N9-317-023 AUGUST 24, 2016

WILLIA M C . K I R B Y

JOYCELYN W. EBY Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

We stand at a crossroads. At stake is not our existence, per se, but the idea that society as a whole benefits when access to a world-class education is based on merit, not privilege or financial circumstances; that the private sector must not be allowed to become the sole repository of excellence; that research conducted in the public’s interest is distinct from inquiry driven by the pursuit of profit; and that the deep commitment to making the world a better place that animates our campus is no accident.

— Nicholas Dirks, Chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley1

University of California, Berkeley (Berkeley) Chancellor Nicholas Dirks strode across the land that he hoped would soon become the Berkeley Global Campus. Located in Richmond, California, with a panoramic view of the San Francisco bay, the land had long been set aside for collaboration with the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.a In 2013, however, federal budget cuts and shifting plans delayed the intended expansion of the Lab, and Dirks had seized the opportunity and location to establish a new model for partnership between American and international universities, one among a series of initiatives launched under Dirks’s leadership.2

Dirks came to Berkeley with a distinguished record of scholarship and academic leadership, having served as executive vice president for the arts and sciences and dean of the faculty at Columbia University. He began his chancellorship in 2013 when, after the calamitous global financial crisis of 2008, Berkeley was beginning to find firm enough footing to dedicate serious time and energy to thinking about its strategy for the future. The financial picture remained challenging, but Berkeley had endured. Dirks recalled, “There was a sense that the place had survived and now everybody could get back to work. There was such a collective sigh of relief that people were just willing to say come in and tell us what you think about the future…. I walked into a space that was enormously open.”

a The Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory was an official lab of the United States Department of Energy, managed by the University of California located close to the Berkeley campus. This entity should not be confused with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which was also a federal research facility managed and operated in part by the University of California.

Professor William C. Kirby and Research Associate Joycelyn W. Eby prepared this case. It was reviewed and approved before publication by a company designate. Funding for the development of this case was provided by Harvard Business School and not by the company. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management.

Copyright © 2016 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to www.hbsp.harvard.edu. This publication may not be digitized, photocopied, or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School. 317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

Given this freedom to set an agenda, Dirks chose to focus on three strategic priorities: the undergraduate experience, interdisciplinary initiatives, and global partnerships. A team of administrators reviewed ways to enhance undergraduate life, not just in the classroom but also through stronger residential programs and campus activities. Interdisciplinary initiatives such as a data science initiative and the Social Science Matrix—an institute for cross-disciplinary social science research—promoted cooperation across departments and worked against departmental isolation. Global partnerships, as exemplified by the Global Campus, would strengthen Berkeley's cooperation with institutions around the world.

A better (if not yet stable) financial situation and clear strategic priorities notwithstanding, Dirks and Berkeley faced significant challenges. Like many institutions, Berkeley’s greatest strengths in one context could prove its most problematic weaknesses in another.

The very foundation of Berkeley's identity was its role as a public university dedicated to access for the citizens of California. Clark Kerr's 1960 Master Plan for Higher Education in California had laid out a division of labor that had for many years coordinated the efforts of the University of California (UC) and California State University campuses, along with many California Community Colleges. Berkeley's identity as a public institution and an engine of upward social mobility remained deeply engrained in the ethos of its faculty and students and for many years had driven and inspired their work.

However, California’s rapid growth and diversification had created a state that looked very different than it had under the Master Plan. The state, its citizens, and the Berkeley community struggled to balance the Berkeley ideal of equitable access and the pursuit of excellence in the context of dramatic demographic shifts and ethnic diversity. More important, unlike the era when the Master Plan was adopted, the state had massively disinvested in public higher education. Berkeley, the state's flagship institution, received only 13% of its budget from the state. Frequent student protests on campus and pronouncements from the Regents fought against tuition hikes, limiting the Berkeley administration’s tools to address diminishing state funding. Beyond funding, recent remarks by Governor Jerry Brown, disparaging Berkeley because “ordinary, normal students” were “getting frozen out,” pointed toward a diminished state commitment to Berkeley as an exceptional institution.3 And yet, professors and students largely still operated under an assumption of entitlement to public funding, even in the face of years of such support declining. The public mission that had made Berkeley so great during the good times of state support constrained its responses to, or even its acknowledgement of, reality during bad times.

The passion and dedication of the faculty to the governance of Berkeley was another long- standing institutional strength. But in the new context in which financial constraints increasingly necessitated tough decisions about resource allocation, faculty participation in governance often impeded administrative efforts to move forward. By his third year in office, Dirks found himself caught in an increasingly small space between an unsupportive governor, an active UC system president, and an engaged (and sometimes enraged) faculty.

On February 10, 2016, Dirks launched a strategic planning initiative to address Berkeley’s “new normal” of limited state funding and to finally confront what had become a permanent structural deficit. The mandate of the initiative was broad—ranging from evaluating human resource policies, redesigning research funding processes, and expanding fundraising capacity to re-examining the university’s athletic programs. Dirks noted that "some of the changes we will undergo will be painful," but he concluded that these changes would in no way be “an abandonment of our commitment to a public mission." Rather, he described Berkeley's "new normal" as "a fundamental defense of the concept of the public university, a concept that we must reinvent in order to preserve."4

2 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

With such a broad vision, where should the strategic planning effort begin? What should it prioritize? How would faculty and students react to an inevitable reordering of the university’s finances and priorities? Could this effort address the fundamental challenge of what it meant to be a privately funded, public university?

The History of Berkeley, from Gold Rush to Gold Standard

It is not the University of Berlin nor of New Haven which we are to copy...but it is the University of this State. It must be adapted to this people, to their public and private schools, to their peculiar geographical position, to the requirements of their new society and their undeveloped resources.

— Daniel Coit Gilman, President of the University of California, 18725

Yale Blue and California Gold: the Melding of Private College and Land-Grant Institution

The stories of UC generally and the Berkeley campus specifically both began with the story of the College of California—a small, academic outpost in the newly-formed state of California. In fact, even before officially achieving statehood, residents of California began to discuss plans for a university. Initially, citizens' demand for higher education was filled through private institutions like the College of California, founded by Yale alumni and incorporated in 1855.

Seven years later, in 1862, the United States federal government passed the Morrill Act, which incentivized state governments to develop public higher education institutions by offering public lands to states who would use them to found (or fund) the establishment of colleges for agriculture and mechanics. A wave of new institutions—the so-called "Land Grant Universities"—were established in states across the country under the auspices of this act. Californians were eager to take advantage of the federal program and to build the public university they had long desired. However, recognizing the value of the foundation—both literal and figurative—built by the College of California, it was decided that, on the condition that the new institution would include a College of Letters and Science in addition to agriculture and mechanics, the land grant institution could be built on the campus of the College of California. On March 23, 1868, this new Science and Letters-Land Grant hybrid was christened the University of California.

Since 1868, the UC has been led by a President, under the direction of a Board of Regents, a leadership structure codified in the California State Constitution, ratified on May 17, 1879. The Board of Regents was composed of 26 members (increased from the original 22 set out in the 1868 charter in 1969), including 18 members appointed to 12-year terms by the Governor of California (reduced from 16-year terms in 1976), one student representative, and seven ex officio members including the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the Assembly, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the President and Vice President of the Alumni Associations of the University of California, and the President of the University.6 From its early years, the Board of Regents helped establish the inclusive and diverse nature of UC, allowing women to attend beginning in 1870, and welcoming international students in the same period as well.

For the first decade of its existence, UC struggled to forge an identity acceptable to both the Letters and Science-oriented Yale descendants and the Morrill Act-inspired Agriculture and Mechanics faction.7 At this key moment, UC was led by one of several particularly influential presidents: Daniel Coit Gilman. Gilman served as UC president only for three years (1872-1875), during which he was often frustrated by political and financial difficulties and after which he left to become the founding president of Johns Hopkins University.8 Still, during his short tenure, he

3 317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

managed to overcome the disagreements about the nature of UC and moved it toward its future as a comprehensive academic institution.

As a young institution, UC struggled also to define its relationship with the state government. When California held its second constitutional convention in 1878, one important item of discussion was the relationship of the university to the government. Thanks in part to the disenchantment of the delegates with the state legislature and in part because of the impassioned defense of institutional autonomy for universities by delegate Joseph Winans, the 1878 California constitution established the university as an autonomous institution that was "entirely independent of all political or sectarian influence, and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its regents and in the administration of its affairs."9 UC’s institutional independence was so complete that it was sometimes referred to as the fourth branch of the California state government.

With firmly established institutional autonomy, UC began to flourish under the leadership of President Benjamin Ide Wheeler, who served the university from 1899 to 1919. Wheeler's tenure established the UC president as a strong, central leader, as he gradually convinced the Regents to cede decision-making rights on certain issues to the Office of the President. By the end of Wheeler’s tenure, the UC president was in charge of faculty hiring decisions as well as budgeting. This amount of power lay in stark contrast to the powers of Wheeler’s immediate predecessor Martin Kellogg, whose major victory in expanding presidential power had been gaining the right to hire, fire, and regulate janitors.10

Wheeler had studied at several of the top higher education institutions in Germany and received a Ph.D. from the University of Heidelberg. Like so many of his contemporaries, he had been heavily influenced and inspired by the German model of a comprehensive research university. It was under Wheeler's tenure that UC began to develop comprehensive academic disciplines as well as a stronger orientation toward research. When Edwin Slosson observed the university for his 1910 volume Great American Universities, he found that the conflict between the College of California academic orientation and the Morrill Act practical orientation had largely been resolved, noting, “I know of no other university which cultivates both mechanics and metaphysics with such equal success, or which looks so far into space, and, at the same time, comes so close to the lives of the people…”11 Slosson also lauded UC for its student body comprised of learners from a wide variety of both socio- economic and ethnic backgrounds.

Wheeler’s tenure saw UC grow in many respects, but was not without critics. Wheeler exercised so much power as president that when he retired, the Academic Senate carried out Berkeley’s first faculty revolt, demanding that more power over academic and faculty affairs be placed in the hands of the faculty themselves, through the Academic Senate. This concerted effort during a power vacuum after Wheeler’s retirement resulted in the strengthening of the powers of the UC Academic Senate to such an extent that, even in 2016, the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate was still among the most influential governing bodies of any American university. The legacy of faculty involvement in and responsibility for academic decision-making became a lasting hallmark of the UC system and a central, distinguishing feature of Berkeley’s governance.

From UC to the UC System and the Birth of the Master Plan

Berkeley Rises in Size and Quality Just as the post-Wheeler “faculty revolution” was taking place, other major changes occurred as the University of California expanded from a single campus in Berkeley to a multi-campus system spanning the state. With the discovery of oil in the southern part of the state at the turn of the 20th century, the population, wealth, and influence of

4 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

Southern California began to grow; there was a push by influential Regents from Southern California to upgrade local institutions to become part of UC. In 1919, the southern branch of UC (later, UCLA) was formally established in Los Angeles, based on the foundation of the Los Angeles Normal School. With the addition of a new campus, the UC governance structure remained largely unchanged. It was still led by the Board of Regents and a President, whose office remained housed on the UC Berkeley campus. The President remained the administrator in control of both institutions.

Throughout the early 20th century, Berkeley continued to grow, even as resources of the state were distributed across a broader and broader range of state higher education institutions (See Exhibit 1 for a timeline of the establishment of select higher education institutions in California). The student population of UC grew from 2,600 in 1899 to over 12,000 in 1919.12 With 14,061 students in 1923, the University of California (all campuses) was the largest university in the United States, and the world.13 This rapid expansion in institutional size did not dilute the quality of Berkeley as an institution; rather, its reputation rose as it grew in size. From the first appearance of national ratings and rankings of U.S. universities in 1906 to the global university rankings of 2015, Berkeley was consistently at the top of league tables (See Exhibit 2 for a chart of Berkeley's early and recent rankings).b

Institutional Transformation and Clark Kerr By the end of World War II, Berkeley and its sister UC campuses were well-established and well–regarded. Still, the post-war boom—both in the population of the state of California and in the number of students seeking admission to UC institutions—made it clear that California needed a higher education system that was both larger and better-organized. Fortunately for California, UC had just the man for such a monumental logistical and intellectual challenge. Clark Kerr had received his doctorate from and spent much of his subsequent career at Berkeley. In 1952, when the Board of Regents recognized that it was increasingly untenable for all UC campuses to be managed by a single central administrator, they established chancellorships at Berkeley and UCLA to share in the administrative burden. Kerr became the inaugural Chancellor of Berkeley. His key duties, as he later outlined them in his memoir, The Gold and the Blue, began with defining his newly-created role in the context of a UC President who was reluctant to relinquish control. Kerr, along with Raymond B. Allen, his fellow inaugural Chancellor at UCLA, slowly re-centered administration and decision-making at the campus, rather than university, level.

Kerr’s experience as Chancellor confirmed his understanding of the need for administrative flexibility and authority at local campuses; and it informed his subsequent role as President of UC from 1958 to 1967. As one of his first initiatives as President, he moved to make the campuses more independent against the influence of the center and the professoriate more independent from the campus administration by initiating UC’s first “continuous tenure” system, which was adopted by the Regents in December 1958.14c Kerr’s presidency also began a trend of placing increasing levels of decision-making power in the hands of the Chancellors and campuses, rather in the center. He later

b For more about the development of university rankings in the United States and the world, see William C. Kirby and Joycelyn W. Eby, “'World-Class' Universities: Rankings and Reputation in Global Higher Education” HBS No. 316-065 (Boston: Harvard Business Publishing, 2015). c Previously, professors at Berkeley were employed through annual contracts. During the loyalty oath controversy of the McCarthy era, discussed in more detail below, this meant that long-time professors could be removed by the simple non- renewal of their annual contracts. Under the “continuous tenure” policy, professors were given lifetime tenure, and, as Kerr noted, could be dismissed “only for ‘good cause’ after a hearing by the appropriate committee of the Academic Senate.” Kerr further commented, “It never occurred to me at the time that I would be the first beneficiary of continuous tenure. After I was fired as president, and over the objections of Governor Reagan, the regents returned me to my professorship on the grounds that I had continuous tenure.” (Academic Triumphs, p. 140).

5 317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

noted that the gradual decentralization of power to each of the campuses was one of the great successes of the system, because it allowed campuses to compete with one another and thus all achieve a higher standard, rather than elevating one or two campuses to an elite status and leaving the rest to founder.

Of Kerr’s many contributions to Berkeley and higher education in California, the most well- known was his leading role in the development of the 1960 Master Plan for Higher Education in California, which established distinct roles for the three types of public higher education institutions in California: the UC system, the California State University (then State College) system, and the California Community College (then Junior College) system. Under the Master Plan, any qualified student, defined as any student who graduated from a California high school, would have access to higher education. The top one-eighth of high school graduates would be given admission to a UC campus, while the top one-third would be guaranteed admission into the state university system, while the remaining graduates would have places in community colleges. The UC and state universities would reserve a significant number of spots in their junior classes for transfer students from the community colleges. UC institutions would be the sole providers of doctoral education. The state government and the administrators of the relevant institutions all united behind this plan, which for many years served the state of California as a powerful engine for social mobility even as the state itself went through significant demographic shifts, with an increasing proportion of the state’s growing population comprised of minorities (particularly Asian and Latino) and income inequality widening.15

Politics on Campus In the latter half of the 20th century, more than any other university in the United States, Berkeley became synonymous with political activism and unrest. While Berkeley’s best-known political struggle was the student-led Free Speech Movement, which began in 1964, political unrest stirred the campus as early as 1949, when the anti-Communist sentiment that had been building on university campuses and in government halls across the country led UC President Robert Sproul and the Board of Regents to require faculty to sign a loyalty oath. Faculty response to this requirement was swift and extreme, and became, in Kerr’s words, “the greatest single confrontation between a university faculty and its board of trustees in American history."16 Of the 69 politically-motivated faculty dismissals at U.S. universities during the McCarthy era, 31 occurred at UC.17 The conflict resulted in an extended period of tense relations and mistrust between the university faculty and administration.d This controversy was followed by the Free Speech Movement and much politicization on campus, which increasingly pitted students against university and state administration. In 1966, Ronald Reagan ran for Governor of California on a platform of quelling the “student revolt at Berkeley.”18 His ultimate election resulted in a state government at odds with Kerr’s leadership, and in 1967, Kerr was fired from the UC presidency. As Kerr famously noted, "The fact was that I had left the presidency of the university as I had entered it: ‘fired with enthusiasm’; my own on the way in, that of certain others on my way out."19

Berkeley, Post-Kerr Following the ouster of Kerr, Berkeley and the higher education system of California more generally continued to follow the trajectory of growth that Kerr had established in the Master Plan (See Exhibit 3 for the growth in enrollment of the UC system and Berkeley from 1880-1995). This growth continued even though uneven levels of financial and political support from California’s governors regularly engendered fear of state disinvestment in the university (see Exhibit 4 for a chart showing state support for UC under each administration from 1951-1997). Despite these

d For a first-hand, detailed description of this controversy and the Free Speech Movement, see Clark Kerr, The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949-1967, Volume II: Political Turmoil, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

6 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

challenges, and despite the growing number of UC campuses that further divided state funding and reduced Berkeley’s special place in the UC system, Berkeley remained an elite university.e The biggest logistical, financial, and existential challenge, however, was yet to come.

Struggle for Survival

By 2008, Berkeley had been through many financial ups and downs, but none of these experiences compared to the 2008 financial crisis. The implosion of U.S. financial markets not only wreaked havoc on Berkeley's endowment, which dropped over 20% from $2.9 billion in 2007 to $2.3 billion in 2009f, and pension investments, it also had an even greater, deleterious impact on the state of California's budget.20 Given recent trends in California legislation that had seen increased amounts of dedicated funding for specific purposes, the UC budget was one of the few areas in which government funds were not pre-committed. Facing a state budget crisis, the legislature passed cuts on to the universities; in 2008, the UC system had to decrease its budget by $813 million (20%).21

While universities across the country confronted significantly reduced endowments and investment returns, few faced as severe a burden of funding loss as the UC campuses, which were hit both by the crash of their own investments and by the sudden elimination of much state funding. Berkeley found itself doing everything from cutting library hours and implementing faculty and staff furloughs to reducing new faculty positions by 90% in order to align expenses with a greatly diminished budget.22 University departments around the country began to circle the Berkeley faculty, believing the time had finally come to poach academic stars from the institution.

Robert Birgeneau, Berkeley’s Chancellor from 2004 to 2013, had to decide how to manage a world- class institution facing crisis on almost every front. Birgeneau made an important decision. Former Executive Vice Chancellor and Provost George Breslauer recalled:

[Birgeneau’s] attitude was not ‘We’re going into retrenchment mode,’ and playing defense. He said he’s never played defense in his life, and he didn’t intend to come here and play defense….Birgeneau was constantly saying, ‘Go for it. Nobody’s going to respect you if all you do is say we survived the worst crash since the Depression. No. We’ve got to come out of this with glory.’

Birgeneau and Breslauer approached their decimated budget with an emphasis on strategy. Even before the onset of the crisis, Birgeneau had taken groundbreaking steps toward the professionalization of financial management on the campus by hiring Nathan Brostrom, former JP Morgan Managing Director, as Vice Chancellor for Administration. Brostrom’s hiring in 2006 had initiated a trend toward professional financial administration.

Birgeneau also strengthened the financial holdings of the center of the university by directing funds received to endow a chair partially back to the center of the university. Birgeneau made it so that 50% of the yield from chair endowments would return to the university budget in support of the chair faculty member's salary. 25% would go back to the chair holder as a scholarly stipend (capped at $25,000 annually), and the remaining 25% of the returns would support graduate students in the field of the chair. (This was a big symbolic step for Berkeley, where chairs had been chronically

e By 2016, the University of California was comprised of ten campuses, located in Berkeley, Davis, Irvine, Los Angeles, Merced, Riverside, San Diego, San Francisco, Santa Barbara, and Santa Cruz. f These figures represent the total endowed funds specifically allocated to Berkeley, including both those managed by the Regents and by the UC-Berkeley Foundation. Berkeley also benefited from a modest sum of system-wide endowed funds managed by the Regents that are not included in these figures.

7 317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

underfunded, although at other universities, such as Harvard, the income from an endowed chair would be returned entirely to the school administration. Named chairs at Berkeley historically supported only the research, not the salary, of a professor.)

Even improved financial management could not make money exist when there was none. Prior to the crisis, Breslauer had been responsible for allocating the Provost’s Office budget of around $45 million. Of this total budget, around $5 million served as a discretionary fund, which he used to support various projects across the university such as new faculty lines. He recalled, “After the financial collapse of 2008, the fun was over.” Determined to approach his budgeting strategically, Breslauer refrained from making uniform cuts across the campus. Rather, he evaluated all the units reporting to him using an extensive set of criteria, then stratified them into four tiers and gave different kinds of cuts to each tier. Breslauer completed most of this process himself: "The crash was so severe and the cut from the state was so severe that...time just didn't seem to be on our side, and one thing I know about committees is that they take forever." Still, he focused on transparency and consultation, so that while painful, the cuts he proposed had “credibility and legitimacy.”

By most accounts, Birgeneau's crisis management strategy, including professionalization of finance, strategic allocation of resources, and concerted efforts for fundraising through a capital campaign and pursuit of major grants and competitions, succeeded initially. At the worst point of the crisis, Berkeley lost 14 faculty members in one year, but quickly returned to its traditionally strong faculty retention rate. (UC as a whole boasted strong faculty retention--the annual UC faculty resignation rate from 2002 to 2011, for example, was less than 2%.)23 Gradually Berkeley found itself on steadier footing.

Post-2008 Berkeley: Out of the Danger Zone?

By 2015, Berkeley had returned from the brink of the 2008 crisis, but it faced many unmet challenges. It still was home to 170 academic departments and programs housed in 14 colleges and schools. Attending these programs were over 27,000 undergraduate students and over 10,000 graduate students, led by 1,620 full-time faculty. Berkeley still had unique and outstanding traditions and programs in administration, faculty retention, student admissions, and internationalization. But its state funding languished at just 57% of its 2007 level.

Governance

On the Berkeley campus itself, governance power was shared between the senior administration, led by the Chancellor, and Berkeley's uniquely strong Division of the Academic Senate.g (See Exhibit 5 for a diagram of the governance structure of the University of California and its campuses). One faculty member noted, "The Academic Senate’s role in everyday affairs is rather supreme...[it] has really total control of the curriculum and 95% control over all hiring, promotions, and advancements,"24 and as an organ of faculty governance was “widely considered to be taken more seriously at Berkeley than [comparable mechanisms were at] most anywhere else in the country.”25 All faculty on the tenure ladder became members of the Academic Senate, though the body only met in full around two times per year. Out of the senate, nearly 40 committees were organized by the Committee on Committees, which was responsible for all committee membership appointments (other than the chair of the Senate, the chair and members of the Committee on Committees, and the

g The Academic Senate of the University of California was comprised of administrators and faculty from all ten UC campuses. The faculty of the Berkeley campus also participated in the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate, which was Berkeley campus-specific.

8 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

six at-large members of the Divisional Council, who were elected). Committees met much more regularly than the Senate and governed matters ranging from budgeting to faculty appointments to parking.

Administrative authority for Berkeley was formally in the hands of the Chancellor. Despite the strength of the Academic Senate, the Chancellor was optimistic about the room afforded to him to enact his vision. "In a way," Dirks noted, "there is a big zone in between what the Academic Senate has traditionally focused on and what [the Office of the President] concerns itself with. The discretion of the senior administration and the Chancellor, in particular, is actually in a way greater than Harvard and Columbia.” The amount of space afforded to the Chancellor seemed to be exemplified by Dirks's Berkeley Global Campus initiative, which he was able to launch with a significant degree of independence from Academic Senate oversight.h

Of course, Berkeley was a campus within a larger university system, and thus the campus-level administrative structures made up only one of two tiers of governance, the other being the UC system-wide governance. The UC system had its Board of Regents. The flagship Berkeley campus had no governing board of its own, limiting the Chancellor’s sources of advice and support. The President of the UC system was supposed to serve as the advocate for all the campuses vis-a-vis the state government. The Office of the President (OP), therefore, was responsible for both negotiating with the state for funding and disbursing the funding to the ten campuses. The President retained control over senior administrator compensation. If Dirks needed to recruit a new member for his administration, he would have to first negotiate the compensation offer with UC President Janet Napolitano. Other important issues that fell under the mandate of OP included setting tuition and the ratio of in-state to out-of-state students. Dirks noted, “You have to get approval from OP for many, many things that would seem to be within the discretion of any president of a private university.” The Board of Regents remained an important part of the central UC leadership, advising OP on system-wide issues.

The work and success of the President of the UC system--and, by extension, of Berkeley--was influenced also by the priorities of the governor of California. Breslauer recognized support from governors as one of the five main factors allowing Berkeley to achieve institutional eminence. He further argued that throughout the history of the state, governors chose to support Berkeley in difficult times because of the persuasive leadership of the UC President.26 After continued and nearly disastrous state disinvestment in the university, some hoped that the 2013 appointment of Napolitano, a former governor of Arizona, might help the UC to have a stronger relationship with the governor. Napolitano and Brown began to work together closely, in what was referred to as “CO2," short for Committee of Two. One former administrator hoped, “Janet can stand up to [Governor Jerry Brown] and speak to him in his own terms and exercise power in a way that an academic in that position [would have trouble doing] unless you had a Clark Kerr.” Nonetheless, state support for UC showed only modest annual increases; it remained nowhere near the level of support before 2008.

h This was not to say that Dirks launched the Berkeley Global Campus project without oversight.. Prior to his announcement of the project to the faculty in October 2014, he presented a Long Range Development Plan, Physical Design Framework, and an environmental impact statement to the Board of Regents for approval. The Board of Regents approved these documents at their May 15, 2014 meeting. (The Regents of the University of California Board Meeting Minutes, May 15, 2014, http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/minutes/2014/board5.pdf accessed August 23, 2016.)

9 317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

Funding

The Daily Californian had an interview with me yesterday by a pretty smart young student reporter. But he kept saying, ‘Are you privatizing?’ Of course my responses was, ‘I came to a university that was 13% funded by the state. I’m not privatizing. It has been privatized.’

— Nicholas Dirks

Gradual state disinvestment throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, followed by a steep drop in state funding in 2008 resulted in a University of California that was public in mission but not in primary funding. The passage of Proposition 30 in 2012, which approved increased personal income taxes to prevent cuts in the state education budget indicated a potentially renewed interest of the California citizenry in funding education and by 2013, Berkeley seemed headed toward more stable financial footing.27 However, as Vice Chancellor of Administration and Finance John Wilton argued in his gloomily titled article, “Time is not on Our Side,” this stability would be only temporary.

The Berkeley 2013-2014 budget plan proposed revenues of about $2.35 billion and expenses of around $2.14 billion, with an additional $240 million in account fund balance transfers for debt service and capital investment.28 (See Exhibit 6 for the 2013-2014 consolidated budget statement of Berkeley). The Berkeley administration had limited options to increase revenue—the Regents had committed to freezing student tuition (28% of Berkeley's revenue) in exchange for a slight increase in state support, which provided 13% of revenue.i Federal government contracts and grants, as well as other contracts and grants and non-operating revenue, represented a further 32% of revenue that was not mutable by any action of Berkeley. Altogether, this meant that 73% of total revenue was constrained (See Exhibit 7 for more on current revenue source distribution and how this has changed over time). If Berkeley were to need to cover increased costs—and it could expect regular, incremental increases in operating costs such as health care plan payments, facilities maintenance, and more—these would need to be financed through non-governmental, non-tuition sources of revenue, such as private philanthropy or corporate partnerships. Wilton argued that in the absence of a concerted effort to shore up these revenue sources, Berkeley would soon face an unsustainable operating deficit.29

Berkeley began to explore new funding pathways. In a speech at the Times Higher Education World Academic Summit, Dirks expressed his commitment to increasing the engagement of the private sector in partnering with and funding public higher education institutions.30 Berkeley already had a history of such partnerships, although they were often initially fraught with concern over how to maintain academic freedom in the face of corporate interests. The 2007 announcement of the Energy Biosciences Institute, a joint new energy technology research project between Berkeley, British Petroleum (BP), the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, funded by an initial $500 million commitment from BP, initially drew fierce criticism from the faculty.31 Controversy over a five-year partnership between Novartis and Berkeley's Department of Plant and Microbiology from 1998 to 2003 was so strong that multiple post-hoc reports were written discussing the ramifications of such corporate funding (the general consensus being that academic integrity had not been breached).32 These past experiences demonstrated that private sector partnerships were possible, but met with extreme skepticism on the part of some faculty members.

i For smaller schools in the UC system, this budget deal, in which there was a 4% increase in state funding in exchange for the freezing of in-state tuition, was helpful. For Berkeley, because tuition dollars provided more revenue than state support, this deal represented a small gain in exchange for an even larger limitation on future revenue growth.

10 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

Dirks had inherited an institution with a poor record of fundraising. Among public universities, UCLA regularly out-fundraised Berkeley, and both of these institutions fell far behind University of Wisconsin-Madison, which raised an average of 31% more than Berkeley every year from 2007 to 2013.33 While Berkeley regularly ranked among the top five universities in the world, it only occasionally was among top 20 universities in the United States for fundraising.

Dirks sought to enhance private giving, especially from alumni. In the 2016 academic year, Dirks led Berkeley to raise almost $480 million from nearly 100,000 gifts made by over 65,000 donors—new Berkeley records both for total amount raised and number of gifts. The new level of fundraising represented significant efforts to engage wide variety of donors. Initiatives such as “the Big Give”—a 24-hour fundraising blitz timed to coincide with the "Big Game,” that is, the annual football match between Berkeley and Stanford—appealed to a broad donor base. At the same time, Berkeley's fundraising operation also targeted larger gifts, recording a record number of gifts of over $1 million from 2015 to 2016.34

The complex relationship between athletics, fundraising, and funding was divisive on many university campuses, and Berkeley was no exception. In recent years, the eleventh hour rescue of five sports teams (mens’ baseball, crew, rugby, and womens’ gymnastics and lacrosse) from demotion to the club level by donors and the $445 million renovation and renewal of California Memorial Stadium and the student athletic center highlighted the athletics program’s ability both to attract and spend down funding. Unfortunately, the latter was much more common, and debt service associated with the stadium renewal project continued to dog Dirks's financial planning. It was estimated that Berkeley would not even begin to pay off the principal on the loans associated with the stadium until 2032.35 In the meantime, the Berkeley football team had yet to produce a record deserving of its newly refurbished stadium. Fundraising and spending related to athletics were continued sources of contention and began to drive a wedge between Dirks and the faculty.

The Operational Excellence (OE) program was another example of a creative approach to bridging Berkeley’s impending funding gap. Launched under Birgeneau’s chancellorship, the program focused on finding new ways to streamline administrative costs without sacrificing operational quality, with the ultimate goal of saving $75 million in operating costs annually. OE sought to meet this goal through projects like stronger campus-wide initiatives in budgeting and procurement, the creation of new online administrative tools to make important information accessible to students and faculty, and the centralization of administrative support in a program called Campus Shared Services. The OE program also included a Revenue Generation Program, through which OE program office staff worked with various campus units to launch revenue-generating projects that would also support academic goals.36 The program, however, met with an uneven reception. Although John Wilton recognized that significant cost savings had been made through OE, faculty and staff were less enthusiastic, and remained suspicious of how the program determined layoffs.37

Wilton warned: "Expenses cannot be cut to balance the books without lasting impact on both the access to higher education and the standards achieved. The very metrics that we want to improve— time to degree, how many students graduate, debt levels, etc.—will worsen. Something has to happen on the revenue side as well as the cost side. There is no other real solution." While Berkeley seemed to be on an improved footing, only time would tell if the dire atmosphere of 2008 was in the past or if Berkeley’s finances were merely in the eye of the storm.

Faculty

Berkeley's long-term investment in faculty hiring meant that the campus had a dedicated body of scholars that produced world-renowned research. In 2015, Berkeley boasted a faculty that included

11 317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

seven Nobel laureates, 33 MacArthur Fellows, 77 Faculty Fulbright scholars, three Fields Medal winners, four Pulitzer Prize winners, three A. M. Turing prize-winners, 235 fellows of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and 144 members of National Academy of Sciences.

A hallmark of Berkeley was the high level of faculty engagement and autonomy in driving the campus forward. Breslauer argued, "It's probably more decentralized than many public universities and more decentralized than almost all private universities.” Since 1919, the Academic Senate was responsible for faculty hiring, a process that involved input from many colleagues and was taken very seriously. Dirks noted, “When [faculty] have a job search, they all read the work together. They go to the job talks. It is really not just a collegial but a collective investment in trying to make these decisions.” Kerr credited many of the outstanding research achievements of Berkeley to the thorough and consultative hiring process administered by the Senate.38

Berkeley’s hiring practices at the assistant professor level were among the most rigorous in the nation. One result was a large percentage of the faculty was promoted to tenure from within. Approximately 80% of assistant professors who joined Berkeley between 1985 and 2011 in the humanities, social sciences, physical sciences, engineering, technology, and mathematics ultimately achieved tenure.39 Once they made it through the hiring process, faculty members were highly likely to remain at Berkeley. Berkeley faculty were notoriously difficult to lure away to work at other institutions, even when other institutions were able to offer significantly higher salaries. Birgeneau noted, “During the darkest days, our retention went up… It was the best period for retention, when the largest number of our faculty had offers from private universities.” Another administrator recalled,

[A professor] was making $150,000 base salary...Duke offered him $450,000 to leave Berkeley and come there…The dean brought him into my office, and we tried to talk sense to him. What we said to him was, “You have to understand there’s no way we’re going to even come close to what Duke is offering you…what number are you willing to settle for?” And I said, “Make sure it doesn’t start with a three or a four." That's when he realized that if he was not careful about what he said, we might just let him go. And so he said, "$220,000,"...it went through the budget committee, we gave him $220,000 and he stayed.

Faculty and administrators at Berkeley could point to several reasons why the university was able to have such strong retaining power. First and foremost was the sense of camaraderie, equality, and responsibility that remained strong among the faculty members more than one hundred years after higher education scholar Edwin Slosson noted that “there was in the [UC] faculty an unusual degree of harmony, or at least of mutual comprehension and respect for each other's ideals."40 Dirks found that faculty "wanted to stay here for reasons having to do with colleagues more than anything else. That's what you hear from faculty, you hear them talk about the public mission, but what you really hear is that they find the depth and the kind of ethos of thought of their colleagues incomparable." Breslauer noted that even from his early days as an assistant professor, “I really appreciated the sense I got that the department was not highly stratified by rank….there was a sense that everybody had full citizenship.”

Another reason was the dedication on the part of the faculty to Berkeley's public, social mission. Breslauer noted, “Some of [the faculty’s desire to stay] comes from the sense and satisfaction about being a public university, and certainly an engine of upward mobility. That’s a source of great pride.” Part of the appeal of this public mission was getting to work with students from a wide variety of socio-economic backgrounds, including Berkeley’s many first generation college students and

12 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

students from families with low-incomes. Breslauer added, “When you ask most faculty, ‘Why do you stay here?’ they say, ‘My colleagues, my students. I love them.'"

This dedication could be a double-edged sword. Berkeley reaped the benefits of nurturing young scholars through the tenure process and maintaining their loyalty throughout their careers. This process produced faculty members who were extremely committed to Berkeley’s culture, but also nativist and inward-looking. They could be suspicious of leaders hired from the other institutions. Administrators that had not spent their careers at Berkeley were accused of “not really get[ting] what Berkeley is all about.”41 Faculty members expected to play a very active role in campus governance, making time-consuming, broad consultation necessary for most administrative initiatives.

While Berkeley excelled at retaining faculty, financial constraints had made hiring faculty difficult. From the early 1990s to 2013, the number of tenured faculty had stayed almost completely flat, from 1,147 in 1993 to 1,155 in 2013. During the same twenty-year period, the student population increased from just over 30,000 to 36,198.42 (See Exhibit 8 for a chart comparing faculty, staff, and student enrollment at Berkeley in 1993, 2003, and 2013). The university relied on increasingly lower-ranked, non-tenured, non-tenure track lecturers, who tripled in number from 54 in 1993 to 158 in 2013. At the same time, student demands for levels of service commensurate with the increasingly high tuition costs grew, as did political demands for regulatory compliance. University staff expanded to meet the demands of this changing environment—full time administrative and managerial staff doubled from 306 in 1993 to 638 in 2011. Thus, while the total number of tenured faculty had remained constant, they were becoming a smaller proportion of overall university employees. To some faculty, this seemed like a fundamental shift in the nature of the university, and furthered a sense of defensiveness about the faculty’s position at the school and their engagement in governance.

Student Body

In terms of lasting, measurable, and concrete contributions to the greater good, what truly and consistently distinguishes the great publics from the great privates in America has to do with the make-up of the student body and, more specifically, with the commitment and ability of public universities to provide an excellent education to the broadest possible swath of the public.

— Nicholas Dirks43

The student body at Berkeley consistently stood out from its peers in terms of both excellence and diversity. By 2014, Berkeley undergraduates had a 4-year graduation rate of 72%, up from 66% in 2008. This figure was comparable to the rate at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor (76%), and well above that of University of Wisconsin-Madison (56%) and University of Texas-Austin (52%).44 Berkeley’s overall graduation rate also stood out favorably compared with its public peers. From 2012 to 2015, Berkeley had both the highest cumulative number of undergraduate program alumni receiving National Science Foundation (NSF) fellowships for graduate study as well as the highest number of current graduate students receiving NSF fellowships.45

Berkeley demonstrated a strong commitment to helping a socioeconomically and ethnically diverse student community access its excellent undergraduate education. In 2014, 9,091 Berkeley undergraduates received Pell grantsj, nearly as many as in all eight Ivy League institutions combined

j Pell grants were need-based financial aid awards offered by the Federal government. Eligibility and award amount depended on students’ financial need, cost of school attendance, status as a part- or full-time student, and school attendance plans.

13 317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

(10,245) and almost nine times as many as at local rival Stanford. These 9,091 students represented 33% of all Berkeley undergraduates, in comparison with the 1,088 Pell grant recipients at Stanford who represented just 15% of that university’s undergraduate population.46 Berkeley was the first public university to have a comprehensive financial aid plan for middle-income students, as well as the first university, public or private, in the United States to offer comprehensive financial aid to undocumented students. 17% of Berkeley freshmen were first generation college students.47 In 2015, underrepresented minorities made up 18% of the undergraduate population.48 Berkeley even had a comprehensive support program for former foster children.

Berkeley’s students were distinguished also by what some called their “insurgent citizenship.” Berkeley students led the Free Speech movement in the 1960s, and the student body remained vocal about various campus and social causes into the 21st century. A growing chorus of student protests against tuition hikes and budget cuts that began in 2009 culminated in a dramatic student “occupation” of Berkeley’s Sproul Plaza in November 2011. Chancellor Birgeneau’s handling of the incident—he called on police, who used aggressive physical confrontation to break up the 1,000 person demonstration—drew even more protests and calls for his resignation.k49 Like the Berkeley faculty, Berkeley students tended to be very invested in the culture of their institution and their role in maintaining it.

Dirks made improvement of the undergraduate experience one of the major goals for his chancellorship. The Chancellor’s Undergraduate Initiative, co-led by Cathy Koshland in the newly established position of Vice Chancellor for Undergraduate Education and Executive Vice Chancellor and Provost Claude Steele (later interim EVCP Carol Christ), sought to create a more cohesive undergraduate experience across the university. The initiative had four major components: transforming the current undergraduate program of the College of Letters and Science in the “College at Berkeley” liberal arts degree program; updating the undergraduate curriculum, particularly for first and second year students, to make it more cohesive and interdisciplinary; renewing physical spaces for the undergraduates; and developing a whole-student educational philosophy.50 Dirks hoped to create an undergraduate program that "people would identify with, that would have a much more shared curriculum, that would be managed in a way that would bring together student and academic affairs much more critically, and would also build in things around residential life."l

Berkeley, like the other UC campuses, sought to maintain a level of ethnic diversity that reflected the ethnic diversity of the state of California. This, however, was increasingly at odds with the mandate of the Master Plan, which required UC schools to first admit the top 12.5% of California's high school graduates. This elite group of high school students did not always reflect the ethnic mix of the state at large. For example, State of California demographic projections estimated that of California's college age cohort in 2015 (age 18-24), 48% were Hispanic or Latino. Of undergraduates enrolled at Berkeley in 2015-2016, only 14% identified as Hispanic or Latino (see Exhibit 9 for a

Statistics about Pell grant recipients were commonly used by universities to measure the economic diversity of their student bodies. k When Birgeneau did resign the following spring, a university spokesperson denied any connection between the student protests and Birgeneau’s decision to step down. l In the realm of residential life, Dirks could build on initiatives already in progress, including the renovation of Bowles Hall, the first residential college built at Berkeley (and at any American university) in 1929. The restoration of Bowles as a residential college was driven by its alumni. In a rare form of privatization deemed acceptable by the Berkeley community, alumni also funded the renovation through a foundation, and had committed to operating and funding the maintenance of the hall for the next 45 years. (Gretchen Kell, “Move Over, Hogwarts: Bowles Hall is Coming Back,” UC Berkeley News, July 13, 2015, http://news.berkeley.edu/2015/07/13/move-over-hogwarts-bowles-hall-is-coming-back/ accessed August 23, 2016.)

14 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

comparison of the ethnic distribution of California's college age population and undergraduate enrollment at Berkeley). Berkeley faced difficult decisions about how to balance access and excellence in an equitable way.

The complexity of admissions decisions was compounded when out-of-state and international students were included. With in-state student tuition frozen by the Board of Regents, raising out-of- state tuition and increasing the proportion of out-of-state or international students was one of the few ways for Berkeley to increase tuition revenue. At the same time, the citizens of California were very sensitive to increases in admission of out-of-state and international students at a time when admissions at universities across the country were becoming increasingly competitive. Still, internationalization in higher education was a broader trend that Berkeley could not ignore.

Internationalization

Increasingly the most important challenges we face are global ones…If we are to fully take these complex global challenges on as our collective responsibility...we must also commit to building new kinds of global partnerships among institutions with the means and the motivation to build the future capacity and global impact of universities in all parts of the globe, private and public.

— Nicholas Dirks51

Berkeley had a long history of international engagement, from its early welcoming of international students to the establishment of the UC system-wide Education Abroad Program in 1962. In 2015, Berkeley maintained a strong commitment to international engagement at the individual and institutional level. 1,275 students from 88 countries were admitted to Berkeley’s freshman class in 2015.52 Total international student enrollment at all levels had more than doubled from 2005 to 2014.53 Study abroad programs continued to play an important part in undergraduate education.

At the same time, Berkeley also pursued institutional internationalization. One of Dirks’s major projects was the establishment of the Berkeley Global Campus in Richmond Bay. Announced by Dirks at a meeting of the Academic Senate on October 29, 2014, the campus would provide a physical location for international partnerships between Berkeley and universities around the world. The first program to be established on the campus would be a graduate-level global citizenship curriculum. In the campus's first 40 years, this curriculum would be joined by a variety of other interdisciplinary, globally-relevant teaching and research programs.54 In October 2015, Dirks, joined by the leaders of the University of Cambridge and the National University of Singapore, announced a commitment to establish a global alliance between their three institutions, some of whose projects would be based on the new Richmond campus.55

These international initiatives represented a commitment to the trend of globalization and internationalization that was coming to dominate higher education, but at the same time, signified a departure from the methods that most universities had thus far employed to achieve “globalization.” Other universities had chosen to establish campuses or research centers in foreign countries, allowing their professors an international “home base” from which to complete global research while also engaging with local students and academics. Berkeley’s global campus would instead bring the world to California in a way that Dirks felt was better aligned with Berkeley's dual identity as a globally relevant, locally supported, public university.56

15 317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

Competition down the Road and around the World

Competition in California and Country-wide

Here was [the University of California], receiving insufficient support from the State, forced to do much work of high-school grade, having only a few hundred students, with its buildings getting old and shabby and little prospect of getting better ones. Query: what would be the effect of opening within thirty-five miles of it [Stanford] with new and beautiful buildings and an endowment of unprecedented magnitude? Whatever the effect may have been, the University of California has [in 1910] nearly eight times as many students at Berkeley [as there are at Stanford], and of higher grade; it is well supported by the State, and receives generous gifts from private sources and has started on a more ambitious building program than any other university in the country. It would be absurd to say that this is altogether due to Stanford....but it is safe to say that its normal growth and prosperity have been very materially accelerated by the presence of its so-called rival, and that in no respect has it been injured or impeded.

— Edwin Slosson, Great American Universities, 1910

Some of Berkeley's fiercest competitors were also its closest neighbors. When Leland Stanford Junior University was founded just 40 miles away from Berkeley in 1885, there was fear that the then- fledgling state would be unable to support two comprehensive research institutions. Instead, the founding of Stanford served to solidify the San Francisco bay area as the premiere bastion of academia west of the Mississippi, and helped establish a critical mass of scholars in the state. While Berkeley and Stanford remained rivals, this rivalry seemed to benefit both institutions as it spurred both forward.

There were still aspects of competition between Stanford and Berkeley. One of Berkeley's best faculty recruiting tools was the appeal of the natural environment in California, but such an appeal would not help if the faculty member were choosing between Stanford and Berkeley. Moreover, were Berkeley to go through another budget crisis of the magnitude seen in 2008, nearby Stanford would likely represent the biggest threat for faculty poaching. There were many ways that, given a combination of unlucky circumstances, the competition between Stanford and Berkeley could turn fierce and sour.

In its early days, UCLA was shrouded in a haze of Southern Californian angst over a perceived unequal distribution of state resources that purportedly favored Berkeley. There had been distinct growing pains as UCLA grew into an ever-stronger institution and gained more support from the state, but by 1960, UCLA had equal status with and government support from Berkeley, and offered Ph.D. programs and many professional degrees in addition to undergraduate education. Friendly competition between the two campuses spurred on their growth. Contentious relations between the state and UC, however, had the power to either strengthen or weaken this relationship. In 2015, many of the challenges that Berkeley faced—responding to state disinvestment, managing tuition levels, balancing ethnic diversity, determining out-of-state admissions—were also faced by UCLA. Together, the two campuses could form a powerful alliance led by Napolitano to face the state. It would be important to maintain this alliance and not let it devolve into infighting for access to limited state resources.

Berkeley contended not just with California-based institutions, but also with many strong universities throughout the United States. Still, Berkeley was competitive with these institutions on several grounds, including overall academic excellence. In terms of national competition for faculty, Birgeneau recognized that Berkeley had a “huge competitive advantage" due to the appeal of its mission and role as a public university. “If [faculty] want to be at a public university, and they’re of

16 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

the caliber that they can get an offer from [the country’s top universities], then it’s going to be the elite private universities over there and one public [Berkeley] over here.” For California students, low in-state tuition ($13,432 in 2015-2016) remained a strong pull over elite private universities such as those in the Ivy League, which all had costs of attendance (including tuition, fees, room, and board) of at least $50,000 per year. The recruitment advantage of being a uniquely excellent public university was one reason for Berkeley to maintain its identity as a public institution even as state funding remained at just 13% of its budget.

Global Marketplace

Not only did Berkeley face strong challengers in California and the United States more broadly, it was also operating in an increasingly globalized market. It needed to compete globally for talent, and, as an institution that received 87% of its funding from non-state sources, for resources.57 While Berkeley still ranked very highly on every global higher education league table, rankings were lagging indicators. Universities that were not globally competitive in 2015 could quickly become so by successfully competing for key resources like talented faculty.

The global competition for talent was already beginning to affect young faculty recruitment; one particularly fierce competitor in this regard was China. In the early 21st century, China introduced national government policies and funding schemes that supported international recruitment of outstanding university faculty, with a particular emphasis on encouraging Chinese scholars who had studied or begun their careers abroad to return to the Chinese mainland.m One professor noted that two of his students had chosen not to apply to entry level faculty positions open in their fields at both Berkeley and MIT, choosing instead to return to top universities in China. “[China's talent recruitment] strategy is actually working...A decade ago, there's no chance [these students] would've gone back to China." Plentiful funding, immediate full professorship, and cultural and emotional arguments were just a few of the appealing factors drawing American-educated Chinese graduate students back to China. Tsinghua University alone boasted 40 senior faculty members who had received their Ph.D.s from Berkeley. Tsinghua had also been able to attract tenured faculty members from Berkeley to high profile academic leadership positions: Qian Yingyi became dean of the Tsinghua School of Economics and Management after becoming a tenured professor at Berkeley and Peng Kaiping, a tenured faculty member in the psychology department, served as the founding chair of Tsinghua’ department of psychology. Other senior Berkeley faculty had found new academic homes in China as well.

Still, global competition did not need to be a zero-sum game. Berkeley maintained strong partnerships with elite institutions around the world, and its creative international initiatives sought to involve the best global talent in work at Berkeley in innovative ways. Time would tell how the Berkeley Global Campus would affect the competitiveness of Berkeley as a whole.

The Crisis of Berkeley’s “New Normal”

Springtime was historically a time of protest on the Berkeley campus. 2016 would prove no exception.

m For more information on these recruitment programs and other recent developments in Chinese higher education, see William C. Kirby and Joycelyn W. Eby, “ Higher Education in China: Internationalization in Turbulent Times,” HBS No. 316- 066 (Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2015).

17 317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

Berkeley had survived the 2008 crisis and, with Dirks’s appointment, appeared reinvigorated and ready to innovate. It had successfully maintained its traditionally strong group of faculty and diverse group of students, and began to launch initiatives to promote excellence in undergraduate education, interdisciplinary research, and international programming.

Just as Wilton had warned, however, time did not appear to be on Berkeley’s side. Underneath the optimistic tone of Dirks’s February 2016 announcement launching the strategic planning initiative was a serious issue: with enduring constraint in state funding, Berkeley continued to face a $150 million structural deficit, in part because of earlier capital expenditures outside the academic realm, including the refurbishment of California Memorial Stadium (home of Berkeley’s football games). Strategic planning at Berkeley would have to include significant strategic cutting. There was no other way. Dirks established an Office of Strategic Initiatives (OSI) to lead and coordinate this painful process.

The process proved to be painful indeed, and reawakened faculty activists in the Academic Senate who continued to believe in the mission of Berkeley as a public institution (and the Senate’s central role in guiding it) even in an era in which the state had effectively abdicated in its role as funder. Never mind that the Senate itself—in which all ladder and even emeriti faculty were members—was in no position to undertake serious strategic planning.

At the same time, the storm against sexual harassment that roiled tens of American campuses in 2015-16 also led to strenuous and complicated conflict. As the broader American higher education sphere was swept up in increasing scrutiny of sexual harassment and assault cases, Berkeley found itself embroiled in numerous harassment allegations, including several against prominent administrators and professors. Dirks found himself caught between a very vocal body of faculty and an active and interested UC President. In one case, when chemist Graham Fleming resigned from his position as Vice Chancellor for Research after allegations of harassment were made by his assistant in April 2015, over 100 faculty members signed a letter in support of Fleming and in critique of the investigatory process led by the office of the UC President.58 Fleming was subsequently appointed to a less conspicuous administrative role overseeing the development of global alliances for the Berkeley Global Campus. In March 2016, however, in an extraordinary step, UC President Janet Napolitano publicly overruled the Chancellor and all but ordered Dirks to fire Fleming—who still enjoyed the support of his faculty colleagues—from his remaining administrative post.59

Meanwhile, as Dirks and his administration began to move forward with the strategic planning process, faculty and staff anger grew over the perceived top-down nature of the strategic planning and budgeting initiatives, despite Dirks’s and his team’s public pronouncements that the administration would avoid the lack of staff consultation that had caused criticism of Chancellor Birgeneau’s Operational Excellence program. “We won’t do anything without extensive consultation,” Dirks stated in a roundtable meeting with staff in March 2016.60 In the end, formal engagement by the Office of Strategic Initiatives were limited to administrative leadership (including a similar team to that of Operational Excellence), with consultation with the Academic Senate leadership, which advised the Chancellor to keep initial discussion to small planning groups.

Suddenly other attacks against Dirks began. The construction of a $700,000 fence around the Chancellor's residence on the Berkeley campus had begun in response to serious security concerns. It drew widespread criticism including a letter from the Academic Senate, despite the fact that the house had been subject to repeated demonstrations and, in the time of former Chancellor Chang-Lin Tien, had been the site of a forced entry by an armed woman who was shot and killed by police.61

18 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

Dirks’s administrative team began to crumble in the face of public faculty attacks. In April 2016, Executive Vice Chancellor and Provost Claude Steele—the one senior executive whom Dirks had recruited from the outside—was criticized for his handling of another sexual harassment case. He announced his immediate resignation, followed days later by the announcement that Vice Provost of Strategic Academic and Facilities Planning Andrew Szeri would resign at the end of June 2016.62

Facing an unexpectedly energized faculty with an increasingly thin administrative team reduced by resignations, retirements, and reshuffling, Dirks took to the podium at the spring meeting of the Academic Senate. “This has been a very deeply challenging year here at Berkeley,” he began.

And I want to acknowledge that. I also want to assure you all, as members, as colleagues in the Academic Senate, that I’ve been hearing your concerns and I’ve been hearing your advice...I appreciate the urgency with which you have offered both, and I am today resetting our strategic efforts in several fundamental dimensions.63

Dirks went on to announce a series of measures that diminished central power and strengthened faculty leadership, including the dissolution of his newly established Office of Strategic Initiatives, curtailment of the centralized Campus Shared Services program (a widely acknowledged failure begun under the previous Berkeley administration) and an increased role for the Academic Senate in academic and financial planning.64 He also announced plans for his office to be more directly involved with the handling of sexual harassment case findings.

Dirks was also forced to step back from his ambitious plans for a global campus in Richmond. Whereas other universities had come under faculty criticism for investing in campuses abroad, Dirks had taken pains to build his international campus at home. But even that was now too much for some faculty. Now he was forced to say: “We are not investing," and repeat, "We are not investing any campus funds in the Richmond campus.” An initiative that once had pride of place as a cornerstone in Dirks's vision for Berkeley and his chancellorship was no longer, it seemed, a primary concern.

Still, none of this academic politicking did anything to solve Berkeley’s enduring financial and organizational challenges, nor did it save Dirks from the growing tide of resentment in the community. His unusual openness to discussing Berkeley's deficit and his willingness to put anything on the table had made him a lightning rod for discontent in an era of faculty frustration. On August 16, 2016, Chancellor Dirks notified UC President Napolitano that he intended to resign. In doing so, this Berkeley outsider honored one of Berkeley’s oldest traditions: Daniel Gilman, the second UC president and one of Berkeley's most influential early leaders, also ended his term after just three years, “beset by financial difficulties and political harassment."65 Dirks’s two immediate predecessors, both, like him, recruited from the outside, had left office after some measure of faculty discontent as well.

Before their resignations, Dirks and Steele had begun to make headway on Berkeley’s structural deficit, and had announced a plan that would reduce the deficit by $85 million by June 2017.66 Unfortunately, as difficult as the deficit issue would be to address, even larger challenges loomed in Dirks’s departing shadow, and would be waiting for whomever agreed to take up the heavy mantle of leading America’s premier public university. The toughest questions remained unanswered: What did it mean to be a "public" institution, when the vast majority of institutional funding came from private sources? What were Berkeley’s obligations to the citizens, taxpayers, and children of the state of California, which no longer funded it in a sustainable fashion? Could Berkeley meet these regional expectations while remaining one of the best universities in the world? Finally, had one of Berkeley’s historic strengths, faculty governance, made it impossible to face inevitably difficult choices? Had

19 317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

Berkeley—home to the Free Speech movement, long traditions of academic autonomy and insurgent citizenship—finally become ungovernable?

20 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

Exhibit 1 Timeline of Select Higher Education Institution Establishment in California

Year Event 1855 College of California chartered 1860 Berkeley site of College of California dedicated 1867 College of California offers its buildings and land to the State on condition that a "complete university" to teach humanities as well as agriculture, mining and mechanics be established 1868 UC established by the Organic Act as "a complete University" incorporating site of College of California and land grant and funds of Agricultural, Mining and Mechanical Arts College 1873 Medical School in San Francisco founded from gift by Dr. H. Toland Classes begin at Berkeley on completion of North and South Halls (South Hall still stands) 1878 Hastings College of Law opens 1888 Lick Observatory on Mt. Hamilton transferred to UC 1891 University Extension inaugurated 1898 Medical Department, Colleges of Pharmacy and Dentistry moved from downtown San Francisco to Parnassus Heights (present site of San Francisco campus) 1901 Marine Station at La Jolla endowed (subsequently named Scripps Institute of Oceanography) 1905 University Farm School (forerunner of Davis) created 1907 Citrus Experiment Station (forerunner of Riverside) established 1912 School of Jurisprudence (now Boalt Hall School of Law) founded at Berkeley 1917 UC Hospital opens in San Francisco 1919 Los Angeles Normal School becomes Southern Branch of UC 1927 Southern Branch renamed University of California, Los Angeles 1931 Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory founded 1944 Santa Barbara State College becomes campus of UC 1958 Santa Barbara designated a general campus; renamed University of California, Santa Barbara 1959 Davis designated a general campus; Riverside designated a general campus; La Jolla site approved for development as a general campus; Irvine Ranch site tentatively selected for new campus 1960 Donahue Act incorporates principles of Master Plan; mandates 60:40 ratio of upper division/lower division students; defines mission of the three segments of higher education in California 1961 Cowell Ranch at Santa Cruz designated as site for general campus. University Academic Plan adopted, underscoring principle of unity with diversity: plan for nine campus System. Undergraduate enrollment for 1985 is projected to be 104,700 1964 San Diego campus begins undergraduate instruction 1965 Irvine campus opens 1985 Groundbreaking for Keck Observatory in Hawaii (joint UC-California Institute of Technology Project). State begins review of the Master Plan. 2005 Merced campus established 2014 Berkeley announces plans for Global Campus in Richmond Bay

Source: Compiled from http://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel-programs/programs-and-initiatives/faculty-resources- advancement/faculty-handbook-sections/brief-history.html , accessed December 7, 2015.

21 317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

Exhibit 2 Berkeley Rankings over Time

Berkeley in Various U.S. Domestic Graduate Program Rankings

System Year Ranking James M. Cattell, "Statistical Study of American Men of 1906 6 Science" (number of distinguished scientific faculty) Raymond S. Hughes, “Report of the Committee on Graduate 1934 2* Education” (number of distinguished departments) 1959 2 Various reputational rankings of overall graduate program, as 1966 1 reported in David S. Webster, “America’s Highest Ranked 1970 1 Graduate Schools, 1925-1982,” Change 15, no. 4 (p. 23) 1979 2 1982 1 Marvin Goldberger, Brendan Maher, and Pamela Flattau, eds., 1993 1 “Research-Doctorate Programs in the United States: Continuity and Change”

Source: Kerr, Clark. The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949-1967,” (Berkeley, University of California Press: 2001, volume 1, 419).

Berkeley in World University Rankings

Times Higher Year QS Shanghai Jiaotong Education 2006 8 4 - 2007 22 3 - 2008 36 3 - 2009 39 3 - 2010 28 2 - 2011 21 4 8 2012 22 4 10 2013 25 3 9 2014 27 4 8 2015 26 4 8

Note: QS and Times Higher Education rankings were published as a single ranking until 2009

Source: Compiled by casewriter from http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings; http://www.shanghairanking.com/; http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university- rankings/2015, accessed December 7, 2015.

22 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

Exhibit 3 Student Enrollment of University of California and the Berkeley campus, 1880-1995

Source: Kerr, Clark. Academic Triumphs, vol. 1 of The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949- 1967 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 74.

23 317-023 -24-

Exhibit 4 UC General Fund Expenditures as a Percentage of State Expenditures, 1951-1997 and 1997-2016

Davis, cont. Schwarzenegger J. Brown

Atkinson, cont. Dynes Yudof Napolitano



Source: (left) Kerr, Clark. Academic Triumphs, vol. 1 of The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949-1967 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 416.; (right) Compiled by HSB Research Associate Yuanzhuo Wang from California Legislative Analyst's Office, "State of California Expenditures, 1984-85 to 2015-16", August 2015, http://www.lao.ca.gov/PolicyAreas/state-budget/historical-data, accessed August 24, 2016; California Postsecondary Education Commission, "State General Fund appropriations for UC and CSU, with local funds for the community colleges" in "Fiscal Profiles 2010", December 2010, http://www.cpec.ca.gov/completereports/2010reports/10-22/21-30.PDF, accessed August 24, 2016; State of California Department of Finance, "Chart A-1: General Fund History - Revenues and Transfers VS. Expenditures" in "Summary Schedules and Historical Charts", January 2016,

317-023 -25-

http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/summary_schedules_charts/index.html, accessed August 24, 2016; California Governor's Library, “List of California Governors”, http://governors.library.ca.gov/list.html, accessed August 24, 2016; University of California Office of the President, “Previous UC Presidents”, http://www.ucop.edu/president/about/past-uc-presidents.html, accessed August 24, 2016.

Note: The original chart showing data from 1951-1998 was produced by Clark Kerr. The chart on the right was compiled by the casewriter and shows data from 1997-2016 on approximately the same scale.

317-023 -26-

Exhibit 5 Governance Structure of the University of California

Source: University of California Academic Senate Website, Septemeber 2007, http://senate.universityofcalifornia.edu/resources/as.org.0907.pdf accessed August 9, 2016.

317-023 -27-

Exhibit 6 Berkeley 2013-2014 Consolidated Budget Statement for Current Funds

Total: FY 2013-2014 Unrestricted Restricted

Current Restricted Gift Rstr. Endowments Contracts and [in thousands, USD] Funds Unrestricted Designated Funds & FFEs Funds Grants

Revenues State Support 319,934 319,910 24 0 0 0 Net Tuition and Fees 667,237 633,545 33,722 0 0 0 Contracts & Grants 651,624 0 0 0 0 651,623 Private Gifts for Current Use 199,263 21,372 0 128,138 49,753 0 Investment Income 125,301 40,868 0 20 84,075 337 Sales and Services of Educational Activities 300,514 297,147 3,367 0 0 0 Non-operating Revenue 82,245 4,345 27,400 0 0 50,500 Total Revenue 2,346,147 1,317,188 64,513 128,158 133,828 702,460 Operating Transfers 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total Revenue & Transfers 2,346,147 1,317,188 64,513 128,158 133,828 702,460

Expenses Total Compensation 1,457,502 1,067,402 85,315 39,806 42,701 222,279 Total Non-compensation 681,130 302,273 (51,447) 54,182 66,952 309,171 Total Expenses 2,138,632 1,369,674 33,868 93,988 109,653 531,449 Net Operating Surplus (Deficit) 207,516 (52,487) 30,645 34,171 24,176 171,011

To/From Plant Funds (186,983) (120,551) (23,203) (27,452) (1,254) (14,523) To/From Regents Endowment Pool 1,510 0 0 0 1,510 0 To/From All Other Fund Balance (55,515) 126,104 (15,080) (5,512) (4,548) (156,488) Changes in Fund Balance (240,988) 5,553 (38,284) (32,964) (4,282) (171,011) Change in Net Assets (33,472) (46,934) (7,639) 1,206 19,894 0

Beginning Balance 1,020,258 595,663 35,105 252,476 137,014 0 Ending Balance 986,786 548,729 27,467 253,682 156,907 0

Source: 2013-2014 UC Berkeley Budget Plan, http://cfo.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/2013-14%20UC%20Berkeley%20Budget%20Plan%20-%20Final%20%289-5-13%29.pdf, 27.

317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

Exhibit 7 Change in Distribution of Revenue Sources over Time

Revenue source distribution, 2013-2014

Note: Revenue sources shown in gray are constrained (73%)

28 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

Sources of Revenue, 2002-2003 and 2012-2013

Source: Wilton, John. “Time is not on Our Side,” Berkeley Administration and Finance, November 29, 2013, part 1, p. 2-4, http://vcaf.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/Time%20is%20not%20on%20our%20side%201%2011.29 .13%20FINAL.pdf accessed December 7, 2015.

29 317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

Exhibit 8 Faculty, Staff, and Student Population at Berkeley in 1993, 2003, and 2013

1993 2003 2013 Tenured Faculty 1,147 1,134 1,155 Professors 891 878 841 Associate Professors 241 244 299 Lecturers 15 12 15

Tenure-Track Faculty 184 178 217 Professors 0 0 13 Assistant Professors 184 177 203 Lecturers 0 1 1

Non-tenured, Non-tenure track 488 173 266 Academic Rank Faculty Professors 138 18 41 Associate Professors 114 19 22 Assistant Professors 168 38 37 Instructors 14 1 8 Lecturers 54 97 158

Full-time Employees 7,887 9,468 9,863 Executive/ 306 545 638a Administrative and Managerial

Total Student Enrollment 30,341 33,065 36,198 Undergraduate 21,577 23,206 25,951 Graduate and Professional 8,764 9,859 10,247

Source: Compiled by Casewriter from the National Center for Education Statistics Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/ accessed August 24, 2016. a Data from 2011

30 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

Exhibit 9 Demographic Comparison of State of California and Berkeley

College age population of California, by Ethnicity (n=3,992,424)

Undergraduate Enrollment at Berkeley, 2015-2016, by Ethnicity (n=27,496)

Source: Figures prepared by casewriter, data compiled from http://www.dof.ca.gov/research/demographic/reports/projections/view.php and http://opa.berkeley.edu/uc- berkeley-fall-enrollment-data, accessed December 4, 2015.

31 317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

Endnotes

1 Nicholas Dirks, “Chancellor’s Corner: Traditions of Excellence Worth Maintaining,” The Daily Cal, February 6, 2015, http://www.dailycal.org/2015/02/06/chancellors-corner-traditions-excellence-worth-maintaining/ , accessed December 7, 2015.

2 UC Berkeley Public Affairs, “Berkeley Global Campus: A New, Bolder Vision for Richmond Bay,” Berkeley News, October 30, 2014, http://news.berkeley.edu/2014/10/30/berkeley-global-campus/ accessed August 8. 2016; Nicholas Dirks, Remarks on “The Berkeley Global Campus at Richmond Bay” presented to the Academic Senate, October 29, 2014, http://news.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/BGC-Senate-Final.pdf accessed August 8, 2016.

3 Ry Rivard, “The New Normal at Berkeley,” Inside Higher Ed, January 23, 2015, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/23/gov-brown-says-normal-californians-cant-get-berkeley-problem-some- californians-blame accessed December 7, 2015.

4 Berkeley Office of the Chancellor, “Announcement of Comprehensive Planning and Analysis Process,” UC Berkeley Website, February 10, 2106, http://chancellor.berkeley.edu/announcement-comprehensive-planning-and-analysis-process accessed August 18, 2016.

5 Patricia A. Pelfrey, A Brief History of the University of California, 2nd Edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), p. v.

6 “An Act to Create and Organize the University of California,” California State Assembly Bill No. 583, March 5, 1868, http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/CalHistory/charter.html accessed August 18, 2016; “Bylaws,” University of California Board of Regents Website, November 2015 http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/governance/bylaws/index.html accessed August 18, 2016.

7 Pelfrey, p. 9.

8 Pelfrey, p. 11.

9 Pelfrey, p. 14-5.

10 Clark Kerr, Academic Triumphs, vol. 1 of The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949- 1967 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 39.

11 Edwin E. Slosson, Great American Universities (New York: MacMillan, 1910), p. 149; Pelfrey, p. 22.

12 Pelfrey, p. 24.

13 Pelfrey, p. 28-9.

14 Kerr, Academic Triumphs, p. 140.

15 See for example A Portrait of Race and Ethnicity in California: An Assessment of Social and Eocnomic Well-Being, Belinda Reyes, ed., (Public Policy Institute of California, 2001) http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_201BRR.pdf ; Deborah Reed, Melissa Glenn Haber, and Laura Mameesh, “The Distribution of Income in California,” Public Policy Institute of California, July 1996 http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_796DRR.pdf accessed August 22, 2016.

16 Clark Kerr, Political Turmoil, vol. 2 of The Gold and the Blue: A Personal Memoir of the University of California, 1949-1967 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), p. 28.

17 Kerr, Political Turmoil, p. 28.

18 Kerr, Political Turmoil, p. 288.

19 Kerr, Political Turmoil, p. 309.

20 University of California Annual Endowment Report 2007, http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/regmeet/mar08/i3attach.pdf accessed August 18, 2016; University of California Annual Endowment Report 2009, http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/regmeet/feb10/i6attach.pdf accessed August 18, 2016.

21 Kevin O’Leary,”California’s Crisis Hits its Prized Universities,” Time Magazine July 18, 2009, http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1911455,00.html accessed December 7, 2015.

32 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

22 Kevin O’Leary,”California’s Crisis Hits its Prized Universities,” Time Magazine July 18, 2009, http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1911455,00.html accessed December 7, 2015.

23 Mac Taylor, Faculty Recruitment and Retention at the University of California, Report of the Legislative Analyst’s Office of California, December 13, 2012, http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/edu/uc-faculty/uc-faculty-121312.pdf accessed December 7, 2015.

24 Interview with Sheldon Rothblatt

25 Interview with George Breslauer

26 George Breslauer, “What Made Berkeley Great? The Sources of Berkeley’s Sustained Academic Excellence,” University of California, Berkeley Center for Studies in Higher Education Research & Occasional Paper Series: CSHE.3.11, January 2011.

27 Curan Mehra, “Prop. 20 Passes, Midyear UC Tuition Increase Avoided,” Daily Cal, November 6, 2012, http://www.dailycal.org/2012/11/06/fate-of-prop-30-still-unclear/ accessed December 8, 2015,

28 2013-2014 UC Berkeley Budget Plan, http://cfo.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/2013- 14%20UC%20Berkeley%20Budget%20Plan%20-%20Final%20%289-5-13%29.pdf accessed December 7, 2015.

29 John Wilton. “Time is not on Our Side,” Berkeley Administration and Finance, November 29, 2013, part 1, p. 5-6, http://vcaf.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/Time%20is%20not%20on%20our%20side%201%2011.29.13%20FINAL.pdf accessed December 7, 2015.

30 Times Higher Education, “THE World Academic Summit: Nicholas Dirks,” YouTube video, 46:59, October 2, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3NkoyHAJiPY accessed December 7, 2015; Nicholas Dirks, “The Future of World-Class Universities,” University World News no. 385, October 2, 2015, http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20151001004022774 accessed December 7, 2015.

31 “Energy Biosciences Institute: About EBI,” 2015 http://www.energybiosciencesinstitute.org/content/energy-biosciences- institute accessed December 7, 2015; Rick DelVecchio, “UC Faculty Critical of BP Deal,” SF Gate, March 9, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/education/article/BERKELEY-UC-faculty-critical-of-BP-deal-2611643.php accessed August 23, 2016.

32 Charles Burress, “Probe of Research Pact at Cal Released,” SF Gate, July 31, 2004, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/BERKELEY-Probe-of-research-pact-at-Cal-released-2737385.php accessed August 23, 2016; Lawrence Busch, Richard Allison, Craig Harris, Alan Rudy, Bradley T. Shaw, Toby Ten Eyck, Dawn Coppin, Jason Konefal, Christopher Oliver, with James Fairweather, External Review of the Collaborative Research Agreement between Novartis Agricultural Discovery Institute, Inc. and the Regents of the University of California, (East Lansing, MI: Institute for Food and Agricultural Standards, Michigan State University, 2004); Robert M. Price and Laurie Goldman, The Novartis Agreement: An Appraisal, UC Berkeley Administrative Review, October 4, 2004.

33 Data from the National Center for Education Statistics Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/ accessed August 24, 2016.

34 UC Berkeley Public Affairs, “Campus Sets New Records for Fundraising,” Berkeley News, July 14, 2016, http://news.berkeley.edu/2016/07/14/campus-sets-new-records-for-fundraising/ accessed August 18, 2016.

35 Nanette Asimov, “Cal Scrambling to Cover Stadium Bill,” SF Gate, June 16, 2013, http://www.sfgate.com/collegesports/article/Cal-scrambling-to-cover-stadium-bill-4604221.php accessed August 23, 2016.

36 “Berkeley Operational Excellence: About,” http://oe.berkeley.edu/about accessed December 7, 2015.

37 Logan Goldberg, “Campus Leaders Address ‘Painful’ Budget Cuts, Other Changes at Staff Forum,” Daily Californian, February 24, 2015, http://www.dailycal.org/2015/02/24/campus-leaders-address-painful-budget-cuts-changes-staff-forum/ accessed August 9, 2016; Curan Mehra and Jordan Bach-Lombardo, “Birgeneau Leaves Legacy of Complicated Commitment to Public Mission,” Daily Californian, May 3, 2013, http://www.dailycal.org/2013/05/03/birgeneau-leaves-legacy-of- complicated-commitment-to-public-mission/ accessed August 9, 2016.

38 Kerr, Academic Triumphs, p. 8-9.

39 Marc Gould, “UCB Faculty Advancement Slides, 1985-2011 by Discipline,” Office for Faculty Equity and Welfare Website, http://ofew.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/ucb_faculty_advancement_slides_by_discipline_2011.pdf accessed August 18, 2016.

33 317-023 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley

40 Slosson, p. 155

41 Teresa Watanabe, “UC Berkeley Chancellor to Resign Following Widespread Criticism by Faculty,” Los Angeles Times, August 16, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-uc-berkeley-chancellor-resign-20160816-snap-story.html accessed August 18, 2016.

42 Data from the National Center for Education Statistics Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/ accessed August 24, 2016.

43 Times Higher Education, “THE World Academic Summit: Nicholas Dirks,” YouTube video, 46:59, October 2, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3NkoyHAJiPY accessed December 7, 2015; Nicholas Dirks, “The Future of World-Class Universities,” University World News no. 385, October 2, 2015, http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20151001004022774 accessed December 7, 2015.

44 U.S. News and World Report, “Best Colleges, 2016,” 2015, http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/ accessed December 7, 2015.

45 John Wilton. “Time is not on Our Side,” Berkeley Administration and Finance, November 29, 2013, part 2, p. 2-3, http://vcaf.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/Time%20is%20not%20on%20our%20side%202%20%2011.29.13%20FINAL.pdf accessed December 7, 2015.

46 Wilton, part 2, pg. 2; U.S. Department of Education, “Distribution of Federal Pell Grant Program Funds by Institution,” June 19, 2015 http://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-institution.html accessed December 7, 2015; U.S. News and World Report, “Best Colleges, 2016,” 2015, http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-colleges/ accessed December 7, 2015.

47 University of California, Berkeley, “By the Numbers,” 2015, http://www.berkeley.edu/about/bythenumbers accessed December 7, 2015.

48 University of California, Berkeley Office of Planning and Analysis, “UC Berkeley Fall Enrollment Data,” http://opa.berkeley.edu/uc-berkeley-fall-enrollment-data accessed December 7, 2015.

49 Tyler Kingkade, “Occupy Cal Berkeley Protest Draws Thousands, As Two Years of Occupation Come Home,” Huffington Post, November 10, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/10/thousands-gather-for-occupy-cal- protest_n_1086963.html accessed August 18, 2016; Amruta Trivedi, “Chancellor’s Statement to ASUC Senate Cut Short by Calls for Resignation,” The Daily Californian, December 8, 2011, http://www.dailycal.org/2011/12/07/chancellors-statement-to- asuc-senate-cut-short/ accessed August 18, 2016; Chloe Hunt and J. D. Morris, “Robert Birgeneau to Step Down as Chancellor of UC Berkeley,” The Daily Californian, March 14, 2012, http://www.dailycal.org/2012/03/13/uc-berkeley-chancellor-robert- birgeneau-announces-he-will-step-down-at-years-end/ accessed August 18, 2016.

50 http://vcue.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/the_undergraduate_initiative-_executive_summary_final.pdf

51 Times Higher Education, “THE World Academic Summit: Nicholas Dirks,” YouTube video, 46:59, October 2, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3NkoyHAJiPY accessed December 7, 2015, 19:00.

52 University of California, Berkeley Office of Undergraduate Admissions, “International Applicant,” 2015, http://admissions.berkeley.edu/internationalstudents accessed December 7, 2015.

53 Berkeley International Office. “International Student Enrollment Data,” 2015, http://internationaloffice.berkeley.edu/students/current/enrollment_data accessed December 7, 2015.

54 Larry Gordon, “UC Berkeley Studies International Education Campus in Richmond,” Los Angeles Times, February 24, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-uc-richmond-20150224-story.html#page=1 accessed December 7, 2015.

55 UC Berkeley Public Affairs. “Campus Launches effort to Form New Global Alliance,” Berkeley News, October 16, 2015, http://news.berkeley.edu/2015/10/16/campus-announces-new-global-alliance/ accessed December 7, 2015.

56 Larry Gordon, “UC Berkeley Studies International Education Campus in Richmond,” Los Angeles Times, February 24, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-uc-richmond-20150224-story.html#page=1 accessed December 7, 2015; Nicholas Dirks, “Open Letter to the Richmond Community from UC Berkeley Chancellor Nicholas Dirks: An Update on the Berkeley Global Campus,” May 28, 2015, http://chancellor.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/UCB- ChancellorDirksOpenLetterRichmond-BGCRB-5-28-15.pdf accessed December 7, 2015.

57 Wilton, part 1, p. 3.

34 Public Mission, Private Funding: The University of California, Berkeley 317-023

60 UC Berkeley Public Affairs, “Berkeley’s Budget Challenge: Reduce, Rethink, Restructure,” Berkeley News Website, March 11, 2016, http://news.berkeley.edu/2016/03/11/berkeleys-budget-challenge/ accessed August 9, 2016.

61 Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, “Fence and Its Costs Rising at UC Berkeley Chancellor’s Home,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 29, 2015, http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/Fence-and-its-costs-rising-at-UC-Berkeley- 6472768.php?t=51d9a8c80c54ca2a9f&cmpid=twitter-premium%20via%20@sfchronicle accessed August 8, 2016.

62 Teresa Watanabe, “UC Berkeley Provost Resigns after Criticism of Handling of Sexual Harassment and Budget Issues,” Los Angeles Times, April 15, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-berkeley-provost-resigns-20160415-story.html accessed August 3, 2016; Suhauna Hussain, “Andrew Szeri Resigns from Position as Vice Provost of Strategic Academic and Facilities Planning,” Daily Californian, June 19, 2016, http://www.dailycal.org/2016/06/19/andrew-szeri-resigns-position- vice-provost-strategic-academic-facilities-planning/ accessed August 8, 2016.

63 University of California, Berkeley Academic Senate Spring Division Meeting audio recording, May 3, 2016, http://academic-senate.berkeley.edu/meetings/division/property-0-3 accessed August 9, 2016.

64 Nanette Asimov, “UC Berkeley Chancellor Faces Skeptical Academic Senate,” SFGate, May 3, 2016, http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/UC-Berkeley-chancellor-faces-skeptical-Academic-7391798.php accessed August 8, 2016.

65 Pelfrey, p. 11

66 University of California, Berkeley Office of the Chancellor, “Update on Campus Budget,” April 11, 2016, http://chancellor.berkeley.edu/update-campus-budget accessed August 3, 2016; University of California, Berkeley Office of the Chancellor, “Reducing UC Berkeley’s Deficit,” http://chancellor.berkeley.edu/deficitreduction accessed August 3, 2016.

35