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AGRARIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND PEASANT UNREST: A STUDY OF LAND-GRAB MOVEMENT IN DISTRICT BASTI, EAST U. P. RAJENDRA SINGH Delhi School of Social Work, Delhi Modernisation, it is argued (Moore Jr. 1967: 453; Hobsbawm 1973: 3-6; Alroy 1966: 68-86), upsets the long-established traditional socio-political and economic structures of peasant societies. In the Third World peasant unrest and revolts can be attributed to the upsetting associated with the break-up of the colonial-feudal agrarian structures. Peasant rebellions have thus been treated as "purposive social acts" (Pye 1964: 164) which attempt to bring about social stability in a new frame. Peasant conflicts are also reflected in the re-defining of goals and means, values and norms. What Worsely and Joshi (Worsely 1964: 118-72; Joshi 1971-6: 16; 1973-6: 9) call "populism", radical ideologies, sectarianism and "demagogy" are also some of the ideological manifestations of peasant conflicts. Explanations offered by social scientists indicate that the gap between programme and implementa- tion, growth and social justice, ideology and action, changing technology and peasant security (Joshi 1970-a: 33; 1971-a: 21-22; 1973-a: 2), democratic polity and "socialistic" economy (Dumont 1969; 193; 1973: 224-225), and, finally between fanned up aspirations and the chance for their fulfilment (Oommen 1971: 264), are the underlying causes and motivations behind agrarian unrest in India. While explaining the phenomenon of peasant conflicts, agrarian reforms are being treated by most scholars as a big conspiracy organised against the real tillers of the land. Abolition of Zamindari and Jagirdari, fixation of ceiling on agricultural holdings and other tenurial changes are thus characterised as "a hoax" and "a fiasco" (Joshi, op. cit. 1973-a: 5; 1970-6: 49) and "an organised subterfuge" (Thorner 1956: 82). It is suggested that these have "signally failed to achieve any substantial measure of progress" in terms of tenurial changes (Sen 1962: v, Preface). For Kotovsky "the land problem remained for Indian peasantry as acute as before" (Kotov- SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN Vol. 23 No. 1 March 1974 AGRARIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND PEASANT UNREST 45 sky 1964: 82); and for Dumont policies and plans to bring socia listic pattern of society at home in India have been an excercise in "Oral Socialism" (Dumont, op. cit. 1973). Agrarian unrest according to Joshi can be attributed to ''growing disparity" along with grow ing insecurity as a "pre-disposing factor" (Joshi 1970-a: 134). There are four assumptions in most agrarian studies that are of prime interest for the present study. We have tried to formulate them as below for verification and analysis: 1. Peasant society and agrarian relations in India can be under- stood in terms of conflicting classes as objective analytical categories. Conflict is inherent in the agrarian social structure having class differentiation which has been identified in terms of Maliks, Kisans and Mazdurs (Thorners: 1956: 4); of land-loards, rich peasants and landless and land-poor peasants (Kotovsky 1964: 10-20); of upper class "quasi-tenant" and "quasi-landlord" land-holding class and the working peasantry (Joshi 1971-a: 23); the "semi-feudal" and "semi-capitalist" landlords and the "working peasants" (Sen 1962-63); of "the feudal land owners" and "the privileged farmers". Mention may be made of Gough (1968-69) and Shah and Gough (1969: 360-600) who arrive at the same type of polarised class categories. The role that castes and caste alliances play and the weight that they carry in relation to land-holdings have either been ignored or under-pla yed in the analysis of the peasantry in India. 2. All legislative measures, pertaining to Zamindari-Jagirdari abolition, fixation of land holdings and ceiling and other tenu-rial reforms have not only failed to provide security to the poor peasantry and agricultural labourers; they have also initiated a process by which the rich are becoming richer and the poor poorer (Dumont 1973: 235; Gough 1968-69; Sen 1962: 174; Kotovsky 1964; Joshi 1966: 172; 1971-a: 23). Explicit as well as implicit indications that one gets from such class analysis is that a sharp polarization is taking place in Indian peasant society. 3. The polarization seems to have become so sharp (Thorner 1956: 82-83; Joshi 1971-6: 24) as to necessitate some radical changes in present agrarian structure in favour of the poor and landless peasants. If these are not undertaken by the govern- 46 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN ment, even if they involve "confiscation" of the land from "functionless landlords", peasant unrest is to become widespread and also to break into peasant resistance in some parts of the country (Joshi 1973-a: 12-14; Thorner 1956: 83). 4. Finally, even though all the objective structural conditions for a peasant revolution are present, it is concluded by some scholars that the subjective character-structure of Indian peasantry is not favourable to such a revolution. As a result of its conditioning to fatalism for centuries the peasant is "rigid and resigned", passive to suffering and injustice, and devoid of "surging forces to shake away his agony". This peasant passivity is typical of "Indianity" (Dumont 1965: 137; 1969: 46; 1973: 238; Joshi 1974: 57). This paper deals primarily with two issues: (i) to analyse the genesis of the 'Land Grab' movement which developed into an organised and even violent attempt by the poor and landless peasants at occupying the surplus land of the big landlords in Basti district of Eastern Uttar Pradesh in 1970; (ii) to identify those structural and emergent 'responsive' factors that resulted in the termination and failure of this movement. Structural factors cannot be explained unless one answers the following type of questions: How have various agrarian reforms introduced by the Congress government in the post-Independence period affected caste, class and land rela tions in the district? Who have been the gainers and who the losers of land as a result of these reforms? What is their caste and class position today? And finally, what is the impact of these reforms upon the emerging pattern of power-structure in the district? While trying to answer these questions we shall also try to reexa- mine the assumptions and conclusions of other social, scientists who have studied the question of peasant movements. We shall also try to evaluate the relevance of the class-model used in the analysis of the Indian peasantry and their land relations by many social scientists. It should also be noted that we are trying to answer these questions in the light of a body of empirical data drawn from "concrete people" and "concrete community". Our study is therefore different from many previous studies of peasant movements which either drew their material from published reports or from impressions of short field visits to farflung villages of different states. The empirical material of our study pertains to a single district, Basti, AGRARIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND PEASANT UNREST 47 and it was collected through intensive fieldwork in selected villages by the author during the period of the land-grab movement in 1970. We present first some basic facts about district Basti which give a background for the study of the land-grab movement. Basti has a population of 2627061 while its total area is 2821 sq. miles. 95. 5% of its population lives in 7653 villages. It has only one town which is the administrative headquarter of the district. About 91% of the district subsists on agriculture and agricultural employment. The predominance of rural population and of agri- culture in the district make it a typical agrarian society. These features are present along with a high population density. As against 648 persons per sq. mile in the state of Uttar Pradesh Basti has a weighing density of 926 persons (Government of India 1961: 21). 88. 8% of the rural population is illiterate. As regards the distribution of population by religion, Hindus account for 81. 30% and Muslims for 18. 66% of the total population. The other religious communities are Sikhs, Christians and others (op. cit. 1961: 522-23). The district is one of the poorest in the whole of the State. The per capita annual income of Basti is only Rs. 165/- and is thus very much lower than the average of Rs. 265/- for the whole State (NCAER: 1959: 8). In the light of all these facts it is appropriate to call Basti a depressed area in the State. TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE OF CASTE, CLASS AND LAND A hierarchical arrangement of persons and groups into superior and inferior castes has traditionally been the basis for permission and prohibition of interpersonal relationships in Basti. Being based upon the principle of purity and pollution and inherited inequalities of power and authority, the system of caste created still greater inequality in the distribution of economic resources i. e. land, groves, forests and fisheries. Economic disparity proved functional in the maintenance of the caste hierarchy. Tradition gave legitimacy to caste society in which inequality of all types got institutionalized. Inequality became the basic norm of social organisation. Conse- quently it crystallised into a bifocal social organisation in which social, religious, economic and political power and privileges tended to get polarized into the status-castes on the one hand and the exterior castes on the other. The rich and the poor in Basti have coincided with high and low 48 SOCIOLOGICAL BULLETIN castes. Traditionally these caste and class categories seem to have merged so completely into each other that conceptualization of one could not have been possible without an understanding of the other. What is crucial in the traditional caste structure of Basti is that it produced not only inequalities—social, political and economic but also a 'culture of inequality'.

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