction with the dam, a system of canals was built to distribute water to the Omo-Kuraz Plantation, within which selected plots of land were assigned for use by ‘settler pastoralists’. At full capacity the Kuraz production sites would realize, this the initial projections, a quarter of Ethiopia’s sugar and ethanol production, more than any other sugar production site in the country (ESC 2014).

Findings from the field by E. G. J. Stevenson and L. Buffavand (2018) indicate, that crop yields were and will be by far not sufficient to feed the pastoralist settlers, let alone to produce a surplus for sale (2018: 120). “… Villagization was actually experienced by the Bodi settlers as undermining food security and diminishing well-being. It was experienced as heat, as disruption of routines, as a loss of control over livelihoods, as being treated like children rather than adults, and as abstracting work from ordinary sociality” (ibid: 122). In congruence with these findings the study on ‘Social-ecological change in the Omo-Turkana basin: A synthesis of current developments’ by almost the entire group of researchers active in the Omo-Turkana basin (Hobold, J. et al., 2019: without page) recapitulates their findings in a sense of comparative winners – the migrant laborers – and losers – the indigenous peoples (including both agro-pastoralists and pastoralists, but with more borne by agro- pastoralists currently): “Important SES-wide impacts will result from changes in regulating, provisioning, and cultural ecosystem services, including potential environmental degradation; loss of biological and cultural diversity; heightened competition and conflict over natural resources; and the potential for increased dependence on food aid (ibid). The other major actors – agro-industry investors, and the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya – they classify as in an equivocal position, with potential for large gains, but also exposure to substantial risks – a position, which is highly contradicted by one of the authors – Benedikt Kamski – at another place. In his argument titled “Omo investors won’t scrub away Kuraz’s sugary stain” (2019) he states: “ESC (Ethiopian Sugar Corporation) rushed into the multi-billion dollar project, largely neglecting critical feasibility and impact assessments”. He stresses the urge ESC is experiencing when the capital-intensive transformation of the region failed to bear fruit for its indigenous communities, which in turn creates new conflict dynamics. He concludes: “If economic interests alone guide investment decisions, official visions for inclusive pastoralist development – as recently reiterated by Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Mekonnen – will require additional effort and financial commitment by the government, and a big question mark remains over whether this will materialize”.

These last insights and reflections correspond with the author’s perceptions and impressions, when meeting with the ESC CEO and various stakeholders of the ESC management alongside the OSA conference. On the basis of these experiences the Development Policy, as outlined below, appeared realistic and feasible!

Policy Recommendations

Scale IV: As indicated above, the paper will now and finally turn towards and highlight some projected initiative in terms of development policies towards a promotion of livelihood security and environmental justice in favor of the indigenous inhabitants of the Lower Omo

326 Valley, the pastoralist societies. The reasoning of this initiative responds to the again outlined and named below livelihood threats and conflict scenarios taken to be highly virulent and tangible.

Upon completion of the KSDP the overall, about 800,000 ha, pastoral land will be reduced by 100,000 ha. The sugar production has from the very beginning meant as vehicle of state governed development and progress. But, despite the major cutbacks in size and processing capacity, KSDP has highly impacted the livelihood system of the pastoralists. River Omo is nowadays framed by about 15-m broad irrigation canals, which hinder traditional use of water by the pastoralists for animals and river bench agricultural cultivation. As the pastoralists had to give way to the sugar plantations, they were called to re-settle in newly established permanent villages – the ‘villagization program’ driven by government policies. In the course of the thus induced transformation processes, many pastoral households are currently facing a livelihood situation of food-insecurity.

Additionally, and along with the establishment of the sugar plantations some extensive labor force was needed. Up to today, about 30,000 migrant laborers arrived from the Ethiopian Highlands. Moreover, re-settlers from the highly populated areas of e.g. the Konso in South Ethiopia, have taken advantage of the labor demand in the sugar project. The number of migrant laborers is expected to reach some hundreds of thousands, when all production sites and the five sugar factories will be fully operational.

Against the depicted situational setting, resource-based conflict and at times violent encounters will be the ‘order of the day’. In the course of resource – land and water – scarcity, the agro-pastoralists ethnicities find themselves squeezed by natural factors (climate change) and the development project. Hence, some growing resentment and animosity towards the dominance of the sugar project and some resistance against the migrant population are poisoning today’s encounters between the diverse interest groups.

Moreover, resource scarcity has increased the intensity and frequency of interethnic conflicts among the agro-pastoral ethnicities. If not solved, the current tensions and violent confrontations are likely to engulf the entire South Omo regional entity – one of government’s perspective development corridors in Ethiopia.

In summary, food and livelihood security of the agro-pastoralists in the Lower Omo Valley has become highly vulnerable. This relates on the one hand to the considerable impact of climate change in the course of which the Belg Rains fail several seasons in succession (Tröger et.al. 2011) but likewise to the reduction of freely accessible pasture land in the course of the establishment of the sugar production sites. The anchor element of this setting is feed for the cattle, the central economic and likewise socio-cultural value in pastoralist livelihoods. With relation to this socio-economic ‘anchor element’ in question, the agricultural value chain of the produce sugar cane moves into the projected focus. This value chain is centered to be the protagonist of conflict mediation and resolution in its function to smoothen livelihood stress and vulnerabilities.

The project targets the given lay of conflicts by one central element: by cut-off residues (bagasse) and molasses, bye-products from sugar production – to be turned into cattle feed. As a consequence, the project is conceptualized as ‘contract research’, with high emphasis on the value chain development of the sugar cane, but likewise with explicit focus on various

327 social perspectives on conflict resolution, discharging into a process of integrative Societal Transformation.

Guided by the promoted government politics in terms of ‘ethnic reconciliation’, the project will operate on value chain development and open access to cattle feed for the pastoralist ethnicities. New environments of coexistence among the interest groups in question on equalized grounds are to be defined and processes of integrative societal transformation to be eased.

Indigenous pastoralist societal organization does by its concepts of live and livelihood constituents not incorporate the idea of feeding, much less, fattening cattle. In contrast, the government program of villagization does, by its outlines, claim the idea of sedentism of the pastoralists in South Omo, which necessarily implies the need of some ways and means of stationary sources of income for the then non-migratory population.

The in consequence enforced societal transformation will demand considerable conceptional architecture and research endeavor in order to accompany and facilitate these pathways into newly to be designed livelihood systems and outcomes. But this should be noted: these at first sight completely new and seemingly culturally non-acceptable pathways are not to be taken as any unrealistic illusion. The listed above research results outreach towards the direction of the societal transformation recently on pronounced demand. Already at that time, ten years ago and in the face of the above addressed severe climate change induced droughts, had Nyangatom cattle herders started to sell cattle – at that time under disguise and hidden away from their fathers and elders (Tröger et.al. 2012). Very obviously, processes of societal transformation were on the way – already at the beginning of the decade, to be enforced and accelerated by today’s bundle of urges.

But – this should be stated from the very beginning of this initiative, in favor of a better and more substantial understanding of processes initially kicked off by changes in terms of ‘transformation’ – the paper turns against a too euphoric interpretation of the perspective of ‘transformations’. Processes of fundamental change, i.e. transformations, their causes, consequences and possible response options remain contested by different groups in society and are associated with different perspectives in power and dominance. Against notions, which continue to primarily discuss social effects of climate change in terms of tolerable risks for societies as a whole (Adger et. al. 2009), the more substantive aspects of social justice need attention: • Which distributional effects will societal transformations have within societies? • How are questions of societal justice, participation, and the distributive effects of climate change addressed in social debates? • What changes in modes of governance could be essential for transformative processes?

In conclusion, the envisaged initiative is to be summarized by the illustration below:

328 Integrative Societal Transformation - A Partnership Initiative

Ethiopian Sugar Value Chain Development Social & Economic Corporation (ESC) Sugar Cane Sciences

Universities: Bonn, Giessen, Cologne, Tentative Portfolio Jinka, Arba Minch Agricultural & technological perspectives: Tentative Portfolio value chain in terms Social-cultural framing: of cattle feed, ownership & access, modalities of procurement governance & responsibilities & storage

Development & Definition of Transformative Adaptation Strategies

To finalize this statement on policy recommendations, alongside the OSA Conference in July 2019, several meetings with management of the ESC – including the CEO Ato Weyo Akako – were staged. The general agreement was stated in several ‘letters of interest’ in some mutually envisaged initiative as outlined above in the near future.

References Abbink, J. et al. (2014): Lands of the Future: Transforming Pastoral Lands and Livelihoods in Eastern Africa. Working Paper N0. 154. Max Planck Institute, Germany.

Adger, N. et.al. (2009): Are there social limits to adaptation to climate change? Clim Chan 93: 335-354.

Buffavand, L. (2016): ‘The Land Does not Like Them’: Contesting Dispossession in Cosmological Terms in Mela, South-West Ethiopia. Journal of Eastern African Studies 10 (3): 476-93.

FDRE (2012): South Omo Villagization Plan. Addis Ababa: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

Foucault, Michel (1977). Dispositive der Macht. Über Sexualität, Wissen und Wahrheit. Merve-Verlag :Berlin.

Hobold, J. et al. (2019): Social-ecological change in the Omo-Turkana basin: A synthesis of current developments. Springer, without pages.

Kamsi, B. (2019): Ethiopia Insight: Omo investors won’t scub away Kuraz’s sugary stain. https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/2019/08/01

Rancière , Jacques (1999). Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. University of Minnesota Press.

Stevenson, E. G. & L. Buffavand (2018): ‘Do Our Bodies Know Their Ways?’ – Villagization, Food-Insecurity, and Ill-Being in Ethiopia’s Lower Omo Valley. African Studies Review 61: 109-133.

Swyngedouw, E (2011): Interrogating post-democratization: Reclaiming egalitarian political spaces. Political Geography, 30 (7), pp. 370-380.

329 Tröger, S. (2018): ‘Everything That Is Happening Now Is Beyond Our Capacity’ – Nyangatom Livelihoods Under Threat. In: Cambridge University Press & UNESCO: Indigenous Knowledge for Climate Change Assessment and Adaptation, Chapt. 15, pp 214 - 226, Cambridge.

Tröger, S. (2011): Climate Policy Brief on Sustainable Land Management (2010). Ethiopian Civil Society Network on Climate Change, Policy Brief 3.

Turton, D. (1985): ‚Mursi Response to Drought: Some Lessons for Relief and Rehabilitation. African Affairs 84 (336): 331-46.

Turton, D. (2010): The Downstream Impact. Presentation at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, organized by the Royal Africa Society. www.mursi.org.

330 Youth Unemployment in Ethiopia: Demographic and Policy Perspectives Hirko Wakgari1* Currently PhD student at Finfinnee (Addis Ababa) University Email: [email protected]

Introduction Since the1990s, Ethiopia’s population has been growing with an unprecedented rapid annual rate of close to 3 percent with a doubling time of 27 years. According to Central Statistical Agency’s 2013 medium projections, Ethiopia’s population will be 105 million by 2022, making it the second populous country in Africa next only to Nigeria (CSA, 2013). Moreover, the historically fast population growth in Ethiopia over last three decades has produced a disproportionately large share of youth in its population, thus creating a ‘youth bulge’ in the country. For example, according to the 2007 census by Ethiopia’s Central Statistical Agency (CSA), over 50 percent of Ethiopia’s population was under 18 years of age while around 70 percent were below 30 years of age (CSA, 2007). Based on its demographic changes, Ethiopia can be said to have the potential to accelerate its economic growth via a demographic dividend that comes with a rapidly increasing youth (working age) population if it responds with appropriate policy and strategic actions. Conversely, if the country’s efforts in this regard are to falter, the implications could be dire in terms of political instability and other social and environmental hazards. Considering the current reality in this regard, however, despite the much-reported continuous Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in Ethiopia’s economy over the last two decades, unemployment remains a major burden to the country (Alemu, 2018; IMF, 2018). Moreover, while youth unemployment and underemployment in general continue to be serious problems in Ethiopia, the growing population of more educated youth encountering fewer jobs is particularly turning out to be a source of a major crisis in the making (Bonsa, 2017; Wakgari, 2016). Nonetheless, current efforts by the government towards addressing the prevailing massive and complex youth unemployment challenge are impeded by a lack of systematic, evidence-based and innovative policy and strategic approaches that match the level of the prevailing challenge. Some of the major problems in this regard include the lack of accurate and relevant data about the youth population in general and about their livelihood and labour conditions in particular; structural and policy problems that constrain the capacity of the country’s economy to create adequate job opportunities for the youth; poor education system that fails to impart employable skills and entrepreneurial mentality to their graduating youth; and misguided job creation policies and strategies from the past that continue to be implemented despite the many changing demographic realities (IMF, 2018; MoE, 2018; MoLSA, 2013; MoWCYA, 2014). In this paper, I examine each of these issues using a combination of policy reviews and empirical evidences obtained from CSA and my 2016 research (Wakgari, 2016) on a related topic. The rest of this paper is organized into four main sections. The first section provides an analysis of Ethiopia’s population dynamics and the ensuing youth bulge, with a particular focus on its links with youth unemployment and other socio-political implications. The second section attempts to unveil the factual misrepresentations in Ethiopia’s existing official data on youth unemployment. The third section examines design deficits and implementation gaps of

1 Former lecturer and consultant researcher at Oromia State University

331 Ethiopia’s past policies in relation to youth (un)employment. The final section provides conclusions and policy recommendations for addressing the current youth unemployment challenge in Ethiopia.

1. Demographic Perspectives: Ethiopia’s Population Dynamics and the “Youth Bulge” Demographic changes are known to have played such a fundamental role in human societies throughout modern history that they have been the subject of theorizing for centuries (Population, 2014). For example, the subject of demographic change has played a central role in the development of Western politico-economic theories like the classical economics of Adam Smith (Smith, 1776) and the sociopolitical theories of Karl Marx (Marx, 1847). In the context of most of Africa and particularly in Ethiopia, however, there have been very little intellectual debates and policy discourses on matters of population dynamics and its impacts on development prospects. This is despite the fact that Ethiopia, like the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, has witnessed a very rapid population growth in the last several decades (ECA, 2013; Nayak, 2014). In particular, while the Ethiopia’s population in general has been growing with a very rapid rate of close to 3 percent with a doubling period of 27 years since 1990s, its working-age population has been growing at an even faster average annual rate of 4.5 percent with a doubling period of around 20 years. As a result, Ethiopia’s labour force increased from 14.7 million in 1984 to 39 million according to the latest census in 2007 (CSA, 2007) and is further projected to rise to 81 million by 2032 CSA, 2013). In Oromia alone, the total labour force that was 13.28 million in 2007 is now estimated to reach 23 million within the next few years (by 2022) and is further projected to rise to 31 million by 2032 (ibid). This means that, in about thirteen years’ from now, the total labour force in Oromia alone will be twice the size that Ethiopia’s total labour force was three decades ago. While it is clear that such population trends will fundamentally shape Ethiopia’s future prospects for sustainable development, well researched information on the link between current demographic trends and their impacts on the economy (including on youth employment) and the country’s overall development is scant (Cilliers, 2018; ECA, 2013).The following section provides preliminary attempts to analyze Ethiopia’s population dynamics with a particular emphasis on the ongoing demographic transition, the ensuing youth bulge and its socio-economic (unemployment) and political implications.

Demographic Transition and Changes in Age Structure in Ethiopia A demographic transition is the process during which mortality rates decline, leading to a population boom, followed by a decline in fertility and the subsequent end of the population boom (Cilliers, 2018). As illustrated in figure 1 below, this transition denotes the phasing-out process of population growth rates from a virtually stagnant growth stage, characterized by high birth rates and death rates (stage 1); through a rapid-growth stage with high birth rates and low death rates (stage 2); to declining birth rate and a slowly falling death rate (stage 3); and finally to a stable, low-growth stage in which both birth and death rates are low (stages 4 and 5). It is to be noted here that all contemporary developed countries have passed through the same stages in their modern demographic history (Todaro & Smith, 2015).

332 Fig 1: The Five Stages of a Demographic Transition

Source: Cilliers (2018)

In analogy with the stages of demographic transition illustrated by the above diagram, prior to the 1990s the rate of Ethiopia’s population growth, like elsewhere in the world, had been strongly influenced by the combined effects of famine, disease, malnutrition, plague, and war— conditions that resulted in high death rates accompanying high birth rates (stage 1 in figure 1). On the other hand, advances in modern education, improved sanitation measures and expanded access to modern health care services throughout the country within the past several decades have resulted in unprecedented reduction in death rates. For example, in the last few decades, Ethiopia has witnessed remarkable reductions in infant and maternal mortality with its under-5 mortality cut in half as a result of improvements in informational and infrastructural services in modern health, hygiene and nutrition (Gribble & Bremner, 2012; Megquier & Belohlav, 2014). Such remarkable reductions in death rates in turn led to the rapid growth of Ethiopia’s population over the last three decades marking its entry (and passage through) the second stage of the demographic transition depicted in figure 1. In a further analogy with the stages of demographic transition illustrated in figure 1, in Ethiopia, women’s reproductive health in recent times has shown substantial improvements and many more women in the country now have the ability and decision-making power to plan their pregnancies with modern contraception methods. For example, use of modern contraceptive methods among married women has grown from 6 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 2012 resulting in women having, on average, 4.8 children compared with 6.5 a decade ago (Gribble & Bremner, 2012). The trend in declining fertility is also likely to continue in the coming decades as women get better and more access to reproductive health and family planning information services from the country’s expanding health and Information Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructures (Megquier & Belohlav, 2014). This indicates that Ethiopia is already entering the third stage of the five-stage demographic transition phase illustrated in figure 1. With its declining infant mortality and fertility rates, Ethiopia is expected to move from a concave population pyramid to a more convex one as shown in the following diagrams (see figure 2 below).

333

Fig 2: Comparative Population Pyramids for Ethiopia between 2010 and 2030 (projection)

Source: Megquier and Belohlav (2014).

Such a transition from age structures dominated by children (diagram 2010) to age structures concentrated in working ages (diagram 2030) may have mixed economic consequences. The demographic dividend may be an important contributor to economic growth (Lam & Leibbrandt, 2013).The rapid increase in population and a demographic transition—a pronounced increase in the share of working age population (SWAP), as illustrated in the diagrams, provides the country with the potential for rapid economic growth (IMF, 2015).On the other hand, such increasingly swelling cohorts of young people entering the working age population also pose a huge challenge to the economy for sufficient job creation. Particularly, in situations where policy and institutional contexts are unfavorable and the educational system is poorly attuned to the job market, the consequence is high unemployment among young people and blighted aspirations (Millington & Cleland, 2017). Moreover, the ongoing demographic transition in Ethiopia has another challenge because the country’s ageing population will grow faster over the next decades. For example, the population aged 65 and over in Ethiopia is projected to grow from 2.5 million in 2007 (3.3 percent of total population) to 6.4 million (4.6 percent of total population) by 2037 thus necessitating additional support for 4 million people of the aging population (CSA, 2013). This calls for the need to take advantage of the current youth bulge before it turns into an ageing- population bulge in the coming decades (Millington & Cleland, 2017).

Implications of the Youth Bulge in Ethiopia: A Demographic Dividend or a Crisis? The demographic dividend refers to the potential for an accelerated economic growth following the changes in the age structure of a country’s population as it transitions from high to low birth and death rates (Gribble & Bremner, 2012)., First, as already discussed in the earlier section, such a demographic transition leads to an increase in the working age population and hence the labor supply gets bigger and, provided the labor market can absorb the larger numbers of workers, per capita production increases. Second, working-age people tend to have a higher level of economic output and also a higher level of savings than other age groups. Thus, national savings will tend to rise when larger proportion of the population is in the working age group (Bloom et. al, 2003). However, the realization of such a dividend is heavily dependent on the

334 policy environment. A growing number of adults will only be productive if there is sufficient flexibility in the labor market to allow its expansion, and if there are macroeconomic policies that permit and encourage investment. Similarly, people will only save if they have access to adequate saving mechanisms and have confidence in domestic financial markets (Bloom et. al, 2003; USAID, 2012). Similarly, the 2007 World Development report by the World Bank suggested that in order for developing countries to be able to take advantage of their demographic dividend in accelerating economic growth and reducing poverty, they need to invest in better education, healthcare and job training for their record numbers of youth and that such efforts need to be supported by evidence based and tailored policy measures (World Bank, 2007). As highlighted in the foregoing paragraphs, the demographic changes currently occurring in Ethiopia provide the country with the potential to accelerate its economic growth via a demographic dividend that its rapidly increasing working age population represents, if it responds to the changes with well thought-out and appropriate policy and strategic actions. Being able to take advantage of a shift in the age structure in Ethiopia’s population requires making strategic investments and developing policies that create jobs for the youth (ECA, 2013; Megquier & Belohlav, 2014). In countries like Ethiopia which find themselves at the beginning of a demographic transition, where mortality and fertility rates are beginning to fall, there is an opportunity for governments to capitalize on the impending demographic transition, where the number of adults of working age grows large relative to the dependent population, and potentially acts as a major economic spur. However, if the appropriate policy environment is not in place, particularly to educate and provide appropriate skills training for the youth who are the product of pre- transition, high fertility, unemployment and instability may be the result, and health, education, and social welfare systems may undergo unbearable strain (ECA, 2013; Gribble & Bremner, 2012). Conversely, if a country’s efforts in this regard are to falter, the implications of such demographic developments could be dire. This is because, the youth bulge, if accompanied by massive youth unemployment, as is presently the case in Ethiopia, has been shown to be one of the main factors affecting political unrest as young people who have not found jobs are susceptible to joining radical groups (Arowosegbe, 2009; Lam & Leibbrandt, 2013; Urdal, 2005; Urdal, 2008). In line with this, Gribble and Bremner (2012) stress that, if the appropriate policy environment is not in place to provide appropriate skills training and job opportunities for the youth who are the product of pre-transition, massive youth unemployment and instability may likely be the result (Gribble & Bremner, 2012). However, it would be a mistake to characterize all political unrests and youth movements as a reaction to the lack of employment opportunities since there are significant differences in the specific national contests that give rise to protests. For example, as widely attested to, the quest for democracy, justice and equality has been a major driving force behind youth (Qeerroo/Qarree and their counterparts) protests throughout Ethiopia during the several years preceding 2018, as it was with the Arab Spring, while this may not be the case for protests in countries with democracies (Gebissa & Mohammed, 2017; ILO, 2012; USAID, 2012). In short, the implications of the youth bulge are dependent on resistance to change by the older generation in power leading to a demographic bomb or marshalling youth resources to create a demographic dividend. The demographic bomb occurs because youth live in a globalized world of digital technologies which allow for cultural inter-penetration and a

335 willingness to challenge the core assumptions of any nation. For the youth bulge to become a demographic dividend, structural and worldview changes are required. These include regulatory and policy changes to allow young people to become economic, technological and social entrepreneurs along with political reforms that allow the youth to have a voice in decision- making (Inayatullah, 2016).

2. Data and Information Gaps on Youth Unemployment in Ethiopia This section attempts to shed light on the challenges arising from the dearth of accurate and relevant data and credible information on the causes, nature and magnitude of youth unemployment in Ethiopia. To begin with, Ethiopia’s CSA has been the sole agency providing labour force and related employment/unemployment data from its surveys of varying scope conducted since the mid-1970s, including the 1984, 1994 and 2007 Population and Housing censuses. The CSA also launched Employment/Unemployment Surveys beginning in 2003 and the latest being the 2013 national labour force survey and the 2018 urban unemployment survey. As witnessed in their report, the CSA has been adopting the ILO definition of unemployment in carrying out its surveys. Accordingly, citing ILO (1990), the report notes that CSA has been measuring unemployment status on the basis of the following three ILO criteria: (i) (being) without work; (ii) (being) available for work; and (iii) seeking work (CSA, 2018). On the other hand, however, unemployment as defined by ILO is increasingly seen as inadequate to characterize low income countries’ labour markets. It has long been widely argued that ILO based characterization of youth unemployment does not provide a full and adequate description of the difficulties that youth face in developing countries’ labour markets in general, and the rural labour conditions of such countries’ in particular (UNESCAP, 2014; Walter, 2019). In fact, the kinds of unemployment observed in the context of developing countries’ labour market conditions has been known by a different kind of terminology in the parlance of development economics – disguised unemployment or underemployment (Bonsa, 2017; Lewis, 1954; Todaro & Smith, 2015). Disguised unemployment describes a condition whereby working age people especially in rural areas have something to do but do not have activities that fully engage them so that they remain idle for a significant part of their work days. This is especially true in low income countries like Ethiopia where, given that there is no publicly funded welfare system, those unable to secure decent employment cannot afford to sit around and be unemployed; they rather resort to survival tactics like joining the hustle of underemployment in the informal sector, helping out with the family in subsistence farming or other engaging in similar substance-based household enterprises (Bonsa, 2017; Walter, 2019). With these forewarnings in mind, let us now consider available data from CSA’s most recent unemployment surveys. As already indicated, the most recent countrywide unemployment survey in Ethiopia is as far as six years back (undertaken in 2013), which does not adequately reflect Ethiopia’s current realities especially in the face of the country’s rapidly growing labour force. Even then, the adoption of the ILO based approach towards conceptualizing and measuring unemployment rate by CSA has made its survey results highly irrelevant or even distorted as shall be elaborated in the following paragraphs. For example, according the 2014 CSA report (CSA, 2014), the general countrywide unemployment rate in Ethiopia in June 2013 was 4.5 percent whereas the rate of the country’s youth unemployment during that period was 6.8 percent. Moreover, the CSA (2014) report indicates that youth unemployment in Ethiopia decreased from 7.4 percent in March 2005 and further went down to a still lower rate of 6.8 percent in June 2013.

336 However, such rosy depictions of the trends of youth unemployment in Ethiopia are untenable given the noticeable dire state of youth unemployment in Ethiopia. It also stands in direct contradiction with official acknowledgements being made by the government. For example, President of Oromia Regional State, Shimelis Abdissa, officially stated on a televised job creation forum (May 08, 2019, Adama) that massive youth unemployment remains a threat to sustainable development and political stability of the whole country. Similarly, Ethiopia’s Prime Minster, Abiy Ahmed, in his July 2019 annual report at parliament acknowledged the dire state of Ethiopia’s youth unemployment and stressed that the current youth unemployment burden is partly the result of unemployment backlogs from the past several years. Even more, the CSA’s unemployment statistics stated above also fail to hold water in the face of the widely observed illegal and risky economic migrations to overseas by tens of thousands of Ethiopian youth each year. For example, according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs’ 2013/14 report, around half a million Ethiopian youth have left the country for economic reasons in the three years preceding the report (MoWCYA, 2014). Hence, as rightly noted by Bonsa (2017), it is enough to look at the large exodus of Ethiopia’s youth, who are prepared to take unimaginable risks– walking across the Sahara and confronting the fatal risk in crossing the Mediterranean to reach Europe or the Middle East, to know Ethiopia has been suffering from massive youth unemployment. In short, the kinds of official unemployment rate figures like the ones produced by Ethiopia’s CSA by following ILO’s definition of unemployment essentially ignore millions of rural youth who engage in household subsistence farming as well as millions of young people who are underemployed in the informal sector. This so because the full picture of youth unemployment in Ethiopia does not show itself in the form of unemployment as in the highly industrialized countries where ILO definitions might be relevant, but much more frequently in the form of chronic underemployment which affects a large proportion of the agricultural community (UNESCAP, 2014). In this regard, Lam (2014) aptly notes that limitedness of official data on youth unemployment in developing countries has led to the acute scarcity of studies on the relationship between youth demography and youth unemployment. Incidentally, one of the major recommendations to be made later in this paper suggests what needs to be done to addresses the current shortcomings in the available labour data and youth unemployment statistics.

3. Policy Perspectives on Ethiopia’s Youth Unemployment Challenge Economic Policy It is to be noted that Ethiopia’s current economic institutions came to existence in the aftermath of the shifts in political and economic institutions in 1991. The shifts were accomplished under the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government that came to power following the demise of the socialist military regime in that same year. Among the major institutional shifts was the economic reform that saw a deregulation of markets including the removal of restrictions on private sector participation in the economy, currency devaluation and trade liberalization – all drawn from the books of a capitalist economic model. These measures allowed the handing over of many previously state-owned enterprises like factories, hotels and so forth to individuals who were closely associated with the then dominant political circles through privatization and custom-made bank loan arrangements (Admasu, 2017; Fayissa, 2005). However, despite declaring capitalism as the guiding economic ideology and taking the stated initial steps in 1990s, in the 2000s the government resorted to a developmental state model

337 which encourages state-led economic development. Most notably, the government has since made public investments in infrastructures, the main priority areas of its economic policy along with the creation of multitude of new state-owned corporations like Sugar Corporation, metal and engineering corporation, Railway Corporation and so on. With the new economic model, the Ethiopia’s economy began to recover during late 1990s and continued to grow at around 10 percent per annum in the following decade. The state-led growth strategies also brought about advances in infrastructure in the areas of communications, roads, energy generation and physical facilities for social services (Admasu, 2017; World Bank, 2009). Nevertheless, not everyone has benefited from these development efforts, and significant income and wealth disparities exist in terms of geographic locations, age groups and gender. Besides, nearly a quarter of Ethiopia’s population still lives in extreme poverty and the country remains among the lowest income countries in the world (IMF, 2018).This means that both poverty and income inequality are key development challenges currently facing Ethiopia, thus calling for the need to design new policies that promote equity and inclusiveness across various socioeconomic and age groups including the youth. On the other hand, the momentum of the state-led economic growth, driven largely by public investment in infrastructure, has already reached its limit. This is evidenced by the currently observable effects of such a state-led economic growth in exacerbating external imbalances, raising public debt vulnerabilities and causing severe foreign exchange shortages. These limitations, coupled with adverse shocks in recent years—protests, conflicts, drought and terms-of-trade deterioration—have continued to undermine the growth and job creation prospects of Ethiopia’s economy (IMF, 2018; World Bank, 2009). In addition, Ethiopia’s economy also suffers from structural challenges. Historically, in many parts of the world, structural change from subsistence agriculture to industrial expansion has helped countries to cater job opportunities for their rapidly growing youth population at times of demographic transition. In East Asia, for example, large numbers of workers leaving agriculture moved into manufacturing thus driving continued growth and job creation. In Ethiopia, however, as stated in the 2009 Job Creation Policy and Strategy Document, unemployment and underemployment continue to be serious problems in Ethiopia mainly as a result of limited employment generation capacity of the industrial sector of the economy in addition to the overburden created by rapid population and labour force growth (FDRE, 2009; Weickert, 2012). Similarly, a 2017/18 annual performance report of Ethiopia’s economy by the country’s national bank states that the share of industry in GDP during the indicated budget year (2017/18) was reported to be 27 percent while that of agriculture and service sectors were 34.9 percent and 39.2 percent respectively (NBE, 2018). The report indicates that Ethiopia’s economy, which had showed 9.3 percent average annual growth during 2013/14 - 2017/18 fiscal years, recorded a slower growth (7.7 percent) in the 2017/18 fiscal year owing to, among others, the growth deceleration in the industrial sector (NBE, 2018). In short, in addition to the fast population growth and the ensuing youth bulge, the inability of the economy to generate sufficient employment opportunities has resulted in the current massive youth unemployment challenge facing Ethiopia. Besides the wealth inequalities and related economic distortions, the slow structural transformation in Ethiopia’s economy, and the fact that past state-led economic growth strategies are reaching their limits, signals that available job opportunities will continue to get scantier by the day unless efforts are made towards alternative innovative solutions.

338 Education Policy Available figures on Ethiopia’s education system suggest that the country has made substantial progresses in terms of expanding access to education for its children and youth. For example, notwithstanding the common disputes on the reliability and accuracy of the data, official reports by Ethiopia’s Ministry of Education indicate that universal enrolment rate has been achieved in the first cycle of primary education (MoE, 2018). There have also been significant expansions in Ethiopia’s higher education system. As a result, Ethiopia which had no more than five universities two decades back currently has over 31 public universities, a couple of private universities and dozens of public and private colleges. At present, Ethiopia’s higher education system hosts a total of around 1.2 million students of which around 300,000 graduates come out to the country’s labour market each year looking for jobs (Feleke, e.t.al, 2019). In contrast to Ethiopia’s laudable achievements in expanding access to education, progress to date in raising the quality of its education system has been limited. In this regard, a study report in the 2018 new Education Roadmap indicates that student learning outcomes at all levels are very low (MOE, 2018).The MOE (2018) report also contends that self-employment and job creation competence of graduates of the Ethiopian education system has been very low and that, as a result, the unemployment rate of educated Ethiopians is rising. Similarly, the2013 unemployment survey by the CSA found that the highest unemployment rate (24.0 percent) was registered for those who attained preparatory education while the lowest such rate was registered for those with non-formal education (1.6 percent) (CSA, 2014).Similarly, in my own 2016 study, around half of the over 2,000 survey participants in Oromia felt that the youth are not getting quality and relevant education for enhancing their employability. In this regard, the New Education Roadmap made recommendations stressing the need to match demand and supply of labour through a well-crafted educational system by decelerating the highly accelerated production of schooled personnel (MoE, 2018). However, while such recommendations could work in the long run, it does very little to deal with the current educated youth unemployment crises as a result of the past blunders in the education system. It is, hence, highly imperative for the government and other stakeholders to work out effective policies and actionable strategies for effectively dealing with the current massive graduate unemployment crisis in the country.

Job Creation Policies and Strategies This section examines design and implementation shortcoming of Ethiopian Youth Development Package (2006) and the National Employment Policy and Strategy (2009) in relation to their effectiveness for job creation and promoting youth employment. To begin with, some of the major themes that run across both the policy and program package documents are tackling youth unemployment challenges, ensuring that youth have access to employable quality education/training and facilitating job creation through small and medium enterprises (SMEs). For example, the youth development package identified youth unemployment as one of the three major problems (along with lack of efficient social services and lack of forums to ensure full participation of the youth) that it set out to address (FDRE, 2006). Similarly, the employment policy and strategy identified the need for employment creation, enhancing growth of labour productivity and improving labour market institutions as its key policy and strategic issues. The later policy document also stated that its objectives had three important dimensions: enhancing social welfare, accelerating economic growth and achieving political stability (FDRE, 2009).

339 First, it should be noted that there are separate agencies and institutions to advance the policy’s and the program package’s stated objectives, like for example, in the areas of industry and enterprise (small and micro-enterprise) development, agriculture, labour and social affairs, education etc. to work on promoting economic growth, employment creation and enhancing growth of labour productivity by ensuring that youth have access to quality education. Besides, matters of youth empowerment in general and promotion of youth employment in particular are known to be issues that cut across many sectors. Nevertheless, both the youth development program package and the job creation policy and strategy fail to indicate specific roles of respective agencies and cross-sector coordination and accountability mechanisms for achieving results through their implementations. In particular, both (the youth development package and the job creation policy and strategy) emphasize job creation through SME development by providing financial, capacity building and related institutional support services for youth groups. The main agencies that the policy and program package identified for this purpose were small and micro-enterprise development agency (recently re-structures as industry and enterprise development), Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) agency and the colleges under it and saving and credit institutions. But then, they both fail to indicate institutional mechanisms of coordination among the stated agencies in organizing, financing and capacity building for job creation through SMEs. Even more, the employment policy and strategy did not have a designated owner of the policy as a responsible body either for its implementation or its follow up (FDRE, 2009). Evidencing implementation challenges arising from the afore-discussed design flaws of the policy and program package, results of my own 2016 study at Oromia State University found that the efforts made so far to help the youth secure employment opportunities through SMEs were largely ineffective for a host of reasons of which poor coordination among those agencies has been the major one. For example, the study found that, on many occasions, when SME agencies organize the unemployed youth, TVET centers, which are supposed to provide trainings on soft skills and behavioral change, are often not ready to provide the necessary training. When these youth SME members were fortunate enough to get a timely training by TVET centers, financial support would not be promptly facilitated by credit and saving financial institutions. Moreover, they were both not followed by flexible and customized guidelines for their implementation. The implementation guidelines that followed the policy and the program package were rather rigid and static with respect to both organizing and financing business startups. Under SME based job creation strategy, for instance, the youth are required to get organized in a predefined manner, to choose between static list of activities to be financed and supported by the government and only those youths who got organized in such SMEs had access to credit services for financing their start-ups. This also made the SMEs highly dependent on the government with the apparent intention of exercising political control over the youth SMEs group members through the politics of provision (Alemu, 2018). In particular, my 2016 study found that the financing aspects of job creation through SMEs are often constrained by a host of factors. For example, most of the study participants reported that the process of getting loan from credit and saving associations was not prompt and adequately responsive to demands of the youth based on their unique socio-economic contexts. On the one hand, saving and credit associations require the youth beneficiaries to have a deposit of 20 percent of the money they could borrow from the institutions. On the other hand, most of the youth found this saving precondition very difficult. Furthermore, even when youth managed to save the 20 percent, thus fulfilling the stated saving precondition, the financing institutions

340 insisted on the repayment of 97 percent of the loans from the previous year before providing new loan to youth customers – no matter whom or which social group might owe the loan. The youth being naturally impatient to put up with such undue bureaucratic delays often opt for less desirable alternatives including risky migrations abroad. Similarly, a 2018 urban unemployment survey report by the CSA found that the great majority of the unemployed youth who would like to establish their own business (54 percent) faced financial constraints. This is despite the fact that the SMEs group-based financing scheme has been up and running for the last several years (CSA, 2018; Wakgari, 2016). Moreover, while the job creation policy and strategy and the youth development package both over-rely on the promotion of SMEs as a job creation strategy, its practical contribution has been almost inconsiderable. For example, according to an annual performance report of Ethiopia’s economy by the country’s national bank, the SMEs job creation strategy created employment opportunities for only 187,945 people throughout the country during the 2017/18 budget year (NBE, 2018). This means that the number of jobs created through the SME schemes throughout the country during the reporting period was less than 0.2 million, while the total number of youth joining the country’s labour force each year is well over 2 million. This is almost negligible given the fact that the government considers SMEs as the major job creation strategy. Besides, as it stands now, there is no comprehensive capacity building and entrepreneurial support program to help the unemployed youth in general and those organized in the form of SMEs in particular with Business Development Services (Alemu, 2018). In this regard, vocational and technical training programs currently being run by TVET colleges in Ethiopia, which were supposed to provide some of these services, are highly limited in the scope, relevance and effectiveness of their services to the youth. In relation to this, past studies (CSA, 2018; Wakgari, 2016) have shown that lack of job related (employable) skills has still been among the major problems that hindered the youth from creating jobs and productively engaging in the economy along with lack of credit (starting capital), work place and land. Likewise, for all job creation strategies including the SME schemes described so far, potential areas of opportunities and resources based on which youth entrepreneurial projects could be initiated have not yet been systematically identified and catalogued. Consequently, the practice so far has been such that district level officials are responsible for identifying existing economic opportunities and develop programs to enable young people to exploit them. On the other hand, while there are evidences, no matter how scanty, indicating that the SMEs focused job creation strategies have produced moderate gains in urban areas, their contribution in rural areas appears to be minimal or rather non-existent. For example, by comparing the views of respondents from rural and urban areas on the benefits of the youth from SME based job creation strategy my 2016 study in Oromia region showed that less than half (49.4 percent) of respondents in rural areas and a moderate majority (58.6 percent) of respondents in urban areas felt that the youth are benefitting from job creation schemes through SMEs and the differences were found to be statistically significant (Wakgari, 2016). Some of the reasons for the ineffectiveness include lack of contextually relevant and effective strategies to promote job creation in rural areas, the nature of jobs available for youth in the rural areas (given the subsistence nature of the country’s agriculture to-date) and a relatively limited understanding of the strategies by the youth in rural communities. Besides, growing land fragmentation and landlessness as the result of rapid population growth and the widespread greedy grab of the best plots of land by private investors often in collusion with corrupt officials have also constrained

341 the involvement of youth in farming and related agricultural activities (Girum & Eden, 2014; Wakgari, 2016). Moreover, in many rural areas, the aspirations of youth do not match the existing local opportunities in their communities. More particularly, educated youth have higher aspirations than the local work opportunities, which are deemed menial and incompatible with their social status and skill levels, and hence choose either to remain without work or to out-migrate. More particularly, the fact that the current youth have spent longer years in school than past generations has made them set their sights higher while available evidence indicates that the more time young people spent in education, the more likely they are to be unemployed (MoE, 2018; Wakgari, 2016). For example, the highest rate of youth unemployment was recorded for the more educated youth in both the 2013 countrywide unemployment survey and the 2018 urban unemployment survey in Ethiopia (CSA, 2014, CSA, 2018). In conclusion, looking at the policies and strategies in place, Ethiopia is does not seem to have been strategically prepared to take advantage of the demographic transition which is unfolding in the country. This underscores the urgent need to address the currently alarming level of youth unemployment by designing and implementing policies and programs that promote youth employment not only for averting the impending socio-economic crisis but also to realize the opportunity provided by the demographic dividend at this historical juncture. Unemployment among Youth Veterans: A New Challenge to Old Policies It is to be noted that the political success that led to the present opening for reform in Ethiopia involved several years of largely peaceful struggle that was spearheaded by youth protest movements across the country. In effect, it is the ultimate sacrifice made by the qeerroo/qarree, together with their counterparts throughout the country over the several years preceding 2018 that finally ushered in the current opportunity for political transformation in Ethiopia. Then again, the protracted struggle has left behind a large number of youth population whose academic and career progress has been disrupted because of the massive imprisonments and the occasional necessities to go underground to escape from tortures and arbitrary arrests that were commonplace at the time. Consequently, the existence of hundreds of thousands of jobless youth because of the direct and indirect victimization during the struggle is unmistakable. With respect to imprisonments, the Ethiopian government’s own recent accounts through the Prime Minister’s 2018 parliamentary report indicated that there are at least 100 thousand such former prisoners who have recently been released through an official amnesty. This is in addition to the pervasive intermittent imprisonments, tortures, physically disabilities and related repressive measure that hindered the academic and career trajectories of a larger number of Ethiopian youth as they went astray in the course of their determined peaceful struggle. Besides the moral question of the need to recompense such patriotic youth citizens, addressing the employment needs of such a large number of veterans and their families is an urgent necessity now viewed even from the perspective of the socio-economic problem it represents. This category of unemployed youth often needs vocational rehabilitation and other kinds of tailor-made employment support services to help them become suitably employed. Nonetheless, whether youth veterans who sustained physical, psychological and career sacrifices have been rehabilitated to a normal track of their former professional or academic life has not yet been attended to at policy and strategic level. Hence, this paper calls on the government to carry out research to find out exactly what kind of life they are leading and to redesign job creation policies and strategies that are inclusive of the special needs of patriotic youth veterans who sacrificed their careers for the noble cause of realizing democracy and justice in Ethiopia.

342 4. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations Conclusions The mixed socio-economic and political consequences of a demographic transition and the ensuing youth bulge are already at the doorsteps in Ethiopia. For example, the largely peaceful struggle that has ushered in the present political opening for reform in Ethiopia has been spearheaded by such a bulging population of the country’s youth thus resulting in a remarkably significant positive gain for the country’s development. This same force, if tapped appropriately also provides the country with the potential for rapid economic growth through a demographic dividend such a large youthful population represents. On the other hand, given the unfavorable policy and institutional contexts in Ethiopia to tap into such a potential and the country’s weak educational system that is poorly attuned to the job market, the increasingly swelling cohorts of young people entering the working age population has resulted in a massive level of youth unemployment thus posing a huge socio-economic and political challenge to the country. Thus, as Ethiopia grapples with the current massive youth unemployment crises, a realistic appraisal of past policies and present practices in the efforts of creating jobs for the youth has never been more urgent. A lack of such policy response has consequences for contemporary political transition. In this regard, the analysis in the foregoing sections of this paper indicated that, overall, Ethiopia does not seem to have been strategically prepared to take advantage of the demographic transition which is unfolding in the country. While the government is fully aware of the massive youth unemployment currently observed in the country, there is no evidence-based public policy discourse and strategic readiness to tap into the demographic dividend as an economic development opportunity for the country. Even more, the current ineffectiveness in job creation strategies in the face of the prevailing massive level of youth unemployment, added to the already volatile political condition accompanying the ongoing transition, can have the potential of fueling another round of protests and social unrests if not attended to with utmost priority. This underscores the urgent need to address the currently alarming level of youth unemployment by designing and implementing effective policies, strategies and programs that promote youth employment in the country rather than relying on reflexive responses and quick fixes. The recommendations in the following section attempt to provide alternative strategic approaches on how to do just that.

Policy Recommendations 1) Addressing the current data and information gaps (on youth unemployment) in Ethiopia by ➢ Undertaking a comprehensive survey of the youth population in terms of their general profiles (gender, age, employment status, educational qualifications, residential areas etc.) and characteristics like values, aspirations, and entrepreneurial and/or career interests. ➢ Re-conceptualizing current measurement approaches in identifying and labeling employment/unemployment status by modifying ILO definitions in a manner that fits with local world views and labour market realities.

2) Promoting modernization of AGRICULTURE through innovation and investment for job creation: ❖ Given that agriculture remains the mainstay of over 80 percent of Ethiopia’s population, an immediate policy shift in agriculture is needed to create employment

343 for the bulk of Ethiopia’s youth in the short term. The basic assumption is that although farming may not be attractive to the educated youths, they could be employed across agricultural value chains like the storage, processing, transportation and marketing of agricultural products.  The following are recommended steps for promoting youth employment through the innovative modernization of agriculture with local-specific strategies that recognize differences in agro-ecologies and resource endowments. i) Resource and opportunity mapping by undertaking a comprehensive assessment to identify available resources and value adding investment opportunities and creating a countrywide, regional and district resources and opportunities database. ii) Undertaking agricultural value chains analysis (that ranges from farm to fork) in the areas of animal production and processing (dairy, poultry, forage, butchery etc.), fruits and vegetables (production, cold-storage, processing and marketing), agro-forestry, aquaculture, etc. iii) Conducting market analysis to identify demands and prospective comparative advantages (with a focus on employment creation potentials) in local, regional and global markets for potential products that can be generated from available resources that were identified through resource and opportunities mapping. iv) Undertaking prefeasibility studies of prototypical business projects based on information generated through resources mapping and market analysis and v) Designing generic youth employment programs by clustering similar entrepreneurial/business projects together. vi) Facilitating self-employment opportunities in agriculture for the youth by: ➢ Redirecting the current focus on youth entrepreneurship promotion through group-based SME programs that yoke them into working together in newly established enterprises without ensuring that the youth involved have the disposition and team-work skills necessary for succeeding in such ventures. ➢ Looking for new and tailored financing models and business organizational principles (like the promotion of cooperative businesses) that are based on related cultural principles instead of the group-based SMEs. ➢ Designing comprehensive capacity building programs that combine technical and entrepreneurship trainings in modern agriculture with life skills trainings in the areas of ICT, financial management, psycho- social skills, etc. by equally focusing on secondary and TVET graduates unlike the past practice of exclusive focus on university graduates.

3) Taking evidence-based measures to ensure that the youth have access to jobs both locally and internationally by: ➢ Conducting systematic labour market assessments to identify available demands for Ethiopia’s youth labour at local, national and global levels; to identify the skills

344 and knowledge demands in the different labour markets; to improve job matching and to design effective training/retraining programs. ➢ Commissioning research to identify the special needs for employment and vocational rehabilitation among youth veterans whose academic and career trajectory has been disrupted during their struggle for the noble cause of realizing democracy and justice in Ethiopia over the past decade(s). ➢ Redesigning job creation policies and strategies in a manner that is inclusive of those special needs of the patriotic youth veterans.

4) Promoting structural transformation of the economy from agriculture to industry by designing long-term policies that facilitate industrial knowledge extension and industrial entrepreneurship initiatives that upscale indigenous cottage industries.

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347 Qeerroo Movement, Gadaa Didactics and Critical Pedagogy: Applications and implications for collective critical action for change Dereje Tadesse Birbirso, PhD College of Social Science and Humanities, Haramaya University [email protected]

Abstract Over the past two years, Ethiopia’s political landscape has changed, mainly due to a new powerful frontier that has emerged, viz. the Qeerroo: youth who are conscious agents of change. The question that remains is not just why or how, but what the implications are for the future policy actions oriented to empowerment of the youths, especially education policy. Constructing together the generation class-grade-age based Gadaa System principles of didactics and the Freirean critical pedagogy as a guiding approach, this paper aimed to understand and explicate the philosophical, historical and social grounds underlying the successful Qeerroo Movement. This approach was further employed to formulate the analytical concept that the educational is also the political and, made an informed guess that Gadaa didactics, which cuts parallel with critical pedagogy were engine of Qeerroo critical consciousness and praxis of freedom. Archives, Qeerroo discourse practices and lived or embedded experience with the Qeerroo Movement were used as data.

348 Introduction Ethiopia’s political landscape has changed over the past two years, due mainly to a powerful frontier that has emerged, viz. the Qeerroo movement. Tom Gardner, reporter of The Guardian newspaper from Ethiopiai, once said that who the Qeerroo are, and how they have helped bring one of Africa’s strongest and most autocratic governments to its knees, is only dimly understood. No sooner had the Qeerroo brought the dictatorial regime in April 2018 to a total collapse than the new and visionary group came to power and began to launch unprecedented democratization reforms in just a few months. The Qeerroo are the young class of Oromo women and men of secondary and tertiary school levels, though the successful and Oromia-wide movement included pupils of junior school and even younger. What they all had in common was conscious awareness about their cause, solidarity, collective actions, and a mutual goal. The Qeerroo, young citizens acting in pursuit of social justice, worked as transformative agents who construct their own collective learning and identity as part of changing their relationship to their social world. In Ethiopian society, there are divergent impressions about the Qeerroo and their movement. One portion of society—potentially the vast majority—praises the Qeerroo victory but considers it to have been a business-as-usual protest. In other words, the majority has little awareness as to what it means, both in terms of its origin and importance for future action. Others denounce the movement as an aberrant ‘juvenile mob unrest’ that at one point legitimately burst against tyranny, but is now gone, never to return. Further, some describe the Qeerroo as adegenya bozene, an Amharic translation of Marx’s lumpenproletariat, meaning the underclass devoid of class consciousness, or the unthinking lower strata of society exploited by reactionary or separatist forces. The question that remains to be clear, and that will be addressed in this paper, is what their movement means socially, educationally, and for the empowerment of future generations of Qeerroo. More specifically, this paper inquires: 1. What exactly is the cultural and historical origin of the Qeerroo? 2. How did they collectively act against the repressive machine of the government, cohering their intra-group (within the Oromo) movement over and across the vast Oromia, winning the hearts and minds of their parents and community elders? 3. Going beyond intra-group, how did they incorporate youths of other Ethiopian nations and nationalities? 4. What socio-educational context is needed for these and future young people to be able to continue delivering their potentials of criticality and agentry as citizens? 5. What is the implication of their successful movement for future actions oriented towards fundamental structural change and empowerment of the Qeerroo in the generations to come?

Methodology Using the age-old Gadaa system’s philosophy of didactics, this paper aims to critically analyze the social, historical, and philosophical emergence of the Qeerroo movement. The Brazilian Paulo Freire’s critical educational philosophy is also adopted to formulate the analytical concept that the educational is also the political. As such, Gadaa didactics, cutting parallel with critical pedagogy, are the engine of Qeerroo critical consciousness and praxis of freedom. This paper involves various methods of engaging in the transformative Qeerroo Movement and collecting data, critically discerning it, and exploring the applications and implications of the movement (Schwandt, 2000, pp. 100-2; Cheetham, et.al. 2018; Lewis and Russell, 2011). These methods include archives,

349 Qeerroo discourse practices and lived experiences (their languages of hope, interactions, intentions, the meaning they attached to their actions, etc.), and the researcher’s own embedded experience with the Qeerroo Movement. Findings will contribute to policymaking for meaningful and sustainable change in the Oromian and Ethiopian contexts, as well as the (Horn of) African context.

Analysis and Discussion This analysis intends to look for perspectival options and discussions rather than a categorical answer to complex and age-old social issues such as Qeerroo and their movement. It shall begin with explicating the Problem History, where the concept Qeerroo is explained etymologically and how their movement was historically situated follows. The Oromo concept of man and history, and the Gadaa system’s educational philosophy, are analyzed because it is believed that these informed and generated the Qeerroo movement. In the next section, Analysis of Options, the Qeerroo Movement is seen as Frerean conscientization process at work. In the second half of the discussion, the concept of Qeerroo is theorized as an invaluable social institution in a society that is suffering a ‘crisis of the future.’ Here, the paper asks what the educational policy and context should be for the Qeerroo Institution to be sustainable. Finally, in the Conclusion and Recommendation section, insights are offered as to how the Qeerroo Movement can be used as a perspective for transforming Oromia’s or Ethiopia’s education policy, and for the democratic construction of Gadaa system.

Problem History

Who are the Qeerroo and how did they rise up? The concept of Qeerroo and its etymology is obscure, not just to foreigners (speakers of Afaan Oromo as foreign or second language), but also to native speakers of Afaan Oromo. It cannot be well understood in isolation from the Oromo Gadaa system, which has guided the Oromo paradigm, including but not limited to natural theology to agriculture, genealogy, politics, arts, ecology, military, health, economics, mathematics, astronomy, and parenting. The plural term Qeerroo literally means ‘bachelors, brides, brides-to-be, leopard-pride.’ It is a variant of qaroo ‘wise, pupil (eye),’ qara’a ‘to wise up, sharpen, read,’ or qora ‘to inquire, examine’ (Tutschek, 1844; Stegman, 2011).ii Nevertheless, the most important is the social or Gadaa system concept of Qeerroo, which is a collective name for all youths of the nation who belong to a common generation-grade-class (i.e., all men and women in the 15-25 age range). In other words, the Qeerroo generation includes pupils, disciples, or practitioners of specific curricula: military science; land security; and exploration of geo-history, or the historical and natural location of themselves and their nation. This begins their biological-social predisposition to grow up wise by critically reading both the words and their worlds. In the human developmental or psychosocial theorists of Piaget, Erikson, and Kohlberg, the Qeerroo generation’s grade-class involves an age of inquiring or, at least, developing an awareness of one’s own socio-cultural identity and role, of the values of tenderness and intimacy, of perceptive skills of logic and aesthetics, and growing loyalty to law and order. During the heyday of the Qeerroo movement, Tom Gardner wrote in another of his reports: “Qeerroo has broader connotations, symbolizing both the Oromo movement, a struggle for more political freedom and for greater ethnic representation in federal structures, and an entire generation of newly assertive Ethiopian youth.”iii

350 Any act that limits human potential is dehumanizing, and Qeerroo suffered dehumanization and estrangement from their essence in the years 1991-2018. Throughout the 27 years, the Ethiopian government maintained a one-size-fit-all and I-know-it-for-you ideology, a determinist ideology that upheld the assumption that all events are fully determined by previously initiated causes. One among these causes, in their views, was economic determinism guided by a ‘Developmental State’ ideology. According to this, because an event would happen (e.g., ‘booming of the economy’) or be blocked (e.g., the mass media), an event was or would be doomed (e.g., public riots, mass demands for their identity of cultural rights) before it would happen. Although this is a bit abstract and philosophical, Mekuria Bulcha has succinctly summarized it in his online article ‘Crimes That Made the Oromo Youth Revolt.’iv He treated the key factors such as the Developmental State economic policy of the TPLF-led government, the forest fires of 2000, the draconian Addis Ababa Master Plan that uprooted hundreds of thousands of Oromos from their native lands, and land-ownership and environmental protection questions, as some of the most conspicuous events in a series of incidents which instigated the Oromo youths protests. Against these ‘social evils,’ the well organized and powerful Qeerroo movement finally broke out in 2013 and succeeded in changing the political landscape of Ethiopia in March to April of 2018. Now, qeerroo is almost an idea, viz., a youth movement in pursuit of social justice and their freedoms, a movement grounded deep in and emerging from the Oromo concept of man and history. To put this differently, qeerroohas now grown to ism, namely qeerroism (qeerrummaa), a doctrine of cognitive and emotional awakening of the youths in pursuit of social justice and their freedom. This doctrine emerged not unreasonably but from age-old concept of man and history which is briefly discussed next.

Oromo concept of man and history The Oromo concepts of man and history are as old as Black African early civilization, are ontologically grounded, and jettison dogmatic and superstitious world views. According to Oromo philosophy of ontology: All living beings are charged with power; all influence each other, each according to its own kind, some being harmful to man, others beneficial…. In any misfortune [or fortune], people do not ask "What is the cause?" but "Who is the cause?" Chance does not exist. Hence the importance of being surrounded by friends…Their encouragement, blessings, and felicitations are not only an expression of their feelings but have a beneficial effect in and of themselves… By blessing each other, people can give something of their own vital strength to their friends. On the other hand, a father’s curse affects his son’s well-being (Bartels, 1969, p. 204; emphasis and square brackets added). Two philosophical points should be underlined here, namely the primacy of Man or the transformative power ascribed to human beings, and the ontology of dialogue. "Who is the cause?" is a conception of the centrality of human praxis or human agency in, not only the production and reproduction of social life, but also transcendence over and harmonization with the world of natural objects. Although the Oromo believe in Waaqa, the Black-Sky Supreme Creator, as a unilateral source of all life, the ultimate causal power that ‘makes something or Creatures to exist,’ the Oromo do not recognize the Western anthropomorphic Supreme Being who existed before the Creature and made something out of nothing. They [Oromo] do not visualize Waaqa existing outside this world in time or space. In this sense Waaqa is as much of this world as the vault of the sky. They have no myths about the creation of the world as we find them e.g., in the bible. When they speak of the beginning

351 of time of the world and even man himself are already in existence (Bartels, 1983, p. 91; emphasis added). The second key philosophical concept pointing to the Oromo worldview in the above quotation is the importance to the Oromo of “being surrounded by friends,” which is directly related to belief in the power of speech acts (i.e., the use of language for making things happen, good or bad, blessing or cursing. The Oromo absolutely believe in the power of ‘wording’, or the ontology of dialogue, and the causal efficacy of words, especially of ancestors and senior citizens. This resonates with Paulo Freire’s concept of man and dialogue, that “Existence is a dynamic concept, implying eternal dialogue between man and man, between man and the world, between man and his Creator. It is this dialogue which makes of man an historical being” (Freire, 2005, p. 14). What is the implication of this worldview for Qeerroism? It is mainly the causal power of words or the ontology of dialogue which automatically feeds into the Qeerroo. In other words, they knew the condition of their life, the misfortune, was neither natural nor God-given, nor was it to be unconditionally accepted as inevitable or unchangeable curse, nor was it linear. The Oromo worldview involves the spiraling cycle of time and history which boils down to the Gadaa paradigm, which is not linear like the Western view of history (Urton, 2017). The critical point for understanding the impact of the Gadaaa model of history and time is that there is an intimate and cyclical causal connection between time and place, and thus, history will continuously move around the spiral of time-space through ever-repeating historical events and with consequences. This means that the collective sons and daughters of a certain age-grade-class (e.g., Qeerroo) should methodologically get committed to achieving the historic, social-educational curricula (e.g., glorious political leadership, victorious military, prosperous life, rainy and fecund environment) of the previous occupants (i.e., their father or grandfather or distant ancestors) by/at a certain age-grade-class (e.g., the Gadaa grade-class of age 40-48). The fathers and grandfathers should sharpen or wise-up their sons for this cause from their early grade-class of Dabballee, age 1-8, up until the Gadaa or political leadership grade-class of age 40-48. This history endlessly repeats, linking an ever-changing man (ontogenesis) and ever-changing society (sociogenesis) with well-known times and places such as an ancient cradleland or an eponymous genius loci man being at one with nature and ancestral spirits. This concept of cross- or inter-generationally cohering and relaying the ever-recycling history, time, space on the one hand; and an ever- changing individual, society and social learning system on the other; is called finna. Kassam summarizes this concept: finna “represents the legacy of the past which each generation inherits from its forefathers [and foremothers] and which it transforms; it is the fertile patrimony held in trust by the present generation which it will enrich and bequeath to future generations . . . [it describes] a developing of the inner potential of society based on the cultural roots it has already laid down” (Kassam, 2007, as cited in Jalata, 2012, p. 140).

Gadaa concept of knowledge and education The Oromo concept of the social process of accumulating and transmitting education is dhugeefannoo which literally means ‘making or abstracting from nature or natural laws the truth for oneself’ (i.e., ontologically social epistemology). As Catholic Father Martial de Salviac observed: The Oromo, the least smothered of Africans, still cultivate the allegory…. by variegation and turgidity, to fictions and oriental stories…We would make a big mistake to imagine the spirit of these Black always dull and down to earth…. The Oromo is naturally an orator and a statesman. He excels in a deliberative style, to which his social morals lend

352 admirably.…He brings into public discussion the grace of elocution, the flexibility of the spirit, the finesse of separatee, the amplitude of ideas, the moderation of voice, the sobriety of gesture, which assures the preservation of his dignity…. He knows how to produce arguments, with results and give them an insinuating style, or an incisive, ironic, indignant upturn. In passionate and irritant questions, he remains the master of his movements, reserving the explosion of his fury for the field of battle…. From childhood, the Oromo witnesses his predilection for the calm and judicious spirit. Brightened up, playful, chatty with his equals, he reserves his confidence for those whom he could, in truth, honor in the name ‘elders’, and darts his satires and his chaff against the frivolity, ineptitude of manner (1901/2005: 282-283).

A recent finding by Disasa (2017) shows us, in the belief system of Borana Oromo, five things are conceptualized in an indivisible chain: the people, people’s labor or work, the culture or education, the truth or epistemology, and Waaqa the Black-Sky God or ontology or natural laws. The adage goes, Dubbiin kan aadaa, aadaan kan Booranaa, Booranni kan dhugaa, dhugaan kan Waaqa: “the discursive practice is ‘the educational or cultural, the educational or cultural is of the Boorans, the Boorans are people of truth or epistemology, the truths or epistemologies are of the Black-Sky God or Natural Laws’” (Disasa 2017, p. 98; translation added). The millennia old Gadaa system’s principle that “without practice there is no democracy” (Legesse 2001, 1973), perfectly fits the Freirean principle that “without practice there’s no knowledge” (Horton & Freire, 1990, p. 98). In the 19th century, de Salviac observed in physical presence for himself and described Oromo practical philosophy of didactics: Speeches in Oromo assemblies and in front of the judges are delivered with much seriousness. The tone, the gesture, the accent, the pause and other oratorical finesses are sufficient among several [Oromo] tribes to strongly nuance the word…astonishing and very original practice not to describe it, in dedicating this digression to our masters in social philosophy…In this oratorical contests of the Oromo, there is always a natural dignity and a decorum that we would like to see in the turbulent champers of Europe, where the wisest have sometimes regretted untimely vivacity (de Salviac, 1901, pp. 220-222). During fora, a practicum, or jila, field experience, learners (including the Qeerroo) have ample time to learn many things related to their culture from aged men and adults accompanying them; are educated by elders about values and customs of the Oromo community; study history, puzzles, stories, tales, poems, songs; argue with each other; and study manners of argument from seniors, whose purposes are to develop creative thinkers.

Disasa (2017) reaffirms that Gadaa principles are guided by culture of speaking (discourse-making and dialoguing) and collaborative learning and learning by practicing or in action, in sharp contrast to rote-learning which, for instance, is widely practiced in Abyssinian monastic circle. According to Gadaa didactics, the qeerroo learn through tutoring with the help of parents, natural theologians and time-reckoners (qaalluu), Gadaa politicians, men of law and order (hayyuu), social ontologists (or men of arga-dhageti), and elderly community members (jaarsa or ateetee—women of law, ethics and aesthetics). They engage in active observations of engagement in meetings, court debates, ritual celebrations and formal programs such as wal argii (induction), nyaachisa (one of the graduation festivals performed at different stages in the Gadaa system with high political discourse and speeches), gumii gaayyoo (the assembly of the senators, statespersons, and senior wisemen and women), etc. Another learning occasion for Qeerroos is yaa’a gadaa, a collaborative

353 program involving elders (above age 70) and young persons (as old as 21 years). They either stay together for months or convene at regular intervals, working together; sharing knowledge, skills, experience among their groups; and practicing and learning how to serve as good leaders of the nation. The premise is that individuals, by progressing through the structured grades/classes and curricula, citizens can develop academic, cultural, political competence (see also Hinew, 2012). Gadaa democracy is founded on the tenet that ‘citizens have an obligation and rights to learning to practice and rights to practicing to learn democracy and governance.’ This resonates with what an influential philosopher emphatically puts: “The more the people become themselves, the better the democracy” but “the less people are asked about what they want, about their expectations, the less democracy we have” (Freire ibid, p. 145).

Analysis of Options Qeerroo movement as a process of conscientization Conscientization is a process of becoming aware of social realities. It is a “cultural action for freedom” or process by which “the subject finds the ability to grasp, in critical terms, the dialectical unity between self and object” (Freire, 1985, p. 160). The lowest level of consciousness, as named by Freire, is semi-intransitive consciousness. This is a level characteristic in which people cannot apprehend problems situated outside their sphere of biological necessity. Their interests “center almost totally around survival, and they lack a sense of life on a more historic plane” (Freire, 2005, p. 13). This lower level of consciousness was true only of the corrupt officials who embezzled or outflew over $30 billion in only 2004-2018.v Naive transitive consciousness was characteristic of the vast majority of Ethiopian people, including the Qeerroo, since the 1990s and until the Qeerroo movement finally broke out in 2013. This is a level characteristic of a greater capacity to engage other people and the world with a historical consciousness. However, it is associated with “populism,” “mass society,” oversimplification of problems, vulnerability to sectarian irrationality, “illogicality,” distorted reason, and “the fanaticized consciousness” engendered by the manipulative politics of populist mass mobilization (Freire, 2005, p. 15). Despite the ethnocentric and divisive ‘federalism’ with no democracy, the relentless propaganda of over a decade of successive 11% GDP growth, and a manifestation of the economic determinist ideology that the government pursued (see FDRE, 2011), the Qeerroo movement proved itself unstoppable. Without suggesting an endism attitude to conscientization, it can be argued here that the Qeerroo had already advanced through the Freirean stages of conscientization and more or less reached the third, highest level of consciousness, viz., critical consciousness. This is a level characterized by a movement toward reflexivity; the substitution of causal principles for magical explanations; refusing to transfer responsibility or rejecting passive positions; the practice of dialogue rather than polemics; formation of social and political solidarity transcending sectarian borders; and openness to information and revision by the attempt to avoid distortion and preconceived notions (Freire, 2005, p. 14). Thanks also to the young intellectual activist Jawar Mohammed, the ‘father of the Qeerroo’ and CEO of the powerful conscientizing media Oromia Media Network (OMN) that played a key role in the Qeerroo movement. The Qeerroo vindicated their movement towards critical consciousness when they came out unarmed while the ‘mouth’ of the guns were pointed at them, shouting slogans expressing that the repressive regime’s interpretation of themes such as federalism, constitution, democracy, development, mass media, flag, and education were not sufficient.

Qeerroo as a social institution amidst the crisis of the future

354 In one of their books, under the sub-section titled ‘Youth and the Crisis of the Future,’ Giroux and Giroux (2004, p. 217) stress: Any discourse about the future has to begin with the issue of youth because more than any other group youth embody the dreams, desires, and commitment of a society’s obligations to the future. This echoes a classical principle of liberal democracy, in which youth both symbolized society’s responsibility to the future and offered a measure of its progress. A social institution consists of a group of people who have come together for a common purpose, and Qeerroo is no exception. The Qeerroo Institution has once again, after more than two centuries of interruption, come out to be a part of the egalitarian, democratic Gadaa System that holistically guides the Oromo worldview and social and political order, as well as governs the behavior and expectations of Oromo youths. This is why and how the Qeerroo worked as transformative agents who constructed their own hariyyaa (age-mates who are engaged in collective learning and collective identity) as part of changing their relationship to their social and political world. The Qeerroo political movement can be seen in four analytical types borrowed from the critical realism philosopher Roy Bhaskar (Bhaskar, 2010, p. 118). Firstly, they exercised life politics, whose ethical counterpart would be a consequentially derived virtue theory (e.g., the Qeerroo conducted a huge movement for land rights and against land-grabbing, for employment opportunity, and for respect for the fundamental and universal human rights). They also demonstrated movement politics motivated by the aspirations of differential collectivities and oriented to the extension of freedoms and rights (e.g., the Qeerroo engaged deeply in demonstrations asking for freedom of expression and rule of law, and movements to protect the forests against arson fire and other environmental movements). At a more advanced level, they exercised representative politics by expressing the needs and interests of different communities whose bottom line is the preservation of existing freedoms and rights (e.g., the Qeerroo staged a massive movement asking the rights of representation in Finfinnee, in the National Defense Army, in the ministerial positions). Further, the Qeerroo showed that they are concerned about participatory-emancipatory politics when they coordinated a series of non-violent acts of resistance with the goal of impacting fundamental structural change. As a result, many policies and practices were successfully dismantled, including the anti-terrorism laws and the proclamations that dismissed the Federalist Constitution and allowed the Central Government to control local governments, the public lands, or the collection of taxes. The Qeerroo also staged non-violent resistance against the government’s violation of international humanitarian laws, advocating for the rights of Oromo prisoners of conscience and the refugees in neighboring countries such as Kenya and Djibouti.

Qeerroo put back together the feelings of togetherness Qeerroo are often called hariyyaa both by themselves and by their parents, because they are group of young people, male and female, having strong cohesion. Bartels (1983) once observed them and wrote about this former Gadaa-grade as follows: The concept of hariyyaa continues to play an important part in the people's everyday life. Between hariyyaa we find no barriers in social intercourse; differences in descent are overlooked and so are rules of precedence and even what in society at large are considered to be good manners…. Being one another's hariyyaa involves a right to mutual help; lasting friendships between hariyyaa are common (p. 324). Qeerroo, the young and conscious group with a sense of togetherness, have a unique collective capability and culture of compromising differences in all areas of social life. They work together

355 in all fields of social labor including agriculture, military, and games. As a result, they have their own unique dances and sing songs that stress on their happiness and togetherness. They also sing wedding sings, songs of of “institutional insults [powerful sarcasm] of their parents,” and “songs they sing in honor of buffalo-killers [and] other songs are ancient songs in honor of warriors.” (Bartels, ibid, p. 325)

Qeerroo as repairers of the shattered intergenerational solidarity Throughout their movements, the Qeerroo acted not only in pursuit of social justice but they also acted as repairers of the shattered intergenerational solidarity among Oromo ancient moieties, sub- moieties, tribes, sub-tribes, clans, and sub-clans. As a consequence of the colonial era Euro- Abyssinian strategy to divide, weaken, and rule (Legesse, 2001), the Oromos suffered disintegration of not only their egalitarian holistic paradigm (i.e., Gadaa System), but also seriously suffered divisions along the lines of the aforementioned genealogical trees, of their religions, and of their regions. Among the language of possibilities introduced by the Qeerroo in their slogans during various peaceful protests and demonstrations were: • Qeerroo—ejeree fi egeree Sabaa!; We Qeerroo are repairers of the shattered ancient edifices and the future of the Nation! • Qeerroo kirrii Sabaa!; Qeerroo—the thread of the Nation! • Gaaffiin Qeerroo gaaffii ummata Oromoo ti; The questions of the Qeerroo are the questions of the Oromo people! • Lammiin lammiif gaachana!; A citizen is the shield of another citizen in danger! The barrage of Qeerroo resistance songs and albums released, especially on social media, abounded with lyrics reciting the names of the ancient moieties, tribes, and clans of the Oromo Nation. One example worth listening to is Haacaaluu Hundeessa’s piece that moved the nation from every angle of Oromia.vi Indeed, any old man or woman grants that Qeerroo are repairers of the shattered intergenerational social labyrinth. This should remind us of the words of Ngugi Wa Thiong’o (1993, p. 76): “The struggle for the survival of our children is the struggle for the survival of our future. The quantity and quality of that survival is the measurement of the development of our society.” The deliberative democracy of the Gadaa System (e.g., gumii gaayyoo, or people’s assembly for reflective actions; Jalata, 2012) “secures for succeeding generations the acquisition of generalized competences for action and sees to it that individual life histories are in harmony with collective forms of life.” When this is shattered and replaced by an ‘external’ paradigm, the social fabric of the society shatters. Consequently, the society experiences social “anomie,” “fragmentation,” “alienation,” “nihilism,” and loss of a coherent sense of community (Habermas, 1981, p. 141). This is what happened to Oromo society, and the Qeerroo are repairing it.

Qeerroo as renewers of inter-ethnic solidarity Nowadays, the Qeerroo are mainly composed of school and university students. In their peaceful but risky protests, they marched across Oromia chanting, “when you shed the blood of an Amhara, you also equally shed the blood of an Oromo!” This critical understanding of peace and solidarity galvanized Qeerroo counterparts in Sidaamaa, Qemant, Agaw, Amhara, Somali and Gurage populations. This was due, among other factors, to the fact that the Qeerroo conscientiously avoided sectarianism of any form in spite of widespread misinformation, disinformation, and incursion of huge loss of lives and limbs themselves. Furthermore, they galvanized the Oromara people’s solidarity. Then, the Oromara movement proliferated beyond Ethiopia, deep into Europe and America through the Ethiopian diaspora, the media and human rights activists. Thus, it can be

356 argued that Qeerroo are similar to Antonio Gramsci’s ‘the subaltern’ who “work ‘alongside’, rather than ‘on behalf of non-professionals,” who “would migrate transgressively across boundaries, audiences and hierarchies and therefore face contradictory demands for accountability, from below as well as above, thereby challenging unexamined claims to professional authority” (Walker, 1996, p. 416).

What should the socioeducational context be for qeerroo institution to be possible? This last question is the crux of the matter of this paper. Let us know this: The degree to which large segments of youth are excluded from the language, rights, and obligations of democracy indicates the degree to which many adults have abandoned the language, practice, and responsibilities of critical citizenship and civic responsibility” (Giroux, 1996, p. 140, as cited in Bahruth & Steiner, 2000, p. 128). The biggest challenge confronting the Oromo Nation at this critical juncture in history is how the education policy, the curricula, and the pedagogy are to be connected to both the social reality and the democratic future the Qeerroo hoped for. During the rule of the Gadaa system, every Oromo person used to pass through eleven series of grades (Hinew, 2012), acquiring the various ontological, epistemological, and methodological knowledge, attitude, and skills, including agriculture, politics, arts, ecology, military, health, economics, mathematics, astronomy, parenting and others. Every person prepared to be a politician in the context of the inseparability of education, power, and politics. However, with the fragmentation and dissipation of the Gadaa system—the realist pedagogy that interconnected the curriculum and social reality and that guided life and living—the learner and the learner’s world was also gone. Since the advent of Euro- Abyssinian education and pedagogy, the history and identity of Oromo, in addition to the social and natural reality, fell apart and disconnected.

Like the Oromo wisemen who frequently and tearfully narrate the old glorious Gadaa rule to the Qeerroo, Carter Woodson explicated in his Miseducation of the Negro the ill-fate of Black Americans long before our era: …the Negro graduate has had little or no training at all. The people whom he has been ordered to serve have been belittled by his teachers [Whites] to the extent that he can hardly find delight in undertaking what his education has led him to think is impossible. Considering his race as blank in achievement, then, he sets out to stimulate their imitation of others. The performance is kept up a while; but, like any other effort at meaningless imitation, it results in failure (Woodson, 2006, p. 6; emphasis added). Woodson adds, not only the students, but also the “educated” people [Negros], however, decry any such thing as race consciousness; and in some respects they are right. They do not like to hear such expressions as “Negro literature,” “Negro poetry,” “African art,” or “thinking black” (Woodson, ibid., p. 7). Woodson believed that education should “allow students to ask difficult epistemological and ontological questions about life, political systems, social and economic inequities, preservation of cultural identity and the very purpose of humankind” (Strong-Leek, 2008, pp. 850-51). Woodson directly speaks to the Oromian or Ethiopian education and the social reality at the time of, and in the times leading up to, the Qeerroo movement. It was not education but domestication, which is “a state of refined estrangement, of the mind’s abdication of its own essential self, of a loss of consciousness of the body, of a “mass production” of the individual, and of conformity in the face of situations considered being irreversible because of destiny” (Freire & Macedo, 1998, p. 82).

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Conclusion This paper has attempted to clearly show that the Qeerroo Movement is better seen in the light of the Gadaa system’s developmental and inter-generational didactics and Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy or critical literacy, both of which bear a resemblance to each other. It has been demonstrated that the Qeerroo Movement is manifestation of the youth’s critical consciousness. It is educationally faultless, socially just, and methodologically informed, with judgmental rationalism of the highest level of non-violent resistance to stand up to oppressive system. This implies the need for the Oromo Nation in particular, and Ethiopia at large, to decolonize and free the educational system and curricula from transplantation of the Eurocentric system into Ethiopian context, as this only subjects the youth to pedagogy of imitation and domestication. For the Oromo, a complete shift in paradigm from Eurocentric education toward integration of the Gadaa system and Freirean critical educational philosophies would make education policy practices relevant to the social reality and challenges posing existential threats to the Oromo nation and Qeerroo. Furthermore, this emerging confluence between the Gadaa and Freirean philosophies of education might offer a new paradigm for de-colonizing education in Ethiopia and perhaps all of Africa. The proposed paradigmatic shift can be readily used in practice as depicted below.

Policy recommendations 1. Caffee Oromia, or the Parliament of Oromia National State, should adopt the Gadaa system’s political structure, whereby not only the Qeerroo category but also other Gadaa classes/grades have elected representations inside Caffee Oromia. 2. The Oromia National State and all the social sectors under it (e.g., education and curricula, school and colleges, agriculture and environment, police and peace, law and justice, economic and health, sport and athletics, culture and arts, women and children, NGOs, private media, and so forth) should institute the Gadaa system’s educational philosophy into their formal and non-formal programs. 3. Oromia Education Bureau, which funds and oversees Oromia’s education policy and school curricula, should adopt Gadaa philosophy and curricula, coalescing with contemporary sciences, from primary through secondary school. It should never allow the Ministry of Education to muddy it with an external, Eurocentric paradigm which fails to accept that Oromos and Africans in general are the subjects of their own civilization. 4. Not only the Qeerroo category, but all 10 Gadaa class-grade categories—from Dabballee (ages one through eight) to Jaarsa (age 80 until death)—should be given unrestricted opportunity to exercise their respective citizenry rights and agency, as was set in the Gadaa philosophy for millennia. 5. Both the Oromian and Ethiopian governments have to listen: “Once we engage in a critical form of listening to the life experiences of subaltern peoples, the decolonization of consciousness becomes a real possibility” (Kincheloe 2008, p. 193).

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Notes i Tom Gardner. 2018. “‘Freedom!’: The mysterious movement that brought Ethiopia to a standstill.” The Guardian, 13 March. Available online at: . ii Related to or usually exchangeable with the term qeerroo as ordinary word as well as the technical Gadaa terminology are Foollee, Gaammee Gudguddaa and Hariyyaa Kuusa; See Legesse 1973 and 2001 for details on these. iii See Tom, ibid. Available online at: iv Advocacy for Oromia, ‘Crimes that Made the Oromo Youth Revolt’. Available at: < https://advocacy4oromia.org/forum/crimes-that-made-the-oromo-youth-revol/> v See ‘Rush for the exits: Why is Ethiopia’s capital flight accelerating?’ Available at: vi “Must Watch - Hachalu Hundessa @ Millennium Hall Finfinnee (Addis Ababa)” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bH61mCEclSw.

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