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Letter from Secretary-General

Honourable Delegates, Participants and Advisors,

It is with great pleasure and honour to welcome you all to the 5th edition of HASTRAIN which will be held on 26th and 27th of October at Kadir Has University Haliç Campus which is located at the Golden Horn of Istanbul.

This year in HASTRAIN we will simulate five committees with agenda items ranging from peace and security to economic development goals. With diverse topics and problems to solve, the committees will provide a platform for the youth to channel their ambition towards these crises’ that are currently negatively affecting the World.

With the topic of East , Sinxiang area in , the delegates of GA4: SPECPOL committee will try to reach a resolution whether there are inhumane actions and systematic genocide towards the Uigur people within the People’s Republic of China.

Throughout this journey my colleague and friend Oğuz Öğrenci will accompany me as the Deputy Secretery General of this conference along with the rest of the academic team including our USG’s and Academic Assistants with their exceptionary academic vision and knowledge

With that, i Look forward seeing all of our participants whether being a delegate, board member or an advisor on 26th of November at HASTRAIN 19. Welcome home.

Letter from Under Secretary-General

Most esteemed participants,

It is my upmost pleasure to welcome you all to Kadir Has University Model United Nations Training Conference 2019. My name is Doğan Bora Dikme and I am an Industrial Engineering student at Işık University. Even though my proficiency or line of work, probably, will not include politics, my admiration or pleasure I get from it are undoubtable. I believe everybody in their own terms has a political or diplomatic side throughout their life and they should take a part in it at least once in their life.

As an individual who believes in the diplomacy and peace, I aim to look upon world’s problems throughout alternative view, not the view that has been presented to us. I am delighted to work with my Assistant Under Secretary-General, Efe Saraç, who is much more than an AUSG for me and for the conference itself. He and I prepared this committee in order for you delegates to approach from different perspective to solve it while the world is crumbling under its pressure. The importance of this committee is that while you are trying to solve the problems and help the oppressed individuals in China, or show the world that there is no oppression it’s just as China has been telling the world, refers to your countries’ perspectives; you will learn how the SPECPOL works and acts.

I would like to give my special thanks firstly to esteemed Secretary-General Tolga Yeşil and his Deputy Secretary-General Oğuz Öğrenci, whom I have worked with numerous times before, for giving me and Efe a chance to create this committee and making this amazing conference.

Kind Regards,

Doğan Bora Dikme

Under Secretary-General responsible for SPECPOL Table of Contents

1. Letter from Secretary-General

2. Letter from Under Secretary-General

3. Introduction to the Committee

4. Introduction to the Agenda Item

A. History of

B. Socio-Economic Aspect

5. Actions That Taken by Chinese Government

A. Economic & Migration Policies to Xinjiang

B. ETIM, Anti-Terrorist and Re-Education Camps

6. Actions That Taken by International Communities

7. Points That Resolution Should Cover

8. References

I) Introduction to the Committee The Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) considers a broad range of issues covering a cluster of five decolonization-related agenda items, the effects of atomic radiation, questions relating to information, a comprehensive review of the question of peacekeeping operations as well as a review of special political missions, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the Report of the Special Committee on Israeli Practices and International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. In addition to these annual items, the Committee also considers the items on Assistance in mine action, and University for peace biennially and triennially respectively.

When it was first created, the Fourth Committee was solely responsible for matters of trusteeship and decolonization. However, the Committee's workload decreased when independence was granted to all the United Nations trust territories and the imminent dismantling of the trusteeship system. Consequently, the Fourth Committee was merged with the Special Political Committee, which had been created as a seventh main committee to deal with certain political issues.

SPECPOL meets every year from late September to mid-November, but also convenes briefly in the spring to adopt any resolutions and decisions relating to peacekeeping passed by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. All 193 member states of the UN can attend its meetings.

Unlike most other United Nations bodies, there is no general debate at the beginning of the Committee’s work. The Committee also allows for petitioners, i.e. civil society representatives and other stakeholders, to address it on decolonization issues II) Introduction to the Agenda Item A) The recorded history of Xinjiang dates to the 2nd millennium BC. There have been numerous civilizations such as and primarily Han, Turkic, and Mongolic, that have ruled over the region, including the , , , Cao Wei of the (Former Liang, Former Qin, Later Liang, and Western Liáng), , , , Kara-Khanid , ( Dynasty), Mongolic , and Manchu . Xinjiang was previously known as "Xiyu", under the Han Dynasty, which drove the Xiongnu empire out of the region in 60 BCE in an effort to secure the profitable , but was renamed Xinjiang (Meaning "new frontier") when the region was conquered by the Manchu-led Qing Dynasty in 1759. Xinjiang is now a part of the People's Republic of China, having been so since its founding year of 1949.

In ancient China, the area was known as "Xiyu" or "", a name that became prevalent in Chinese records after the Han Dynasty took control of the region. For the , the region is "Sharqi " (literally "Eastern Land of the Turks" in English). The region was referred to as part of "Turkistan" by the 13th century Venetian traveler Marco Polo. After the Qing Dynasty reconquered this region, the area was designated Xinjiang, which was used to refer to any area of former a Chinese empire that had been previously lost but was regained by the Qing, but eventually meant this northwestern Xinjiang alone. In the , Xinjiang is considered more center than northwestern in orientation.

Islamization

The ancient territory of what is known as Xinjiang includes one of the distinctive regions of the and , was initially populated by Indo-European Tocharian and Iranic people who rehearsed the Buddhist religion. The Turfan and Tarim Basins were populated by users of Tocharian language, with "Europoid" mummies found in the area. The region was exposed to Islamization in the hands of Turkic . The social shift was done between 9th and 11th centuries by two distinctive Turkic kingdoms, the Buddhist Uyghur Kingdom of and the Muslim Karluk Kara-Khanid Khanate. During the 10th century, the Saka Buddhist went under assault by the Turkic Muslim Karakhanid ruler Musa, and in what demonstrated to be a vital occasion in the Islamization of the Tarim Basin, the Karakhanid leader Yusuf Qadir vanquished Khotan around 1006.

Professor James A. Millward classifed the first Uyghurs as physically Mongoloid, giving considerable evidences in Bezeklik at Temple 9 of the Uyghur benefactors, until they started to blend with the Tarim Basin's eastern Iranian occupants. The current Uyghur community are presently a blended ethnic gathering of East Asian Mongoloid and Europoid Caucasian populaces.

Administration

Xinjiang is divided into thirteen prefecture-level divisions: four prefecture-level cities, six prefectures, and five autonomous prefectures (including the sub-provincial of , which in turn has two of the seven prefectures within its jurisdiction) for Mongol, Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Hui minorities. At the end of the year 2017, the total population of Xinjiang is 24.45 million.

These are then divided into 13 districts, 25 county-level cities, 62 counties, and 6 autonomous counties. Ten of the county-level cities do not belong to any prefecture, and are de facto administered by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. Sub-level divisions of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is shown in the adjacent picture and described in the table below:

Administrative divisions of Xinjiang

Prefecture-level city district areas County-level cities

Divisions[94] Divisi Populati No Area in Aut. CL on Division 2[92] on Seat Distric Counti . [91] km [93] counti citie code 2010 ts es

es s Xinjiang 65000 Uyghur 1664900. 21,813,3 Ürümqi cit 13 62 6 25 0 Autonomous 00 34 y

Region 65010 3,110,28 Tianshan 1 Ürümqi city 13787.90 7 1

0 0 District 65020 2 Karamay city 8654.08 391,008 4

0 District 65040 3 city 67562.91 622,679 1 2

0 District 65050 142094.8 Yizhou 4 city 572,400 1 1 1

0 8 District 65230 1,428,59 5 Autonomous 73139.75 Changji city 4 1 2 0 2

Prefecture Bortala 65270 6 Autonomous 24934.33 443,680 Bole city 2 2 0

Prefecture Bayingolin 65280 470954.2 1,278,49 7 Autonomous city 7 1 1 0 5 2

Prefecture 65290 Aksu 127144.9 2,370,88 8 8 1

0 Prefecture 1 7 Kizilsu 65300 9 Autonomous 72468.08 525,599 city 3 1 0

Prefecture 65310 Kashi 137578.5 3,979,36 10 Kashi city 10 1 1

0 Prefecture 1 2 65320 249146.5 2,014,36 11 Hotan city 7 1

0 Prefecture 9 5 Ili 65400 56381.53 2,482,62 12 Autonomous city 7 * 1 * 3 * 0 * 7 *

Prefecture 12 65420 1,219,21 Tacheng cit 94698.18 4 1 2 a 0 Prefecture* 2 y 12 65430 Altay 117699.0 526,980 6 1 b 0 Prefecture* 1

65900 Hongshan A city 456.84 635,582 1

1 Subdistrict Renmin 65900 B city 5266.00 166,205 Road 1 2

Subdistrict 65900 Qiganquele C city 1927.00 147,465 1

3 Subdistrict Jinyinchuan 65900 D Aral city 740.00 72,613 Road 1 4

Subdistrict 65900 E Beitun city 910.50 76,300 Beitun town 1 5 65900 Tiemenguan Chengqu F 590.27 50,000 1

6 city Subdistrict 65900 cit Tasierhai to G 742.18 53,800 1 7 y wn 65900 Kokdala to H Kokdala city 979.71 75,000 1 8 wn 65900 I Kunyu city 687.13 47,500 Kunyu town 1 9 Sub-provincial prefecture Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps cities * – or are subordinate to Ili Prefecture. / The population or area figures do not include Altay Prefecture or Tacheng Prefecture which are subordinate to Ili Prefecture.

B) Socio-Economic Aspect Xinjiang being the agriculturally rich of the stores of minerals and oil, and Ostensible GDP was about 932.4 billion RMB (US$140 billion) starting at 2015 with a normal yearly increment of 10.4% for as far back as four years, because of disclosure of the rich stores of , oil, gas just as the China Western Development arrangement acquainted by the State Council with lift monetary improvement in . Its per capita GDP for 2009 was 19,798 RMB (US$2,898), with a development pace of 1.7%. Southern Xinjiang, with 95% non-Han populace, has a normal for every capita pay a large portion of that of Xinjiang in general.

In July 2010, China Daily reported that:

“Local governments in China's 19 provinces and municipalities, including , , , and , are engaged in the commitment of "pairing assistance" support projects in Xinjiang to promote the development of agriculture, industry, technology, education and health services in the region.”

Agriculture and Fishing

Principle region is of watered farming. By 2015, the horticultural land zone of the area is 631 thousand km2 or 63.1 million ha, of which 6.1 million ha is arable land. In 2016, the all-out developed land rose to 6.2 million ha, with the harvest creation arriving at 15.1 million tons. was the primary staple yield of the locale, maize developed also, millet found in the south, while just a couple of zones (specifically, Aksu) developed rice.

Cotton turned into a significant harvest in a few desert springs, remarkably Khotan, Yarkand, and Turpan by the late 19th century. Xinjiang is well known for its grapes, melons, pears, pecans, especially Hami melons and Turpan raisins.

The domesticated animals of the locale have generally been . A significant part of the district's pastureland is in its northern part, where more precipitation is accessible, however there are mountain pastures all through the area. Because of the absence of access to the sea, and restricted measure of inland water, Xinjiang's fish assets are constrained. In any case, there is a lot of height changes in Lake Ulungur and Lake Bosten and in the River. An enormous number of fishponds have been developed since the 1970s, their surface surpasses 10,000 hectares by the 1990s. In 2000, the aggregate of 58,835 tons of fish was delivered in Xinjiang, 85% of which originated from aquaculture.

Previously, the Lop Lake was known for its fisheries, and the zone occupants, for their angling society; presently, because of the redirection of the waters of the Tarim River, the lake has dried out.

Mining and Minerals

Xinjiang was known for transporting salt, pop, borax, gold and jade in the 19th century. The oil and gas industry in Aksu and Karamay is on the rise, with the West–East Gas Pipeline connecting to Shanghai. The oil and petrol division get up to 60 percent of Xinjiang's economy. Containing over a fifth of China's coal, petrol and oil assets, Xinjiang has the most astounding centralization of goods and derivative stores of any district in the nation.

Foreign Trade

Xinjiang's fares added up to US$19.3 billion, while imports ended up being US$2.9 billion of since 2008. The larger part of the general import/export out volume in Xinjiang was coordinated to through Ala Pass. China's first fringe facilitated commerce zone (Horgos Free Trade Zone) was situated at the Xinjiang-Kazakhstan in the outskirt of city of Horgos. Horgos is the biggest "land port" in China's western district and it has simple access to the Central Asian market. Xinjiang additionally opened its subsequent outskirt exchange market to Kazakhstan March 2006, the Jeminay Border Trade Zone.

Some Economic and Technological Development Zones:

 Bole Border Economic Cooperation Area

 Shihezi Border Economic Cooperation Area

 Tacheng Border Economic Cooperation Area

 Ürümqi Economic & Technological Development Zone is northwest of Ürümqi. It was approved in 1994 by the State Council as a national level economic and technological development zones. It is 1.5 km (0.93 mi) from the Ürümqi International Airport, 2 km (1.2 mi) from the North Railway Station, and 10 km (6.2 mi) from the city center. Wu Chang Expressway and 312 National Road passes through the zone. The development has unique resources and geographical advantages. Xinjiang's vast land, rich in resources, borders eight countries. As the leading economic zone, it brings together the resources of Xinjiang's industrial development, capital, technology, information, personnel and other factors of production.

 Ürümqi Export Processing Zone is in Urumuqi Economic and Technology Development Zone. It was established in 2007 as a state-level export processing zone.

 Ürümqi New & Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone was established in 1992, and it is the only high-tech development zone in Xinjiang, China. There are more than 3470 enterprises in the zone, of which 23 are Fortune 500 companies. It has a planned area of 9.8 km2 (3.8 sq mi), and it is divided into four zones. There are plans to expand the zone.

 Yining Border Economic Cooperation Area

III) Actions That Taken by Chinese Government A) Economic & Migration Policies to Xinjiang

‘We say China is a country vast in territory, rich in resources and large in populations; it is the Han nationality whose population is large and the minority nationalities whose territory is vast and whose resources are rich'

Mao Zedong

After the establishment of Chinese Communist Party in 1949, the People’s Republic of China gained control in Eastern Turkestan in a short time and since then China is applying various policies to "integrate" its Turkic-Muslim Uyghur population into Chinese economic life. In 1954 Beijing Government established Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). Officially this organization was established for guarding the western frontier of China and sustain a healthy development in agriculture and industry in the region. On the other hand, some scholars argue that XPCC was a Han organization and its aim to ensure that sufficient is settled and remained in the territory. When the organization established, it was consisted of 175 thousand soldiers 86% of them being Hans. i. In the beginning, the organization was primarily focused on mass agricultural production. Then it also focused on sectors such as , steel, chemical, textiles, coal mining and food processing. In 1975 the XPCC was dissolved and its assets were transferred to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Administration. In the year 1981 XPCC was restored and the assets were shared among XUAR Administration and XPCC. Today under its administration, it has 700,000 productive employees, approximately 400 thousand of them being farmers and the rest are civil servants such as teachers, doctors and staff working in other sectors.ii After Xinjiang being part of China, the Chinese government orchestrated intense Han migrations and increased the proportion of Han's in the population between 1949 and 2008 from 6,7 % (220,000) to 40% (8,4 Million).iii Most of the Uyghurs lived in the traditional Tarim Basin territory, where the fundamental economic activity is agriculture. On the other hand, Han migrants were systematically settled into more industrialized cities such as Urumqi while Uyghurs were forced to settle in the south of the territory.iv The following maps indicate the population change in Xinjiang in 1998-2009

On the other hand, Beijing applied strong economic policies at various times to strengthen the economy of the territory. In the year 1999, President Jiang Zemin has initialized the project known as The Great Leap West. As the output of the project, new and modern airports, railroads, highways and telecommunication networks. In the first year, the budget was approximately 100 Billion Chinese Yuan 's (approximately 14 Billion United States Dollars). This heavy investment in Beijing drastically increased the GDP of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The following chart shows the GDP growth in the territory between 1978 and 2010.

For Beijing, this project was a success. Wages increased and infrastructure of the territory is modernized. But on the other hand, Uyghurs argue that the Han’s are being employed for the newly created jobs throughout the project and trying to emphasize the international community that those policies cause economic inequality. In contrast, average Uyghur income in Urumqi in 2010 was 893 Yuan's but the average income of a Han was 1,141 Yuan’s.v It is important to bear in mind that most of the natural resources of the territory are being transported to the other parts of the country. For instance, 2% of petroleum stays in the territory. The rest is being transferred to the out of the territory via the Xinjiang- Shanghai gas pipelinevi. Those economic policies applied in the territory which causes economic inequality could be regarded as one of the reasons behind the social problems in the territory. In 2013 President Xi Jinping announced the Belt-and-Road Initiative. It aims to resurrect the historical Silk Road in a modern sense with also a maritime route to make it as the most vital for the world economy. Its route will be going through of 69 countries, which generates 42% of the world GDP and owns 75% of the known energy sources. This project is empowered by 1 Trillion Dollars to build new transport & trade facilities, energy plants, and natural gas pipelines.vii This project also has importance for the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the new Silk-Road will go through Urumqi, and it is a fact that the project will increase wealth in the territory. But, the question of, will this wealth be distributed among Uyghurs and Hans in the territory remains while China is applying unjust economic and social policies towards Uyghurs.

B) ETIM, Anti-Terrorism and Re-Education Camps i. ETIM After the September 11 attacks on World Trade Center and other crucial locations in the United States, the international community initialized global “War on Terror" campaign under the leadership of the United States and its allies. As mentioned above People's Republic of China has been discriminating Uyghurs in terms of migration and economic policies, Beijing government started to see its Turkic-Muslim population as a treat to its peace and at from Chinese point of view, the government started to fight what they call "the three evils": separatism, religious extremism and international terrorism" at all costs. To understand the Chinese policy against terrorism, first, it is important to understand the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). ETIM is an organization which was founded by Ziyauddin Yusuf and Hasan Mahsum in 1989 with the aim of establishing an independent within China and since its establishment and since then it is active in China, , Kazakhstan, and . The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement was listed on 11 September 2002 pursuant to the paragraphs 1 and 2 of the resolution 1390 as being affiliated with Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden or the Taliban for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of” or “otherwise supporting acts or activities of” Al-Qaeda.viii. After getting strong in the territory, ETIM has set up camps outside China to recruit and train terrorists and sent back them to China to undertake terrorist attacks. Such as bombing buses, cinemas, stores, hotels and marketplaces. On May 23, 1998, ETIM members have blown op a warehouse in the Urumqi Train Station, armed looting of approximately 247,000 RMB Yuan in Urumqi on 4 February 1999. They also conducted two bombings in 1999 and those bombings resulted in the deaths of 140 people and injuries to 371. On September 2002, Chinese police seized 98 guns and 4500 anti-tank grenades and supplies used in bomb-making from ETIM in a raid. Following that year, ETIM’s plan to bomb the United States Embassy in Bishkek, was failed due to co-operation between Kyrgyz and American Government. In 2003, Hasan Mahsum was killed in a raid conducted by the Pakistani forcesix. In 2007, ETIM sent its effective members to China to establish new camps within the country. However, Chinese forces arrested those members when an ETIM cell house was disclosed.x. In 2008 when the international community was mostly focused on the Olympics which held in Beijing, ETIM drew the public attention by undertaking a series of attacks and killings and deadly bus explosions in Xinjiang. On April 9, 2008, ETIM posted a video with its own logo, which shows the executions of three Han Chinese. On May 2005, ETIM claimed the bombing of two buses in two different cities: Longwan Village in City, Zhejiang Province and Shanghai. In total 22 people were dead, and 57 people were injured. The aforementioned bombing in Shanghai is quite controversial because it was officially regarded as a traffic accident. After that ETIM claimed the attack but while claiming it, they have indicated another date than the incident has occurred. By that, Chinese Government rejected the claim of ETIM by stating, there is no evidence that links the incident with ETIM. 6 Months prior to the Olympics ETIM published a series of videos, claiming that they are claiming all recent attacks in China and said “We have completed our preparations for striking the Olympic Games and thwarting them. We will make this year a year of grief and terror for all Chinese, turning their joy into funeral processions and tears everywhere”. But ETIM did not undertake any attacks in Beijing but conducted several in Xinjiang.xi ii. Anti-Terrorism and Re-Education Camps In July 2009, riots broke out in Urumqi, Xinjiang and according to the Chinese government, the riot resulted with 197 deaths, 137 of them being Han’s and the rest were Uyghurs, and 1.700 people were injured. On the other hand, more than 1,500 people were arrested.

Footage from the Urumqi Riots (2009)

There was much reason behind the riots, such as governments’ acts of social and economic injustice towards Uyghur which caused unemployment and unrest. But the trigger event was a brawl in Xuri Toy Factory in , Guangdong Province which is 3,000 kilometers away from Urumqi. The brawl began after a Han girl entered the Uyghur dormitory in the factory and the rumor had spread that she was sexually assaulted by Uyghurs in the dormitory. Following this, Chinese factory workers and Chinese mob have retaliated the situation with machetes and killed two Uyghurs and 118 were injured and 13 of them being seriously injured.xii

Footage from the toy factory brawl.

Since 2014, the Beijing government, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, started applying controversial anti-terrorism methods towards against Uyghurs stating that they are fighting against extremism in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The Chinese government is trying to shape Islamic faiths and beliefs for the sake of authority of the atheist, Chinese Communist Party. In other words, Beijing believes that its Muslim population is eager to separate from the People's Republic of China and that would paralyze the Belt and Road Initiative, the modern Silk Way project. Chinese government started to do mass detentions, extreme surveillance and apply strict rules to Uyghurs such as: forbidding , banning religious appearance ( including facial hair and clothing), the requirement of pilgrimages to Mecca to be organized by the state, limit the usage of halal banner only in few edible products, banning the religious education from the schools and banning children to participate in any kinds of religious practices even with their family and banning students to drop out from the school due to religious reasons and some say that Chinese government put poster of President Xi Jinping on Mihrabs ( to direction you worship which resembles Allah) in Mosques to stop people from worshipping their God.xiii.

On the other hand, Beijing has established, Re-education camps, in their words, Vocational Training Centers in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Since 2017, between 800,000 and 2 Million Uyghurs and other Muslims such as and being detained in those camps and most of the inmates are not charged with any crimes. According to an Amnesty International report, individuals might be detained due to suspicious acts in their social media accounts, and according to the already mentioned report, Chinese government regards sending greeting message via WhatsApp (which has end-to-end encryption system) as a suspicious activity due to its state' inability to monitorxiv. Inside of the camps, the inmates are forced to pledge their allegiance and loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party, sing communism praising songs and quit Islam. Inmates are being monitored 24/7, and face torture. Some reports show that some inmates have witnessed suicides. On the other hand, it is important to bear in mind that, children whose parents are detained are forced to stay in government-run orphanages and they are not able to contact their parents.

The following two states the positions of the Beijing Government and Uyghurs respectively

The training has only one purpose: to learn laws and regulations…to eradicate from the mind thoughts about religious extremism and violent terrorism, and to cure ideological diseases. If the education is not going well, we will continue to provide free education, until the students achieve satisfactory results and graduate smoothly. —Speech by Chinese Communist Youth League Xinjiang Branch, March 2017

What they want is to force us to assimilate, to identify with the country, such that, in the future, the idea of Uyghur will be in name only, but without its meaning. Tohti, who left Xinjiang in 2017, March 2018

There are twenty-seven confirmed camps as it mentioned in the map and the total number of the camps is estimated to be as high as 1,200.

IV) Actions That Taken by International Community It is a known fact that the international community failed to act against policies of Beijing applied in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Mostly the non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are acting. But without inter-state co-operation, it is certain that things won't change for Uyghurs in the territory. On the other hand, the international community have witnessed few turning points regarding the . In March 2016 twelve countries lead by the United States issued a joint statement, stating their concerns for Uyghurs in Xinjiang. In July 2019, a new joint-statement has issued by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, which urges to end its mass arbitrary detentions and violation against Muslims in the territory . As an answer to this statement UN Ambassadors of 37 countries including the Russian Federation, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and North Korea have released a letter defending China's policies in Xinjiang. V) Points That Resolution Should Cover 1. Are the Beijing government’s actions against Uyghurs just? 2. What can the international community do to make the process in the re-education camps more transparent? 3. How could the economic inequality in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) be reduced? 4. How can PR China run its war-on-terror campaign in XUAR in accordance with the international law and in co-operation with other nations? 5. How could the Muslim populated countries get involved with the conflict? VI) References

i McMillen, D. (1981). Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps: A Han Organisation in a Non-Han Region. The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 6, pp.65-96. ii Dr Yajun Bao, D. and Dr Yajun Bao, D. (2019). The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps: an Insider’s Perspective. [online] blogs.bsg.ox.ac.uk. Available at: https://blogs.bsg.ox.ac.uk/2018/02/02/the-xinjiang-production-and-construction-corps-an-insiders- perspective/ [Accessed 31 Aug. 2019]. iii Liu, A. and Peters, K. (2019). The Hanification of Xinjiang, China: The Economic Effects of the Great Leap West. iv Dr Yajun Bao, D. and Dr Yajun Bao, D. (2019). The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps: an Insider’s Perspective. [online] blogs.bsg.ox.ac.uk. Available at: https://blogs.bsg.ox.ac.uk/2018/02/02/the-xinjiang-production-and-construction-corps-an-insiders- perspective/ [Accessed 31 Aug. 2019].

v Zang, Xiaowei. 2011. ‘Uyghur–Han Earnings Differentials in Ürümchi.” The China Jour- nal 65: 141–55.

vi Tyler, Christian. 2003. Wild West China: The Taming of Xinjiang. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

vii TOLOnews. (2019). The Eurasian Nucleus Of China’s Belt And Road Investments | TOLOnews. [online] Available at: https://www.tolonews.com/opinion/eurasian-nucleus-china’s-belt-and-road- investments [Accessed 12 Sep. 2019]. viii https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/easter n-turkistan-islamic-movement ix http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/24/content_293163.htm x https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/easter n-turkistan-islamic-movement xi Foreign Affairs. (2019). The ETIM: China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat; The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land.. [online] Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2011-01-01/etim-chinas-islamic-militants- and-global-terrorist-threat-uyghurs [Accessed 9 Sep. 2019]. xii Hays, J. (2019). XINJIANG RIOTS IN 2009 | Facts and Details. [online] Factsanddetails.com. Available at: http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat5/sub89/item1005.html [Accessed 10 Sep. 2019]. xiii Human Rights Watch. (2019). “Eradicating Ideological Viruses” | China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims. [online] Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign- repression-against-xinjiangs [Accessed 10 Sep. 2019]. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-crackdown-uighurs-xinjiang xiv Amnesty.org. (2019). Up to one million detained in China’s mass “re-education” drive. [online] Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/china-up-to-one-million-detained/ [Accessed 10 Sep. 2019].

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