Courts and Political Parties: the Politics of Constitutional Review in Ecuador
COURTS AND POLITICAL PARTIES: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN ECUADOR by Agustín Grijalva BS in Law, Universidad Católica, Quito, 1990 M.A. in Political Science, The University of Kansas, 1998 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in Political Science University of Pittsburgh 2010 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Agustin Grijalva It was defended on April 14, 2010 and approved by Barry Ames, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Comparative Politics Robert. S. Barker, Professor of Law Chris. W. Bonneau, Associate Professor Thesis Director: Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Associate Professor ii Copyright © by Agustín Grijalva 2010 iii COURTS AND POLITICAL PARTIES: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUCIONAL REVIEW IN ECUADOR Agustin Grijalva, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2010 The central argument of my dissertation is that political parties and timing influence constitutional judges’ behavior in highly fragmented party systems under specific institutional conditions such as short terms in office, the threat of impeachment, and the possibility of reappointment. Partisan influence on judges’ decisions is selective, and it is dependent on institutional features. The carrots and sticks of appointment, reappointment, and impeachment may be useful tools for legislative coalitions to obtain judges’ deferential behavior when the terms of these judges are short and immediate reappointment is possible. However, politicians do not care about all cases of constitutional adjudication equally. Compared to the total number of constitutional review cases, only few decisions, generally about laws, attract politicians’ attention, are reported by the media as national issues, and mobilize pressure groups.
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