Trade ISSUE 174 Hot Topics

After Brexit: A Guide and Roadmap for the Commonwealth

Christopher Stevens*

1. Introduction were resolved by the UK–EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), finalised on 24 December 2020. When the UK decided in 2016 to leave the EU, many This is an FTA covering all goods and limited services hopes and fears were expressed about the potential that leaves scope for regulatory regimes to diverge effects on other countries. The Commonwealth over time.2 was closely involved in these debates and is likely to be heavily affected by the outcome. In 2019, This issue of Commonwealth Trade Hot Topics Commonwealth countries’ exports to the UK takes stock and flags: totalled US$116 billion (49 per cent goods) • Which of the many possible effects of Brexit accounting for around 13 per cent of intra- identified over the past four years remain in play; Commonwealth merchandise exports and 25 per cent of services exports. Access to the EU (and the • Which Commonwealth countries might be most UK) market varied widely: affected by those that remain relevant; and

• Cyprus and Malta were part of the Single • The developments that need to be monitored European Market. over the medium term.

• Many Commonwealth members had highly 2. Possible Brexit effects on Commonwealth preferential access under Economic Partnership countries Agreements (EPAs), free trade areas (FTAs) or There is a range of possible effects (Table 1) with the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). different timescales. The highest priority for many • But five countries exported only on the Most countries has been to avoid immediate trade Favoured Nation (MFN) terms of the World Trade disruptions on 1 January 2021. But the “immediate Organization (WTO).1 response” measures set the foundations on which future policy is built. Have they established solid The scale and type of many Brexit effects depend on foundations for later improvements or, at a the precise form of the commercial relationship minimum, avoided making improvement harder? between the UK and the EU. Most of the uncertainties

* Christopher Stevens is a partner in CJS Trade Consultants and has published widely on EU trade. Any views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Commonwealth Secretariat. 1 Maldives, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Brunei Darussalam 2 In Northern Ireland market conditions may differ in some cases from those described in this Trade Hot Topic because of implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol to the Withdrawal Agreement under which the UK left the EU. Issue 174 | 2021 Issue 174 | 2021 | Page 2 Table 1:RangeofpossibleBrexit effects onCommonwealth countries* Note: *Country groups inbrackets indicate those most likely to beaffected transition period from February to December 2020 2020 December to February from period transition Both the UK and its Commonwealth partners put the that require closemonitoring. loose some ends thathavethepotential to causeproblems remain there But 1). (Figure regime and GSP beneficiaries through a multi-tier UK trade signatories EPA/FTA for avoided been largely has The big picture is a positive one: preference erosion Preference removal moving audio-visual) would face delays andprohibitions. or flowers cut as chains (such border EU–UK the across services supply and goods whether Commonwealth-originating was other trade its MFN” and market “better-than- any whether was single One agreements. EU’s the exited finally UK the that day the on countries member Commonwealth faced questions immediate Two 2.1 Immediate effects onwards) Long term(2025 (2022–2024) Medium term December 2021) Short term(April– March 2021) Immediate (January– Broad timescale 4 3 GSP: Nigeria,India;UK–EU TCA: Cyprus, Malta;MFN:Australia, Brunei Darussalam,Malaysia, Maldives, Nauru,New Zealand, Tonga Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Bangladesh,Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu; Enhanced Framework GSP: Pakistan, Sri Lanka; General Framework and theGrenadines, Trinidad andTobago, Samoa,Solomon Islands;LDCFramework GSP: The Gambia, Malawi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica,SaintLucia, St Kitts andNevis, Fiji,PapuaNew Guinea;BridgingMechanism: Cameroon, Kenya, St Vincent Singapore, South Africa;PartialFTA: Canada; Provisional FTA: AntiguaandBarbuda,The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Ghana, (MFN) provisions. As reported inUK,2021aat5March 2021–FullFTA: Botswana, eSwatini, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,Seychelles, This term isusedto describealltrade regimes thatapply border restrictions lessonerous thantheUK’sapplied mostfavoured nation 3 access to the UK market would lapse. The lapse. would market UK the to access faster ordifferent UKgrowth (global). Greater trade andinvestmentasaresult of states). country (high-andupper-middle-income vis-à-vis aspecified Commonwealth Trade creation from UKliberalisation sugar andperishablegoodsexporters). to UK–EU border disruption(FTA andLDC • Positivesupply chainchangesinresponse signatories, GSP beneficiaries); perceived problems withEUpolicy(FTA • UKtrade anddevelopmentpolicyremoves Hopes the EUorUK(Box1). FTAeither an with have not do and middle-income are nolongerclassifiedbythe World Bankaslower- Tongaand Nauru incomes: rising detailed of result the are no although be EU’s, to comparison has yet been said published. the The exceptions regime to trade UK equivalent a by covered are terms “better-than-MFN” on EU the to exporting TCA), all bar two of the the 46 toCommonwealth countries subject (now Malta and Cyprus from Apart the (Stevens andKennan, 2016). laying available time the given ambitious more even been (or have would regimes new building entirely for) foundations countries; member of treatments accorded to different Commonwealth been a complex has undertaking in itself given This the variety bilaterally. replicated been have regimes EU relevant most that is result The access. market to change edge cliff a avoid effect to good to policy) (when theUKcontinued to becovered byEUtrade the precise restriction). UK importcontrols (impactdependenton • Trade destructionfrom any more onerous LDCs, EUmemberstates); towards other countries (FTA signatories, • Trade diversion from UKliberalisation goods exporters). chains (FTA andLDCsugarperishable Commonwealth goodsintriangularsupply • DisruptionattheUK–EU border for developed countries (LDCs)); exports to UK(FTA signatories, least • Preference removal for Commonwealth Fears slower ordifferent UKgrowth (global). Lower trade andinvestmentasaresult of 4 has an EPA or an FTA are covered by a UK FTAor UK a by coveredFTAare an or EPA an has on those of the EU. Most countries with which the EU modelled directly are regimes trade UK The continued of guarantee favourable access. no are accords Such Diplomatic of Exchange Notes and ensure continuity of trade” (UK, 2021a). or Understanding of such non-binding mechanisms include Memoranda agreement; an applyprovisionally or ratify fullyto trade, where theUKortreaty partners are unable of continuity ensure to means alternative “an as The UK government defines bridging mechanisms FTAs”.ratified “fully were nine only provisional; or FTAsbridging wereCommonwealthcountries with 29 UK’s the of two-thirds almost generally, More tuna exports (EPAMonitoring, 2021a). and banana Ghana’s for notably problems, The (UK2021b). temporary deterioration isreported to havecaused procedures’ of completion internal ‘the relevant following implemented be FTAinterim toan on reached was agreement 2021 February EPA In GSP. limited an more UK’s from the to regime market UK the to of access downgrading Ghana’s a in resulting 2021, of start the exception: third a FTAan on Negotiations Ghana. was were incompleteat there 2021 March Until Note: Thisisbased ontheUK’s importregimes asat5March 2021.Source: Calculated usingUNCTADStat 2019 valueofUKimportsfrom them) Figure 1:New UKimportregimes (numberofCommonwealth countries subjectto eachregime andthe 5 effect inearly 2021, withpreferential tariffrates beingapplied. In additionto provisional andbridgingarrangements, theCanada FTA isdescribedas“partial”withthe expectationthatitenters into 5

this charge isanFTA. TheregimewouldonlyUK removethat available cent for almost three-quarters of its UK exports. Tongaregimes.But per 10 of tariff MFN facesan main exportsto theUKunderoldandnew ontheir applied tariffs the between difference no immediateimplications, asthere is no and, have will Vanuatu) potentially,for Nauru StandardGSP for MFN (to status of change The this may soon change. show but Tongabeneficiaries, and GSP Nauru as example, both for 2019), for are (which data trade its GSP EU latest The change. toregime the reflect alters country importing an before lag a often is there cases), these in UN the and independently of trade policy (by the World Bank LDC. Where income or LDC status is determined an as qualifies longer no it that 2020 December 4 on decision UN a following regime trade UK current its of out “graduated” similarly be may Vanuatu LDCs. plus countries middle-income lower-coversand EU’s) low-only the (like which GSP,Tonga UK’s and the Nauru for ineligible are the Pacific from examples – graduation Preference 1: Box

Issue 174 | 2021 | Page 3 Issue 174 | 2021 | Page 4 Figure 2:Exportsto theUK(%) rmwr) xlds ay od, especially goods, agricultural ones. One-fifth of the many UK’s 10,000 or so excludes LDC the (except Framework) GSP UK the model, EU its Like 3. 2. 1. which, like its EU counterpart, has three segments. GSPUK’s the providedvia treatmentis than-MFN Mechanism. Bridging Source: Calculated usingUNCTADStat Kenya isnot yet formally partofanEPAwiththeEUasthiswillnot become effective untilallEast AfricanCommunity (EAC) partieshavesigned 6 9 These figures excludeCyprus andMalta,whichwere identifiedasvulnerable to a“no-dealBrexit” andmay yet beaffected bytheUK–EU CTA. 8 As isKenya for 46lines;were its FTA withtheUKnot to befinaliseditwould revert to theGSP General Framework. 7 accounting for around 3percentofglobalexports. UK the with Nigeria, and India are group this into fall that countries member Commonwealth two eligible only for the “General Framework GSP”. The cent ofglobalexports. Commonwealth each ofwhichtheUKaccounts for around 7per two include member countries –PakistanandSri Lanka, for They GSP+. EU’s the on modelled regime GSP” “Enhanced and over2percentfor Rwanda andTanzania. LDCs’ percent for Bangladesh, 9 almost 4 per cent as for Malawi Commonwealth high as is share its most 2), (Figure exports of share a tiny only for accounts Arms UK the But Although Everything scheme. EU’s the to equivalent te lw ad oe-ideicm sae are states lower-middle-income and low- Other UK’s the for eligible are countries Eight The “LDC Framework GSP” offers market access regime. UKcreative service industriesare already complaining aboutexportdisruption. Moreover, theUKgovernmenthasdecided to apply thenew importregulations withalighttouch duringthefirst sixmonthsofthenew was agreed. And both partieshaveagreed to waive somedeclaration requirements around rulesoforiginfor thefirst year ofoperation. understood. UK–EU traffic duringJanuary 2021was artificially low becauseofCovid-19 restrictions andstockpiling before theTCA the other fivemembers qualifyfor theUK’sLDCFramework GSP offering duty-free quota-free access onallgoodsapartfrom armaments. and ratified –butitisunderstood to havebeengranted EPA-equivalent access intheinterim. Kenya istheonly developingcountry intheEAC; Some ofthelogistics problems for goodsexperienced sofar are “teething troubles”, resolvable once thenew systems are fully 6 o te et ay better- any rest, the For for certain products are also “graduated out” of the competitive too be to deemed Countries 2020a). and also, mostly, from theEnhancedGSP (UK, Framework Main the from excluded are lines tariff makes no provision for triangular cumulation (Box 2). UK–EUespeciallythe risk, because particular at TCA and finance for as industries). creative implications (such services potential Commonwealth are and goods There in both services. trade affects friction that border evident already is it days, early is it Although Border disruptionsto trade bridging agreements. most vulnerable countries are covered only by the of five scale, uncertainty the of end other the tariff hikes are currently covered by a full UK FTA. to vulnerable At most as identified countries 31 the uncertainty for the future because only seven of regime. equivalent an to transferred The answer is that all except one (Tonga) 2)? have been 1, Tables 2016: Kennan, and (Stevens shock” “Brexit a vulnerable to most as identified countries Commonwealth the all cover regimes new the Do the GSP for 2,652lines. of out graduated is India products. those for GSP 9 For goods, small suppliers are suppliers small goods, For 7

8 u tee is there But

for some. Sugar exporters, for example, fear that that fear more processors may follow thereported example,decisionof for exporters, Sugar some. for suppliers to UKproducers, butthetrade isimportant input major tobe Commonwealthnot memberstend for thesmallshipmentsofmarginal suppliers. consignment”, the relative costs are especially high “per levied are charges and most (Evans Since 2021). Foster, price consumer final the of cent per 12.5 to 8 represent that is wine) European in trade EU–UK (for bureaucracy border of costs non-tariff the of example One checks. border standard for English Channel. These will be additional to charges import dutiesmay beimposedwhenitcrosses the be kept in bond while in the UK. If this is impractical, that isthendistributedto, say, UK Germany willneedto the into imported consignment a of part EU. Any the and UK the to in small facilities separate too support by are and/or that and chain imperatives, value logistics global their of strategy are suppliers whose transport routes are determinedbythe these of first the from risk at Most • • face border disruption: goods originating Commonwealth of types Two 10 problem ifitusedUKorEUbeetsugar. the cane sugar. The processor would not face this of account on UK the in considered“originate”to the exported to theEUbecauseitwould not cumulation, be if tariffs MFN triangular face would product UK processed of absence the in But, countries. same the to regime duty-free same the applies EU The regime. treatment UK the under duty-free from benefiting country a from imported sugar food cane UK use can a processor example, For regime. import the same apply members FTA all which to members non- from imports to principal same the applies of origin of the final product. takenintocountry the account establishing when partner that are imported from another can be for allow one by typically processed inputs FTAswhereby “cumulation”, in origin of rules The Box 2:Triangular Cumulation goods thatare thentraded between eachother. supply theother market; hub ineithertheUKorEUandthensplitto nus noprtd no K r U processed EU or UK into incorporated Inputs central a to bulk in transported are that Those required liberalisation clasheswithacountry’s other commitments (suchasto aregional customs union). As free trade areas theEPAsrequire allpartiesto liberalise “substantially all”oftheirtrade; thishasbeenespecially contentious whenthe Triangular cumulation cumulation uidcin EU 22: ) A te ae time, same the At divergence offers somenew opportunities 3). (Box3). 2021: (EIU, jurisdiction goods each in separately certified be to have will market manufactured standards soany soldinboth theUKandEU of cross-recognition the for provisions no are there Similarly, practice. EU from diverging begun. is UK the because standards EU already exports, and to UK have both will under certified be has animal and plant including as UK’s products, Agricultural the diverge, and EU standards the as onerous increasingly become will goods transhipped controlson Border batteries (FosterandInagaki,2021). currently one of the main global producers of these is India TCA; EU–UK the under origin of rules the batteries intheUKto avoidfuture problems with for example,hasdecidedto produce electric car by Brexit- UK, Nissan sourcing. firms’ UK to changes induced indirectly affected be may countries 2021b). Monitoring, Even if (EPA they do chocolatenot export to the their UK, Commonwealth in sugar beet EU-sourced or UK- use to 2020 June in Nestlé of trade preferences (to include servicesandthe coverageproduct wider administration, their and origin of onerousrules less Theseincluded policy. trade a“development-friendly” and futuristic more create to made been have suggestions Many EPAs. “reciprocity”of requirementsthe as such remove perceived deficiencies in the EU’s regimes would practice and policy bilateral UK’s the that was term short the for hope expressed widely A 2.2 Short-term changes also exempt. are fruit, passion a and kiwi Other guava, as requiresuch fruits, 2020b). longer (UK, no certificate will phytosanitary leaves) and citrus imported (fruits 2021 April 1 From are changing. Ireland) Northern (not Britain in rules The citrus-growing country. this is contested – and the UK is not a commercial concerns necessary to protect European citrustrees but Africa) as arejustified checks Theinfection. fungal spot South phytosanitary inspectionfor evidenceofblack (especially EU the to exporters citrus of complaint standing A Box 3:ABrexit gain–citrusblackspotcontrols 10

Issue 174 | 2021 | Page 5 Issue 174 | 2021 | Page 6 htsntr iseto o ctu fut Bx 3). (Box fruit citrus of inspection phytosanitary One improvement already announcedison on theagendafor future action. be could many or,months firmly within put introduced that, failing agendas, legislative to theUK. introduce by Subject action to unilateral only involve space floated been have breathing that ideas the of Most the improvements. is there avoided, edge cliff preference trade Brexit a With Copland, 2017: 3). and and (Jones labour standards of environmental design evidenced-based more a and preferences, from graduation country product and stringent less peaks), tariff of removal eoig hr egs rm h ihrtd EU inherited the from edges sharp removing tariff agricultural WTO quotas. Europe’s of post- split the of Brexit and EU’s the from diverging policy creation ordiversion asaresult oftheUKtrade Dominating the medium term is the scope for trade 2.3 Medium-andlonger-term changes border friction. greater creating regimes government diverging about concern UK any sidestep could action such coverageservices TCAlimited, the very Because is market. UK the in absorbed were exports services total Commonwealth’s the of cent per 18 around 2019, In waiver. services WTOLDC the with line in Framework LDC could beextended,for example,to GSP cover services The regimes. EU’s the on Services alsoillustrate how theUKcould improve the creation ofaUK–EU border. by affected adversely be to likely most exporters small the for especially required, be may agencies for development from challenges support impose Technical exporters. will regulations EU and UK between differentiation any time, same the At widely known cases? South Africa because has actively publicised it. Are there other partlyless case well-known a is black spot Citrus of consumers. or endangering producers range UK without either wider a exports on Commonwealth checks health onerous the wholeofEU, there may bescope to relax than production and conditions climatic of range Because the UK, as a single economy, has a narrower 12 Quantitativelimitsonthevolumeofgoodsbenefiting from reduced tariffs havebeensetintheWTO Agreement11 onAgriculture

cent annually), probably becauseIndian tariffs are higher, butthisignores services, whichwould bethe priority for India. reached intheWTO. for thewholeEU.Following Brexit, thesetotals mustbesplitinto aUKand anEUshare. Butnoagreement onthissplithasyet been Changes inmerchandise exports would begreater for theUK(forecast to increase annually by33percent) thanfor India(upby12per 11 hs a dme U etuis for enthusiasm UK dampen may This ih omnelh ebr onre are countries member Commonwealth FTAs Other with an trade. for Commonwealth in scope increase substantial agricultural offer New could major and Zealand Canada with Australia, as FTAs such producers EU, the sourced currently from are imports food billion $65 annual UK’s the of cent per 70 around that Given FTA may alsostartin2021. partial Trans-Pacific the further develop to Canada and with for Comprehensive Partnership UK Agreement (CPTPP) (UK, 2020c, d, e). the as Negotiations well Progressive of as Zealand, membership New and Australia with negotiations bilateral on focus These 2021). to thecentre ofUKplans(Parker andWilliams, FTAmoved Commonwealthhas the negotiations, UK–USAthe up pick will USA the administrationin Biden the quickly how over cast being doubt With regimes) FTAs withtheUK. GSP agree deepening to countries more for incentive the reduces and broadening by schemes lestunilateral liberalisation (for example siaig t sae a lat ni atr the after until least at pandemic isundercontrol. scale, its estimating unlikely thatmuchattention willbedevoted to toadditional be will Covid-19the effects, seems it effect Brexit any though Even Covid-19. of shock larger much the by submerged been has impact the with global such any of course,scale of the then, Since compared years 15 forecasts current at that time (Parker et al., 2018). next the over points percentage 5 by reduced be would growth FTAEU), (an the achieved with actually one the to scenario closest the under that, suggested 2018 January dated government UK the by One years. There have been many forecasts over the past five feed and investment. trade will for supply This and EU. demand global the into and through UK the both of rate economydynamics howand far altersit growththe the leveloftrade complementarity, political by determined be maycountries other on Brexit of effects fundamental most the term, longer the For could increase substantially (Banga,2017). trade that suggests example, for FTA, UK–India a Modelling burner. front the on not if possible, 12

1. examples provide aflavour. Three investigation. rapid and early close, justifies and interesting particularly is in avenue second This change Brexit the because circumstances allows new possibilities. or better” do improvements Such could occur either because the UK simply wants “to impact. development any reduce to believed are that regimes EU inherited policy andadministration to remove features ofthe The to emerge for other products. non- and European European costs in both EU and UK markets are likely relative in changes Similar potential wineries. offering Africa’s South increase, for opportunities market to tend will Africa non-European wine intheUKmarket relative to, say, thatofSouth since EU of cost The costs. such face already exporters production European border frictionfor thewinetrade appliesonly to of cost extra the about above cited example The visible. become also may opportunities new Some organisations may beneeded. society civil European of support and monitoring duplicate Close the with governments and firms representationby justify storage. to and scale transport the lack and chains Commonwealth smaller for suppliers thathold less power within their value useful less be producers may Solutions European are inputs. large-scale or to EU borderappropriate or UK–EU UK with the incorporated cross that goods perishable produce and/or scale in small are that exporters for acute especially is and management The sectors to thepractical optionsandpossibilities. private and public sensitise to needed is emerge) roadmap A post-Brexitthe of details further as (updated change. world for representations make be prepared and,where they consider itappropriate, in areasto need society civil and governments firms, which those identify to known now is Enough 3. Way forward -aroadmap legal landscapes. need, watertight in numerous and often very different not do Regulations therefore, to beframed to UK). make them the of rest the in and Scotland (in regimes (closely legal two related) the only face Britain to Imports EU’s systems?legal in change the of simplybecause the than “heavy” less made be regimes ol te Ks diitain f t trade its of administration UK’s the Could short-term focus short-term meit need immediate should be on improving UK improving on be should isfor supply chain above, for example,would bewipedoutbyaUK– noted exports wine African South to fillip potential The involved. countries the on depends exporters clear, but the impacts that they may have on specific and policy both of practice). terms The potential implications of new FTAs are (in TCA UK–EU the of evolution FTAsthe new and of negotiation UK’s the Prospects for the 3. 2. British firms to look for markets outside the EU in EU the outside markets for look to firms British push may friction Increased diverge). regulations but itcould also increase (for examplebecause decline overtimeasnew systems are beddedin– health checks payments,and Customs declarations. VAT This friction may origin, of rules of burden administrative the given frictionless, longer no is Despite theTCA, trade between theUKandEU 3. 2. 1. one ofthree groups. current access to the UK market. Countries fall into multilaterally or via new FTAs) depend on a country’s(whether liberalisation UK any of implications The Mercosur FTA butnot byonewithMexico. states. member like-minded with initiatives additional also have pursue could UK the agreements, similar signed countries Commonwealth other Since Agreement. Economy Digital Singapore UK– a on 2021 in commence will Negotiations any Brexit losses, notably in the digital economy. way that islessdisruptiveto trade. a in rules the of objectives legitimate the so,If spot3)? Box – mayit topossible be achieve interest to theUK(asincaseofcitrusblack of notare that protectingeconomicactivities of of UKliberalisation. to Group 2butmore nuancedto similar theprecise areas effects of range a face would India), which as (such “better-than-MFN” modestly risk trade diversion. by them; with FTAcompetitorUK woulda new contrast, with a FTA a new or tariffs MFN UK’s expect trade creation from eitheracutinthe AustraliaNewas Zealand)and (such terms could MFN largely on UK the with trading economies its MFNtariffs oragree FTAs with competitors. would face trade diversion iftheUKwere to cut partners) FTA UK’s the and LDCs all (including New areas of commerce may flourish to offset to flourish may commerce of areas New Do the EU rules have the effect (if not the intent) n h mdl ae onre wt acs ta is that access with countries are middle the In countries/ scale, the of end other the At access market free substantially with Countries eim term medium are dominatedby

Issue 174 | 2021 | Page 7 Issue 174 | 2021 | Page 8 ag, . 21) Bei: potnte fr India”. for Opportunities “Brexit: (2017) R. Banga, References of likelihood the early Commonwealth increases firmsbeingquick to respond. horizon but the perceived, below dimly just challenges) (and onlytoopportunities sensitisation are These countries. Commonwealth many and EU the UK, the for impacts trade longer-term significant have In short, Brexit is a non-trivial change that is likely to Commonwealth countries. the relative competitiveness ofUKtourism in restrictions ontourism withinEurope may increase more dynamic regions suchasAsiaandAfrica.New The FinancialTimes Britain”. to Hit Financial of Warns Analysis Brexit Parker,Pickard,G., Hughes,and J. “Secret(2018) L. Times Fade”. US with TradeDeal Quick a of Hopes “Britain’s (2021) A. Williams, and Parker,G. Post-Brexit”. Development for Workshop Report, Oxford, June. Work Trade at UK “Making (2017) (eds) Copeland,C. and Jones,E. Range Expand to Chance Sunderland”. as Deal Greets “Nissan Brexit (2021) K. Inagaki, and P. Foster, The FinancialTimes in”. Kicks Hangover Brexit as Prices Higher Face Drinkers Wine “UK (2021) P. Foster, and J. Evans, for-acp-triangular-supply-chains/ does-the-new-eu-uk-trade-agreement-mean- the-case-of-fresh-horticultural-products-what- https://epamonitoring.net/ January 19 Chains?’ Fresh TriangularSupply ACP for Mean TradeAgreement of Case UK EU “The New the Does What Products:Horticultural (2021b) Monitoring EPA an-urgent-priority/?_sft_category=brexit ghanas-duty-free-access-to-the-uk-market-is- https://epamonitoring.net/restoring- January 26 Free Access to the UK Market Is an Urgent Priority”. Duty- Ghana’s “Restoring (2021a) Monitoring EPA Risk andResilience for “Brexit: Business”.London: EIU. (2021) Unit) Intelligence (Economist EIU doclib/docs/2020/february/tradoc_158640.pdf https://trade.ec.europa.eu/ December. 1 for Trade, Directorate-General Commission Statistics”. European “GSP (2020) Commission European London: Commonwealth Secretariat. 2017/01. Paper Briefing Competitiveness Trade , 22January. The FinancialTimes , 30January. , 22January. , 22January. The Financial eeomn, 7 ue https://www.gov.uk/ International June. for 17 Development, Department of Launch Agreement”. the Trade Free Zealand on UK-New the for Parker Negotiations Minister and Truss State“Joint of (2020c) Secretary UK by Statement uk#get-a-phytosanitary-certificate-pc plants-fruit-vegetables-or-plant-material-to-the- https://www.gov.uk/guidance/importing- December. Agency, 31 Plant Environment, and Animal and Affairs Rural & Food For Department Ireland”. Plant Northern and Plants and Britain Greatto countries non-EU from Import Products “Guidance: (2020b) UK developing-nations of government/publications/trading-with- https://www.gov.uk/ Scheme December. 31 January, Generalised 14 “UK Trade,International for Department Preferences”. (2020a) UK Commonwealth “Trade for Topics 133.London: Commonwealth Secretariat. (2016) Brexit J. TradeCommonwealthCountries”. Developing Hot of Kennan, and Implications C. Stevens, statement-ghana-uk-trade-partnership-agreement https:// www.gov.uk/government/news/ghana-uk-joint- February. 4 for Development, Department International Agreement”. Partnership Trade Ghana-UK Statement: Joint “Ghana-UK (2021b) UK agreements-with-non-eu-countries https://www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-trade- March. Trade, 5 International for Department countries”. non-EU with Agreements Trade “UK (2021a) UK https://www.gov.uk/ membership-of-trans-pacific-free-trade-area September. government/news/uk-takes-major-step-towards- 9 towardsRelease, Press Development Step Area”. International for Trade Major Department Free Trans-Pacific Takes of “UK Membership (2020e) UK trade-agreement-the-uks-strategic-approach agreement-with-australia/uk-australia-free- uks-approach-to-negotiating-a-free-trade- https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ The UK’s Strategic Approach”. Policy Paper, 17 July. Agreement: Trade Free “UK-Australia (2020d) UK new-zealand-fta government/news/statement-on-launch-of-uk- ebr. h IP prah s o cn h tae n dvlpet adcp fr ra wee orthodox where areas for landscape development and trade the scan to is approach ITP The members. Commonwealth involving discourses related the into inputs informed providing and issues development ITP is entrusted with the responsibilities of undertaking policy-oriented research and advocacy on trade and and governments member among co-operation and countries in the common interest consultation of their peoples and in the promotion of international consensus-building. facilitating – economies island and countries,independent 54 of association landlockedcomprisingdeveloping, and largedeveloped small, and an – Commonwealth the of agency intergovernmental main the is which Secretariat, Commonwealth the Tradeof the Division of Section Trade(ITP) International Policy the by Tradeout TopicThisbrought Hot is Commonwealth Secretariat International Trade PolicySectionatthe developed countries (LDCs), smallstatesandsub-Saharan Africa. least – constituencies Commonwealth vulnerable highly on particularly impact that environment trading international the in issues emerging to response quick enable to flexible is plan work Its those. address to approaches are ineffective or where there are public policy failures or gaps, and to seek heterodox approaches osnu-ulig n sus f neet to interest of Commonwealth members. issues and on inputs, consensus-building informed disseminating ideas, of exchange supporting facilitating for and trade-workshops/dialogues issues, emerging policy, development trade related of range a on research analytical undertaking arrangements, trading regional various Tradeand Organization member states in their negotiations in the World assisting on focus activities recent most ITP’s ITP Recent Activities • • • areas: broadthree in principally activities undertakes ITP Scope ofITPWork t otiue t te rcse involving processes the to contributes It and consultations research, policy conducts It members developing Commonwealth supports It atclry sal tts n LC ad sub- and LDCsSaharan Africa. and states small particularly, members, country of developing regimes Commonwealth participation beneficial trade more bilateral advance that and multilateral the of policyoptionsfor successfuladaptation. the of understanding and environmenttrading international changing increase to advocacy through expandedtrade. development promotegrowth economic outcomes,their friendlynotably that regional agreements and multilateraltrade of negotiation their in

Supported byITP Selected Recent Meetings/Workshops Geneva, Switzerland. Governance for 21stCentury Challenges,’ heldin Publication ‘WTO Reform: Reshaping GlobalTrade 26 June2019:LaunchoftheCommonwealth Studies ofSri Lanka Lanka incollaboration withThe Institute ofPolicy Fourth IndustrialRevolution heldinColombo, Sri Summit XII:ShapingSouth Asia’sFuture inthe 26–27 September2019:12thSouth AsiaEconomic Kingdom. Meeting heldatMarlborough House,London, United 10 October 2019:Commonwealth Trade Ministers and theUNWTO. Geneva, Switzerland incollaboration withtheWTO InclusiveApproach (WTO PublicForum) heldin of SmallEconomies: ATransformative and 11 October 2019:Tapping theTourism Potential London, UnitedKingdom. Integrated Framework) heldatMarlborough House, LDC Graduation (inpartnership with theEnhanced Shocks in the Commonwealth: Natural Disasters and 28 January2020:Roundtable DiscussiononTrade House, London, UnitedKingdom. Policy Dialogue,Bangladesh)heldatMarlborough the OECDDevelopmentCentre andtheCentre for Reflection by the LDV IV Monitor (in partnership with 29 January2020:Looking to LDC V:ACritical Development Centre, UN-OHRLLSandFERDI. Countries (LDC5)incollaboration withtheOECD the FifthUNConference onLeastDeveloped LDC IVMonitor andheldvirtually ontheroad to Resources, organised intheframework ofthe Tackling Vulnerabilities andLeveraging Scarce 21–23 October 2020:Recovery from COVID-19 –

Issue 174 | 2021 | Page 9 Issue 174 | 2021 | Page 10 please [email protected] For furtherinformation orto contribute to theSeries, Directorate oftheCommonwealth Secretariat Produced byTrade, Oceans andNatural Resources Series editor: Brendan Vickers Commonwealth Secretariat andinternationalexperts. analyses ontrade andrelated issues, prepared both by publication whichprovides concise andinformative Commonwealth Trade Hot Topics isapeer-reviewed ISSN: 2071-8527(print)ISSN: 2071-9914(online) Topics Trade Hot Issue 168: 168: Issue Issue 169: Issue 170: Issue 171: Issue 172: 173: Issue Topics Series Commonwealth Trade Hot Previous Ten Issuesofthe Issue164: Issue 165: Issue 166: Issue 167:

A Time to Remain Vigilant as aResponse Tool Efforts: Tapping into Trade Facilitation Prospects FDI: ImmediateImpactsandFuture Countries: The Turning Point Indian Economy for Commonwealth Access to COVID-19 Vaccines Economic Co-operation Leveraging DigitalTechnologies for Supplies Trade inCOVID-19-Related Medical Commonwealth Commonwealth States? Did We GetHere andWhat’s Nextfor the AfCFTA? Economic Resilience: WhatRole for WTO FisheriesSubsidies Negotiations: Natural Disasters andRecovery COVID-19 andCommonwealth Implications ofaSlowdown inthe The Great Race: EnsuringEquitable Trade ×Technology beyond COVID-19: Prioritising thePoor:LDCs and COVID-19 andFoodSupplies inthe Dispute Settlement at theWTO: How Building Africa’sPost-COVID