The Making of the Territorial Order: New Borders and the Emergence of Interstate Conflict∗ David B. Carter The Pennsylvania State University H. E. Goemans University of Rochester February 9, 2010 Abstract We argue that new international borders are rarely new. We propose that when states choose new borders they use previous administrative frontiers to solve a difficult short- term bargaining problem and a long-term coordination problem. With a unique new set of data collected specifically for this project, we systematically examine the new in- ternational borders of the twentieth century resulting from secession, partition, and the use of force. New international borders, we find, are drawn not according to principles of “nationalism” or defensible borders, but rather according to previous administra- tive frontiers. How borders are drawn has important consequences for international stability: Borders drawn along previously existing internal or external administrative frontiers experience fewer future territorial disputes and have a much lower risk of militarized confrontation if a dispute emerges. Keywords: territoriality, territorial disputes, political geography, focal points, coordi- nation, borders, institutions. ∗Authors’ names are in alphabetical order. For helpful comments the authors would like to thank Deniz Aksoy, Nisha Fazal, David Lake, Jeff Legro, Beth Simmons, Subhashish Ray and especially the anonymous reviewers for their clear and constructive suggestions. Mistakes, omissions, and other assorted infelicities remain our own responsibility. The authors can be reached at
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[email protected]. We gratefully acknowledge assistance from PEPR and Lanni grants from the Wallis Institute and the Political Science Department at the University of Rochester, respectively.