The emergence of the Act: A case study

by Ashley Braun

B.A. (Hons.), University of the Fraser Valley, 2017

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

in the School of Criminology Faculty of Arts and Sciences

© Ashley Braun 2019 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY Spring 2019

Copyright in this work rests with the author. Please ensure that any reproduction or re-use is done in accordance with the relevant national copyright legislation. Approval

Name: Ashley Braun Degree: Master of Arts Title: The emergence of the : A case study Examining Committee: Chair: Bryan Kinney Associate Professor Neil Boyd Senior Supervisor Professor Martin Bouchard Supervisor Professor M-J Milloy External Examiner Assistant Professor Department of Medicine University of

Date Defended/Approved: April 12, 2019

ii Abstract

This case study identifies the key factors that preceded the introduction of the Cannabis Act, using newspaper articles from between January 1, 2000 and April 14, 2017. It develops a chronology of cannabis-related events that influenced the social, political, or legal nature of cannabis, and categorizes other stories into five major themes: judicial decisions, medical regulations, commercial industry, international developments, and public opinion. Analysis reveals three key findings that set the stage for legalization, including the government’s failure to create a constitutionally sound cannabis access program, Colorado and Washington’s legal precedent, and a ballooning commercial industry. Law reform benefits, such as product quality, accessibility, and tax revenue are discussed and contrasted with several limitations of the Act, including consumption-related risks, criminal penalties, and ongoing stigma. Overall, the Act is a bold reform that marks a new era in Canadian drug policy.

Keywords: cannabis legalization; cannabis policy; criminal law reform; case study

iii Dedication

For Opa, Jacob Banman (1931-2019).

iv Acknowledgements

“First find out what you are capable of, then decide who you are.” – Tara Westover

First and foremost, I would like to thank God. Thank you for your faithfulness, protection, and provision, and for giving me the strength, wisdom, and peace necessary to complete this project.

Also, I must thank my incredible supervisory committee for their time and efforts in reviewing this work. This project would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of my senior supervisor, Professor Neil Boyd. Thank you for inspiring me and introducing me to the world of cannabis policy and law reform. I would also like to thank the other members of my supervisory committee, Dr. Martin Bouchard and Dr. M-J Milloy, and the chair of my defence, Dr. Bryan Kinney. I am truly grateful for the opportunity to work with such exceptional academics.

And to my husband Curtis; we did it! I could not have done this without you. Thank you for your unwavering support, for pushing and challenging me to be better, and for putting things in perspective. You have been by my side through every step of this journey and I am delighted to share my success with you. I love you and am thrilled to see where God leads us.

Lastly, a big thank you to the incredible, stalwart, and tenacious Reddicopp and Braun families. I would not be here today without your love and support. Thank you to Mom and Dad Reddicopp, Mom and Dad Braun, Breanne, Ruby, Alana, Greg, Wes, and Evaya, for always believing in me and praying for me. I think it’s time for some cake!

v Table of Contents

Approval ...... ii Abstract ...... iii Dedication ...... iv Acknowledgements ...... v Table of Contents ...... vi List of Tables ...... ix List of Figures...... x

Chapter 1. Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 2. Background Information ...... 4 2.1. What is cannabis? ...... 4 2.2. History of ...... 6 2.2.1. in New France ...... 6 2.2.2. “A solution without a problem” ...... 6 2.2.3. “Saga of promise, hesitation, and retreat” ...... 9 2.3. Alternative regulatory models ...... 12 2.3.1. Design options ...... 12 2.3.2. Depenalization ...... 15 2.3.3. Decriminalization ...... 16 2.3.4. De jure legalization ...... 18 2.3.5. De facto legalization ...... 19 2.3.6. Legal regulation ...... 20 Colorado ...... 21 Washington ...... 21 Uruguay ...... 23 Canada ...... 23 2.4. Theoretical framework ...... 24

Chapter 3. Methods ...... 27 3.1. Study objectives ...... 27 3.2. Research design...... 27 3.2.1. Case study analysis ...... 27 3.2.2. Data source and access ...... 28 3.2.3. Sampling procedure...... 28 3.3. Data analysis ...... 30 3.4. Ethical considerations ...... 33

Chapter 4. Results: Critical Events ...... 35 4.1. R v Parker (2000) ...... 35 4.2. R v Krieger (2000) ...... 37 4.3. Medical Access Regulations (2001) ...... 38 4.4. Senate Special Committee (2002) ...... 39

vi 4.5. House of Commons Special Committee (2002) ...... 40 4.6. Bill C-38 (2003) ...... 41 4.7. Bill C-10 & C-17 (2004)...... 42 4.8. Reform ballot in Colorado and Washington (2012) ...... 42 4.9. Reform in Uruguay (2013) ...... 44 4.10. Marijuana for Medical Purposes Regulations (2014) ...... 46 4.11. regulates dispensaries ...... 49 4.12. Reform ballot in California (2016) ...... 50 4.13. Access to Cannabis for Medical Purposes Regulations (2016)...... 52 4.14. Bill C-45 (2017) ...... 52

Chapter 5. Results: Key Themes ...... 56 5.1. Judicial decisions ...... 56 5.1.1. Hitzig v Canada (2003) ...... 56 5.1.2. R v Malmo-Levine, R v Caine (2003); R v Clay (2003) ...... 57 5.1.3. Allard v Canada (2014) ...... 59 5.1.4. R v Smith (2015) ...... 59 5.1.5. Allard v Canada (2016) ...... 60 5.2. Medical regulations ...... 60 5.3. Commercial industry ...... 61 5.4. International developments ...... 64 5.5. Public opinion ...... 65 5.5.1. Consumption ...... 65 5.5.2. Charges ...... 66 5.5.3. Grow operations ...... 67 5.5.4. Distaste for harsher penalties ...... 67

Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusions ...... 69 6.1. Key findings ...... 69 6.2. The role of law reform ...... 73 6.3. Law reform benefits ...... 74 6.4. Law reform limitations ...... 75 6.5. Public health approach ...... 77 6.6. Study limitations and future directions ...... 80 6.7. Conclusion...... 81

Chapter 7. Epilogue: From First Reading to Royal Assent...... 82 7.1. Parliamentary process ...... 82 7.2. Key concerns and criticisms ...... 83 7.2.1. Distribution and sale ...... 83 7.2.2. Impaired driving ...... 84 7.2.3. Criminal record pardons ...... 85 7.3. Likely effects of legalization ...... 87

References ...... 88

vii Appendix A. Articles in database ...... 109

Appendix B. Past-month cannabis and alcohol use ...... 119

Appendix C. Fatality rate per 100 million vehicle miles traveled by US state .. 121

viii List of Tables

Table 1. Cannabis convictions and charges, 1964 – 1973 ...... 9 Table 2. Drug offences and penalties, 1929 – 1996 ...... 12 Table 3. Regulatory design elements of cannabis policy ...... 14 Table 4. Chronology of cannabis-related events ...... 32 Table 5. Comparative cannabis policy...... 46 Table 6. Cannabis possession incidents per 100,000 ...... 50 Table 7. Cannabis possession charge-to-incident ratio ...... 50 Table 8. Canada’s cannabis policy under the Act ...... 53 Table 9. Comparative financial information ...... 64 Table 10. Drug penalty differences between CDSA and Cannabis Act ...... 76 Table 11. Fatality rate per 100 million vehicle miles traveled ...... 79 Table 12. Chronology of Bill C-45 ...... 82

ix List of Figures

Figure 1. Policy option spectrum ...... 13 Figure 2. Sampling and analytical process ...... 34 Figure 3. Units of edibles sold in Colorado ...... 44 Figure 4. Registered patients ...... 47 Figure 5. Number of dispensaries in Vancouver ...... 48 Figure 6. Number of licensed producers in Canada ...... 52 Figure 7. Stock prices ...... 62 Figure 8. Police-reported rates of cannabis offences ...... 66

x Chapter 1.

Introduction

On April 13, 2017, the Ministers of Health, Public Safety, and Justice held a press conference to present historic legislation. The Ministers introduced Bill C-45, An Act respecting cannabis and to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Criminal Code and other Acts (the Act), which would legalize and regulate non-medical cannabis. The Act was designed to control and regulate the production, distribution, and sale of recreational cannabis. During the press conference, the Ministers discussed the failure of prohibition to achieve public health and safety goals, summarized by Public Safety Minister, :

If your objective is to protect public health and safety, keep cannabis out of the hands of minors, and stop the flow of illegal profits to organized crime, then the law as it stands today, has been an abject failure. Police forces spend between two and three billion dollars every year trying to deal with cannabis, yet Canadian teenagers are among the heaviest users in the western world. And criminals pocket seven to eight billion dollars in illicit proceeds. We simply have to do better (Global News, 2017).

The failings of prohibition began in 1923, when it was first prohibited. At that time, it was a relatively unknown drug with few users and little attention in the anti-drug campaign (Carstairs, 2006). Instead, its prohibition has been referred to as “a solution without a problem” (Giffen, Endicott, & Lambert, 1991, p. 182). In the 1960s, cannabis became a symbol of the counterculture movement, leading to increased consumption and arrest rates. This eventually overwhelmed the criminal justice system, sparking public outrage demanding change. Since the mid-1960s, calls for policy reform from various reports, commissions, and legislative bills have been promised; however, a lack of political will and public appetite have stagnated any meaningful reform. Canada’s cannabis policy has been a “saga of promise, hesitation, and retreat” (Giffen et al., 1991, p. 571).

Since the turn of the century, discussion on has erupted and numerous court decisions, federal inquiries, and international developments made reform seem imminent (Fischer, Ala-Leppilampi, Single, & Robins, 2003). Cannabis is the most commonly used illicit drug in Canada, and 41% of youth aged 16-19 reported

1 some use in the past year (Health Canada, 2017). Further, there have been several notable changes in the social nature of cannabis in Canada. Police-reported rates of arrest have declined, with varying rates of cannabis-related charges across Canada (Allen, 2018; Rotermann & Macdonald, 2018). Consumption rates remain relatively unchanged, although the number of registered medical cannabis patients and cannabis policy reform supporters has increased dramatically (Health Canada, 2018; Ipsos, 2018).

Public appetite for change was growing. In 2012, membership approved a resolution to legalize and regulate cannabis. The policy was proposed by the Young Liberals of Canada and gained traction in 2013 when newly elected party leader admitted to smoking cannabis as a sitting Member of Parliament. Trudeau’s admission sparked debate across political party lines on cannabis reform, and further polarized the federal parties. The Liberals used Trudeau’s declaration to stress the party’s openness and transparency, in hopes of appealing to younger voters1. While cannabis was not the key election issue, it allowed the Liberals to paint the Conservative party as out of touch. For example, during the campaign, Harper continued to argue that cannabis legalization would encourage and normalize use, instead promising more police resources for enforcement.

In 2015, the Liberal Party of Canada won a majority government and the Act was introduced eighteen months later. The government clearly outlined four key goals for cannabis legalization platform: preventing youth access, protecting public health, deterring criminal activity, and reducing the burden on the criminal justice system. When it came into force on October 17, 2018, the Act ended 95 years of prohibition and made Canada the second country in the world and first G7 nation to legalize cannabis. The Act symbolizes a marked departure in Canadian cannabis policy; moving to a legalized, controlled, and regulated system is a dramatic shift from the prohibitionist past.

This thesis is driven by one key question: how did we get here? It seeks to identify the key events that preceded the introduction of the Act and understand what the Act demonstrates about law reform. Employing a case study approach, this thesis uses a variety of data sources with the primary procedure consisting of a qualitative content analysis on newspaper articles. It identifies cannabis-related news events and key

1 Voter turnout among youth aged 18 to 24 increased from 39% in the 2011 election to 57% in 2015 (Elections Canada, 2016).

2 themes that influenced the social, political, or legal nature of cannabis between 2000 and 2017. Chapter 2 provides background information on the history of cannabis in Canada, describes several alternative regulatory models, and introduces a theoretical framework. Chapter 3 details the methodological decisions and discusses the study’s objectives, design, and ethical considerations. Chapters 4 and 5 are results chapters, covering the critical events and thematic results, respectively. Chapter 6 summarizes the key findings, study limitations, and future directions. Chapter 7 is an epilogue, detailing the events between the introduction of the Act and its coming into force in 2018.

3 Chapter 2.

Background Information

This chapter discusses four topics that lay the groundwork for understanding Canadian cannabis policy. It begins by describing cannabis, including its origins, medical benefits, and adverse consequences. Then, it details Canadian cannabis policy from the 1500s to the 1990s to provide historical context before outlining various policy design considerations and alternative regulatory models. It introduces approaches that have been implemented in other jurisdictions and briefly discusses some empirical evidence. Finally, the chapter concludes by introducing the normalization thesis as a theoretical framework.

2.1. What is cannabis?

The cannabis plant has a long history with mankind; no other herb has been criticized or praised quite like cannabis (Abel, 1980, p. ix). It is one of nature’s most resilient plants and can thrive in nearly every possible climate. Cannabis needs little care to grow and sprouts “defiantly, arrogantly, confident that whatever the conditions it has the stamina to survive” (Abel, 1980, p. ix). The earliest evidence of cannabis comes from an ancient village in China, where hemp played an important role in society and was used to make clothes, shoes, paper, and bowstrings (Abel, 1980). China is also credited for discovering the psychoactive effects, although poor documentation limits the validity of this claim (Athey, 2018). The Chinese were also the first to discover the medical properties of cannabis, and Chinese emperor, Shen-Nung, used cannabis as an analgesic to treat a variety of ailments (Abel, 1980). It is believed Dr. William Brooke O’Shaughnessy introduced cannabis to Western medicine in 1843, when he used cannabis to treat patients (Abel, 1980). Doctors remained skeptical, however, because of unpredictable patient experiences and were reluctant to recommend it to patients. Since then, a wealth of anecdotal evidence of the health benefits of cannabis has accumulated, and medical patients have used derivatives from the cannabis plant to treat a range of conditions (Weiss, Howlett, & Baler, 2017).

4 Despite a dearth of clinical trials, using cannabis for medicinal purposes has surged in popularity. In 2017, the prestigious National Academy of Sciences published a book called The Health and : The Current State of Evidence and Recommendations for Research. In it, researchers analyze every study ever published on cannabis and found conclusive evidence cannabis is effective for chronic pain, chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting, and multiple sclerosis symptoms (National Academy of Sciences, 2017, p. 13). The lack of evidence for other common medicinal uses is partly related to four complications associated with cannabis:

1. the inherent variability of botanical products stemming from genetic variations, growing conditions, use of pesticides, time of harvest, etc.;

2. the large number of compounds that comprise the plant which may or may not have significant, harmful, or even opposite biological activities

3. the lack of information regarding optimal routes of administration and appropriate dosing; and

4. the absence of risk benefit analyses in different patient populations to guide prescribing practices and use (Weiss et al., 2017, p. 43).

In short, cannabis is not a well-defined medicine. Its derivatives contain a variety of ratios with different active chemicals, and these barriers make cannabis unlike any other medicine. Naturally, physicians’ have resisted recommending it to patients, although patients claim it treats a range of conditions (Caulkins, Kilmer, & Kleiman, 2016). The scientific evidence has yet to verify these claims.

Other research has confirmed several adverse effects associated with cannabis use (Hall, 2017). Studies have examined the health and social consequences and found that cannabis use is related to altered brain development, respiratory problems, schizophrenia and psychosis, dependence, other illicit drug use, and lower educational attainment and employment (Hall, 2017; Hill, Shanahan, Costello, & Copeland, 2017; Hasin et al., 2015). Since there are many different variations of cannabis and users, the relationship between cannabis and the negative consequences is difficult to untangle. However, it is likely this research base will continue to grow as more jurisdictions move towards cannabis legalization, removing the regulatory barriers that prevent the advancement of cannabis knowledge.

5 2.2. History of cannabis in Canada

2.2.1. Hemp in New France

The story of Canada’s history with cannabis begins nearly five hundred years ago, during France’s colonization in North America. In the 1500s, France envisioned a land of hemp and timber in the New World. Hemp was used to make rope for naval ships and France wanted its new colonies to grow hemp so it could export and sell it to other countries for a profit (Abel, 1980). When France arrived in North America, it tried to persuade its colonies to grow and cultivate hemp as a crop but few labourers and harsh conditions for farmers made it difficult. Few were willing to sacrifice their time and energy to grow hemp when they could barely grow enough food to stay alive. Thus, incentive programs by France, and later England in the 1700s, to encourage hemp cultivation failed and Canadian farmers sent little hemp back to Europe (Abel, 1980).

2.2.2. “A solution without a problem”

In the 1850s, England and China were embroiled in the second Opium War (Boyd, 1991). England had gone to war to introduce opium to China, despite steadfast resistance by the Chinese government. Eventually England was successful, and smoking opium became popular among the Chinese in the late 1800s (Boyd, 1991). Shortly after, Canadian manufacturers sought cheap labour to help with construction projects in western Canada, and thousands of Chinese labourers immigrated to Canada (Boyd, 1984). Several of these Chinese merchants in Canada opened opium factories in British Columbia (BC) with little public concern, where they produced black tar opium that was purchased and smoked recreationally by white and Chinese customers (Carstairs, 2006, p. 41).

In 1907, an economic crisis and anti-Chinese sentiment fuelled stories of the opium dens, which came to a head in September 1907 in Vancouver (Boyd, Carter, & MacPherson, 2016; Fischer, Bibby, Argento, Kerr, & Wood, 2012; Comack, 1997). A rally at city hall supporting a ban on Chinese immigration turned into a riot, as protestors damaged and destroyed Chinese and Japanese business in Vancouver. Deputy Minister of Labour, and later Prime Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, was sent to Vancouver to settle the Chinese claims for damages. King stated, “we will get some

6 good out of this riot yet”, and two months later the federal government passed the Opium Act (Boyd, 1991, p. 8). This was the first time Canada criminalized a psychoactive drug, and it became illegal to import, manufacture, sell, and possess for sale opiates for non- medical use (Giffen et al., 1991).

During this time, the medical profession was making great advances and opiated tonics, elixirs, and analgesics were being sold as patent medicines (Boyd, 1984). Although often mixed with cocaine and alcohol, the industry heavily promoted opium as a panacea (Boyd, 1984). In the early twentieth century, the reality of opiate dependence was acknowledged, and Canada passed the Patent and Proprietary Medicine Act in 1908. This required certain ingredients in medicines to be labelled and the quantity of opiates had to be labelled (Abel, 1980).

In 1909, the International Opium Commission was held in Shanghai, which King attended (Boyd, 1984). The commission made several recommendations at the meeting, including that cannabis be added to the list of proscribed drugs. Although Canada did not support this initiative, it did pass the Opium and Drug Act in 1911, with penalties of up to seven years for importation and trafficking (Carstairs, 2006). This added four drugs to the schedule, criminalized possession, and placed the burden of proof on the accused when they claimed a scientific or medical purpose (Giffen et al., 1991). King also attended the Opium Conference in 1911, which called for the study of Indian hemp. Historian Catherine Carstairs (2006) argues these international meetings played a key role in Canada’s cannabis prohibition and cannabis became a concern for King. By 1922, ten US states had prohibited cannabis, and Carstairs argues it is likely King saw cannabis as an issue in other parts of the world and it made sense to prohibit cannabis before it became an issue (Carstairs, 2006).

In the 1920s, public anti-drug sentiment reignited. Suffragette Emily Murphy published a series of articles in Maclean’s magazine on drug use, which were eventually collected into a book, The Black Candle. Although her work focused on opium, she included a seven-page chapter on cannabis, which quoted the Los Angeles police chief:

“Persons using this narcotic smoke the dried leaves of the plant, which has the effect of driving them completely insane. The addict loses all sense of moral responsibility. Addicts to this drug, while under its influence, are immune to pain, and could be severely injured without having any realization of their condition. While in this condition, they become raving

7 maniacs who are liable to kill or indulge in any form of violence to other persons, using the most savage methods of cruelty, without, as said before, any sense of moral responsibility” (Murphy, 1922 as cited in Giffen et al., 1991, p. 180).

Her writing was sensational and has been referred to as "racist hysteria meant to drum up support for stricter drug laws" (Turner, 2018). She was unashamedly racist, and told her readers drug users were non-white, non-Christians, who craved drugs and the seduction of Canadian women (Carstairs, 2006). As remedies, she favoured long imprisonments, whippings, and deportations. Most Canadians had never heard of cannabis before, and Murphy’s writings informed Canadians of a fairly frightening view of its psychoactive effects.

These events culminated in 1923 when cannabis was added to the schedule of restricted drugs. There was no debate or discussion; just a simple statement in the House of Commons that cannabis was now illegal (Carstairs, 2006). It was a relatively unknown drug at the time, with few users and little attention in the public anti-drug campaign, leading some to refer to Canada’s prohibition as “a solution without a problem” (Giffen et al., 1991, p. 182). However, anti-drug sentiment was strong at the time, and it made sense to criminalize cannabis before international pressures to do so. Cannabis fell under international control in 1925 when the International Convention relating to Dangerous Drugs was signed in Geneva.

Cannabis remained an unknown drug, and the first cannabis-related arrest occurred years later in 1937 (Boyd et al., 2016; Carstairs, 2006). The government revised its drug laws in 1954, increasing some penalties to a maximum of fourteen years, and in 1961, penalties were increased to a maximum of life imprisonment under the Narcotic Control Act (NCA; Giffen et al., 1991). The NCA placed cannabis in its Schedule 1, (alongside opiates and cocaine) which meant the drug had a high likelihood of harm and addiction. This classification could result in a maximum seven years’ imprisonment for drug possession. However, despite these harsh penalties, use of cannabis skyrocketed in the 1960s as the status of cannabis radically changed (Erickson & Hyshka, 2010; Fischer et al., 2003). At the same time, the international community introduced the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), which condemned the production, distribution, and use of cannabis and other drugs for non-scientific and non- medical purposes (Bewley-Taylor & Jeslma, 2011).

8 Cannabis became a popular symbol of the growing youthful counterculture, tied to the anti-authoritarian movement of the day (Fischer et al., 2003). As the number of users increased, so did the number of arrests and convictions. As shown in Table 1, there were only 28 convictions in 1964, but the numbers rose rapidly in the years following (Giffen et al., 1991, p. 495). In 1969, there were 2,964 convictions and 6,292 convictions in 1970; however, the biggest increase came a few years later. Between 1972 and 1973, the number of convictions increased 8,216 from 11,713 in 1972 to 19,929 in 1973 (Giffen et al., 1991, p. 495). The criminal justice system became overwhelmed with cannabis criminals and few sentencing options meant many young offenders were imprisoned (Erickson, 1992). Most cannabis offenders were young white men, who were well-educated and came from wealthy families (Fischer et al., 2003). This led to widespread public outrage over the increasing number of young, wealthy, white-men stained with a criminal record for cannabis possession. The consequences of cannabis prohibition were seen as worse than cannabis itself, and many Canadians disagreed with the criminalization of simple possession.

Table 1. Cannabis convictions, 1964 – 1973

Year 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Convictions 28 60 144 586 1,429 2,964 6,292 9,478 11,713 19,929 Source: Giffen et al., 1991.

2.2.3. “Saga of promise, hesitation, and retreat”

The government responded in 1969 and launched the Commission of Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs (Le Dain Commission, 1969-1973). The commission produced four reports, including a cannabis-specific report in 1972. In Cannabis, the commission concluded that the costs of prohibition outweighed the benefits and did not find that the health and social risks of consumption warranted criminalization (Boyd, 1991; Le Dain, 1972). Thus, they concluded “criminal prohibition was an excessive, ineffective, and costly tool for controlling cannabis use” (Fischer et al., 2003, p. 271). According to the commission, drug prohibition failed to deter cannabis use and thus, was poor public policy (Le Dain Commission, 1972).

“The costs to a significant number of individuals, the majority of whom are young people, and to society generally, of a policy of prohibition of simple possession are not justified by the potential for harm of cannabis and the

9 additional influence which such a policy is likely to have upon perception of harm, demand, and availability” (Le Dain Commission, 1972, p. 302).

Instead, the commission recommended the decriminalization of cannabis, preferring an administrative ticketing scheme and the abolition of a possession offence (Hathaway & Erickson, 2003, p. 482). Despite growing concerns for leniency in cannabis control from public and the media, there was “no tangible political action” (Fischer et al., 2003, p. 271) following the commission’s recommendations. This led to what Giffen et al. (1991) called, the “saga of promise, hesitation, and retreat” (p. 571). High-ranking officials from all federal parties made promises of reform, but nothing ever materialized. The closest the government was to any meaningful reform was Bill S-19, which was introduced in 1974. Proposing to limit possession to a $100 fine and eliminate criminal records, the bill later died in the House of Commons (Fischer et al., 2003).

In 1969, judges were granted the option of a “fine only” sentence, and later allowed the use of absolute and conditional discharge alternatives for cannabis possession offences in 1972 (Fischer et al., 2003). Thus, a decline in sentence severity and improved court efficiency reduced public demand for cannabis law reform. As judges began using the new sentencing options, fewer offenders were imprisoned. The number of convictions drastically increased in the 1970s but then declined in the mid- 1980s. Ninety percent of all cannabis offences were for simple possession as Canada’s drug policy specifically targeted cannabis (Erickson, 1992, p. 246). The urgency for reform was replaced with indifference, as Canada “learned to live with drug use and prohibition” (Erickson, 1992, p. 248).

In 1986, President Ronald Reagan announced the launch of the US War on Drugs, arguing “drugs are menacing our society... there is no moral middle ground" (Erickson, 1992, p. 248). Two days later, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney announced that “drug abuse has become an epidemic that undermines our economic as well as our social fabric” (Erickson, 1992, p. 248). This statement evaporated any real cannabis reform in Canada and caught drug professionals, researchers, and government officials off guard. The government introduced Canada’s Drug Strategy in 1987, with funding of $210 million over five years (Erickson, 1992). The new strategy recognized the failure of supply efforts and aimed to reduce demand through youth education and treatment, with 70% of funding earmarked for prevention and treatment programs (Erickson, 1992).

10 The government was also developing new drug legislation in the 1980s. The draft law was widely opposed by lawyers, researchers, and public health experts, because it doubled the maximum penalties for simple possession (to a $2,000 fine and/or 12 months’ imprisonment; Fischer et al., 2003). Meanwhile, new public opinion polls showed that 69% of Canadians favoured a depenalized form of cannabis control. The bill was reinvented by the government after consultations and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) went into effect in 1996. The CDSA contains a separate cannabis possession offence of 30 grams of cannabis, with maximum sentences of $1,000 and/or six months’ imprisonment for first offenders (Fischer et al., 2003).

The new offence was promoted by some officials as de facto decriminalization and a better representation of the views of the Canadian public. The government claimed, “this new law will put Canada in the forefront of leading the War on Drugs from a perspective of harm reduction” (Erickson, 2015, p. 199). However, there were some problems with this discourse, as the CDSA was still criminal law and charges under it still resulted in a criminal record. Fischer et al. (2003) explain:

“These interpretations, of course, generously ignored the fact that the CDSA’s new cannabis provisions were still embedded in the criminal law and still offered incarceration as a sentencing option, that convicted offenders would still acquire a criminal record, and that the most the Act did was provide legal confirmation – but not reform – of the sentencing practices for simple cannabis possession that had been implemented by the courts for years” (p. 273).

The introduction of the CDSA was met with new record highs in drug offence arrests in the mid-1990s. Reports show an average of 60,000 drug offences per year, with 50% for simple cannabis possession (Fischer et al., 2003).

As shown in Table 2, the CDSA was Canada’s fourth attempt to punitively control cannabis through offences and penalties. Between 1929 and 1996, several changes were implemented to try to reduce the . Notably, there was an increase in the severity of penalties for drug trafficking to a maximum of life imprisonment introduced in 1961. Some minimum sentences have also been eliminated over time; in 1954, minimum sentences for trafficking and production were removed, and in 1961, minimum sentences were removed for possession.

11 Table 2. Drug offences and penalties, 1929 – 1996

Possession Trafficking Production Summary Indictment Summary Indictment Summary Indictment $200 $200 $200 $200 $200 $200 Min 6 months 6 months 6 months 6 months 6 months 6 months 1929 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 Max 18 months 7 years 18 months 7 months 18 months 7 years Min 6 months 6 months 1954 Max 18 months 7 years 14 years 18 months 7 years Min 1961 Max 7 years Life 7 years Min 1996 $1,000 Max 5 years Life 7 years 6 months Source: Giffen et al., 1991.

Since the introduction of the CDSA in 1996, there has been much discussion about cannabis law reform. At the turn of the century, court decisions, public opinion, federal inquires, and international developments made cannabis-control reform seem imminent (Fischer et al., 2003). However, meaningful legislation was not introduced until 2017 under the Act. Canada’s approach is one of many taken to cannabis around the globe, as other jurisdictions have chosen to adopt a range of approaches to meet their socio-political needs.

2.3. Alternative regulatory models

2.3.1. Design options

Cannabis policy exists along a continuum, and policy approaches range in restrictiveness and potential harms. As shown in Figure 1, at either end of the continuum are unregulated markets (criminal and legal) with the highest social and health harms, which occur during ultra prohibition and commercial promotion. In between, there are a variety of approaches that can minimize the harms of cannabis and cannabis use while maximizing the benefits. Rolles and Murkin (2016) argue that the balance between harm and policy restrictiveness is found at the bottom of the continuum, in strict legal regulation. Citing high demand and a resilient illicit market, they conclude that “the regulated market models found in this central part of the spectrum will best be able to deliver the outcomes we all seek” (p. 29).

12 Figure 1. Policy option spectrum

Source: Rolles & Murkin, 2016

Now, the type of policy implemented depends on the nation’s sociopolitical needs and the design decisions of government. There are a variety of policy design elements that determine the costs and benefits of a policy (Rolles & Murkin, 2016; Caulkins et al., 2015; Kilmer, 2014). Issues of production, promotion, price, and taxation all affect the ability of the policy to minimize social and health harms. As shown in Table 3, I have attempted to simplify the regulatory design process by outlining the different elements policy makers encounter and the corresponding legal regulation goals and decision areas (Rolles & Murkin, 2016; Kilmer, 2014). Essentially, there are eight design elements regulators must consider; production, profit motive, price, tax, potency, marketing and promotion, prevention and packaging, and permanency. Under a legal regulatory system, there are certain goals policy makers attempt to achieve and to do so, they must answer specific questions when designing the regulations. For example, one design element is profit motive. The legal regulation goal of profit motive is to protect public health by minimizing corporate incentive to develop and maintain heavy users. When designing a legal regulatory system, legislators must determine whether large corporations will be allowed and whether small-scale production will be allowed. In answering these questions appropriately, regulators can achieve the legal regulatory goal of profit motive.

13 Internationally, countries have moved away from criminal prohibition of cannabis over the past couple of decades. These policies can be generally categorized into five approaches: depenalization, decriminalization, de jure legalization, de facto legalization, and legal regulation (Rolles & Murkin, 2016; Room, Fischer, Hall, Lenton, & Reuter, 2010). The following section will describe each model and provide a jurisdictional example.

Table 3. Regulatory design elements of cannabis policy

Design Legal regulation goals Decision areas elements Production  Ensure quality and safety of product  Where will cannabis be grown?  Ensure security of production  How will producers be regulated and systems to limit diversion licensed?  How will quality be measured?  What products are permitted?  Will vertical integration be permitted?  How will production limits be determined?  Can producers export products? Profit motive  Protect public health by minimizing  Will large corporations be allowed? corporate incentive to develop and  Will smaller-scale production be permitted maintain heavy users (home grows, cannabis buyers’ clubs, non- profit cooperatives)? Price  Effectively use price controls to  Which price controls will be implemented manage conflicting priorities (e.g. (direct price fixing, maximum/minimum discouraging use, reducing illicit prices)? market, revenue generation) Tax  Integrate tax into price that  Which tax options will be implemented (ad maximizes revenue while supporting valorem sales tax, fixed-rate tax, other policies progressive, license fees)?  How will taxes be imposed (value, weight, THC content)? Potency  Ensure reliable and consistent  What limits on potency will be established potency (maximum THC concentration, minimum CBD concentration, THC-CBD ratio)?  How will potency be tested? Marketing and  Prevent promotion for commercial  How will companies be allowed to promote promotion interests their product (billboards, window displays, social media)? Prevention  Protect public health by preventing  How will minimum age limits be set and and use enforced? packaging  Ensure packaging design is not  Will purchase limits be implemented? used to encourage use  Will there be a residency requirement?  Where can cannabis be consumed?  What information will be required on the label (product content, risk information)?

14  Where and how many will outlets be allowed?  Will there be restrictions on days of operation or store hours? Permanency  Allow for future system changes  How will flexibility be built into the model (sunset clause)? Source: Rolles & Murkin, 2016; Kilmer, 2014

2.3.2. Depenalization

Room et al. (2010) define depenalization as “any change of cannabis use control provisions in the letter or practice of the law that reduces the severity of the penalties – whether criminal or civil – imposed on the offender” (p. 78, emphasis in original). Although cannabis remains prohibited, alternative measures such as reduced fine amounts or shortened sentences are introduced. This reduces the punitiveness and preserves the law’s deterrent intent and is often referred to as cautioning or diversion schemes (Room et al., 2010).

Some Australian states, including New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, and Tasmania, implemented depenalization measures in the 1980s, as jurisdictions removed criminal penalties for small amounts of cannabis possession and use (Room et al., 2010). Instead, offenders are required to admit to the offence, and then attend either an education session, drug problem assessment, or drug treatment (Room et al., 2010). In doing so, the offence is suspended to allow the individual to complete the intervention, but failure to do so results in the offender being charged with the original offence. States have various restrictions over the number of offences the policy applies to and the amount of cannabis it can be used for (15-50 grams). Evaluations of Australia’s depenalization schemes have been processual (Baker & Goh, 2004; Hales, Mayne, Swan, Alberti, & Ritter, 2004) and have not examined the policy’s effects on rates of use (Room et al., 2010).

Elsewhere, controversy ignited in England in the mid-2000s over the proportionality of the law regarding cannabis (Pearson, 2007). It was proposed the government reclassify cannabis from a Class B to a Class C drug because cannabis had few social or health consequences and reclassification would make possession a non- arrestable offence (Warburton, May, & Hough, 2005). Instead of arrest, police used informal warnings to discourage possession of Class C drugs, which did not result in a

15 criminal record. Cannabis was reclassified to Class C in 2004, but the government simultaneously changed the rules on possession of a Class C drug and made it an arrestable offence. This essentially eliminated the depenalization component of the reclassification (Room et al., 2010, p. 84; May, Duffy, & Hough, 2006). The London Police responded, issuing a statement to officers indicating that arrest for cannabis possession should be avoided. In 2008 the government reclassified cannabis again and made it a Class B drug.

The multiple changes to the legal status of cannabis caused much confusion among the British citizenry and led to inconsistent practices among law enforcement. A 2006 study conducted an online survey of 749 respondents in England and Wales to examine public knowledge and opinion about cannabis’ reclassification to Class C. Although non-representative, 78% of the sample believed they had a good understanding of the changes and 69% believed that the cannabis user could be arrested (May et al., 2006). Following the 2004 reclassification, Room et al. (2010) found no evidence of increased cannabis use, although the number of police contacts increased (2004: 88,263; 2005: 119,917; 2006: 130,406). They also found a decrease in lifetime cannabis use among those aged 16 to 59, and a decrease in past-year use among youth aged 16 to 24 (Room et al., 2010).

2.3.3. Decriminalization

Another approach to cannabis policy is decriminalization, defined as “reforms which change the status of cannabis use from a criminal to a non-criminal (e.g. a civil) offence” (Room et al., 2010, p. 78, emphasis in original). Thus, decriminalization is a form of depenalization, and often referred to as “prohibition with civil penalties” to avoid misunderstanding. In some cases, possession or use remains illegal, but violations are dealt with through non-criminal statutes or interventions (Room et al., 2010).

The most popular example of decriminalization is Portugal, where the country decriminalized personal possession of all drugs in 2001 (Murkin, 2014). Instead, possession is an administrative violation and punishable by fines or community service. Portugal police send referrals to regional panels called Commissions for the Dissuasion of Drug Addiction, which consist of legal, health, and social work professionals (Hughes & Stevens, 2010). The commission decides whether the person is dependent on drugs

16 or not, and those deemed drug dependent are encouraged to seek treatment (Hughes & Stevens, 2010).

Evaluations of Portugal’s approach are limited because there was little baseline data available prior to decriminalization, making it difficult to examine changes (Van het Loo, van Beusekom, & Kahan, 2002). Data that did exist from universities and drug research centres is limited and unreliable due to changing data sets, various age groups, and different drug use indicators (Murkin, 2014; Hughes, 2006). However, there is some evidence to show improved health outcomes since 2001, including decreased HIV cases, drug-related deaths, and drug-related crime, and increased substance users in treatment (Murkin, 2014; Hughes & Stevens, 2010). As Hughes and Stevens (2010) note, the decriminalization occurred alongside an expanded welfare state, drug treatment, and an aging population of drug users, which all contributed to the effects.

Prohibition with civil penalties schemes also operate in some Australian states, including South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, and Western Australia. Each state has its own civil penalty provisions where minor possession offences are fined (Lenton, McDonald, Ali, & Moore, 1999). States vary in the fine amount ($50-$200), possession limits (30-100 grams), and number of plants (one or two) an infringement notice can apply (Room et al., 2010). In some states, police have the discretion to choose between issuing an infringement notice or a criminal charge to offenders; in others, police are generally required to issue a notice to all eligible offenders.

South Australia’s Cannabis Expiation Notice (CEN) began in 1987 and is the most researched drug policy in Australia. In the mid-1990s, empirical studies compared the rates of cannabis use in South Australia to other states that maintained prohibition (Donnelly, Hall, & Christie, 2000). Researchers found an increase in adult lifetime cannabis use from 26% to 36% in South Australia, as well as increases in Victoria, Tasmania, and New South Wales. However, they did not find a statistically significant difference between the increases in South Australia and the other states (Donnelly et al., 2000). Thus, even if more adults were trying cannabis, it did not result in more regular use (Room et al., 2010). Researchers also looked at the impact of the CEN on adolescent use. They found a nationwide increase among lifetime rate of use among

17 youth aged 14 to 29, and that the rate in South Australia did not differ from other states (Donnelly et al., 2000).

Other research has examined the social impacts of the CEN (Lenton & Heale, 2000; Lenton, Humeniuk, Heale, & Christie, 2000; Lenton et al., 1999). Lenton and colleagues compared the social impacts of a CEN in South Australia to a criminal arrest and conviction in Western Australia among first time offenders. They found that the respondents who received a criminal charge were more likely to report adverse employment consequences, further contact with the criminal justice system, relationship problems, and accommodation difficulties that were linked to their cannabis offence (Room et al., 2010, p. 114). Further, the convicted users also reported more negative feelings towards criminal justice actors; they were less trusting and more fearful of police. Finally, it is important to note that there have been some problems with the CEN scheme in South Australia, where less than half (45%) of fines are paid by the due date (Christie & Ali, 2000). There is also some evidence of “net widening”, which refers to an increase in the number of people issued notices (Christie & Ali, 2000).

2.3.4. De jure legalization

De jure legalization is a type of partial prohibition, which occurs when the change is legally outlined in law (Room et al., 2010). This means that “the non-punishment of cannabis use is either explicitly written into the relevant drug control statute or the scope of the law governing illegal drug use does not extend to cannabis possession” (Room et al., 2010, p 92). De jure legalization relies on existing legal norms and does not depend on the way the law is applied (Room et al., 2010). This approach is typically used to allow cannabis use in specific spaces or by specific populations, as users are shielded from negative consequences.

This is the approach India adopted, where cannabis is used for religious, medical, and social purposes (Room et al., 2010). In 1961, the UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was adopted, and included a 25-year grace period to allow India time to discontinue non-medical use and access to , a cannabis drink. This proved politically difficult because of the country’s longstanding religious and cultural use of bhang. However, the government prohibited the drug quietly under the Indian Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act in 1985 with little debate because of their

18 international obligations and the political sensitivity in the country. The act banned the use of cannabis, except for drinks made from cannabis leaves, including bhang (Room et al., 2010; Charles, Bewley-Taylor, & Neidpath, 2005). The government excluded bhang from the law using two carefully crafted loopholes, which allow bhang to still be consumed (Tandon, 2015). The law only prohibits consumption of certain parts of the plants, and does not prohibit consumption of the leaves, from which bhang is made (Malhotra, 2015). Also, cultivation is illegal, but individuals are still allowed to harvest leaves that grow in the wild. Smokable forms of bhang are available for purchase in special government-authorized shops, but rules vary between states regarding possession limits and purchase age (Malhotra, 2015; Room et al., 2010).

2.3.5. De facto legalization

De facto legalization is also a form of partial prohibition. In this model, cannabis use and possession remain formally prohibited but the laws are not enforced (Room et al., 2010). This creates a distinct difference between the law on the books and criminal justice practices, and there are usually formal procedures in place to ensure personal cannabis use is not punitively sanctioned (Room et al., 2010, p. 92).

The best example of this approach is the coffee shop system in the Netherlands. Although cannabis is still illegal, the Dutch government adopted formal enforcement guidelines in 1976. At that time, the Dutch saw an increase in drug use throughout the 1960s with a rising counterculture. This opposition to drug prohibition contributed to two commissions in the early 1970s, which made distinctions between hard and soft drugs (Uitermark, 2004). The commissions recommended separating the drug markets to keep soft drug users away from the hard drugs to minimize any gateway effects. The approach is based on two Dutch principles, including “gedogen”, which means looking the other way when you must, and “godoogbeleid”, which is the systematic application of discretion. Guidelines recommended police and prosecutors tolerate cannabis offences involving less than thirty grams, and cannabis use or sale near Dutch coffee shops be tolerated (Room et al., 2010). Restrictions prohibit sales to minors, public nuisance, and the sale and use of other illicit substances.

Empirical evaluations of the Dutch coffee shop system have been controversial. MacCoun and Reuter (1997, 2001) compared cannabis use data from the Netherlands,

19 United States, Denmark, and Germany. They found that the commercialization and proliferation of coffee shops may have contributed to an increase in rates of use. In the mid-1980s, the Dutch policy changed from passive depenalization to commercialization, which allowed for more coffee shop marketing (MacCoun & Reuter, 2001). MacCoun and Reuter hypothesized increased advertising may be related to the increased rates of use; however, this glamorization thesis has been criticized by others (Korf, 2002).

Other research compared cannabis users in Amsterdam, Bremen, and San Francisco (Borchers-Tempel & Kolte, 2002). They found that the Amsterdam system was effective in its attempts to separate cannabis users from harder drugs because 87% of the Amsterdam sample purchased their cannabis from coffee shops. In addition, 85% of the Amsterdam sample stated that no other drugs were available for purchase from where they obtained their cannabis (Borchers-Tempel & Kolte, 2002). Thus, it does appear that the coffee shop system has separated soft drug users from the potential harms of harder drugs (Room et al., 2010).

Dutch policy has gone through many changes since the 1990s, including increased drug tourism and international pressure. There is also shifting support away from the policy of “gedogen” as Dutch residents have expressed concerns about the coffee shops (Uitermark, 2004). Drug tourism, nuisance, crime, trafficking, and cultivation have all decreased support for the drug policy and has led to a shift from public health to enforcement (Van Ooyen-Houben & Kleemans, 2015).

2.3.6. Legal regulation

Legal regulation legalizes and regulates the production, distribution, and sale of a substance (Room et al., 2010). This implements a set of guidelines to control and monitor the product and processes. Under a regulatory framework, either a government monopoly or free market actors would be responsible for cultivating and distributing cannabis to interested parties. Cannabis use for non-medical and non-scientific purposes has been legalized nationally in Uruguay and ten US jurisdictions. Despite similar regulatory approaches to cannabis, the legalization process and implemented policies vary widely among the jurisdictions.

20 Colorado

In 2012, Colorado voters approved Amendment 64 to legalize the retail sale, purchase, and possession of cannabis for adults over 21 (Reed, 2016; Monte, Zane, & Heard, 2015; Pardo, 2014). This followed a long history of cannabis regulation that began in 2000 when the state legalized medical cannabis (Reed, 2016). The medical system was not very popular until 2009, when the US Department of Justice issued the Ogden Memo, instructing US attorneys not to focus resources on medical cannabis (Monte et al., 2015). In 2010, the medical system commercialized and the Marijuana Enforcement Division (MED) was created to license and regulate the new industry. As a result, the number of medical users ballooned: in 2009 there were 5,000 registered patients and in 2011 there were 119,000 patients. Then, Amendment 64 passed in 2012. It legalized the production, distribution, and sale of recreational cannabis, and retail stores opened January 1, 2014. Adults over 21 can legally possess up to 28.5 grams of cannabis and grow up to six plants in their home; unauthorized possession can result in a $100 fine. Drivers are considered cannabis-impaired when they have over 5 nanograms of THC per 100 millilitres of blood. The state did not specify any THC potency limits for products but implemented a 10% cannabis sales tax and 15% excise tax on wholesale cannabis (Subritzky, Pettigrew, & Lenton, 2016).

Washington

Washington’s cannabis reform began in 1998 when voters approved Initiative 692, which legalized medical cannabis for registered patients (Moren, 2017). Since then, enforcement of non-medical cannabis began softening. In 2003, city officials in Seattle and Tacoma declared cannabis the lowest priority for police officers officials (Cambron, Guttmannova, & Fleming, 2017). In 2007, Seattle administrators reviewed the policy and found it worked quite well. There was no evidence to revoke the program, as no changes in adolescent use, crime, or public health issues could be directly linked to the low enforcement policy (Cambron et al., 2017). Further, the review found reductions in cannabis-related criminal justice system interactions and savings in public health areas since 2003 (Cambron et al., 2017). Then in 2012, Initiative 502 passed with 55% of Washington voters favouring the legalization and regulation of non-medical cannabis (Jensen & Roussell, 2016; Roffman, 2016). Retail stores opened in July 2014 under a regulatory approach like Colorado’s. The key difference is that Washington does not

21 permit home grows and unauthorized possession can result in steeper fines and possible jail time. Initially, Washington charged a 25% tax on the cannabis value at each stage of the process; however, this proved to be egregious, as prices were marked up between 300 and 400% to customers (Jensen & Roussell, 2016). The problem was rectified in July 2015, when the state implemented a sales tax of 37% on the product.

Recreational cannabis has also been legalized in Alaska, California, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington, DC, and several other states also have legalized medical cannabis laws. However, studies on the policy landscape in Colorado and Washington have dominated the academic literature. Research has examined implementation challenges (Calonge, 2018; Cambron et al., 2017; Ghosh et al., 2017; Parnes, Bravo, Conner, & Pearson, 2017; Jensen & Roussell, 2016; Roffman, 2016; Subritzky et al., 2016), public health (Davis et al., 2016; Hall & Lynskey, 2016; Monte et al., 2015), edibles (Gourdet, Giombi, Kosa, Wiley, & Cates, 2017; Kosa, Giombi, Rains, & Cates, 2017), and impaired driving (Aydelotte et al., 2017), to name a few. Colorado and Washington both require regular reports from state departments, which help facilitate new studies (Reed, 2016). Because these findings are still preliminary, and it will take decades to see the full effects of cannabis legalization, this section will discuss a few early public health findings.

First, there does not appear to be an increase in cannabis use among adults or youth (Ghosh et al., 2017). Researchers from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment reported no change between adult 30-day use among adults between 2014 (13.6%) and 2015 (13.4%) (Ghosh et al., 2017, p. 4). Likewise, youth cannabis use has not seen a statistically significant change in 30-day or lifetime use between 2013 (lifetime: 36.9%, 30-day: 19.7%) and 2015 (lifetime: 38.0%, 30-day: 21.2%) (Ghosh et al., 2017, p. 5). Instead, it appears that youth perception of risk has decreased, as less students view cannabis use as risky (2013: 54%, 2015, 48%) (Ghosh et al., 2017).

Second, motor vehicle fatality rates are not statistically different from states without recreational cannabis legalization. Aydelotte and colleagues (2017) compared motor vehicle fatality rates before and after recreational legalization in Colorado and Washington and compared them to eight matched control states. They found there was no significant association between cannabis legalization and changes in motor vehicle fatalities in the first three years after legalization (Aydelotte et al., 2017, p. 1330).

22 Third, the recreational Colorado market experienced an unexpected increase in sales of non-flower product (Orens, Light, Lewandowski, Rowberry, & Saloga, 2018). Sales of concentrates and edibles increased from 25% in 2015 to 37% in 2017 (Orens et al., 2018). However, there are several concerns associated with edibles including delayed reaction time, accidental ingestion, and the amount of THC potency per serving (Kosa et al., 2017). Initially, there were no packaging or labelling restrictions, which likely contributed to an increase in the number of hospitalizations, emergency department visits, and poison control calls (Reed, 2016). The findings presented here are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution. More research is needed to determine the effects of cannabis policy on use, driving, and consumption patterns.

Uruguay

The first nation to introduce this framework was Uruguay in 2013, when they legalized the production, distribution, and consumption of cannabis for non-medical and non-scientific purposes (Cruz, Boidi, & Queirolo, 2018; Cerda & Kilmer, 2017; Pardo, 2014). The legislation was promoted by former President Jose Mujica and passed despite heavy public opposition. At the time, there was no lobbyist pushing for legalization or strong political intention to legalize (Cruz et al., 2018). Instead, some scholars have argued Uruguay’s policy change was the result of political insecurity following several violent events, which opened a policy window (Rossel, Queirolo, Alvarez, & Repetto, 2018). Regardless, Uruguay’s legalization goals are to undermine the illicit drug market and to lower patterns. The model is strict, and the state has a monopoly on every step of the process with price and production controls (Cruz et al., 2018; Pardo, 2014). Uruguayans can obtain cannabis by growing their own, joining a , or purchasing from a pharmacy (Cerda & Kilmer, 2017). Empirical research on Uruguay’s legalization examines the policy process and public opinion, and there is no available data to date on the policy’s effects.

Canada

On April 13, 2017, the Canadian federal government introduced the Act, which became law June 21, 2018 and is set to come into force October 17, 2018. The Act legalizes and regulates the production, distribution, and sale of cannabis for non-medical and non-scientific purposes. Adult Canadians will be allowed to possess up to thirty

23 grams of cannabis and grow up to four plants in their home (per household). The regulations limit THC potency to ten milligrams per serving and implement a tax of 10% or $1 per gram, whichever is more. Penalties for unauthorized possession can result in a $5,000 fine and/or six months in jail for a summary possession offence. Under the Act, provinces have control over the distribution and sale of cannabis, and each province has developed its own set of regulations.

2.4. Theoretical framework

After examining different regulatory models and the increasing number of jurisdictions implementing more liberal policies, it is prudent to wonder why such changes are taking place. What has changed in society to account for such dramatic policy shifts? One idea that is useful in answering this question is the normalization thesis. Developed in the United Kingdom in the 1990s, this conceptual framework describes a process whereby “stigmatized or deviant individuals or groups becoming included in many features of everyday life whereby their identities or behaviour become increasingly accommodated and perhaps eventually valued” (Parker, 2005, p. 205). It argues that has become a normal, unremarkable part of leisure time (Parker, 2005; Parker, Aldridge, & Measham, 1998; Measham, Newcombe, & Parker, 1994). Drug users are no longer members of a deviant subculture where their master status is determined by their choice to use drugs (Mostaghim & Hathaway, 2013). Instead, drug use has become entrenched in society through an increase of social and cultural acceptance of drug users (Pennay & Measham, 2016). The normalization framework has been referred to as a “barometer of change”, which recognizes that attitudes and behaviours regarding illegal drugs and drug users change over time (Parker, 2005, p. 206). It is intended specifically for recreational drug use, defined as “the occasional use of certain substances in certain settings and in a controlled way” (Parker, 2005, p. 206). Normalization can be identified through six indicators of change:

 increasing access and availability in the community;

 increasing prevalence of use;

 increasingly tolerant attitudes toward drug use by users and non- users;

24  expectations among current abstainers regarding future initiation of drug use;

 the cultural accommodation of drug cultures in film, TV, and music; and

 more liberal policy shifts (Parker, 2005, p. 206-207).

The normalization thesis has been called the “most important development in contemporary sociology of drug use” in decades (Sandberg, 2013, as cited in Duff & Erickson, 2014, p. 211) “because it differed from previous criminological and psychological theories that associated drug use with deviance or resistance, subcultural affiliation, and pathology of disease” (Pennay & Measham, 2016, p. 187). Numerous Canadian studies have juxtaposed the normalization thesis with other research on cannabis (Osborne & Fogel, 2017; Asbridge, Valleriani, Kwok, & Erickson, 2016; Hathaway, Mostaghim, Kolar, Erickson, & Osborne, 2016; Duff & Erickson, 2014; Mostaghim, & Hathaway, 2013; Brochu, Duff, Asbridge, & Erickson, 2011), which is the most normalized of all illicit substances (Osborne & Fogel, 2008, 2007; Hathaway, 1997; Measham et al., 1994). For example, Osborne and Fogel (2017) conducted interviews on Canadian recreational cannabis users and found support for three normalization dimensions including availability and access, prevalence of use, and drug trying rates. They found that users integrated drug use into their daily lives in responsible and controlled ways (p. 23). The authors argued that the participants' drug use rates were determined by family, work, and financial obligations, rather than the illegality of the drug. This finding is congruent with that of Duff and Erickson (2014) who found that the risks associated with cannabis use are managed and controlled through responsible, conscientious use. Cannabis-using Canadians consume with few health or social consequences, suggesting the risk profile of cannabis has shifted.

Other research considers liberal policy shifts as an indicator of normalization. In 2011, Brochu et al. gathered data from Canadian cannabis users, which revealed a pattern of inconsistent enforcement. Police officers often asked users to stop use and dispose, instead of proceeding with formal charges. Users viewed the irregularities as de facto decriminalization, and one interviewee even noted that “the worst they [police] can do is take it away from you right?” (Brochu et al., 2011, p 107). The authors argued that the discrepancy between Canadian law and enforcement policy contributed to normalization, even in the absence of formal reform. Thus, Canada’s cannabis

25 legalization allows Canada to more closely adhere to the normalization process Parker outlined (Asbridge et al., 2016, p. 221).

The empirical evidence demonstrates the normalization of cannabis in Canada; recreational drug use has become an unremarkable leisure activity. Consequently, cannabis legalization is a liberal policy change to align state responses with this social reality. Employing this framework shows how cannabis legalization is an unsurprising response considering the available data. This paper contributes to the normalization thesis literature by examining the processual aspects of implementing a liberal policy shift in Canada.

26 Chapter 3.

Methods

3.1. Study objectives

This thesis is based upon a qualitative study of the social, legal, and political context of cannabis in Canada between 2000 and 2017. Exploratory in nature, the main objective of this study is to identify the factors that preceded the introduction of the Act to improve the understanding of law reform in Canada. This is the first study to thoroughly examine its evolution, and was guided by two questions:

1. What events preceded the introduction of the Cannabis Act?

2. What does the evolution of the Cannabis Act demonstrate about law reform?

3.2. Research design

To achieve these objectives, the study employed a case study analysis. The primary procedure included a qualitative content analysis of newspaper articles from the Globe and Mail. Findings were supplemented with secondary information from academic articles, government statistics, and financial information.

3.2.1. Case study analysis

Case study analysis is a qualitative research methodology, which allows researchers to thoroughly explore an issue using a variety of data sources (Baškarada, 2014). In case study, all the data are collected and analyzed together. Like puzzle pieces, each finding contributes to the researcher’s overall understanding of the phenomenon and strengthens the conclusions (Baxter & Jack, 2008). This allows for a multi-faceted examination and produces a holistic understanding of the phenomenon.

There are some methodological challenges associated with case study design. As Palys (1989) outlines, case study is not highly regarded among researchers because of its inherent lack of manipulative control. Within science, there is a hierarchy of

27 research methods, with the “best” being those where the researcher can exert control over the study’s conditions (ie. laboratory studies). However, due to the nature of case study design, researchers do not have the ability to manipulate the conditions of the case (nor would they want to because the goal of case study design is not to influence the case, but to understand it within its context). Consequently, the concern is that case studies may fail to recognize rival plausible explanations of the phenomenon (Palys, 1989). Case study researchers amass countless data and observations and may fail to see the forest through the trees in their interpretation, which can significantly reduce the reliability of their findings. Thus, it is the researcher’s responsibility to identify, explore, and eliminate (if possible) all other relevant factors.

In this study, I was able to mitigate this risk by incorporating both critical events and key themes in the analysis. I approached this study with a broad lens, attempting to initially include as much data as possible, before narrowing down the findings into several key findings. By using this process, I became familiar with the events and could determine which factors were most important.

3.2.2. Data source and access

The main data source for this study is newspaper articles from the Globe and Mail, which was selected because of its national readership and high popularity. The Globe is also quite representational and provides a wide range of viewpoints on current events and issues. Access to the articles was obtained through the ProQuest Canadian Newsstream database, which is an open-source database containing full-text content of Canadian news sources from 1977 to present. Database access was obtained via the Simon Fraser University Library website.

3.2.3. Sampling procedure

For this study, I decided to employ a criterion sampling strategy using the key words “cannabis” or “marijuana”. Initial search results that included cannabis synonyms, such as pot, weed, or grass generated nearly 23,000 articles because each article that used the search term, regardless of context, was included. To reduce the volume of data, I arbitrarily decided to limit the number of key words to two and selected cannabis and marijuana. I decided to use these specific key words because they are most

28 commonly used to describe the substance. Since cannabis synonyms represent jargon, I believed that limiting my results to more popular, commonly used language would capture the broadest range of newspaper articles, while simultaneously limiting their number.

The search was limited to all articles that were published between January 1, 2000 and April 14, 2017. The year 2000 was chosen as a minimum search parameter because was it was the year the courts first invalidated cannabis prohibition in R v Parker (2000). April 14, 2017 was chosen as the maximum search parameter because this was the date the Act was introduced in the House of Commons. Thus, these parameters can capture a wide range of events prior to the introduction of the Act and describe a criterion sampling method (Palys & Atchison, 2014).

Initial search results yielded 5,238 articles, and two filters were applied to reduce the volume of data. First, only articles that contained the search terms in the full text at least three times were included further. This was an arbitrary condition, implemented to ensure cannabis was the theme of the article and not a passing reference. However, since many articles used colloquial language (ie. weed, pot, grass) interchangeably with the search terms, this condition may have excluded articles that used a search term once or twice and colloquial language throughout the article. Further, because the focus of this thesis is on events, I felt confident excluding articles in this way would not diminish my findings. I believe that any events critical to the introduction of the Act would have met this criterion because at least one article used the search terms cannabis or marijuana at least three times. While it is likely that some events were excluded through the use of this filter, I did not thoroughly examine articles that contained less than three key words to identify their key differences. Second, only articles published in the news section of the paper were retained. The news articles have higher readership and contain important general interest stories. Consequently, articles that discussed the emerging industry or health reports but were published in other sections of the newspaper were excluded. Including these two conditions narrowed the number of articles to 935.

Next, each article was briefly scanned and those that were a duplicate item, not relevant to the study, or a letter to the editor were excluded. Articles were deemed not relevant to the study if they did not describe or comment on a cannabis-related news

29 event. I defined a cannabis-related news event as an event that changed Canada’s relationship with cannabis. For example, news articles that detailed the discovery of clay pipes that may have been used by William Shakespeare to smoke cannabis were excluded. Similarly, news of ’s television channel or ongoing extradition battles were also excluded. Although Emery is a well-known cannabis activist, I did not include these because he did not face Canadian legal challenges, and I felt that much of his influence was confined to the province of BC. Because I wanted to understand the cannabis with a national lens, I chose to exclude stories with a regional focus. There were several other regional stories, especially from BC, that were excluded (ie. Stop the Violence campaign, organized crime) because of their regional focus. While these events likely played a role in changing public opinion, I decided to maintain a high-level, national approach. I also excluded articles about drug seizures, drug testing, cannabis spirituality, and celebrity cannabis charges, among other things because I did not believe they were events influential to the introduction of the Act, though the stories may have influenced public opinion.

The number of remaining articles was 285 and were published in various sections of the newspaper including national news, international news, comment, and editorial. Some editorial articles were included because they discussed a specific news event, while those that outlined the Globe’s position on cannabis policy were largely excluded. A copy of each article was download from the database saved on a USB for data management.

3.3. Data analysis

The article title, year, and section (ie. international news, health) were recorded into an Excel spreadsheet. Each article was visually scanned and descriptively coded to represent the subject of the article, which was placed in a new column in Excel. This code was useful to identify commonalities between articles when the titles were unclear. For example, in 2015, the Globe published an article titled “Anti-pot policies help industry grow”, which describes the relationship between government regulations and the new commercial industry.

The purpose of this study is to understand the social, legal, and political context of cannabis in Canada. To do so, I re-read the articles to identify influential newsworthy

30 events that discussed cannabis. How had the social, legal, and political relationship with cannabis changed? What were the key events that influenced these changes? After reducing the number of articles, I went through and identified each news event. Of the 285 articles, I identified 34 cannabis-related news events, all of which were described in at least one newspaper article. At this stage, I did not exclude articles; rather, I looked at the articles to identify the major events they discussed. Some articles did not discuss events, but instead detailed reform ideas from politicians, commented on health studies, and provided general commentary on cannabis policy. Thus, the 34 events included in the study represent marked changes in Canada’s history with cannabis. As shown in Table 4, the selected events discussed important developments in Canada’s history with cannabis such as court cases, medical regulations, public opinion polls, and international developments.

Upon review of the chronology, I felt that some of these events were more important to the introduction of the Act than others. For example, R. v Parker is a landmark judicial decision that strongly influenced that nature of cannabis in Canada, leading to the introduction of the first medical regulations for authorized patients. Alternatively, the outcome of Hitzig v Canada struck down several sections of the regulations, but did not categorically change Canada’s social, legal, or political relationship with cannabis. Similarly, Colorado and Washington’s reform ballot set a legal precedent by becoming the first states to regulate cannabis, while California’s reform ballot in 2010 was important, but it did not pass and legalization was only approved in 2016. I felt it was important to identify this distinction between events listed in the chronology, so I selected 14 that influenced social, legal, and political nature of cannabis reform, and termed them critical events (Chapter 4). Critical events were operationalized as influential initiatives to reform cannabis policy. These include landmark court cases, government bills, government inquiries, medical regulations, and international developments that shaped the law reform process. The remaining events, while not influential individually, were grouped thematically to show their significance over time. Themes include judicial decisions, international developments, medical regulations, commercial industry, and public opinion (Chapter 5). A summary of the sampling and analytical process is available in Figure 2.

Because of the large volume of newspaper articles (285) used in the study, a coding system was adopted. The first two letters of the code indicate the newspaper;

31 “GM” refers to the Globe and Mail. The first two numbers refer to the last two digits of the year the article was published. For example, “00” refers to 2000 and “10” refers to 2010. The last two digits indicate the chronological position of the article within that year. Therefore, “0204” refers to the fourth article published in 2002. A full list of the articles is available in Appendix A.

Table 4. Chronology of cannabis-related events

R v Parker Reform ballots in Alaska & California 2000 R v Krieger Marijuana Medical Access Regulations 2001 47% of Canadians support legalization Senate Special Committee Reform in Britain 2002 Reform ballot in Nevada House of Commons Special Committee Hitzig v Canada 2003 R v Malmo-Levine, R v Caine, R v Clay Reform Bill C-38 Possession charges decrease 30% 2004 Reform Bill C-17 2005 Conservative Party elected 2006 Reform in Mexico 2007 R v Sfetkopoulos 2008 2009 Reform ballot in California 2010 2011 Safe Streets Act Reform ballot in Colorado & Washington 2012 R v Mernagh 2013 Reform in Uruguay Marijuana for Medical Purposes Regulations Allard v Canada Reform ballot in Oregon & Alaska 2014 Retail sales begin in Colorado & Washington Vancouver regulates dispensaries 2015 R v Smith Liberal Party elected Allard v Canada Reform ballot in California Access for Cannabis for Medicinal 2016 Purposes Regulations 68% of Canadians support legalization 2017 Bill C-45 Note: Crucial events have been bolded.

32 3.4. Ethical considerations

The current study was exempt from ethics review under section 7.3 of the Simon Fraser University Research Ethics Review because data were retrieved from an open- source database with no reasonable expectation of privacy2. My analysis of publicly available data precluded common ethical concerns (such as informed consent, confidentiality, privacy, and deception) from affecting my work. Instead, my ethical considerations included ensuring the quality of my findings. While quantitative research relies on the concepts of validity, reliability, and generalizability, credible qualitative research is approached differently and judged on separate standards.

Quality qualitative research depends on the authenticity and trustworthiness of the research, which can be demonstrated through attributes of dependability, confirmability, credibility, and transferability (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, as cited in Fabian, 2010, p. 104). Dependability and confirmability establish where the data comes from, how it is collected, and how it is used. Methodologists recommend developing an audit trail to track each research decision to show how data was analyzed and themes were developed (Golafshani, 2003), so I kept notes throughout the research process. Credibility is the degree of believability of the research findings, while transferability is whether the findings can be applied to another situation or context. By situating the findings in what is already known about cannabis policy, I can establish the reliability and validity of my findings.

2 SFU Policy R 20.01 (Available at http://www.sfu.ca/policies/gazette/research/r20-01.html)

33 Figure 2. Sampling and analytical process

5,238 articles Initial search conducted Search terms "cannabis" or "marijuana"

935 articles Search terms appeared at least three times Published in news section

285 articles Duplicate, non-relevant, or letters to the editor excluded

34 events Initial chronology developed 14 critical events, 5 key themes

34 Chapter 4.

Results: Critical Events

This chapter presents the findings of the chronology. It summarizes the crucial cannabis-related events that occurred between January 1, 2000 and April 13, 2017. The events include court cases, medical regulations, proposed government bills, and international developments, all of which changed the nature of cannabis in Canada.

Before beginning, it is necessary to understand the social, legal, and political context of cannabis in Canada in 2000. Shortly before the turn of the century, there was a court case involving HIV/AIDS patient Jim Wakeford (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015). Charged with possession and cultivation, Wakeford claimed cannabis relieved his medical symptoms and he sought a constitutional exemption to the CDSA by writing letters to the Health Minister. In response, the Health Minister informed Wakeford he would need a scientific sponsor to demonstrate cannabis use for medical purposes was safe (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015). Discouraged, Wakeford understood an exemption was unlikely and challenged his case in court, arguing possession and cultivation prohibition infringed on his s. 7 Canadian Charter or Rights and Freedoms (Charter) rights. The Ontario Superior Court ruled prohibition did infringe on his liberty and security rights, acknowledging his need to treat his ailments without fear of arrest. Thus, the court asked Health Canada to develop a process for medical patients to access cannabis, so Wakeford could “to treat his terminal illness effectively and with dignity” (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015, p. 2). After trial, Health Canada created an exemption under s. 56 of the CDSA, which allowed the Health Minister to grant individuals exemptions from the cannabis possession section of the CDSA. Mr. Wakeford was the first Canadian granted an exemption on June 9, 1999 (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015).

4.1. R v Parker (2000)

The following year, the Ontario Court of Appeal heard the case of Terrence Parker, a cannabis activist who suffered frequent and severe epileptic seizures (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015). Traditional medical treatments had failed to provide any relief, but he found cannabis helped to minimize the frequency and severity of his

35 seizures (McIntosh, 2005). Since he could not locate a legal source of cannabis, he grew his own.

Parker was the first to challenge the prohibition of cannabis because it forced him to choose between adequate medical treatment and illegal activity. He was charged with cannabis possession under the CDSA but argued the federal government’s blanket prohibition under the CDSA infringed on his s. 7 Charter rights because it did not allow for the medicinal use of cannabis (McIntosh, 2005). The trial judge agreed and stayed the charges, which the Crown appealed (GM0004). However, the Court of Appeal unanimously found that the blanket prohibition infringed on Parker’s s. 7 liberty and security rights because it limited access to medical treatment (Hern, 2001).

Prohibition forced Parker to “choose between commission of a crime to obtain effective medical treatment and inadequate treatment” (R v Parker, 2000, para 107). The judge found that the decision to use cannabis for medicinal purposes is a decision of fundamental personal importance and should be protected by the Charter (Hern, 2001). Principles of fundamental justice require that individuals have autonomy to make personal choices, and medical decisions fall within this category (Rodriguez v. British Columbia, 1993; R v Morgentaler, 1988). Prohibition, therefore, was inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice because it denied individuals access to a medicine they need (Hern, 2001). Additionally, the Court found that blanket prohibition without a medical exemption was overbroad to achieve the state’s objective:

To the extent that the state's interest in prohibiting marijuana is to prevent the harms associated with marijuana use including protecting the health of users, it is irrational to deprive a person of the drug when he or she requires it to maintain their health. As in Morgentaler, the court must consider the actual effect of the legislation (R v Parker, 2000, para 144).

As a result, the Court ruled prohibition breached s. 7 liberty and security rights and could not be saved by s. 1, finding the possession offence to be of no force and effect (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015). Further, exemptions under s. 56 of the CDSA were ruled unconstitutional because they were arbitrarily granted by the Health Minister and not subject to oversight (Lucas, 2008). The federal government was given one year to amend the law or allow it to be struck down, effectively decriminalizing cannabis possession for medical purposes.

36 4.2. R v Krieger (2000)

Later that year, another case concerning the constitutionality of cannabis was decided in Alberta. Grant Krieger was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and grew cannabis for himself and others with severe or chronic pain (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015). He was charged with cannabis production under the CDSA and argued this violated his s. 7 Charter rights. The trial judge found that since no legal source of seeds or cannabis plants were available, medical patients who should be legally entitled to access cannabis, had to participate in the illicit market to do so. The judge commented on the ironic situation:

Obtaining a s. 56 exemption from the Minister of Health triggers the absurdity that an individual who has been granted an exemption has the legal right to produce, possess and use cannabis marihuana. However, in order to obtain the product, that individual is required to participate in an illegal act… (R v Krieger, 2000, para 36).

Consequently, the judge struck down the production offence and the declaration of invalidity was suspended for one year. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision and the Supreme Court of Canada later refused leave.

Parker and Krieger were high-profile cases concerned with the use of cannabis for medical purposes. The implications, however, affected medical and recreational users and cannabis law reform in general. Notably, the courts recognized the applicability of Charter arguments in issues of choice and drug use (Fischer et al., 2003, p. 276) and several cases have since used Charter arguments to challenge the CDSA and medical cannabis regulations (Hitzig v Canada, 2003; R v Malmo-Levine, R v Caine, 2003; R v Clay, 2003; Sfetkopoulos v. Canada, 2008; R v Mernagh, 2013; Allard v Canada, 2016). In both Parker and Krieger, the courts gave the government an ultimatum: amend the CDSA to reflect the Charter deficiencies or allow the legislation to become null and void (Fischer et al., 2003). The federal government responded, and through Health Canada, introduced the first in a series of medical cannabis access regulations in 2001.

37 4.3. Marijuana Medical Access Regulations (2001)

When the Marijuana Medical Access Regulations (MMAR) came into force July 30, 2001, Health Canada had already granted 250 exemptions under s. 56 (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015). The MMAR outlined the eligibility criteria and process for legally obtaining government permission to possess and access a legal supply of cannabis (Capler et al., 2017, p. 2). Under the MMAR, there were three categories of medical patients, each with slightly different application requirements. Tier one was for those suffering from a terminal illness where death was expected within one year; tier two was for individuals who had a specified medical condition (ie. AIDS, HIV, cancer), and tier three was for those with severe symptoms that were not associated with a disease specified in tier one or tier two (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015). Authorized Canadians could grow their own or designate someone to grow for them, both of which required a license, although seeds were not provided.

The application process under the MMAR was arduous. It included a lengthy medical declaration from a physician (and/or specialist) that outlined the diagnosis, symptoms, and daily cannabis dose, among other things. Patients also had to sign a declaration stating they understood cannabis was not regulated by the Food and Drugs Act, they understood the risks of cannabis use, and would only use cannabis for medicinal purposes (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015).

The medical community pushed back on the regulations, expressing serious concerns about medicinal cannabis use. Specifically, the Canadian Medical Protective Association, the Canadian Medical Association, and the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario highlighted the lack of scientific research on the risks of short and long-term use, medical benefits, appropriate dosage, method of administration, relationship with other drugs, and the effect of cannabis on other medical conditions (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015, p. 4). Under the MMAR, physicians became gatekeepers for a drug that had not been through rigorous regulatory review, and the CMPA and CMA expressed concerns about medico-legal liability. The organizations urged Health Canada to amend the regulations and advised their physicians to exercise caution if they decided to participate (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015). Regardless, the number of patients authorized to possess medical cannabis under the MMAR grew. In September 2002, there were 376 authorized patients, 622 in May 2004, and 2,639 in May 2008 (R v Beren, 2009).

38 The number of medical users has continued to grow in recent years, to over 330,000 in June 2018 (Health Canada, 2018).

4.4. Senate Special Committee (2002)

The Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs was created in 2001 to examine cannabis legislation, policies, and programs following criticism of the CDSA (Fischer et al., 2003). Lead by Senator Claude Nolin, the committee conducted extensive research and consultation, culminating in a 2002 report. They found that “cannabis in itself poses very little danger to users and to society as a whole” (Senate Special Committee, 2002, p. 42) and that “the continued prohibition of cannabis jeopardizes the health and well- being of Canadians much more than does the substance itself or the regulated marketing of the substance” (Senate Special Committee, 2002, p. 45). Further, they argued cannabis criminalization “undermines the fundamental values… of a country based on diversity and tolerance” (Senate Special Committee, 2002, p. 45). Instead, the committee recommended the government legalize cannabis possession and use and regulate its production and sale, arguing the state should only prohibit what is necessary to ensure “respect for life, other persons and a harmonious community… supporting and assisting others, not judging and condemning difference” (Senate Special Committee, 2002, p. 45).

The report’s recommendation for a legalized and regulated framework received strong support from activists and patients, sparking national debate about Canada’s drug laws (GM0219). Not everyone was enthusiastic about the Senate’s report, and a Globe editorial urged compromise and pushed for cannabis decriminalization, arguing “the committee has gone too far” (GM0222). The editorial stated that “taking the outright leap to legalization would pose enormous difficulties” (GM0222).

These difficulties were likely to come from the United Nations and United States, who both cautioned Canada against implementing a legalized and regulatory system. The executive director of the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Mr. Antonio Maria Costa, argued countries send the wrong message to developing nations when they change drug policy and reminded politicians of their obligation as a signatory to various anti-drug UN conventions (GM0226). Sternly worded warnings also came from the United States’ Office of National Drug Control Policy Director John Walters. He

39 “sharply criticized … for allowing ill people to smoke pot and for considering relaxed anti marijuana laws” (GM0223). US officials argued cannabis law reform would make Canada a hub of cannabis traffic and threatened tougher measures at the border: “if there's a higher risk of illegal drugs moving… we're not going to sit idly by” (GM0228). According to Walters, medicinal cannabis had no scientific basis and liberalized cannabis policy was “ludicrous” (GM0235).

Despite the backlash, the federal government indicated its intention to move toward the smaller step of decriminalization in its Throne Speech later that year (House of Commons, 2002). The speech stated the following:

The government will also implement a national drug strategy to address addiction while promoting public safety. It will expand the number of drug treatment courts. It will act on the results of parliamentary consultations with Canadians on options for change in our drug laws, including the possibility of the decriminalization of marijuana possession (House of Commons, 2002).

Although it mentioned the possibility of decriminalization, Canada saw greater pressure from the US government (GM0239).

4.5. House of Commons Special Committee (2002)

At the end of the year, the House of Commons Special Committee on the Non- Medical Use of Drugs released their final report, which reviewed cannabis law and policy (Special Committee on Non-Medical Use of Drugs, 2002). The House Committee was created in 2001 following debate in the House of Commons after the introduction of a private member’s bill to make simple possession an administrative offence (Fischer et al., 2003). Acknowledging cannabis policy was a non-partisan issue, the House Committee was formed to discuss options.

Unlike the Senate Committee, the House Committee adopted a moderate tone and recommended cannabis decriminalization (GM0237). Their report suggested the government develop a policy for "decriminalizing the possession and cultivation of not more than thirty grams of cannabis for personal use” (Special Committee on Non- Medical Use of Drugs, 2002, p. 131). Other recommendations included an administrative ticketing scheme, which would implement fines for possession and production violations

40 (Fischer et al., 2003; Special Committee on Non-Medical Use of Drugs, 2002). Shortly after the report was released, Justice Minister Martin Cauchon announced that cannabis policy changes would be introduced in 2003 (GM0236).

4.6. Bill C-38 (2003)

Accordingly, the federal Liberal government introduced Bill C-38, An Act to amend the Contraventions Act and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, under the leadership of Jean Chrétien in May 2003 (Fischer et al., 2003). It proposed to decriminalize possession of less than 15 grams of cannabis by making it a contravention under the Contraventions Act. Possession would remain illegal, but not be subject to criminal sanctions. Instead, fines would range from $100 – 400, while penalties for possession over 15 grams would remain the same. Measures to strengthen cultivation penalties were also included (Hyshka, 2009).

Observers noted the government’s purpose behind Bill C-38 was to increase enforcement: if possession was decriminalized, police would be more willing to punish users (Hyshka, 2009, p. 77). Thus, the bill was an attempt to increase the deterrent effect of existing cannabis laws and did not represent a marked departure from the federal government’s cannabis policy. As Hyshka notes, “the federal government’s intention that more people face legal sanctions for cannabis use demonstrated continued adherence to the view that drug use is primarily a matter of law enforcement rather than public health” (2009, p. 78).

Following its first reading, the bill was referred to committee and reintroduced in the House. The committee sought to make a distinction between possession for personal use and possession for the purposes of trafficking and returned the bill to the House in October (Hyshka, 2009). However, Chrétien prorogued Parliament prior to the Liberal leadership race (which selected as Canada’s prime minister), and Bill C-38 died before it could receive a second reading (Hyshka, 2009).

41 4.7. Bill C-17 (2004)

Bill C-17 was introduced in November 2004 (GM0411; GM0412). Like the previous bills, it was referred to the justice committee two weeks after introduction in the House of Commons (Hyshka, 2009, p. 79). Unfortunately, it sat with the committee for nearly a year without being studied and died in November 2005 when the government fell. When the federal election was held in January 2006, the Conservative Party of Canada formed government, effectively ending an era of cannabis policy reform in Canada, albeit one with very little significant legislative change.

4.8. Reform ballot in Colorado and Washington (2012)

Over the next few years, there was no discussion of decriminalization or legalization under Prime Minster ’s government. In fact, the next crucial event occurred in 2012, when Colorado’s Amendment 64 and Washington’s Initiative 502 both received 55% of the vote, legalizing the production, purchase, and possession of cannabis for adults (Pardo, 2014; GM1203). Both states implemented a free-market approach that regulated cannabis like alcohol. In Colorado, the Marijuana Enforcement Division (under the Department of Revenue) was granted authority to oversee the emerging industry. Production licenses were awarded to companies and individuals following background and security checks (Rolles & Murkin, 2016). There were no restrictions on the potency, product, or strain that could be produced, but strict regulations on product packaging (Rolles & Murkin, 2016).

Legislative changes in Colorado and Washington have allowed interested Canadians to learn about the strengths and weaknesses of the free-market approach, and the Globe published numerous articles on the status of legalization (GM1401; GM1403; GM1303; GM1208). The industry provided a new source of tax revenue, generating $67 million the year the retail market opened (2014), and reached $247 million in 2017 from taxes and licensing fees (Hartman, Humphreys, Burack, & Lambert, 2018; Brohl, Kammerzell, & Koski, 2015). Legalization has also created jobs as the industry evolved; Colorado’s unemployment rate dropped from 8.2% to 3.0% between 2012 and 2017, below the national average (Bureau of Labour Statistics, n.d., b).

42 Further, legalization may decrease alcohol use as some empirical evidence suggests that adults substitute cannabis for alcohol (Subbaraman, 2016). Prevalence estimates from the US National Survey on Drug Use and Health shows there has been an increase in past-month cannabis use between 2014 and 2017 in states with legal recreational cannabis, with some decreases in past-month alcohol use3 (Appendix B; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, n.d.). The biggest decrease in alcohol use was in Nevada, where past-month use among adults aged 18- 25 decreased 15.76% (65.70% in 2014; 49.94 in 2017). Similarly, Colorado saw a decrease in past-month alcohol use from 67.46% to 62.66% over the same period. However, Washington saw a slight increase in cannabis and alcohol use, so it is unclear whether these changes are statistically significant or coincidental. Therefore, more analysis is needed to understand the relationship between cannabis, alcohol, and legalization (Reed, 2016).

Other Globe articles detailed the difficulties of legalized cannabis, cautioning onlookers (GM1502; GM1503). Some of the challenges included new methods of consumption, the illicit market, and the tensions between public health and profit, and industry and investment (Subritzky et al., 2016; Cambron et al., 2017; Carnevale, Kagan, Murphy, & Esrick, 2017; Ghosh et al., 2017; Jensen & Roussell, 2016; Reed, 2016; Roffman, 2016; Monte et al., 2015; Pardo, 2014). For example, one of the most unexpected outcomes of legalization in Colorado was the popularity of edibles. As shown in Figure 3, a total of 2.8 million units of edibles were sold to recreational customers in 2014, and this has increased steadily since4 (Hartman et al., 2018; Brohl, Humphreys, Kammerzell, & Burack, 2017; Brohl, Kammerzell, Koski, & Burack, 2016; Brohl et al., 2015).

3 These changes may also reflect a greater willingness to report use, given the changing legal status of cannabis in several US states. 4 Colorado data does not compare sales of flower to edibles and concentrates, making it difficult to determine the market share of each. However, in 2017, over 238,000 pounds (approximately 108,022 kilograms) of cannabis were sold under the retail market in 2017. Assuming users consume ½ gram per cigarette, this would equate to 54 million cigarettes (or units), which far exceeds the 9.3 million units of edibles sold during the same time.

43 Figure 3. Units of edibles sold in Colorado

10,000,000 9,000,000 8,000,000 7,000,000 6,000,000 5,000,000 4,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000 0 2014 2015 2016 2017

Medical Retail

Source: Hartman et al., 2018; Brohl, Humphreys, Kammerzell, & Burack, 2017; Brohl, Kammerzell, Koski, & Burack, 2016; Brohl et al., 2015.

However, edibles pose unique challenges, unlike other consumption methods, and Colorado legislators scrambled to create edible-specific regulations (Gourdet et al., 2017). Unlike smoking, edible cannabis presents a delayed activation that depends on the user’s body composition, sex, and eating habits (Kosa et al., 2017). Another concern is the THC content per serving, as it is inconsistent throughout the edible. Thus, users may overconsume because they do not feel the anticipated effects, but the inconsistency of the THC content can lead to a longer-lasting or more intense result (Gourdet et al., 2017). Edibles do not contain any distinguishing features and look like other candy or baked goods, leading to several instances of accidental ingestion, which led to an increase in the number of poison control calls and emergency room visits (Subritzky et al., 2016). The government swiftly responded, enacting stricter packaging and labelling regulations for edibles (Ghosh et al., 2017).

4.9. Reform in Uruguay (2013)

Meanwhile, in December 2013, Uruguay became the first country to legalize the production, distribution, and consumption of cannabis for non-medical and non-scientific purposes (Cruz et al., 2018). Promoted by “socialist guerilla” and former President Jose Mujica, Uruguayan legislators approved legalization despite heavy opposition from the public (GM1420). Uruguay’s strict regulatory approach gives the state a monopoly over the production, processing, and sale of cannabis to undermine the illicit drug market and

44 lower consumption patterns (Rolles & Murkin, 2016; GM1423). The regulatory body, the by Institute for the Regulation and Control of Cannabis (IRCCA), oversees the production and distribution of cannabis. Producers are contracted by the state to grow cannabis on state land under private and government security (Rolles & Murkin, 2016). The producers sell the cannabis to the government, who distribute through pharmacies to registered users and any form of promotion is strictly prohibited (Rolles & Murkin, 2016, p. 256). Uruguay has legalized five strains, with predetermined THC and CBD levels and cannabis taxes fund the IRCCA and public education campaigns. Further, Uruguay permits residents to grow up to six plants in the house and allows small cannabis cooperatives.

The cooperatives (or cannabis social clubs) are non-profit organizations that produce and distribute cannabis to certain adult users (Decorte et al., 2017). These are legal and regulated in Uruguay, allowing members to pool cannabis allowances. Cooperatives can have between 15 and 45 members and can grow up to 99 plants (Rolles & Murkin, 2016). After completing a lengthy authorization process, groups register with the IRCCA, where they must comply with many legal requirements (Decorte et al., 2017). As of September 2018, 107 cooperatives had been approved by the IRCCA (IRCCA, n.d.).

Despite being the first country to legalize cannabis, most published academic research is on the changing public opinion of Uruguayans and there is little research on the implementation effects (Cruz et al., 2018; Cerda & Kilmer, 2017). Researchers have had a challenging time as bureaucracy, funding, and stigma have hampered efforts (Robles, 2018). However, some data are beginning to trickle out of the IRCCA: three reports published in 2018 provide data on registered Uruguayans (IRCCA, 2018). The data show that lifetime and past 12-month cannabis use have both increased since legalization. Observers suggest this is due to an increase in non-typical consumers, including women, adults over 35, and rural residents (Musto & Robaina, 2018). However, more research is needed to better understand the benefits and challenges of Uruguay’s system.

Colorado, Washington, and Uruguay’s adopted policies are outlined in Table 5 and a key difference between the three jurisdictions is the penalties for unauthorized possession. In Uruguay there is no penalty, whereas in Washington violators face up to

45 a $1000 fine or 90 days in jail. Another difference is the drugged driving standard; where Colorado and Washington set a limit at five nanograms of THC per millilitre of blood, in Uruguay, any detectable THC deems a driver impaired. These changes showcased how legalization might work in Canada. International developments elicited much excitement among Canadians and reignited the cannabis-reform discussion.

Table 5. Comparative cannabis policy

Colorado Washington Uruguay State constitution, laws, State law and Level of law National law and regulations regulation Minimum age 21 21 18 Personal possession 28.5 g 28.5 g 40 g Penalties for unauthorized Up to $1000 fine or up Up to $100 fine None personal possession to 90 days in jail Home grows 6 plants None allowed 6 plants Potency limits – flower Not specified Not specified IRCCA set THC limit Potency limits – edibles 10 mg THC/ serving 10 mg THC/ serving IRCCA set THC limit Any detectable THC Drugged driving standard 5 ng THC/mL blood 5 ng THC/mL blood deems impaired 10% sales tax; 15% Product tax 37% sales tax Not specified excise tax on wholesale Source: Pardo, 2014.

4.10. Marijuana for Medical Purposes Regulations (2014)

Following a barrage of court cases and political challenges to the MMAR, the federal government announced it would rewrite the medical cannabis regulations (GM1102). In the previous ten years, the courts had ordered rule changes to the system eight times while patient complaints regarding onerous applications, excessive waits, and poor-quality cannabis increased (Capler et al., 2017; GM1001). Under the MMAR, patients could grow their own, designate someone to grow it for them, or purchase cannabis directly from Health Canada. However, under the new medical regulations, the Marijuana for Medical Purposes Regulations (MMPR), there was only one legal avenue to obtain cannabis: purchase though licensed producers authorized by Health Canada (Government of Canada, 2001, 2013, 2016). These regulations came into effect April 1, 2014, and essentially created a free market system that opened the door for an emerging new commercial industry.

46 Firms from a range of industries applied for a Health Canada licensed producer licence, optimistic of future growth opportunities (GM1501). Initial federal projections in 2013 estimated revenues to exceed $1.3 billion by 2024 serving 400,000 patients; however, as shown in Figure 4, the number of registered patients reached 330,000 in June 2018 (Health Canada, 2018; GM1313). Over the next three and a half years, 35 firms received permission from Health Canada to participate in the medical cannabis industry (Health Canada, 2018b).

Figure 4. Registered medical cannabis patients

350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000

-

Jun-16 Jun-14 Jun-15 Jun-17 Jun-18

Mar-15 Mar-16 Mar-17 Mar-18

Dec-14 Sep-15 Dec-15 Sep-16 Dec-16 Sep-17 Dec-17 Sep-14 Source: Health Canada, 2018.

Under the MMPR, licensed producers (LPs) were only allowed to deliver cannabis to patients via registered mail. LPs expressed concerns about the security and reliability of the direct mail system, but Health Canada insisted this system would “[strike] an appropriate balance between individuals’ need for access and communities’ need for safety and security” (Government of Canada, 2013). Following the advice of law enforcement, fire departments, and municipalities, Health Canada argued direct mail would be safer and reduce diversion than retail storefronts (Government of Canada, 2013). One drawback of the direct mail system was the lack of producer-patient consultation. Patients seeking alternative methods of pain relief could not discuss different strains, methods of administration, or dosing practices, and many patients turned to local dispensaries for education and advice (Capler et al., 2017; GM1510; Belle-Isle et al., 2014). Dispensary patients were found to be older, value specific strains, and use greater amounts of cannabis (Capler et al., 2017, p. 6).

47 As shown in Figure 5, the number of dispensaries surged between 2012 and 2015, as evident by data retrieved by the Globe from the City of Vancouver (Keller, 2015). Vancouver’s British Columbia Compassion Club Society (BCCCS) was the first dispensary to open in 1997, and is a non-profit organization that provides holistic care, including acupuncture, counselling, and herbalism to its 10,000 members (Lucas, 2008, p. 3; BCCCS, n.d.). While the BCCCS supports individuals living with chronic or debilitating illnesses, many of the newer dispensaries began selling cannabis for recreational uses (Keller, 2015). Under the MMPR, licensed producers were limited to offering dried flower and oil, but many dispensaries also sold pills, lotions, and edibles (Keller, 2015).

Figure 5. Number of dispensaries in Vancouver

120 100 80 60 40 20

0

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2015 2000 Source: Keller, 2015.

As dispensaries continued to pop up, the Canadian Medical Cannabis Industry Association called on the federal government to clarify the legality of storefront shops. The association argued that “the lack of clear regulations and enforcement perpetuates the unfair playing field for the licensed producers, who have sunk millions of dollars into the highly secure growing facilities and quality-control processes mandated by Health Canada's medical-marijuana regime” (GM1604). Writing for the Globe, PhD student Jenna Valleriani similarly argued that “the continued existence of dispensaries is really premised on the government's failure to create a program that can stand up to constitutional scrutiny and the increasingly relaxed attitudes of Canadians toward cannabis” (GM1510). Thus, the prevalence of dispensaries demonstrated the federal government’s inability to create a medical cannabis framework that met the needs of patients and expectations of citizens.

48 4.11. Vancouver regulates dispensaries

Law enforcement and municipalities were forced to contend with increasing numbers of dispensaries. In Vancouver, the number of illegal medical cannabis dispensaries increased from 14 to 98 between 2012 and 2015, and the City announced plans to regulate them after several opened near schools and playgrounds (Keller, 2015; GM1505). The federal government responded immediately with a strongly worded statement, claiming legalizing and normalizing cannabis would increase use and addiction (GM1506). Vancouver city councillors were unyielding, calling government officials “completely out of touch with the realities on the ground” and argued that “the policies that [the federal government advocate] are backwards and destructive and they've driven us to take the steps that are necessary here today” (GM1508). The regulations included a $30,000 licensing fee (or $1,000 for compassion clubs) and restricted storefronts from operating at least 300 meters from schools and community centres (GM1505). When the application process closed in August 2015, city staff had received 176 applications and issued nineteen business licenses as of October 2018 (City of Vancouver, 2018).

The city’s approach to dispensaries demonstrates the relaxed culture towards cannabis in Vancouver. Prior to the transition to the MMPR, the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) stated cannabis dispensaries were a low priority for the force. Constable Montague argued that “if these places are operating in a professional, safe manner… and if there is no additional element that would cause us concern for public safety, then [VPD would] use [their] discretion not to enforce certain drug laws” (Lee, 2014). Instead of pressing formal charges, VPD officers often ask users to stop use and dispose, resulting in a relatively low incident-to-charge rate, with cannabis offences accounting for one-third of drug offences (Cotter, Greenland, & Karam, 2015).

Data from the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey, as shown in Tables 6 and 7, reveals that Vancouver has one of the highest rates of cannabis possession incidents per 100,000, with an average of 220.15 incidents between 2013 and 2017 (Statistics Canada, 2018). Vancouver also had the highest number of incidents overall, but one of the lowest incident-to-charge ratios at 1:6 (one charge for every six incidents). In contrast, had an average of 96.34 incidents per 100,000 and an incident-to- charge ratio of 2:5, while had one of the lowest rates of incidents per 100,000 of

49 47.80 with an incident-to-charge ratio of 1:2 (Statistics Canada, 2018). Lower ratios contribute to users’ uncertainty regarding drug law and may change individual consumption patterns. As Brochu and colleagues note, “cannabis use has risen in the last twenty years, attitudes towards cannabis use have become more liberal, and cultural representations of cannabis in the mainstream media have grown considerably” (2011, p 110), pointing to its increasing normalization in Canada. The city’s approach to dispensaries further entrenched cannabis normalization in Vancouver. However, not all operators were willing to comply with the regulations, and many looked to surrounding municipalities for new opportunities (Gawley, 2017; Olsen, 2017).

Table 6. Cannabis possession incidents per 100,000

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Avg Calgary 64.57 58.54 46.35 36.08 33.47 47.80 130.89 133.50 112.75 99.53 76.48 110.63 Halifax 189.71 199.23 161.93 148.48 140.37 167.94 Montreal 118.17 118.72 107.31 107.20 101.61 110.61 Saskatoon 152.33 113.14 104.51 101.16 80.28 110.28 Toronto 110.77 116.31 103.37 83.12 68.11 96.34 Vancouver 275.90 252.12 220.18 189.77 162.78 220.15 Victoria 255.16 236.34 185.52 113.96 112.30 180.66 Winnipeg 41.42 40.97 38.68 28.03 21.85 34.19 Source: Statistics Canada, 2018

Table 7. Cannabis possession charge-to-incident ratio

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Avg Calgary 1:02 1:02 1:02 1:02 1:03 1:02 Edmonton 1:02 1:02 1:02 1:02 1:02 1:02 Halifax 1:06 1:06 1:07 4:06 1:02 1:08 Montreal 1:02 1:02 3:05 5:09 1:02 1:02 Saskatoon 7:09 7:09 7:09 3:04 5:07 3:04 Toronto 1:02 4:09 2:05 1:03 1:03 2:05 Vancouver 1:06 1:06 1:06 1:06 1:06 1:06 Victoria 1:06 1:07 1:07 1:05 1:06 1:06 Winnipeg 2:03 2:03 4:07 1:02 4:07 3:05 Source: Statistics Canada, 2018

4.12. Reform ballot in California (2016)

In 2016, voters in California revisited cannabis legalization. The state had previously legalized medical cannabis in 1996, and narrowly voted down a legalization initiative in 2010 known as Proposition 19 (Leon & Weitzer, 2016; Caulkins, Kilmer,

50 Maccoun, Pacula, & Reuter, 2012). When the topic resurfaced in 2016, Colorado, Washington, Alaska, and Oregon had already passed legalization initiatives, and four other states were considering recreational legalization ballots5. Proposition 64 was approved with 57% support and legalized recreational cannabis for adults over 21 (State of California, 2018). Adults are permitted to possess up to 28.5 grams and grow up to six plants in their home. Consumption is restricted to private property, although owners can ban consumption or possession (Colorado Department of Public Health, 2017). Proposition 64 included details on how tax revenue is to be spent and major initiatives include research, treatment, enforcement, education, and environment (State of California, 2018).

Several observers noted the magnitude of California’s successful initiative. For example, Allen St. Pierre, the Executive Director of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), called California the "linchpin for hemispheral legalization" (GM1639). Other policy experts forecasted California’s legalization would “unleash massive innovation and revolutionize the cannabis industry” with estimates suggesting over $1-billion annually in tax revenue (GM1639). California is home to twelve-percent of the US population and is the world’s fifth-largest economy; thus, its policies attract national and international attention (Corcoran, 2018; United States Census Bureau, 2017). Tom Angell, founder of the group Marijuana Majority, argued that “passing legalization in California [would] greatly accelerate our ability to end the federal prohibition”, and many supporters understood California’s approval as the beginning of the end for cannabis prohibition in the US (Berman, 2016; Steinmetz, 2016).

Interestingly, the latest state to legalize recreational cannabis was Vermont in January 2018, and it was the first state to do so through the legislature (Angell, 2018). Perhaps Vermont’s approach signals a change in the origins of cannabis policymaking, as legislators begin to demonstrate leadership over law reform (Rolles, 2018). As Rolles (2018) indicates, activist-led ballot initiatives in the US have focused on personal freedom, social justice, and commercial interest, while legislative-led reforms prioritize public health and strict regulation. Thus, as cannabis legalization continues to unfold in

5Ballots were approved in Massachusetts, Maine, and Nevada, while Arizona’s ballot was defeated.

51 parts of the US, it will be interesting to see how they originate and what regulations are implemented.

4.13. Access to Cannabis for Medical Purposes Regulations (2016)

The federal government introduced its third set of medical cannabis regulations, called the Access to Cannabis for Medical Purposes Regulations (ACMPR), following two court cases that challenged the MMPR. In Allard v Canada (2016), the judge suspended the existing law for six months to allow time for the newly elected Liberal government to rewrite the medical cannabis regulations (GM1609). The government did not appeal the decision, instead enacting the ACMPR in August 2016. Under the ACMPR, the government reintroduced medical patients’ ability to grow their own cannabis, while keeping the licensed producer system (Health Canada, 2016). When the AMCPR was enacted, the government had approved 35 firms as licensed producers, and another 94 companies were approved between August 2016 and October 2018 as shown in Figure 6 (Health Canada, 2018b). The rise in licensed producers was related to the federal government’s intent to legalize cannabis, as companies applied for ACMPR licenses in preparation for the recreational market.

Figure 6. Number of licensed producers in Canada

140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Source: Health Canada, 2018b.

4.14. Bill C-45 (2017)

On April 13, 2017, the ministers of Public Safety, Health, and Justice jointly introduced Bill C-45, the Cannabis Act. It provides legal access to cannabis and controls

52 and regulates its production, distribution, and sale. There are four main goals of the Act, including preventing youth access, protecting public health, deterring criminal activity, and reducing criminal justice system burden. As outlined in Table 8, the Act allows adults over 18 to possess up to 30 grams of cannabis in public and cultivate up to four plants in their residence. Each province has also developed its own set of regulations regarding distribution and sale, so the rules vary slightly across the country.

Under the Act, cannabis can be grown by licensed producers and Canadian citizens. While only dried flower and cannabis oil are permitted for production, edibles and concentrates are expected to be legalized in 2019. Vertical integration is permitted, whereby companies can operate at more than one stage of the supply chain (ie. production and distribution), though companies need to apply for each license separately. The government has not set production limits but has implemented a cannabis tracking system that tracks the cultivation, processing, and sale of cannabis and cannabis derivatives (Health Canada, 2018c). The Act encourages a mix of larger corporations and small-scale production, though there has been little discussion regarding cannabis buyers’ clubs or non-profit cooperatives.

Table 8. Canada’s cannabis policy under the Act

Level of law Federal law Minimum age 18 (or 19, depending on province) Personal possession quantity 30 grams Indictable offence: Imprisonment up to 5 years less a day Penalties for unauthorized Summary offence: Fine not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment not personal possession exceeding 6 months, or both Indictable offence: Imprisonment up to 14 years Penalties for adult distribution Summary offence: Fine not exceeding $15,000, or imprisonment not or sale to a minor exceeding 18 months, or both Indictable offence: Imprisonment up to 14 years Penalties for unauthorized Summary offence: Fine not exceeding $5,000, imprisonment not exceeding production 6 months, or both Home grows 4 plants (prohibited in Manitoba and Quebec) Potency limits – flower Not specified Potency limits – discrete unit 10 mg THC Drugged driving standard 2 ng THC/mL blood Product tax 10% excise tax or $1/gram The price per gram will be set by the market, and the government has not implemented any type of price controls to guide the cost. Analysis by Deloitte (2018) shows that cannabis users will pay up to $0.74 per gram more for legal cannabis, though

53 the price should not be too much higher than the illicit market. The government is, however, implementing an excise tax on cannabis products. Similar to the tax imposed on alcohol and cigarettes, the excise tax will be paid by the producer when the product has been delivered to a purchaser (ie. provincial wholesaler or final customer; Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), 2018). The tax will charge an additional ten-percent or one- dollar per gram, whichever is higher, for recreational and medicinal cannabis products (Spears, 2018). Customers will also have to pay provincial sales taxes on their cannabis purchases, which vary by province (CRA, 2018).

Canada’s regulations do not include a limit on potency of THC in dried flower, but prior to sale, producers must verify the purity and potency of the cannabis harvest (Courtney, 2018; Government of Canada, 2018). Although the various cannabis licenses are eligible to conduct the testing, this requires specialized equipment and expertise, and will likely be conducted by a licensed laboratory (Health Canada, 2018c). Further, the Act and regulations enact strict rules regarding marketing and promotion of cannabis, cannabis accessories, or cannabis-related services (Government of Canada, 2018). Companies are not permitted to use sponsorships, endorsements, testimonials, or reviews and cannot promote cannabis as part of an attractive lifestyle. Further, advertisements cannot be appealing to young people or seen by young people in the media (Robertson & Pellegrini, 2018).

Packaging requirements are outlined in the Act, which introduces strict plain packaging regulations to reduce the likelihood of cannabis appealing to minors. This includes the mandatory display of the universal symbol, health warnings, and product labelling information (Health Canada, 2018d). There are other restrictions on the background colour, font, and logo companies can use, but other graphics, images, or embossing is prohibited. Packaging must be child-resistant, tamper-evident, and opaque or translucent (Health Canada, 2018d).

The distribution and sale of cannabis is controlled by the provinces and territories, and each published its own cannabis control act and supporting regulations. Provinces have the authority to strengthen areas also under federal jurisdiction, and most have set the minimum age limit to 19, which is in line with the minimum age for

54 alcohol and tobacco purchases in those provinces6. In BC, cannabis consumption is permitted in the same areas where tobacco smoking is permitted, but not in areas where children are present (ie. beaches, parks, playgrounds) or in vehicles (Bill 30-2018; Office of Legislative Counsel, 2018; Province of British Columbia, 2018).

BC has not implemented a purchase limit or residency requirement for purchasers; there is also no limit on the number of retail storefronts (Province of British Columbia, 2018). The province allows public and private companies to open retail stores, but they cannot be co-located where alcohol or tobacco are sold and require municipal approval. Stores must be standalone businesses that sell federally-approved cannabis and accessories and can be open between 9AM and 11PM, unless otherwise specified by the municipality. In-store consumption or sampling is prohibited, and minors are not allowed to enter the store for any reason (Province of British Columbia, 2018).

6 The minimum age remains 18 in Alberta and Quebec.

55 Chapter 5.

Results: Key Themes

This chapter provides supplementary information to situate the critical events described in the previous chapter within Canada’s changing social, political, and legal context. It highlights additional events between January 1, 2000 and April 13, 2017 that relate to five major themes: judicial decisions, medical regulations, commercial industry, international developments, and public opinion. In doing so, the thematic results contribute to a more holistic understanding of how the nature of cannabis changed.

5.1. Judicial decisions

One of the most important themes in Canada’s cannabis history is the influence of the judicial system. The constitutionality of cannabis prohibition and consequent medical regulations have been challenged several times in court. While Parker and Krieger are the most well-known cases, several others are worth a cursory look because of their collective cannabis policy influence.

5.1.1. Hitzig v Canada (2003)

In 2003, several activists challenged the provisions under the MMAR, arguing it violated s. 7 of the Charter (Hitzig v Canada, 2003). The appellants claimed the MMAR restricted patient access to cannabis because the government did not provide access to legal cannabis seeds. The Court agreed and struck down five sections of the MMAR (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015; GM0333).

Hitzig also argued the MMAR were insufficient to meet the court’s requirement of R v Parker (to amend the law or allow it to be struck down). The Court confirmed that the MMAR were not a “constitutionally sound medical exemption” (Hitzig v Canada, 2003, para 170), and that cannabis possession had been of no force and effect since July 31, 2001. By striking down sections of the MMAR, the court constitutionalized the government’s medical exemption, thus reinstating the illegality of cannabis possession (Hitzig v Canada, 2003, para 170). Following the decision, the Justice Department was forced to stay nearly four thousand cannabis possession charges for people that were

56 charged between July 31, 2001 and October 7, 2003 (GM0342). Health Canada also amended the MMAR to reflect the decision in Hitzig (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015).

5.1.2. R v Malmo-Levine, R v Caine (2003); R v Clay (2003)

Shortly after, the Court heard from three appellants who challenged the constitutionality of cannabis criminalization: Malmo-Levine challenged the constitutionality of trafficking provisions, Clay challenged the trafficking and simple possession provisions, and Caine challenged the simple possession provisions. They argued that cannabis consumption was central to their lifestyle and prohibition violated their constitutional rights. The argument had three challenges, including sections 7 and 15 of the Charter and the federal government’s ability to criminalize cannabis based on the constitutional division of powers (Lawrence, 2004, para 67).

This court case brought cannabis use for recreational purposes back into the spotlight. Following the prorogue of Parliament and the end of Bill C-38 earlier in 2003, the court case reignited discussion of the appropriateness of cannabis prohibition (GM0401). Even the court noticed, stating “the appellants… say that that the line between criminal and noncriminal conduct has been drawn inappropriately and that the evil effects of the law against marihuana outweigh the benefits, if any, associated with its prohibition” (R v Malmo-Levine, R v Caine, 2003, para 5). However, the court stated that its concern was “solely with the issue of constitutionality”, and that Parliament has “legislative jurisdiction to criminalize the possession of marihuana should it choose to do so… or otherwise modify any aspect of the marihuana laws that it no longer considers to be good public policy” (R v Malmo-Levine, R v Caine, 2003, para 5).

In the 6-3 decision, the majority upheld cannabis offences for non-medical use, citing the need to protect vulnerable populations. Most of the discussion centred on the s. 7 argument; the majority found that simple possession with the threat of imprisonment engaged s. 7 protection but did not find that simple possession without the threat of imprisonment would similarly engage s. 7. Their argument is as follows:

While we accept Malmo-Levine's statement that smoking marihuana is central to his lifestyle, the Constitution cannot be stretched to afford protection to whatever activity an individual chooses to define as central to his or her lifestyle. One individual chooses to smoke marihuana; another has an obsessive interest in golf; a third is addicted to gambling. The

57 appellant Caine invokes a taste for fatty foods. A society that extended constitutional protection to any and all such lifestyles would be ungovernable (R v Malmo-Levine, R v Caine, 2003, para 86).

In a commentary on the case, Lawrence (2004) questions the wisdom of the court in this decision. Does the court’s unwillingness to protect individual lifestyle choices permit the federal government from criminalizing others? How are life and liberty protected if the court refuses to protect lifestyle choices? Lawrence argues:

Whilst there is no protection for "whatever activity an individual chooses to define as central to his or her lifestyle" there should be some protection for some zone of "choice" in the question of "lifestyle." A society where all foods save one are criminalized, where all leisure activities save one are banned -- would this not present a life or liberty problem? (para 69).

The appellant lawyers maintained that the prohibition qualified for s. 7 protection. Further, they argued a harm principle be included as a principle of fundamental justice, which are used to decide whether there is any infringement on the life, liberty, and security of person. The appellants claimed that the lack of harm to others “deprives Parliament of the power to impose criminal liability” (R v Malmo-Levine, R v Caine, 2003, para 103). The majority rejected the concept and did not find that preventing harm is an unconstitutional motivation for law. Three justices dissented and found simple possession unconstitutional; Justice Arbour for reasons related to the harm principle and Justices LeBel and Deschamps related to arbitrariness. Justice Arbour found most cannabis-related harm to be self-inflicted and rejected the majority’s position that the potential for cannabis harm justified prohibition in an attempt to protect vulnerable user groups. Arbour evaluated the harm principle by examining society’s tolerance of the product’s harmful effects and looked to comparable products (ie. alcohol and tobacco) before concluding that the effects of cannabis elicited minimal societal harm (Lawrence, 2004, para 75).

Next, the judges examined whether imprisonment for cannabis prohibition was arbitrary or irrational. The majority concluded that while the risk to most users is minimal, the risk of harm to vulnerable groups is higher, supporting the state’s interest to intervene to protect them, arguing “the Charter allows Parliament a broad, though certainly not unlimited, legislative capacity to respond” (R v Malmo-Levine, R v Caine, 2003, para 135). Justices LeBel and Deschamps dissented here, finding cannabis criminalization arbitrary. Justice LeBel writes,

58 The harm and the problems connected with the form of criminalization chosen by Parliament seem plain and important. Few people appear to be jailed for simple possession but the law remains on the books. The reluctance to enforce it to the extent of actually jailing people for the offence of simple possession seems consistent with the perception that the law, as it stands, amounts to some sort of legislative overreach to the apprehended problems associated with marihuana consumption. Moreover, besides the availability of jail as a punishment, the enforcement of the law has tarred hundreds of thousands of Canadians with the stigma of a criminal record. They have had to bear the burden of the consequences of such criminal records as Arbour J. points out. The fundamental liberty interest has been infringed by the adoption and implementation of a legislative response which is disproportionate to the societal problems at issue (R v Malmo- Levine, R v Caine, 2003, para 280).

In the end, the court upheld cannabis possession offences. The majority argued that imprisonment was reserved for serious offences and was unlikely to occur for simple cannabis possession. They argued that the “availability of imprisonment in a statute dealing with a variety of prohibited drugs does not, in our view, make the criminalization of possession of a psychoactive drug like marihuana contrary to the principles of fundamental justice” (R v Malmo-Levine, R v Caine, 2003, para 5).

5.1.3. Allard v Canada (2014)

In 2014, the Canadian government introduced the MMPR, which repealed the MMAR and licenses allowing patients to grow their own cannabis (Allard v Canada, 2014). Cannabis grown under the MMPR was cultivated by licensed producers, and the appellants expressed concerns about the cost, quality, and strains available. The court agreed and granted an injunction to allow patients with MMAR authorizations to continue to grow their own cannabis to under the MMPR (GM1408).

5.1.4. R v Smith (2015)

Another case challenged the federal government’s restrictions on the methods of administration. Previously, patients were only allowed to consume cannabis by drying or smoking it, which the court found to be an arbitrary limitation and a violation to patients’ s. 7 Charter rights. They concluded that a prohibition on alternative methods of administration imposes a threat of conviction and “[forces] a person to choose between a legal but inadequate treatment and an illegal but more effective one” (R v Smith, 2015).

59 The decision allowed authorized patients to legally consume cannabis in a variety of ways, including oils, concentrates, and lotions (GM1507).

5.1.5. Allard v Canada (2016)

In 2016, a Federal Court judge ruled that medical patients have the right to grow their own cannabis (GM1609). The judge struck down a ban on home growing from the MMPR but suspended its judgement for six months to allow time for the newly elected Liberal government to rewrite the medical cannabis regulations (GM1609). Justice Phelan found the MMPR regulations to be overboard and arbitrary, forcing patients to choose between their health and crime, stating “I agree that the plaintiffs have, on a balance of probabilities, demonstrated that cannabis can be produced safely and securely with limited risk to public safety and consistently with the promotion of public health” (Allard v Canada, 2016, para 282). Further, the court found that the MMPR system could not guarantee “that the necessary quality, strain and quantity [of cannabis] will be available when needed at some acceptable level of pricing” (Allard v Canada, 2016, para 15).

This cycle of patient challenges, judicial decisions, and government provisions characterized the stalemate between the government and activists. Court cases relied heavily on s. 7 Charter arguments to establish the disconnect between federal law and patient rights, and judicial decisions forced the government to modify its approach to cannabis. Unfortunately, various iterations of the government’s regulatory approach failed to establish a constitutionally sound cannabis access program.

5.2. Medical regulations

The government’s involvement in the medical cannabis business began after Wakeford v Canada (1999). In early 2000, the federal government announced it was going to research the medical uses of cannabis and was seeking a supplier to grow, process, store, and distribute cannabis to research participants (GM0001). The program was the first of its kind in the world, producing two strains for exempted patients (GM0202). Prairie Plant Systems (PPS) was awarded a five-year, $5.7 million contract, agreeing to use its high-tech greenhouses in an unused part of a mine located near Flin

60 Flon, Manitoba (GM0009). Unfortunately, ongoing delays hindered the government’s ability to distribute to patients and conduct research:

… [F]ederal bureaucrats are still trying to figure out how to package, label and distribute their first dope harvest. Officials have not decided whether to roll it into joints, send it out in Ziploc bags, grind it or deliver it in bulk. They are investigating whether to make it available from drugstore pharmacists or by personal courier. Neither has the department pinned down the labelling details of the drug's active ingredients or its shelf life (GM0121).

… [M]ore than 250 kilograms of the federally sanctioned buds have been harvested, but still have not budged... Federal officials are still working out crucial details about how to run the program, which they announced more than a year ago (GM0202).

Finally, after years of uncertainty and political indecision, Health Canada announced that the PPS cannabis would be supplied to medical patients in July 2003 (GM0323).

Unfortunately, Health Canada encountered a few challenges in its new role as a cannabis supplier. In 2006, almost half of the 278 authorized patients had accounts in arrears, owing over $160,000 as the department discovered the policy failed to indicate late-payment consequences (GM0601). To complicate matters, the first supply of cannabis from PPS was “of such poor quality that many medical users gagged, coughed and promptly returned the product. The batch was weak, dry, ground up too finely and included the less potent leaves and stems” (GM0601). Although later batches were improved, users continued to express concerns about the quality (Capler et al., 2017). In their survey of medicinal cannabis users, Capler and colleagues (2017) found that dispensaries had superior quality; overall, 96% of respondents reported dispensary quality was “very good” or “good”, compared to only 20% for Health Canada (p. 4). The government attempted to address these concerns with the MMPR, using licensed producers.

5.3. Commercial industry

The poor quality and patient dissatisfaction likely contributed to the government’s decision to license producers under the MMPR, which created a new free market industry. Prior to the introduction of the ACMPR in 2016, 35 firms had been licensed to participate in the medical cannabis industry. Between August 2016 and October 2018,

61 another 94 firms had received Health Canada licensing, and the industry has ballooned since the free market model was introduced (Health Canada, 2018b). While estimating the size of the market is beyond the scope of this thesis, data analysis from the financial statements of three large cannabis companies can provide some context to describe how fast the industry has grown.

Some of the largest cannabis companies in Canada are Aphria (APH.TO), Aurora Cannabis (ACB.TO), and Canopy Growth (WEED.TO)7, which are all public companies currently trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange (Daily Hive, 2018; Krishna, 2018). The stock prices of these companies have rapidly increased between April 2017 and October 2018, as shown in Figure 7. Canopy Growth’s stock price has grown from $11.14 in April 2017 to a high of $74.45 in September 2018. Aphria and Aurora also grew rapidly and peaked at $24.75 in January 2018 and $16.24 in October 2018, respectively. Another BC cannabis company, Tilray, listed on the NASDAQ in July 2018 and increased from $34.10 in July to a peak of $300 in September. The sharp spike followed the company’s announcement that it had received authorization from the Drug Enforcement Administration to test its product in the US and CEO Brendan Kennedy’s recommendation cannabis will be a global pharmaceutical substitute (Imbert, 2018).

Figure 7. Stock prices

$100 $80 $60 $40 $20

$0

Highest Highest pricestock

2018/07 2017/04 2017/05 2017/06 2017/07 2017/08 2017/09 2017/10 2017/11 2017/12 2018/01 2018/02 2018/03 2018/04 2018/05 2018/06 2018/08 2018/09 2018/10

Canopy Growth Aphria Aurora

Source: Yahoo Finance, n.d.

A common financing method for public companies is issuing shares in the company in exchange for cash. The cumulative amount received from all issuances is

7 Data analysis for this section was pulled from the most recent financial statements available, including the audited financial statements for Canopy Growth, and the interim unaudited financial statements for Aphria and Aurora.

62 reported on the balance sheet with the number of shares issued and outstanding disclosed in the financial statements. For the year ended March 31, 2018, Canopy Growth (2018) reported $1.077 billion in share capital with 199 million outstanding shares. Similarly, Aurora (2018) reported $1.466 million in share capital and 459 million outstanding shares on their financial statements.

One indicator of the size of a company is its market capitalization, which is the number of the company’s outstanding shares at the current stock price. This figure is a common tool in the investment company to determine company size and comparing market capitalization figures is useful to determine the growth of the company over time. Canopy Growth’s market capitalization is $12.53 billion; thus, while the historical value of Canopy Growth’s common shares is $1.076 billion, those same shares are worth $12.53 billion at the current price8 (Yahoo Finance, n.d.). This simply demonstrates that the value of the shares has increased rapidly and is another indicator to determine company growth.

As indicated by the rising stock prices, market capitalization, and revenue growth, there is a high expectation of future profitability in the industry. While all three companies have strong revenues, Aphria (2018) and Aurora reported net income in 2018. Notably, Aurora recorded $69 million, an $82 million difference from 2017. Meanwhile, Canopy Growth reported a loss of $54 million, which was reported alongside strong revenues of $77 million. As shown in Table 9, these figures demonstrate how the burgeoning cannabis industry has surged since 2016, and it is likely to get another major boost following legal recreational sales since several new companies have entered the industry since the Act was introduced. However, Aphria, Aurora, and Canopy Growth are enjoying the benefits of the legal medical market as early entrants and positioning themselves to capitalize on the legal recreational market too.

8 Market capitalization figures as of October 22, 2018.

63 Table 9. Comparative financial information

Aphria, for the year ended May 31, 2018 2018 2017 Difference Revenue 36,917 20,438 16,479 Income 29,338 4,198 25,140 Share capital 1,113,981 274,317 839,664 Outstanding shares 210,169,924 138,628,704 71,541,220 Earnings per share 0.18 0.04 0.14

Aurora, for the year ended June 30, 2018 2018 2017 Difference Revenue 55,196 18,067 37,129 Income 69,227 -12,968 82,195 Share capital 1,466,433 221,447 1,244,986 Outstanding shares 459,782,532 279,029,226 180,753,306 Earnings per share 0.16 -0.05 0.21

Canopy Growth, for the year ended March 31, 2018 2018 2017 Difference Revenue 77,948 39,895 38,053 Income -54,134 -7,572 -46,562 Share capital 1,076,838 621,541 455,297 Outstanding shares 199,320,981 162,187,262 37,133,719 Earnings per share -0.40 -0.06 -0.34 Note: Financial results reported in thousands of Canadian dollars, except share and per share amounts. Source: Aphria, 2018; Aurora, 2018; Canopy Growth, 2018

5.4. International developments

Back in the US, California residents voted on Proposition 19 in 2010 (GM1002). The measure would legalize and regulate recreational cannabis and allow each city and county to develop its own regulations on production, distribution, taxation, and possession (GM1003). The proposition was defeated with 46.5% support (Caulkins et al., 2012; Sanchez, 2010). Subsequent ballots proposing cannabis legalization in other states were passed in 2014 in Alaska and Oregon and in 2016 in Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada; most other states allow medical use under specified circumstances. Colorado did eventually legalize cannabis a few years later, in 2016.

64 5.5. Public opinion

The fifth theme represents the changing public opinion toward cannabis policy since 2000. Over the years, Canadians’ support of the decriminalization of simple possession has remained steadfast and increased slightly from 55% to 65% between 2003 and 2015 (Ipsos, 2018). In 2016, the first Ipsos poll to survey support for recreational legalization was conducted and found support among 61% of Canadians (Ipsos, 2018). Support for legalization was highest among men (65%) and millennials (73%). Further, support was the highest among current or past cannabis users, with only 38% of Canadians who never used cannabis supporting its legalization (Ipsos, 2018).

5.5.1. Consumption

The Ipsos study also revealed that more Canadians will use cannabis post- legalization. While 15% reported current use, 26% stated they would use cannabis recreationally after legalization. Likewise, 6% reported using medicinal cannabis, with 35% noting they would be more likely to use cannabis medicinally after legalization (Ipsos, 2018).

More detailed analysis on cannabis use has been conducted by Statistics Canada analysts. Rotermann and Macdonald (2018) examined the findings from nine household population surveys that collected data on cannabis use between 1985 and 2015. Although direct comparisons are impossible due to methodological differences, the authors found the Canadian Tobacco Use Monitoring Survey (CTMUS) and Canadian Tobacco, Alcohol, and Drugs Survey (CTADS) provide the most reliable data between 2004 and 2015 due to the surveys’ similarity in sampling method, collection mode, and sample size (Rotermann & Macdonald, 2018, p. 16). Self--reported past-year cannabis use has remained stable between 2004 and 2015, ranging from 9 to 12% (Rotermann & Macdonald, 2018).

Stats on adolescent cannabis use come from the Canadian Student Tobacco, Alcohol and Drugs Survey (CSTADS), formerly the Youth Smoking Survey (YSS). Data from 2012 to 2016 shows that prevalence of past-year cannabis use among youth have remained stable, with the highest rates of use among students in grades eleven and twelve (Statistics Canada, 2018b). Further, is the most common

65 method of consumption among youth (79.9%), followed by edibles (34.2%), and vaporization (29.7%) (Statistics Canada, 2018b).

5.5.2. Charges

As shown in Figure 8, there has also been a decrease in the number of police- reported rates of cannabis offences (Allen, 2018). Following a peak in 2011 of 228 per 100,000, there has been a steady decline, which is likely related to the changing culture, police enforcement priorities, and political environment. Public opinion may have also driven the decrease in police-reported cannabis offences. Following a drastic increase in rates between 1992 and 2002, the Globe reported the varying nature of cannabis possession charges, (1992: 23,178; 2002: 50,246; GM0329). Changing culture, enforcement priorities, and political environment contributed to the varying rate of possession offences over the years. After the federal Conservative party formed government in 2006, the number of arrests for cannabis possession increased. Police authorities noted the increase was “directly linked to that proposed [decriminalization] legislation, which died as a result of the 2006 federal election” (GM0703). Several police forces stopped laying charges after Bill C-38 was introduced in 2003, but the election of the federal Conservative party halted all cannabis reform.

Figure 8. Police-reported rates of cannabis offences

250

200

150

100 Rate per 100,000perRate

50

0

2008 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2000 Note: Includes possession, trafficking, production and importation or exportation offences Source: Allen, 2018.

66 5.5.3. Grow operations

Another factor influencing public opinion was the increased prevalence of illegal grow operations. In 2004, “Canada [found] itself a centre of large-scale, high-quality illegal production” (GM0414). Growers used empty suburban homes to discreetly grow high-quality cannabis, which concerned law enforcement, insurance agencies, municipalities, and realtors. A report from the RCMP noted a 250% increase in illegal grow operations between 2000 and 2002, and blamed organized crime groups for exploiting the booming cannabis industry and minimal sentencing terms (GM0406).

Public education campaigns began to help residents identify grow operation homes (GM0207). Between 1989 and 2003, the number of seized cannabis plants rose from 50,000 to 1.5 million, and police found it “impossible to get ride of them, there’s that many” (GM0414). However, in 2007, there was a significant decline in cannabis grow-op seizures in BC. The RCMP attributed the change to increased enforcement, organized crime group cooperation, and operators relocating to the US (GM0707).

5.5.4. Distaste for harsher penalties

One of the overarching themes that emerged was that public attitudes no longer supported cannabis prohibition. This was particularly noticeable following the introduction of the Safe Streets and Communities Act by the Conservative government in 2011. The bill introduced a variety of mandatory minimum sentences, including a minimum six-month sentence for individuals caught with six cannabis plants. After the bill was introduced, the Liberal Party of Canada announced it would not support the bill, citing it would target young people and increase prison costs (Galloway, 2011). The Conservatives countered, arguing the severe penalties were necessary to deter drug crime9.

Certainly, deterrence is part of any healthy criminal justice system and punishment should be swift, certain, and severe (Paternoster, 2010). However, the Conservatives’ emphasis on punishment severity was misplaced. Research on these

9 However, in 1993, the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada election platform noted that the answer to offending "does not lie in simply building more prisons and getting more police” (Greenspan & Doob, 2011).

67 three deterrence principles shows the certainty of punishment is a more effective deterrent, specifically in relation to the likelihood of arrest (Nagin, 2013). Canadian courts have dealt with over fifty cases of mandatory minimum sentences from provisions in the Criminal Code and the CDSA, and over the years, approximately half of the cases have found a violation under s. 12, the cruel and unusual punishment provision in the Charter (MacAlister & Barkase, 2018). Canadian courts have essentially found that mandatory minimum sentences are too severe for cannabis offences.

Mandatory minimum sentences are also costly. Articles criticized the government’s plan, pointing to the failure of the mandatory minimums in the US. Prison populations in the US increased from 700,000 in 1985 to 2,300,000 in 2011, at a cost to taxpayers of $110,000 a year per inmate (The Globe and Mail, 2011). Fortunately, housing a prisoner in Canada costs less at $88,000 per year, but the Conservatives did not provide any cost/benefit analysis for taxpayers (The Globe and Mail, 2011b).

Further, it was unclear what social need mandatory minimums were designed to fill. Nearly half of Canadians have used cannabis in their lifetime, and it remains the most widely used illicit drug in Canada (Health Canada, 2017). Thus, the prevalence and acceptability of use was incongruous with attitudes toward harsher penalties, as an article argued “there is no appetite for stiffer penalties” (GM1101). The Safe Streets Act garnered little public support, and many articles used it as an opportunity to promote alternative cannabis control policies, including legalization and decriminalization.

“Why should growing six marijuana plants in one’s basement bring six months in jail? If judges can’t be trusted to give the appropriate sentence… maybe that’s because Canadians generally don’t see it as a serious crime… This is a page from the discredited war-on-drugs handbook” (GM1104).

68 Chapter 6.

Discussion and Conclusions

6.1. Key findings

This study provides an account of how cannabis law reform emerged in Canada. Looking broadly at the political, social, and legal landscape, it is clear Canada has come a long way in its relationship with recreational cannabis and perhaps legalization was inevitable. Police-reported rates of arrest have steadily declined since 2011, while the number of registered medical cannabis patients has increased tenfold within the past three years (Allen, 2018; Health Canada, 2018). Consumption rates remain virtually unchanged since 2004, with varying rates of cannabis charges and increased public support for cannabis-policy reform across Canada (Allen, 2018; Ipsos, 2018; Rotermann & Macdonald, 2018).

The current study sought to explore the major events and themes that created Canada’s appetite for change; analysis revealed fourteen critical events and five key themes. During this period, ongoing court challenges ushered in a new era in cannabis reform. R v Parker (2000) was the first case to challenge the prohibition of cannabis, and sympathetic judicial decisions understood cannabis as medicine. By striking down the law, the courts forced the government to act, beginning a series of flawed medical cannabis regulations. Parliamentary committees recommended the government reform its cannabis-control policies, and a series of bills were introduced in the early 2000s. However, a change of government in 2006 suspended political discussions of reform for several years. Then in 2012, non-medical cannabis legalization was approved in Colorado, Washington, and Uruguay, setting a legal precedent. The law reform represented a significant shift in attitudes that acknowledged cannabis was less dangerous to public health than alcohol. New medical regulations came into effect in 2014 and relied on licensed producers, installing a free market system. The number of licensed producers and patients increased rapidly, and investors purchased stock in companies that quickly became very well capitalized.

During the 2015 federal election, Liberal Party leader Justin Trudeau promised to legalize and regulate cannabis, further differentiating the positions of the federal parties.

69 While cannabis was not the key election issue, it demonstrated the party’s openness and transparency, in hopes of appealing to younger voters. The legalization initiative allowed the Liberals to paint the Conservative party as out of touch with youth, and the Liberal party won a majority of seats on the House of Commons. Following a comprehensive report from a federal task force, the government introduced Bill C-45 on April 13, 2017. An examination of the historical and social context of events that preceded the Act leads to three distinct conclusions.

First, legalization was possible because the government failed to create a constitutionally sound cannabis access program. The cyclical relationship between medical patients, the judiciary, and government regulations highlights the government’s inability to create regulations that could pass constitutional scrutiny because of their unwillingness to take a leadership role in developing sound public policy (GM1510). Ongoing s. 7 challenges unnecessarily limited patient access to medicine, frustrating activists and patients (Solomon & Clarizio, 2015).

Further, the regulations that did exist were colossal failures. Licensed producers operated out of heavily secure facilities and were subjected to strict advertising guidelines that limited their ability to communicate the benefits or effects of specific strains to consumers (Capler et al., 2017; Belle-Isle et al., 2014). Limits on the delivery system and products available also hindered the legal medical system and created a void the illicit market capitalized on (Keller, 2015). Regulatory weaknesses, along with the slow bureaucratic process, frustrated and discouraged interested companies from joining the legal market, demonstrating the disconnect between Canadians’ expectations and public policy (Capler et al., 2017).

Another obstacle to the regulations was the lack of buy-in from the medical community. Although cannabis derivatives have been used by medical patients to treat a range of conditions, physicians remained hesitant to proscribe it because of the lack of scientific evidence and lack of standardization compared to traditional medicines (Zolotov, Vulfsons, Zarhin, & Sznitman, 2018). Whereas conventional medicines contain specific quantities of active ingredients and distinguishable side effects, cannabis is a herbal substance with different active substances of varying potencies and effects (Zolotov et al., 2018, p. 6). Consequently, some physicians refused to support patient requests for legal authorization, causing many to change physicians (Belle-Isle et al.,

70 2014). One study found that one-third of respondents obtained legal authorization, which suggests “that despite the existence of a legal framework, a substantial number of chronically and seriously ill Canadians continue to access [medical cannabis] without legal authorization and from illegal sources” (Belle-Isle et al., 2014, p. 697). Thus, the government’s regulatory system failed to meet the needs of Canadians and created an appetite for law reform.

Second, legalization was possible because Colorado and Washington set a legal precedent. The reform represented a significant shift in public attitudes in the US as voters accepted cannabis use as a leisure activity. Ballot initiatives highlighted that cannabis was not more dangerous than alcohol and argued the substances should be regulated similarly (Subritzky et al., 2016). Legalization proponents noted that high law enforcement costs had failed to reduce consumption patterns and funded the illicit market instead. The legal framework would reduce consumers’ interaction with the illicit market and, by extension, harder drugs. Moreover, legalization would improve the economy by generating tax revenue and saving law enforcement costs (Hartman et al., 2018).

Legislators in both states were pioneers and used alcohol policy as a framework to develop new regulations, despite national prohibition. Following the ballot, US Department of Justice (DOJ) issued the Cole Memo to all US attorneys (Reed, 2016). The memo stated that the DOJ would not enforce federal prohibition in states that legalized recreational cannabis, except to maintain certain federal law enforcement priorities (Reed, 2016). Effectively, the memo signaled a shift by the US federal government to de-prioritize cannabis and ushered in a non-interference approach (though the memo was rescinded by the Trump administration in 2018) (Rough, 2017).

Observers predicted other jurisdictions would follow Colorado and Washington’s lead, and as the policy experiment unfolded, Canadians watched with baited breath. Slowly, preliminary data were released which showed no extreme changes among any key indicators (ie. adolescent use, impaired driving), and public support for legalization in Canada grew (Reed, 2016). Although the full effects of legalization may not be evident for decades, following the developments in Colorado and Washington allowed Canadians to see how legalization might work.

71 Third, legalization was possible because the commercial industry ballooned. The number of licensed producers and patients registered under the MMPR and AMCPR increased rapidly and some companies decided to go public to raise funds (Health Canada, 2018, 2018b). Rising stock prices, high market capitalization, and strong revenue growth characterized the industry prior to recreational legalization, and investors purchased stock in companies that recorded millions in net losses in anticipation of the profit potential following legalization (Aphria, 2018; Aurora, 2018; Canopy Growth, 2018).

Further, the commercial industry established themselves as an industry. Multiple associations were created to meet the needs of industry, including the Cannabis Council of Canada. The Council aims to promote industry standards, support the regulated cannabis industry, and act as a resource on responsible cannabis use (Cannabis Canada Association, 2018). Other advocacy groups were created to advance the needs of niche markets, such as medical patients and craft cannabis companies. There are also several cannabis conferences held each year; Lift & Co. host a business conference, industry trade show, and exhibition in Vancouver and Toronto to connect commercial experts and consumers (Lift & Co. Ltd., 2018). Professional service providers began to specialize in medical cannabis and published reports on the market and regulations, while consulting firms helped interested parties navigate the Health Canada licensing process (Cannabis Compliance Inc, 2018; Deloitte, 2018; trinafraser, 2018).

The medical cannabis industry grew rapidly, and companies distinguished themselves by building goodwill with customers (Canopy Growth, 2018b). They also invested heavily in infrastructure, converting pre-existing greenhouses to massive cannabis operations (Lindeman, 2018). Over time, the commercial industry became an unstoppable force in Canada as the prospect of cannabis legalization approached, prepared to welcome law reform with quality product.

Together, these developments significantly changed the future of cannabis in Canada and a growing chorus championing reform celebrated when the Act was introduced. After 95 years of prohibition, support for law reform was evident. A majority of Canadians understood criminalization had failed and were prepared for the next era in cannabis policy.

72 6.2. The role of law reform

As Canada enters a new era in cannabis policy, it is appropriate to briefly pause and examine the purpose of prohibition and the role it has played in shaping Canadian society. Psychoactive drugs, like cannabis, are those that affect an individual’s waking conscious when consumed in small amounts. They include illegal substances like heroin, cocaine, and LSD, but also more popular products such as alcohol, tobacco, and caffeine. Criminalizing cannabis created an arbitrary boundary between legal and illegal substances, based on the belief that illegal substances threaten the moral fabric of society. Prohibition aimed to maintain societal norms and prevent consumption among young adults, and support for “good” and “bad” substances grew by ignoring pharmacological and epidemiological evidence. For example, alcohol is a dangerous psychoactive substance and public health risk, but past-year youth consumption rates remain stable (23% of students in grades 7-9; 65% of students in grades 10-12; Statistics Canada, 2018c). The division between legal and illegal substances labelled some substances as “good” because they were legal (ie. tobacco and alcohol) despite the associated public health risk. Youth often experiment with legal psychoactive substances before trying illegal, less common drugs like heroin or cocaine, and the threat of punishment has not been a successful deterrent (Statistics Canada, 2018c; CCSA, 2017; Erickson & Hyshka, 2010). It is estimated that nearly 500,000 Canadians have been permanently stained by criminal records for cannabis possession, impairing their ability to secure work, find housing, and travel internationally (Canadian Nurses Association, 2017; Berman, 2015; Erickson & Fischer, 1995).

Acknowledging the failure of prohibition, various jurisdictions have implemented less restrictive drug policies. A system of legal regulation balances social and health harms with policy restrictiveness, and theoretically should provide optimal public health and safety outcomes (Rolles & Murkin, 2016). Under this framework, the government controls and regulates the production, distribution, and sale of cannabis through decisions on various regulatory elements. Naturally, “making a market legal greatly increases the mechanisms available to the state for regulating it” (Room et al., 2010, p. 103), and include policy design decisions on production, price, and promotion (Kilmer, 2014). Now, the underlying goal of a legal regulation system is to minimize the harms caused by prohibition and the illicit market. Implementing this type of reform should

73 generate a host of implicit benefits related to product quality, accessibility, the criminal justice system, and tax revenue.

6.3. Law reform benefits

Under a legalized and regulatory framework, governments can enact product quality standards. In Canada, licensed producers are required to have products tested for microbial contaminants, chemical contaminants, and solvent residue prior to sale (Government of Canada, 2018). Rigorous testing standards protects consumers, ensuring health risks associated with contaminated cannabis are absent (Rolles & Murkin, 2016). Further, testing confirms the THC and CBD potencies, allowing consumers to make educated decisions on products.

Further, legalization ensures accessibility. Past medical access programs failed to meet the needs and expectations of patients, and legalizing allows a wider system of distribution and sale. Canadians have more options in terms of where and how they legally access cannabis, as stores open across the country and not just in major urban centres. However, the degree of accessibility depends largely on the province’s (and municipality’s) distribution plan.

There is also the benefit of a reduced burden on the criminal justice system. Legalizing cannabis allows police departments to focus on more serious issues and reduces the involvement of organized crime and street gangs. Instead, law enforcement will play a key role in enforcing the regulatory framework and prosecuting criminal activities outlined in the Act (ie. home cultivation, illicit cannabis).

Finally, legalization creates a new source of tax revenue. Canada’s federal government will retain 25%, while the remaining 75% will be shared with the provinces. Though specific decisions on spending priorities have not been clearly defined, a survey of Canadians ranked six potential options, with most desiring increased health care transfers to the provinces (Scotti, 2018). Other priorities included increased job skills training, cannabis-related public education, and deficit reduction.

74 6.4. Law reform limitations

Despite the benefits of law reform, it is important to recognize some inherent limitations of the Act. First, regulatory models will not eliminate every cannabis-related harm. Some risks associated with consumption patterns must be managed by individual users. Decisions on frequency of use, THC content, and method of consumption cannot be mandated by law, so public education on lower-risk use guidelines is appropriate (Fischer et al., 2017). Further, law reform cannot change consumer behaviour. Eliminating the harms of the illicit market requires users to switch to the legal market, which is more likely when the price, product, and quality of licit cannabis matches that of the illicit market (Deloitte, 2018).

Governments cannot rely on the law to bring about change; they must also make smart regulatory decisions to encourage alternative behaviour patterns. Additionally, public media campaigns can educate Canadians on cannabis. Advertisements could include what intoxication feels like, how long it lasts, and how to mitigate the risks (Capler, Bilsker, Van Pelt, & MacPherson, 2017). Traditional fear-based messaging is ineffective and Capler et al. recommend a different approach:

Maintaining a clear and consistent message that is relatable to cannabis users’ personal experience and those of their peers improves the credibility of messaging. The evidence shows that non-judgmental, factual, and concise messages are more effective at promoting cannabis use-related behaviour changes (Capler et al., 2017b, p. 49).

Second, this type of law reform retains cannabis criminality. The Act is criminal law, meaning that violators can be criminally charged, prosecuted, and sentenced. As outlined in Table 10, the penalties contained in the Act for possession, trafficking, and production are harsher than those under the CDSA. For example, the Act has increased the summary penalty for possession offences, increasing financial repercussions from $1,000 to $5,000. It also introduces new summary penalties for trafficking and production where they did not exist under the CDSA. There are also now penalties that make it illegal for an adult to distribute cannabis to a minor, and minor possession remains illegal. Some commentators have questioned the necessity of excessively harsh and draconian penalties, and advocate has referred to the Act as “prohibition 2.0” for its unnecessarily severe and strict regulation (Brown, 2017; Emery, 2017). Federal Green Party leader, Elizabeth May, called the penalties “unreasonable”,

75 and put forth a motion to delete a clause of the Act that makes it a criminal activity for an adult to distribute cannabis to a minor (Brown, 2017). She argued the Liberals crafted cannabis legislation that is grounded in prohibition philosophy (May, 2017). Lawyer Michael Spratt (2017) agreed:

In reality, the new bill is an unnecessarily complex piece of legislation that leaves intact the criminalization of marijuana in many circumstances… The new pot bill also continues to criminalize anyone under 18 who possesses more than five grams of marijuana — an activity that will be perfectly legal for adults. Nowhere else in the Criminal Code is a youth criminalized for an act that is legal for an adult. The disproportionate and asymmetrical criminalization of youth is simply counter-productive and an irrational criminal justice policy.

The criminal penalties, however, did not gain much traction in the news media. Bill Blair, former Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice, responded to May’s concern in the House of Commons by stating the penalty for distribution to a minor would range from a ticket up to 14 years imprisonment. No substantive changes to the penalties were made.

Table 10. Drug penalty differences between CDSA and Cannabis Act

Possession Trafficking Production Summary Indictment Summary Indictment Summary Indictment $1,000 1996 5 years Life 7 years 6 months $5,000 $15,000 $5,000 2018 5 years 14 years 14 years 6 months 18 months 6 months Third, laws alone cannot change or eliminate stigma. Although cannabis has become increasingly normalized (Osborne & Fogel, 2017; Asbridge et al., 2016; Hathaway et al., 2016), cannabis use “still carries a certain stigma reflecting cultural ambivalence about the use of drugs” (Hathaway, Comeau, & Erickson, 2011, p. 454). Stigma is associated with crime and deviance, and serves to punish and deter behaviours, characteristics, and identities (Hathaway et al., 2011, p. 463). Again, this notion is tied to the moral underpinnings of drug prohibition, where “good” and “bad” drugs exist and individuals that consume illegal or “bad” drugs are deviants. Prominent theorist Howard Becker was one of the first to theorize about cannabis (Heidt & Wheeldon, 2015). According to Becker, when an individual is labelled as a drug user, it becomes his or her master status (or defining characteristic). Master statuses define

76 personalities and imply certain expectations (ie. cannabis users as lazy) that may not be true (Heidt & Wheeldon, 2015). Stigma toward cannabis users is evident in a 2018 poll of Canadians, where 50% of cannabis user respondents admitted they do not plan to tell others if they consume (Ipsos, 2018). While legalization symbolizes the social acceptability of cannabis, preconceived stereotypes of cannabis users remain deeply ingrained, and this forces cannabis users to defend against the “stoner” culture, which cannot be changed via law reform (Dangerfield, 2018).

6.5. Public health approach

One of the key differences between the legalization approach in Canada compared to Colorado and Washington is Canada’s public health framework. Canada has a long history of public health dating back to colonization, which includes the formation of the Canadian Public Health Association (CPHA) in 1910 (Rutty & Sullivan, 2010). Public health is defined as “an approach to maintaining and improving the health of populations that is based on the principles of social justice, attention to human rights and equity, evidence-informed policy and practice, and addressing the underlying determinants of health” (CPHA, 2017, p. 4). Under a public health framework, the prevention of death, disease, injury, and disability are key goals, and some of the past campaigns have highlighted tobacco use, motor vehicle safety, infectious diseases, and physical activity (CPHA 2017, p. 4; Rutty & Sullivan, 2010). Considering Canada’s long and successful history with public health, it is natural it would be applied to cannabis. Health Canada’s (2016c, p. 15) legalization and regulation task force adopted a public health approach, and specifically identified six public health goals:

1. delay the age of the initiation of cannabis use;

2. reduce the frequency of use;

3. reduce higher-risk use;

4. reduce problematic use and dependence;

5. expand access to treatment and prevention programs; and

6. ensure early and sustained public education and awareness.

Naturally, a public health approach is at odds with profit driven companies. The commercial industry effectively maintains lifelong, heavy users to turn a profit for

77 shareholders, and research has shown a relationship between cannabis use patterns and both advertising and retail outlets (Subritzky et al., 2016, p. 3). This tension between public health and commercialization is exacerbated in the United States because of the constitutional right to free speech. Consequently, well meaning government regulations that restrict marketing tactics to promote public health objectives could be challenged and overturned (Subritzky et al., 2016).

Conversely, Canada purposefully implemented very strict regulations regarding promotion, marketing, and advertising that are different from those in effect for alcohol to prevent commercialization (Government of Canada, 2018). While it is likely the regulations will evolve with the industry, lawyer Michael Kilby predicted the advertising rules would be subject to a Charter challenge “given the number of companies involved and the amount of money at stake” (Robertson & Pellegrini, 2018). Kilby’s comments highlight the tension between public health and commercialization and suggest the decision may ultimately lie in the judiciary.

Canada’s public health approach can be evaluated using a set of indicators identified by epidemiologists from the University of British Columbia (Lake et al., 2018). The indicators fall under five broad categories, including public safety, cannabis use trends, other substance use trends, cardio-respiratory health, and mental health and cognition (Lake et al., 2018). Preliminary evidence from Colorado and Washington provides Canadian researchers a glimpse into the potential effects of legalization. For example, as shown in Table 11, early findings indicate a slight increase in the fatality rate per 100 million vehicle miles traveled following cannabis legalization (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, n.d.). However, this data also demonstrates that the change in fatality rate is similar to the US average (see Appendix C for the fatality rate per 100 million vehicle miles traveled for each US state). While this data may suggest an increase in the fatality rate following the recreational legalization, these findings are preliminary and may not be indicative of the true relationship between cannabis legalization and motor vehicle fatalities. For example, some of the biggest increases in this fatality rate occurred in Florida and South Carolina, however neither state has legalized recreational cannabis. Thus, as policies mature, so do data collection practices, procedures, and tools, and this will produce more accurate data in the future.

78 Table 11. Fatality rate per 100 million vehicle miles traveled

1.80

1.60

1.40

1.20

1.00

0.80

0.60

0.40

0.20

0.00 Alaska California Colorado Oregon Washington US Average

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, n.d.

The preliminary data might provide some indication of what Canada might expect, but it is important to note that Canada’s approach is quite different from Colorado and Washington. Accordingly, many expect limited effects, if not improvements, on public health indicators (Lake et al., 2018). However, this will depend on the implementation of specific policies by provinces and municipalities.

Further, as Rolles (2018) notes, government-led cannabis policies are more likely to emphasize public health than activist and industry-led reform. Government-led reforms, like those enacted in Uruguay and Canada, evolve after a period of stakeholder engagement. For example, Canada’s Act and the subsequent regulations were “informed by recommendations from a federally appointed task-force, with a clear public health mandate, operating under a Department of Health secretariat and consisting predominantly of health professionals” (Rolles, 2018, p. 607). Likewise, Uruguay’s model was created following a two-year consultation period, led by public health professionals from public health agencies. Conversely, ballot initiatives in Colorado and Washington were designed and funded by pro-cannabis organizations. Inspired by a variety of priorities, including personal freedom, social justice, and commercial industry, special interest groups wrote the referendum’s text, leaving little room for public health concerns (Rolles, 2018, p. 607).

79 6.6. Study limitations and future directions

The current findings should be interpreted in the context of several limitations. First, the sample relied heavily on one main data source (the Globe and Mail), making the findings specific to events reported in the Globe. Since the Globe is a left-wing newspaper, the selected events represent a liberal approach to cannabis policy. Further, the Globe’s national events focus eliminated the possibility to examine regional events. For example, BC’s Stop the Violence campaign in 2012 was not represented in this sample, though it likely played a role in changing public opinion. Second, initial results included over 5,000 articles and it is likely that the search parameters excluded some cannabis-related articles. Industry articles published in the business section or medical studies published in the health section were automatically excluded from analysis.

Future research should monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the Act. This research could measure changes in youth access, public health, criminal activity, and the criminal justice system. A series of metrics should be created to evaluate each objective, like those designed for public health and safety (Lake et al., 2018). Adolescent use metrics may include information on knowledge, attitudes, and behaviours of youth like those found in the Canadian Cannabis Survey (CCS). Other data on the quantity, potency, product, and method of administration among young people should also be collected and monitored in the coming years. Illicit market metrics may consist of user buying habits, licensed producers’ sales reports, and seed-to-sale audits. Additional data on cannabis tourism and charges under the Act may also provide helpful measures.

Future research should also expand this study to include right-wing and regional newspapers to capture a fuller picture of the events preceding the Act. Including the sources like the National Post and Vancouver Sun would allow for a more nuanced understanding of national and local intricacies of the social, legal, and political context. Research could also examine the normalization thesis in light of cannabis legalization. What role does legalization play in understanding normalization? Does the framework make sense in some parts of Canada? If not, how could the framework be refined to better explain cannabis policy reform?

80 6.7. Conclusion

This thesis sought to understand the emergence of the Act and it adds to the literature on Canada’s cannabis policy. The results suggest that cannabis legalization was the likely outcome of a combination of social, political, and legal events that changed the nature of our collective understanding of cannabis in Canada. The government’s failure to create a constitutionally sound cannabis access program, Colorado and Washington’s legal precedent, and a ballooning commercial industry set the stage for a marked departure in cannabis policy. Growing public support, increasing pressure for reform, legalization at other national and state levels, judicial decisions determining legality, and an expanding cannabis industry of licensed producers, enabled the government to legitimize its production, distribution, and sale through a parliamentary statute.

81 Chapter 7.

Epilogue: From First Reading to Royal Assent

7.1. Parliamentary process

Following the introduction of the bill in April 2017, the Act made its way through Canada’s parliamentary process, as shown in Table 12. The Liberals’ majority in the House of Commons enabled the bill to travel smoothly through the House, which passed only one substantive amendment to the bill following the Standing Committee on Health. Initially, the bill included a restriction on the height of plants cultivated in personal residences to a maximum of 100 centimeters; however, opposition led to the elimination of all height-related restrictions (Aiello, 2017). Following Third Reading in the House, the bill was sent to the Senate for debate.

Table 12. Chronology of Bill C-45

Date Event 2017-04-13 House of Commons First Reading 2017-06-08 House of Commons Second Reading and referral to committee 2017-10-05 Standing Committee on Health report presented 2017-11-27 House of Commons Third Reading 2017-11-28 Senate First Reading 2018-03-22 Senate Second Reading and referral to committee 2018-05-30 Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science, and Technology 2018-06-07 Senate Third Reading 2018-06-21 Royal Assent Acting as the government’s “sober second thought”, ongoing delays threatened to postpone the bill’s passage. The Act faced growing resistance in the Senate, especially from Conservative senators (Ibbitson, 2017). During the debate, a Conservative staffer was fired for circulating a memorandum to senators, which encouraged them to delay the final vote (The Canadian Press, 2018). Eventually, the Senate did approve C-45 with over forty proposed amendments in June 2018 (Bryden, 2018). Although most amendments were technical and eventually approved by the federal government, the Senate’s prohibition on promotional material was rejected along with an amendment on home cultivation. Conservative senators proposed an amendment to permit provinces to disallow home cultivation, following enforcement

82 concerns raised by Quebec and Manitoba (Leblanc, 2018). The federal government rejected this change, arguing expert opinion recommended allowing home cultivation:

“The decision on home cultivation of up to four plants was based on logic and evidence and it's one that we will continue to establish as part of the federal framework… criminal organizations make billions of dollars a year in profits on the sale of marijuana. We need to move forward on a system that controls and regulates while protecting our kids and our communities" (Leblanc, 2018).

Although senators could have chosen to further delay the bill, they did not, understanding the Senate’s role in Canadian politics (Pratte, 2018). Instead, the bill was sent back to the Senate, which passed the Act on June 19. It received Royal Assent two days later and came into effect on October 17, 2018.

7.2. Key concerns and criticisms

7.2.1. Distribution and sale

One concern prior to the Act coming into force was the system of distribution and sale that would be implemented by the provinces and territories. Each jurisdiction created its own processes, resulting in a patchwork of cannabis regulations across the country. The biggest difference is who would be allowed to sell cannabis retail, and most provinces opted to allow private companies to conduct retail sales (trinafraser, 2018). Only two jurisdictions (BC and Nunavut) permit both public and private sales, a plan which a Globe editorial called “the smartest one so far” (The Globe and Mail, 2018). The editorial argued that using a mixture of public and private retailers will allow for accessible and affordable cannabis, bringing current users into the licit market. Relying solely on government-run stores would allow the illicit market to flourish because loyal users would continue to purchase from their illicit suppliers. Conversely, relying on private retailers would not eliminate the illicit market, because provinces could not effectively control suppliers and distributors. Thus, by regulating some illicit retailers, provinces can bring loyal cannabis users into the licit market.

Another concern was the likelihood of supply shortages. Many believed the novelty of cannabis would inspire non-users to experiment, limiting product availability. Some provinces believed there would be enough product, but less selection than expected when the Act came into force (Thomas, 2018). The supply shortages were

83 attributed to low crop yields, sales license delays, and processing delays (Gollom, 2018). One issue was the excise stamps, that indicate the product was licitly produced; however, “among the issues were that the stamps arrived late, that they didn’t fit certain producers’ package sizes and that they had to be manually glued on to ensure that they fully comply with specifications listed in the Excise Act” (Subramaniam, 2018). Licensed producers lamented, claiming excise stamps directly caused slower production and were responsible for supply shortages (Subramaniam, 2018).

7.2.2. Impaired driving

Cannabis-impaired driving also dominated the news headlines during this period. Canadians feared an increased number of impaired drivers, and by extension, an increased number of motor vehicle accidents and deaths. Preliminary evidence suggest legalization may be related to changes in the number of motor vehicle fatalities; however, whether these statistics represent changes in cannabis access, use, or enforcement is difficult to determine (Aydelotte et al., 2017; Carnevale et al., 2017; Reed, 2016; Tefft, Arnold, & Grabowski, 2016; Couper & Peterson, 2014).

Statistics Canada gathered data on cannabis users’ driving behaviours prior to legalization, and a 2017 report revealed that 39% of users had driven within two hours of using cannabis (Health Canada, 2017). Further, one in five users did not think cannabis affected their ability to drive (Health Canada, 2017). Scientific studies, however, show that cannabis hinders the ability to drive through reduced cognitive and behavioural functioning, and users attempt to overcompensate by driving slower and leaving more room (Capler et al., 2017b). This makes cannabis-impaired driving a public health and safety risk, and the government acted accordingly by introducing Bill C-46 to strengthen impaired driving laws. The bill allows police officers to use oral fluid testing devices, introduces three new offences for impaired driving, and defines impairment at 2 ng/mL.

In August 2018, the federal government approved the first oral fluid screening device. Officials representing the Draeger DrugTest 5000 promoted the device across the country, but criticism over false readings and cold weather reliability called into question the appropriateness of the device in Canada (Moore, 2018). Further, oral fluid devices can determine the THC concentration in an individual but measuring cannabis impairment is much more complex.

84 THC is just one of the psychoactive compounds that contributes to impairment, and there is no standard instrument available to test for impairment (Parnes et al., 2017). Rates of intoxication depend on the individual’s tolerance, metabolic rate, intoxication level, and method of administration (Carnevale et al., 2017), and there is no consensus among researchers on a “safe” level of THC in the blood (Parnes et al., 2017; Health Canada, 2016b). Heavy users, such as medical users, may not show signs of impairment but have significant concentrations of THC in their blood (Health Canada, 2016b). Because of the difficulty in measuring cannabis impairment, governments and policy makers must define impairment limits, though this measures cannabis concentration and not driver impairment. While the current measurement tools and cut- off limits are not ideal, they do establish a legal standard for all drivers until better data is available.

A review of cannabis and driving by Capler et al. (2017b) recommended some key initiatives governments can implement to reduce the amount of harm amongst users. Public education is key, as announcements can provide useful information to discourage impaired driving. Effective campaigns depict cannabis use realistically and provide useful information to users, including how to identify impairment and strategies to drive safely (Capler et al., 2017b). This can include recommending an appropriate amount of time to wait before driving, encouraging alternative forms of transportation, and outlining the harms associated with using cannabis and alcohol.

7.2.3. Criminal record pardons

Many observers speculated how the government would handle past convictions following legalization. Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale emphasized that the Act does not include automatic amnesty, instead referring to the existing criminal record pardon processes (Bronskill, 2017). However, the government faced mounting pressure to provide amnesty and a public opinion poll showed that 62% of Canadians supported possession pardons (Leblanc, 2017). Thus, the federal government announced it would introduce legislation before the end of 2018 to pardon simple cannabis possession when the Act came into force (Leblanc, 2018b).

An editorial published by the Globe argued pardons do not go far enough and advocated for expungement instead (The Globe and Mail, 2018b). A record

85 suspension/pardon hides the criminal record, whereas expungement erases the conviction. Expungement would erase any history of the offence, “without the onus of a conviction for a minor cannabis offence in country where adults can use the drug with the government’s blessing” (The Globe and Mail, 2018b). Calls for cannabis expungement followed a June 2018 bill that allows Canadians to expunge criminal records for Canadians convicted of homosexual acts (The Canadian Press, 2018b).

Canadians were also concerned about how their cannabis use or industry involvement would affect international travel, especially to the US. First, immigration lawyer, Len Saunders, noted that pardons nor expungement are not recognized by the US government (CKNW, 2018). Most cannabis convictions occurred during the 1970s and 1980s and may not have been digitized into the Canadian criminal databases; however, applying for a pardon would automatically create a digital record, flagging past transgressions that might not be recognized otherwise (CKNW, 2018). Though a pardon might be useful for a criminal record check, it might create other problems for international travel (CKNW, 2018). Second, US Customs and Border Protection initially maintained a hardline stance, indicating that anyone involved in the industry would be inadmissible to the US (Boisvert, 2018). However, US officials relaxed their position before the Act came into force, stating that Canadians working in the legal industry would be admissible, provided their travel is unrelated to work (The Canadian Press, 2018c). The government of Canada warns Canadians of the risk:

Previous use of cannabis, or any substance prohibited by U.S. federal laws, could mean that you are denied entry to the U.S. Canadians travelling for reasons related to the cannabis industry may be deemed inadmissible. Do not attempt to cross the Canada-U.S. border with any amount of cannabis in any form, even if you are travelling to a U.S. state that has legalized possession of cannabis. If you do so you can expect legal prosecution and fines, and possibly jail time (Government of Canada, 2018b).

Other observers wondered whether the government would decriminalize cannabis possession during the bill’s parliamentary process. The NDP supported this idea, “calling it a logical first step that would prevent young people from being burdened with criminal records for the rest of their lives” (Bronskill, 2017), but the government upheld prohibition until legalization came into effect. Trudeau justified his government’s decision, arguing “anyone who is currently purchasing marijuana is participating in illegal activity that is funding criminal organizations and street gangs” (Harris, 2018). Thus,

86 while the legalization bill was debated in the House of Commons and Senate, police continued to enforce cannabis offences.

7.3. Likely effects of legalization

The day the Act came into force, the Globe published an editorial neatly summarizing the likely effects of cannabis legalization (The Globe and Mail, 2018c). In it, they concisely describe how Bill C-45 changes little in the day-to-day lives of Canadians. Many have used cannabis for years and are unlikely to modify consumption patterns because of a law. Instead, legalization will change how Canadians purchase and consume cannabis. Now, users can purchase preferred potencies with assured quality produced by licensed manufacturers from government or private retailers (The Globe and Mail, 2018c). Legalization marks the end of an era of possession-related arrests, allowing Canadians to purchase, possess, and consume without the fear of arrest.

The Act does, however, breed several economic and political effects. It provides Canada an opportunity to prove itself as an international leader in the budding industry. While many companies have already generated billions in revenue from the expectation of growth, now they have the chance to develop new production and research initiatives (The Globe and Mail, 2018c). Further, small communities can breathe new life through the repurposing of old factory spaces and the travel and hospitality industries are gearing up for a spike in job creation (The Globe and Mail, 2018c). Politically, the federal government must protect the new industry and the employees from the criminalization effects of other countries (The Globe and Mail, 2018c). Legalization also enables researchers to conduct cannabis-related studies, which will greatly contribute to our understanding of cannabis and drug policy. While the full effects of legalization may not be evident for decades, it represents the government’s acknowledgement of the prevalence of cannabis use among Canadians and the relatively few cannabis-related health risks. The Cannabis Act is a bold reform, nearly fifty years in the making and marks a new era in Canadian drug policy.

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108 Appendix A.

Articles in database

Code Date Title Author Page GM0001 06-May-00 Health Canada looking for marijuana supply MacKinnon, Mark A2 GM0002 16-May-00 Pot possession doesn't warrant jail term, Day says Matas, Robert A4 GM0003 19-Jul-00 Demographics cited as crime rate drops again Appleby, Timothy A2 GM0004 01-Aug-00 Law against marijuana struck down in Ontario Gadd, Jane A1 GM0005 14-Oct-00 Pot crusader seeks distribution rights The Globe and Mail A9 GM0006 18-Oct-00 Alaskans asked to make marijuana legal again Rosen, Yereth A13 GM0007 24-Oct-00 Practical pitfalls of the plebiscite Saunders, Doug A3 GM0008 12-Dec-00 Ailing Alberta man wins right to grow pot Walton, Dawn A6 GM0009 22-Dec-00 Federal pot farm planned at mine Campbell, Clark A1 GM0101 11-Jan-01 Crown appeals ruling on medical marijuana The Globe and Mail A6 GM0102 16-Mar-01 High court will hear pot test cases Makin, Kirk A3 GM0103 26-Mar-01 Imaginative smugglers hide marijuana: among Mexican string-bean shipments Mitrovica, Andrew A6 GM0104 03-Apr-01 Attention pot growers: Sign here for legal buyers Laghi, Brian A1 GM0105 06-Apr-01 Ottawa to legalize marijuana for severe arthritis Laghi, Brian A1 GM0106 15-May-01 Highest American court rejects medical marijuana Saunders, Doug A1 GM0107 18-May-01 MPs set to debate legalizing marijuana MacKinnon, Mark A1 GM0108 19-May-01 Minister 'quite open' to marijuana debate MacKinnon, Mark A1 GM0109 22-May-01 Support rising for legalizing marijuana, poll finds MacKinnon, Mark A1 GM0110 14-Jun-01 Committee to study non-medical drug use Leblanc, Daniel A10 GM0111 19-Jun-01 Trial to test crusader's right to grow pot for the sick, dying Walton, Dawn A5 GM0112 21-Jun-01 Krieger was right to break law on pot-trafficking, Calgary jury says The Globe and Mail A8 GM0113 21-Jun-01 Marijuana trafficker says he had no choice Walton, Dawn A10 GM0114 25-Jun-01 Canadians evenly split on legalizing pot The Globe and Mail A4 GM0115 04-Jul-01 Legal-marijuana users to get photo ID cards Laghi, Brian A1 GM0116 21-Jul-01 New marijuana charge for Alberta crusader Walton, Dawn A9

109 GM0117 31-Jul-01 Marijuana regulation draws fire Freeze, Colin; Abraham, Carolyn A1 GM0118 31-Jul-01 New pot law cuts access, activists say Smith, Graeme A8 GM0119 20-Oct-01 Dutch cabinet OKs bill on medicinal marijuana The Globe and Mail A18 GM0120 16-Nov-01 Police charge marijuana activist again Makin, Kirk A11 GM0121 22-Dec-01 Medicinal-pot users fuming over delays Abraham, Carolyn A8 GM0201 19-Feb-02 Commons panel hears about pot-growing The Globe and Mail A7 GM0202 22-Apr-02 Medicinal-marijuana harvest on hold Abraham, Carolyn A1 GM0203 27-Apr-02 operations flourishing Matas, Robert A7 GM0204 03-May-02 Pot smokers gain Senate backers Kim Lunman A4 GM0205 08-May-02 U.S. refused to supply medical marijuana seed The Globe and Mail A7 GM0206 24-May-02 Charter allows use of pot, civil suit says Jones, Vernon Clemont A8 GM0207 15-Jun-02 Pot farms conceal deadly risks Oberman, Mira A9 GM0209 11-Jul-02 Britain to let pot smokers off lightly Freeman, Alan A11 GM0208 11-Jul-02 In Canada, marijuana possession: is still illegal -- in theory at least Anderssen, Erin A11 GM0210 13-Jul-02 Would softer pot law stir wrath of U.S.? Anderssen, Erin A5 GM0211 16-Jul-02 Cauchon says pot laws could be eased Laghi, Brian A1 GM0212 17-Jul-02 Cauchon admits he smoked pot; questions possession law Laghi, Brian A3 GM0213 18-Jul-02 Light up, inhale, decriminalize Johnson, William A15 GM0214 19-Aug-02 Seized pot packs punch, Ottawa finds Abraham, Carolyn A6 GM0215 20-Aug-02 Ottawa shelves medicinal pot Picard, André; Abraham, Carolyn A1 GM0216 22-Aug-02 Marijuana drug touted as a safe pain reliever Picard, Andre A9 GM0217 02-Sep-02 The Flin Flon flip-flop Robinson, Spider A13 GM0219 05-Sep-02 Activists, experts hail Senate's report on pot Smith, Graeme A8 GM0218 05-Sep-02 Senators want pot legalized Kim Lunman A1 GM0220 05-Sep-02 Taking the high road Johnson, William A19 GM0221 06-Sep-02 Senators admit trying cannabis in distant past Kim Lunman A3 GM0222 07-Sep-02 Don't legalize pot, decriminalize it The Globe and Mail A20 GM0223 13-Sep-02 Canada's pot policy under fire from U.S. Smith, Graeme A7 GM0224 18-Sep-02 Rock planned to release pot, letter says Laghi, Brian A4 GM0225 20-Sep-02 Sick people have right to use pot, lawyer argues Abbate, Gay A6 GM0226 24-Sep-02 Don't make pot legal, UN official warns Tu Thanh Ha A4 GM0227 01-Oct-02 Ottawa tiptoes toward relaxing marijuana laws Campbell, Clark A5

110 GM0228 02-Oct-02 U.S. warns against liberalizing laws on pot Campbell, Clark A5 GM0229 10-Oct-02 First clinical pot trial to use U.S. stash Laghi, Brian A6 GM0230 19-Oct-02 Don't throw out federal pot laws, lawyer warns Gadd, Jane A18 GM0231 19-Oct-02 Nevada pushes next frontier: legalizing pot Gee, Marcus A19 GM0232 24-Oct-02 Benefits of cannabis scrutinized in Britain Hirschler, Ben A16 GM0233 18-Nov-02 Flin Flon pot to escape fiery fate Cheney, Peter A4 GM0234 20-Nov-02 Fewer N.S. teens smoking tobacco, but marijuana use constant: study Richer, Shawna A10 GM0235 22-Nov-02 Stop marijuana trade, U.S. drug czar urges Matas, Robert A7 GM0236 10-Dec-02 Ottawa set to ease pot laws Kim Lunman A1 GM0238 11-Dec-02 Many other countries try decriminalization Smith, Graeme A10 GM0237 11-Dec-02 Parliamentary committee to recommend new pot law Laghi, Brian; Kim Lunman A10 GM0239 12-Dec-02 Drug czar talks about tightening at border Kim Lunman; McCarthy, Shawn A7 GM0240 13-Dec-02 U.S. fears change in marijuana laws Kim Lunman A9 GM0243 14-Dec-02 Canada has it right on marijuana Elders, Joycelyn A23 GM0242 14-Dec-02 Our own and native weed Murphy, Rex A23 GM0241 14-Dec-02 Supreme Court delays pot appeal Kim Lunman A7 GM0244 20-Dec-02 Court ruling prompts pot-delivery service Peritz, Ingrid A3 GM0301 03-Jan-03 Pot possession not illegal, judge rules Freeze, Colin A1 GM0302 04-Jan-03 Ottawa to appeal ruling against pot laws Laghi, Brian A5 GM0303 10-Jan-03 Pot regulations violate Charter: Ontario court Gadd, Jane A5 GM0304 11-Jan-03 Marijuana laws take another pounding in Ontario Makin, Kirk A6 GM0305 18-Jan-03 The state in the pot dens of the nation Ibbitson, John A21 GM0306 11-Feb-03 Ottawa to appeal marijuana ruling Laghi, Brian A5 GM0307 03-Mar-03 The latest weed in the Canada-U.S. garden Ibbitson, John A13 GM0308 26-Apr-03 Medical pot firm mulls legal action over delays Laghi, Brian A16 GM0309 28-Apr-03 Ottawa may allow sale of pot at pharmacies Beeby, Dean A7 GM0310 01-May-03 Supreme Court will hear marijuana-law challenge despite talk of changes Makin, Kirk A9 GM0311 02-May-03 Canada's marijuana control is going up in smoke White, Randy A19 GM0312 03-May-03 Cellucci repeats warning over decriminalizing pot The Globe and Mail A4 GM0313 07-May-03 Federal government defends its pot laws Makin, Kirk A4 GM0314 10-May-03 Marijuana legislation expected next week Laghi, Brian A4 GM0315 15-May-03 Ottawa delays introduction of marijuana legislation Kim Lunman A7

111 GM0316 16-May-03 Lighter penalties for minors in pot bill Ibbitson, John; Kim Lunman A1 GM0317 17-May-03 No laws ban possession of marijuana, court rules Freeze, Colin; Kim Lunman A9 GM0318 27-May-03 Ottawa set to preach evils of pot Kim Lunman; Laghi, Brian A1 GM0319 28-May-03 Pot bill lets youth, drivers get off easier Kim Lunman; Koring, Paul A5 GM0321 02-Jun-03 San Francisco weeds out prison time for pot arrests Armstrong, Jane A8 GM0320 02-Jun-03 U.S. states, not Canada, led way in decriminalization, critics told Oziewicz, Estanislao A8 GM0322 06-Jun-03 Ontario police are in a fog over pot laws Freeze, Colin A6 GM0323 09-Jul-03 Ottawa's pot grower will supply patients Kim Lunman; Laghi, Brian A1 GM0324 10-Jul-03 MDs will dispense marijuana Laghi, Brian A1 GM0325 10-Jul-03 Patients seek relief on price of medical pot Laghi, Brian A8 GM0326 11-Jul-03 MDs balk at dispensing marijuana Laghi, Brian A7 GM0327 17-Jul-03 Head of medical-pot program resigns Bueckert, Dennis A9 GM0328 21-Jul-03 Health Canada readies release of dope manual Beeby, Dean A12 GM0329 11-Aug-03 Critics lambaste marijuana charges Galloway, Gloria A5 GM0330 19-Aug-03 MP group sought U.S. help to derail pot bill Laghi, Brian A1 GM0331 01-Sep-03 Dutch make pot a prescription drug Gallagher, Paul A8 GM0332 16-Sep-03 Health Canada dope stinks, patients say Beeby, Dean A11 GM0333 08-Oct-03 Marijuana ruling a victory for the ill Makin, Kirk A7 GM0334 09-Oct-03 Pot limits for possession may be cut by one-third Kim Lunman A10 GM0335 14-Oct-03 Many bills may face legislative limbo Kim Lunman A4 GM0336 21-Oct-03 Liberal MP dismisses U.S. views on pot Kim Lunman A2 GM0337 28-Oct-03 Prorogue of Parliament threatens high-profile bills Campbell, Clark; Leblanc, Daniel A5 GM0338 31-Oct-03 Pot panel invites American drug czar Kim Lunman A9 GM0339 26-Nov-03 Caucus members break with Layton on marijuana policy Kim Lunman A4 GM0340 04-Dec-03 Reluctant jurors convict Albertan pot crusader Walton, Dawn A6 GM0341 05-Dec-03 Judge's charge to jury seen as case for appeal Walton, Dawn A8 GM0342 09-Dec-03 Ottawa stays pot charges in 4,000 cases Kim Lunman A8 GM0343 24-Dec-03 Pot still illegal, top court rules Makin, Kirk A1 GM0401 02-Jan-04 The pot law may stand, but it still needs fixing The Globe and Mail A14 GM0402 16-Feb-04 Marijuana bill targets trafficking, not simple possession Kim Lunman A8 GM0403 02-Mar-04 Canadian pot a growing concern, U.S. says McKenna, Barrie A5 GM0404 02-Mar-04 U.S. report cites Canada as major source of drugs McKenna, Barrie A8

112 GM0406 08-May-04 Marijuana grow-ops booming in suburbs Weber, Bob A17 GM0405 08-May-04 Pot decriminalization bill is about to go up in smoke Campbell, Clark A4 GM0407 12-May-04 Approval for cannabis spray sought in Canada Mickleburgh, Rod A17 GM0408 09-Jun-04 Study sees pot of gold in illegal B.C. crop Mickleburgh, Rod A11 GM0409 22-Jul-04 Marijuana use almost doubles, survey finds Galloway, Gloria A6 GM0410 29-Jul-04 Pot-possession charges down by 30 per cent Kim Lunman A6 GM0411 02-Nov-04 Let's remember Prohibition -- and legalize marijuana Ibbitson, John A4 GM0412 02-Nov-04 Ottawa revives plan to relax pot laws Campbell, Clark A4 GM0413 25-Nov-04 Pot -- it's not just for bohemians any more Armstrong, Jane A3 GM0414 29-Dec-04 Grow-ops too many to raid, police say Appleby, Timothy; Saunders, John A13 GM0501 05-Mar-05 Tory MP calls for crackdown Freeze, Colin A12 GM0502 20-Apr-05 Cannabis painkiller is approved Picard, André A1 GM0503 07-Jun-05 Top court lets U.S. ban medicinal pot Freeman, Alan A15 GM0504 03-Aug-05 Just say no to Uncle Sam's DEA Young, Alan A17 GM0505 20-Aug-05 DEA set to destroy tunnel Bains, Camille A13 GM0601 06-Feb-06 Ottawa has trouble collecting marijuana debt Beeby, Dean A7 GM0602 03-May-06 Fox to sign Mexico's liberalized drug law The Globe and Mail A8 GM0603 05-Aug-06 Reefer is worth getting mad about Costa, Antonio Maria A13 GM0604 12-Oct-06 New deal for federal pot grower Dobrota, Alex A9 GM0605 27-Oct-06 Pot activist to get new trial Makin, Kirk A5 GM0701 23-Feb-07 U.S. drug czar finds ally in Tory government Galloway, Gloria A9 GM0702 16-Apr-07 Ottawa puts high price tag on its pot Beeby, Dean A7 GM0703 09-Jul-07 Spike in pot arrests linked to bill's demise The Globe and Mail A6 GM0704 07-Sep-07 Time to address medical marijuana, Onley says Trevisan, Matthew A10 GM0705 15-Nov-07 Pot activists hail ruling Beeby, Dean A10 GM0706 04-Dec-07 Ottawa must loosen medical pot rules, lawyers argue Babbage, Maria A9 GM0707 18-Dec-07 Production of potent pot flourishing and lucrative, RCMP report says The Globe and Mail A8 GM0801 20-Feb-08 B.C. marijuana smoker wins human-rights ruling Theodore, Terri A7 GM0802 23-Feb-08 The toke smelled round the world? Wente, Margaret A23 GM0803 14-Apr-08 Medical marijuana users owe Ottawa more than $500,000 Beeby, Dean A5 GM0804 15-Apr-08 Who'll grow the weed, man? Rennie, Steve A2 GM0805 02-Jul-08 Dutch doobs and don'ts Hornby, Catherine A2

113 GM0901 24-Apr-09 Ottawa out of appeals in medicinal marijuana case The Globe and Mail A2 GM0902 22-Jul-09 Medical pot venture goes up in smoke White, Patrick A2 GM1001 17-Jul-10 Legal challenges Perreaux, Les A9 GM1002 21-Oct-10 California considers a truce in pot war Slater, Joanna A18 GM1003 29-Oct-10 Reefer madness The Globe and Mail A22 GM1004 30-Oct-10 Proposition 19 could kill B.C's buzz Matas, Robert A11 GM1101 15-Feb-11 Jails, jails, jails The Globe and Mail A16 GM1102 04-Jul-11 Doctors to prescribe, not a ministry The Globe and Mail A14 GM1103 22-Aug-11 Ottawa has a drug problem Greenspan, Edward; Doob, Anthony A11 GM1104 21-Sep-11 This obsession is not magnificent The Globe and Mail A20 GM1105 17-Oct-11 A little legalizing, a big peace dividend Reynolds, Neil A15 GM1106 20-Oct-11 Legalizing drugs isn't the answer Wente, Margaret A21 GM1201 16-Jan-12 A Liberal weekend: monarchy, marijuana and Mike Taber, Jane A4 GM1202 20-Feb-12 Ex-attorney-general joins call for legalization of pot Matas, Robert A6 GM1203 07-Nov-12 States headed toward historic legalization of gay marriage, marijuana Mickleburgh, Rod A13 GM1204 08-Nov-12 Vote threatens to nip B.C. market in the bud Dhillon, Sunny A3 GM1205 07-Dec-12 Washington potheads to celebrate legal smoke Johnson, Gene A24 GM1206 17-Dec-12 Medical marijuana move angers health professionals Picard, André A11 GM1207 26-Dec-12 Sea change in public attitudes The Globe and Mail A28 GM1301 02-Feb-13 Court upholds Canada's medical marijuana laws Makin, Kirk A12 GM1302 02-Apr-13 Business booms thanks to marijuana legalization in two U.S. states Drews, Kevin A8 GM1303 03-Jun-13 Review brings out entrepreneurial spirit Galloway, Gloria A8 GM1304 26-Jun-13 Commercial growers favour new medical pot scheme Galloway, Gloria A9 GM1305 26-Jul-13 Trudeau embraces legal pot as Liberals, NDP look to 2015 Leblanc, Daniel; Dhillon, Sunny A1 GM1307 01-Aug-13 Uruguay debates legalizing pot to fight crime Fernandez, Pablo A3 GM1306 01-Aug-13 Uruguay legalizes cultivation and sale of pot Llambias, Felipe; Malena Castaldi A3 GM1308 17-Aug-13 Police to hand out Doritos instead of citations at Hempfest Kaminsky, Jonathan A18 GM1309 23-Aug-13 Trudeau's pot use fans legalization debate Curry, Bill; Chase, Steven A1 GM1310 23-Aug-13 So Trudeau smoked pot. At least he's honest Mason, Gary A11 GM1312 30-Aug-13 PM considers tickets, not charges, for pot Curry, Bill A3 GM1311 30-Aug-13 Two states get go-ahead for legalization experiment Ingram, David A3 GM1313 30-Sep-13 Tories launch free market in medical marijuana Beeby, Dean A13

114 GM1314 07-Oct-13 conundrums The Globe and Mail A10 GM1315 11-Dec-13 Pot-hating President supports creation of marijuana market The Globe and Mail A19 GM1316 23-Dec-13 Medical marijuana users fear prices are about to soar Nguyen, Linda A5 GM1403 03-Jan-14 Reefer madness will spread - if it works Mason, Gary A13 GM1401 06-Jan-14 Colorado lights up a big experiment The Globe and Mail A8 GM1402 17-Jan-14 Pot holes: Study shows drug law applied unevenly across Canada Offman, Craig; Hui, Ann A1 GM1404 17-Feb-14 For Mexico, legalization is freedom Fox, Vicente A11 GM1405 20-Feb-14 Colorado rakes in the green from pot The Globe and Mail A14 GM1406 06-Mar-14 Ottawa mulls softening marijuana laws Wingrove, Josh A4 GM1407 18-Mar-14 Ottawa to inform police if growers flout new rules Bronskill, Jim A5 GM1408 22-Mar-14 Federal Court grants injunction to allow patients to grow medical marijuana Keller, James A6 GM1409 24-Mar-14 Wary doctors pressed into prescribing medical pot Grant, Kelly A1 GM1410 31-Mar-14 New medicinal pot laws divide doctors Ubelacker, Sheryl A7 GM1411 03-Apr-14 Up in smoke: Injunction burns budding medical pot industry Offman, Craig A1 GM1412 21-Apr-14 In Colorado, a mainstream celebration of legal cannabis Riccardi, Nicholas A3 GM1413 25-Jul-14 Police appear to be losing motivation to enforce pot laws, new statistics show Galloway, Gloria A3 GM1414 18-Aug-14 Doctors withdraw support of anti-drug campaign Picard, André A8 GM1415 19-Aug-14 Anti-marijuana campaign not political, Ambrose says Picard, André A4 GM1416 20-Aug-14 MacKay says relaxed marijuana laws still on the table Luk, Vivian A4 GM1417 21-Aug-14 An unhealthy dose of partisanship Yakabuski, Konrad A11 GM1418 22-Aug-14 Canada's pot policy needs to sober up Picard, André A5 GM1419 10-Sep-14 Substance-abuse centre calls for pot-policy review Curry, Bill A6 GM1420 25-Sep-14 Why Uruguay legalized pot, from the top down Nolen, Stephanie A8 GM1421 16-Oct-14 Government still harshing Colorado's legal mellow Flanagan, Tom A13 GM1422 22-Oct-14 Opposition says marijuana report lacks key details Curry, Bill A3 GM1423 03-Dec-14 Should Canada do a Uruguay? Simpson, Jeffrey A17 GM1424 05-Dec-14 A marijuana measure worth watching Simpson, Jeffrey A17 GM1501 24-Feb-15 Regulators warn of poor disclosures by marijuana companies McFarland, Janet A1 GM1503 07-Apr-15 The Dope On Legal Dope Lepore, Jessica A7 GM1502 07-Apr-15 Washington State's Road To Legal Marijuana Is Strewn With Potholes Mason, Gary A6 GM1504 16-Apr-15 Report suggests drop in teen marijuana use Branswell, Elen A6 GM1505 23-Apr-15 Vancouver to be first city to regulate medical pot dispensaries Bula, Frances A1

115 GM1506 24-Apr-15 Ottawa warns against plan to regulate pot dispensaries Woo, Andrea A1 GM1507 12-Jun-15 Health Minister 'outraged' by SCOC marijuana ruling Fine, Sean A3 GM1508 25-Jun-15 Vancouver becomes first to regulate pot dispensaries Hager, Mike A1 GM1509 03-Jul-15 Anti-pot policies help industry grow Galloway, Gloria A4 GM1510 13-Jul-15 How Ottawa created the 'Wild West' of medical marijuana Valleriani, Jenna A12 GM1511 12-Aug-15 Harper pledges to beef up police resources against grow-ops Galloway, Gloria A4 GM1512 11-Sep-15 Health Canada warns RCMP may act if pot dispensaries remain open Hager, Mike A1 GM1513 29-Sep-15 Ontario judge strikes down mandatory minimum sentence for growing pot Fine, Sean A1 GM1514 14-Oct-15 Mulcair says NDP would eventually legalize pot Galloway, Gloria A7 GM1601 06-Jan-16 Legalizing pot will run afoul of global treaties, PM warned Blanchfield, Mike A8 GM1602 09-Jan-16 Blair faces 'formidable challenge' in leading marijuana task force Leblanc, Daniel A6 GM1603 13-Jan-16 Expect strict control of marijuana, Blair asserts Leblanc, Daniel A13 GM1604 15-Jan-16 Marijuana industry wants illicit dispensaries shut down Hager, Mike A8 GM1605 22-Jan-16 Avoiding a marijuana 'wild west' The Globe and Mail A12 GM1606 30-Jan-16 Medical pot producers eyeing recreational market Leblanc, Daniel A3 GM1607 08-Feb-16 Liberals' vow to legalize pot creating chaos, police say Leblanc, Daniel A1 GM1609 25-Feb-16 Canadians can grow their own, court rules Hager, Mike A4 GM1608 25-Feb-16 Battle looms over lucrative recreational pot market Robertson, Grant; Morrow, Adrian; A1 Leblanc, Daniel; Blackwell, Richard; Hunter, Justine GM1610 26-Feb-16 Court rulings aside, legalizing pot still a pipe dream Mason, Gary A11 GM1611 29-Feb-16 Majority agree pot should be legal: poll Leblanc, Daniel A4 GM1612 25-Mar-16 Ottawa won't appeal court ruling on medical pot Hager, Mike A4 GM1613 18-Apr-16 Caution in pot adoption urged at summit Robertson, Grant A3 GM1614 07-May-16 Toronto overtakes Vancouver as country's cannabis capital Hager, Mike A16 GM1615 13-May-16 Toronto set to crack down on illegal marijuana dispensaries Gray, Jeff A1 GM1616 23-May-16 Tobacco, marijuana are exactly the same when it comes to insurance premiums Hager, Mike A3 GM1617 24-May-16 Vancouver's dispensaries remain open Hager, Mike A6 GM1618 25-May-16 Pot dispensaries 'reckless,' Blair says McArthur, Greg A4 GM1619 27-May-16 Police, bylaw officers raid marijuana dispensaries across Toronto Hager, Mike; Bastien, Laurent A1 GM1620 28-May-16 Pot advocates remain defiant Gray, Jeff; Bastien, Laurent A6 GM1621 03-Jun-16 Hire signals Ottawa's strict line on recreational marijuana Leblanc, Daniel; Hager, Mike A1

116 GM1622 24-Jun-16 Police raid more Toronto dispensaries The Globe and Mail A8 GM1623 01-Jul-16 Ottawa moves toward tight controls on recreational marijuana Leblanc, Daniel A1 GM1624 04-Jul-16 Canada's issues not U.S. 'red flags' Clark, Campbell A4 GM1625 04-Jul-16 To understand pot, look to Colorado The Globe and Mail A8 GM1626 19-Jul-16 Marijuana task force faces 'fascinating journey' in making regulation decisions Leblanc, Daniel A4 GM1627 23-Jul-16 Medical pot companies aim to grow export business Bastien, Laurent; Hager, Mike A4 GM1629 29-Jul-16 The Globe's investigation The Globe and Mail A9 GM1628 29-Jul-16 True Relief? Weeks, Carly A8 GM1630 30-Jul-16 What's not in your pot? Robertson, Grant; McArthur, Greg A4 GM1631 01-Aug-16 Legalize pot, but bring in quality controls Picard, Andre A9 GM1632 12-Aug-16 Health Canada to allow safety testing of medical marijuana Galloway, Gloria; Hager, Mike A1 GM1633 13-Aug-16 Ottawa's rule change on testing eligibility will not cover illegal dispensaries Hager, Mike A4 GM1634 09-Sep-16 CMA pushes 21 as minimum age for purchasing marijuana Grant, Kelly A1 GM1635 21-Sep-16 Ottawa failed to act on tests showing toxins in retail pot Robertson, Grant A1 GM1636 23-Sep-16 Not aware of report about toxin-laced marijuana, Philpott says Robertson, Grant; Bailey, Ian; A1 Leblanc, Daniel GM1637 24-Sep-16 Health Canada saw cannabis lab reports Robertson, Grant A4 GM1638 03-Oct-16 Cities challenged by Ottawa's pot plan Robertson, Grant A3 GM1639 07-Nov-16 Pot, death penalty on the California ballot Mason, Gary A7 GM1640 08-Nov-16 From plastic bags to pot, voters face referendums McMahon, Tamsin A8 GM1641 28-Nov-16 Pot legalization report due this week Cryderman, Kelly A4 GM1642 01-Dec-16 Government receives cannabis task force's report Leblanc, Daniel A3 GM1644 14-Dec-16 Legal age for cannabis sales emerges as contentious issue Weeks, Carly A9 GM1643 14-Dec-16 Ottawa plans to open up legal market for cannabis by early 2019 Leblanc, Daniel A1 GM1645 14-Dec-16 Testing pot should be 'a cornerstone': report Robertson, Grant A9 GM1646 15-Dec-16 Top pot dispensaries plan to expand before legalization Hager, Mike A6 GM1648 16-Dec-16 Many potholes in marijuana legalization Mason, Gary A13 GM1647 16-Dec-16 Pot-purchasing age should match drinking age, PM says Leblanc, Daniel A10 GM1701 26-Jan-17 A tale of two cities policing pot Hager, Mike A11 GM1702 08-Feb-17 No pesticide testing done for marijuana, regulator says Robertson, Grant A1 GM1703 10-Feb-17 Ottawa clamps down on growers Robertson, Grant A9 GM1704 11-Feb-17 Tainted-pot risks played down: specialist Robertson, Grant A18

117 GM1705 14-Mar-17 CEO urges stricter cannabis regulation Robertson, Grant A7 GM1706 27-Mar-17 Ottawa rushing to craft marijuana bill ahead of 4/20 Leblanc, Daniel A6 GM1707 28-Mar-17 Cannabis legalization may be slowed by provinces Hager, Mike A3 GM1708 31-Mar-17 Marijuana producers lobby for branding Posadzki, Alexandra A9 GM1709 12-Apr-17 Canada to speed up cannabis production Leblanc, Daniel A4 GM1710 14-Apr-17 Liberals table historic marijuana legislation - criminal market Leblanc, Daniel; Hager, Mike A1 GM1711 14-Apr-17 Liberals table historic marijuana legislation - Police to get sweeping Leblanc, Daniel; Hager, Mike A1

118 Appendix B.

Past-month cannabis and alcohol use

2014 2017 Difference Alaska Cannabis past-month Ages 12-17 9.19 8.84 -0.35 Ages 18-25 21.30 26.27 4.97 Ages 26+ 10.42 14.97 4.55 Alcohol past-month Ages 12-17 9.22 10.10 0.88 Ages 18-25 59.65 55.68 -3.97 Ages 26+ 59.05 56.35 -2.70 California Cannabis past-month Ages 12-17 8.74 6.93 -1.81 Ages 18-25 21.05 24.07 3.02 Ages 26+ 7.09 9.70 2.61 Alcohol past-month Ages 12-17 12.01 8.95 -3.06 Ages 18-25 57.67 53.66 -4.01 Ages 26+ 54.28 54.85 0.57 Colorado Cannabis past-month Ages 12-17 12.56 9.02 -3.54 Ages 18-25 31.24 31.74 0.50 Ages 26+ 12.45 14.81 2.36 Alcohol past-month Ages 12-17 14.25 9.75 -4.50 Ages 18-25 67.46 62.66 -4.80 Ages 26+ 66.24 64.79 -1.45 Maine Cannabis past-month Ages 12-17 9.90 9.89 -0.01 Ages 18-25 28.38 34.38 6.00 Ages 26+ 10.77 13.89 3.12 Alcohol past-month Ages 12-17 11.86 11.24 -0.62 Ages 18-25 66.39 64.29 -2.10 Ages 26+ 62.82 59.37 -3.45 Massachusetts Cannabis past-month Ages 12-17 8.88 8.91 0.03 Ages 18-25 28.74 30.27 1.53 Ages 26+ 9.08 10.94 1.86 Alcohol past-month Ages 12-17 13.30 12.72 -0.58 Ages 18-25 70.15 70.51 0.36 Ages 26+ 66.05 64.91 -1.14

119 2014 2017 Difference Nevada Cannabis past-month Ages 12-17 7.97 8.82 0.85 Ages 18-25 18.01 25.86 7.85 Ages 26+ 6.13 10.11 3.98 Alcohol past-month Ages 12-17 13.59 9.63 -3.96 Ages 18-25 65.70 49.94 -15.76 Ages 26+ 61.82 52.45 -9.37 Oregon Cannabis past-month Ages 12-17 10.19 10.35 0.16 Ages 18-25 24.85 33.15 8.30 Ages 26+ 10.68 18.07 7.39 Alcohol past-month Ages 12-17 12.92 10.54 -2.38 Ages 18-25 62.92 62.70 -0.22 Ages 26+ 61.12 62.88 1.76 Washington Cannabis past-month Ages 12-17 10.06 8.96 -1.10 Ages 18-25 24.47 26.48 2.01 Ages 26+ 11.21 14.28 3.07 Alcohol past-month Ages 12-17 10.44 10.05 -0.39 Ages 18-25 59.03 60.41 1.38 Ages 26+ 57.87 59.42 1.55 Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, n.d.

120 Appendix C.

Fatality rate per 100 million vehicle miles traveled by US state

State 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Difference Alaska 1.17 1.57 1.23 1.05 1.50 1.29 1.60 0.43 Oregon 0.94 0.99 1.02 0.93 1.03 1.24 1.35 0.41 California 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.93 1.01 1.07 0.23 Florida 1.25 1.25 1.27 1.25 1.24 1.42 1.47 0.22 South Carolina 1.65 1.70 1.76 1.57 1.65 1.89 1.86 0.21 Colorado 0.96 0.96 1.01 1.03 1.00 1.08 1.17 0.21 Arizona 1.27 1.39 1.37 1.40 1.23 1.38 1.46 0.19 Alabama 1.34 1.38 1.33 1.31 1.25 1.26 1.50 0.16 Georgia 1.12 1.13 1.11 1.08 1.04 1.21 1.27 0.15 Idaho 1.32 1.05 1.13 1.34 1.15 1.30 1.47 0.15 Illinois 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.94 0.88 0.95 1.01 0.13 Missouri 1.16 1.14 1.19 1.09 1.08 1.21 1.28 0.12 Kentucky 1.58 1.50 1.58 1.36 1.40 1.56 1.69 0.11 Michigan 0.97 0.94 0.99 1.00 0.93 0.99 1.07 0.10 Texas 1.29 1.29 1.43 1.39 1.45 1.39 1.39 0.10 District of Columbia 0.67 0.76 0.42 0.57 0.65 0.65 0.75 0.08 Washington 0.80 0.80 0.77 0.76 0.80 0.92 0.88 0.08 Mississippi 1.61 1.62 1.51 1.58 1.54 1.70 1.69 0.08 Nebraska 0.98 0.95 1.10 1.09 1.15 1.22 1.05 0.07 US Average 1.11 1.10 1.14 1.10 1.08 1.15 1.18 0.07 Nevada 1.16 1.02 1.08 1.08 1.15 1.26 1.22 0.06 New Mexico 1.38 1.36 1.43 1.24 1.52 1.09 1.44 0.06 Delaware 1.13 1.10 1.24 1.06 1.29 1.32 1.17 0.04 New Hampshire 0.98 0.71 0.84 1.05 0.73 0.87 1.01 0.03 New Jersey 0.76 0.86 0.79 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.78 0.02 Hawaii 1.13 0.99 1.24 1.01 0.93 0.90 1.13 0.00 Virginia 0.90 0.94 0.96 0.92 0.87 0.91 0.90 0.00 Indiana 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.94 1.04 0.99 -0.01 Massachusetts 0.64 0.68 0.68 0.62 0.62 0.58 0.63 -0.01 Oklahoma 1.40 1.47 1.48 1.41 1.40 1.35 1.39 -0.01 Wisconsin 0.96 0.99 1.04 0.91 0.84 0.91 0.95 -0.01 Maine 1.11 0.95 1.16 1.02 0.92 1.07 1.09 -0.02 Ohio 0.97 0.91 0.99 0.88 0.89 0.98 0.95 -0.02 Iowa 1.24 1.15 1.16 1.00 1.03 0.96 1.21 -0.03 Maryland 0.88 0.86 0.90 0.82 0.78 0.90 0.85 -0.03

121 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Difference Louisiana 1.59 1.46 1.54 1.47 1.53 1.56 1.54 -0.05 North Carolina 1.29 1.19 1.24 1.23 1.19 1.23 1.24 -0.05 Utah 0.95 0.93 0.82 0.81 0.93 0.94 0.89 -0.06 Minnesota 0.73 0.65 0.69 0.68 0.63 0.72 0.66 -0.07 Connecticut 1.02 0.71 0.84 0.92 0.80 0.85 0.93 -0.09 New York 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.81 0.89 0.83 -0.09 Kansas 1.44 1.29 1.32 1.16 1.25 1.13 1.34 -0.10 North Dakota 1.27 1.62 1.69 1.47 1.28 1.31 1.16 -0.11 Tennessee 1.47 1.32 1.43 1.40 1.33 1.25 1.35 -0.12 Vermont 0.98 0.77 1.07 0.97 0.62 0.78 0.84 -0.14 Pennsylvania 1.32 1.30 1.32 1.23 1.20 1.19 1.17 -0.15 Rhode Island 0.81 0.84 0.82 0.84 0.66 0.57 0.64 -0.17 Arkansas 1.70 1.67 1.67 1.49 1.38 1.58 1.52 -0.18 Montana 1.69 1.79 1.72 1.90 1.58 1.81 1.51 -0.18 West Virginia 1.64 1.78 1.76 1.73 1.42 1.35 1.38 -0.26 South Dakota 1.58 1.23 1.46 1.48 1.47 1.44 1.22 -0.36 Wyoming 1.66 1.46 1.33 0.93 1.59 1.51 1.20 -0.46 Source: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, n.d.

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