Harvard Law School Faculty 20–21
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Marking 200 Years of Legal Education: Traditions of Change, Reasoned Debate, and Finding Differences and Commonalities
MARKING 200 YEARS OF LEGAL EDUCATION: TRADITIONS OF CHANGE, REASONED DEBATE, AND FINDING DIFFERENCES AND COMMONALITIES Martha Minow∗ What is the significance of legal education? “Plato tells us that, of all kinds of knowledge, the knowledge of good laws may do most for the learner. A deep study of the science of law, he adds, may do more than all other writing to give soundness to our judgment and stability to the state.”1 So explained Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School in 1923,2 and his words resonate nearly a century later. But missing are three other possibilities regarding the value of legal education: To assess, critique, and improve laws and legal institutions; To train those who pursue careers based on legal training, which may mean work as lawyers and judges; leaders of businesses, civic institutions, and political bodies; legal academics; or entre- preneurs, writers, and social critics; and To advance the practice in and study of reasoned arguments used to express and resolve disputes, to identify commonalities and dif- ferences, to build institutions of governance within and between communities, and to model alternatives to violence in the inevi- table differences that people, groups, and nations see and feel with one another. The bicentennial of Harvard Law School prompts this brief explo- ration of the past, present, and future of legal education and scholarship, with what I hope readers will not begrudge is a special focus on one particular law school in Cambridge, Massachusetts. ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– ∗ Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence; until July 1, 2017, Morgan and Helen Chu Dean and Professor, Harvard Law School. -
Justice Jackson in the Jehovah's Witnesses' Cases
FIU Law Review Volume 13 Number 4 Barnette at 75: The Past, Present, and Future of the Fixed Star in Our Constitutional Article 13 Constellation Spring 2019 Justice Jackson in The Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Cases John Q. Barrett Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law, New York City Follow this and additional works at: https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreview Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons Online ISSN: 2643-7759 Recommended Citation John Q. Barrett, Justice Jackson in The Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Cases, 13 FIU L. Rev. 827 (2019). DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.13.4.13 This Keynote Address is brought to you for free and open access by eCollections. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU Law Review by an authorized editor of eCollections. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 10 - BARRETT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/19 6:03 PM JUSTICE JACKSON IN THE JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES’ CASES John Q. Barrett* I. Robert H. Jackson Before He Became Justice Jackson ..................828 II. Barnette in Its Supreme Court Context: The Jehovah’s Witnesses Cases, 1938–1943 ...........................................................................831 A. The General Pattern of the Decisions: The Court Warming to Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Constitutional Claims .......................831 1. The Pre-July 1941 Court ....................................................831 2. The July 1941–May 1943 Court ........................................833 3. The June 1943 Court ..........................................................834 B. Some Particulars of Supreme Court Personnel, Cases, and Decisions, From Gobitis (1940) to Barnette (1943) ................834 III. Justice Jackson on Jehovah’s Witnesses: The Author of Barnette Wrote First, and Significantly, in Douglas .....................................844 IV. -
City Court of New York, City of Watertown: People V
Touro Law Review Volume 27 Number 3 Annual New York State Constitutional Article 18 Issue October 2011 City Court of New York, City of Watertown: People v. Carreira Michael J. Puma [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Recommended Citation Puma, Michael J. (2011) "City Court of New York, City of Watertown: People v. Carreira," Touro Law Review: Vol. 27 : No. 3 , Article 18. Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss3/18 This Confrontation Clause is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Puma: City Court of New York, City of Watertown: People v. Carreira CITY COURT OF NEW YORK CITY OF WATERTOWN People v. Carreira' (decided January 12, 2010) Raven Carreira was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated and aggravated driving while intoxicated. 2 Carreira con- tended that her Confrontation Clause rights under the United States and New York Constitutions' were violated when the People failed to "produce the authors of [breathalyzer certification records] for cross- examination."4 Therefore, the record's "admission and the . evi- dence [the records] support[ed]" should have been precluded.' The court granted the defendant's motion to preclude the evidence and held that the "simulator solution and calibration records [were] testi- monial for Sixth Amendment purposes and . inadmissible absent live testimony by those who prepared them."6 The prosecution sought to prove Carreira's intoxication by us- ing the evidence taken from the breathalyzer' administered to Carrei- 893 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Watertown City Ct. -
Military Tribunals: the Quirin Precedent
Order Code RL31340 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Military Tribunals: The Quirin Precedent March 26, 2002 Louis Fisher Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers Government and Finance Division Congressional Research Service The Library of Congress Military Tribunals: The Quirin Precedent Summary On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush issued a military order to provide for the detention, treatment, and trial of those who assisted the terrorist attacks on the two World Trade Center buildings in New York City and the Pentagon on September 11. In creating a military commission (tribunal) to try the terrorists, President Bush modeled his tribunal in large part on a proclamation and military order issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1942, after the capture of eight German saboteurs. This report describes the procedures used by the World War II military tribunal to try the eight Germans, the habeas corpus petition to the Supreme Court, and the resulting convictions and executions. Why was the tribunal created, and why were its deliberations kept secret? How have scholars evaluated the Court’s decision in Ex parte Quirin (1942)? The decision was unanimous, but archival records reveal division and disagreement among the Justices. Also covered in this report is a second effort by Germany two years later to send saboteurs to the United States. The two men captured in this operation were tried by a military tribunal, but under conditions and procedures that substantially reduced the roles of the President and the Attorney General. Those changes resulted from disputes within the Administration, especially between the War Department and the Justice Department. -
Nicolas Cornell
Nicolas Cornell Legal Studies & Business Ethics Department Phone: (215) 573-0601 The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania Fax: (215) 573-2006 600 Jon M. Huntsman Hall Office: 669 Jon M. Huntsman Hall 3730 Walnut Street Email: [email protected] Philadelphia, PA 19104 Homepage: http://scholar.harvard.edu/ncornell Academic Positions Assistant Professor, Michigan Law School commencing Fall 2017 Assistant Professor, Legal Studies & Business Ethics Department, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania with affiliated appointment in the Department of Philosophy Fall 2013 until Spring 2017 Education Ph.D. Philosophy, Harvard University, 2014 Dissertation: Wrongs without Rights Committee: Christine M. Korsgaard, T.M. Scanlon, Frances Kamm, John C.P. Goldberg J.D., Magna Cum Laude, Harvard Law School, 2010 Articles Co-Chair, Harvard Law Review A.B. Philosophy, Magna Cum Laude, Harvard University, 2004 Areas of Interest Specialization: Ethics, Contract Law, Philosophy of Law Competence: Remedies, Tort Law, Political Philosophy, Environmental Ethics Research Articles The Possibility of Preemptive Forgiving, Philosophical Review (forthcoming). Wrongful Benefit & Arctic Drilling, U.C. Davis Law Review, Vo. 50 (forthcoming 2017). The Aesthetic Toll of Nudging, Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 14 (forthcoming 2016). A Complainant-Oriented Approach to Unconscionability and Contract Law, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 164, pp.1131-1175 (2016). Wrongs, Rights, and Third Parties, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 109-143 (2015). The Puzzle of the Beneficiary’s Bargain, Tulane Law Review, Vol. 90, pp. 75-128 (2015). A Third Theory of Paternalism, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 113, pp.1295-1336 (2015). Nicolas Cornell 2 Essays & Commentary Ripstein’s Buttery Rights, Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies (forthcoming). -
Who Is the Attorney General's Client?
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-3\NDL305.txt unknown Seq: 1 20-APR-12 11:03 WHO IS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CLIENT? William R. Dailey, CSC* Two consecutive presidential administrations have been beset with controversies surrounding decision making in the Department of Justice, frequently arising from issues relating to the war on terrorism, but generally giving rise to accusations that the work of the Department is being unduly politicized. Much recent academic commentary has been devoted to analyzing and, typically, defending various more or less robust versions of “independence” in the Department generally and in the Attorney General in particular. This Article builds from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, in which the Court set forth key principles relating to the role of the President in seeing to it that the laws are faithfully executed. This Article draws upon these principles to construct a model for understanding the Attorney General’s role. Focusing on the question, “Who is the Attorney General’s client?”, the Article presumes that in the most important sense the American people are the Attorney General’s client. The Article argues, however, that that client relationship is necessarily a mediated one, with the most important mediat- ing force being the elected head of the executive branch, the President. The argument invokes historical considerations, epistemic concerns, and constitutional structure. Against a trend in recent commentary defending a robustly independent model of execu- tive branch lawyering rooted in the putative ability and obligation of executive branch lawyers to alight upon a “best view” of the law thought to have binding force even over plausible alternatives, the Article defends as legitimate and necessary a greater degree of presidential direction in the setting of legal policy. -
Rights As Signals
RIGHTS AS SIGNALS DANIEL A. FARBER* ABSTRACT Because rights operate as trumps over normal governmental interests, they have an inherent cost. Consequently, by entrenching protection for human rights, govern- ments can signal a willingness to give up power in the short term to obtain long- term benefits. Investors can infer from this that the government has a low discount rate and is less likely to pose a threat of expropriation. Similarly, when courts vig- orously enforce human rights, they dramatize their judicial independence, which is valuable to investors, who themselves may have no interest in human rights. Thus, human rights enforcement may help encourage investment and thereby indirectly foster economic growth. I. INTRODUCTION CAN developing countries afford human rights and the rule of law? Perhaps not, according to Richard Posner. Posner advises poorer countries against "creating a first-class judiciary or an extensive system of civil liberties."' Although he is by no means opposed to judicial independence and human rights, he argues that they should largely await economic growth.2 From this point of view, the dramatic recent expansion of constitutionalism is a bit perplexing, if not a mistake. Posner's argument can be challenged on several grounds. Although he minimizes the importance of an independent judiciary to development,' the current consensus among economists is apparently to the contrary.' Some * McKnight Presidential Professor of Public Law, Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, and Associate Dean for Faculty and Research, University of Minnesota. Thanks to Jim Chen, David McGowan, Eric Posner, and Tom Ulen for helpful comments. 'Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 World Bank Research Observer 1, 9 (1998). -
The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 Yale Law Journal
Vanderbilt University Law School Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 1996 The rP actice of Dissent in the Supreme Court Kevin M. Stack Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Kevin M. Stack, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 Yale Law Journal. 2235 (1996) Available at: http://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/227 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court Kevin M. Stack The United States Supreme Court's connection to the ideal of the rule of law is often taken to be the principal basis of the Court's political legitimacy.' In the Supreme Court's practices, however, the ideal of the rule of law and the Court's political legitimacy do not always coincide. This Note argues that the ideal of the rule of law and the Court's legitimacy part company with respect to the Court's practice of dissent. Specifically, this Note aims to demonstrate that the practice of dissent-the tradition of Justices publishing their differences with the judgment or the reasoning of their peers 2-cannot be justified on the basis of an appeal to the ideal of the rule of law, but that other bases of the Court's political legitimacy provide a justification for this practice. -
Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship
Responses Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship Ian Ayrest I. INTRODUCTION Eric Posner has written a thoughtful and provocative indictment of the modem economic analysis of contracts. His essay makes two central claims1 about the failings of scholars "to produce an 'economic theory.' Specifically, Posner claims that the economic approach "does not explain the current system of contract law" and that it does not "provide a solid basis for criticizing and reforming contract law."2 In other words, Posner claims that modem scholarship fails as either a descriptive or a normative theory, in that it fails to give an account of what current law is or what efficient law should be. The descriptive criticism deserves only brief comment. Although he claims that modem scholarship has failed to achieve "what its proponents set out as the measure of success, ' 3 Posner sadly distorts reality by claiming that the leading scholars have been engaged in an attempt to use economic theory to predict the content of current legal rules. This is a straw man. Of course, decades ago this was the project of Richard Posner. 4 But the thought that efficiency analysis would provide a mechanism to predict the details of current doctrine is a serious misreading of the aims of modem scholarship. t William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School, [email protected]. Alan Schwartz provided helpful comments. 1. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?,112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003). 2. Id. 3. Id.at 879; see also id, at 831 ("[Tjhe original aspiration[] of the economic analysis of contract law [was] to provide an explanation of existing legal rules ...."). -
Fed Leadership Transition Looms
Issue: The Federal Reserve Short Article: Fed Leadership Transition Looms By: Victoria Finkle Pub. Date: April 10, 2017 Access Date: September 28, 2021 DOI: 10.1177/237455680311.n5 Source URL: http://businessresearcher.sagepub.com/sbr-1863-102582-2776875/20170410/short-article-fed-leadership-transition-looms ©2021 SAGE Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. ©2021 SAGE Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. “Uneasy politician” Yellen likely to be replaced Executive Summary President Trump will have the opportunity to reshape the leadership of the U.S. Federal Reserve by naming a new chair and appointing several members to the central bank’s governing board. A key takeaway: The departure of Governor Daniel Tarullo will allow the president to name a vice chairman for supervision, the official in charge of bank regulation at the Fed. Full Article Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen discusses the central bank’s decision to raise its benchmark interest rate at a news conference in March. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images) The Federal Reserve is bracing for a significant transformation of its top brass over the next few years. The biggest change will be at the helm: the likely replacement of Janet Yellen as Fed chair. President Trump has indicated that he will name someone else to fill the job when Yellen’s term expires next February. “She is not a Republican. When her time is up, I would most likely replace her because of the fact that I think it would be appropriate,” he said in May 2016, during the campaign. 1 Ending Yellen’s tenure after just one term would be a departure from how the White House has operated in recent decades: President Barack Obama reappointed Ben S. -
Harvard Law School Handbook of Academic Policies 2021-2022
Harvard Law School Handbook of Academic Policies 2021-2022 Table of Contents Faculty ....................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Professors Emeriti ............................................................................................................................................ 8 Professors and Assistant Professors of Law .......................................................................................... 9 Clinical Professors and Assistant Clinical Professors ...................................................................... 12 Professors of Practice .................................................................................................................................. 12 Affiliated Harvard University Faculty .................................................................................................... 13 Visiting Professors of Law .......................................................................................................................... 13 Climenko Fellows........................................................................................................................................... 15 Lecturers on Law ........................................................................................................................................... 15 Notice: Public Health and Delivery of Academic Programs .............................................................. -
Hereby Neutering—The Doctrines That Serve to Subject Administrative Agencies to the Rule of Law
HARVARD JOURNAL of LAW & PUBLIC POLICY VOLUME 42, NUMBER 3 SUMMER 2019 ARTICLES MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP AND THE FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Mark L. Movsesian ................................................................. 711 THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT Marc O. DeGirolami ................................................................ 750 YAKUS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE James R. Conde & Michael S. Greve. ....................................... 807 CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND “OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES” James C. Phillips, Benjamin Lee & Jacob Crump. ................... 871 NOTES GIVE VETERANS THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT: CHEVRON, AUER, AND THE VETERANS CANON Chadwick J. Harper .................................................................. 931 THE ORIGINAL MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF EARLY STATE PROVISOS TO THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION Branton J. Nestor ..................................................................... 971 HARVARD JOURNAL of LAW & PUBLIC POLICY Editor-in-Chief RYAN PROCTOR Deputy Editor-in-Chief Articles Editors CHADWICK HARPER Managing Editors HAYLEY EVANS BRAD BARBER DANIEL JOHNSON WILL COURTNEY Executive Editors KEES THOMPSON ANNIKA BOONE GRAHAM CARNEY Deputy Managing Editors Assistant Articles Editors RYAN FOLIO NICOLE BAADE NICK AQUART CHANSLOR GALLENSTEIN CHASE BROWNDORF AARON HSU JORDAN GREENE HUGH DANILACK PARKER KNIGHT III KEVIN KOLJACK Articles Board VINCENT LI BEN FLESHMAN GRANT NEWMAN Notes Editors ANASTASIA FRANE DAVID RICHTER AARON GYDE JOSHUA HA SAM WILLIAMS BRANTON NESTOR JAMES