Russia and Conspiracy As a Way of Life Constitutional Order

Jonathan W. Daly. Autocracy Under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1866-1905. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1998. xi + 260 pp. $38.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-87580-243-5. Reviewed by Z. Ronald Bialkowski Published on H-Russia (April, 2001) Russia and Conspiracy as a Way of Life constitutional order. Unlike other works, such as During the Cold War it was not uncommon Frederic Zuckerman's The Tsarist Secret Police in for historians to trace the antecedents of the Sovi‐ Russian Society, 1880-1917 and Charles Ruud's et police state back to its Imperial predecessor. and Sergei Stepanov's Fontanka 16: The Tsars' Se‐ Most arguments in this vein viewed the "totalitari‐ cret Police, Daly draws on a wide scope of an" system's political centralization and invasion archival materials.[1] He challenges the Russian of the private sphere as a continuation of the Rus‐ liberal stereotype of the secret police as the epito‐ sian autocratic tradition. The Soviet regime's dis‐ me of the autocracy's arbitrary statescraft and dis‐ trust and suspicion was often compared with the regard for its own laws. Although Daly concurs bunker mentality of tsarist security forces. There with the argument of the aforementioned works is little doubt that the political culture of an un‐ that the Russian secret police adopted practices al‐ derground revolutionary movement and Bolshe‐ ready employed in Western Europe, he takes this vik ideology contributed to the surveillance soci‐ thought one step further by probing the ways in ety of Soviet Russia. Yet the most recent historiog‐ which the secret police might have contributed to raphy of Imperial Russia's security organs sug‐ the rule-of-law in Imperial Russia. gests that the contribution of the tsarist police Daly traces the history of the secret police practices to the Soviet political system should not from 1866 through 1905 (a subsequent work be taken so easily for granted. should follow the history of the security police Among the recent works on the Imperial se‐ from 1905 to 1917). His account begins with a cret police, Jonathan Daly's Autocracy Under brief description of the Third Section, the secret Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, police-gendarme organization established by Tsar 1866-1905 merits attention for its considerable Nicholas I (1825-1855) and its aboliton following emphasis on the police's role in Russia's halting Dmitrii Karakozov's assassination attempt on Tsar (and unsuccessful) evolution towards a liberal- Alexander II (1855-1881). In the ensuing reorgani‐ H-Net Reviews zation of internal security (1871), the responsibili‐ derground. By 1895, for example, most secret po‐ ties of the secret police were separated from those lice officials possessed legal training, experience of the Corps of Gendarmes (although inter-minis‐ as prosecutors, and an intimate familiarity with terial disputes over jurisdiction would persist up European security practices. But the secret police through the revolution of 1917). The book is divid‐ owed its greatest debt to conspiratorial innova‐ ed into six chapters addressing the origins of the tors such as Aleksandr Mikhailov of the People's security police, its organizational structure, the Will who devised sophisticated evasion tech‐ development of police methods, the struggle be‐ niques which would transform conspiracy into a tween the political underground and the police, way of life for both communities.[3] This applied Sergei Zubatov's attempts to reform the police, to all police agents and even more so to inform‐ and the chaos generated by the revolution of ers. The most notorious informer, Evno Azef, rose 1905. to head the Battle Organization of the Socialist If the tsarist secret police exercised extra-le‐ Revolutionary Party in the 1900s.[4] gal powers, its methods by no means differed The improvement of police methods enabled from practices already established in Western Eu‐ the autocracy to contain most revolutionary senti‐ rope. Daly portrays the secret police not as a force ment in the 1890s. However, Daly stresses that the essential to social control (as was the case with police's professionalization fell short of Western the KGB and its widespread network of inform‐ standards since most officers continued to rely on ers), but as a tool employed by the autocracy pri‐ patronage and politics to advance their careers. marily against a small revolutionary under‐ Extraordinary officers such as Sergei Zubatov and ground. In this sense, the secret police was notex‐ Aleksandr Spiridovich were the exception rather pected to compensate for the autocracy's poor than the rule. In his brief discussion of Azef affair, statescraft and pervasive social discontent. In fact, for example, Daly notes that many agents relied Daly suggests that the autocracy's opponents ini‐ on their relationship with informers to advance tially enjoyed tremendous leeway and often suc‐ their career. And informers,as Daly observes, cessfully evaded the police. Revolutionaries in came mostly from outside the police establish‐ part owed their early successes in the 1870s due ment and lived a very precarious life. to the gendarmes' inability to counter conspirato‐ If any individual should be considered the rial activity. The gendarmes possessed few effec‐ protagonist of Daly's work, it is the police re‐ tive prophylactic measures against political radi‐ former Sergei Zubatov. While it might be odd for cals and were easily marked on the street as po‐ a monarchist to assume the mantle of the tragic lice officers. Nevertheless, the gendarmes re‐ hero, Daly suggests that Zubatov unwittingly ad‐ mained the state's most prominent symbol of po‐ vanced the rule-of-law in Russia. Zubatov sought litical authority through 1917 while the secret po‐ to differentiate between the regime's violent and lice went mostly unnoticed until brought to the non-violent opponents and inculcated all his sub‐ public's attention after the notorious secret agent ordinates with strong monarchist idealism. Al‐ Azef was unmasked in 1908-1909.[2] though best remembered for his ambitious plans The Ministry of the Interior assumed adminis‐ to co-opt the labor movement with monarchist tration of the secret police in 1870. Daly concurs unions, Zubatov's most telling contributions to with the view of Zuckerman, Ruud, and Stepanov Russia's security organs were administrative. Zu‐ that the professionalization of police methods and batov transferred the jurisdiction over political training under its purview dramatically improved cases from provincial gendarmes to new security the autocracy's ability to contain the political un‐ bureaus in order to respond more effectively to 2 H-Net Reviews political agitation and provide greater career op‐ it might have benefited from more systematic or‐ portunities for talented police officials. ganization. Moreover, a more detailed assessment Most explanations for the failure of Zubatov's of the exile system would be in order given its im‐ labor program refer to Nicholas II's indifference portance to the political underground. and the opposition of "patriotic" industrialists to So in what way did Imperial Russia's secret it. But as Daly observes, much of the onus must police contribute to the distrust and suspicious‐ also be laid on the sluggishness, conservatism, ness characteristic of the Soviet police state? The and unresponsiveness of the Imperial bureaucra‐ Soviet Union certainly drew on the imperial prac‐ cy. The labor program, as Zubatov's critics aptly tices of political exile and penal labor (harsher perceived, could not function without him and and more pointless than its Imperial predecessor). was thus doomed to failure. Even in the manage‐ It likewise continued the tradition of restricting ment of his coveted security bureaus, Zubatov political discourse and persecuting its citizens for kept most of the details to himself. the most innocent pronouncements. Yet the con‐ Daly's sympathetic treatment of Zubatov rais‐ struction of Communism extended the system of es important questions concerning the capability surveillance to the general population at a of Imperial Russia's bureaucracy to reform the tremendous cost to the populace's moral and psy‐ system. Although regulations and patronage net‐ chological health. The Imperial practice of allow‐ works hampered the bureaucracy's innovative‐ ing political radicals to remain largely at liberty ness, the fact that a police official flled a policy- until they committed a crime hardly anticipated making vacuum suggests that the regime lacked the police state maintained by the KGB. Daly's the administrative prowess to avert the revolu‐ work reminds us that the Imperial secret police tionary catastrophes of 1905 and 1917. The securi‐ directed their efforts mostly at a narrow segment ty police, Daly emphasizes, was intended primari‐ of the population committed to overthrowing the ly to contain an illegal revolutionary movement. government. In this respect Russia's anonymous It by no means was equipped to contend with the enforcers of public orthodoxy were akin to their legions of opponents produced by Russia's rapid Western counterparts except that they served a modernization and an archaic political culture. far less tolerant state and confronted a more nu‐ The widespread indifference to Zubatov's labor merous and vitriolic opposition. Given the autoc‐ program in government circles speaks to the rela‐ racy's reluctance to compromise its own authori‐ tive poverty of Russian conservative policy-mak‐ ty, it is hardly surprising that its defenders be‐ ing in the autocracy's last days. The regime lacked came maligned and despised. the fexibility to rival Disraeli's insight on popular Notes: aspirations and Bismark's ambitiously crass op‐ [1]. See Charles Ruud and Sergei Stepanov, portunism. Even though Nicholas II realized that Fontanka 16: The Tsars' Secret Police (Ithaca, the police could not preserve the autocracy, he 1999); Ben Fischer, Okhrana: The Paris Opera‐ failed to grasp the sophisticated way in which offi‐ tions of the Russian Imperial Police (Washington, cials such as Zubatov sought to construct a 1997); Frederic S.

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