'Duality' of Fraud in English Law and Practice Nir Tolkovsky Msc CFE

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'Duality' of Fraud in English Law and Practice Nir Tolkovsky Msc CFE The 'duality' of fraud in English law and practice Item Type Thesis Authors Tolkovsky, Nir Download date 28/09/2021 10:01:31 Item License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10545/623029 UNIVERSITY OF DERBY The ‘Duality’ of Fraud in English Law and Practice Nir Tolkovsky MSc CFE Doctor of Philosophy 2018 Contents List of Tables ..................................................................................................................................... iv List of Figures ................................................................................................................................... iv Glossary of Acronyms and Nomenclature ......................................................................................... v Preface ..............................................................................................................................................vii Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ viii Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................ x Chapter One: Introduction.................................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1 1.2 On the ‘Duality’ of Fraud and the Research Questions ........................................................... 3 1.3 Thesis Structure ....................................................................................................................... 9 Chapter Two: Literature Review ...................................................................................................... 16 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 16 2.2 Origins of the Fraud Act 2006 ................................................................................................ 18 2.3 Theoretical Frameworks ........................................................................................................ 30 2.3.1 Black’s (1976) Theory of Law ......................................................................................... 31 2.3.2 Third-Party Theory (Black & Baumgartner, 1983) .......................................................... 33 2.3.3 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 39 2.4 Theoretical ‘Fault Lines’ and a ‘Wide Blanket’ Approach to Criminalisation .......................... 40 2.4.1 Theoretical ‘Fault Lines’ .................................................................................................. 42 2.4.2 ‘Eroded’ Criminality Under a ‘Wide Blanket’ Approach to Fraud Criminalisation ........... 44 2.4.3 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 53 2.5 Parallel and Competing Provisions ........................................................................................ 56 2.5.1 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 65 2.6 Theoretical Discussion of a Dishonesty-Based Conduct Offence (the Fraud Act 2006) ....... 67 2.6.1 On the Scope of (Effective) Criminalisation and Criminology in the Context of Fraud and White-Collar Crime ................................................................................................................... 70 2.6.2 The Absence of a Lower Threshold for Fraud in the Fraud Act 2006 ............................ 79 2.6.3 White-Collar Crime .......................................................................................................... 83 2.6.4 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 96 2.7 The Fraud Act 2006 in Practice ............................................................................................. 98 2.8 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 111 Chapter Three: Methodology ......................................................................................................... 114 3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 114 3.2 Research Philosophy ........................................................................................................... 115 3.2.1 Reflexivity and Positionality .......................................................................................... 115 3.2.2 Approaches to the Study of Fraud ................................................................................ 121 3.2.3 Ontology ........................................................................................................................ 137 3.2.4 Epistemology ................................................................................................................ 140 3.2.5 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 143 3.3 ‘Phase One’ – Secondary Data ........................................................................................... 146 3.3.1 Historical Socio-legal Interpretivist Approach ............................................................... 146 3.3.2 Method .......................................................................................................................... 148 3.4 ‘Phase Two’ – Primary Data Collection and Analysis .......................................................... 151 3.4.1 Contemporary Empirical Approach ............................................................................... 152 3.4.2 Theoretical Background ................................................................................................ 153 3.4.3 Design ........................................................................................................................... 154 3.4.4 Sample .......................................................................................................................... 160 3.4.5 Measures ...................................................................................................................... 161 3.4.6 Procedure ..................................................................................................................... 166 3.4.7 Analytical approach ....................................................................................................... 170 3.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 172 Chapter Four: Historical Perspective ............................................................................................. 176 4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 176 4.2 Acquisitive Crime in the Age of Private Prosecution ........................................................... 182 4.2.1 The Epistemology of ‘Criminal’ and ‘Other Resolution Mechanisms’ (RQ1) Prior to the Emergence of Public Prosecution in England ........................................................................ 183 4.2.2 The Functionality of the Courts in Resolving ‘Inter-Personal Disputes’ ........................ 189 4.2.3 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 194 4.3 A Historical Ontology ........................................................................................................... 196 ii 4.4 Pre-Industrial Justice and Acquisitive Crime ....................................................................... 210 4.4.1 Social Circumstances and Dispute Resolution in Pre-Industrial England .................... 211 4.4.2 The Crown as a Prosecutor, and Prosecutions on Behalf of the Crown’s Local Administration ........................................................................................................................ 218 4.5 The ‘Particularisation’ and Criminalisation of Fraud ............................................................ 226 4.6 The Scope of the ‘Sovereign Guarantee’ of Trust ............................................................... 244 4.7 The Industrial Revolution (1750-1850) and the Increased Demand for Law in England ..... 256 4.7.1 Social Change and Change in the Social Functionality of Private Prosecution ........... 257 4.7.2 The Associations for the Prosecutions of Felons, and the Shift Away from Compensatory Justice in the Context of Theft ....................................................................... 262 4.7.3 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 274 4.8 ‘Regulation by Reputation’ ................................................................................................... 276 4.9 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................
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