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Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm
Buffalo Law Review Volume 52 Number 3 Article 8 7-1-2004 Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm Michael J. Meurer Boston University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview Part of the Law Commons, and the Legal Theory Commons Recommended Citation Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 727 (2004). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol52/iss3/8 This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm MICHAEL J. MEURERt Economic analysis of the law assumes the "shadow of the law" influences the behavior of businesses. Thus, busi- ness people consider the costs and benefits of contract litigation when they make decisions about contract per- formance, they consider the costs of tort litigation when they make investments in safety, they consider the costs of violating a regulation when they make decisions about regulatory compliance, and so on. Economic models of law typically abstract from organizational detail and treat busi- nesses as if they are represented by a single manager who controls the firm's behavior and acts to maximize its profit. This abstraction simplifies analysis but, not surprisingly, it limits the ability of analysts to fully explore some important legal policy questions. -
Ten Theses on the Firm As a Democratic Institution Anna Grandori, Bocconi University, Milan
∗ Ten theses on the firm as a democratic institution Anna Grandori, Bocconi University, Milan Abstract The paper contributes to revising the notion of the firm by a) reconstructing the conditions in which a firm-like entity may be necessary for conducting economic action; b) showing that such an entity can be established by an agreement or contract associating and dedicating partners and/or assets (in most Civil Law countries called a contract of ‘societas’); and c) arguing that such an entity, as any legally recognized association, in modern constitutional democratic legal orders, is bound to be governed according to democratic principles and procedures. Different types of firms differ according to who are the principals in the democracy, and whether the ‘societas’ is a society of assets or of people. Those theses allow to derive some other relevant implications of the nature and governance of the firm (for example, the irrelevance of the objectives pursued, and the relevance of responsibility toward third parties, for defining a firm). The whole set of propositions is exposed in ‘ten theses’. Introduction The starting question of our analysis is, so to speak, a ‘zero-based analysis’ question : When and why the constitution of an entity, such as the firm, is necessary for undertaking economic action, i.e. other ways of associating or transacting fall short from providing adequate support? What is the ‘glue’ that can bring and keep different actors together in such an entity, i.e. what is the ‘relation’ between individuals/primary groups with such an organization? Those questions lies at the core of organization theory and organizational economics ever since, and received various responses. -
Edith Penrose's Legacy to Economics
Edith Penrose’s Legacy to Economics, Management and Political Economy Kofi Adjepong-Boateng and Christine Oughton Academics have seldom shaped their discipline to the extent that their name becomes a byword for theory, practice and policy. Keynes is a noteworthy example, leaving a legacy of Keynesian economics and policy that shaped the international economic order, underpinned the golden age of economic growth, helped to create a central bank in India and led a US President to declare himself a ‘Keynesian’ in 1971. Even fewer academics have achieved such acclaim across two disciplines. Edith Penrose, however, is one of them, her influence spanning the disciplines of economics and management. Her achievement is all the more remarkable given the lack of representation and recognition of women in economics, both then and now. The absence of women in the economics profession has not gone unnoticed, at least by the Financial Times (FT), The Economist and other media outlets. Both Diane Coyle (August 2017) and Gemma Tetlow (April 2018) have highlighted this problem in the FT. In her article, Gemma Tetlow point out that Elinor Ostrom is still the only woman to have been awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics; and that this year Rachel Griffith, Professor of Economics at Manchester University, has become only the second female president of the Royal Economic Society since its creation in 1890. Moreover, a list of influential economists in The Economist attracted much attention, a fair bit of which was critical. One of the criticisms was the total absence of any women. A more recent article in the same publication argues that the gender problem in economics results in fewer ideas to benefit the discipline and the consequent disadvantage of a skewed point of view. -
Emerging Economies
Asia Pac J Manag (2018) 35:829–857 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-018-9599-3 REVIEWS The growth of the firm in (and out of) emerging economies Mike W. Peng1 & Sergey Lebedev2 & Cristina O. Vlas3 & Joyce C. Wang1 & Jason S. Shay4 Published online: 2 October 2018 # Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract Starting with Peng and Heath (Academy of Management Review, 21: 492– 528, 1996), the growth of the firm in emerging economies (EE) has received increasing attention in the literature in the last two decades. This line of research has not only extended our knowledge on firms’ strategic choices to the context of EE, but also proposed new perspectives on the growth of the firm. Leveraging prior research, this article focuses on three major modes for firm growth—organic, acquisitive, and network-based. For each mode, we identify new themes and insights emerging from the last two decades of research. They center on (1) compositional capabilities and frugal innovations for organic growth, (2) business groups and cross-border acquisi- tions for acquisitive growth, and (3) network capitalism and institutional transitions for * Mike W. Peng [email protected] Sergey Lebedev [email protected] Cristina O. Vlas [email protected] Joyce C. Wang [email protected] Jason S. Shay [email protected] 1 Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, 800 West Campbell Road, SM 43, Richardson, TX 75080, USA 2 College of Business, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132, USA 3 University of Massachusetts Amherst, 121 President’sDrive,Amherst,MA01003,USA 4 Aviall – Boeing Global Services, 2750 Regent Blvd., Dallas, TX 75261, USA 830 M. -
Edith Penrose's 'The Theory of The
Munich Personal RePEc Archive Edith Penrose’s ‘The Theory of the Growth of the Firm’ Fifty Years Later Pitelis, Christos 13 March 2009 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23180/ MPRA Paper No. 23180, posted 10 Jun 2010 05:46 UTC Edith Penrose’s ‘The Theory of the Growth of the Firm’ Fifty Years Later∗∗∗ Christos N. Pitelis Judge Business School and Queens’ College University of Cambridge Trumpington Street Cambridge CB2 1AG UK Tel: 0044 1223 339618 Fax: 0044 1223 766815 Email: [email protected] 13 March 2009 ∗ This paper draws and builds upon earlier work by Penrose and Pitelis (1999) and Pitelis (2004, 2005, 2007a, 2007b). am grateful to Edith Penrose for discussion and numerous colleagues for comments on earlier drafts, especially Mie Augier, (ohn Dunning, (oe Mahoney, Robin Marris, Perran Penrose, David Teece and Alain ,erbeke. Errors are mine. 1 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1477885 I. INTRODUCTION 2009 marks the 50th anniversary of Edith Penrose’s The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (TGF thereafter). In a review of the book in the Economic Journal, Robin Marris (1961) predicted that TGF would prove one of the most influential of the decade. In his 1987 entry to the New Palgrave he added that “this proved an understatement” (p831). Marris’ statements were referring mainly to the economic theory of the firm, especially the literature on ‘managerial theories’, which were popular in the 1960s and in which he himself was a major contributor (Marris 1964). Neither Marris nor Penrose herself could foresee what appears to be the case 50 years on; this is a situation where the influence of TGF in mainstream economics has been rather limited (also Marris, 1987 and below). -
Transnational Corporations, Vol. 8, No. 1 (April 1999) SPECIAL FEATURE: FOREIGN PORTFOLIO and DIRECT INVESTMENT
VOLUME 8 NUMBER 1 APRIL 1999 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS United Nations United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Division on Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development Editorial statement Transnational Corporations (formerly The CTC Reporter) is a refereed journal published three times a year by UNCTAD. In the past, the Programme on Transnational Corporations was carried out by the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (1975–1992) and by the Transnational Corporations and Management Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Development (1992–1993). The basic objective of this journal is to publish articles and research notes that provide insights into the economic, legal, social and cultural impacts of transnational corporations in an increasingly global economy and the policy implications that arise therefrom. It focuses especially on political and economic issues related to transnational corporations. In addition, Transnational Corporations features book reviews. The journal welcomes contributions from the academic community, policy makers and staff members of research institutions and international organizations. Guidelines for contributors are given at the end of this issue. Editor: Karl P. Sauvant Associate editors: Bijit Bora, Kálmán Kalotay, Michael C. Bonello and Michael Mortimore Managing editor: Tess Sabico Advisory editor for international framework matters: Arghyrios A. Fatouros Guest editor for special feature on foreign portfolio and direct investment: Mira Wilkins home page: http://www.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/1_itncs/1_tncs.tm Subscriptions A subscription to Transnational Corporations for one year is US$ 45 (single issues are US$ 20). See p. 213 for details of how to subscribe, or contact any distributor of United Nations publications. -
The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis Joel P
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business Volume 17 Issue 1 Winter Winter 1997 The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis Joel P. Trachtman Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb Part of the International Trade Commons Recommended Citation Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 470 (1996-1997) This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis Joel P. Trachtman* Without a theory they had nothing to pass on except a mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire. 1 While the kind of close comparative institutional analysis which Coase called for in The Nature of the Firm was once completely outside the universe of mainstream econo- mists, and remains still a foreign, if potentially productive enterrise for many, close com- parative analysis of institutions is home turf for law professors. Hierarchical arrangements are being examined by economic theorists studying the or- ganization of firms, but for less cosmic purposes than would be served3 by political and economic organization of the production of international public goods. I. INTRODUCrION: THE PROBLEM Debates regarding the competences and governance of interna- tional economic organizations such as the World Trade Organization * Associate Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. -
Multinational Corporations and Transaction Costs
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Todorova, Tamara Book — Published Version Multinational Corporations and Transaction Costs Suggested Citation: Todorova, Tamara (2020) : Multinational Corporations and Transaction Costs, ISBN 978-605-7736-99-4, KSP Books, Istanbul, http://books.ksplibrary.org/978-605-7736-99-4/ This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/222987 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ -
The Essential RONALD COASE
The Essential RONALD COASE by L. Lynne Kiesling Fraser Institute d www.fraserinstitute.org The Essential Ronald Coase by L. Lynne Kiesling Fraser Institute www.fraserinstitute.org 2021 www.fraserinstitute.org d Fraser Institute d iii Copyright © 2021 by the Fraser Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. The author of this publication has worked independently and opinions expressed by her are, therefore, her own, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Fraser Institute or its supporters, directors, or staff. This publication in no way implies that the Fraser Institute, its directors, or staff are in favour of, or oppose the passage of, any bill; or that they support or oppose any particular political party or candidate. Printed and bound in Canada Cover design and artwork Bill C. Ray ISBN 978-0-88975-644-1 Contents Introduction / 1 1 Institutions, Property Rights, and Transaction Costs / 5 2 Why Do Firms Exist? / 9 3 Resolving Disputes: The Problem of Social Cost / 19 4 Applied Transaction Cost Economics: Spectrum Allocation / 27 5 Applied Transaction Cost Economics: Emission Permit Trading / 33 6 Coase and the Lighthouse in Economics / 41 7 Problems of Monopoly / 45 8 Conclusion / 53 Works Cited and Suggestions for Further Reading / 55 Publishing information / 61 Author’s acknowledgments / 62 About the author / 62 Publisher’s acknowledgments / 62 Supporting the Fraser Institute / 63 Purpose, funding, and independence / 63 About the Fraser Institute / 64 Editorial Advisory Board / 65 Fraser Institute d www.fraserinstitute.org Introduction: Who Was Ronald Coase? Ronald Coase was one of the most influential economists of the 20th century, and one of the most unusual. -
Towards a Political Theory of the Firm
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES TOWARDS A POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FIRM Luigi Zingales Working Paper 23593 http://www.nber.org/papers/w23593 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 July 2017 I thank Mark Gertler, Gordon Hanson, Enrico Moretti, Tim Taylor for very useful comments and Steve Haber for educating me on the multiple ways in which Google lobbies. Financial support from the Stigler Center and from the George Rinder Research fund at the University of Chicago is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2017 by Luigi Zingales. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Towards a Political Theory of the Firm Luigi Zingales NBER Working Paper No. 23593 July 2017 JEL No. G3 ABSTRACT Neoclassical theory assumes that firms have no power of fiat any different from ordinary market contracting, thus a fortiori no power to influence the rules of the game. In the real world, firms have such power. I argue that the more firms have market power, the more they have both the ability and the need to gain political power. Thus, market concentration can easily lead to a “Medici vicious circle,” where money is used to get political power and political power is used to make money. -
Unitary Taxation of Multinational Enterprises for a Just Allocation of Income: Nigeria As a Case Study of Africa’S Largest Economies
Unitary Taxation of Multinational Enterprises for a Just Allocation of Income: Nigeria as a Case Study of Africa’s Largest Economies. By Alexander Ezenagu Faculty of Law McGill University Montreal, Quebec, Canada April 2019 A Thesis submitted to McGill University In partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Civil Law © Alexander Ezenagu, 2019 1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ACMT Alternative Corporate Minimum Tax AfCFTA African Continental Free Trade Agreement ALP Arm’s Length Principle APA Advance Pricing Agreement ATAF African Tax Administration Forum AU African Union BEPS Base Erosion and Profit Shifting BEPS Project BEPS Project of the OECD CAMA Companies and Allied Matters Act CbCR Country-by-Country Reports CCCTB Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base CFC Controlled Foreign Corporation CUP Comparable Uncontrolled Price ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EOI Exchange of Information EU European Union FDI Foreign Direct Investment FIRS Federal Inland Revenue Service FPI Foreign Portfolio Investment GVCs Global Value Chains GPNs Global Production Networks GWCs Global Wealth Chains HLP High Level Panel IFF Illicit Financial Flow IMF International Monetary Fund MLI Multilateral Instrument MNE Multinational enterprise OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD MTC OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2 PCT Platform for Collaboration on Tax PE Permanent Establishment PSM Profit Split Method SDGs Sustainable Development Goals TIWB Tax Inspectors Without Borders TNMM Transactional -
Penrosian Learning Confronts the Neoclassical Fallacy
Is the Most Unproductive Firm the Foundation of the Most Efficient Economy? Penrosian Learning Confronts the Neoclassical Fallacy * William Lazonick Working Paper No. 111 January 26, 2020 ABSTRACT Edith Penrose’s 1959 book The Theory of the Growth of the Firm [TGF] provides intellectual foundations for a theory of innovative enterprise, which is essential to any attempt to explain productivity growth, employment opportunity, and income distribution. Properly understood, Penrose’s theory of the firm is also an antidote to the deception that is foundational to neoclassical economics: The theory, taught by PhD economists to millions upon millions of college students for over seven decades, that the most unproductive firm is the foundation of the most efficient economy. The dissemination of this “neoclassical fallacy” to a mass audience of college students began with Paul A. Samuelson’s textbook, Economics: An Introductory Analysis, first published in 1948. Over the decades, the neoclassical fallacy has persisted through * President of The Academic-industry Research Network; Professor of Economics Emeritus, University of Massachusetts; Open Society Fellow; CIFAR Fellow; Professeur Associé, Institut Mines-Télécom, Paris; Professorial Research Associate, SOAS University of London. Lazonick: Is the Most Unproductive Firm the Foundation of the Most Efficient Economy? 18 revisions of Samuelson, Economics and in its countless “economics principles” clones. This essay challenges the intellectual hegemony of neoclassical economics by exposing the illogic of its foundational assumptions about how a modern economy functions and performs. The neoclassical fallacy gained popularity in the 1950s, during which decade Samuelson revised Economics three times. Meanwhile, Penrose derived the logic of organizational learning that she lays out in TGF from the facts of firm growth, absorbing what was known in the 1950s about the large corporations that had come to dominate the U.S.