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International Journal of Naval History A Global Forum for Naval Historical Scholarship International Journal of Naval History Volume 1 Number 1 April 2002 “There should be No Bungling About this Blockade:” The Blockade Board of 1861 and the Making of Union Naval Strategy Kevin J. Weddle US Army War College When Abraham Lincoln issued the Proclamation of Blockade days after the attack on Fort Sumter, it seemed clear to many that the president’s first major war measure would reap great dividends.[1] One navy officer declared, “I am anxious for the blockade to get established; that will squeeze the South more than anything.”[2] However, the magnitude of the Union Navy’s strategic challenge was enormous and its resources were meager. Of the Navy’s forty-two ships in service in April 1861, Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles had but twelve to call upon to enforce the blockade of a 3,500 mile coastline; the remaining ships were either in ordinary or in overseas squadrons. Welles had also to develop an organizational structure and operational concept to command and control the blockade effectively.[3] To solve these and other problems related to the blockade, the Navy established a Blockade Board. This board, deliberating throughout that turbulent summer of 1861, developed a significant portion of the Union’s naval strategy.[4] Naval and Civil War historians have ascribed varying degrees of significance to the board and its work. Most believe the board was important, but most also have largely ignored the strategic aspects of the naval war. As Gary Gallagher has observed recently: “Beyond perfunctory considerations of Winfield Scott’s Anaconda Plan, most discussions of northern strategy virtually ignore its naval component,” and “no historian has written a specialized study about Union strategists and the navy.”[5] This study aims to examine the context within which the board was formed, the origins of the board, its proceedings, and its strategic legacy.[6] I maintain that the Blockade Board – an organization whose origins came from outside the Navy Department – was an early, and largely successful, attempt by the service to produce a comprehensive and enduring naval strategy that was fully coordinated with national strategy and government policies. The board created a roadmap for the Union Navy to conduct a major portion of its strategic responsibilities and stood as the role model for later naval boards and commissions.[7] Immediately after the attack on Fort Sumter, Welles, and Chief Clerk of the Navy Department and later Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Gustavus V. Fox, began to take steps to deploy an adequate force to patrol the Rebel coast. First, Welles recalled most of the overseas squadrons to reinforce the blockade. The next step was to procure rapidly ships to augment the blockading force. Welles and Fox issued orders to commandants of A Global Forum for Naval Historical Scholarship International Journal of Naval History Volume 1 Number 1 April 2002 various naval yards to lease ships that would be suitable for blockade duties.[8] Welles initially confronted the problem of command and control of the blockade by dividing the responsibility of the awesome task between two squadrons, the Coast (later the Atlantic) and Gulf Blockading Squadrons. The Atlantic Blockading Squadron’s area of operations ranged from Alexandria, Virginia to Key West, Florida. The Gulf Blockading Squadron’s responsibility extended from Key West to the Mexican border.[9] The commanders of these squadrons faced challenges that no amount of additional ships could completely solve. To begin with, the commanders had limited local knowledge of coasts, inlets, harbors, river systems, ports, tides, and water depth. Their quarry usually labored under no such handicaps. Second, the commanders quickly recognized that in order to blockade effectively their assigned coasts, they had to establish bases for refueling and reprovisioning. Initially, the blockading squadrons had but two widely separated bases of operations available to them: Hampton Roads, Virginia, and Key West. As James McPherson has observed, “Some ships spent nearly as much time going to and from these bases for supply and repair as they did on blockade duty.”[10] Thus, the United States Navy faced the strategic challenge that confronts most military forces, the tyranny of logistics. Clearly, the Navy would have to establish additional and more convenient bases for the blockade squadrons. Finally, the commanders of these squadrons found that it was nearly impossible for them to command, control, and communicate adequately with their scattered and overextended forces.[11] The Navy’s lack of local knowledge, command and control problems, and logistical deficiencies became the focus of the Blockade Board’s labors . Unfortunately for the Union, in the early days of the war Welles was so overwhelmed by details, that he was unable to address the strategic challenges that had to be surmounted to enforce an effective blockade. Welles personally tackled issues such as promotions, resignations, leaves, recruiting, procurement of equipment, as well as naval operations against the Confederacy. With breathtaking understatement, Welles declared to his wife in April 1861 that, “The rebellion has given me labor and trouble and will make more.”[12] Indeed, in April and May 1861, Welles and Fox, in an attempt to provide better information on local conditions to his blockading squadrons, found themselves personally requesting charts from the Superintendent of the Coastal Survey, Alexander Dallas Bache, on an almost daily basis.[13] The haphazard nature of these requests and Bache’s vigorous support of Union military efforts would lead to the formation of the Blockade Board. Alexander Bache was a frightened man in early 1861. The Union was not only in peril, but he also viewed the national crisis as a direct threat to the Coastal Survey, an organization he had led for almost twenty years. The political dislocation of secession, and the loss of access to thousands of miles of coastline, threatened the very existence of the Coastal Survey. Bache revealed his fears in a letter to a friend as early as January 1861 when he lamented that “the terrible disruption of our country . will sweep our A Global Forum for Naval Historical Scholarship International Journal of Naval History Volume 1 Number 1 April 2002 organization away entirely, or sadly cripple it.”[14] In this respect, Bache was no different from any other government bureaucrat; he was determined to protect his agency from any threat, or baring that, to do anything to prove that his organization was indispensable. During his tenure as superintendent, Bache interpreted the mission of the Coast Survey very broadly and was able to forge an international reputation for outstanding scientific accomplishments. Despite this, Bache could wrest only paltry appropriations from Congress; thus, he relied heavily on the temporary assignment of Army engineers and naval officers to augment his own scientists and surveyors. Bache’s associations and friendships with these talented military officers would help ensure not only the survival but also the prosperity of the Coastal Survey during and after the Civil War.[15] Thus, in May 1861, Gideon Welles and Gustavus Fox were overwhelmed with details and the blockading squadrons were poorly organized, inefficient, ineffective, and ignorant of basic information. In addition, the harassed superintendent of the Coastal Survey feared for the very existence of his agency. It was within this context that Bache first conceived the idea for the Blockade Board. The first mention of the Blockade Board in the written record appears in a May 22, 1861 letter from Fox to Captain Samuel F. Du Pont, Commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard. It is proposed to have a board of persons, say General Totten, Professor Bache, and Captain Du Pont, meet here and condense all the vast information in the Engineers Department, Coast Survey, and Navy, for the use of the blockading squadron. Professor Bache suggested it in answer to the numerous inquiries I have made of him. Will you give up the [Philadelphia Navy] Yard and come with us to the bitter end?[16] Bache was a close friend and professional colleague of Brigadier General Joseph G. Totten, Chief of Engineers, United States Army, and Captain Du Pont. Indeed, they had served on the Lighthouse Board together in the early 1850s; therefore, it was probably Bache and not Fox or Welles who recommended the composition of the board.[17] The timing of this letter also makes sense. The number of requests for information to the Coastal Survey reached their zenith in May, overwhelming Bache and his meager organization. Any attempt to streamline and consolidate all of the critical information for the Navy would be welcome. In addition, the formation of a Board composed of such eminent men as General Totten and Captain Du Pont and supported and sponsored by Secretary Welles himself, could go a long way toward ensuring the continued importance of the Coastal Survey . Du Pont’s reply to Fox has not surfaced, but in a letter to Bache several days latter, Du Pont enthusiastically endorsed his old friend’s idea, . A Global Forum for Naval Historical Scholarship International Journal of Naval History Volume 1 Number 1 April 2002 There was some talk of a blockade board suggested by you and which I told Mr. Fox I would be ready to serve on at any moment, and that moreover I deemed the suggestion a most important one . it is greatly wanted and I flatter myself that you and General Totten with my very small aid could turn out something that would be of infinite value.[18] Clearly, the creation of such a board appealed to Du Pont – one of the few officers in the United States Navy with blockading experience gained during the Mexican War -- who had very strong ideas indeed about how to run a blockade.
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