ARTICLES The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism: Security, Sue Thompson Economic Development, and Foreign Power Support for

Regional Initiatives, 1947-77

Redefining ASEAN Way: Democratization and Inter- M. Faishal Aminuddin, governmental Relations in Southeast Asia Joko Purnomo

The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda Leni Winarni

Higher Education Integration in ASEAN: ASEAN University Teuku Rezasyah, Network Case Neneng Konety, Affabile Rifawan, Wahyu Wardhana

Sub-National Government and the Problem of Unequal Agus Suman, Development in ASEAN Economic Integration: Case of Pantri Muthriana Erza Killian, Ni Komang Desy Arya Pinatih

RESEARCH NOTE Liberal World Order in the Age of Disruptive Politics: A South- Moch Faisal Karim east Asian Perspective JOURNAL OF ASEAN STUDIES (JAS)

Editor in Chief Tirta N. Mursitama

Managing Editors Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Tangguh Chairil Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Paramitaningrum

Layout Editors Theodora Vivi Juliani

Associate Editors Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Donatus K. Marut , Indonesia Kiki Verico Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Lili Yulyadi Brawijaya University, Indonesia M. Faishal Aminuddin University of Warwick, United Kingdom Moch Faisal Karim University at Albany, SUNY, United States Mutti Anggita Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Pamungkas A. Dewanto National Planning Agency, Republic of Indonesia Sumedi A. Mulyo Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Wendy A. Prajuli

Advisory International Editorial Board BINUS Business School, Indonesia Ahmad Syamil Swinburne University of Technology, Australia Alfons Palangkaraya University of Indonesia, Indonesia Andi Widjajanto Sebelas Maret University, Indonesia Andrik Purwasito Jana Wyżykowskiego University, Poland Arkadiusz Kotlinski Airlangga University, Indonesia Baiq L. S. Wardhani University of Le Havre, France Darwis Khudori Paramadina University, Indonesia Dinna Wisnu Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia, Indonesia Dino P. Djalal University of Hawai’i at Manoa, United States Ehito Kimura Jawaharal Nehru University, India Gautam K. Jha Bina Nusantara University, Indonesia Harjanto Prabowo Ritsumeikan University, Japan Jun Honna University of Indonesia, Indonesia Dr. GR Damodaran College of Science, India K. K. Ramachandran Australian National University, Australia Lorraine Elliott Yunnan University, China Lu Guangsheng ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Malcolm Cook National University of Singapore, Singapore Marleen Dieleman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia Universiti Teknologi , Malaysia Nanthakumar Loganathan Australian National University, Australia Pierre van der Eng Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia Rizal Sukma Kaohsiung SEAS, Taiwan Samuel C. Y. Ku Budapest Business School, Hungary Tamas Novak Cheng Shiu University, Taiwan Wan-Ping Tai Padjadjaran Univeristy, Indonesia Yanyan M. Yani

JOURNAL OF ASEAN STUDIES Volume 5 Number 1 2017

Contents

EDITORIAL Tirta N. Mursitama

ARTICLES The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism: Security, Economic Development, 1-22 and Foreign Power Support for Regional Initiatives, 1947-77 Sue Thompson

Redefining ASEAN Way: Democratization and Intergovernmental Relations in 23-36 Southeast Asia M. Faishal Aminuddin Joko Purnomo

The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda 37-50 Leni Winarni

Higher Education Integration in ASEAN: ASEAN University Network Case 51-59 Teuku Rezasyah Neneng Konety Affabile Rifawan Wahyu Wardhana

Sub-National Government and the Problem of Unequal Development in ASEAN 60-67 Economic Integration: Case of Indonesia Agus Suman Pantri Muthriana Erza Killian Ni Komang Desy Arya Pinatih

RESEARCH NOTE Liberal World Order in the Age of Disruptive Politics: A Southeast Asian 68-74 Perspective Moch Faisal Karim journal.binus.ac.id/index.php/jas Aim and Scope

The Journal of ASEAN Studies (JAS) is an International peer-reviewed bi-annual journal that enriches understanding of the past, current, and future issues relevant to ASEAN and its circle of issues. The article shall address any research on theoretical and empirical questions about ASEAN. The Topics addressed within the journal include: diplomacy, political economy, trade, national development, security, geopolitics, social change, transnational movement, environment, law, business and industry, and other various related sub-fields.

Journal of ASEAN Studies expects the articles encourage debate, controversy, new understanding, solid theory, and reflection on ASEAN. The articles sent should have a sharp analysis and rigorous methodologies quantitative or qualitative as well as written in an engaging and analytical style. The JAS does publish original research, reviewing research, book review, opinion pieces of current affairs. However JAS does not publish journalistic or investigative style of article. The JAS would not be responsible for any implied or written statements of articles published. Each author would be responsible for their own writing.

Journal of ASEAN Studies is an international multidisciplinary journal, covering various fields of research on ASEAN either as community, organization, process, and web of cooperation.

Journal of ASEAN Studies publishes the following types of manuscripts:

• Scholarly articles: The manuscripts should be approximately 5,000-8,000 words. The manuscripts must contain a review of the current state of knowledge on the research question(s) of interest, then share new information or new ideas that will impact the state of theory and/or practice in area of ASEAN Studies.  • Review Article: The manuscripts should be approximately 1,500-3,500. The manuscripts must contain the current state of understanding on a particular topic about ASEAN by analysing and discussing research previously published by others  • Practice notes: These are shorter manuscripts approximately 1,500-3,500 words that are of specific interest to practitioners. These manuscripts must present new development for the ASEAN.  • Research notes: Similar to practice notes, these are shorter manuscripts approximately 1,500-3,500 words that have specific implications for ASEAN. The manuscripts should employ rigorous methodology either qualitative or quantitative.  • Book Review: The manuscripts should be approximately 1,500-4,000. The manuscripts must contain a critical evaluation of book by making argument and commentary on the particular book discussed. Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies

Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies (CBDS) is established as part of the International Relations Department, Bina Nusantara (BINUS) University. Our aims are to undertake and promote research and deliberation on diplomacy, business, international relations and developmental issues particularly in Indonesia, Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific.

We also commit to build, connect and share research and others kinds of knowledge generating activities for the betterment of life of the people and earth. Our immediate constituency is International Relations Department, BINUS University and the larger constituency is the broader academic community of the BINUS University and other universities and institutions both national and international as well as policy community.

CBDS publishes scholarly journal, working papers, commentaries and provides training and consultancies services in the areas of diplomatic training, negotiations, commercial diplomacy, conflict resolutions for business, business and government relations, promoting competitive local government in attracting foreign investment, and understanding impact of regional economic integration on development specifically toward ASEAN Community 2015.

CBDS Secretariat Kijang Campus, Binus University Jl. Kemanggisan Ilir III No. 45, Kemanggisan / Palmerah Barat 11480 +62.21 534 5830 ext. 2453 +62.21 534 0244 http://ir.binus.ac.id/cbds Editorial

Greetings from the Journal of ASEAN Studies. We are very grateful to reach the fifth year of contributing to the Southeast Asian studies, both Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as institution and also individual country in the region. With the publication of this Volume 5 Issue 1, 2017, we are pleased to stay on track in providing an academic venue for scholars, practitioners, diplomats, businessmen, and larger stakeholders of ASEAN to contribute to the development of knowledge and debates pertaining to the Southeast Asian political, social, economic, and security issues.

In this issue, there are six interesting manuscripts that consist of five articles and one research note. The first article is entitled, “The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism: Security, Economic Development, and Foreign Power Support for Regional Initiatives, 1947-77” written by Sue Thompson from Australian National University, Australia. Thompson discusses Southeast Asian regionalism by focusing on the aspect of economic development and security. She argues that the evolution of Southeast Asian regionalism was a combined effort of foreign power support for Asian initiatives throughout the economic development with the aim to provide security during the political transformation of the region from the post-war period into the early years of ASEAN and the aftermath of the war in Vietnam.

The second article is entitled, “Redefining ASEAN Way: Democratization and Intergovernmental Relations in Southeast Asia” written by M. Faishal Aminuddin and Joko Purnomo, both from University of Brawijaya, Indonesia. Aminuddin and Purnomo review inter-state relations in Southeast Asia countries and find that regional cooperation in the region has achieved limited political development. They provide an alternative type of political diplomacy by combining formal diplomacy actions done by state institution and informal diplomacy actions done by non-government actors.

The third article is entitled, “The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda” written by Leni Winarni from Sebelas Maret University, Indonesia. Winarni examines why the Buddhist Community in Myanmar turns into religious violence against Rohingya people in the State of Rakhine. She uses historical perspective to analyze the ethnic-religion violence and finds that the conflict is either an indication of a weak state or failure state in managing diversity.

The fourth article is entitled, “Higher Education Integration in ASEAN: ASEAN University Network Case” written by Teuku Rezasyah, Neneng Konety, Affabile Rifawan, and Wahyu Wardhana from Padjadjaran University, Indonesia. Rezasyah et al. discuss the role of ASEAN University Network (AUN) in enhancing regional integration in the higher education sector in ASEAN. Lastly, the fifth article is entitled, “Sub-National Government and the Problem of Unequal Development in ASEAN Economic Integration: Case of Indonesia” written by Agus Suman, Pantri Muthriana Erza Killian, and Ni Komang Desy Arya Pinatih. They elaborate the problem of increasing intra-national development gap due to regional integration by using Indonesia as a case study.

This issue ends with a research note entitled, “Liberal World Order in the Age of Disruptive Politics: A Southeast Asian Perspective” written by Moch Faisal Karim from University of Warwick, United Kingdom. Karim explores the notion of disruptive politics and the challenge it poses to the liberal world order. Finally, the editor-in-chief would like to express highest appreciation for the authors who have submitted their manuscripts as response from our invitation and call for papers, as well as who have participated in the International Conference on Business, International Relations, and Diplomacy (ICOBIRD) at Bina Nusantara University whose papers are published in this issue. We also would like to thank the Indonesian Association for International Relations (AIHII) for continuing support of this joint publication with the Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies (CBDS) of the Department of International Relations of Bina Nusantara University.

Jakarta, 31 July 2017

Prof. Dr. Tirta N. Mursitama, Ph.D. Editor-in-chief The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism: Security, Economic Development, and Foreign Power Support for Regional Initiatives, 1947-77.1

Sue Thompson Australian National University, Australia

Abstract

Policy objectives for Southeast Asian regionalism had been evolving since the end of the Second World War. Economic development viewed as essential for establishing peace and stability in Southeast Asia and the links between development and security were evident in the elaboration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Also evident was the second-line support provided by external powers. While ASEAN was a regional initiative that came out of the Bangkok talks to end Confrontation, Western governments had been formulating regional cooperation policies in Southeast Asia decades prior. Economic development viewed as essential for containing communist influence and preventing internal insurgencies in the region. Growth and prosperity would come through regional development programs with external support. This would then expand to some form of collective security led by the Southeast Asian nations themselves. Regionalism viewed as one way of providing economic assistance to newly independent nations without the appearance of foreign interference in regional affairs. Therefore, the evolution of Southeast Asian regionalism was a combined effort of foreign power support for Asian initiatives throughout the economic development with the aim to provide security during the political transformation of the region from the post-war period into the early years of ASEAN and the aftermath of the war in Vietnam.

Key words: regionalism, Southeast Asia, economic development, security

.*1This article was originally presented in The Fifth International Conference on Business, International Relations, and Diplomacy (ICOBIRD 2016) at Bina Nusantara University.

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2017), pp. 1-22 DOI: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.4160 ©2017 by CBDS Bina Nusantara University and Indonesian Association for International Relations ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic 2 The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism

regional cooperation. Australia and New Introduction Zealand too saw the benefit of such an arrangement, taking the initiative to seek At the end of the Second World War, consultation with the U.S. on the future of early efforts towards Southeast Asian the Pacific region at the end of the war. regionalism emerged from Southeast Asian Britain was also supportive of the idea of nations seeking to achieve peace and regional cooperation and looked at stability, economic development and developing a policy for its colonial areas. policies of self-reliance. Western Both the British and the Australians believed governments too were pursuing their that some form of regional cooperation was policies on regional cooperation for similar much preferable to a post-war mandate outcomes. For the United States (U.S.) system (Letter, Evatt to Johnson, 1944). especially, such agreement would provide Securing support from the region was crucial stability for a grouping of non-communist for officials who were keen to avoid direct nations without the appearance of Western interference in the affairs of governing support, as well as a multilateral umbrella bodies, and within Asia, some states also under which bilateral relationships between backed the idea of closer cooperation, the West and Southeast Asian countries especially those that supported would thrive and prosper. These policies decolonization, but not pro-communist have often overlooked when tracing the independence movements. post-war evolution of Southeast Asian regionalism as the focus of this topic has However, regional cooperation could tended only to highlight the role played by only succeed if Southeast Asian nations the regional nations themselves. Indeed, themselves agreed that there was a need for officials such as Abu Bakar Lubis, the private closer relations and would work together. secretary to Indonesian Foreign Affairs This need did come from the common fear of Minister , have promoted this China’s domination in the region and perception, denying that formal regional concern for economic development, cooperation was the result of an American especially once Western interests reduced. idea or action (Anwar, 1994, pp. 49-57). The creation of formal regional cooperation Additionally, perceptions of the role of came with the establishment of the regional cooperation have highlighted Association of Southeast Asian Nations economic and social issues, rather than any (ASEAN), a move that was only possible security benefits, missing the importance of through regional initiatives from the regionalism as a vehicle for promoting both founding member states. Indeed, the economic development and safety policies of creation of ASEAN attributed to efforts from regional and external powers. the countries in the region, especially ASEAN’s conception was a direct result of Western governments initially the Malaysian-Indonesian talks that ended sought to secure regional peace and Confrontation, the conflict between these cooperation through the two nations. However, Western policies did (UN). Washington was interested in contribute to the evolution of regional collaboration among groups in the UN cooperation in Southeast Asia, reflecting the where there was mutual interest, such as Journal of ASEAN Studies 3

combined efforts of foreign power support countries and non-regional members such as for Asian initiatives. France, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the U.S. As the Cold War Early Initiatives intensified, the Australian Government particularly, promoted the commission as a On 4 July 1949, Philippine President forum for non-communist governments and Quirino made a speech outlining the need capitalist development (Mitcham, 2012, p. for a ‘Pacific Union, a real union of peoples 191 & 1930). around the Pacific on the basis for common counsel and assistance.’ Quirino then sent a However, Washington and several letter of instructions to General Romulo, other countries were cautious about Philippine Diplomat and President of the Philippine overtures towards the UN General Assembly at the time, outlining development of a Pacific Union. When his plans for such an organization. Romulo General Romulo tried to undertake responded and proposed that Korea, the preliminary discussions on the idea with Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, various diplomatic representations at the Australia, India, Burma, Ceylon and UN, several nations indicated that American Indonesia organize a political and economic policy would largely influence their position. union aimed at containing ‘Russo-Chinese’ Following this, Romulo attempted to secure Communism, while also denouncing a commitment from Washington to support European imperialism. Britain, France, the the participation in a Southeast Asian Netherlands and the U.S. would at first meeting. The response from the State excluded from such an organization. After Department was that while the U.S. would some form of grouping emerged, an offer of be sympathetic to the principle of a economic cooperation with the U.S. would Southeast Asian association, the success of pursue. Then, if Communism could contain, any such group would have to be generated a joint appeal for American military aid spontaneously within the area (Memo, could be considered (Memo, for Butterworth Secretary of State and Butterworth, 1950). and Fisher, 1949). Nevertheless, the U.S. continued to The links between economic promote the idea of Asian regionalism to development and security had been evident counter anti-Western forces. This idea from the beginning of the UN and had reflected in support for the development of resulted in the establishment of some the Mekong River Basin. Post-war interest in agencies such as the Economic and Social developing the area came out of French-Thai Council (ECOSOC) and the International negotiations to settle a territorial dispute. In Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1950, former Office of Strategic Service (IBRD), amongst others. In early 1947, Director William Donovan recommended ECOSOC created regional commissions to that the administration support the encourage development, and one of these development of the Mekong Basin as a long- bodies was the UN Economic Commission range project to secure cooperation between for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), which Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and was established on 19 March 1947. The Vietnam. This concept presented to ECAFE, membership of ECAFE included both Asian and in 1957, the Committee for the 4 The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism

Coordination of Investigations of the Lower supporting two main goals in Southeast Asia Mekong Basin established. In 1958, as interdependent: security and social and Washington provided US$2 million to help economic development (Administrative finance the collection of primary data in the History of the Department of State, 1963- area. The State Department viewed the 1969). In early 1965, State Department Mekong Committee as having enormous advisers suggested to Under-Secretary of potential for the political and economic State George Ball, that some Asian future of the region, ‘in determining whether development defense agency, or Southeast Asia remains free or comes under organization, might be initiated to replace the control of the Sino-Soviet Bloc’ (Memo, existing groups. Ball agreed to consider such Landon to Rostow, 1961). an approach (Conversation between Ball and Talbot, 1965). However, many in By the early 1960s, there were some Washington were wary that this policy regional organizations in existence, but only would portray as American interference. In a few with solely Asian membership. The April 1965, Chester L. Cooper, a staff Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) - an member of the National Security Council economic and cultural organization that (NSC), suggested that Washington should included Malaya, the Philippines, and present to UN Secretary General, U Thant, Thailand - was one such organization. It the idea of forming a new regional founded in 1961, yet its functions limited, institution called, The Southeast Asia especially when the Philippines refused to Development Association. It would be a recognize the newly created Federation of coordinating and consultative organization Malaysia, because of a Philippine claim to with permanent staff and an executive agent the British Borneo territory of Sabah. for the management of multi-national capital Another organization was Maphilindo, for projects, and the concept must appear to be Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Its an Asian initiative and be Asian (Talking purpose was to unite the Malay world, and Points for Bundy from Cooper). arose out of the Manila Agreement, a report by the Foreign Ministers of those countries, Many officials felt that regional accepted and augmented by the three heads cooperation was to be an Asian idea, of government in meetings in Manila in July privately Washington attributed main part and . They agreed that foreign of its implementation to American money. bases should not undermine their Johnson’s Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, independence, although Maphilindo came to claimed that one important step towards nothing because of the outbreak of regional cooperation was the provision of Confrontation, and Manila’s claim to Sabah US$1 billion for economic development in (Minute, Mare to Mr. Samuel, 23 January Asia, as outlined in a speech delivered by 1967). President Johnson at Johns Hopkins University. Another important step was American Initiatives directing this US$1 billion towards the establishment of the Asia Development Bank Under President Johnson, the (ADB) and other regional programs (Rusk to Department of State continued to pursue Rev. Dusen, 1965). regional cooperation as a policy objective, Journal of ASEAN Studies 5

Until Confrontation ended, regional depending on Indonesia’s participation. security cooperation was unfeasible. Consideration would then have to be taken However, economic development could be a as to the form and substance of such a group, means to end that dispute, and improve what its relationship would be with other relations between Indonesia and other regional organizations and in what direction Southeast Asian countries, especially would American diplomatic initiatives Malaysia and Singapore. When Washington follow in furthering the idea (Memo from commented favorably on Maphilindo as an Ropa to Rostow, 1966). organization that might provide the means of promoting regional cooperation and of Continuing American interest in finding a solution to Confrontation, Asian economic development and regional Singapore Prime Minister , security cooperation continued as Johnson expressed his concern that the U.S. was made a trip to the region in October- supporting the resurrection of Maphilindo. November 1966. There he met with the Department of State officials told Lee that heads of six nations – Australia, New Maphilindo was an Asian and not an Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of American initiative and that the State Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand – in Department did not want any plans for trade Manila on October 24-25. This meeting and security cooperation perceived as closed with a declaration of Peace and American interference (Washington to Progress in Asia and the Pacific and all seven Singapore, 1965). heads of government declared strong support for the principle of regional By mid-1966, some regional and sub- cooperation (Administrative History of the regional cooperative initiative had evolved Department of State, 1963-1969). such as the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC) – an economic and cultural alliance made up British Support and the End of of non-communist countries within the Confrontation region, the ADB and the ASA. State London also supported regional Department officials believed these bodies cooperation for Southeast Asia, especially were promising for future progress in considering Britain’s military commitments regional and sub-regional cooperation that to the region. In early 1964, the British would, in turn, led to collective efforts at Embassy in Washington delivered an Aide solving economic, social and security Memoire to the White House posting that problems in Asia (Memo for Rostow from Western withdrawal from Vietnam or Jorden, 1966). Donald D. Ropa of the NSC Malaysia was inevitable and if there was any Staff stressed to National Security Adviser, chance of stabilizing an independent Walt Rostow in April 1966 that American Southeast Asia without the presence of security interests in the Pacific basin would Western forces, regional cooperation was an be dependent on more regional cooperation undeniable attraction. This withdrawal was for economic development and political an ideal situation in the long-term, but it was cooperation for mutual security concerns. not possible in the short-term, especially due The ASA or Maphilindo might be able to to the leftist chaos of Indonesia (British evolve as a wider cooperative group, Embassy in Washington Aide Memoire, 6 The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism

1964). However, the British did not present form of regional cooperation in Southeast any ideas on how to progress this issue. In Asia that would be worked out by the May 1965, Rusk suggested to his British participating countries (London to certain counterpart, Michael Stewart, that missions, 1966). Then London could plan for Washington and London should do more to the withdrawal of its forces from Singapore. encourage Southeast Asian countries to While Washington wanted the British cooperate. With the aim of reducing British military bases to stay for at least the or American military involvement in the immediate future, the hope of some U.S. region, suggesting the establishment of an officials was that out of the regional organization around Malaysia, the initiatives implemented in the early 1960s. Philippines, and Thailand (Record of The initiatives would uniquely be Asian discussion, Rusk, and Stewart, 1965). mutual security arrangements, buttressed by American power presence, which will Some Southeast Asian states compensate for ultimate British withdrawal supported the departure of Western military (Ropa to Rostow, 1966). bases from the region, but not all. Indonesian leader, General Formal Initiatives and the Creation of reportedly said in February 1966 that the ASEAN defense of Southeast Asia was a matter for the countries in the area and that the British It informally agreed at the Bangkok military base in Singapore was a target for talks that Indonesia should join an ASA-type China’s expansionism. The Malaysian and body that would give a new name (Kuala Singapore governments, on the other hand, Lumpur to London, 1966). Indonesia was wanted the base to stay ( to keen to see that foreign forces withdraw Ottawa, 1966). Nevertheless, cooperation from the region and new Indonesian between the Southeast Asian nations was President Suharto wanted closer ties with his required. London was quite keen on the neighbors to help stem the spread of China’s establishment of an organization like the influence in the area (Jakarta to Washington, defunct Maphilindo, with the addition of 1966). He told two British Members of Singapore. However, the Malaysians were Parliament that an Asian community should less sure of resurrecting this organization. be responsible for the security of Southeast Kuala Lumpur’s preference was for the ASA, Asia (Meeting, Jackson MP, Dalyell MP, and which would include Thailand. Regardless General Suharto, 1966). Thai Prime Minister of the form such an association would take, and Malaysian Prime London’s position was to support any new Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman said that organization that might emerge from the they were pleased that countries in the Bangkok talks between Malaysia and region were increasingly aware of the need Indonesia on ending Confrontation (Memo, for regional cooperation, and stressed their Pritchard to Lord Beswick, 1966). Britain determination to make a Southeast Asian was uncertain whether a regional association work (Kuala Lumpur to organization would discuss at these Washington, 1966). Malaya had been the meetings; however, it instructed its missions initiator of ASA and was a participant of in the region to stress its approval for some Maphilindo, and was now, like Malaysia, willing to join a regional organization that Journal of ASEAN Studies 7

would include members of Singapore. The support to be too obvious, Thanat replied Australian High Commission in Kuala that he was sure Washington would be able Lumpur saw the possibility that a new local to determine where and when it could organization would make Malaysia less provide useful assistance (Record of dependent on its non-Asian allies (Kuala conversation between Rusk and Khoman, Lumpur to Canberra, 1966). Malaysian 1966). Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin explained to U.S. officials that the American nuclear However, problems arose over umbrella and a Southeast Asian regional whether the organization would involve organization were the only two alternatives itself in regional defense. Malik stressed to to avoid the spread of communist influence the American Ambassador in Jakarta in early (Kuala Lumpur to Washington, 1966). 1967 that the new regional group would only be an economic, cultural and technical The Malaysian Government association and that defense matters would specifically, agreed with continued Western not consider; although in time ASEAN support in Southeast Asia. During a meeting would take on a more political role (Jakarta between Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister to Canberra, 1967). However, one defense Tun Abdul Razak and U.S. Defense Secretary matter that was discusses was the presence Robert McNamara in Washington, Razak of foreign military bases in the region. said that from Malaysia’s perspective, it was Indonesia was opposed to such bases and important to have Laos, Burma, Cambodia, wanted this reflected in the new and Thailand coordinating policy to keep organization’s declaration. This opposition any pressure from China away from had been an aim of the previous regime in Malaysia’s borders. McNamara then Jakarta and had been part of Sukarno’s anti- emphasized the importance that the U.S. imperialist rhetoric during Confrontation. attached to the creation of some form of For the apparent pro-Western Suharto regional grouping so that American forces government, the motivations for opposing could eventually withdraw from the Asian foreign bases seemed less clear. However, in mainland (Washington to Kuala Lumpur, early 1967, officials told Australian and 1966). In Thailand, Thai Foreign Minister British representatives that the Indonesian had told Humphrey, he military stood to gain significantly if wanted to gather representatives from non- countries in the region opted out of defense communist Asian countries to promote arrangements with non-regional powers and increased regional cooperation. The instead organized their defense plans with Japanese Prime Minister, Eisaku Sato, and the participation of Indonesia (NIC 303(74), the South Korean President, Park Chung- First Draft, 1974). Although, the Acting hee, backed this sentiment (Letter, Vice- Director of Asian Regional Affairs at the president to Johnson, 1966). However, State Department, Philip Manhard, also told Thanat did not want overt American the Australians that it was difficult to support. He told Rusk that he hoped determine how far Malik was interested in regional development could have America’s ASEAN taking on a security role and discreet blessing. When the Secretary of whether the Indonesian Army was pushing State asked if Bangkok did not want U.S. for this position. Manhard pointed out that 8 The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism

in a recent speech, Malik had denied that the Jakarta insisted on a statement reflecting the new regional grouping would have a temporary nature of Western bases in the security role, but had then made region. For Indonesia, the declaration must contradictory statements, commenting that refer to the foreign bases, and stipulate that regional security had discussed amongst the the region was responsible for its defense. five nations (Washington to Canberra, 1967). However, the other four nations also did not Back in May 1967, Malik asked whether emphasize ASEAN as a security proposals for the new regional organization organization (Canberra to all posts, 1967). would include a joint military security plan Indeed, days later, when the Soviet against communist infiltration, he replied Ambassador to Thailand asked Thanat about that regional cooperation along the lines of the issue of bases, he responded that the economic, cultural and technical military bases stationed in Thailand was partnerships could interpret as a form of Thai and not American and that the U.S. was defense (Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, 1967). only needed to use these bases in the face of North Vietnamese aggression (Washington When ASEAN was inaugurated on 8 to Canberra, 1967). August 1967, the State Department regarded the formation of ASEAN as a positive move, The Australian Government, on the despite the indication that member nations other hand, seemed to view the organization would not welcome any form of outside as a forum to promote security in the region. interference, and not just from China. A day after ASEAN’s inauguration, Washington was not overly concerned about Australia’s Minister for External Affairs, the paragraph relating to foreign bases, Paul Hasluck, praised the new association believing the negotiations had largely and its aims at increasing cooperation avoided contentious political issues amongst the member states. He added that (Washington to Canberra, 1967). The Soviets ASEAN not only had committed to support denounced ASEAN, labelling it a new economic growth, social progress and military group and China completely cultural development in the region but to ignored the new organization. ASEAN’s also ‘promote regional peace and stability’ – declaration stated that the countries in objectives that had the full support of Southeast Asia would cooperate on Canberra (Canberra to certain posts, 1967). economic, social and cultural development. Years later, in his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew The founding countries also declared their wrote that the unspoken objective of ASEAN commitment to stabilizing and securing the was to build strength through regional region from external interference (Gill, 1997, solidarity before a power vacuum was pp. 30-33). The declaration added that all created because of the British military foreign bases were temporary and that the withdrawal from Southeast Asia and a countries in the region shared the main possible American one later (Yew, 2000, responsibility for defending Southeast Asia, p.369). although ASEAN was not directly concerned with defense. Of the five founding members, The Early Years of ASEAN Indonesia was the only country that did not However, in the early years of have Western forces inside its territory, and ASEAN, the organization was loosely Journal of ASEAN Studies 9

structured, and Singapore was the only cooperation, or try to forge ahead into the member state that gained any great financial security arena. Singaporean Foreign benefit. The pushed for issues Minister, S. Rajaratnam, stated that his such as tourism, shipping, fishing and intra- government believed ASEAN should stay regional trade to be considered by the first solely focused on economic cooperation in meeting of the ASEAN standing committee, Southeast Asia. Whereas Malik referred to hoping that these economic projects would Britain’s military withdrawal and a lead to closer involvement in regional prospective American disengagement as planning. However, four of the five cause for the member states to ‘induce us to founding members – Thailand, Malaysia, jointly consider policies in our effort to cope Indonesia, Philippines – had similar and with the new emerging situation.’ Thanat competed for agricultural economies and Khoman also mentioned security concerns, economic nationalism was expected to be a which was reiterated by the Malaysians, major hurdle for the new organization. stating that there was scope to work out Singapore was the country best suited some form of security arrangements and that economically to a regional arrangement. As member countries should take responsibility a result, the Australian Government’s for their region following any power assessment of the benefit of ASEAN was that vacuum left by departing Western forces it would carry more significance in the (Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, 1969). political rather than the economic sphere (Canberra to all posts, 1967). Indeed, this Fueling these security concerns was view was reflected in the outcome to internal the announcement in January 1968 of tension within the organization through Britain’s intention to withdraw all its Manila’s ongoing claim to Sabah that caused military forces from Southeast Asia by 1971 the breakdown of Philippine-Malaysian and U.S. President Nixon’s statement on the diplomatic relations in 1968. ASEAN island of Guam in July 1969 that the U.S. encouraged a resolution of the crisis and expected Asian nations to assume more Indonesia was given credit for acting as an responsibility for their defense. America effective mediator (Talking points for would keep all existing treaty commitments, meeting with Malik, by Kissinger, 24 but would not enter any new ones, unless September 1974). However, the approach they were vital to the interests of the U.S. In was essentially one of non-interference in the case of internal subversion in Asia, member disputes, reflecting the way ASEAN assistance from Washington would not be in tackled both external and internal pressures the form of troops, but development aid, through a philosophy of non-interference military equipment, and training (Record of and consensus (Tarling, 2006, p. 210). meeting between Wilson and Nixon, 1969).

Debate on the future role of ASEAN Later in the Philippines, Nixon emerged at a meeting of foreign ministers in nevertheless continued to stress the December 1969. The opening statements importance of economic development as a from some ministers revealed emerging vehicle for increased stability in Asia. In a issues on whether the organization would statement, the American President reiterated deal solely with economic and cultural U.S. was backing for the ADB saying that he had asked Congress to appropriate US$20 10 The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism

million for the ordinary capital of the ADB to Indonesia, Kissinger told Agnew that he and US$25 million to its special fund for the should stress that Jakarta’s pursuit of following fiscal year. He also stressed that regional economic policies and multilateral the Bank was an Asian institution with its economic aid approaches justified America’s headquarters in Asia and with a requirement aid program to Indonesia (Memo, Kissinger that 60 per cent of its capital must come from to Agnew, 1969). Indeed, by the end of 1969, Asia. While the U.S. and other non-Asian the administration in Washington had countries could play a role, the leadership of noticed that Asian nations were starting to the Bank must always come from Asia rely less on individual outside aid donors. (Nixon Statement, 1969). Then, a few weeks The Asian begin to rely more on multilateral later, Secretary of State William Rogers aid organizations such as the ADB and the supported Nixon’s position in a speech to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and that media in Canberra. He stressed that the Americans welcomed the creation of American policy in Asia would be to other Asian organizations based on Asian encourage Asian leaders to meet their own initiatives. Therefore, while the U.S. did not internal security needs with material want to interfere, it would be willing to assist assistance from the U.S. and to encourage multilateral and regional organizations ‘rapid economic development of the area where possible (Memo, East Asia and the with emphasis on increasing regional Pacific, 1969). cooperation’ (Rogers speech, 1969). Nixon publicly announced in January 1970 his The Changing Regional Scene proposal to ask Congress to authorize a Overall, the response of Southeast contribution of US$100 million to the ADB’s Asian leaders to Nixon’s comments was that Special Funds over a three-year period – they viewed the so-called Nixon Doctrine as US$25 million in the first fiscal year, and then a warning signal that the U.S. would US$35 million and US$40 million in the eventually disengage from the Asian following two fiscal years. He stressed that mainland and regional allies must assume since the ADB’s establishment, the bank had greater responsibility for their security. For made a major contribution to Asian some regional nations, the American policy economic development and that it provided announcement was in step with current a ‘unique capability for acting as a catalyst aspirations, such as Bangkok’s efforts to for regional cooperation’ (White House Press move towards a more independent foreign Statement, 1970). policy path and Manila’s wish to move However, officials American beyond the traditional image as an American Embassy in Singapore warned Washington strategic client (Acharya, 2012, p. 140). The that if Southeast Asian regionalism were to Australian Embassy in Manila reported that be successful, nations there must be sure that the Philippines appeared to be in favor of the U.S. would not abandon them (Singapore Southeast Asian nations becoming more self- to Washington, 1969). Kissinger too stressed reliant. Philippine President Marcos’s this position to the American Vice-President proposal for an Asian forum to ‘solve Asian in December 1969, before Spiro Agnew’s problems’ and his foreign secretary’s proposed to visit the region. During the visit references to Asian security arrangements indicated that Manila acknowledged the Journal of ASEAN Studies 11

changing role of future American facing any possible contingencies (Memo involvement in Southeast Asia and admitted 126, 1971). that the Philippines would become more involved regionally (Manila to Canberra, Malaysia’s reaction to Nixon’s 1970). declaration was to support bilateral relationships between countries of the region Thanat Khoman told the Australians but without treaty ties or another that he believed China would become a more institutionalization. This policy stemmed serious problem after the end of the war in from the announcement of not just the Nixon Vietnam and that countries in the region had Doctrine, but also the British intention to only two alternatives: either submit to China withdraw militarily. Kuala Lumpur’s doubts or unify and develop a front, which the about the utility of the newly formed Five- Chinese would have to accept. A pact was Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) not necessary for this purpose, instead of between Britain, Australia, New Zealand, regional cooperation based on mutual Singapore, and Malaysia, as well as limited understanding and self-interest was all that expectations of Australian and New Zealand was needed (Bangkok to Canberra, 1969). assistance (Kuala Lumpur to Canberra, However, a year later, the Thai Government 1970). seemed to recognize that regional cooperation alone would not provide in the Singapore’s response to the changed immediate future any prospect of an strategic environment was to build its alternative security backing. This defense forces, but these efforts were not a recognition was because of the disparity of direct reaction to the so-called doctrine, power between countries in the region, the although Singapore’s efforts for closer internal instability in most Asian nations and cooperation in defense matters with Bangkok’s reluctance to accept the risks that Malaysia could have been encouraged by it. would be involved in any new mutual However, since the British announcement, security arrangement. Nevertheless, Singapore had been building its military due regional cooperation potentially provided an to its geographical proximity to Malaysia opportunity for Thailand to supplement its and Indonesia (Singapore to Canberra, 1970). security alliance with the U.S. by The Indonesians seemed to accept underpinning political and economic ties much of what was outlined by Washington with its neighbors (NIC Note 4/70, 1970). and emphasized the need for extensive This assessment was made a few months foreign aid to counter the military weakness after Thailand secured additional financial of the countries in the region. In fact, the assistance from Washington. In August concept of increased economic development 1971, Nixon directed that a US$45 million to replace a foreign military presence suited special assistance packaged negotiated with the government in Jakarta that was quick to Bangkok to strengthen the Thai economy point out that Indonesia lacked the capacity and defense capabilities. The Americans to contribute to the joint defense and military hoped this would accelerate the security. Rather its priority was economic improvement of Thai armed forces development (Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, capabilities so that they might be capable of Singapore to Canberra, 1970). Nevertheless, 12 The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism

Indonesia became the beneficiary of an arms was out of regional altruism, Jakarta expanded U.S. military aid program when was extremely keen to secure funds for six C- Washington approved in March 1970 130 planes, and an M-16 rifle factory and contributions of approximately $15 million American officials noted that they might U.S. dollars per year – an increase of $10 have used their support for and participation million from the original budget (Kissinger in regional cooperation as part of their bid. memo for Secretary of State and Secretary of NSC staff member, John H. Holdridge raised Defense, 1970). Jakarta was hoping for yet that possibility with Henry Kissinger, before more and that the Americans would not adding that while there was still no depart any earlier than 1973 and would leave movement towards a regional security no security vacuum. Suharto sent General arrangement in Southeast Asia, ‘the Sumitro to Washington in July 1970 to ask for Indonesians might just be able to get things more military aid, and during discussions going’ (Memorandum, John H. Holdridge to with Nixon’s National Security Adviser, Kissinger, 1970). Nixon authorized an Henry Kissinger, he stressed that Indonesia increase in military aid to Indonesia to $18 was not yet a ‘real power’ and was still million for the 1971 fiscal year unable to take over the responsibility of (Memorandum, Holdridge and Kennedy to security in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the Kissinger, 1970). Indonesian Government had not intended to expand its armed forces before 1973, instead The Australian Government was also deciding to concentrate on economic hopeful that Jakarta would pursue a greater development and ‘sacrifice’ security for the interest in a collective security for Southeast sake of national reconstruction. Jakarta was Asia, despite Suharto’s preoccupation with worried that its neighbors – Thailand, the economy and internal disputes along Singapore, Philippines, and Malaysia – with the continuation of the Indonesian lacked the military power to withstand position of non-alignment. Malik’s efforts to potential internal instability, or stand up to arrange an international conference in intensive Soviet diplomacy. Besides, these Jakarta in 1970 on how to bring peace to Asian nations might turn to the Soviet side to Cambodia was the cause of these high hopes counter Chinese infiltration. Therefore, in Canberra. The officials believed that the Indonesia now had to develop strong armed Jakarta Conference on Cambodia revealed forces and hoped to acquire military the Indonesian Government’s willingness to supplies from Western Europe and the U.S. take a leading role in regional security (NIC (Memo of Conversation between Sumitro 1(70), 1970). and Kissinger, 1970). Kissinger responded Britain as well recognized the very positively to Sumitro, stating that, ‘we importance of Indonesia as an emerging recognized the Indonesian role, precisely leader in Southeast Asia. In 1971, the British what the Nixon Doctrine required Ambassador in Jakarta urged the British (Memorandum of Conversation between Government to acknowledge the growing Sumitro and Kissinger, 1970). importance of Indonesia to regional stability. Although the Americans did not He wrote to the Foreign Office that the long- presume that Indonesia’s request for more term security of British investments in Malaysia and Singapore depended on the Journal of ASEAN Studies 13

fortunes of Indonesia and hoped that concept, while the Indonesians, Thai, London would steadily increase its aid Filipinos, and Singaporeans showed their program there. Ambassador Combs felt that preference for a zone of peace, freedom and the Indonesians viewed their position in neutrality (NIC 124(72), 1972). Southeast Asia, as resident guarantors of stability in the region, were keen supporters These proposals first discussed at a of ASEAN and were increasingly likely to meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in take the lead on regional policies (Combs, to Kuala Lumpur in November 1971. At this Foreign Office, 1971). In early 1969, London venue, the Malaysians sought an agreement was providing £200 million a year on aid and that all foreign powers should be excluded technical assistance to the Far East. While from Southeast Asia, that the region should this support was mostly bilateral, the British not use as a theatre for international power placed a lot of emphasis on multilateral aid struggles, and that the great powers – the to Southeast Asia and the opportunities it U.S., Soviet Union, and China – would presented for regional cooperation. In doing guarantee this. This proposal was so had played a role in many regional bodies unacceptable to the four other such as the Colombo Plan, the ADB, the representatives at the meeting. They did not Mekong Committee, and the specialized want to see a certain reference to institutions of the UN (Speech, Maclehosesp, ‘neutralization’ or great power guarantees. 1969). The meeting’s declaration reflected this. In the end, the meeting stated that the ASEAN The Zone of Peace, Freedom and nations would make all necessary efforts to Neutrality enable Southeast Asia to be recognized as a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality that As the level of American and British was free from any form of interference by military involvement in Southeast Asia outside powers. The regional nations would declined, the five ASEAN countries started also make every effort to increase to pay closer attention to political and cooperation amongst themselves (Canberra security issues. However, each of these to Australian posts, 1972). nations had different security arrangements. Thailand and the Philippines were members However, each member state had of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization different aspirations regarding security in (SEATO), and the Philippines had a security Southeast Asia and their existing bilateral treaty with the U.S., Malaysia, and Singapore relationships. For the Malaysians, ZOPFN were members of the FPDA. Indonesia had was a means to achieve domestic security no security deals but shared joint-military without cooperative arrangements with non- arrangements with Malaysia. Nevertheless, regional or regional states (NIC 303(74), there was a new attitude towards a 1974). For the other four ASEAN nations, reassessment of past policies and practices in external security guarantees still viewed as an aim to seek more regional independence. necessary. Thailand and the Philippines As a result, ideas of some neutral area continued to place importance on the U.S. as presented as a solution to the changed their main protecting power. Singapore, security environment in Southeast Asia. The with an economy oriented to manufacturing Malaysians proposed a neutralization and exporting, on the other, hand believed 14 The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism

its interests were best served by an open- Despite the signings of ZOPFAN, door policy for all the great powers, and not and an agreement in 1973 to establish a only one powerful ally. Indonesia saw itself Permanent ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, as playing an independent role in the region, Washington felt pressure from within which involved encouraging its neighbors to Southeast Asia. Notably, Thailand and the strengthen their security systems as well as Philippines, retain SEATO as a symbol of practice closer regional cooperation. At the American presence in the region during its same time, Jakarta also placed a lot of transitional period of disengagement reliance on its relationship with the U.S. for (Buszynsky, 1981, pp. 287-296). However, both economic assistance and a guarantee of Bangkok and Manila did agree to abandon regional security (NIC 124(72), First Draft, the military component of SEATO in 1972). response to Australian and New Zealand pressure on Washington to downgrade the By 1973, ZOPFAN continued to exist alliance as a price of their continued as a mere statement of intent rather than any membership. concrete framework. Indonesia, especially, was in no hurry to see the implementation of The issue of a changing role for the neutralization proposal because of its SEATO raised during a meeting with Nixon wish for a continued U.S. military presence and the SEATO General Secretary, General (Memo, Kissinger to Ford, 1975). Singapore Sunthorn, just days before the September also supported American military presence 1973 SEATO Council meeting. During the in the region and during a visit to the U.S. in former, when Sunthorn suggested that March 1973, Lee Kuan Yew emphasized the SEATO could play a future role in benefits to achieving the long-term objective supplementing bilateral aid programs in of a quadripartite balance between U.S., Asia, Nixon replied, ‘that can give meaning Soviet Union, Japan and Western naval to the organization. The military is very forces. In turn, the neutralization concept important, but this is also helpful’ (Memo of did not appear to be a factor severely conversation, President Nixon and General affected by the U.S. military planning in the Sunthorn, 1973). At the 18th SEATO Council region, nor did it halt the flow of American meeting of 28 September 1973, all delegates economic and military assistance (NIC agreed to abolish the military structure of 57(73), 1973). Indeed, ZOPFAN reflected the SEATO, except military exercises. changes taking place in Southeast Asia that the ASEAN nations were unable to Canberra’s pressure to downgrade influence, as they were unable to agree on SEATO reflected the regional policy aims of what would be the future role of the external the Australian Prime Minister, Gough powers (Narine, 1998, pp. 198-201). Towards Whitlam. When he first came to office in the end of the decade, the Malaysians had 1972, Whitlam endorsed proposals for lost interest in the concept, as had the other neutralization of the Indian Ocean and ASEAN member states (Response to Southeast Asia, sought to withdraw Proposed Parliamentary Question, 1977). Australian forces from Vietnam, praised the Guam Doctrine and Nixon’s moves towards Diversification détente with China and the Soviet Union, and showed little support for the FPDA or Journal of ASEAN Studies 15

SEATO. For Whitlam, supporting regional Southeast Asian nations. During the 1975 cooperation would be one of the main Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, the discussion elements of Australia’s foreign policy for the was dominated by the implication of the 1970s with less emphasis on military pacts political changes in Indochina. Ministers (Briefing Paper, 1974). This increased expressed optimism and caution and emphasis on regionalism and cooperation concluded that the war’s end provided hope between the superpowers led to calls from for securing peace, progress, and stability in Whitlam to propose an Asian and Pacific Southeast Asia and decided to initiate organization that would eventually include friendly relations with the Indochina nations China’s membership. The idea would be to (Draft Paper, 1975). bring the Asia-Pacific nations closer without the interference of the major powers (The At the first meeting of Heads of Hobart Mercury, 1973). Such an ASEAN governments in Bali in February organization was not supposed to replace 1976, members reiterated the commitment to SEATO, ASPAC or ASEAN, nor was it to the organization and at a subsequent transform these organizations. Rather, meeting of economic ministers; the Whitlam attempted to propose new ideas agreement reached on the establishment of about regional cooperation (Letter, Paris to an industry in each member country where Canberra, 1973). there would be joint equity participation that would be developed to benefit the region. The Singaporeans also had visions of The Philippines then suggested the other regional groupings. Rajaratnam told establishment of an ASEAN common his Australian counterpart during a meeting market; however, this proposal was only in Canberra in November 1973 that while a supported by Singapore. Instead, long-term objective for his government was discussions commenced on whether to set a larger regional group, this would come up a system of preferential tariffs. By the about with the assistance of the formation of mid-1970s, ASEAN members had also some smaller sub-regional groupings. started cooperating closely in international Suggestions for these sub-groups were the bodies, coordinating votes at the UN and possibility of a smaller organization made of representations to the European Economic up of Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand and Community (EEC) on economic matters Papua New Guinea, and creating a group for (Response to Proposed Parliamentary the four Commonwealth countries in the Question, 1977). Significantly, member region. These groups would run alongside states obtained from the EEC recognition of ASEAN and the FPDA, strengthening ASEAN as one region and preferential access Southeast Asian unity (Record of to certain commodities into EEC markets, Conversation, Rajaratnam and Willesee, strengthening relations between the two 1973). regional blocs (Jakarta to Canberra, 1974). ASEAN also pursued external economic The End of the War in Vietnam support from wider regional states, security some joint economic cooperation projects The end of the war in Vietnam and with Australia, and seeking similar the withdrawal of American forces paved cooperation with New Zealand and Canada. the way to closer cooperation between some 16 The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism

Japan also started expressing a willingness to After the second summit meeting of undertake joint economic ventures with the ASEAN heads of Government in Kuala regional group, despite earlier refusals to do Lumpur on 1977, ASEAN leaders so (Jakarta to Canberra, 1974). maintained the level of cooperation in economic areas and took steps to increase Despite closer cooperation cooperation in cultural and social fields. One economically and diplomatically, ASEAN of the most substantial areas of progress was member states continued, ten years after the in ASEAN’s external relations through association’s inauguration, to differ as for discussions with the Prime Ministers of whether ASEAN should pursue security Australia, Japan and New Zealand on objectives. Indonesia was one of the stronger common foreign policy and especially supporters of security cooperation amongst foreign economic policy. As Lee Kuan Yew members, but even Jakarta was concerned pointed out in his closing statement at the about the organization presenting an image meeting, ‘it is psychologically easier to deal of a defensive alliance. Thus, most military with ASEAN’s external partners than to sort cooperation in the region remained bilateral out intra-regional arrangements between the and at the 1976 ASEAN summit in Bali, partners themselves.’ These arrangements leaders agreed to continue to cooperate on are an indication that ASEAN nations would security matters, on a non-ASEAN basis continue to value both cooperation within (Memo, U.S. Interests, and Objectives in the the Association while maintaining their Asia-Pacific Region, 1976). external relationships (ASEAN Information Independence and non-alignment Paper, 1977). were a major goal for ASEAN members Conclusion regarding security cooperation; however, relations with Vietnam also shaped defense Policy objectives from inside the issues, as there was a consensus among the countries and outside of Southeast Asia member’s states not to confirm Vietnamese towards regional cooperation and security suspicions that ASEAN would become the had been developing since the end of the next SEATO. Hanoi’s position was that Second World War. Economic development while it was prepared to develop bilateral viewed as essential for containing relations with ASEAN member states, it was communist influence and preventing not willing to deal with ASEAN as an internal insurgencies in the region. Regional Association. In turn, the Southeast Asian cooperation was one way of providing member nations in ASEAN, despite financial assistance to newly independent increased cooperation within the nations without the appearance of foreign organization as well as continued interference in regional affairs. The aim for aspirations for independence and non- many of the countries involved in Southeast alignment, sought continuing American Asian regionalism was that growth and involvement in their region as a deterrent to prosperity would come through regional the Soviet Union and Chinese strategic development programs with external ambitions as well as Japanese economic support. This program would then expand domination (FCO paper, 1977). to some form of collective security led by the Southeast Asian nations themselves. This Journal of ASEAN Studies 17

policy started to gather pace during the security relations continued to be supported 1950s and 1960s. By the late 1950s, the U.S. by foreign powers. administration was strongly promoting the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the About Author Far East as one of the most important Dr. Sue Thompson is a Senior multilateral groupings in promoting Lecturer at the National Security College in regional economic and social cooperation the Crawford School of Public Policy at the and development. In 1950, the U.S. Australian National University. Her focus of supported the development of the Mekong research examines the history of regional Basin as a long-range project to secure cooperation in Southeast Asia during the regional cooperation between Burma, Cold War with a focus on foreign power Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. In influences in the post-war evolution of the early 1960s, the U.S. tried to promote Southeast Asian regionalism. Dr. Thompson regional cooperation in Asia by urging closer has conducted extensive fieldwork in North Japanese relations with other countries in the America, Europe, and Southeast Asia and is region, initially through the Association of currently working on her second sole- Southeast Asia. Key to this plan was the role authored book on this topic. Dr Thompson that the regional nations would play completed her Ph.D. from the School of themselves. For Western countries, regional Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the cooperation not only potentially provided a University of London in the United vehicle for containing communism in Asia, Kingdom. She holds a Master’s degree from but the policy presented an alternative the London School of Economics and a security system in replace of Western Bachelor degree with honours from the military bases. Southeast Asian nations Australian National University. themselves supported closer regional integration as a means of containing Chinese References communist influences and for countering the decline of Western military support. The Primary Source Archival Material inauguration of ASEAN paved the way for a formal regional association to bring some Letter, H.V. Evatt to Nelson T. Johnson, 24 Southeast Asian nations together, and February 1944, A989, 44/735/168/20, although the organization’s initial aim was NAA & Cablegram, Bruce to Curtin, claimed to be socioeconomic collaboration, 10 November 1944, political factors such as the promotion of A989,44/630/5/l/11/22, National regional peace and stability were present Archives of Australia (NAA). from the beginning. Therefore, while formal Memorandum, for Butterworth and Fisher, regional cooperation came directly out of 15 July 1949, Box 5, John F. Melby initiatives from Southeast Asian leaders, it Papers, China File, Publications, did not end continued Western financial General, Box 5, Harry S. Truman support to local institutions, nor did it end Library (HSTL). external bilateral security relationships. In the early years of ASEAN, Asian initiatives Memorandum, Secretary of State and towards economic development and Butterworth, 16 January 1950, John F. 18 The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism

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Minute, A.J. de la Mare to Mr. Samuel, 23 Administrative History of the Department of January 1967, FCO 15/18 and Foreign State during the Administration of Office Memorandum, July 1966, FO President Lyndon B. Johnson, 371/187566, The National Archives November 1963-January 1969, (United Kingdom) (TNA). Volume I, Administrative History, Department of State, Volume I, Administrative History of the Department of Chapters 7-9, Box 3, LBJL. State during the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, British Embassy in Washington Aide November 1963-January 1969, Memoire on The Western Position in Volume I, Administrative History, South East Asia, 13 February 1964, Department of State, Volume I, National Security File, Country File, Chapters 7-9, Box 3, Lyndon Baines Vietnam, Box 53, LBJL. Johnson Library (LBJL). Record of discussion between Rusk and Conversation between Ball and Talbot, 22 Stewart, 14 May 1965, FO 371/180439, February 1965, Papers of George W. TNA. Ball, Indonesia, National Security File, Box, 4, LBJL. Kuala Lumpur to Ottawa, 22 February 1966, FCO 15/18, TNA. Talking Points for Bundy from Chester L. Cooper on A Regional Development Memorandum, N. Pritchard to Lord Proposal for Southeast Asia, National Beswick, 20 May 1966, FO

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Rusk to Rev. Henry Van Dusen, 10 371/187564, TNA. September 1965, Central Policy Files Ropa to Rostow, 28 July 1966, Name File, 1964-66, Political Affairs and Ropa Memos, National Security File, Relations, RG 59, Box 1897, National Box 7, LBJL. Archives at College Park (NARA). Kuala Lumpur to London, 3 June 1966, FO Washington to Singapore, 23 November 371/187565, TNA. 1965, Box 1803, Central Policy Files 1964-66, Political Affairs and Jakarta to Washington, 27 May 1966, Foreign Relations, RG 59, Box 1803, NARA. Relations of the U.S. (FRUS) 1964-68, p. 432. Memorandum for Rostow from William J. Journal of ASEAN Studies 19

Record of meeting between Colin Jackson A9564, 221/4/16, NAA. MP, Tam Dalyell MP and General Suharto, 2 June 1966, PREM 13/1058, Canberra to all posts, 5 September 1967, TNA. A1838, 3004/13/21 Part 3, NAA.

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1 Redefining ASEAN Way

Redefining ASEAN Way: Democratization and Intergovernmental Relations in Southeast Asia.1

M. Faishal Aminuddin University of Brawijaya, Indonesia Joko Purnomo University of Brawijaya, Indonesia

Abstract

This paper reviews inter-state relations in Southeast Asia countries. Regionalism in Southeast Asia has been criticized on its limited achievement in political development, Political development in this region focuses more on nation’s interests than regional interests. Added to this, there is a lack of political channel outside formal government relations hinders political connectivity among Southeast Asian people.

The aim of this paper is threefold. Firstly, to analyze the pattern of political development in Southeast Asian region. Secondly, to assess the implication of using non-interference principle for maintaining political relations in Southeast Asian region and its contribution to the lack of political awareness regionally. Thirdly, to propose new political diplomacy concerned with promoting political awareness regionally.

This paper ends by providing an alternative type of political diplomacy by combining formal diplomacy actions done by state institution and informal diplomacy actions done by non-government actors. We point out an alternative strategy to promote political awareness in Southeast Asian community in the future. First, open policy to connecting the diplomatic based community. Second, optimize the regional cooperation with more concern with democracy and human rights issue. Third, building and institutionalizing political awareness through people participation.

Key words: regional cooperation, non-interference principal, political awareness, communitarian

.1This article was originally presented in The Third International Conference on Southeast Asia (ICONSEA 2009) at the University of Malaya by M. Faishal Aminuddin in the form of a paper entitled, “Political Awareness: Building Inter-government Relation in Southeast Asia Countries.”

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2017), pp. 23-36 DOI: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.962 ©2017 by CBDS Bina Nusantara University and Indonesian Association for International Relations ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic 24 Redefining ASEAN Way

taking place in Asia. First, political processes Introduction fail to build democracy as in South Korea and Taiwan and enforces consolidated Regionalism in Southeast Asia is autocracies in China, Laos, Singapore, and dominantly related to ASEAN. Since it was Vietnam. Second, there is unstable established over 50 years ago, it appears that autocracies occurred in Afghanistan, strategical position of ASEAN has not been Cambodia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and able to bring the significant form of mutual Thailand. Added to this, civil society understanding among the members. The organizations get significant pressure from positive achievement in terms of economic autocratic power and only a few among development within this region contributes those organizations who have political a minor progress in narrowing inequalities representation. BTI (2016) also found that between countries. Previously, economic countries with high economic growth, such growth within this region was followed by as Singapore and Vietnam showed that certain reduction of inequalities between political stability, strong government countries. There was also some progress in institutions, and tight administration control term of poverty alleviation. After the 1990s, are factors contribute to economic however, economic growth only facilitates transformation. Hence, there is a little the increase in inequalities between progress in flourishing democratization at Southeast Asia countries. Interestingly, the regional level. inequality within country shows different pattern. Inequality trends have diverged, The studies noted that the concept of with inequality rising in Indonesia and ASEAN way is a passive response and it falling in Thailand, Malaysia, and the tends to hinder the progress of Philippines; in part due to policy Efforts democratization. The ASEAN way is going (Jain-Chandra et al., 2016). In terms of into the debate and still unclear, hence, it internal mobility within this region, there is needs to get a more extensive explanation an intriguing interaction between people in (Haacke, 1999; Acharya, 2001). Other study Southeast Asia countries. A study shows that cited that the ASEAN way may represent the 97 per cent of the 6.5 million internal collective identity of ASEAN crystallized in migration in 2013 only circulates in three the principle of non-intervention or silent countries: Thailand, Malaysia, and diplomacy (Rüland, 2000; Nischalke, 2000). Singapore. In a more specific scale, of a total In some cases, however, the ASEAN way is of 88 per cent of internal migration, more than just the principle of non- connecting eight corridors (ILO & ADB, intervention. Some evidence depicts the 2014). success in the intervention of domestic conflicts such as in Cambodia (Goh, 2003). In the context of social and political Unfortunately, weak political intervention to matters, however, connectivity among foster democratization in this region only Southeast Asian people is very limited. This facilitates a hijack of the ASEAN Way led by circumstance exists because there is a lack of autocratic power. These are caused by the political channel caused by straight inclination of the state sovereignty and government policy. In the study of BTI (2016), there are two processes that are Journal of ASEAN Studies 25

policy priorities in maintaining domestic 2) explanation on the extension of the stability (Katsumata, 2003). boundaries of regionalism towards democratization pressure to create open Moreover, the achievement of regionalism; 3) designing the model of economic growth is not always followed by political awareness as an active concept of an increase in regional exchange to share non-intervention. democratic values. Studies on democratization showed findings varied. In Scoping Government Interaction Malaysia and Singapore, democracy runs within the strong-state authority, where the The intergovernmental relationship stability of the regime occurs due to its in Southeast Asian region comes into strong control over political activities (Slater, dynamics situation. It attracts scholars to 2012). On the other side, democratization in contribute to the theoretical discussion on Indonesia successfully reduces state regionalism perspective. Generally, authority but it also facilitates the rise of regionalism is interpreted as a policy and a oligarch (Hadiz & Richard Robinson, 2013). tremendous project where some actors from In general, there is no single factor that state or non-state engage in cooperative and causes stagnant democratization in this coordinate their common good for the region. Specific explanation of the region. Krasner (1983), stated that some difficulties of democracy establishment aspects have necessarily to be identified relies on the tradition of the political elites related to some norms, rules, and procedures who have a concern to dominate the political which may be met to the expectation of some system. Thus, democracy merely produces different actors. We argue that regionalism "elected autocrat" (Kurlantzick, 2012). in ASEAN is viewed as an interplay between political development, pseudo-nationalism, This paper will answer the question and closed regionalism. of: to what the extent the redefinition of ASEAN way should able to solve regional The important variable needs to be politics problem? We offer normative explored in the discussion of regionalism is assessment based on the cultural approach political development. Even though there to undertaking the ideal type of inter- are variations of political development governmental relationships in this region. within this region, but there is a tendency for We use the interpretive analysis on the centralizing political power as a model of concepts of forming the ASEAN cooperation political development. It can be seen in and undertake the theoretical review to Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore. The explain the compatibility of democracy in government authority had dominant control this region. in public life even though citizen is still given political space if not considered as national This paper consists of three stability threat. We argue that centralistic discussions, namely: 1) restrictive government-style with significant political conceptions on intergovernmental relations power is intended to create political analysis to obtain the possibility or subsistence aimed to ensure the stability of probability for interconnectivity amongst the domestic economy. Hence, political governments in politically sensitive issues; development in this region only focused 26 Redefining ASEAN Way

merely on country’s interests rather than Democratization, however, may contribute regional interests. to the structural political change in each country. Moreover, it also gives adequate This pattern of political development influenced pressure for the pattern of continued until the early of the 1990s. regional relationship, especially inter- Afterward, regionalism became a well- political agencies. Democratization provides known issue which discussed since the a great opportunity for replacing state-centric shifting of worldwide power constellation. model that puts the state as a center for all ASEAN regionalism was reconstructed to the interaction. Ideally, democratization become tether of expectation for within regionalism becomes a part of the strengthening government control capacity. political commitment to fight against The expansion form of ASEAN consultation authoritarian style in domestic politics with other state or regional cooperation whether by self-modality based on domestic counterpart had significance only to capacity and capability or by using stronger improve regional economic development. By power from the outside. the expansion of Japan and China, it had a possibility to transform larger regional State-centric model came from the economic agenda, namely Asian economic definition extended by Weberian that gave agenda. This kind of action, however, is larger space for the optimization of state inadequate for developing the democratic authority. General view concerning the role pattern in Southeast Asian region. Two of the state puts the government as the explanations on this matter. Firstly, superior political agency. To control Southeast Asian economic actors do not have extensively, the authority requires the any specific interest to ensure the existence of internal loyalty and external establishment of democracy because they are acknowledgment. Hence, the state should more interested to expand their business not only act for their interest but should also outside Southeast Asian region due to its represent the interest of others outside the economic advantages. Secondly, China and government. It can be stated that decision Japan also have limited attention on the making process within the state is an arena political matter during its economic of many interests and the results represent expansion in Southeast Asian region. China the dynamic interaction amongst them has strong desire to become the center of (Moravcsik, 1999). regional corporation in Asia (Wunderlich, 2008). The tendency to secure its energy From this perspective, the model of security and market expansion, however, state authority influences the behavior of its makes China does not put significant governmental regime. Governmental attention to political development in Asia. behavior has its scope and can be divided into bilateral and multilateral. A bilateral Southeast Asian region has an relationship is developed both with opportunity to increase political countries within region and countries development rapidly. It can be ignored that outside regions. While a multilateral there are difficulties to maintain its political relationship is developed both with regional development related to the problem of countries and different regional countries. establishing democratization. Both of those stages become natural fence Journal of ASEAN Studies 27

which indicates that the government has highly obvious that the type of regional limited scope for territory and sovereignty. integration only concerns with institutional policy and behavior, but it has less connected Another variable which needs to be with people’s interests, namely observed is the “network establishment” in democratization with specific values the regional cooperation. Domestic regime embedded within ASEAN society. commonly brings function as motivator or catalyst for strengthening relationship The concept of regionalism in Asia within the jurisdictional region. The pattern needs to be viewed as a representation of of organized network provides sufficient ASEAN value, namely communitarian. stability which indicates non-hierarchical Moreover, democratization is considered as and interdependent attitude. Moreover, it is specific value embedded in ASEAN society. also connecting various actors who share Domestic politics that becomes a threat to the high mutual interest and trust as a sign of institutionalization of democracy is togetherness. This kind of cooperation with important to get an attention. Undoubtedly, collective purpose achievement considered there are some countries who had an as an ideal type of regionalism (Börzel, 1997). unsteady political situation. The process of Hence, regionalism should be viewed as a democratization faces significant challenges complex and multi-facet process involving as it can be seen in Kampuchea, Laos, and both formal and informal integration Vietnam. On these countries, build the supported by networks from government commitment for integrating democracy with and society. domestic politics is not an easy task to be done. We argue that the participation of Democratization and Regionalism: A ASEAN in the process of democratization in Crossing Boundaries their members will give significant contribution to the deepening democratic Regionalism has limited attention to spirit in that countries. Moreover, it can integrating the regional interest with the reduce the participation of external actors promotion of democracy. Regional such the United States or European countries integration tends to consider more on to involve in domestic politics within economic, social and cultural aspects and has ASEAN countries. a limited action to bring the spirit of democracy when dealing with domestic We need to consider that there is no politics. It is very important to change the homogeneous political culture in the region. essence of regionalism where economic As it can be seen from the polarization of interests are superior than commitment on state political institution that is divided in democratization. Added to this, ASEAN the form of absolute monarch, constitutional gives limited interest to strengthen the inter- monarch, republic, socialist and junta citizen relationship to spread democratic military. Meanwhile, governmental values. Consequently, ASEAN has lost its structure is also varied, namely: presidential, opportunity to create reciprocal dialogue to parliamentary, Leninist, and military broader political issues. It is not surprise that dictator. Clark Neher and Ross Marlay ASEAN is viewed as an elite integration (1995) classify this region into four categories rather than people integration. Hence, it is in term of democratic scales: semi- 28 Redefining ASEAN Way

democracy, semi-authoritarian, structure and kinship containing a set of authoritarian based on citizen participation, mutual share principle and doing something electoral competition and civil freedom. for a community (Inoguchi, 1998). Political Democratic implementation which has culture in the Southeast Asia is closely electoral competition and civil freedom is related to kinship system that influences the relatively well known in Indonesia, shape of interaction or inter-institutional Philippines, and Thailand. relationship. Personal figure is very important for the whole process for taking Even though some countries show decision. Fukuyama (1995) described an positive performance to accept the example like in China which strictly democracy, it does not mean that there are develops the greatness of family. limited political obstacles in those countries. Attempts of the military coup, political Specifically, in the Southeast Asia, it competition among elites, local resistances seems that the personal trust exceeds social and separatism are among potential trust. It needs a new formulation where the problems faced by countries such as combination between colleague trust and Indonesia, Philippine, and Thailand. In other formal regulation of political institution is words, serious political problems still exist, established. Regional integration needs to even though democracy is also flourishing. take into accounts the urgency of using the With this circumstance, it gives relevance for basic value of society when establishing ASEAN to strengthen its contributions to regional policy and behavior. Marsh (ed. democracy with the spirit of ASEAN: 2006) mentioned that Malaya cultural communitarianism. background is less influence compared to China cultural background to governmental Expanding spectrum of behavior. On the contrary, other aspects such democratization will bring a better as ideology, whether it is liberal democracy consequence for the intergovernmental or authoritarian, influences more (Blondel, process of negotiation. Democratization Sinnott, & Svensson, 1998). Hence, model is not homogenous. It needs to establishing connectivity by strengthening represent and accommodate political colleague trust as a manifestation of cultural tradition. Hence, it allows variety of values as an important aspect of developing domestic political management in each regional policy and behavior is very country. One good example is what important action to be done. happened in Myanmar. The crisis was handled by two things: regional cooperation The design of communitarian through ASEAN participation and public democracy that is accommodating local awareness regarding humanitarian issues. values is essential for ASEAN. The act of regional institution combined with Communitarian democracy differs with people awareness and participation are western liberal democracy in terms of potentially reducing the crisis. providing space for local wisdom-cultural values, instead of abandoning these values. Democratization with Asian values It is expected that by using local wisdom- may be used as a moral reference that is cultural values that embrace the sense of formed by the characteristic of social communitarian, democratization in region Journal of ASEAN Studies 29

and promoting regional-based conflict issues occurred in one country becomes very resolution for any political dispute within minimum, even though the political issues ASEAN are truly established. The sense of may affect other countries or regional communitarian among people will develop stability. This kind of diplomacy leads to substantially if connectivity does exist. To be political ignorance between ASEAN on that stage, we need to consider, what we members and it reduces mutual call, “political awareness”. ASEAN understanding between countries. We community needs to consider opening more cannot ignore that non-interference principal extensive opportunity for instituting is chosen by considering sociocultural political instruments, where the regional aspects embedded in Southeast Asian political institutions may be used for society. The implementation of this supporting the design of political awareness. principal, however, should also consider the Civilian also has a good experience to importance of responsiveness among others manage a better integration, not only in the about the political problems that can economic field but also in sociopolitical significantly influence regional politics. policy and regional security (Bersick & Pasch, 2007). Second, the regional intercommunity relationship has already been formed but Designing Political Awareness limited action has been done to foster this society relationship to strengthen regional We view the concept of political connectivity among ASEAN people. awareness as an awareness of citizens to Domestically, network of non-government accept a concept of political action and the organization (NGOs) is flourishing. results of the political process. Political Regionally, the connectivity between NGOs awareness has a direct impact on certain tends to focus on specific issues related to the aspects such as the political action of citizens concern of NGOs but it gives less attention to and their political behavior which is strengthen political awareness and political dependent on the intake and supply of dialogues. In other words, a potential asset political information (Zaller, 1990). that already exists between civil society to create connectivity among civil society is Political awareness is an urgent ignored. agenda needed to be strengthened in ASEAN. There are reasons for it. First, each Third, the regional corporation that government tends to strengthen regional strongly relies on non-interference principal diplomacy by not having interfered with provides complexity when defining which domestic problems faced by other ASEAN problems needed to tackle domestically and members as an act of implementing the which problems that needs regional principle of non-interference. Human rights attention and actions. This complexity gives violation in Papua, Rohingya persecution in dis-incentive for ASEAN to maintain Myanmar, and the arrest of pro-democracy regional interest and become important activists in Malaysia, as examples, did not actors within regions. As a result, ASEAN bring significant political attention does not use the opportunity to foster inter- regionally. Consequently, attention between country relationship by using its unique ASEAN members toward some political 30 Redefining ASEAN Way

cultural and traditional ASEAN values to On the other side, no country has the tackle domestic problems. courage to bring domestic political issues to become regional political issues. The Political issues slant Southeast Asian problem is that this situation is worsened by countries can compare into two scales. It the increase in political cooperation between particularly appears during the last second ASEAN state members and external actors decade, facilitated by the increase of such as developed country and other worldwide political escalation and the multilateral cooperation beyond the regional spread of these issues through transnational boundary. Thus, regional politics in this channels. The first scale is regional issue, region is picturized by political ignorance which emerges as the effect of global and political dependence into external actor interaction. After the 9/11, this region takes a outside the region such as China, USA, and significant attention to war against terrorism Russia. This article tries to bring the attention programs sponsored by the USA under of the limited political awareness among President George W. Bush. This agenda ASEAN member. Moreover, this article also results to the domino effect toward the reviews the recent political value of this existence of transcultural communities region that too much rely on non-interfere within this region due to the idea of principal. Specific attention is given to the polarization and stigmatization between issue of political awareness between radical and non-radical community or countries which is politically abandoned. terrorist and non-terrorist organization. There is an urgent need to emphasize The second scale is domestic political awareness in the way ASEAN government issue contributing to the members construct their diplomacy. It is an regional stability. There is a fluctuation urgent action to put political awareness as a relationship among countries in Southeast spirit of cultural and political diplomacy. Asian region, especially when it comes to the The concept of political awareness refers to bilateral relationship. Pursuing its national the establishment of space for mutual interests rather than promoting mutual understanding among countries which are understanding among ASEAN member is not only concentrated on domestic issues but becoming the picture of the bilateral also extend to some issues across the country relationship. Moreover, there is a tendency in logical reason and boundary. Political of conducting political ignorance when it awareness insists to each country for having comes to the political issues of one country. an equal responsibility in a mutual Separatist issue occurred in Pattani, understanding frame, concerning with the Southern Thailand; Papua, Indonesia; and need of promoting and protecting regional Moro, Philippines is only viewed as internal democratization. Thus, a mutual controlling matters and does not bring more attention to dynamic for each country may have build regional collaborative act to solve the maximum power to put the position of each problems. ASEAN is seen to do anything but country as balancing force against political ignorance. It can be stated that ASEAN unstableness. provides limited incentives for bringing truly intergovernmental interaction in the Using a case of Spratley Archipelago, political matter. a territorial dispute between some ASEAN Journal of ASEAN Studies 31

countries and China, we can see that the actors from outside region. Eliminating maintenance of political stability in this external pressure and infiltration will be region is ignoring the importance of seeking additional benefits from this action. a solution by maximizing the role of ASEAN to involve actively in regional politics. In the Second, facilitate the connectivity positive side, the involvement of external between economic actors, especially to actor outside ASEAN gives contribution for maximize regional market. Regional market problem resolution by forming partner for within ASEAN country provides benefits dialogue. While from the negative side, the mainly for big corporations especially when external environment affects cohesion of each economic actor only focuses in their ASEAN policy itself (Yoshimatsu, 2006). own domestic market. ASEAN corporations More importantly, the role of ASEAN is tend to choose international market than dominated by the active role of external develop market within ASEAN territory due actors. Hence, political stability in this region to economic advantage’s consideration. A at some degree has significant dependency new type of regional economic connectivity, on external actors rather than internal actors. especially done by small and medium Important assessment regarding this issue enterprises could bring positive progress not came from Emmers (2003), he evaluated that only in terms of economic benefits but also ASEAN had its own way in resolving its social benefits. Connectivity between different problems in every case and for each economic actors will develop a better member. There is no legal mechanism which understanding of others led to the allow to approach each problem by using collaborative work for maximizing regional dialogue effort for achieving collective market for ASEAN’s economic actors. consensus. The main frame for this Third, build a stronger altruism spirit. consensus is national sovereignty and non- We cannot ignore that each country has inference politics in the domestic matter. domestic problems that potentially becomes Consequently, the desire to maintain their regional problems. Abu Sayyaf group in domestic interests rather than regional Philippine, as an example, tends to be interests is obvious. With this situation, each viewed as the domestic problem in country does not want to be politically tied, Philippine rather than an embryo for thus, they become an unpredictable agent. regional problems faced by all ASEAN We are emphasizing alternative member. Being selfish and ignore each other pathways to strengthen the work of ASEAN. - as the best action of the ASEAN way-, First, develop the network among non-state however, is only postpone the development actors. Civil societies in Southeast Asian of problems. It needs urgent attitude change region need to strengthen its communication among countries to put concern for the other and collaboration regionally. Cultural interests. bonding as an Asian people can be used to Fourth, reduce the dependency to strengthen solidarity and trust among Asian external actors outside ASEAN to solving people. This network can be expected to local or regional problems. There is a perform the significant collaborative action tendency where involving external actors, to solve regional problems instead of invite mainly powerful countries, is the first 32 Redefining ASEAN Way

reaction among ASEAN countries rather less significant role. A new form of approach than relying on inviting ASEAN to solve needs to be offered. ASEAN members need domestic problems. Terrorism, illegal to be pushed to create a closer cooperation migration, drug trafficking problems, and and formulate policy collectively. As territory dispute as it is shown at South happened in Kampuchea in the 1980s or China Sea are some examples of that ASEAN reconciliation mission in East Timor, tendency. Strengthen trust and commitment both change political mindset, particularly in among ASEAN countries and between the concept of autonomy and self- ASEAN countries with other counterparts to government (Vatikiotis, 2006). settle problems using peaceful and durable solution as it already undertakes when The regional issue needs to be announcing the Declaration on The Conduct resolved by considering the expectation of of Parties in The South China Sea (DOC) be the people in this region. Cooperation and implemented seriously. consultation which bring mutual benefit among the countries involved in the issues Neighboring Partnership may influence the type of solution. Cultural similarity in ASEAN community is Has government realized what they commonly considered have a significant should do in neighboring life? This simple power in searching for the solution. One question has a significant implication for the example for this is in the effective conflict improvement of regional cooperation, resolution based on cooperative principle. It whether it is represented by ASEAN as might be traced from what was stated by the regional cooperation institution or another Indonesian ex-minister of foreign affairs in initiative in the relationship of 1979 concerning with communicatively intergovernmental. Focused on ASEAN, the conflict resolution (Anwar, 1994). The same issue of well-neighboring concept is still thing may be known from Ghazali Shafi’e problematic. Pursuing their internal benefits who commented in Malaysia that collective when conducting diplomatic matters rather cultural inheritance was spirit of than regional benefits is one explanation for togetherness in a big kampong this situation. Moreover, ASEAN country (village/country) of Southeast Asia. Estrella tends to choose bilateral relationship to gain Solidum from the Philippines underlined expected benefits due to its less complexity ASEAN way is consistent with the cultural than regional relationship. Bilateral elements that every member of ASEAN has. relationship that always emphasizes more ASEAN way is viewed as process of taking on internal benefits among two countries policy based on consultation and consensus, conducted relationship is an advantage informally, non-confrontation and collective behind that choice. benefit (Acharya, 2001).

One of the basic things strictly Indeed, the establishment of observed is that conflict resolution model in supranational organization in Southeast ASEAN is less powerful. The cause relates to Asia has limited prospect or better future. the very strong nationalist politics in each There are three main reasons for that. First, country. Hence, the intergovernmental historically, there is no political authority organization such regional organization play that dominantly governs to this region. The Journal of ASEAN Studies 33

second is ideological reason, where on reducing in consensus’s effectiveness. nationalism becomes the main trigger to the Without that, well-established cooperation emergence of resistance against colonialism. and the optimization of the result of Hence, nationalism exceeds regionalism. cooperation among ASEAN members will be Lastly, until now there is no country who far away to be reached. wants to play powerfully as regional leaders. ASEAN form which is static and with no A legal and formal cooperative political integrated orientation should be framework is extremely needed. tested for the next further period. Political International law should also need to dynamics of intercountry relationship in this become compulsory. Consensual and region is extremely influenced by external political approaches in regional relationship pressure. On the other side, the within ASEAN, however, must be accumulation of domestic issues in this strengthened to maintain positive region until now does not come up with an achievement. It is functioned for covering effective resolution, yet. the impasse of formal diplomatic line or limited negotiation toward some exertions A space for discussing various kind or services that are involving the interest of of governmental interest, not only in the case country beyond the region. of giving protection for the citizen but also for national interest, maybe accommodated Collectivity and caring one with in special diplomatic action which is another should not be considered as part of considering another country as part of one’s aggressiveness toward each other. strategic partnership cooperation. Strategic With this new understanding, involving in partnership cooperation is needed to be one country’s matter should not be viewed strengthened to gain better understanding as an act of interfering with the domestic and perception among countries. issue of one country. On the other side, proactive offer should also be provided in Another framework which has better the incidental cases that need urgent opportunity in the context of regional responses. cooperation is a neighboring partnership. Philosophical background of this framework Conclusion comes from some positive elements in closer ASEAN is unique regional social life. Neighbor is a part of someone cooperation. There is some achievement in closer life. In Southeast Asian society economic development in this region, tradition, collectivity becomes a foundation however, regional integration provides little of interfamily interaction, however, it has benefits in terms of political development. not hit the boundary of privacy for each The principle of non-interference as a code of territory. conduct for maintaining regional diplomacy Implementation of neighborhood reduces significantly a political awareness to partnership needs a precondition that the political matters. Therefore, political should be fulfilled by each country. Low connectivity among Southeast Asian trust among countries within ASEAN is countries is limited. needed to be minimalized due to its impacts 34 Redefining ASEAN Way

This paper has opened a space for research focuses on globalization and further discussion as an attempt to design international development. Currently, he both formal and informal field for conducts research related to border affairs intercountry regional relationship. A within Southeast Asia region. significant recommendation from this article is to review non-interference concept of References ASEAN since it only results to a deferment Acharya, A. (1997). Ideas, identity, and of conflict explosion. In addition, Future institution‐building: From the agenda on implementing democracy based ‘ASEAN way’ to the ‘Asia‐Pacific on communitarian tradition must be the way’? The Pacific Review, 10(3), 319- principal regional agenda to support the 346. implementation of neighborhood partnership model. With this proposal, it is Acharya, A. (2001). Constructing a security expected that political awareness among community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN people in Southeast Asian region replaces and the problem of regional order. political ignorance embedded within non- Routledge. interference principle. Connectivity, that is the heart of regional integration, then, is no Andersson, A. E., Harsman, B., & Quigley, J. longer an illusion. M. (Eds.). (1997). Government for the future: Unification, fragmentation, and About the Authors regionalism. New York: Elsevier.

M. Faishal Aminuddin is a lecturer at Anwar, D. F. (1994). Indonesia in ASEAN: the Department of Politics, Government, and Foreign policy and regionalism. International Relation (DPGIR) at University Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. of Brawijaya. Currently, he serves as Director of Portsmouth-Brawijaya Centre for Bersick, S., & Pasch, P. S. (2007). Südostasien: Global Health, Population, and Policy (PB zur Zukunft der deutschen Centre), an Indonesia-U.K. research Außenbeziehungen. In Kompass 2020 institution based in University of - Deutschland in den internationalen Portsmouth (U.K.) and University of Beziehungen: Ziele, Instrumente, Brawijaya. He studied political science at Perspektiven. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert- the Universität Heidelberg, Germany. His Stiftung. research focuses on comparative politics and Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2016). Bertelsmann democratization in emerging countries. Transformation Index Report. Joko Purnomo is a lecturer at the Retrieved from: https://www.bti- Department of Politics, Government, and project.org/en/reports/regional- International Relations (DPGIR) University reports/asia-and-oceania. of Brawijaya. Since 2017, he serves as Head Blondel, J., Sinnott, R., & Svensson, P. (1998). of Government Studies Program at DPGIR, People and Parliament in the European Univesity of Brawijaya. He got his Master’s Union: Participation, democracy, and degree in International Development from legitimacy. Oxford University Press. Flinders University, Australia in 2008. His Journal of ASEAN Studies 35

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The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda

Leni Winarni Sebelas Maret University, Indonesia

Abstract

Regarding Southeast Asia as a multi-ethnic region, this paper attempts to examine about why Buddhist Community turns into religious violence against Rohingya people in the State of Rakhine (formerly known as Arakan). Through understanding the triggers of conflicts, this paper applies historical perspective to analyze why ethnic-religious conflict occur nowadays between Buddhist and Rohingya Muslim in Myanmar. This paper also discusses how history has influenced the construction of the government’s policy under a military regime to exclude Rohingya. However, the ethno-religious conflict is either an indication of a weak state or failure state in managing diversity.

Key words: ethnic-religion violence, Muslim Rohingya, Buddhist Rakhine, state’s role

Introduction Throughout history, the conflict between Rohingya Muslim in the north The challenges that newly and Rakhine Buddhist in the South of independent state faces in the post-colonial Rakhine state are much influenced by their period are not only on how to manage relationship in the past. Although it is diversity but also how to maintain the classic, the history has created a pattern of stability of a nation-state based on a conflict which is accumulated in the nationalism. Southeast Asia is the society and has constructed their portrayal of the “melting pot” with its perspectives about the others. Moreover, mixed ethnic identity and religious this can also be used to analyze why the diversity among them. It is the place where government leads the primordialist issue most of its unification is an agreement as a reason to maintain stability within the resulting after the colonial states left at the state. Thus, history is one main factor to end of World War II. Meanwhile, the construct the ethnic-religious conflict in mixed community has also caused another Myanmar today. Even though, Aung San problem, which revolves around minority Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy and majority. Rather than examining the (NLD) won the elections in 2015 and her problem of diversity, this paper will focus victory is a way to democracy, but in the on explaining why the Rohingya Muslim case of the Rohingya, the task will not be and Rakhine Buddhist often involve in easy. these conflicts compared to other ethnic groups in Myanmar throughout its historical perspective.

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2017), pp. 37-50 DOI: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.1812 ©2017 by CBDS Bina Nusantara University and Indonesian Association for International Relations ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic 38 The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda

Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Rohingya has Muslims- Sunni. In his book, Pagodas Minahan also stated that according to Bamar Historian “…the term ‘Rohingya’ did Many centuries ago, Hinduism is not appear until the 1950s when it was coined the most dominant religion in the Rakhine by Bengali Muslim migrants who had settled in Kingdom and Buddhism took its place in the Rakhine region during the colonial the 500 BCE. After around 710 CE, Islam period…” (Minahan, 2012). On the contrary, reached the state (Saw, 2011; Sakinada, another literature claims that the Rohingya 2005). According to Minahan (2012) in the community has settled in that region for a book entitled Ethnic Groups of South Asia long period before it was under the British and the Pacific: An Encyclopedia, Islam’s colonial rule. arrival has embraced many of the former Buddhist, Hindu, and animist population. The historical background of When Bengal was under Muslim rule in Arakan seems close to the conflict. In 1785, 1213, Muslim’s influence was greatly Burman soldiers have attacked Arakan developed in Arakan (Minahan, 2012) one brutally resulting to the destruction of the other hand, Bamars or Burmans mosques, libraries, and cultural disposed the king of Arakan in 1404. institutions (Jonassohn & Björnson, 1998). During the same period, Buddhism The Burman monarchy attempts to clean became the most influential and up those who were considered as “the ascertained religion which can be seen in other” or has non-Burmese origins. In the the later period of Rakhine kings who were efforts to appall the memories of Burmese all Buddhists (Gibson, James, & Falvey, brutality, the Rohingya community 2016). Another fact of Rakhine State is that welcomed the British in Arakan and it was for many centuries there has been relations during the colonial rule that they received made between the Muslims in Bengal and political rights and economic autonomy. In the Kingdom of Arakan. When Arakan was 1937, the British separated Arakan from the independent in the 15th and 16th century, Indian empire which causes the Rohingya this region was ruled by both Buddhists community’s regress into its previous and Muslims (Ursula, 2014). situation; living in fear and insecurity.

According to Minahan (2012), In 1942, the Japanese forces have Rohingya was also known as Ruainggas, reached Rakhine and made that area as a that is part of Indo-Aryan ethnic group. He front line until the end of the Second World stated that there are other Rohingya War. During 1942-43, both Muslims and communities spreading out in Saudi Rakhines were attacking each other mostly Arabia, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, due to their different alliances; most Europe, North America, United Arab Muslim communities were pro-British, and Emirates, Australia, and New Zealand. Rakhines were supporting the Japanese. That is approximately 3.5 million of With shellacking from both parties, Rohingya people and about 800,000 has Muslim communities fled to the north lived in the Rakhine State (Minahan, 2012). where they were a majority, and Rakhine He also explained that Rohingya speaks an moved to the south (Yegar, 1972, in Asia Indo-Aryan language which refers to Report No. 26, International Crisis Group Bengali or known as Chittagonian (ICG), 2014). This is reasonable in seeing language that Southeastern Bangladesh why the largest Muslim groups were uses and in the religion aspect, most of settled in the Rakhine State. In 1945, British Journal of ASEAN Studies 39

awarded the Rohingya community a Arakan since 1823 (Bayefsky, 2005). The civilian administration in Arakan because Rohingya community was not only of their loyalty. Two years later in 1948, stateless but also endures military Arakan State was integrated into Burma pressure; including highly restrictive according to the 1948 treaty and Burma policies. This situation is compounded by granted its independence from Britain the fact that the military regime is the one (Jonassohn & Björnson, 1998). to facilitate the movement against Rohingya (Dittmer, 2010). The goal of that Although many evidences and movement is to reduce Rohingya’s historical reports prove that the Rohingya population, hence, there is no accurate community is a native in that region, but documentation estimating the number of Burma (now Myanmar) as well as the Muslim population in the Rakhine State. Burmese Kingdom still perceived them as Meanwhile in 1982, there was about 56 per foreigners or newcomers. Therefore, for cent of the total population inhabitant in the Muslims living as a minority in the the district (Yegar, 2002). It is possible that Buddhists’ land is difficult for Rohingya. the Rohingya community has the highest The poor relationship between Muslims population at that time. A decade later in and Buddhists did not only happens today, 1994, Burmese Muslim was estimated to be but it has a heavy historical relation that 3 per cent out of the total population of 45 result to the Burmese’s reluctance to co- million, but Muslim claimed that their exist with the Rohingya Muslims since number of population is around 7 million centuries ago. or 13 per cent out of the total population Today the Rakhine State, like other (Veen, 2005). According to the data, the states of Myanmar, is a diverse region. The Muslim population shows a small number Rakhine Buddhist is the largest group in Myanmar, but the data of ICG in 2014 or amongst the total population which is other sources stated that Rohingya approximately 60 per cent of the 3.2 Muslims were the second largest group in million. The Muslim communities, the State of Rakhine; even though the including Rohingya, are at least 30 per cent number was under 50 per cent of the while the rest population is Chin (who are population. However, this imbalance Buddhist, Christian or Animist), and other number of population causes insecurity small minorities including the Kaman (also and fear to emerge. Muslim), Mro, Khami, Dainet and Violence Against Rohingya: Problem Maramagyi who have reached 10 per cent with Ethnicity or Religiosity? (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2014). In fact, the data of Rohingya population could The violence against minority not be accurately mentioned; it is because refers to “uncertainty” (Appadurai, 2006). there are discrepancies of numbers from The problem “came out” when they are different sources. among us and the boundaries are unclear between “them” and “us.” Likewise, the Moreover, there are communities minority group who has identified unregistered as citizens because they are themselves as different, the majority needs unrecognized by the regime under the 1982 them to determine what they call as “we.” Citizenship Law. The military regime According to Appadurai (2006), the rejects Arakan Muslims (Rohingya) from majority needs the “other” to define their their recognition as citizens, even though own identity. He also argues that the they have been settling in the land of 40 The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda

majority recognizes the minority group as of abuse. While, the data has also shown an “impure” element in the national body. that in 1994, at least 110,000 Karen and Meaning, they destroy an opportunity for Mon people (some of Myanmar’s self-definition in “understanding their ethnicities) as other minority groups in own identity” (Sen, 2010). Myanmar fled to Thailand during the intense offensive act by the military of In fact, the concept of “we” as the Rakhine (Burma Project, n.d.). Muslim majority’s argument poses as a difficult Rohingya might not be the only minority boundary to accept the “others.” In the case group that is targeted in the violence. of Rohingya, the Burma Kingdom for However, compared to the other groups, many centuries ago and Myanmar state the issue of Rohingya Muslims is more today have continuously oppressed them complicated. because they are different. They are regarded as not a part of Myanmar Meanwhile, according to the 2009 nationality. Rohingya is perceived as Human Right Watch Report, in 1995, the different because they were pro-British in Bangladesh government has forced most of the Second World War and they have a Rohingya Muslims to go back to the border different religious identity with the with the UN supporting this repatriation majorities of Myanmar. Rohingya was process. Then, the government granted closely associated with Bengali, but on them a Temporary Registration Card contrary, they are clearly different from (TRC), which gave them the limited Bengali; physically and politically. freedom of movement and employment in the western part of Arakan. When it is believed in 1990 that in accordance with the ending of Cold War, The violence for anti-Muslim also the world would return to a new hope of occurred in 1996 in Shan state and Yangon. peacefulness and a more democratic world In 1997, SLORC initiated an anti-Muslim order, but the fact is showing the riot in Mandalay as well as other cities and pathologies in the nationhood purification. the government is reported to be involved Myanmar, since their political isolationism in the riot (Veen, 2005). The issue of anti- under the military’s rule in 1962, is closed Muslim violence has since been happening from outside world. There is not much in 2001 as well as in Sitwe which results to information acknowledged by the many Muslims and Buddhists killed and international community regarding injured. Since that time, the Government Myanmar’s situation. There is no clear and decided for travel restriction on Muslims in obvious information on how Rohingya the conflict area, particularly those who do people becomes the object of perpetrator travel between Sitwe and other towns. In and the subject to brutal violence from the these cases, there were no information on majorities. For example, in 1991-2, the whether Muslim-Rohingya has been army has arranged about 250,000 Rohingya involved in the conflict or not. However, communities to flee to Bangladesh, and the issue of anti-Muslim (non-Rohingya) they were repatriated without “given has also spreads out to the other Muslim citizenship” by the state (Dittmer, 2010). communities. The data from Amnesty International reported that Karen Muslim In addition, the data reported by community has also been victimized. A Rianne ten Veen and the Islamic Human refugee from Muslim Karen Woman from Rights Commission states that in 1991, Hpa’an Township Kayen State, said that Rohingya Muslims were targeted as object Journal of ASEAN Studies 41

her village was destroyed by the soldiers in Rakhine Buddhists. Besides being Muslim, April 2004 - including their mosque. the physical appearance of Rohingya is very distinct from the descendant of Until in 2012, the conflict occurred Mongoloid. It seems to simplify the reason, between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya “they are not like us; we cannot accept Muslims in Rakhine finally spreads out in them” (Hurd, 2015). international media, harvesting mass attention from the world. The trigger of The communal violence between this conflict is the rape and murder of a Muslim Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine Buddhist woman by Rohingya Muslims was not only an issue in the Islamic world, which leads into violence and riot in the but also in international level. It leads into same year. The data report shows that strong international critic over military dozens of people were killed, a hundred government of Myanmar neglecting the houses burned, and 75,000 people, mostly conflict in Rakhine state. However, the Rohingya, displaced (Caballero-Anthony, violence against Rohingya Muslim by the 2016). state is showing how state has significant rule in perceiving Rohingya as “the other.” The conflict between Muslim Thus, the discrimination was not only in, Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine also law, economic, or education, but also spreads out of the Rakhine state. In March political and humanity right. 2013, violence occurred in Meiktila, Mandalay region and 43 people were killed When Buddhists Turn to Violence in this accidence. While in May 2013, a boarding school and a mosque were set on The historical explanation fire in Lashio, Shan State (Fuller, 2013). describes that Arakan State, for centuries, According to the data, extremist Buddhist has been an area for territory struggle and groups known as 969 were suspected to symbol of power, respectively amongst initiate the anti-Muslim violence. This Portugal, Britain and Japanese. The report is also written by Caballero (2016), Rakhine Buddhist and Muslim, including but according to her, 40 people were killed Rohingya are claiming each other that because of these riots. She explained that a Arakan is their own land, whether that is commotion in a gold shop in Meiktila, “the land of Muslims” or “the land of Central Myanmar has lead the violence Buddhists.” In terms of political between Buddhist and Muslims. phenomenon, there are two major factors in ethno-religious conflicts which are She also explicated that based on ethnicity and territory (Harris, 2009). the UN claim and a BBC News report, in January 2014, more than 40 Rohingya men, In her book, Erika Harris (2009) women, and children were killed in explained that homeland is a crucial place Rakhine State after an issue that a for the people: Rohingya Muslim killed a Rakhine police. “In the case of homeland, the appeal is Seeing these cases, we can see how that, in the first place, it belongs to violence can be easily followed by another people whose name it carries; what violence; even the reason behind the happens to others who may not have incident was unclear. The boundaries of another homeland or who even think of conflict become unclear then, whether it is it as their own is as secondary communal conflict between Rohingya and consideration, if a consideration of Rakhine or Rohingya Muslims and 42 The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda

ethno-national movements at all… nomenclature of Rakhine was designed for there is no potential for conflict Rakhine people or known as “the Buddhist anywhere without disputed territory, land.” as there is no peace without territorial settlements. Homelands are spaces There are three core points where national narratives are made, to contesting in this conflict; ethnicity, which past struggles and dreams of the territory, and identity, which are all related future belong. All homeland are “lands to the historical background. These points of hope and glory” but also, space of the are the main elements of why conflict nightmare of ethnic violence take happens in the world, particularly in place….” Rakhine. According to Jack Snyder (2000), there are two kinds of nationalities in the Nevertheless, the conflict in world: ethnic nationalism and civic Rakhine state is not only about the clash of nationalism. Ethnic nationalism is based on two ethnicities, but also identity, which the primordial sentiments such as Harris did not include it as an element of ethnicity, culture, or religion. While, civic analysis. The identity could not be nationalism is based on national separated from homeland nor ethnicity. It sentiments that overcome the distinction of can be seen from the Palestine conflict ethnicity, religion, race, and social class between Palestinian and Israeli who fights within the society. Today, in the and claims that Palestine is their homeland. globalization era, the ethnic nationalism, For Rohingya people or the Rakhine which based on primordialism sentiment is Buddhist, Rakhine state is the place where being abandoned gradually, especially in their ancestor lived in and they are the West. In contrary, the countries that emotionally engaged with. Arakan is the faced diversity problems like Myanmar, place where they find the memories of their the common structure of a conflict is identity. Although the oppressed constructed by the dominant power to government compels them to leave the marginalize the minorities with great land, they are returning with the oppression. consequence of being stateless. It is because they have no other place nor The question then is why the choice for both to stay and survive. Buddhist community turns to violent measures against Rohingya Muslims. Historical homeland conflict also Firstly, it should be noted that religious has its root when U Nu regime fulfilled violence can occur in all religions their promise to give autonomy in Arakan (Hansclever & Rittberger, 2000; Seul, 1999; and Mon in 1962. However, the Mujahidin Bartels, n.d.). Jeffrey Seul in his journal in that time continue demanding its legal argued that the escalation of intergroup or separation from Burma (Azizah in Yusuf, inter-ethnicity conflict cannot be solely 2013). In the same year also, Burmese seen as identity competition, even Army did coup d’état against U Nu regime, economic and politics factors also play and Burma was under military junta. In important roles in the conflict (Seul, 1999). 1989, the government changed the name of By adopting Connor’s idea about Arakan to Rakhine. Thus, when someone nationalism which refers to “us-them” mentions “Arakanese Muslims,” it refers to (Seul, 1999), Seul explains that Connor’s Muslim minorities that has already argument was based on a single cultural disappeared. It seems that the marker, including religion which can be Journal of ASEAN Studies 43

the root or reference for national identity and nations (Hasenclever & Rittberger, construction. This argument could be 2000). Otherwise, in the constructivist examined in the context of Myanmar in perspective, religion is an intervening which Buddhism was constructed as their variable. national identity. In the other hand, Rohingya community is not reflected as a Marco Ventura (2014) mentions part of the Mongolian nation. Thus, there about the constructivist approach in his must be a logical argument to explain how book in the following term: intergroup conflicts in Rakhine occur. “…ethnic identity is as fluid, Seul as well as Samuel Huntington changeable, and often actively are using the primordialist perspective. contested. From such perspective, most Huntington believes that the next pattern of the emphasis of the analysis is on the of conflict after the Cold War pattern was strategic aim of collectivity framing not only dominated by ideological or ethnic membership and boundaries in a economical aspects, but it will involve given manner than on individual religion-fed cultural “fault lines” (Ventura, motives to endorse a given ethnic 2014). The following statement is affiliation. Consequently, elite and Huntington’s most cited passage in The mass interests are not assumed to Clash of Civilization: converge, nor are the interests of different ethnic group assumed to be “It is my hypothesis that the intrinsically divergent: ethnic conflict fundamental source of conflict in this and violence can serve elite interests new world will not be primarily beyond ethnic boundaries and can ideological or primarily economic. The contradict the interests of the masses great divisions among humankind and on all sides.” the dominating source of conflict will be culture” (Huntington, 1993). This approach also described about how the elite plays a significant role in According to the primordialists intergroup conflicts. Related to the (Samuel Huntington, Gilles Kepel, Jeffrey Rohingya case, the elite Army plays a role Seul, and Bassam Tibi), they argue that the to mobilize the violence through most important factor in the twenty-first recognizing that Rohingya people are the century conflicts is the nations in “impure” community in the state. Here, civilization (Hasenclever & Rittberger, the regime saw the issue of impurity as an 2000). In their book, Hasenclever and opportunity to reduce population. Indeed, Rittberger are also attempting to outline Buddhist-Muslim violence is nothing new the three approaches to analyze the impact in Myanmar, especially in Rakhine of faith and politics, before it can be used to (Kingsbury, 2015). It can be seen from the measure the conflict. government statement when other entities ask of the solution for refugee camps or In the instrumentalist perspective, deportation. President Thein Sein socio-economic are the basic of conflict and emphasizes that Rohingya people were religion is only a spurious correlation in unacceptable in Myanmar. His comments terms of intergroup conflict. The in Radio Free Asia (2013), states that they Instrumentalists believe that most of take responsibility for their own ethnics religious conflicts start from unequal and because Rohingya were not growth between economic, social, political authentically their ethnic, it was 44 The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda

impossible to endure them legally Bengali. When Arakan was Bengal’s (Caballero-Anthony, 2015). feudatory in the 15th century, Rohingya converted to Islam and developed their There are two approaches to own distinct culture and art (Jonassohn & understand the Buddhist in how they are Björnson, 1998). The Rohingya community involved in the violence; that are has the skills needed to develop their own primordialists and constructivist economic ability or thorough education perspective. But this hypothesis has also but because they are “stateless,” they do been influenced from the history of not have the opportunity and are relationships between Buddhist and powerless. On the other hand, the Rakhine Rohingya just as how Burmese-Buddha Buddhist already has an opportunity to has ruled for centuries imposing the restore their socio-economic because they Rohingya. Aside from the historical have obtained official citizenship. background, cultural reasons also play an However, when Rakhine Buddhists opted important role. If cultural reasons cause the violence, it seems that they are defending construction of “us and them,” which is their nationalism, but unfortunately very clear to differentiate Rohingya Rohingya could not do the same way, Muslim and Rakhine Buddhist, then it is because they have either no state or indeed an important factor that depicts and “nationalism.” influences the course of history for Rohingya people in Myanmar An Overview: Islam in Myanmar continuously. Muslim in Myanmar was not The Buddhist practices its religion dominated by the ethnic of Rohingya, there as a Burmese religion for centuries so that some ethnics involved as well. However, it has a strong influence in the Burmese the antagonistic relationship between culture. Although the government Rohingya Muslim and Buddhist Rakhine changed the name of Burma into has never been in peace. Serial conflicts Myanmar, the identity was already record that ethnical conflict between embraced by the whole nation. Since there Burmese with Buddhists as a majority and is an imbalance between majority and other immigrant, such as Indians, does minority, the Buddhist culture becomes a happen. Sub-ethnics such as Mon and reflection of their basic culture. They feel Karen, as mentioned previously, have also insecure and fearful that the minority will become victims in the Burmese conflict, change the Buddhist culture. and many among of them are Muslims.

On the other hand, according to the It is significant since Buddhists in historical background in during the British Myanmar has not been in the conflict with colonial, Rohingya Muslims owns legal other Muslim community with Chinese administration since they were loyal to the descendant –Chinese Muslim that comes British colony. They have an opportunity from Yunan, a border area between China in economic, social status, and education. and Myanmar in the west. Most of them They have a position in the government come to Burma as traders, breeders and and this continues in the U Nu regime until refugees in the post-Panthay revolution coup d’état by the junta military in 1962. (1856-1873). Under the Manchu Historically, they came to Arakan as government in Myanmar, this Chinese traders and soldiers, most are notably from Muslims then are well-known as Panthay Arab, Mongol, Turkish, Portuguese, and Journal of ASEAN Studies 45

or Hui in the Chinese language. According happened due to fear over wide to Naw Lily Kadoe in her writing entitled distribution of Muslim power and the Ulama, State, and Politics in Myanmar, as possibility of a scrapped Buddhist cited in Yegar (1972), this tribe easily position, which still needs to be proved. assimilates with the local community and Third is that conflict over Buddhist is be able to keep their identity as Muslims. Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya is considered completely as an ethnical On the other hand, the arrival of conflict, but it has much to do with a Indians under the British government had religion. For the example, their rejection caused an increasing number of Muslim over Rohingya without mentioning Islam population in Myanmar. Previously, the as the religious attribute. Fourth is the Muslim population in this state is small, limited information of conflict regarding passive and loyal to the king of Burma. the relationship between Buddhist Yet, the coming of Indian immigrants have Burmese and ethnic Hui (Panthay) as doubled the population and with the minority. Meaning the closeness between increasing number of mosque and school Rakhine and Hui could be viewed as based on Islamic education constructions ethnical intimacy, both of which came from (Yegar, 1972). The scale of ethnical conflict Mongoloid race. Yet, it could be also between Indian Muslims and Burmese interpreted that the ethnic of Hui could Buddhists increases in the post-World War adopt the local culture better compared I, that is in the 1930 and 1938 which with Bengali Muslim (Rohingya) and happens due to the fight for jobs in Indians. Rangoon (Yangon) (Kadou, 2015). Path for Harmony Analyzing conflict in Myanmar is not an easy task, but serial historical factors Although it is not easy and there is with violence over Muslim Rohingya is still no win-win solution acquired between showing that ethical conflict is not new, it Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya, was rooted on their historical relationship. many efforts had already been shown to Through short explanation, we can analyze reconcile the parties. Indeed, this issue had what Buddhists’ relationship with the grabbed international attention, either Muslim minority in Myanmar looks like. from the Muslim countries or non-Muslim However, it cannot be generally concluded countries. International respond over the that the Buddhist-Muslim relationship in conflicts in Myanmar, especially in the Myanmar is worse because, in several northern Rakhine State is a movement for cases, anti-Muslim sentiment happens in global humanitarian crisis. Rakhine due the ethnicity of Rohingya, and the conflict has also happened outside Since the crisis happened in the Rakhine. 2012, 57 counties affiliated in the Organization of Islam Cooperation (OIC) There are some hypotheses that condemned genocide over Rohingya can be drawn by looking at this problem; Muslim in Myanmar, as what happened in first is that conflicts happening between the summit meeting in Mecca, Augusts Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya is 2012 (Kadoe, 2015). In the other side, motivated through economic-politic and Myanmar government invited the state social variables. Second, is that the conflict representatives and UN to see the actual between the two had created bigger reality that is happening in the Rakhine religious conflicts crossing ethnicity. It had 46 The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda

State. Indeed, this decision also emerges a emergency support for Rohingya Muslim serial of protests especially from Buddhists refugees in February 2017. It is recorded in several areas of conflicts, such as that since the humanitarian crisis Yanggon, Meiktila, Lashio in the northern happened in 2012, many Rohingya Shan State. refugees have been escaping to Southern Malaysia. A couple years before in 2011, Adli Abdullah, the leader of the International Likewise, Malaysia and Indonesia Concern Group on Rohingya (ICGR) in as the largest Muslim populations in Asia Malaysia, hoped that the Rohingya issue have also been supporting the refugees in could be discussed in the ASEAN Summit the same way. Recently, refugees of while several parliaments from Southeast Rohingya community receives Asian countries still intensively conducted accommodation and hospitality in Aceh the dialogue to solve the issue of Rohingya. before they depart to Australia to gain They urge ASEAN to include this issue as asylum. Indonesia is also the only state the main agenda of the ASEAN summit in allowed by the Myanmar government to Malaysia on 26-27 April 2015. However, enter the Rakhine region to provide this effort still has an obstacle, because humanitarian assistance to Rohingya Myanmar considers the issue of Rohingya refugees when the crisis still occurred. The as a domestic matter and ASEAN has no Indonesian government through the right to interfere this issue. Even if there are Ministry for External Affairs has been many Rohingya refugees residing in doing diplomacy in resolving conflict as ASEAN countries, particularly in well as giving humanitarian aids for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Rohingya Muslims. Thus, international demand for harmony cannot be well- Later, on 20th of May 2015, the achieved without internal effort from Foreign Ministers of three ASEAN Myanmar government per se. countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand conducts a meeting in Kuala The wining of National League for Lumpur to discuss joint solutions and the Democracy (NLD), pioneered by Aung San resolving of regional issues (Indonesian Suu Kyi in the general election 2015 had Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). This previously seen as bringing a hope for Meeting also aims to find a comprehensive religious freedom and sectarian conflict. In solution involving the country of origin, contrary, wining does not give a significant transit, and goals through the principle of contribution to religion harmony. Indeed, burden sharing and shared responsibility. Aung San Suu Kyi intents to limit This is necessary to prevent the issue of international intervene for resolving the irregular migrants for it not to evolve into problem of Rohingya Muslim and a humanitarian crisis in Southeast Asia. Buddhist Rakhine. Furthermore, the appointment of Htin Kyaw in the Furthermore, in the meeting with parliament (2016) gives no significant the Ministry of External Affair of ASEAN changes due to his loyalty towards Aung in Yangon December 2016, the Minister San Suu Kyi. Thus, the harmony is located from Malaysia, Anifah Aman, demands for on the government’s ability in handling full humanitarian access in the conflict militaristic regime. At least, the president area. It made Malaysia as the ASEAN from civil society could be a new hope for country that initiates involvement into the issue. Indeed, Malaysia also reports to give Journal of ASEAN Studies 47

Myanmar after many years of militaristic 2016). Otherwise, according to historian controlling regime. and it is mostly believed by Rohingya people, they argued that their ancestors While, international sympathy over were not only coming from East Bengal, this case is still going on. In the prior but also from different Muslim countries. December 2016, there are fourteen They were not coming to Rakhine State countries, among them are Austria, during the British colonial period but over Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, hundred years earlier before. Rohingya France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, people has heavily rooted in Rakhine, the Poland, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the definition of Rohingya people identity United States. These countries imposed seems difficult to be explained. Hence, the Myanmar government in allowing them to Rohingya people itself as an ethnic identity give aids for Rohingya Muslims (The New is still debatable. York Times, 2016). It is related to the UN report portraying the increasing number of The conflict in Rakhine based on humanitarian crisis in that area. However, the primordialists and constructivist the amount of aid especially in food is still perspectives also could be explained based limited. There are 20,000 people from on historical context which states that for 150,000 refugees who got food. This centuries the Burma Kingdom did invade tragedy was reported by Pierre Péron, a Rohingya to get Arakan. After Arakan was spokesperson of UN for Coordination of a part of Burma Kingdom, this land since Humanitarian Affairs. then belongs to them. In the 17th century, when Arakan was under the British rule, Basically, the problem of Rohingya Rohingya was protected until the Britain Muslim is not an easy task to be solved, it colony left the country in 1948. Post-British is due to historical complexity that has rule, the Muslims’ peacefulness in Arakan been happening for a long while. In other changes into conflict with the Buddhists. words, a conflict between Rohingya Indeed, since 1962, the junta military has Muslim and Buddhist Rakhine is not oppressed Rohingya Muslims and played merely a temporary response; it is rooted a significant role in the movement to expel happened many years, across generation Rohingya from the Myanmar state. The and remaining into the present. case of Rohingya currently has found a new stage and it is a concerned as an issue Conclusion related to humanitarian disaster in It is believed that Rohingya is a Southeast Asia. This issue becomes more legacy from British colonial policies that complex because the conflict involves not are trapped in a misfortunate situation. only ethnic-religious, but also economic, Historically, Rohingya were leaving their social and political aspects. However, the ancestors to migrate into Rakhine State conflict between the Buddhist and during the British colonial period and was Rohingya community is very complicated called by most non-Rohingya people as and its resolution is not easy. The Bengali Muslim. The official view of the international communities are continuing Myanmar Government is that all Rohingya their efforts to negotiate with junta military people are illegal immigrants from Bengal to give more accesses to Rohingya and to (present day Bangladesh) and the know about what happened in Rakhine as government does not address Muslim a part of humanitarian activities. migration under British rule (Gibson, 48 The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda

About the Author 29, 2017, from BBC: http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/du Leni Winarni is a lecturer in nia/2015/04/150422_rohingya_asea International Relations and researcher in n_parlemen. Center of ASEAN Studies, Sebelas Maret University, Surakarta. Currently, she is a Caballero-Anthony, M. (Ed.). (2016). An Ph.D. candidate of Inter-Religious Studies introduction to non-traditional (IRS) in Gadjah Mada University. Her key security studies: A transnational interests are politics and religion, Islamic approach. Sage Publication Ltd. studies, history, conflict resolution, and Russia and East European studies. Christian, J. L. (1942). Burma: Strategic and Political. Far Eastern Survey, 11(3), References 40-44.

Ahmed, I. (2010). The plight of the stateless Dittmer, L. (Ed.). (2010). Burma or Rohingya: Responses of the state, Myanmar? The struggle for national society & the international identity. Singapore: World Scientific community. Bangladesh: University Publishing Company. Press Ltd. Gibson, T., James, H., & Falvey, L. (Eds.). Amnesty International. (2005). Myanmar: (2016). Rohingyas: Insecurity and Leaving home. Amnesty citizenship in Myanmar. Songkhla: International. Thaksin University Press.

Appadurai, A. (2006). Fear of small numbers: Harris, E. (Ed.). (2009). Nationalism: Theories An essay on the geography of anger. and cases. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Durham and London: Duke University Press. University Press. Hasenclever, A., & Rittberger, V. (2000). Bartels, D. Your God is no longer mine: Does religion make a difference? Moslem-Christian fratricide in the Theoretical approaches to the Central Moluccas (Indonesia) after a impact of faith on political conflict. half- millennium of tolerant co- Millennium: Journal of International existence and ethnic unit. Retrieved Studies, 29(3), 641-674. December 15, 2015, from Hohmeyer, U. (2014). Burma in transition: Nunusaku: But Buddha is never in a hurry. http://www.nunusaku.com/03_pu German: Books on Demand. blications/articles/yourgod.html. Human Rights Watch. (2009). World Report Bayefsky, A. F. (Ed.). (2005). Human rights 2009. Human Rights Watch. and refugees internally displaced persons and migrant workers: Essay in Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. memory of Joan Fitzpatrick and Arthur (2015). Masyarakat ASEAN edisi 8: Helton. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Aman dan stabil, keniscayaan bagi Publishers. ASEAN. Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Kerja Sama ASEAN. Bonasir, R. (2015, April 22). Parlemen ASEAN minta Rohingya dibahas di tingkat ASEAN. Retrieved March Journal of ASEAN Studies 49

International Crisis Group. (2014). Selth, A. (1986). Race and resistance in Myanmar: The politic of Rakhine state. Burma, 1942-1945. Modern Asian Brussels: Asia Report N˚ 261. Studies, 20(3), 483-507.

Ives, M. (2016, December 9). 14 countries Sen, A. (2010). Fear of small numbers: An press Myanmar to allow aid in essay on the geography of anger – Rohingya areas. Retrieved March 28, By Arjun Appadurai. The Journal of 2017, from The New York Times: the Royal Anthropological Institute, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/ 16(2), 439- 440. 09/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya- crisis-rakhine-muslim.html?_r=0. Seul, J. R. (1999). Ours is the way of God': Religion, identity, and intergroup Jonassohn, K., & Björnson, K. S. (1998). conflict. Journal of Peace Research, Genocide and gross human rights 36(5), 553-569. violations: In comparative perspective. New Brunswick and London: Shah, T. S., Stepan, A., & Toft, M. D. (Eds.). Transaction Publishers. (2012). Rethinking religion and world affairs. Oxford: Oxford University Kadoe, N. L., & Husein, F. (2015). Ulama, Press. state, and politics in Myanmar. Al- Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, Sidasathian, M. C. (2014). Rohingya: The 53(1), 131-158. persecution of a people in Southeast Asia. United States: Createspace Kingsbury, D., & Laoutides, C. (Eds.). Independent Publishing Platform. (2015). Territorial separatism in global politics: Causes, outcomes, and Thwe, P. K. (2003). From the land of green resolution. London and New York: ghosts: A Burmese odyssey. Harper Routledge. Perennial.

Mason, R. (Ed.). (2016). Muslim minority- Tikhonov, V., & Brekke, T. (Eds.). (2015). state relations: Violence, integration, Buddhism and violence: Militarism and policy. New York: Palgrave and Buddhism in modern Asia. Macmillan. London: Routledge.

Minahan, J. B. (2012). Ethnic groups of South Tim Riset TGR. (2011, May 5). ICGR: KTT Asia and the Pacific: An encyclopedia. ASEAN agar bahas etnis Rohingya. California: ABC-CLIO. Retrieved April 10, 2017, from The Global Review: http://theglobal- Mouffe, C. (2013). Agonistic: Thinking the review.com/lama/content_detail.p world politically. London-New York: hp?lang=id&id=4851&type=3#.Wg Verso Books. krfrjdVdk.

Seekins, D. M. (2011). State and society in Topich, W. J., & Leitich, K. A. (2013). The modern Rangoon (Asia’s history of Myanmar. California: transformations). New York: Greenwood. Routledge. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (Ed.). (2000). State of the world’s refugees: Fifty 50 The Rohingya Muslim in the Land of Pagoda

years of humanitarian action. USA: Yegar, M. (2002). Between integration and Oxford University Press. secession: The Muslim communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Veen, R. T. (2005). Myanmar's Muslims: The Thailand, and Western oppressed of the oppressed. England: Burma/Myanmar. New York: Islamic Human Rights Lexington Books. Commission. Zimmerman, M. (2006). Buddhism and Ventura, M. (2014). From your Gods to our violence. Lumbini International Gods: A history of religion in Indian, Research Institute, 2, 213-242. South African, and British Courts. Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books.

1 Higher Education Integration in ASEAN

Higher Education Integration in ASEAN: ASEAN University Network Case.1

Teuku Rezasyah Padjadjaran University, Indonesia Neneng Konety Padjadjaran University, Indonesia Affabile Rifawan Padjadjaran University, Indonesia Wahyu Wardhana Padjadjaran University, Indonesia

Abstract

Higher education has an important role in the region’s economic growth, with talents and ideas developing in the process. ASEAN University Network (AUN) is the institution that facilitates cooperation among ASEAN universities and beyond. This research attempts to describe the role of AUN in enhancing regional integration in the higher education sector in ASEAN. This research uses qualitative method to get depth information and the bigger picture in the governance of AUN’s role and mechanism in regional integration of higher education system. The results of this research showed that AUN helped enhancing regional cooperation.

Key words: AUN, regional integration, higher education, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

.1 This article was originally presented in The Fifth International Conference on Business, International Relations, and Diplomacy (ICOBIRD 2016) at Bina Nusantara University.

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2017), pp. 51-59 DOI: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.962 ©2017 by CBDS Bina Nusantara University and Indonesian Association for International Relations ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic

52 Higher Education Integration in ASEAN

Introduction competitiveness and capability of human resources. Education is one of the sectors that have a crucial role in regional integration. The cooperation in the education It is a backbone for development and sector in Southeast Asian level particularly regional integration, as it has been proved, higher education has been established in Western Africa, which helped to further since 1956. Mustajarvi and Bouchon (2014) regional integration (Guannu, 2010). This explained it narratively with the first research argued that such experience is establishment of the Association of also relevant in ASEAN. Southeast Asian Institutions of Higher Learning (ASAIHL) in 1956, followed with ASEAN integration process has the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education shown its greater importance following the Organization (SEAMEO) in 1965 establishment of ASEAN Economic (Mustajarvi & Bouchon, 2014). Thirty years Community (AEC) in late December 2015. later, the ASEAN University Network The integration process consists four (AUN) was established in 1995. Mustajarvi pillars of economic integration; single and Bouchon also described the market and production base, competitive comparison later compared the higher economic region, equitable economic education integration in Europe and development, and integration of the global ASEAN. The pattern of higher education economy (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015). This integration in ASEAN more likely suitable integration has proceeded with a new with neo-functionalist approach and phase after ASEAN Charter in 2008. With accompanied with legal formal and the new phase of integration in the political initiatives. economic sector, hopefully, it will begin to advance in integration and boost Research Question and Methodology development in a region. The fact is ASEAN has not yet In ASEAN today, only eight fulfilled the complete integration among occupations received mutual recognition stakeholders of higher education. agreements among ASEAN countries Although the stakeholders such as policy (Fukunaga, 2015). Therefore, there is a makers and institutions have established demand to produce more capable skilled the regional organization, in the process, labor to increase or maintain its education has not involved all universities in sector quality and contribute to regional ASEAN, or at least the state universities. integration with an equal and fair standard. The purpose of this research is to highlight the regional integration of The regional integration process in ASEAN in higher education sector. It uses EU countries could be a set of an example the theory of regional interdependence for of regional integration in the education regional integration. This theory is sector for ASEAN. In Europe, the Bologna originated from interdependence theory Process helped to support the which developed as a critique of realist modernization of education and training theory in the 1970s and emphasized non- and helped to better integrate the countries state actor in international relations inside EU (Papatsiba, 2006). It shapes (Wilkinson, 2010). The term of regional European values and knowledge that form interdependence is more familiar with European identity also increase economic development in a region. The

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2017), pp. 51-59 DOI: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.4155 ©2017 by CBDS Bina Nusantara University and Indonesian Association for International Relations ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic

Journal of ASEAN Studies 53

non-state actor has bigger role in regional higher education governance in integration and economic prosperity. Philippines has put the main policy maker in one institution that is the Commission The questions that arise in this on Higher Education (CHED) which was article are: established in 1994. It is an autonomous 1. How is the quality of the higher institution that has authority on higher education sector in ASEAN education policy in Philippines. The countries? unique thing about the higher education system in the Philippines is that the quality 2. How can AUN contribute in assurance or accreditation based on an regional integration in the higher internal request and then to be accredited education sector? by the external auditor and the higher education institution pays the accredited The method of this research uses agents. The regional cooperation of the descriptive analytical method, and get data higher education institution in Philippines incorporate primary data coming from is very extensive but mostly only located in ASEAN Secretariat, and secondary sources five best universities in Philippines. coming from academic journals dealing with the development of AUN. Indonesia

This research is divided into two Indonesia has 3,000s higher parts. The first part is to describe the education institution until 2013, and the overview of higher education in ASEAN majority is college type campus countries. Each of ASEAN countries will be (Moeliodihardjo, 2014). Recently, in 2014, described in this part. The second part is to the new administration has established a discuss regional integration process of new ministry dealing only with research higher education sector in ASEAN and advance education, with its own particularly AUN and analyze how AUN budget. Before that, the higher education contribute for regional integration of the was put merely under the directorate higher education sector. general level, under the Ministry of Education and Culture. Today, the higher The Overview Condition of Higher education in Indonesia has begun to show Education in ASEAN Countries greater trends to conduct extensive Nowadays, with the introduction international networks. In terms of regional cooperation, every university has of AEC in 2015, ASEAN tried strongly to its own policy with so many association narrow the gap among ASEAN countries, proved with the growth of the higher and organization but in this part, only education system in ASEAN. Here is the AUN that been described. brief overview of higher education in Malaysia ASEAN Countries. With 600 higher education Philippines institutions in 2011, Malaysia has proved itself to become an advanced institution of There are 2,060 higher education higher education sector in Southeast Asia institutions until 2008 in Philippines (ICHEFAP, 2011). Most of them are (Arokiasamy, 2011). Public institutions in this country received massive support satellite campus. The political structure of from the government, and later developed

54 Higher Education Integration in ASEAN

themselves to becoming international of Thailand higher education system and reputed universities. Earlier on, Malaysia paid attention to the use of English as the operated a system called National Higher medium of communication. Education Strategic Plan (NHESP). In 2014, NHESP was in phase 2, with the merging Brunei Darussalam of two ministries, focusing on Brunei currently has 18 higher internationalization, to become a hub for learning institutions (Ministry of international higher education. The Education of Brunei Darussalam, 2015). existing activities in internationalization The public institutions are predominantly among others are international mobility in Brunei and administered by the Ministry program, international service learning, of education of Brunei, aiming to educate and international cooperation in education its citizens. Most of Brunei citizen are and training, and boosting and trust to studying in tertiary education abroad and Malaysia partners (Knight, 2013). prefer to choose advance education in Singapore advance APEC. In internationalizing its higher learning institutions, Brunei With only six universities, provided scholarships for foreigner to Singapore has the best higher education study in Brunei’s universities. institution in ASEAN (Ministry of Education of Singapore, 2015). Two of Vietnam them are Nanyang Technological Vietnam is developing countries University and National University of with rapid growth in the economy and Singapore is the major reputed global needs progressive advancement in the university and even the best in Asia. The higher education sector to support its Ministry of Education is the major policy economic growth. There are 498 maker of higher education institution in institutions of higher education in Vietnam Singapore. The country has successfully (Nguyễn & Vũ, 2015). The main utilized its long national stability and administrator of higher education sector in economic growth, and successfully Vietnam is the department of higher integrated and centralized all areas of education under the authority of Ministry education. The universities in Singapore of education and training. Vietnam is have also maintained enormous improving and restructuring its internal cooperation with world class universities quality. such as Harvard, Cambridge, and made themselves the global hub of education in Laos Southeast Asia. Laos began its commitment to Thailand developing its higher education in the early 1990s (Ogawa, 2008). Previously, the Thailand had 645 higher education government focused on improving the institutions in 2000 (Kirtikara, 2001). The primary education sector. Until 1995, the Ministry of Education holds the authority country had only 10 public higher in running the education system. education institutions. Today, it has grown Following the Second 15-year Long Range to 91, including the rapid number of Plan on Higher Education and the 11th private institutions (Lie, Kaur, & Sirat, Higher Education Development Plan, the 2014). The rapid development of private country conducted an internationalization

Journal of ASEAN Studies 55

institution was driven by decree of Education holds main authority in ruling government that allows private the higher education, focusing on the institutions to be established. The Ministry improvement and enhancement of its of Education holds the power to govern internal quality. Specific attention had higher education sector in Laos. The focus been given to, in reaching young of Laos is the internal quality improvement generation to participate in tertiary within the late development of higher education. Like Laos and Myanmar, education sector. Considering the need to Cambodia also preferred to attract foreign support international student mobility, the sources to develop its higher education Ministry of Education continued to send system. the local students overseas to study, aiming to come back to the country to The Role of AUN in Integration of improve the quality of education in Laos. Higher Education in ASEAN However, Laos also accepted international In November 1995, AUN was student from abroad. established. Following the development in Myanmar 1997 to 1999, the membership of AUN was expanded in line with the increasing The transition from the military member of ASEAN. Today, AUN regime to a more democratic regime in incorporates 30 universities (AUN 2011 helped to reform the higher education Secretariat, 2016) (Table 1). system in Myanmar, with government launched a comprehensive review of the AUN establishment was based on education system in 2014 (Win, 2015). That the ambitions of the leaders of ASEAN and review aimed as a foundation for the the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Education betterment of higher education sector in (ASCOE) in establishing ASEAN Myanmar. Nationally, there are 164 of universities. But the idea failed due to higher education institution in Myanmar, constraints of cost, location, and with 96 institutions located in Mandalay leadership. Therefore, in 1994 ASEAN and Yangon (McCord, Simon, & Weil, initiated began initiated ideas leading to 2013). The main authority in ruling higher the establishment of networks between education sector is the ministry of universities in ASEAN so that cooperation education, visioning international in the field of education can be improved. cooperation for Myanmar higher In 2000, the AUN Secretariat set up in education system mainly focusing on aid Bangkok, Thailand (Beerkens, 2004). While preferably coming from overseas to most of AUN member are public improve the local education quality. At the universities, only two universities are same time, Myanmar also sends the local private, namely De La Salle University and student abroad to transfer the knowledge Ateneo de Manila University. and practice in Myanmar’s education.

Cambodia

Soon after the end of the Khmer regime in 2009, the new government in Cambodia began to improve the qualities of the local 134 educational institutions (Kitamura et al., 2016). The Ministry of

56 Higher Education Integration in ASEAN

Table 1. AUN Members in ASEAN

Mandalay University of Brunei Ateneo de Manila Royal University of De La Salle University Darussalam University Phnom Penh University

Royal University University of the Airlangga Nanyang Gadjah Mada of Law and Philippines University Technological University Economics University

National University of Singapore Institute Burapha University University of Indonesia Management of Technology Singapore University

National Chiang Mai National University Chulalongkorn University of University of University of Malaysia University Malaya Laos

Mahidol Universiti Putra Prince of Songkla University of Vietnam National University Malaysia University Science, Malaysia University, Hanoi

Universiti Utara Vietnam National Yangon Institute of Can Tho University University of Malaysia University, Ho Chi Economics Yangon Minh City

The objective of AUN is the wish schemes initiated through South East Asia for the establishment and strengthening Engineering Education Development solidarity networks between universities Network (SEED-Net) helped to strengthen in ASEAN. So far, the cooperation the Japan-ASEAN Summit in 1997 and the involved the exchange of staffs and ASEAN+3 Summit (Watanabe et al, 2006). students respectively to increase the skills, This brings considerable benefits in knowledge, and ability of Human utilizing geological potential in Southeast Resources (HR) at each university (AUN Asia, as well as exchange of students and Secretariat, 2016). AUN also managed to staff. Another example in social sciences establish cooperation with universities issues, AUN has the positive impact on its outside ASEAN such as EU, Japan, South member by the enhancement of the Korea and China and invited them as an Southeast Asian Human Rights Studies observer in meetings of the AUN. Network (SEAHRN). It involves other universities which are not AUN member. For example, in the fields of geology, AUN and cooperation between Learning from the ideas of Thomas universities in Japan conducted research Friedman which highlighted the greater on the potential development of geology in importance of globalization following the the area. Research and development of year 2000, it can be asserted that the products successfully developed in this increasing development of AUN, run in collaboration. Based on research tandem with the ASEAN’s path by conducted by Koichiro Watanabe et al, establishing the what so called the ASEAN shows the AUN and Japanese cooperation Community in 2015 (Friedman, 2005).

Journal of ASEAN Studies 57

In fact, AUN continued to highlight scheme. In the membership issue, it is not the importance of human resources, easy to integrate quickly in adding the new manifested in the completion and member. Such difficulties can be overcome innovation. In the process, universities if every member of AUN play a role in inside ASEAN had begun to better interact, practicing AUN mechanisms, and share with experts and academics working their expertise to their fellow partners at together to improve the education qualities the national level. AUN enhancement in in various countries inside ASEAN at the SEAHRN could be the good model for same time (Ratanukul, 2009). collaboration beyond AUN member in ASEAN. In the same way, AUN can share At the level of regional cooperation its best practices in supporting the local and the establishment of AUN is also governments inside ASEAN’s provinces to attractive because it can improve the better deal with globalization issues, such relationship between ASEAN countries. as finding the best ways to achieve all Education has been utilized as a tool of targets stipulated in the Sustainable foreign policy, with member benefitting Development Goals (SDGs). By doing this, from permitting their universities to better AUN’s role will further strengthens interact with their partners inside ASEAN. ASEAN’s path towards achieving all goals In addition, education is a part of people to stipulated in the ASEAN Community 2015 people diplomacy by doing international and raise the reputation of its members at mobility student. Nowadays, there are 12 the global level. programs of scholarship that available for AUN member and will increase along with Conclusion the capacity enhancement of AUN member (AUN Secretariat, 2016). AUN has a network which runs in line with the ideas of ASEAN Community. In line with the findings of Josef T. In addition, AUN has a capacity to Yap, universities inside ASEAN had improve the quality of education and benefitted from the exchange of people, universities in ASEAN, especially transnational education, information changing the mind of universities which exchange, regulatory reform, and are outside the top 400 universities in the development cooperation. In this research, world. Yap mentions that the AUN and ASEAN Quality Assurance Network had played an Acknowledging there is a big gap important role in furthering the on one hand between universities in importance of ASEAN (Yap, 2012). Even Singapore and Malaysia, and universities though the ideas of quality of assurance in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. On the and accreditation is yet to come, but other hand, it is advisable that AUN to integration processes inside ASEAN tend better focusing on strengthening the to work along this direction. internal cooperation using all frameworks inside ASEAN. There is a lot of potential of Even though, AUN alone currently AUN to contribute in the regional covers only 30 universities from thousands interdependence of ASEAN. By doing this, of universities in Southeast Asia. There are AUN will help to narrow the current gap still a lot of universities inside ASEAN that already exist, which will in the long run have the potential, to take advantage of this help to increase the sense of belonging and

58 Higher Education Integration in ASEAN sense of identity as an internal part of http://www.aunsec.org/scholarships.p ASEAN. hp.

About the Authors AUN Secretariat. AUN member universities. Retrieved from Teuku Rezasyah is a lecturer at http://www.aunsec.org/aunmemberun Department of International Relations, iversities.php. Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Padjadjaran University. He can be AUN Secretariat. AUN’s history and contacted by e-mail background. Retrieved from [email protected]. http://www.aunsec.org/ourhistory.ph p. Neneng Konety is a lecturer at Department of International Relations, Beerkens, H.J.J.G. (2004). Global Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, opportunities and institutional Padjadjaran University. She can be embeddedness; higher education consortia contacted by e-mail [email protected]. in europe and southeast asia (PhD Dissertation). Enschede: Cheps/UT Affabile Rifawan is a lecturer at Department of International Relations, Friedman, T. L. (2005). The world is flat: A Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, brief history of the twenty-first century. Padjadjaran University. He can be New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux contacted by e-mail Fukunaga, Y. (2015). Assessing the [email protected]. progress of ASEAN MRAS on Wahyu Wardhana is a non- professional services. ERIA Discussion permanent lecturer and researcher at Paper, No.21, pp. 1-43. Department of International Relations, Guannu, J. (Ed.). (2010). Nation-states and Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, the challenge of regional integration in Padjadjaran University. He can be West Africa: The case of Liberia (Vol.13). contacted by e-mail Paris: Karthala Editions. [email protected]. Kirtikara, K. (2001). Higher education in References Thailand and the national reform Arokiasamy, A. R. A. (2011). An analysis of roadmap. Invited Paper presented at the globalization and higher education in Thai-US Education Roundtable, 9 Malaysia. Australian Journal of Business (January). and Management Research, 1(9), 73. Kitamura, Y et al. (Eds.). (2016). The political ASEAN Secretariat. (2015). A blueprint for economy of schooling in Cambodia: Issues growth ASEAN economic community of quality and equity. Springer. 2015: progress and key achievement. Knight, J. (Ed.). (2013). International Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. education hubs: Student, talent, AUN Secretariat. ASEAN scholarship. knowledge-innovation models. Retrieved from Springer Science & Business Media.

Journal of ASEAN Studies 59

Lie, K. Y., Kaur, S., Sirat, M. (2011). Quality Journal of International Cooperation assurance and university rankings in the Studies, 16(1), 105–129. Asia Pacific: Country and institutional context. Pulau Pinang: Universiti Sains Papatsiba, V. (2006). Making higher Malaysia. education more European through student mobility? Revisiting EU McCord, C., Simon, D., & Weil, C. (2013). initiatives in the context of the Bologna Investing in the future: Rebuilding higher Process 1. Comparative Education, 42(1), education in Myanmar. New York: 93–111. Institute of International Education. Ratananukul, P. (2009). Asian higher Ministry of Education of Brunei education and the challenges of Darussalam. (2015). Brunei Darussalam globalization. Waseda University national education for all report 2015. Global COE Program, Global Institute World Education Forum, retrieved for Asian Regional Integration. from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/002 The International Comparative Higher 3/002305/230503e.pdf. Education Finance and Accessibility Project (ICHEFAP). (2011). Higher Ministry of Education of Singapore. (2015). education finance and cost-sharing in Education statistics digest 2015. Phillipines. Retrieved from Singapore: Ministry of Education of http://gse.buffalo.edu/org/inthigheredf Singapore. inance/files/Country_Profiles/Asia/Phi lippines.pdf. Moeliodihardjo, B. Y. (2014). Higher education sector in Indonesia. Retrieved Watanabe, K., et al. (2006). Building from capacity of global geoscientific https://www.britishcouncil.in/sites/def workforce through Japan-ASEAN ault/files/indonesian_higher_educatio university network. Geopyshical n_system.pdf. Research Abstract 8.

Mustajarvi, J., & Bouchon, F. (2014). Wilkinson, P. (2010). International relations. Tourism education and regional New York: Sterling Publishing integration: Is the European Union Company, Inc. (EU) model applicable for ASEAN?. Asia- Pacific Journal of Innovation in Win, P. P. T. (2015). An overview of higher Hospitality and Tourism, 3(2), 215-237. education reform in Myanmar. International Conference on Nguyễn, N. V., & Vũ, T. N. (2015). Higher Burma/Myanmar Studies education reform in Vietnam: Current Burma/Myanmar in Transition: situation, challenges and solutions. Connectivity, Changes and Challenges. VNU Journal of Science: Social Sciences and Humanities, 31(4), 85-97. Yap, J. T. (2012). Regional cooperation in education: Issues for developing Ogawa, K. (2008). Higher countries in the Asia-Pacific. PIDS education in Lao People's Democratic Discussion Paper no. 2012-15. Republic: Historical perspective.

Journal of ASEAN Studies 61

Sub-National Government and the Problem of Unequal Development in ASEAN Economic Integration: Case of Indonesia.1

Agus Suman University of Brawijaya, Indonesia Pantri Muthriana Erza Killian University of Brawijaya, Indonesia Ni Komang Desy Arya Pinatih University of Brawijaya, Indonesia

Abstract

Economic integration, as a prevalent phenomenon in contemporary international relations, brings with it several problems including in the practice of development. Krapohl & Fink (2013) argue that regional integration can follow three different developmental paths which are intra-regional interdependence, extra-regional dependence and intra-regional asymmetries and hence regional integration can in fact reinforce current situations rather than changing it. With regards to this, ASEAN is following the second path, creating a reliance on external actors and thus requiring member states to be highly competitive in the global level. However, this strategy ignores an important element, the intra-national development gap, since ASEAN is mostly focused in overcoming the intra-regional gap. This paper therefore seeks to elaborate the problem of increasing intra-national development gap due to regional integration by using Indonesia as a case study. The findings show that regional integration in Indonesia can in fact widen the national development gap due to three main reasons. First, ASEAN integration is highly top-down in nature, thus limiting the role of Indonesia’s sub-national governments (SNGs) and private actors in the process; second, differing capacity of Indonesia’s sub-national governments to engage in IR provides higher opportunities for some while creating hindrances for others and lastly, the high transactional cost of intra-national economic activities in Indonesia causes the benefits of economic integration to be highly concentrated in one area. Therefore, there needs to be a larger role for SNGs in regional integration particularly in the most underprivileged area of Indonesia.

Key words: ASEAN, Indonesia, development gap, sub-national government

.1 This article was originally presented in The Fourth International Conference on Business, International Relations, and Diplomacy (ICOBIRD 2015) at Bina Nusantara University.

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2017), pp. 60-67 DOI: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.2060 ©2017 by CBDS Bina Nusantara University and Indonesian Association for International Relations ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic Journal of ASEAN Studies 61

Introduction development gap among member countries, ASEAN is also facing For most countries, regional development gap within their own integration is no longer a choice but a countries, such as the case of Indonesia. necessity. The need to be included in the global economy and obtain the benefits of Indonesia is an archipelagic a freer market have forced countries to country with a relatively modest engage in multiple trade arrangements. infrastructure quality and a high level of As of April 2015, a total of 612 regional inequality. Indonesia has one of the fastest trade agreements have been reported to growing inequality rate (Gini index) in World Trade Organization, with 406 East and Southeast Asia, rising from 0.32 agreements being in force (WTO, 2015). Of in 1999 to 0.41 in 2012 (World Bank, 2014a). these 406 agreements, there are at least 13 Indonesia’s inequality is not only evident arrangements which are formed based on in the fact that Indonesia’s richest regional integration or regionalism. By far, population has enjoyed a 20 per cent European Union (EU) is the most higher growth in their income and advanced regional integration while consumption since 2003, but also a Association of Southeast Asian Nations disparity in regional development (ASEAN) is the most successful and long- progress where eastern Indonesia lags in enduring regional integration outside of other areas (World Bank, 2014). According the western world (Beeson, 2013). to the head of Indonesia’s Autonomy Watch or KPPOD, Sofjan Wanandi, only ASEAN member countries 10 per cent of Indonesian cities themselves are highly diverse in terms of experienced an improvement in their economic growth and political conditions. economic performance ever since Its member countries include wealthy Indonesia’s implementation of a states such as Singapore and democratic decentralization policy in 2001 (Antique, countries like Indonesia, but also 2009). incorporate poor countries such as Cambodia and authoritarian states like Based on this background, this Myanmar. In terms of economic growth, paper seeks to explain ASEAN regional intra-ASEAN trade has a moderate integration and its effect on development, growth, with an average growth of 7.62 particularly on intra-national inequality, per cent from 2007 up to 2013 (ASEAN by using Indonesia as the case study. This Statistical Yearbook, 2014). This number is paper argues that when regional relatively low compared to other areas integration is implemented in a country such as Europe and Southern America. At with high level of economic inequalities, the end of 2015, ASEAN will enter a its benefits will be diminished since higher level of economic integration regionalism will in fact widen the which includes free flow of labor, development gap, as in the case of investment and capital, commonly known Indonesia. Furthermore, the nature of the as ASEAN Economic Community. Under integration, whether it is a top-down or this scheme, one of the main goal or pillar bottom-up integration, also determines is to achieve an ‘equitable economic the effect of regionalism on development, development’ which focuses on since it can lead to a concentration of minimizing development gap between power and rulemaking capacity at the member countries. However, aside from central government. This paper will be 62 Sub-National Government and the Problem of …

divided into three parts where part one range from 1960s to 1980s focus mostly on will review existing studies of regionalism the debate between the intergovernmental and sub-national government while part and supranational approach, which two and three will discuss regional highlights the difference between integration in Indonesia and highlight the regionalism as an inter-state project and role of sub-national government in this regionalism as a project to create process. institutions above the state (supranational). Theories under this Theorizing Economic Integration and heading include classic theories of Regionalism functionalism, neofunctionalism, Economic integration is the federalism, confederalism and liberal removal of barriers to trade, payment and intergovernmentalism. Newer theories of mobility from the factors of production, or regionalism emerge in the late 1980s and in other words, is an effort to unite the early 1990s following the shift and economies of two or more countries inclusion of non-material or ideational through a series of joint policies factors in the analysis. One important (Carbaugh, 2010). Basically, the idea of theory under the New Regionalism economic integration dates back to liberal Approach is Multilevel Governance (MLG) economists such as Adam Smith and in which the article uses as its basis. David Ricardo who believe that non- Marks (1996) defines MLG as a restricted economic activities will give the policy-making or decision-making process most efficient outcome for all countries. which involves not only the state as the Economic integration will create static exclusive actor but also other actors at efficiency gains and dynamic efficiency various levels, namely at the gains (Balaam & Dillman, 2011). Static supranational, national and sub-national efficiency gains occur because economic levels. Under MLG, each level should integration will lead to specialization have the authority to create and among member countries and market implement policies and in several cases, to expansion, resulting in the economies of even refuse in implementing decisions scale (Balaam & Dillman, 2011). Aside that higher levels of authority impose. from static efficiency gains, economic Multilevel governance was originally integration will also bring dynamic developed in the European Union where efficiency gains because in the long run, the tendency to result in overlapping economic integration will stimulate governance among multiple levels of innovation and make industries much government is high since many countries more efficient and competitive (Balaam & uses a decentralized system of Dillman, 2011). Although, economic gain government. MLG tries to avoid this was often considered the primary motive problem by offering an alternative form of for regional integration, newer theories of power sharing between multiple levels of regionalism focus less on highlighting governance and reduces the chances of only the economic gains. overlapping. Multilevel governance sees In general, theories of regionalism regionalism as a process of governance can be classified into 2 eras or waves of and policy making that involve multiple theorizing, the classical theories and the actors at multiple levels (supranational, new waves or New Regionalism national and sub-national), employing Approach (NRA). Classical theories which both vertical and horizontal relationship Journal of ASEAN Studies 63

(Gavin, 2005). Horizontal relationship regionalism as one of their development means that the process involves multiple strategies since it is viewed as a actors at the same level while vertical collaborative effort that countries do to relationship involves different levels of engage in development. However, governance (Gibson, 2011). In this sense, countries are also in a dilemma on MLG expands the classic definition of choosing to fully integrate themselves to rulemaking (in terms of regional the global economy or still trying to retain integration) by government to include their economic sovereignty. Hence, various actors at multiple levels. countries are struggling to balance their domestic interests, regional agreements Regionalism and Development in and international demands through ASEAN Countries multilateral cooperation (Abugattas, 2004). In their 2007 Report, United With regards to ASEAN, relatively low Nations Conference on Trade and socio-economic conditions by member Development (UNCTAD) stated that countries has caused development to be developing countries have started to use one of the priority issues in ASEAN.

Table 1. Human Development Index (HDI) of ASEAN Member Countries

(1985-2013)

Source: ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2014)

In average, there has been an PDR is around 0.4 which shows quite a increase in the human development high level of human development condition of ASEAN member countries inequality. In addition to that, the from the year of 1985 up to 2013, with Lao domestic inequality also shows a similar PDR obtaining the lowest HDI (0.569) and picture. Singapore has the highest (0.901). The difference between Singapore and Lao 64 Sub-National Government and the Problem of …

On average, from 1990-2013 almost a large problem in Southeast Asia. In all ASEAN countries have the experience terms of intra-ASEAN trade itself, ASEAN of an increase in their Gini coefficient, still trade largely with external countries with Indonesia showing the steadiest (non-ASEAN states) with a ratio of upward trend. This shows that despite the around 1:3, in both exports and imports implementation of ASEAN Free Trade (ASEAN Statistical Yearbook, 2014). Area in 1994, domestic inequality remains

Table 2. Gini Coefficient of ASEAN Member Countries (1990-2013)

Source: ASEAN Statistical Yearbook (2014)

Regionalism and Sub-National result of complex interactions between Government: Case of Indonesia different actors at various political levels. Supranational institutions can also be a In terms of the formation of medium for society to advance their own regionalism, ASEAN is considered as interests with less government highly state-centric in nature. ASEAN involvement. A study by Guido & Secretariat (ASEC) only acts as the Kamarulnizam (2011) shows that although facilitator for member states’ activities. Indonesian public generally supports the ASEC is also understaff and has no ASEAN Community, they lack the executive or legislative power knowledge regarding its process and (Wunderlich, 2012). Furthermore, ASEAN policymaking which means that the member countries deliberately avoid process excludes them greatly. However, creating a strong supranational institution, this is not to say that ASEAN’s making ASEAN Secretariat highly intergovernmental is less favorable that underpowered (Hill & Menon, 2010). In EU’s supranationalism since ASEAN contrast to EU which is highly offers flexibility that EU does not always supranational, ASEAN limits rulemaking have. All in all, although state-centric ability and involvement of other sectors regionalism is not necessarily bad, it can other than the central government. In generally reduce the public’s awareness supranationalism, regionalism is usually a Journal of ASEAN Studies 65

and involvement in the overall process, difference of 20-100 per cent between particularly those who are marginalized. western and eastern Indonesia. For example, a sack of cement can cost 10 Aside from ASEAN’s times more in eastern Indonesia than it is characteristics, Indonesia also faces a in the western area (Pambudy, 2011). problem in provincial disparity at various Under this condition, competitiveness will economic sectors, such as trade and also vary greatly between provinces in investment. In terms of foreign trade, data Indonesia since provinces which have shows that Indonesia has average export access to international ports will be more growth of 1.59 per cent in non-oil and competitive. Tanjung Priok port in Jakarta non-gas sector (Ministry of Trade, (Indonesia’s capital) currently accounts Republic of Indonesia, 2015). However, 18 for two-thirds of Indonesia’s international provinces (out of 32 provinces) records a trade (World Bank, 2014b) meaning that lower growth rate than the average rate as only one-third of Indonesia’s international well as 17 provinces experiencing a trade is done outside of the capital city. decline in export growth (Indonesian This shows that international trade is still Ministry of Trade, 2015). In terms of highly concentrated in the wealthiest area. investment, foreign investments are also mostly dominated in Java area Conclusion particularly in DKI Jakarta, West Java and Banten (BPS-Statistics Indonesia, 2015). Based on the discussion, it can be One exception is for East Kalimantan viewed that despite the implementation of province that records a high amount of decentralization, problem of inequality in foreign investment. This disparity Indonesia still exists (as is shown by Gini attributes to the fact that Indonesia has a Index). With regards to economic large gap in terms of conducting integration in Southeast Asia, positive international trade and attracting effects of ASEAN economic integration to investment. Not all provincial or city reduce intra-state inequality is still not government are equipped with the ability present. The implementation of ASEAN to create, promote, communicate or Free Trade Area in 1994 does not translate engage in foreign activities due their to reduced inequality and on the contrary, limited human resources. This in turn increases inequality. For Indonesia, the creates limitation for them to reap the biggest problem is the high discrepancy benefits of freer trade and investment between provinces and the limited flows. This situation is also worsened by capacity of provincial and city the high transactional cost between government. With limited capacity to provinces in Indonesia. engage in productive international relations, these cities and provinces may The high cost of domestic trade is lose their opportunity to benefit from the one element that can reduce Indonesia’s economic integration under ASEAN’s competitiveness at the global level (Asia scheme. Foundation, 2008). It is reported that Indonesia’s cost of transporting goods is About the Authors around USD 0.34 per kilometer which is higher than Asia’s average cost at USD Agus Suman is a lecturer at 0.22 per kilometer (Asia Foundation, 2008). Department of International Relations, This high logistics cost results in a price 66 Sub-National Government and the Problem of …

Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, Community. Journal of Current University of Brawijaya. Southeast Asian Affairs, 30(1), 39-67.

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Research Note Liberal World Order in the Age of Disruptive Politics: A Southeast Asian Perspective

Moch Faisal Karim University of Warwick, United Kingdom

Abstract

There is no question that the current liberal world order faces yet another challenge. The upcoming challenge that we are about to confront is an exceptionally different kind of challenge. This challenge is the emergence of what I call a disruptive politics in the heartland of consolidated liberal states. The two main side effects of disruptive politics can be seen at both the domestic and international levels. Domestically, there is growing rise of populism in stable western democracies epitomized with the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States of America. Internationally, there is a growing rejection of globalization and integration, exemplified by the UK leaving the EU. Many commentators and pundits have observed that the rise of disruptive politics is the very threat to the liberal world order that could eventually cause it to collapse from within. While the side effects of disruptive politics should be addressed with caution; however, it is misleading to equate the disruptive politics with its side effects such as the rise of populism and the growing contend with the globalization. I would argue that disruptive politics is necessary for the survival of the liberal world order. Disruptive politics is a way to make us realize that liberal democracy is not perfect, and we need to fix it. This essay explores the notion of disruptive politics and the challenge it poses. It begins by unpacking the notion. It then offers three insights on how to maintain the liberal world order in an age of disruptive politics.

Key words: disruptive politics, Liberal World Order, Donald Trump

The Challenges from within the non-western rising power that seemingly challenges the liberal world There is no question that the order has, for the most part, accepted this current liberal world order faces yet order and hugely benefitted from it. another challenge. Indeed, since its inception by the western power from the Nevertheless, the upcoming ashes of World War II, the liberal world challenge that we are about to confront is order has always been challenged, by the an exceptionally different kind of spread of communism during the Cold challenge. Many have thought that the War, and the rise of terrorism after 9/11, main challenges of the liberal world order which is becoming even more diffused and come from the without especially pressure decentralized. Despite the challenges, the from the others. Surprisingly the challenge liberal world order has survived and in fact comes from the within. This flourished. It provides a relatively more challenge is the emergence of what I call a stable world than before it existed. Even disruptive politics in the heartland of

Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2017), pp. 68-74 DOI: 10.21512/jas.v5i1.2129 ©2017 by CBDS Bina Nusantara University and Indonesian Association for International Relations ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic Journal of ASEAN Studies 69 consolidated liberal states. The two main the liberal world order should be side effects of disruptive politics can be maintained. seen at both the domestic and international levels. Domestically, there is growing rise Understanding Disruptive Politics of populism in stable western democracies within the Liberal Order epitomized with the election of Donald In 1995, Clayton Christensen (1997) Trump as President of the United States of put forward the notion of disruptive America. Internationally, there is a innovation as “an innovation that creates a growing rejection of globalization and new market and value network and integration, exemplified by the UK leaving eventually disrupts an existing market and the EU. value network.” Borrowing the notion of Many commentators and pundits disruptive innovation, I define disruptive have observed that the rise of disruptive politics as a politics that interrupts the politics is the very threat to the liberal established order of things, particularly in world order that could eventually cause it the core constituency of the liberal order. to collapse from within. International Disruptive politics is particularly experts like Stephen Walt (2016), Ian different from conventional contentious Buruma (2017), and the New York Times’ politics, defined as “a politics that uses Roger Cohen (2017) have warned about the disruptive methods to make a political dark times facing the liberal world order point or to change particular government with the recent disruptive politics policies” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). While happening in the western liberal contentious politics can be seen democracies. Joe Biden even stated that the throughout both democracies and liberal world order is at risk of collapsing autocracies, disruptive politics is a slow in his last international remarks as US Vice process within liberal democracy that President at the World Economic Forum in strikes at the very core of the liberal world Davos (Biden, 2017). order, namely liberal democracy and While the side effects of disruptive global capitalism. Just like the call for politics should be addressed with caution; democracy in an authoritarian regime, however, it is misleading to equate the disruptive politics within democracies is disruptive politics with its side effects. I mainly caused by the politics of would argue that disruptive politics is resentment, particularly towards the status necessary for the survival of the liberal quo and the elites who undermine the world order. Disruptive politics is a way to ordinary people. make us realize that liberal order is not In the authoritarian setting, perfect, and we need to fix it. disruption often occurred due to the lack of This policy note explores the notion freedom to contend the authoritarian rule of disruptive politics and the challenge it and demand on regime change. In liberal poses. It begins by unpacking the notion. It democracies with a stable democratic then considers the way in which global transfer of power, the very same leaders should manage the liberal world disruption rarely happened. Liberal order in the age of disruptive politics. This democracy has embraced protests and note concludes that there is a need for dissidents as part of its legitimation world leaders to rethink the way in which strategy and provided democratic platforms that neutralize resistance 70 Liberal World Order in the Age of Disruptive Politics

towards the status quo. But it does not opposite. Disruptive politics can have address the issue of inequality where the dangerous outcomes, but this is by no accumulation of power in the hands of the means the end of the liberal world order. It few has made the voice of most of the is Janus-faced. On the one hand, it might people unheard. An interesting study lead to the decline of liberal democracy conducted by political scientist Martin with the rise of populist nationalism where Gilens and Benjamin Page on the US angry democratic majorities rule, which democracy reveals that ordinary citizens might lead to the rise of authoritarian have a non-significant influence on public strong men. On the other hand, it could policies compared to the economic elites provide us with an opportunity to reform (Gilens & Page, 2014). With this condition, the core principles of liberal world order, democracy has been habituated as a which the national and global agenda have ceremonial celebration for the ordinary been aggressively pursuing, particularly citizens while the decisions are dominated since the end of the Cold War. Disruptive by rich and powerful elites. politics is a harsh wake up call to both the elites and the average citizens that the In the long run, just like in liberal world order is not without its authoritarian rule, liberal democracies, shortcomings. Through disruptive politics, instead of being the government of the we have been given a chance to step back people, by the people, and for the people, and reassess the national and global as envisioned by Abraham Lincoln, have agenda of the liberal world order. metamorphosed to become an oligarchy. The recent predicament in the liberal Managing Disruptive Politics: A democracies is perfectly summed up in Southeast Asian Perspective Animal Farm’s famous remarks, “all animals are equal, but some animals are With the emergence of disruptive more equal than others” (Orwell, 2003). To politics, what kind of global political order tame these circumstances, disruptive will emerge in the aftermath? This is politics is needed. indeed a very important question that has attracted the attention of the brightest Borrowing from Carol Hanisch minds. To contribute to the debate, I offer (1969), the occurrence of disruptive politics three insights on how to maintain the has made politics become more personal liberal world order in an age of disruptive and personal is political. While the status politics. quo within democracies has disconnected the politics from the people, disruptive First, the disruptive politics politics could empower people to be more happening in the western world could involved in politics for better or worse. provide fresh voices from the non-western Some commentators have even argued that powers to come up in defense of the liberal the recent rise of populist nationalism in world order. Rather than antagonizing mainstream western political discourse over the non-western powers’ motives in might have been made possible by a pursuing global leadership, it is time for collective loss of faith in democracy. western leaders to trust the non-western world in terms of the burden of leadership It is possible to read what I have sharing to maintain the global order. The written here as a defense of the rise of disruptive politics unfortunately has populism and the decline of liberal brought the discourse of protectionism and principles. But my message is the exact Journal of ASEAN Studies 71 anti-globalization into mainstream important in the region. The disruptive western politics, with President Trump’s politics with the election of Trump that statement “Buy American Hire American” focus on his “American first” slogan, has (Chu, 2017). Surprisingly it was the indeed shaken this progress and thus Chinese president, Xi Jinping who might change the balance in favor of China. denounced protectionism and defended globalization (Fidler, Chen, & Wei, 2017). However, the disruptive politics The so-called rising power that is certainly create a new space for second-tier considered illiberal is the one that countries in the Asia-Pacific to show their seemingly holds the principle of the liberal willingness to cooperate and initiate their order dearly. This suggests that even own commitment without the need to have though non-western powers may not yet the great power on board. Although fully embrace the liberal principles, they Donald Trump has succeeded in getting are aware of the importance of maintaining the United States out of the Trans-Pacific the liberal world order. Partnership (TPP), it does not necessarily make Asia-pacific countries unable to In the case of Southeast Asia, spawn similar things without the United Indonesia has tried to play a constructive States. At the APEC summit in Danang, role in supporting global world order Vietnam, Trade ministers from 11 Asia- particularly through the promotion of its Pacific countries agreed on to press ahead democratic values albeit in its own way with a major trade deal without the United and with its own caveats (Karim, 2017b). States, as they seek to go it alone without Indonesia has been a promoter of the involvement of Donald Trump’s democratic ideals and human rights values America. at the regional level. This shows that non- western power could become the Secondly, the disruptive politics supporter of western-dominated world has demonstrated how economic order in promoting western liberal norm. resentment towards global capitalism other than being supporter of western- emanating from perceived inequality dominated liberal order, countries within could tear apart the social fabric of the Southeast Asia also concern on the liberal order. Global capitalism has indeed importance of the western military lifted hundreds of millions of people out of presence as a force of balancing in the poverty around the world, especially in region (Karim & Chairil, 2016). Asia. Yet, it also brings huge inequality and social injustice too. In the eastern world, Indeed that disruptive politics China’s embrace of economic globalization create uncertainty for Southeast Asia given has not only made it an economic that regional architecture built by ASEAN powerhouse but has also led to it becoming has been based on US-sponsored liberal a country with one of the highest levels of international order through which ASEAN income inequality in the world, where one aimed to diffuse the norms into its regional percent of the richest households own a norm and mechanisms (Chong, 2017). third of the country’s wealth. The Moreover, under Obama’s leadership, conundrum that most of the time is ASEAN has been leveraged into one of the happening on the periphery has now most important agenda within the US reached its core. In the US, inequality has foreign policy with its pivot to Asia become even greater, reaching its most strategy thus boost ASEAN strategic extreme point since the Great Depression 7 2 Liberal World Order in the Age of Disruptive Politics

(Desilver, 2013). In Europe, inequality has ASEAN countries should pay attention to risen substantially since the mid-1980s concept of inclusive growth seriously. The (Fredriksen, 2012). Basically, inequality has inclusive growth could start with the become the Achilles heel of the liberal economic policy that focus on investing in order. I believe that the explanation for the public goods such as infrastructure, rise of racism and xenophobia as well as healthcare and the environment. the allure for the strong men in western democracies cannot be separated from the Thirdly, we need to reconsider the growing inequality within society. way in which the core values of the liberal Inequality will incite fear and insecurity order should be promoted. Democracy will among people. In return they can be easily be the most desirable form of government mobilized for hatred towards others and the global standard for legitimate (Karim, 2017a). It is time for the global governance, despite the seemingly leaders to genuinely focus on solving the democratic decline and the variety of tension between the inequality produced models that might not be particularly by market capitalism and the equality that liberal (Ikenberry, 2011). And so is is required by democracy. capitalism. Though not always subscribing to the notion of a liberal free-market, most Southeast Asia is also home for the of countries will eventually embrace rise of inequality particularly due to the capitalism as the way in which to govern impact the lack of the government to their economy in the foreseeable future. address market failure and reduce rent- However, the assumption that liberal seeking activities. While in general, the principles should be universally accepted case of inequality has been experienced by is not only wrong but also dangerous. Southeast Asian countries, however, Lao PDR and Indonesia have inequality trends We should learn on how the two that should be a cause of concerns (Yap, decades of liberal interventionist policy 2013). In a long run, the economic growth have failed and created more instability in without inequality would only create some parts of the world. It has even dissatisfaction that may lead to social nurtured antipathy from the periphery unrest. The inequality could also endanger states of the liberal order. The challenge the regional integration project in posed by disruptive politics also cautiously Southeast Asia once the project deemed to shows us that even mature liberal be detrimental toward the poor and democracy is not immune from shifting vulnerable section of the society given the towards an illiberal one. We should learn benefits of economic integration have often from history that there is always a danger been unequally distributed. of imperial overstretch even when it comes to ideas. Liberal principles might be the last It is the time for Southeast Asian man standing in history. Yet just like many countries to find out what is the best way other ideas, it is far from perfect. It is time to increase its wealth while at the same to be humble and let the two core liberal time reduce the gap of inequality. To do principles evolve into a variety of models this, at least, there should be a shift in how that stem from different cultural and the economic elites should see the historical contexts. development paradigm of neoliberal economic agenda which shows its failure Indeed, that there is a steady in creating wealth with equality. Thus, decrease of democratic space as well as the protections of human rights in Southeast Journal of ASEAN Studies 73

Asia. Many countries remain International Studies, University of undemocratic, and others have taken a Warwick, United Kingdom. His research worryingly repressive turn (Edwards & interest lies in the intersection of political Karim, 2016). This might be caused by the economy and International Relations (IR) negative views on democratic norm due to with an emphasis on Southeast Asia, the liberal interventionist policies that are particularly Indonesia. failing in any other parts of the world. Rather than seeing it as a failure of Reference democracy alone, disruptive politics Biden, J. (2017, January 18). Joe Biden’s last should remind us the need to create our major speech as Vice President in full. own system and norm that also reflect the Retrieved from World Economic Forum: universality of democratic and human https://www.weforum.org/agenda/201 rights norm while at the same time accept 7/01/joe-bidens-last-major-speech-in- the cultural and historical differences. In full/. this case, Southeast Asian countries should able to increase the role of ASEAN human Buruma, I. (2017, January 10). Hoping for the rights mechanisms as well as enabling its best against Trump. Retrieved from own civil society to foster its local norm on Project Syndicate: https://www.project- democracy and human rights. syndicate.org/commentary/hoping- against-trump-by-ian-buruma-2017- A Move Forward 01.

It seems quite self-evident to say Chong, J. I. (2017). Deconstructing order in that change always creates uncertainty, Southeast Asia in the age of Trump. and the way we perceive changes often Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal determines how we respond to them. But of International and Strategic Affairs, this is straightforward advice for us in an 39(1), 29-35. age of disruptive politics. Disruptive politics has certainly changed the course of Christensen, C. M. (1997). The innovator’s the liberal world order into unchartered dilemma: When new technologies cause territory. We can see it as a threat and great firms to fail. Harvard Business hence react accordingly. Or we can see it as School Press. an opportunity and thus mitigate its Chu, B. (2017, January 20). What does ‘buy negative side effects. The disruptive American and hire American’ actually politics happening in the western world mean? Retrieved from The should remind us that no matter how Independent: globalized and integrated our world is, our http://www.independent.co.uk/news/ thousand-year old tribalistic DNA is still business/news/buy-american-and- there. As long as a large segment of the hire-american-means-donald-trump- population do not feel the benefits and feel a7538231.html. alienated from the process, liberal principles only strengthen the boundaries Cohen, R. (2017, January 27). The closing of and thicken the barrier. Trump’s America. Retrieved from The New York Times: About the Author https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/ Moch Faisal Karim is currently a opinion/the-closing-of-trumps- Ph.D. Candidate in Politics and america.html. 7 4 Liberal World Order in the Age of Disruptive Politics

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