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Home , Women in philosophy

Lani Roberts, Ph.D. Oregon State University

Publication and Copyright Information

Prepared for the lecture series, "Ideas Matter," at the Department of , Oregon State University, and presented on February 3, 1994. Copyright © 1999 Lani Roberts. Used by permission of the author.

Introduction

I want to begin with a few caveats. , as discussed here, should be understood to be limited to western, European-based philosophy, primarily as done by white women academics. Although multicultural philosophy is rapidly developing and gradually incorporated into classroom teaching, for most academics, philosophy has been western and European. Here and elsewhere, an increasing number of scholars and teachers are examining other kinds of philosophy, some even predating the ancient Greek masters, often considered to be the founders of philosophy as studied in most of academia. Oregon State University is especially fortunate in this regard because our Philosophy Department has teachers knowledgeable about some non- and religion. For example, we offer courses in Chinese and Indian , Non-Western Religion, Hispanic Thought and, next term, Pre- Columbian Philosophy.

Feminist philosophy, although generally done by women, has been and is being done by men too. There are both classic and contemporary male who ponder some of the issues raised by feminist philosophy. also sees a few men fully engaged in feminist philosophy and who publish in , the journal of feminist philosophy.

On the other hand, traditional philosophy, although nearly exclusively done by men in the past, also engages the attention and energy of many women. Today's feminist scholars were required to excel in traditional philosophy in order to become the successful academics many are. As philosophers, feminists also seek to thoroughly understand traditional philosophy in order to avoid "straw men" fallacies in their work of criticizing classic philosophical traditions, presuppositions and methodologies. Given that feminist philosophy does not break cleanly along gender lines, it may be best characterized as a new, challenging and invigorating critique of traditional philosophical questions and the presuppositions that underlie them.

One final caveat: a lecture of this sort permits only the broadest of brush strokes, thus every generalization made should be understood to have exceptions.

I plan to proceed in the following way. I want to try to give broad answers to two questions: why feminist philosophy? and, what is feminist philosophy? Then, I offer a specific example of the contribution is making to philosophy. Finally, it seems to me that we can learn something about the future course of philosophy from what we have witnessed over the past 20 or 30 years in regards to the role of feminism in philosophy.

Why Feminist Philosophy?

The impulse for feminist philosophy arose for at least two relatively simple and related . Women have been unable to recognize themselves in traditional philosophical discourse. A studying traditional philosophy a dissonance and senses incoherence between what is claimed as generally true of human and women's lived experiences. Philosophical literature is replete with descriptions of women's nature as well as what her function is and/or ought to be, however in most cases, the portrait is not one that would lead a female student to believe she could succeed in the philosophical enterprise. Although I will not be quoting sample passages, some of the more notorious include Rousseau's description of women in Emile or Education and Schopenhauer's utterly misogynistic tirade against women in his essay "On Women."

The general characterization of women in philosophical literature is of dependent, childlike, emotional beings. The very skills required for reasoned discourse, , and philosophical thought were deemed severely limited or altogether missing in women. This kind of portrayal of women, pervasive in traditional philosophy, is particularly disturbing to its women students. The irony is that if the portrayals are accurate at all, the woman student is foreclosed from success. When I would mention my concern about such characterizations of women, I was consistently advised to take into account the historical nature of much of philosophy and to recognize how much had changed since "those" days. And, clearly, much had improved because here I was - a woman - studying philosophy. This explanation satisfied me to a certain extent but the consistency of women's degradation continued to trouble me. What has changed such that women, however few of us, are now successfully studying philosophy and completing doctorates? Has the nature of women changed so dramatically over the past hundred years or so? Alternatively, were the traditional philosophical discourses on women mistaken all along? Or, is there some other explanation?

The dissonance that arose between the classic characterization of woman and the actuality of women excelling at philosophy compelled the question of whether the generic "man" of philosophy was gender neutral after all. Students have been encouraged to read "man" as "human being." However, in most philosophy, "man" was generally honored and woman was not. Careful examination of much of philosophical discourse seemed to show that what philosophy said was true of "men" was not necessarily true of women too. Thus, it was exceedingly difficult for women to find themselves in philosophy.

This kind of incoherence between ideas and experiences led women students and scholars to more closely examine the assumptions and methods of traditional philosophy. Women asked if the demeaning portrait of women in much of the great works was fully explained solely in historical terms. Close examinations led women to suspect that traditional philosophical assumptions might function in ways that maintain male gender superiority at the deepest theoretical and methodological levels of philosophy.

From pre-Socratic philosophy through to the present, value-hierarchical thinking, that is, the assumption that entails hierarchy in a normative sense, lays the very foundation of much of philosophical inquiry. For example, pre-existing , Pythagoreans laid down ten principles showing that numbers have attributes belonging to everything, even the . Parallel columns list the following attributes under odd and even numbers respectively. Odd numbers correspond to limits, singular, male, rest, straight, light, good and square. Even numbers are in harmony with unlimited, plural, female, movement, crooked, dark, bad and oblong. The first time I read excerpts from Pythagorean philosophy, I was struck that male, light and the good were grouped together and opposite to female, dark and bad. Perhaps one might wish that the Pythagorean groupings were an historical anomaly but, alas, this cannot be said.

Beginning in and persisting throughout the history of philosophy is the general sense that men, culture, and are valued over women, nature, bodies and emotions. Valuing one set of these attributes privileges men over women at the very foundation of the philosophical enterprise. Normative dualities such as these form the underlying presuppositions of the traditional philosophical enterprise itself. Echoing the Pythagorean schemata, the following dichotomies form the outlines of philosophical investigation. Objectivity rather than subjectivity, reason rather than emotion and mind rather than body have been the tools of philosophy itself. Is it other than coincidental that women have been identified with emotion, body and subjectivity while philosophy traditionally requires their opposites?

Feminist philosophers argue that since the very foundational presuppositions of philosophy define women according to one half of the dualisms and require the other half for participation, that the tradition itself is constituted in such a way that women are pushed to the margins or excluded entirely. This critique prompts feminists to ask whether whatever consensus exists in philosophical discourse is related to philosophy's essentially eurocentric, male character. Is it possible that the classic conception of "objectivity" has arisen from this hegemony?

What Is Feminist Philosophy?

Although feminist philosophy begins from the of subordination and exclusion, it does not work around the edges of philosophy but goes to its heart - the central presuppositions and key concepts that form the very foundation of traditional philosophy itself. It can be argued that this task is best done by feminists. As the Hegelian -slave teaches us, the master need only know his own perspective but the slave must know both the master's and his own for survival.

From its political genesis, feminist philosophy seeks to understand why philosophy's characterizations of women have been so faulty and how this has functioned to maintain gender inequality. To this end, the valuing of mind over body, reason over emotion, objectivity over lived experienced has been and is being challenged. Although some feminist philosophers seek to reverse the normative dualisms, e.g., raising body over mind, most feminist philosophy seeks to show the fundamental conception of these pairs as dichotomous is itself mistaken. Rather than being opposed to one another, feminist philosophers generally argue that mind and body are complimentary and both are required for a full awareness of our human ; to privilege one over the other is to attain a partial picture of what it means to be a human person. The same is claimed of reason-emotion, objectivity-subjectivity and many others pairs. Feminist philosophers have challenged the traditional philosophical stance that , and/or wisdom is most certain if discovered through mind, reason and objectivity.

Through this kind of enterprise, feminist philosophers began to conclude that women's experiences, knowledge, ways of being, learning and knowing must be articulated, examined and critiqued since philosophy seeks to understand the human condition. Otherwise, what we have is not an examination of the human condition; rather, traditional philosophy has told us a great deal about some men's existential condition. Thus, feminist philosophy seeks to contribute to a more inclusive conception of what constitutes the human condition. The work has really just begun but there now exist feminist approaches to virtually every area of philosophy including , , , , , , and . In each case, there are critiques of the gender based assumptions built into the theories and methods and an effort to rethink traditional questions and problems in ways that respond to a more inclusive human condition.

One thing is clear. There is a difference between women doing philosophy and feminist philosophy. Being both female and a does not a feminist philosopher make. Although there is tremendous variety in feminist philosophies, including some deep conflicts, there is some common ground. Most argue that classic philosophy is built on assumptions that contribute to the systematic exclusion or marginalization of women's , knowledge and wisdom. Feminist philosophers, in general, think that gender counts, even in what has passed for "abstract" and "objective" thinking. Reconstructing philosophy involves redefining the methods and subject matter in ways that value women in such a way that we can move from being ill-defined objects of the philosophical gaze to subjects, knowers and agents. This involves re-examination of the full body of philosophical discourse, seeking for that which is salvageable in terms of being free from androcentric preconceptions.

Another shared characteristic of feminist philosophy is the commitment to check theories by connecting them to everyday life. It was this methodology that called forth the chasm between traditional philosophical theories of women and women's own experiences. It revealed that "man" is not generic and never was. Once this was apparent, philosophers looked more deeply at other foundational assumptions and feminist philosophy was born. The commitment to testing theory against practice, then, may provide a safeguard against repeating the very errors that provided the genesis of feminist philosophy.

Thus, feminist philosophy values diversity in terms of gender, race, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age and ablebodiedness and is especially interested in the intersections of these categories. Feminist philosophy is no monolith, there is no "woman's voice" and no singular "feminist philosophy." There is a sense of urgency to broaden the range of people who become philosophers, to include those who have been marginalized or excluded in the tradition's past. Not only does this increasing diversity not jeopardize the quality of reasoned inquiry, it may allow a period of creativity equal to any in the history of philosophy.

In giving this overview of feminism and philosophy, it seems we should briefly look at the reception this challenge to tradition has received. It has been essentially twofold. There has been tremendous resistance to and rejection of the entire feminist enterprise. Many have maintained the validity of the basic assumptions and claimed objectivity of philosophy as practiced traditionally. Ad hominem attacks characterize this reaction. There currently is a heated and vituperative dispute being aired in the pages of the American Philosophical Association's Proceedings and Addresses. The debate is full of ad hominem fallacies countered by pleas from those under attack to address feminist philosophical claims and arguments. Those who reject feminist challenges to received wisdom insist feminist philosophy is a purely political ideology and is not philosophy at all.

Alternatively, feminist philosophy has been met with intellectual curiosity and integrity, with a willingness to examine the claims and arguments put forth. Certainly, these claims have been given no more latitude than any philosophical claim and they have provoked reexamination of age old presumptions of traditional philosophy. In this sense feminism has reinvigorated philosophy in a profound way, clear down to its very bones. Reasoned response and skepticism is all that any philosopher deserves and should expect. Feminist philosophers believe that philosophy itself can only benefit from careful analyses, thoughtful and wellreasoned argument.

Now that we've covered some of the why's and what's, I want to turn to the subject of this lecture: feminism's transformation from invisibility to inspiration in philosophy.

Invisibility

Although there have been women in philosophy from the earliest of times, they have been few and unknown to a vast majority of philosophers until relatively recently. Why is this? Some of the explanation lies in the nature of philosophy itself, as discussed earlier, but there always have been women who transcended these limitations. Other parts of the explanation for women philosopher's relative invisibility results from the media of discourse.

Beyond the walk-around academy of Plato and , philosophy relied on the written word. Few women, given the assumed limitations of their nature, were educated to read and write. This of course did not mean that women did not reason or discuss; it meant there was no record of their thoughts to pass to others, either contemporaneously or down through history.

This invisibility is so complete that Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy contains not a single woman. And, although I must rely on someone else's efforts for this information, the four volume Encyclopedia of Philosophy mentions only one female in spite of numerous articles about extraordinarily obscure male philosophers. Women philosophers, however few, did exist though. The journal of feminist philosophy is named after one of the earliest - Hypatia. Descartes regularly corresponded with two women in regard to his philosophical thinking, Queen Christina of Denmark and Elizabeth. But, both of these women were royalty and educated. Lady Anne Conway was sufficiently versed in philosophy that some questions have been raised as to whether Leibnitz "borrowed" her ideas. I became aware of Lady Anne Conway when the only woman philosophy professor I ever had assigned me to read her work and, given what I knew about Leibnitz' theories, draw my own conclusion about this issue. I decided Leibnitz had not used Conway's material, at least to any significant degree.

Again, the possibility of participating in philosophical discourse depended upon reading and writing. Rare was the woman in the days of the "enlightenment" who could read and write, let alone who had the luxury of enough free time to think about matters transcending the daily survival needs of her family. Philosophy requires time for contemplation and musing. Few people and fewer women had such privileges. In the late 1700's, noted in her "Vindication of the Rights of Woman" that if women are taught to be passive, dependent and emotional, that is what they will be. In other words, the early educational experiences of women created a self-fulfilling prophecy. It does, today, seem to be the case that if women are permitted the same kind of education as men, whether they are encouraged or not, there are no areas of study inherently inaccessible to us.

Much that we know about the role of women in philosophy has only recently come to light and this reemergence from the forgotten shadows has occurred because feminist philosophers have been curious about our predecessors and have sought a place in the historical context of philosophy.

Inspiration

Philosophical surveys, in addition to being chronological, are also according to subject matter. As mentioned earlier, there are no branches of philosophy untouched by feminist critiques. The role of feminism in logic, philosophy of science, metaphysics, epistemology and the like attest to the full range of women's philosophical interest and expertise. The best way to show the contribution of feminism to philosophy is to examine one issue in greater detail.

Although I am generally familiar with the feminist impulse in much of philosophy, today I am going to stay with what I know best. My area of specialty is Ethics and its subcategories which include , , , Feminist Philosophy and, most recently, Ethics of Diversity. In this new area, I am examining philosophical theories of oppression and their applicability to the many ways we humans subordinate one another. It is a new kind of inquiry and I do not know where it will lead.

For our purposes here, I have chosen to discuss a case that comes from Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law. I have selected this specific problem in part because it is accessible to a general audience, in part to illustrate the persistent character of the ontological foundations of philosophy and how feminism has inspired reexamination of many of the underlying assumptions of our discipline. Before I begin, I want to again make clear that this forum permits only the broadest of general outlines.

The social contract theory of government which underlies the United State's political system has its most developed beginnings in the philosophies of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau who wrote from the early 1600's through the late 1700's. Although there is significant variation in the three theories, the social contract theory is recognizable in all three. The social contract theory generally says that from a state of nature, that is, from a condition prior to any government at all, men decided to come together and form a government. In the state of nature, men were free and equal to one another. For differing reasons, these men concluded that having a governmental organization was preferable to the insecurities and difficulties presented by having none.

In order to form a government, each man, or at least a majority of those involved, had to be willing to give up whatever freedom he had in the state of nature, to varying degrees depending on which philosopher one is referring. In exchange for ceding freedom, men received security in the form of protection from foreign enemies, for his property and a degree of orderliness in adjudication of his affairs with others. By this social contract, made by man with man, government was formed, the State was born and man became a citizen. In brief outline, the social contract can be seen to also describe the inception of our country too. In fact, the framers of the American Constitution were learned men, aware of these philosophers on whom they built as well as Plato and others.

When I originally studied the social contract theory through these philosophers' works, I read "man" and "citizen" to include me. Carol Pateman, a feminist political theorist, argues that this is a mistake. Pateman is the author of several books including The Sexual Contract (1988, Stanford U Press) in which she analyzes the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau from a feminist perspective and concludes that both "citizen" and "man" refer solely to male humans. She goes on to argue that while these theories rely on men being born free and equal in a state of nature, women are born into subordination. Pateman's interpretation seems born out in re-examinations of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau but, and I have heard this said, perhaps this is really of only historical interest. If this is so, the historical interest is much closer to home than 1 7th and 18th century European philosophy. At its creation, the Constitution, our social contract, allowed citizenship only to men and, more specifically, those of European heritage and propertied. Excluded from citizenship were slaves, who counted as three-fifths of a person, and women. Interestingly, in spite of Plato's arguments in favor of woman as citizen, the earliest citizenry of the United States replicated that of the ancient Greek polis of Plato and Aristotle's time.

Again, however, one is tempted to respond that this is an historical fact since corrected by the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments, ratified just after the Civil War. Full citizenship was granted to women as recently as 1920 by the 19th Amendment which guaranteed women the right to vote. We might conclude that this correction finally resolved the problem created by understanding "man" and "citizen" to include women. If this problem was one of only historic significance, we could agree. Some feminists, however, maintain that the issue goes much deeper than historical wrongs and this seemingly superficial and transparent problem continues to arise in law and politics.

In criminal law and tort cases, the judicial system has long relied on an important standard called the "reasonable man." For example, self-defense claims are differentiated from manslaughter based on what a "reasonable man" would have done in the same or similar circumstances. This standard is still in use is many jurisdictions in the United States. Several years ago, however, many courts began to use, instead, a "reasonable person" standard, with the aim of eliminating the gender bias the courts have found inherent in the "reasonable man" standard. Yet, even this alteration failed to yield equal .

Feminists argue that "man," even if intended to include women, establishes the male human as the standard against which all persons are measured and evaluated. Even "reasonable person" retains, oddly enough, male ideals as the norm. Some of the time, the influence of this particular example of normative dualities yields consequences of minimal significance. However, sometimes it matters tremendously.

In a 1977 a Washington State Supreme Court Justice held that "reasonable person" was interpreted by a jury to mean, in fact, "reasonable man." In State V. Juanrow, the Court overturned a woman's conviction for manslaughter, concluding that the jury had judged her guilty on the basis of what a reasonable man would have done in same or similar circumstances. This woman was physically attacked by a man with a baseball bat and defended herself by shooting the assailant with a gun. The jury found her guilty of manslaughter rather than not guilty on self-defense grounds because they determined that a "reasonable person" could have defended himself short of shooting the assailant.

The Justice who wrote the opinion, who was a man, concluded that the jury, even though given the "reasonable person" standard, had actually used the "reasonable man" standard. He argued that had the jury interpreted "reasonable person" to include "reasonable woman," they would have found her self-defense claim strong enough to find her not guilty of manslaughter. You see, this woman was on crutches because her leg from hip to toe, was in a full cast. The Justice saw that there was little other that she could have done to defend herself against a baseball bat wielding person of superior size and strength. Thus, her conviction was overturned. This is one of the earliest cases where explicit "reasonable woman" standard was incorporated into criminal law.

The development of the "reasonable woman" standard is continuing apace in both the jurisprudence and practice of both criminal and civil law. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is the federal district that includes Oregon and Washington, has adopted the "reasonable woman" standard in evaluations of sexual discrimination claims under the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964. To date, the Supreme Court of the United States has neither adopted nor rejected the "reasonable woman" standard for this purpose. I have been able to keep abreast of the developing Philosophy of Law relevant to this matter because the national expert on the "reasonable woman," Caroline Forrel, teaches at the University of Oregon School of Law.

The development of the "reasonable woman" standard is a revealing example of the sometimes disorganized, sometimes contradictory collection of scholarship called feminist philosophy. If you recall, early I suggested that feminism gender counts, even in an abstract and theoretical sense. It is also committed to evaluating theory by testing it in the material conditions of our everyday lives. I hope the discussion case I explained here adequately illustrates these claims.

How does this very specific development pertain to feminism's inspiration in philosophy? Couldn't this kind of work be understood to be self-serving rather than contributing to philosophy generally? One way feminism can be seen to inspire philosophy is this: by reexamining the dualisms which form the ontological foundation of philosophy, assumptions have been brought to light that not only ground much of philosophical discourse but, at the same time, have a relevant and concrete impact on daily life.

Let us return to the normative dualisms mentioned earlier on. It can be seen that feminism has inspired philosophy in a broad and important manner. It has been claimed that at its foundation, philosophy has presumed the value of mind over body, reason over emotion, and culture over nature. Briefly, feminism's re-analysis of the reason-emotion dichotomy has inspired a rebirth of ethics and the larger body of philosophy that bases on our caring for one another rather than the predominantly logical formulations of Kantian deontology and .

The mind-body dichotomy is related directly to the culture-nature distinction. In this case, feminism has prompted a new look at the consequences of such value hierarchical thinking. The revaluing of our human bodies and the body of Earth has contributed to reassessment of our relationship with nature. Ecofeminism, which attempts to analogize attitudes towards women to our treatment of nature, is a developing theory in the important area of Environmental Ethics. Next week, Professor Peter List will address this most important area of philosophical inquiry in his talk, "The Greening of Philosophy."

By insisting that the more or less discounted halves of normative dualisms be brought into the light of philosophical thought, feminism has inspired philosophy at its center. It remains to be seen where these lines of inquiry will lead but it is safe to say that feminism has reinvigorated our discipline.

Finally, I would like to comment on what I think there is to be learned metaphilosophically from the inclusion of feminism in philosophical discourse. If we were to assume that some of the new directions in philosophy have arisen from the inclusion of previously invisible or marginalized ways of thinking about the human condition, then as multicultural philosophies are incorporated into the larger dialogue, we should expect to see further inspiration to examine fundamental assumptions that are invisible even to feminism. Recall that feminist philosophy has generally been done eurocentric women. What kinds of assumptions have we made that limit our understanding of the human condition? I suspect they exist and I am excited to give consideration to such challenges and creative insights that will come from expanding access to philosophical discourse to the full human community.