The Syrian Coast: A Painting Of Demographic Changes In The Security And Economic balances

Kamal Shahin

The key to understanding the gravity of demographic changes affecting countries in times of war lies in the undeclared recognition of an imbalance in the social contract, which is supposed to formulate and form an inclusive national identity, which builds a correct relationship between the individual and the guarantor state of his rights and duties, and refers collective affiliation to national levels. Under the nine-year-old Syrian war, the demographic dimension has become one of the most important reasons for the continuation of the Syrian conflict, primarily linked to the structures (sectarian and denominational) of the national community, the sects are not abstract entities, self-growing, and they are not (sects only within the state, not alone). The state (that ensure the perpetuation of the movement of the sects to reproduce political entities, and within the frame of the state, they are institutions1, and secondly linked to the basis of building the modern state, that is, the nationalism in its contemporary enlightenment role. The demographic dimension also took the greatest impact by moving from the level of internal conflict to the level of regional and international conflict, with a diligent work on the shredding of the fabric and the national entity, which remained mostly trying to resist the deliberate dismantling by all parties involved

1 Mahdi Amel, In the Sectarian State, First Edition, Dar Al-Farabi, , 1986, p. 23. in the Syrian fighting, the first of which is the policies of the regime and the opposition. It is evident in the different communities working to protect themselves instinctively and culturally from the acts of exclusion, tyranny and collective exclusion of all the evil of the Syrian war. One model of war that can be argued is the reality of the Syrian coast, the economic and social, since 2011 until now, the presence of hundreds of thousands of loyal residents - to varying degrees - and a few opposed to the orientations of the political regime, with hundreds of thousands of displaced people loyal, opposed and neutral - to varying degrees - from different areas, where the Syrian realities during the nine-year crisis record a small percentage of the clashes between residents and displaced persons, and many community solidarity processes with the displaced, as recognized by the international community itself, may in some ways be one of pain sharing. There are many explanations for what happened, one of which is the propaganda narrative of the political regime that what happened was a "real extension of a national cohesion that existed before the conspiracy against the country", and these do not withstand the attack of criticism under the sovereignty of the totalitarian security state, the most present and close to reality according to that, in one of its aspects, was as unconscious societal preservation of a social pattern that historically constituted one of the pillars of the Syrian state since the independence, before the power swallowed up the state itself, swallowed this unifying pattern, and framed it within its demagogic nationalist concepts. Some of the concerned argue that the political regime would have been able to create problems between residents and the displaced people if it wanted to. 2 This is true in principle. These communities are not immune to infiltration and are subject to heavy security authority. In addition, these IDPs are specifically considered "state supporters" (not the regime). This was enough to give them the instrument of forgiveness, without ignoring the fact that the relationship between the Syrian citizen and the individual with the state / authority, in the context of its last five decades, it is an ambiguous relation and not based on the social contract (rights and obligations).

Historical Context of the Demographic Coast until 2011

There was no sectarian or ethnically pure area in , especially in cities that play an attractive role for individuals and groups of different sects. In the 1870s, according to historian Elias Saleh, was a predominantly Christian and Sunni Arab minority with no Alawite presence.3 In a census in 1946, during which Mounir al-Sharif was governor of Lattakia (including Tartous), the Syrian coast included 13 religious components (including Jews), and ethnic (including Armenians, so far in Kassab). The number of Christians, of all religious and national denominations, are almost equal to the number of Sunni Arabs, there were not within the boundaries of the administrative city any . While the coastal mountain areas included Alwites with the presence of a Christian and Sunni (Duraykish and Safita in Tartous, for example). 4

2 Researcher: Rateb Shaabou from a dialogue with the writer. 3 Elias Saleh, Effects of the Era in Latakia, Manuscript, Rewritten and Achieved by Salman Aziz Asaad, Dar Al-Manara, 2007, 388 p. 4 Mohammed Hawash, Republic Formation, Tourist Library, , Lebanon, I, p. 228 After the seventies of the twentieth century, the demographic map of Syria changed as a whole, the map of the city of Latakia changed with a large rural influx from nearby mountains, and the population increased until 2010 it reached nearly 800 thousand and half of them are Alawites, especially after the opening of Tishreen University in 1975, while the population of the city of Tartous was approximately half a million (80% Alawites, 10% Christians, and 10% Sunnis)5 .In the mid-1990s, the Syrian coast witnessed again migrations from nearby interior areas, especially , Jisr al-Shughour and some areas of countryside. A long time ago (they are called the "Eastern")6 and they are not welcome from the Sunnis of Lattakia, who live in Saliba and Tabiat neighborhoods, because of their economic competition. Rural-to-urban migration is a global phenomenon, not just a monopoly for Syria. As the reasons vary, political and social stability and the search for better options for life have created rural-to-urban migration, including educational migrations, without ignoring the failure of rural development policies, and the first one is the failure to manage water resources in an area such as the Upper Mesopotamia (called California Syria in the 1950s) created a forced migration to marginalized neighborhoods on the outskirts of major cities, such as , , and Latakia. The Syrian War and the Reverse Demographic Change

The displacement of the Syrians took the form of sudden and successive human waves, depending on the development of the

5 Syrian Statistical Group, 2010, Lattakia Governorate 6 Idlib and Jisr al-Shughur are located approximately east of Latakia, meaning the title, coming from the east. joints of crisis and war, followed by the movement of the "last minute decision", first the cities turned, and villages later, to a volcano flush thousands of waves emanating to the various sides, the displacement did not stop at one point, but it was repeated dozens of times and many IDPs were stranded in hard- to-reach areas.7 This forced displacement was multi-level, in more than 296 areas across the country, the largest of which was in rural Damascus, Aleppo, and , and to a lesser extent in Deir Ezzor, Al-Hasakeh and , while the displacement in the coast was limited to the group of villages in the northern countryside. 8 some of them (especially Aleppo), went to the coast, some of whom stayed there, and some considered it a stop on the journey to Turkey, Europe or other areas in neighboring countries (Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt, while Iraq saw the reception of more than 150 thousand Kurds in Erbil alone). By the end of 2017, UN statistics indicated that 6.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), nearly half a million of whom arrived at the Syrian coast without a fixed figure,9 constituted a slight increase in population, without significant impact on the structure of society itself, The main factor in determining this trend has been the security. In times of peace and prosperity, a process of sectarian dissolution usually occurs, but in wartime, the security provided by societies (although they appeared sectarianly united) takes precedence over other causes. 10

7 Kamal Shahin, Displacement Seasons, Arab Ambassador, April 29, 2019 8 Whole of syria 2018 protection overview-V2, P88, Avaliale at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/protection.pdf 9 Syrian cities lost a fifth of its population! The dispersion in the city is higher than in the countryside, Qassioun Newspaper, issue 809, May 7, 2017. 10 Sectarianism in Syria’s civil war, Fabric Balanche, The Washington Institute For NEAR EAST Policy, p.91. A study conducted in the Mashreq Arab Migration Project shows that 67% of those leaving for These displaced people were distributed in different areas of the Syrian coast, including the countryside, where some rented houses and started multiple works, repositioning the economic market in the coast, specifically for small businesses, and a new culture of work, which in a short time has left its mark on the market. The poorest of the displaced have been housed in unused or used schools, camps or colleges. Recent influxes of displaced people have inhabited locations far from cities and in social environments that are very different from their original, but economically identical, creating a new reality in which Syrians get to know each other away from preconceived notions, although the fear factor has prevailed for years, by virtue of the extremely dangerous security reality for any coming from non- loyal or even neutral environments.

Socio-economic reality Beginning in mid-2017, the local authorities began dismantling shelters and to give choice to the residents either to return to their original places or to move to other places of residence. Most of the centers on the Syrian coast have been closed, the last one was Al- Jendiriya center which was closed last year. Some of the reasons for this behavior are due to the mechanisms of the interaction of the Aleppo refugee issue with the local environment in two directions: the first with the loyalists, or those who are clearly not with power (the countryside), and the integration between the two parties was rapid, because they benefited from the labor force of Aleppo, or to form partnerships with the Aleppians. While the Aleppians clashed

Turkey chose it because of the safety factor and fear of retaliation in government-controlled areas, followed by a much smaller percentage that put the political factor first. with the city, they became economic rivals for the Latakani merchant or industrialist. In addition to the migration factor from the country, where more than 5 million Syrians have arrived in other countries, the current scene in the reality of the IDPs is the attempt to leave to their areas of residence, who have not been able to instill new roots in the cities and regions of the coast, or whose economic situation worsened. Socially, there can be minor changes in the relationship between the displaced and the customs of coastal society. There is a noticeable change in the traditional dress, and there are dozens of cases of mixed marriages, without all these changes being an integrated community phenomenon. It is not possible to know the number of IDPs who left the coast inward or outward, as there is no official census, but it can be seen the decline in the number of economic cities, in the city of Tartous, the proportion of departures appears less than Lattakia, and Banias, while in the countryside, the remaining rates are also few. 11 Changes in the last two years

In view of the many variables that have flowed in the last two years at the Syrian level, most notably the low frequency military operations, and the fact that any military move is subject to international consensus among Syrian blood partners, the war and its tracks have lost their first position in favor of the economic situation, where it can be seen that the Syrian army's control over the rest areas of Hama countryside and some of Idlib countryside did not have a significant effect similar to what happened in regaining control over the areas of Ghouta, Aleppo

11 Local views. or Homs, in contrast, shows the amount of large virtual protests on the rise of the dollar exchange rates, which amounted to 700 SP, up more than 150 pounds in less two weeks, the huge impact of the continuing economic reality in the deterioration, which effectively paralyzed the markets in the first vegetable- producing region in Syria, where Syrians talked that the series of power outages. In the winter season, the fear of the absence of heating and cooking materials (diesel and gas) has begun to take place in the absence of distribution of any amount of diesel so far, which was supposed to start since the end of August, but this has not happened so far . The most prominent talk that occupies the coastal street is the talk of the house arrest of the famous businessman Rami Makhlouf (the cousin of the president), and the businessman Samer Fawz took his place in the management of the business empire and its affiliates. The decision to place the Al-Bustan Charity Society (affiliated with Rami) under the management of the Presidential Palace has been at the forefront of the oral headlines, as the only founding association that primarily served the coast and in the absence of any official explanation for what happened, rumors remain the dominant position, without moving into the usual virtual context, as a means of reporting news in Syria. That was not strange foe the people due to the arrest of a number of activists for days as a result of writing posts on Facebook pages, the latest of which was Nabih Nabhan, who was released a few weeks ago, was a clear message that things were still under security control.

What about the future? The situation of the Syrian coast does not differ from the rest of the other areas of "beneficial Syria" 12, waiting real change. The international powers, the decision-makers, do not appear to have taken their decision yet, given the inability of the loyal and opposition national forces to make any attempt to change. It was reflected in the apparent indifference of the people to the formation of the Constitutional Commission, which had been waiting for years, and the start of Turkey's establishment of the safe area north and east of the country, although this would open the door to further regional and local conflicts. On the coast, the sense of powerlessness is amplified by successive shocks that have shown the fragility of the regime that is not serious about changing human conditions for the better. Anti-corruption measures seem to be a recurring play that has no credibility. Everyone knows that the horse stud is not in this place, but elsewhere where no hands or legal proceedings can catch.

12The term is now given to areas controlled by the Syrian government