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The Moral Philosophy of William Wollaston City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 6-2014 The Moral Philosophy of William Wollaston Yael Sofaer Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/285 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM WOLLASTON by YAEL SOFAER A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2014 2014 YAEL SOFAER All Rights Reserved ii This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. David M. Rosenthal Date Chair of Examining Committee Iakovos Vasiliou Date Executive Officer Stefan Bernard Baumrin John Kleinig Peter Phillips Simpson Supervisory Committee THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii Abstract THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM WOLLASTON by Yael Sofaer Adviser: Professor Stefan Bernard Baumrin This dissertation provides the first thorough exposition of the moral theory proposed by William Wollaston in his treatise The Religion of Nature Delineated (1724), and demonstrates it to be an innovative contribution to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries project of developing a moral theory by reason alone (in which lie the origins of contemporary moral realism); with the foundational principle of acting in accordance with nature as the standard of morality. Wollaston s treatise contains an unrecognized innovation: the principle that rational agents express propositions by their actions that, as propositions, have truth values which makes it possible to determine the moral status of such actions by evaluating these truth values. The principle that actions express propositions to the same extent that verbal statements express propositions bridges the gap between ideas in the mind and the facts of the world (i.e., nature). It defines the deliberate actions of moral agents as natural events which can thus be evaluated in the same way that all natural objects and events are evaluated. Actions of moral agents can then be evaluated as to whether they are consistent or inconsistent with all other parts of nature. The correspondence between the truthfulness or falsehood of the propositions that moral agents express by their iv deliberate actions, and the empirical facts of the world, provides a focused method of evaluating the moral status of such actions in accordance with the empirical standard of moral realism. Also, in Wollaston s system, as it is the nature of human beings to seek happiness, and as acting in accordance with nature is the means of attaining happiness, the production or destruction of happiness determines the degree of the moral rightness or wrongness of actions. The dissertation also demonstrates that the prevalent criticisms of The Religion of Nature Delineated which have caused it to be largely disregarded do not engage the theory and are often directed at straw men. v CONTENTS Chapter I. Introduction ...................................................................................................................1 Chapter II. The Response to Wollaston’s Theory .......................................................................20 A. The Eighteenth Century: Popularity and Influence ....................................................20 B. The Nineteenth Century: Decline and Dismissal ........................................................27 C. The Twentieth Century: Sporadic Interest ..................................................................29 Chapter III. Wollaston’s Moral Theory .......................................................................................37 A. The Structure of The Religion of Nature Delineated ..................................................37 B. The Reliability of Reason: Section III, “Of Reason, and the Ways of Discovering Truth” .....................................................................................................................41 C. The Standard of Morality: Section II, “Of Happiness” ...............................................51 D. The Moral Theory of RND: Section I, “Of Moral Good and Evil” ............................62 E. The Extent of Moral Obligation: Section IV, “Of the Obligations of Imperfect Beings with Respect to Their Power of Acting” ................................................................88 Chapter IV. Wollaston’s Application of His Moral Theory ........................................................97 A. Religion: Section V, “Truths Relating to the Deity. Of His Existence, Perfection, Providence, etc.” ....................................................................................................98 B. The Basis of Political Theory: Section VI, “Truths Respecting Mankind in General, Antecedent to All Human Laws” .........................................................................102 C. Political Theory: Section VII, “Truths Respecting Particular Societies of Men, or Governments” ......................................................................................................124 vi D. Domestic Life: Section VIII, “Truths Concerning Families and Relations” ............143 E. Virtue and the Soul: Section IX, “Truths Belonging to a Private Man, and Respecting (Directly) Only Himself” .....................................................................................147 Chapter V. Wollaston’s Critics ..................................................................................................166 A. The Misleading Observers Straw Man .....................................................................167 B. Thomas Bott and His Followers................................................................................176 C. The “All Immorality Is Lying” Straw Man ...............................................................180 D. Joel Feinberg’s Response to Hume ...........................................................................182 E. The Description Error ................................................................................................187 Chapter VI. Conclusion .............................................................................................................191 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................202 vii CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION The Rev. William Wollaston (1659-1724) was one of the most famous and highly esteemed writers of his time, and yet in the century following his death, his reputation fell into sharp decline until he became an object of disrespect in the writings of Hume, Price, Bentham, and others. A fair-minded contemporary reader, I think, will find that Wollaston did have something important and original to say, however confused his manner of saying it, so that is one reason for reexamining his major work, The Religion of Nature Delineated (1722)—Joel Feinberg.1 William Wollaston, author of The Religion of Nature Delineated (1724) (hereinafter referred to as RND), was a popular and highly regarded moral philosopher in the eighteenth century, yet in the nineteenth century he fell into disrepute. He was no longer read and his moral theory was ridiculed and dismissed. This view has persisted to the present. In this dissertation I will provide the first thorough exposition of Wollaston’s moral theory and demonstrate it to be an innovative contribution to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’ project of developing a moral theory by reason alone (in which lie the origins of contemporary moral realism); with the foundational principle of acting in accordance with nature as the standard of morality. Also, that it contains a largely unrecognized innovation: the principle that rational agents express propositions by their actions—that, as propositions, have truth values—which makes it possible to determine the moral status of such actions by evaluating these truth values. I will also demonstrate that the prevailing dismissal of this theory is based on arguments which fail to engage it and instead attack straw men. Wollaston’s moral theory is usually classified as rationalist, but not clearly described. It is 1 Joel Feinberg, “Wollaston and His Critics,” The Journal of the History of Ideas 38, no. 2 (1977): 345. 1 most commonly, and incorrectly, described as being somehow similar to Samuel Clarke’s theory of fitness,2 with Wollaston sometimes labeled a disciple of Clarke and subject to descriptions such as this: The moral rationalists claimed, for example, that moral distinctions are based on transcendental principles and immutable relations that oblige all rational creatures and that can only be discerned by the use of reason.... An exaggerated view of the power of reason leads the rationalist to suppose that reason can pierce its way into the realm of transcendental values.3 However, Wollaston had no such visions of transcendental normative realms nor does his theory resemble Clarke’s doctrine of intuitively observable fitnesses; rather, he devised a rule for deriving moral judgments from propositions concerning empirical experience. Wollaston
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