Metafísica Y Persona18 15FEB18.Indd
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Metafísica y Persona Filosofía, conocimiento y vida Metafísica y Persona, Año 9, No. 18, Julio-Diciembre 2017, es una publicación se- mestral, coeditada por la Universidad de Málaga y la Universidad Popular Au- tónoma del Estado de Puebla A.C., a través de la Academia de Filosofía, por la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades y el Departamento de Investigación. Ca- lle 21 Sur No. 1103, Col. Santiago, Puebla-Puebla, C.P. 72410, tel. (222) 229.94.00, www.upaep.mx, [email protected], [email protected]. Editor res- ponsable: Roberto Casales García. Reservas de Derecho al Uso Exclusivo 04-2014- 061317185400-102, ISSN: 2007-9699 ambos otorgados por el Instituto Nacional del Derecho de Autor. Licitud de Título y contenido No. (en trámite), otorgados por la Comisión Calificadora de Publicaciones y Revistas Ilustradas de la Secretaría de Gobernación. Impresa por Édere, S.A. de C.V., Sonora 206, Col. Hipódromo, C.P. 06100, México, D.F., este número se terminó de imprimir en octubre de 2017, con un tiraje de 250 ejemplares. Metafísica y Persona está presente en los siguientes índices: Latindex, ISOC, E- Revistas, SERIUNAM, The Philosopher’s Index, ERIH PLUS. Las opiniones expresadas por los autores no necesariamente reflejan la postura de los editores de la publicación. Queda estrictamente prohibida la reproducción total o parcial de los contenidos e imágenes de la publicación sin previa autorización de los editores. ISSN: 2007-9699 Metafísica y Persona Filosofía, conocimiento y vida Año 9 — Número 18 Julio-Diciembre 2017 Contenido Artículos Eros, Filía y Filautía en Aristóteles. Relaciones y diferencias en la afectividad de la persona Rómulo Ramírez Daza y García ..................................11 In Medias Res: A Resolution of Some False Dichotomies in Origins of Life Research Donald Frohlich Richard Austin Choate ..........................................35 Agentes humanos, ficciones y homúnculos: En defensa de un enfoque no homuncular de la agencia María Ayelén Sánchez . 61 La necesidad de lo inútil. El arte como reivindicador antropológico Raquel Cascales................................................81 The Truth about Poverty and Wealth: reflections on the centrality of the natural family in economics and politics Rafael Alvira Domínguez Rafael Hurtado Domínguez ....................................101 El valor del cuestionamiento crítico de la comunidad de investigación en la organización de la educación Paniel Reyes Cárdenas . .115 Phenomenology vs Scientistic Approach to Life. On some Aspects of the Euro- pean Cultural Crisis in 19th and 20th Century Elena Pagni...................................................125 Tiempo diacrónico y la epifanía de la alteridad: un análisis del tiempo y la relación con el Otro a partir del pensamiento de Emmanuel Levinas María Elizabeth Aquino Rápalo .................................143 Pascal y Kierkegaard. La lógica del corazón y la fe como pasión ...........157 Catalina Elena Dobre “Amapolita morada”. Identidad mexicana silvestre y melancólica Noé Blancas Blancas ...........................................177 Phenomenology vs Scientistic Approach to Life. On Some Aspects of the European Cultural Crisis in 19th and 20th Century1 Fenomenología contra el enfoque cientista a la vida. Sobre algunos aspectos de la crisis cultural europea en los s. XIX y XX Elena Pagni University of São Paulo, São Paulo [email protected] Abstract In this paper it is shown how the efforts of Phenomenology can help to overcome the problems that the scientistic approach to life unleashed in Western culture. I approach the evolving Western philosophical tradition as a response that re-integrates the unity of human flourishing in its right dimension. Keywords: Phenomenology, scientism, humanism, Western Cultural Crisis. Resumen En este escrito se muestra cómo los esfuerzos de la fenomenología pueden auxiliar a superar los problemas del enfoque cientista a la vida desatado en la cultura occidental. En dicho escrito muestro la tradición filosófica occidental como una respuesta que reintegra la unidad del florecimiento humano en su dimensión justa. Palabras clave: Fenomenología, cientismo, humanismo, crisis cultural en occidente. 1 Text of the presentation made at the IV Congreso IberoAmericano de Personalismo, “Perso- nalismo, justicia y ciudadanía”, Puebla, México, 28-30 de agosto de 2017. Grant # 2016/04236-7 São Paulo Research Foundation (fapesp) Recepción del original: 25/08/17 Aceptación definitiva: 29/11/17 125 Metafísica y persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida Año 9 — Julio-Diciembre 2017 — Número 18 Introduction In Western philosophy, after the defenestration of traditional metaphys- ics took place in the 18th century, mostly due to its inability to legitimate itself as a positivist thought, the new science has aimed to establish an objec- tive world, ruling over it without subjective, qualitative and anthropological considerations. Although not belonging to the phenomenological tradition, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) is a forerunner of philosophical Existentialism as a radical reflection on human beings and life. Moreover, ahead of the 20th centu- ry phenomenology, Schopenhauer’s thought contrasts with an epistemological paradigm implicated in naive realism as much as in the theoretical attitude of science, which considers the world and its phenomena (including corporeality) fully accessible and understandable through the principle of material causal- ity. However, as Schopenhauer demonstrated, such a reductionist argument scarcely contributes to bridge the gap between the natural sciences and the humanities, nature and nurture, mechanism and meaning, in such a way that epistemology and ethics end up highlight two separate paths of humanity. According to Schopenhauer, looking at life from a philosophical point of view means to be at the service of life itself, that is, to reveal to human beings their own mental automatisms, making them aware of false prejudices and beliefs about their representations of the world. Like any other living being, Schopenhauer claims, humans are governed and dragged by the irrational, dis- ruptive and senseless force of the will manifested in all nature, whose only pur- pose is to perpetuate and safeguard the survival of the species. Therefore, the birth and death of the individuals are mandatory and the process of individua- tion fits within a much wider horizon, which is that of safeguarding the species.2 Death leads to the end of the unique temporal phenomenon of the will (as embodied in the organismal life), but not to the will itself that is a blind force (“Fighting and continuous tearing without any end”3), relentless, out of time, irrational and only tending to its own realization as a “will to live”.4 As much ill-fated the destiny of humanity may be considered, it is, nevertheless, shared by all other species. 2 Schopenhauer, A., The World as Will and Representation, New York: Dover Publication, Inc. 1969 [1st ed., 1818]. 3 Preti, G., Filosofia, Enciclopedia Feltrinelli Fischer, Milano: Feltrinelli Editore, 1966, p. 365 (it: “Lotta e lacerazione continua senza alcun fine”. Original title: “Philosophie”, Fischer Bücherei KG, Frankfurt am Main und Hambürg, 1958). 4 Piana, G., “Commenti a Schopenhauer II e III”, 1990. Recuperado de http://www.filosofia.unimi. it/piana/index.php/commenti-a-schopenhauer. 126 Phenomenology vs Scientistic Approach to Life. On Some Aspects of the European Cultural Crisis in 19th and 20th Century Certainly, this is a very provocative message, of very difficult reception, especially in the European cultural context of those years, characterized not only by the hegemony of rationalism, which persuades to an unconditional trust in the human reason and in science’s methods and techniques for na- ture’s domination, but also by a romantic vision of humans being at the top of the layers of nature itself.5 The “Automatism by with which the intellect works” (it. “L’automatismo con cui opera l`intelletto”) –as Piana argues6 with regards to Schopenhauer– obligates us to a kind of knowledge that is based on the principle of cause, which identifies knowing “in grasping causal connections/links” (it. “nell’afferramento di nessi cau- sali” Piana 1990).7 However, while remaining bound to such a mechanism, one cannot grasp the intimate essence of the world precisely because the logical/ causal chain of events is more in line with the daily cares of our intellect, with its functioning, than with the real being of the world. So, what can philosophy do within this scenario, which, on the one hand makes humans prisoners of their own mental and causal representations –in the sense that human beings cannot go beyond their state of nature: the only way they have to think about the objects of the world and their relations is by rep- resentation and the causal relation– and on the other hand it makes humans an instrument of the manifestation of the irrational will of nature, endowing them with a body expressing needs and wishes pursuing the struggle for survival? As it follows from “The World as Will and Representation” (1st ed., 1818), phi- losophy does not represent a pillar to leap over the phenomena themselves, like a sort of trick to go beyond the cognitive limits of human beings. Hu- mans are doomed to pain and suffering instigated by the will to live. There is no way to escape from this. However, philosophy has the task of revealing to mankind the harsh reality and its existential condition, making humans aware of their destiny and of their place in the world. Although in a different form and with other results, 20th century phe- nomenology draws attention to some of the concerns that Schopenhauer an- ticipated in his book “The World as Will and Representation” about a century before. Particularly, phenomenology’s reflection on the crisis of the positive thought is a crucial step to shed new light on the conflicts arising from the split between knowledge and lifeworld, science, culture and nurture, tech- nique and meaning. The preliminary project of Edmund Husserl (1859- 1938)’s phenomenology is to build a methodology upon which grounding 5 Piana, G., “Commenti a Schopenhauer II e III”. 6 Piana, G., “Commenti a Schopenhauer II e III”, p.