11M75-016
CommunistMWtaryand Economic Aid to NorthVietnam1970-74
3 January1975 ~HIIII
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: JAN 2005
(b) (1) (b) (3)
COMMUNISTMILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO NORTHVIETNAM,1970-1974 COMMUNISTMILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO NORTHVIETNAM,19701974
KEY POINTS
Communist aid to NorthVietnam from 1970-1974 is estimated at
$5.6 billion. TotalCommunistmilitary and economic aid was higher in 1974 than in any previous year as the followingtableindicates.
CommunistMilitary and Economic Aid to North Vietnam~
MillionCurrent US $
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1970 1974
Military 205 315 750 330 400 2,000 Economic 675 695 695-720 425 440 575 605 1,150 1,190 3,520 3,650 Total.. 880 900 1,010-1,035 1,175 1,190 905 935 1,550 1,590 5,520 5,650
These data combineintelligenceestimates with US analogies where appropriate. Tables based wholly on analogies to US aid programs in South Vietnam, which we believeportray less valid estimates than those above, are also shown in the text.
The high level of militarydeliveries in 1972 replaced North Vietnamesecombatlosses in that year.
The cessation of US air attacks in NorthVietnam at the begin ning of 1973 and the decline in combatactivity in the South in 1973 resulted in decreases in air defenseequipmentassist-
This memorandum has been preparedjointly by the CentralIntelligenceAgency and the DefenseIntelligenceAgency, and has been concurred in by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,Department of State.
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ance and in the amount of ammunition and ground forces equipmentprovided to Hanoi.
In 1974, the delivery of ammunition to Hanoimarkedly in creased and reached a level as high as that of 1972,although deliveries of groundforcesequipmentcontinued at relatively low levels.
At the levels of military aid shown,NorthVietnam smilitary capabilities in the South have increased,demonstrating that NVA capabilities are not exclusivelyaid-driven particularly when the aid flows of only one or twoyears are considered.
Economicaid to No:rthVietnamduring1970-1974amounted to about $3.6 billion, rising from almost $700 million in 1970 to nearly $1.2 billion in 1974.
Economic aid was reduced to nearly $400 million in 1972 with the closure of NorthVietnameseports, but rose in 1973 and 1974with their reopening and an increase in reconstruc tion efforts,coupledwith the continuedneed for consumption items.
Chinabecame the leadingsupplier of economic aid for the first time in 1973.
The estimate of military aid to NorthVietnam is not comparable with US aid to SouthVietnam.
Communistforces in SouthVietnam can launchattacks from redoubtareas,while the GVN is required to maintainroughly
twice the number of men under arms to defend all of South Vietnam and thus musthave commensuratelylargerlogistic support.
The type of equipmentsupplied to South Vietnambecause of its mobility and firepowerrequirements is necessarilymore sophisticated and expensive than that received by Hanoi.
Estimates of total military aid to NorthVietnam are subject
to a widemargin of error owing to the weak data base.
On the economic aid side, muchfirmer data are available on the
amount of goodsdelivered,although there is a lack of information on quality and appropriate price data, as well as on the number of technicians and academictrainees.
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The application of US salaries to numbers of Communisttech nicians in North Vietnam is inappropriatebecause they re flectdifferentproductivity and livingstandards. The estimate presented in this memorandum is based on an analysis of Communistprograms for technical services and academic
training in otherLDCs and considers the differences in out put and standard of living. It results in a lower value than would be derived from a US analogy.
3 ______DISCUSSION2
CommunistMilitary Aid to North Vietnam military aid values arrived at in the adjusted estimatederived by the intelligencecommunity. 1. Estimates of military aid to North Vietnam Table 1-B shows the military aid valuesarrived at are subject to a wide margin of error and should by using an unadjusted US analog price series. not be used as controllingfactors in forming con clusions about North Vietnamese military capa 3. During the years 1970-1974, North Vietnam bilities or Soviet and Chinese policy. They are receivedsome $2.0 billion in militarysupport from based on a range of data, methodologies, and as its allies. About $1.4 billion of this was composed sumptionsvarying from reasonably valid to poor. of combat materiel such as artillery, tanks and Moreover, for reasonsdiscussed in the paper, this ammunition; the remaining $600 millioncomprised estimate is not comparable to US mil:itary aid to military support items includingpackaging and SouthVietnam. delivery costs, training,transportationequipment, and POL.3 These deliveries were a major factor MilitaryImports: 1970-1974 8 Estimates in the economicsection of this memorandum 2. Thevalue of Communist aid North military to treat those goods that have dual (civilian and military) Vietnam was calculated using two price series, a end-useexcept in thosecases in which the NorthVietnamese receives more than its relative share US analog and an adjustedanalog. The adjustments Army substantially in the population.Thus, POL and trucks are split between were madeprincipally to reflectknown, wide dis military and civilian use in the appropriatetables.Because between US and Communist costs. The crepancies the equivalent of only about 5 percent of North Vietnam s net result of the is adjustments small, decreasing available food goes to the army, this commodity is treated In the total estimate by only five percent.Because the economicsection. At the risk of a minorduplication, a value for militaryrations has been included in the military of this smalldifference, the discussionbelowtreats analog in Table lB. That portion of North Vietnamese the estimate. Table 1-A. only adjusted shows the constructionequipment and materiel imports (for use on such projects as roads, pipelines, etc.) which is provided The materielportion of the estimate uses or agrees with by Soviet and Chinese aid is also included in the economic US analogs for SouthVietnam, but the serviceportion uses aid estimates. On the US side, militaryconstruction costs analogiesadjusted to provide more accurateestimates than In South Vietnam have made up about 1 percent of the would result from the unadjusted US analog. total military aid package In recentyears.
Table I-A
Soviet and ChineseMilitary Aid to NorthVietnam: Best Estimate MillionCurrent US $
---- 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1970-74
Total 200 310 745 325 395 1,975 USSR CombatMateriel3 60 145 360 140 90 795 MilitaryRelatedSupport 40 45 120 70 60 335 China CombatMateriel3 75 90 200 85 180 630 MilitaryRelatedSupport 25 30 65 30 65 215
Preliminary. An additional 325 million in militaryaid -about $5 million per year isestimated to have been delivered from other Communistcountries.
Values for combatmateriel include an estimate for ammunitionimports which is less than
figurespreviously used. See paragraph 17 for a fullerexplanation.
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Table 1-B
Soviet and ChineseMilitary Aid to NorthVietnam: US AnalogPrices MillionCurrent US $
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1970-74~
Total 210 330 770 350 410 2,070 USSR
CombatMateriel3 60 145 360 140 90 795 MilitaryRelatedSupport 45 55 130 85 65 380 China
CombatMateriel ~ 75 90 200 85 180 630 MilitaryRelatedSupport 30 40 80 40 75 265
Preliminary. An additional $25 million in militaryaid about $5 million per year -isestimated to have been delivered from otherCommunistcountries. Values for combatmateriel include ab estimate for ammunitionimports which is less than
figurespreviously used. See paragraph 17 for a fullerexplanation.
in enabling the NorthVietnamese to launch a major 5. The 1972 Spring Offensive resulted in the offensive in 1972, replace the losses accruing from highestmilitary aid levels of the war, with the that offensive, and expand and modernize their exception of 1967. The SovietUnionsuppliedhard armedforces. Since the cease.fire,estimated mu; ware costing $360 million, over three-quarters of tary aid has been well below that of 1972 and which consisted of expensive air defense equip virtually no new types of equipment have been ment,includingMIC-21aircraft, SA.2 missiles and provided. Nonetheless, by mid-1974 the North antiaircraftweapons.Deliveries from China were Vietnamese had developed their most powerful valued at $200 million and were again concen force ever in the South, and aid has beensufficient trated in groundforcesequipment and ammunition. to enableHanoi to maintain this force. 6. The cost of military-relatedsupport from the 4. Deliveries of combatmateriel and equipinent USSR and China also soared in 1972 to $185 variedgreatly from year to year, generallyreflect million as the heavy fighting and US bombing ing North Vietnam s military needs. Soviet and throughoutIndochinagenerated a greater need Chinese militaryhardware and ammunition de for auxiliarysupport. Spare part deliveries pri liveries to North Vietnam were valued at $135 marilysurface-to-airmissiles and fighteraircraft million in 1970 and $235million in 1971. The Soviet were estimated at a record $73 million, while the Union contributed about three-fifths of this aid value of transportationequipmentnearly doubled whichconsisted of air defenseequipment as well from previous levels, principallybecause of large as groundforcesequipment and ammunition (see Communist truck losses. Delivery costs were also Table 2). Chinese aid during this periodfocused high during this period. almostexclusively on groundforcesequipment and 7. Soviet and Chinesemilitarydeliveriesdropped ammunition. Military related support for North sharply to $225 millionduring 1973, as the cessa Vietnam s armed forces during these years~ was and valued at $65 million and $75 millionrespectively, tion of US air operations in Indochina a re duction in in South Vietnamresulted in or about 40 percent of combatmaterieldeliveries. fighting Transportationequipment,spareparts and delivery reducedrequirements for Hanoi s forces. Except costseachcomprisednearlyone-quarter of the total for the SA-3missilesystem, no new majorweapons during the period (see Table 3). systems were delivered to North Vietnam. Hanoi
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Table 2
Soviet and ChineseDeliveries of Combat Materiel and Equipment to NorthVietnam MillionCurrent US $
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974~ 1970-1974
USSR China USSR China USSR China USSR China USSR China USSR & China
Total CombatMateriel 60 75 145 90 360 200 140 85 90 180 1,425
Air DefenseEquipment 10 8 66 6 139 39 59 5 I 54 385
Missiles 6 15 131 37 190 GroundForcesEquipment.... 12 32 37 44 23 86 19 24 15 30 320 Ammunition8 34 36 27 33 59 71 27 58 72 95 510
NavalCraft 8 8 2 20
Individualcategories are rounded to the nearest 11 million, totals to the nearest $5 million. Totals may not add because of rounding. 2 PrelimInary. ~ Values for ammunition are less than figurespreviouslypublished. This decrease was the result of more complete data on US comparable costs. For 1974, an average price of $3,800 per ton was used for valuingCommunistammunition,compared to an average price of about$1,900 per ton on the US side. The higher unit cost of ammunitionreflectsCommunistemphasis on the
use of relativelysmallcaliberammunitionwhich is more expensive in terms of unit weightcosts.
Table 3
CommunistMilitary-RelatedSupport t NorthVietnam MillionCurrent US $
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
USSR China USSR China USSR China USSR China USSR China
Total MilitarySupportItems 40 25 45 30 120 65 70 30 60 05
POL 6 NegI. 7 NegI. 10 NegI. 5 10 12 25 TransportationEquipment (Trucks, and 13 8 8 7 16 13 30 7 22 5 Helicopters, Transports) . MedicalSupplies 2 1 2 3 5 6 3 2 3 3 Delivery Costs 9 5 16 7 37 15 19 ~5 10 9 Spare Parts 9 10 11 12 45 28 11 6 8 21 TechnicalAssistanceAdvisers I NegI. 1 NegI. 2 NegI. 2 NegI. 2 NegI. Trainees NegI. NegI. Negi. NegI. Negl. NegI. Negi. NegI. NogI. Negi. CommunicationsGear 1 1 2 2 3 3 I I I I
I Preliminary. 2 Individualcategories are rounded to the nearest 81 million, totals to the nearest $5 million. Totals may not add b cause of rounding.
imported ground forces equipment and ammuni- Vietnam indicates that North Vietnamreceived tion at nearly half the 1972 rate. related Military about $270 million worth of equipment and ma- fell support during 1973 to $100 million, even teriel from its Communistdonors. This is 20 per- though POL costs were more than double most cent more than 1973. Moreover, Chinaappears to previous years. have been the main contributor, for the first time 8. Thepreliminaryestimate of militarydeliveries since 1970, with deliveriestotalingapproximately during1974 aperiod of increasedcombat in South $180millioncompared to $90 million for the Soviet
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Table 4 Union. The shift resultslargely from the cessation Comparisons of MajorCategories of Soviet arid Chinese in US bombingwhichreduced the need for expen Military Aid to NorthVietnam and US Aid to sive air defense from the Soviets.Chinese equipment SouthVietnam military aid apparentlyincreased by $95 million over the previous year. The delivery of MIG-19s Communist Aid (about $54 million)accounts for more than half Military US Aid to the increase.Increasedammunitionshipments and to North South Vietnam Vietnam
inflationaccount for the rest. The cost of ammuni (Million $) (Million $) tion, for example,increased 25 percent in 1974 CY 1974 FY 1975 over1973, and for othercategories of militaryhard Total 389(100%) 700 (100%) ware the rate of inflation,although less, was still substantial. Air DefenseEquipment 55 (14%) (NegI.)
GroundForcesEquipment 45 (12%) (NegI.) 9. Last year the estimated value of combat-re Ammunition 167 (43%) 268 (38%) latedsupportitemsincreased to $125million.Trans. POL 37 (10%) 87 (12%) and portationequipment spare parts were again SpareParts 29 (7%) 83 (12%)
two in this 27 major components category,although TransportationEquipment. . (7%) (NegI.) POL driven by the high rate of inflation in DeliveryCosts 19 (5%) 74(11%) Technical Assistance and creased by more than 100 percent over the 1973 Training 2 (NegI.) 80 (9%) record level. Other 8 (2%)2 128 (18%)3
Comparisons of Military Aid to North and Figures may not add because of rounding. This numerical total is less than that of Table IA because of South Vietnam component rounding. 2 Includescommunications and medical 10. Comparisons between US aid to equipment supplies. military ~ One reason for the wide disparity is a charge of $36 million South Vietnam and Communist military aid to for administrativeexpenses for the DAO in South Vittnam North Vietnam are the misleading.Throughout which has no knowncounterpart on the Communist side and war, South Vietnam s forces have been roughly other items for which no counterpart on the Communist side twice the size of North Vietnam s forces in the is available, such as $16.3 million for offshoremaintenance servicing of military and $1.6 million for con South, primarilybecause the missions of South equipment, struction. Vietnam sforces protectingpopulation and hold
ing territory haverequired logistic support for Similarly, the cost of supporting a foreignmilitary a muchlarger and widelydispersedmilitarystruc. technician in NorthVietnam is valued at substan ture. To compensate for the Communists ability to tially less than the cost of an Americancivilian concentratetheirforces and firepower on objectives technicianresiding in SouthVietnam, even though of their own choosing, the GVN has required a they have the same function. Because of these large combat air force and an ability to redeploy and other factors, the proportion of US military forcesrapidly by ground and air transport. Thus, aid going into militarysupportcosts in recentyears the type of equipmentsupplied to SouthVietnam has averaged around 50-60 percentcompared to by the US has been more sophisticated and there about 30 percent for the Communists. Table .4 fore more expensive than that received by Hanoi. shows a proportionalbreakdown, by major com ponent, of Communist and US military aid to 11. Anotherfactor is that the cost to provide the. North and SouthVietnam,respectively. same service or goods to each country may vary for reasonsunrelated to the amountbeingsupplied. For example, the cost of transporting goods from Methodology China to NorthVietnam is much less than the cost 12. Estimates of North Vietnam s military im of transportinggoods from the US to South Viet ports are derived from a variety of intelligence nam, simply because of the distancesinvolved. sources and analyticaltechniques. The sources,
___ 7 whichinclude vehiclesandequipment.4ThePOLestimate is heav ily dependentupon the level of militaryactivity and equipmentinventories;otherfactorssuch as storage j construction capacity and the number of civilian do not permittimely or. completeestimates.Analyti projects act as limitingparameters on military con cal techniques vary from the inclusion of an item sumption. based on directevidence,judgments on some com 16. For other items such as medical supplies, ponents for whichpartialevidence is available, and communicationsequipment, and spareparts where on otherswherethere is virtually no evidence. virtually no information on deliveries or usagerates 13. Combat Materiel and Eauinment. Very is available imports were estimatedbasedmainly limitedinformation is on the US experience in Vietnam. In the case of medicalsupplies for example, US medicaldeliveries have averaged about 1.5 percent of total military aid during the past two years, and a similarpercent was used to estimateCommunistdeliveries.Finally, the number of foreign techniciansstationed in NorthVietnam and the number of NVA military personneltrainedabroad was derived from limited information.
17. Pricing. Once the quantitativeestimate had been made, unit costs for combatmateriel were assumed on the basis of US productioncosts.These pricesweredevelopedunder the assumptionthat all equipment is new when delivered.__J
14. The final major component of the materiel estimate infantryweapons and all types of ammu nition is derived indirectly
15. MilitaryRelatedSupport.Theanalyticaltech This estimate is particularlyshaky niquesemployed to estimatemilitarysupportcosts reflect the diversenature of the items contained
in this category. For example, for the purpose of this paper only, the amount of POL imports used
for in NorthVietnam was derived militarypurposes Includes air defense and ground forces equipment and by using estimated usage rates for NVA military ammunition.
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military aid to NorthVietnam has been described
as non-refundable in both the Soviet and Chinese press.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Methodology 18. Under the combat support category, US 21. Estimates of militarydeliveries to NorthViet equivalentprices or internationalprices were used suffer from serious weaknesses7 which have with the exception of two categories delivery nam alwaysexisted but are now more acutebecause of costs and technicalassistance. In recentyears, the the decline in collection and re US analogprice for packaging,handling, and trans major intelligence since the 1973cease-fire porting of materiel sent to SouthVietnam has been porting January agreement. Because of the of directdata on deliveries, about 11 percent of the value of the goodsshipped. paucity militaryimportsfrequently show up for the first Price estimates for this component,however, were time on the battlefield in SouthVietnam. The time adjusteddownward to reflect what were believed delaymakes of actualdeliveryarbitrary to be more accurateshippingcharges, given the assignment shorter distancesbetween the Soviet Union and
China and NorthVietnam.Delivery costs were de termined from general data on Sovietfreight rates and a more limitedknowledge of Chinese rates, whichaveraged out to about 9 percent of the value of goodsshippedoverland by the Soviets and 6 per cent for the Chinese.
19. If US militarytechnicians were stationed in SouthVietnam, the US analog price for their costs
on the scale for US (based pay a Army Major) ~Other would be roughly times our price estimate _____J assumptionscouldhave beenused to come up with for foreignmilitarypersonnelstationed in North muchhigher or lowerfigures. Vietnam. The estimate was based onf 22. Anotherdifficulty in estimatingmilitary aid concernsassigningspecific shares to the various donors. For somemajoritems, such as aircraft, this is easy because the particular item is produced or exported by only onecountry.OtherItems,however, particularlyindividualweapons and associated am munition, are produced by both China and the USSR. Prior to the cease-fire,relativelygoodinfor mation on the shares of this materielprovided by the
Chinese and Soviets was available f
20. The commodity prices used represent the value of the equipment in US terms and do not reflectSoviet or Chineseprices or whatHanoimay havepaid for the equipment. The assistanceprob Moreover, this estimaterepresents the first attempt to ably has been.provided on a grantbasis. In the past, quantify the dollar value of total military aid to North Vietnam.Previousestimatesfocused on annualmilitaryhard See the economicsection for a discussion of food and waredeliveries only and theirImpact on Communistmilitary POL costs. capabilities.
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23. Theproblem is evenmoreacutewithmilitary- Economic Aid Flows relatedsupport items where we are forced to use 26. TotalCommunisteconomic aid to NorthViet the US experience in Vietnam in order to estimate suchcategories as spareparts and medicalsupplies. We have, however, made adjustments for the size of the opposingarmies and the differentsituations facing the two sides which we believe are reason able.
24. In short, estimates of militarydeliveries of combatequipment and ammunition to North Viet the differencebetweenimports nam arefairlygood; and even a morecompletedata and exports increasedthroughout the period ex basewouldproduceestimates of the same relative cept for a sharp but temporarydrop in 1972.Annual magnitude. This is not true,however, for the value aid levels rose from about $700 million in 1970 to of most militaryrelatedsupportitems, where the almost $1.2 billion in 1974, or from roughly $850 lack of hard data makes our estimatessubject to million to nearly $1.5 billion,depending on which widermargins of error. set of prices is used.
27. Somemajorchanges in composition and ori CommunistEconomic Aid to North Vietnam gin of commodityimports and aid took place over 25. Arriving at a single acceptable value series this relativelybriefperiod.Most of NorthVietham s for Communist aid to NorthVietnam for 1970-74 is importsduring1970 and 1971, as in previousyears, considerablymorecomplexthan it mightappear on consisted of seaborneshipments in large part in the surface.Information on the amount of comrnodi dustrial goods, transportation equipment and ties delivered is relativelygood, and the number of food from the USSR and EasternEurope. How foreign technical advisers and students trained ever, thesedeliveriesweresharplyreduced in 1972 abroad can be roughlyestimated. The choice of ap as a result of the mining of HaiphongHarbor and propriate price series, however,introduces major the curtailment of industrialreconstructionduring difficulties.Simplyassigninganalogiesfrom the US the bombing. Hanoi shiftedemphasis to overland aid program in South Vietnam is unrealistic pri shipments primarily from China offoodstuffs, marilybecause US salaries are considerablygreater petroleum, andotheritemsthatwereeitheressential than those of Communistsuppliers.8 To cope with for the war effort or for meetingminimumcivilian this problem, we havecomputed two separate total consumptionneeds.Consequently,whileSoviet and economic aid bills: East Europeanshipments fell drastically,China s contributiondropped less (see Table 6). one based on CIA estimates of international
market costs and appropriateCommunist sal 28. Imports rose sharply in 1973-74 with the re aries (Table5-A); opening of Haiphong, the resumption of large-scale reconstruction, and the continuinglarge-scaleneeds another based on South Vietnamanalogies for food and other basic consumption items. (Table 5-B). China continued the heavy use of the overland
The key difficulty in transferring US salaries to the routes in 1973, and became the leadingsupplier Communist aid Is that they reflect productivity. setting for the first time sincebefore the war. Spurred by There Is everyreason to believe that the Communistswould an upsurge in food deliveries to fill the shortages require fewerpeople to do the same Jobs if they were of the same skill level as reflected in the prevailing US salaries. createdprimarily by typhoondamage to the 1973 This conclusion is consistent with a global Communist aid autumn rice crop,importtonnagesclimbedover 30 pattern of project assistance to less developedcountries percent to an unprecedented 3.5 million tons in much more labor-Intensive (that Is, requiring more tech nicians) than that from other donors. 1974. A steady albeitsmaller increase in Imports
10 Table 5-A
CommunistEconomic Aid to NorthVietnam,1970-1974 CIA Estimates I
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
- Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Quantity Price Value Quantity Price Value Quantity Price Value Quantity Price Value Quantity Price Value
(thousand ( million) (thousand (1 million) (thousand (S million) (thousand (S million) (thousand (S million)
metric metric metric metroe metric
tons) tons) tons) tons) tons) CommodityImports 1,900 635 2,250 645 1,525 360 2,520 540 3,450 1,145
Food 660 100 65 615 100 60 740 110 80 780 220 170 1,410 295 420
- Fertilizer 160 65 10 310 45 15 105 40 5 185 40 5 220 120 25
Petroleum3 225 35 10 225 35 10 155 40 5 365 45 15 465 120 55 TransportEquipment4... 15 2,000 35 10 2,050 20 15 2,120 30 20 2,200 40 25 3,200 80 OtherMachinery 55 3,000 170 30 3,090 100 20 3,150 65 25 3,400 85 50 4,180 205 MetaiProducts 125 280 35 140 390 55 85 350 30 105 340 40 145 420 60
Miscellaneous 375 440 165 380 500 190 115 390 45 555 145 80 565 230 130 - Unidentified 285 510 145 540 360 195 290 345 100 485 215 105 570 300 170 TechnicalAssistance (thousand (thousand (thousand (thousand (thousand persons) persons) persons) persons) persons) ForeignTechnicians 3 6 6,500 20 40 4 8 6,500 25 50 2 4 7,500 15 30 4 8 7,500 30 60 5 10 8,000 40 80 NVN Trainees 25 2,800 70 25 3,000 75 25 3,300 80 25 3,300 85 25 3,600 90 ~ Subtotal 725 745 745 770 455 470 655 686 I , 275 1,315 ~ Less Exports 50 50 30 80 125 Economic Aid 675 895 695 720 425 440 575 605 1, 150-1,190
1 Quantities are rounded to the nearest 5,000 tons; all values are current and rounded to the nearest $5 million; and technièaladvisers are rounded to the nearest 1,000 persons. Preliminary. $ Petroieumfigures have been reduced to allow for allocation of part of the petroleumimports to military aid (see paragraph 15). CIA data on total petroleumimports are as follows: Thousand Metric Tons $ Million
1970 375 15 1971 405 15 1972 390 15 1973 735 30 1974 775 90
4 Transportationequipmentfigures have been reduced to allow for allocation of a portion of truck imports to military uses (Bee.paragraph 16). Data on total transportationequipment imports are as follows:
- - Thousand - Metric
- Tons $ Million
1970 25 55 1971 15 35
1972 30 - 60 1973 25 55 1974 30 90 12 I I ~LII1
Table 6
NorthVietnam sEstimatedTradeBalance with the CommunistCountriei,1970 1974 MillionCurrent US $
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Im- Ex- Im- Ex- Im- Ex- Im- Ex- Im- Es ports ports ports ports ports ports ports ports ports ports
Total 635 50 645 50 360 30 540 80 1,145 125
USSR 350 20 325 25 195 15 200 50 420 65 China 65 15 110 10 80 5 225 10 415 25 EasternEurope and Other 220 15 210 15 85 10 115 20 310~ 35
1 Preliminary. A substantial part of the upsurge in imports from EasternEurope and other CommunistCountries in 1974 is attributable to Cuba and NorthKorea.
of construction petroleum,machinery,equipment, materials, and industrialgoods also occurred as the pace of reconstructionpicked up with the comple tion of preliminarydamagesurveys. Most bf the tonnageincrease in 1974 was seaborne, with con tinuingimprovements in NorthVietnam s port fa numbers of Vietnamese cilities helping the USSR and EasternEurope to abroad some25,000 probably re sharplyincreasetheirdeliveries.China also stepped mained relatively stable throughout the period. up its seaborneshipments in 1974,although its share About 80 percent of the students or trainees were of total Communistdeliveriesdeclined from the sent to the USSR or EasternEuropewhile the rest 1973high. went to China. The increase in the combinedvalue of technical and training aid stemmedmuch more 29. The imputed value of imports based on from annualincreases in unit costs than from a rise internationalprices surgedforward more rapidly in theirnumbers. in 1974 than in any previous year as a result of un usually rapid worldwideinflation. The 30 percent increase in volume was considerablyoutdistanced by a near-doubling in value from less than $600 million to about $1.1 billion. Of the total, the USSR and Chinaaccounted for nearly 75 percent,Eastern Europe about 15 percent, and other Communist countries(mainlyCuba and NorthKorea)another 10 percent.
30. Because the base of evidence is considerably
thinner, the detailedanalysispossible on the com modity side cannot be extended to technicalassist ance or training. We estimate that about 5,000- 10,000foreignCommunisttechnicians and advisers were employed in North Vietnamduring 1974. A
gradualincrease in the numbers of technicians or 33. Importprices under both price series are calculated in current dollars for each year and include an allowance for transportation
IBy contrast, CIA estimated
______j~ii~s,where IYI,verebased on worldmarket information derivedprimarily from international Financial Statistics (an IMF publication) and na tional statistics of major tradingpartners. An ex ception to this rule is machinery and equipment, broad a category for which a representativeglobal price series is not available. In this instance, US production costs were estimated by the Depart. ment of Commerce in 1971, suitablyadjusted for shipping, and subsequentlyinflated by the US in dustrial goods price index each year. Since the
CIA estimates for NorthVietnam have been com pared frequently with South Vietnamese import price statistics to confirm their reasonableness, it is not surprising that the results of the two series are not significantlydifferent. The total value of imports as estimated by CIA is somewhathigher than the analogestimates,reflectingamong other things the fact that they have been consistently checked to assure they measure the international market cost to Hanoi sdonors of their aid programs.
r,u c~,flfl4Le iias ucen inciuuea ror USC minusculeamount of commoditiesarriving by air, except for occasional de liveries of aircraftthemselves.
Textiles are usuallypriced in terms of linearmeters. To estimate a value for textile materials, we use a rough con version of meters 7,000 per metric ton and then make ap propriatequality and price judgments.
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plication, then, they also take cognizance of the substantialdifferences in and living standardsamong the donors.
38. In the absence of any existingse:ries on Com munisttechnical and academic aid to North Viet
nam,someinnovation wasnecessarysimply to reach appropriatenumbers of individuals in these pro 38. Estimates of NorthVietnam s aid receipts are grams derivedsimply by subtracting its exports from its imports of goods and technicalservices (see Tables 5-A and 5-B).Analysis of such deficits with major suppliersrepresents the best availablemethod of estimating aid deliveries to North Vietnam, since neitherHanoi nor its donors have ever published we believe that nearly10,000Commumsttecnnicai any reliable aid figures. No meaningfulapportion advisers would have supported the aid, projects ment of this aid between credits and grants is thatwereundertaken in NorthVietnamduring 1974 possible. The Soviet and East European trade sta tisticsshowhugedeficits for NorthVietnamwhich, because grant aid reportedly is excluded,presum ably represent credits. However, the distinction between credits and grants has little real sign~fi cance. Because Hanoi s cumulative trade deficit
with its aid donors had grown so large that there was no likelihood of repayment, the USSR and several of the major East European donors an ______Scattered press and nounced a moratorium on all past debts in 1973. diplomaticreporting has suggested that a rough annual order of magnitude for North Vietnamese Strengths and Weaknesses trainees in Communistcountries is some 25,000. 39. The data used in deiiving the economic aid 37. / estimates vary widely in quality
______I The methodology em ployed______us the result of constantchecking and adjustment over some 10
years and can be exoected to give reasonably re L liableresults. The CIA estimates reflect analysis of
and consideration ot the technicalskills and responsibilities of the involvedpersonnel. By im
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p
the final analysis, some overallmoderateupward bias in prices(caused by overestimates of quality) probably offsets a moderatedownward bias in quantities from incompletecoverage.
the wcakest of the data is in the realm ot numbers of technicians and academictrainees
40. Aftervalues are assigned to the imports I I the estimatesbecome
less exact but are certainly still defensible. The world marketprices and Saigon-landed prices ap plied to various bulk commodities -such as food, fertilizer, and petroleum arefairly representative. Both the US price series and the Saigon-landed priceseriesused to estimateimportvalues for many industrial goods, includingmachinery and trans Comparability with US Aid to GVN portationequipment, may impart an upward bias 42. Although every effort was made to recon to this portion of our estimatesbecause of the struct those elements of the Communist aid pro probable lower quality of the equivalent goods / for which there was an equivalent US ex imported by North Vietnamj grams penditure in South Vietnam, there remaincertain categories that simply are not a part of Communist countries operations in North Vietnam. For ex ample, some 20 percent of South Vietnam s eco nomic aid in 1974 or about $150 million of a total of $700 million consisted of aid elements other than commodityimports and technical as sistance.Another $50-75 million in economic as
sistance was provided in the form of direct US piasterpurchases for which there are no normal comparablecategories in NorthVietnam. In addi tion, about $90 million of AID-appropriated funds SouthVietnamese r~ was spent on salarypayments to technicalpersonnel,purchases of local materials, and grants to agricultural and industrialdevelop ment banks.
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