Courts and Political Parties: the Politics of Constitutional Review in Ecuador
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COURTS AND POLITICAL PARTIES: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN ECUADOR by Agustín Grijalva BS in Law, Universidad Católica, Quito, 1990 M.A. in Political Science, The University of Kansas, 1998 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in Political Science University of Pittsburgh 2010 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Agustin Grijalva It was defended on April 14, 2010 and approved by Barry Ames, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Comparative Politics Robert. S. Barker, Professor of Law Chris. W. Bonneau, Associate Professor Thesis Director: Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Associate Professor ii Copyright © by Agustín Grijalva 2010 iii COURTS AND POLITICAL PARTIES: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUCIONAL REVIEW IN ECUADOR Agustin Grijalva, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2010 The central argument of my dissertation is that political parties and timing influence constitutional judges’ behavior in highly fragmented party systems under specific institutional conditions such as short terms in office, the threat of impeachment, and the possibility of reappointment. Partisan influence on judges’ decisions is selective, and it is dependent on institutional features. The carrots and sticks of appointment, reappointment, and impeachment may be useful tools for legislative coalitions to obtain judges’ deferential behavior when the terms of these judges are short and immediate reappointment is possible. However, politicians do not care about all cases of constitutional adjudication equally. Compared to the total number of constitutional review cases, only few decisions, generally about laws, attract politicians’ attention, are reported by the media as national issues, and mobilize pressure groups. In a fragmented party system, partisan influence is difficult to exercise given higher costs for the coalition to monitor and enforce judges’ deferential behavior. Hence, a natural division emerges between politically important cases and standard cases without political pressure. Whereas some political variables help explain judicial votes on political cases, they have no influence on standard cases without political relevance. As a consequence, a constitutional judge may behave strategically on political cases and vote sincerely on standard cases. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.1 JUDICIAL POLITICS AND THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS APPROACH ......................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 JUDGES AND LEGISLATIVE COALITIONS ............................................. 12 1.3 CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW ....................................................................... 16 1.4 THE ECUADORIAN CASE ............................................................................. 20 1.5 OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................... 23 2.0 CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN ECUADOR ..................................................... 25 2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ..................................................................... 27 2.1.1 Parliamentary Dominance ............................................................................ 28 2.1.2 Creation of the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees (TGC) ................ 29 2.1.3 Transition to democracy ............................................................................... 34 2.2 THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL AS A POLITICAL ACTOR ........ 41 2.2.1 The Constitutional Reform of 1996 .............................................................. 41 2.2.2 The 1998 Constitution, the TC and legislative coalitions ........................... 47 2.3 THE TC AND THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF 2005 ...................................... 57 2.4 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................ 61 3.0 POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL IN ECUADOR .................................................................................................................................. 64 v 3.1 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ........................................................................ 67 3.1.1 Timing ............................................................................................................. 67 3.1.2 Legislative majorities and coalitions ............................................................ 69 3.1.3 Political salience ............................................................................................. 70 3.1.4 Ombudsman: .................................................................................................. 72 3.1.5 Case Facts ....................................................................................................... 74 3.1.6 Ideology........................................................................................................... 75 3.2 DATA BASE AND INFORMATION SOURCES .......................................... 77 3.3 HYPOTHESES AND MEASUREMENT........................................................ 79 3.3.1 Timing ............................................................................................................. 79 3.3.2 Legislative majorities and coalitions ............................................................ 84 3.3.3 Salience ........................................................................................................... 86 3.3.4 Ombudsman ................................................................................................... 88 3.3.5 Case Facts ....................................................................................................... 88 3.3.6 Ideology........................................................................................................... 89 3.4 INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW .... 91 3.4.1 Timing and reappointment ........................................................................... 91 3.4.2 Constitutional review of laws ........................................................................ 96 3.4.3 Interaction of judge’s term and party ......................................................... 97 3.4.4 Role of the Ombudsman................................................................................ 99 3.4.5 Ideology......................................................................................................... 105 3.4.6 Conclusions................................................................................................... 113 4.0 CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW RULINGS .......................................................... 115 vi 4.1 THE VALUE ADDED TAX CASE................................................................ 117 4.1.1 General background .................................................................................... 117 4.1.2 The ruling ..................................................................................................... 120 4.1.3 Legal arguments .......................................................................................... 123 4.2 THE D’HONDT CASE ................................................................................... 126 4.2.1 General background .................................................................................... 126 4.2.2 The ruling ..................................................................................................... 130 4.2.3 Legal arguments .......................................................................................... 132 4.3 THE FIRM DETENTION CASE................................................................... 135 4.3.1 General background .................................................................................... 135 4.3.2 The ruling ..................................................................................................... 136 4.3.3 Legal arguments .......................................................................................... 138 4.4 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................. 144 5.0 CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW .............. 146 5.1 THE DEMISE OF THE TC, 2005-2008 ........................................................ 149 5.2 THE 2008 CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT . 155 5.3 TIME AND STRATEGY ................................................................................ 158 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 163 vii LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Judicial Terms and Judicial Independence in Latin America ......................................... 11 Table 2-1: The Ecuadorian Constitutional Tribunal, Appointment and Terms ............................ 31 Table 2-2: Ecuadorian Presidents and Congressional Support (1979-2005) ................................ 38 Table 2-3: The TC and Types of Constitutional Adjudication ..................................................... 46 Table 2-4: Legislative coalitions and the Ecuadorian Constitutional Tribunal 1997 – 2007 ...... 51 Table 3-1: Variable Description for a Model of Constitutional Review ...................................... 90 Table 3-2: TC Judges’ Votes and Institutional Conditions ........................................................... 92 Table 3-3: Predicted Probabilities of a Vote to Strike Down a Law .......................................... 100 Table 3-4: Predicted