Using Ipv6 for Information Covert Exfiltration

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Using IPv6 for information covert exfiltration MSc. Bernhards 'Lockout' Blumbergs, GXPN A pentester and exploit researcher view on IPv6 (we could be talking different language....) 2 Do you ? (Since 06/06/2012 IPv6 is the new normal) 3 What is wrong here? # ip6tables -nvL Chain INPUT (policy ACCEPT 0 packets, 0 bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination Chain FORWARD (policy ACCEPT 0 packets, 0 bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination Chain OUTPUT (policy ACCEPT 0 packets, 0 bytes) pkts bytes target prot opt in out source destination 4 Control and monitor • Network ingress and egress • IPv6 as "Backdoor protocol"? 5 Evading detection [not really] (for fun) • Protocol ambiguities • Device limitations (CPU, RAM, HDD, Sampling rate) • Insertion, Evasion • IPv6 product maturity and functionality 6 IPv6 Header(s) • IPv6 Header • IPv6 Extension headers 7 Known IPv6 security issues • Extension headers • Transition technologies • ICMPv6 • Network reconnaissance • Fuzz testing IPv6 implementations 8 Extension headers (RFC2460) • Options header • Hop-by-hop optins (Router alert attack) • Routing headers (RH0 attack - deprecated) • Fragmentation header (frag attacks) • Destination options • IPSec (ESP+AH), Mobility, Shim6 • Unknown options header 9 IPv6 Extension header chaining • RFC2460: [...] it is recommended that those headers appear in the following order [...] 10 Long live IPv4! (when is it going to happily retire?) 11 Transition mehanisms • RFC6180 • Dual stack • Tunneling • Protocol translation 12 Dual stack • IPv6 preferred over IPv4 • Attacks on both IP protocols • Upper layer attacks still work 13 Tunneling • Static and dynamic • Such as: Teredo, ISATAP, 6in4, 6to4, 6over4, 6rd... • 6in4 (RFC4213): 14 6to4 (RFC2529, RFC3964) • Uses 6in4 • Protocol IP[9]=41 • 2002:V4ADDR:/48 • Anycast 192.88.99.1 15 The scenario (under development and testing) 16 The layout IPv4 Dual stack 17 Initial foothold Client-side targeting IPv4 Dual stack 18 Calling back home IPv4/6 CnC server IPv4 Custom 6to4 Evasion approaches Dual stack 19 Hitchhiking back home RFC "compliant" Custom 6to4 IPv4/6 6to4 relay CnC server IPv4 Dual stack 20 All the things • Know what you use • Use wisely • Control and monitor • Be prepared to react • ... 21 To be continued... .

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