DOCSLIB.ORG

EU Competition Law Newsletter — Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement Likely to Continue During Margrethe Vestager’S Second Term As Competition Commissioner

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
EU Competition Law Newsletter — Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement Likely to Continue During Margrethe Vestager’S Second Term As Competition Commissioner August/September 2019 EU Competition Law Newsletter — Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement Likely To Continue During Margrethe Vestager’s Second Term As Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager has been re-appointed as Commissioner for Competition for a second term. If her appointment is approved by the European Parliament, as is expected, she would be in line for a combined 10-year term, which would make her the longest-serving Competition Commissioner. In addition to the competition portfolio, Ms. Vestager will also take on responsibility for the “a Europe fit for the digital age” agenda, and has been designated as one of the executive vice-presidents of the Commission. High-profile cases likely to continue During her first term, Commissioner Vestager drew attention in particular for bringing high-profile abuse of dominance cases against U.S. tech companies. The most well-known are perhaps the abuse of dominance cases against Google, where the Commission levied fines against Google totaling a record- breaking €8.2 billion for abusing its market dominance as a search engine, as well as its abusive practices regarding online advertising and Android mobile devices. During Vestager’s first term, the Commission also imposed fines totaling €1.2 billion on Qualcomm, one of which was for predatory pricing, a practice which the Commission has not penalized in over a decade. + Remedies required to address the reduction in “innovation competition” resulting from the merger FaF voring own comparison shopping services over those of rivals iin Google search engine considered abusive TheT EC ned Qualcomm for predatory pricing – a theory of harm notn applied for the past 16 years TheT EC intends to order interim measures in Broadcom investigation – thet tool would be used for the rst time since 2001 clearygottlieb.com EU COMPETITION: MONTHLY REPORT AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2019 There is also every indication that the Commissioner will continue to target perceived Ireland abusive practices in the tech sector using the full — €14.3 billion (including interest) range of competition tools at her disposal. In a — Appeal pending before the GC speech following her nomination, Ms. Vestager noted that “as competition authorities, we need to keep a close eye on the way that digital platforms LuxL embourg deal with data [and] be prepared to take action — €250 million if we find that they’re using their control of data — Appeal pending before the GC to undermine competition.”1 The Commission has recently opened separate antitrust probes into Amazon’s collection and use of sensitive LuxL embourg data of third party sellers that use Amazon’s — €20–30 million — EC decision conrmed by the GC online marketplace, and Broadcom’s allegedly exclusionary practices on the market for TV and modern chipsets. It is also considering a probe into Libra, Facebook’s cryptocurrency,2 and an NetherlandsN — €20–30 million investigation into Google’s practices in the online — EC decision annulled by the GC job-search market is rumored to be underway.3 During her hearing at the European Parliament, Commissioner Vestager referred to the Google/ In her second term, Ms. Vestager will seek to AdSense case and said that despite Google stopping cement her legacy by defending appeals of her its behavior when the Commission issued a most high-profile decisions before the EU courts, Statement of Objections (“SO”), “the market including the Apple state aid decision and the hasn’t picked up” and advocated for remedies that Google and Qualcomm abuse of dominance are “even stronger” and “much more far-reaching.” decisions, which are currently pending before the Commissioner Vestager also gained a reputation General Court. for targeting selective tax deals struck by Member Pressure for reform of antitrust rules States with prominent international companies using state aid enforcement measures, a policy Commissioner Vestager is likely to face pressure that has drawn the ire of the U.S. government for to reform the current antitrust framework during perceived anti-U.S. bias, and has led to several her new mandate. After the Commission blocked Member States accusing her of infringing national the Siemens/Alstom merger, despite significant sovereignty on taxation matters. Notably, the political pressure to approve the deal, there were Commission ordered several Member States calls from the French and German governments to recover illegal state aid from (mostly U.S.) to change EU antitrust rules to introduce greater firms including Apple, Amazon, Starbucks, and flexibility, including the ability to consider factors Fiat. Most prominently, Ireland was ordered to such as European industrial policy (which may recover €14.3 billion (€13.1 billion plus interest of involve permitting or encouraging consolidation €1.2 billion) of illegal tax benefits granted to Apple, in the EU industry, and even the creation of which is by far the largest state aid recovery order “European champions,” to help stave off non-EU the Commission has made. rivals, notably from China). Ms. Vestager has 1 Margrethe Vestager, Security and trust in a digital world, Speech to CCBE Standing Committee, September 13, 2019, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/ commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/security-and-trust-digital-world_en. 2 Bloomberg, Facebook’s Libra Currency Gets European Union Antitrust Scrutiny, August 20, 2019, available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2019-08-20/facebook-s-libra-currency-gets-european-union-antitrust-scrutiny. 3 Reuters, Exclusive: Google’s jobs search draws antitrust complaints from rivals, August 13, 2019, available at: https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-eu-google- antitrust-exclusive/exclusive-googles-jobs-search-draws-antitrust-complaints-from-rivals-idUKKCN1V30IX. 2 EU COMPETITION: MONTHLY REPORT AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 2019 cautioned against such approach, noting that New digital policy agenda applying less stringent rules (e.g., considering In addition to her role as Competition Commissioner, markets to be worldwide in scope) would weaken Ms. Vestager will now also be in charge of setting the Commission’s ability to enforce competition EU policy in the digital sector—an appointment rules, would likely have undermined its cases which has raised eyebrows in Silicon Valley, in against Google, and would ultimately have a particular in light of the tough line she has taken negative impact for EU consumers.4 During on tech companies in her first term. Ms. Vestager her hearing at the European Parliament, has already signaled that her policy will draw on Commissioner Vestager indicated that she stands the insights gained from the Commission’s by the Siemens/Alstom decision and reiterated antitrust enforcement when considering the support for the current framework. This regulations for the digital sector. Speaking to policy debate may come to a head when Germany the press on September 10, 2019 following her takes up the six-month rotating presidency of the nomination, Ms. Vestager said that the Council of the EU in July 2020. Commission had gained “insight from specific Other aspects of EU antitrust legislation are also cases” during her first term, noting that “in a set to come under scrutiny. The Commission number of cases … the case work itself cannot do is already reviewing the current state aid rules it.” She predicted that these insights would lead with the intention of updating and aligning them the Commission to “consider more regulation.”10 with the new political priorities.5 It will also Ms. Vestager may seek to draw on the Commission’s have to evaluate the functioning of the Vertical experience in reducing interchange fees charged Block Exemption Regulation,6 which is due to to merchants by Visa and MasterCard, which expire during Commissioner Vestager’s second involved a series of fining and commitment term. The Commission is also likely to reassess decisions for breaches of competition rules, as the guidelines for the assessment of horizontal well as the Interchange Fee Regulation,11 which cooperation agreements7 that include e.g., rules on capped interchange fees across the EEA. research and development “which play a key role Ms. Vestager will share the EU digital policy in European competitiveness and the development agenda with the Commissioner for the internal of technology-driven markets.”8 Finally, the market, France’s Sylvie Goulard, and one of Commission’s leniency program might need their major tasks will be the preparation of the revisions to increase its attractiveness, as the new Digital Services Act, which should set out number of leniency applications has been steadily rules for digital platforms, services and products. declining in recent years.9 In particular, the legislation should clarify websites’ liability for published content, and subject algorithms used by big tech platforms to 4 Financial Times, Vestager: French-German antitrust push would have cleared Google, March 31, 2019, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/676e24c6- 509a-11e9-b401-8d9ef1626294. 5 GCR, Mosso: DG Comp will “rethink” state aid rules, September 17, 2019, available at: https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1197711/mosso-dg-comp- will-%E2%80%9Crethink%E2%80%9D-state-aid-rules. 6 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 102/1. 7 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co- operation agreements, OJ C 11/1. 8 European Parliamentary Research Service Briefing, Margrethe Vestager – Vice-President: A Europe fit for the digital age, September 2019, available at: http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/640171/EPRS_BRI(2019)640171_EN.pdf. 9 Ibid. 10 MLex, Tech giants face antitrust and regulatory tag-team, EU’s Vestager says, September 1, 2019, available at: https://www.mlex.com/GlobalAntitrust/ DetailView.aspx?cid=1127400&siteid=190&rdir=1.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • United States Code: the Tariff Commission, 19 USC §§ 91-107
    TITLE 19.-CUSTOM, 1 DUTIES § 123a station to another for duty may be allowed, within tihe discre- 96. Invcstigatios as to customs.-- Supersedecd.l tion and under written orders of the Secretary of the Treasury, This section mast5uperseded by I 1332 (a) of this title. the expenses incurred for packing, crating, freight, and dray- 97. Information to President and Congress.--[ SUplerseded.I age in the transfer of their household effects and other per- This section was superseded sonal property. (Mar. 4, 1923, c. 251, § 5, -12 Stat. 145; June by J 1332 (g) of this tillO. 17, 1930, c. 497, Title IV, § G-15(b), 46 Stat. 701.) 98. Investigating tnmiff relations with foreign countries.-- This section was in part repealed by 1 015 (b) of Act June 17, [Sulerseded. 1 1930, cited thereto, which read its follows: "So much of the Act This section was superseded by 1 1132 (b) of lihs titl. entitied 'An Act to provide the necessary organization of the Customs Service for an udequate administration and enforcement 100. Documents and copies for investigations; teltimony; of the Tariff Act of 1922 and all other customs revenue laws,' ip. compelling production of books or papers; freedom of wit- proved M[arch 4, 1923, as anitided, as limits the amount of house. nesses from prosecution.-[SUlitrsededI. hold effects and other personal property of customs officers nl employees for which expenses may be allowed upon transfer from This section wits suprsedeld hy 111313(a) itn (e) of this tlil, one oflehil station to another, is hereby retlied." and the auendatory set of Selpt.
    [Show full text]
  • Jesus on Tithing 17
    www.Tithing.com 1 CHAPTER INDEX PREFACE 3 INTRODUCTION 5 FIRST FRUITS 8 ABRAHAM & JACOB 11 JESUS ON TITHING 17 ETERNAL PRINCIPLE 21 THE MINIMUM STANDARD 29 THE LOCAL STOREHOUSE 33 THE BURDEN OF TITHING 38 GREATER GIVING 43 CLOSING THOUGHTS 51 www.Tithing.com 2 PREFACE The preface may be the most important portion to read in this whole book. This will define some terms and clear up some preconceived notions before we proceed to more controversial issues. If you do not believe the tithe is commanded, and are giving through freewill, Spirit-led giving, this resource is written in support of your view of giving; but if you read this only gaining support for the tithing debate, then you will have missed greater intentions that the Spirit of God has. If you support tithing (a minimum requirement of 10%), this resource is not written in total support of your view, but if you feel that this resource will make attempts to excuse selfishness, greed, and disobedience, then you will have missed the greater intentions of giving written here. The challenge for all is to gain knowledge and experience of the greater call and higher guilt led by the Holy Spirit. Whether you give beyond the tithe with limitless offerings, or you give freely, you already exercise the tool used to define "Spirit-led giving". This book will challenge you to give sacrificially. First, let’s explain and compare two types of givers. 1. Cheerful tither - They follow the examples in scripture about tithing, while cheerfully and willingly committing themselves to give a 10% minimum.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Tax Governance Or National Tax Discrimination: the Case of EU
    Masthead Logo North East Journal of Legal Studies Volume 39 Fall 2019 Article 2 Fall 2019 Global Tax Governance or National Tax Discrimination: The aC se of EU vs. APPLE John Paul CUNY Brooklyn College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/nealsb Recommended Citation Paul, John (2019) "Global Tax Governance or National Tax Discrimination: The asC e of EU vs. APPLE," North East Journal of Legal Studies: Vol. 39 , Article 2. Available at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/nealsb/vol39/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It has been accepted for inclusion in North East Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Fairfield. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 15 / Vol 39 / North East Journal of Legal Studies GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE OR NATIONAL TAX DISCRIMINATION: THE CASE OF THE EU VS. APPLE by John Paul* I. INTRODUCTION On August 30, 2016, the European Commission (EC) concluded that Ireland and Apple Inc. (Apple) had violated the European Union (EU) state aid rules when Ireland granted tax advantages to Apple; therefore, the EC ordered Ireland to collect up to €13 billion euros ($15.3 billion U.S. dollars) in tax underpayments from Apple for the 2003 to 2014 period.1 The amount at issue makes this case one of the largest tax controversies in history and has generated a lot of press as a result.2 While the amount in the EC vs. Apple case is unprecedented, it is only one of several EC Decisions dealing with the taxation of multinational transfer pricing activities issued recently, possibly in response to both a United States (U.S.) Senate investigation into U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • New Experimental Electricity Tariff Systems for Household End Use
    Panel 2 - ID 54 - p1 Wols i n k New experimental electricity tariff systems for household end Use Ma a r ten Wol s i n k De p a r tment of Environmental Science, University of Amster da m Abstract A significant tool in Demand Side Management is the structure of tariffs. Price incentives can be directed at dif- ferent parts of the efficiency-concept: efficiency in capacity planning, efficiency in total electricity consumption, efficiency in total fossil fuel use, efficiency in total energy demand. The tariff system, which is currently used in the Netherlands, does not give proper price incentives for end-user efficiency. In particular total electricity demand is rather stimulated, which is somewhat dampened by the introduction of the eco-tax. In the Netherlands field experiments with tariff systems directed at influencing household electricity demand were carried out by five utilities. In the experiments differentiated tariff-variants were introduced, replacing the old tariff-system. The experiments included voluntary price differentiation, which introduced a free-rider prob- lem in combination with the chosen price levels. Furthermore remote-monitoring, feedback, special peak-pricing etc. were implemented in the experiments. Some interesting options, in particular those influencing total demand, were not implemented by utilities. The reasons for it should be categorized as ‘strategic’ and part of the utilities’ policy. 1. Reasons for tariff experimentation In 1989 the electricity sector in the Netherlands was reorganized. Part of it was the separation by law of produc- tion companies and distribution utilities. A series of changes in purchase-rates from producers in which flexibility and capacity-cost became more important urged utilities to pay more attention to load patterns.
    [Show full text]
  • EC Commission V. Ireland (Case 288/83)
    Re Imports of Cyprus Potatoes: E.C. Commission v. Ireland (Case 288/83) Before the Court of Justice of the European Communities ECJ (Presiding, Lord Mackenzie Stuart C.J.; Bosco, Due and Kakouris PP.C.; Pescatore, Koopmans, Everling, Bahlmann and Galmot JJ.) M. Marco Darmon Advocate General. 11 June 1985 Application under Article 169 EEC. Imports. Quantitative restrictions. Article 30 EEC prohibits, in trade between member-States, all public bans on imports and all other restrictive measures in the form of import licences or other similar procedures. [20] Constitutional law. Community law and national law. The E.C. Commission cannot, even by approving expressly or by implication a measure adopted unilaterally by a member-State and whether or not there has been prior consultation, confer on such State the right to maintain in force provisions which are objectively contrary to Community law. [22] Agriculture. Common organisation of markets. Inter-State trade. Agricultural products (in casu potatoes) in respect of which a common organisation of the market has not been established are subject to the general rules of the Common Market with regard to import, export and movement within the Community. A member-State may not, therefore, rely on the special rules of Article 39 et seq. to derogate from those rules in respect of such a product. [23] Imports. Free circulation. Articles 9, 10 and 30 EECapply without distinction to products originating in the member-States and to those coming from non-member countries and put into 'free circulation' within the Community. Once the latter have been duly imported into the Community they are definitively and wholly assimilated to products originating in member-States.
    [Show full text]
  • Energy Pricing Policy in Iran Politika Određivanja Cijena
    Davood Manzoor Ministry of Energy Teheran, Iran HR9600065 ENERGY PRICING POLICY IN IRAN Abstract: Low energy prices in Iran do not reflect economic costs. Further distortions exist in the tariff structures of most energy sources and in their relative prices. Price reform is a key policy element for achieving increased energy conservation and economic substitution. Subsidies should be made transparent and explained by the Government, and, when eliminated, they could be compensated by target measures or direct subsidies for low income households. Price reforms are under way, with some caution though, because of possible political and inflationary consequences. In order to better understand the need for price reforms a brief analysis of the current energy pricing policy is provided here. POLITIKA ODREĐIVANJA CIJENA ENERGENATA U IRANU Sažetak: Niske cijene energije u Iranu ne odražavaju stvarne njene troškove. Nadalje, postoje deformacije u tarifnoj strukturi za većinu energetskih izvora, kao i u njihovim relativnim cijenama. Reforma cijena je ključni element politike usmjeren na postizanje boljeg čuvanja energije i gospodarske zamjene. Vlada treba u potpunosti predstaviti i objasniti subvencije, a nakon što ih ukine treba ih nadomjestiti ciljanim mjerama ili izravnim subvencijama za kućanstva s niskim prihodima. Reforme cijena su u tijeku, premda uz veliki oprez zbog mogućih političkih i posljedica inflacije. Da bi se bolje razumjela potreba za reformom cijena, ovdje se daje kratka analiza sadašnje politike njihovog određivanja. 1. The price Fixing Procedures in Iran Proposals for tariff increases are submitted to the Plan and Budget Organization (PBO) by the Ministry of Energy (MOE) for electricity and by the Ministry of Petroleum for oil products and natural gas.
    [Show full text]
  • The Environmental Bias of Trade Policy∗
    The Environmental Bias of Trade Policy∗ Joseph S. Shapiro UC Berkeley and NBER [email protected] May 2019 Abstract This paper documents a new fact, then analyzes its causes and consequences: in most countries, import tariffs and non-tariff barriers are substantially lower on dirty than on clean industries, where an industry's \dirtiness" is defined as its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per dollar of output. This difference in trade policy creates a global implicit subsidy to CO2 emissions in internationally traded goods and so contributes to climate change. This global implicit subsidy to CO2 emissions totals several hundred billion dollars annually. The greater protection of downstream industries, which are relatively clean, substantially accounts for this pattern. The downstream pattern can be explained by theories where industries lobby for low tariffs on their inputs but final consumers are poorly organized. A quantitative general equilibrium model suggests that if countries applied similar trade policies to clean and dirty goods, global CO2 emissions would decrease by several percent annually, and global real income would not change. JEL: Q50, Q56, F6, F13, F18, H23 ∗I thank Costas Arkolakis, Tim Armstrong, Kyle Bagwell, Brian Copeland, Arnaud Costinot, Thibault Fally, Penny Goldberg, Edgar Hertwich, Sam Kortum, Arik Levinson, Giovanni Maggi, Guillermo Noguera, Bill Nordhaus, Michael Peters, Steve Puller, Andr´esRodr´ıguez-Clare,Nick Ryan, Bob Staiger, Reed Walker, Marty Weitzman, and seminar participants at AEA, Columbia, Dartmouth, the Environmental Defense Fund, Georgetown, Harvard Kennedy School, IDB, NTA, Stanford, UBC, UC Berkeley, UC Santa Barbara, U Mass Amherst, and Yale for useful discussions, Matt Fiedler and Ralph Ossa for sharing code, Elyse Adamic, Kenneth Lai, Eva Lyubich, Daisy Chen Sun, and Katherine Wagner for excellent research assistance, and the Alfred P.
    [Show full text]
  • Guest Editorial
    GUEST EDITORIAL The Apple Case: Who Wins? What’s Next?* On 15 July the General Court of the EU (GC) passed down From a policy perspective, the main effect of the GC its much awaited judgment in cases Ireland v. Commission judgment is to correct the innovative use of Article 107 and Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe v. TFEU by the Commission as a tool to tax ‘untaxed profits’ Commission,1 annulling a Commission decision on state aid and eliminate international tax planning schemes of mul- granted to Apple by Ireland. The outcome was expected tinationals (MNEs). It is true that the judgment seems to since much of the relevant principles in the judgment were begin by (unsurprisingly) rejecting Apple’s and Ireland’s already established in previous case law (notably but not arguments that Member States and their tax policies are exclusively, Starbucks2 and Fiat3). not subject to scrutiny under the state aid rules and that The Apple judgment can be read in different forms: sovereignty is not a valid exception to the application of from a tax policy (or maybe politics?) perspective, from Article 107 TFEU. However, the judgment makes it very a purely state aid standpoint, or from a strictly transfer clear that the parameters to analyse whether there is state pricing perspective. Before advancing some conclusions on aid must be defined by taking into account the tax system these different fronts, it is useful to recall the main issue of the Member States, which severely limits the use by the discussed in the case.
    [Show full text]
  • Eu Tax Alert 2020/09
    EU TAX ALERT 2020/09 The Apple case decision on State Aid: the General Court annuls the de- cision issued by the European Commission against Apple and Ireland On 15 July 2020, the General Court of the European Union (“GCEU”) issued its judgment in cases T-778/16, Ireland v. Commission, and T-892/16, Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe v Commission, thereby annulling the decision taken by the European Commission with regard to the Irish tax rulings that allegedly favoured Apple (the “Tax Rulings”). The Tax Rulings were issued on 29 January 1991 and 23 May 2007 in favour of two Irish companies of the Apple group (Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe, respectively “ASI” and “AOE”). In particular, the Tax Rulings endorsed the methods used by ASI and AOE to determine their taxable profits in Ireland, with respect to the trading activity carried out by their respective Irish branches. According to the Commission, by means of those rulings Ireland granted to Apple a selective tax treatment, which constituted an illegal state aid under EU law. In this respect, the Commission maintained that the Tax Rulings artificially lowered the tax paid by Apple in Ireland since 1991 and gave Apple a significant advantage as compared to other businesses that were subject to Irish domestic tax law. Pursuant to the Commission’s estimation, Ireland granted Ap- ple with a 13 billion euro unlawful tax advantage. As previously mentioned, the GCEU discharged those allegations. First, it found that the Commission incorrectly concluded that Ireland had granted to ASI and AOE an advantage as result of not having allocated to their Irish branches cer- tain Apple IPs and, consequently, all of ASI and AOE’s profits deriving from Ap- ple’s sales outside Americas.
    [Show full text]
  • Holding Companies of Europe – Tax Planning for European Expansion in a Changing Landscape
    r u c h e l m a n HOLDING COMPANIES OF EUROPE – TAX PLANNING FOR EUROPEAN EXPANSION IN A CHANGING LANDSCAPE Insights Special Editions TABLE OF EDITORS’ NOTE CONTENTS For several years, the summer edition of Insights has examined the use of holding Editors’ Note companies as part of European tax planning. Introduction .................................. 3 Historically, these plans followed a roadmap designed to deconstruct business op- erations, placing production, financing, and I.P. functions with separate group mem- B.E.P.S. & Holding Companies .. 21 bers in different countries. If the roadmap was carefully followed, European taxes could be driven down in ways that did not result in immediate U.S. taxation under European Tax Law..................... 42 Subpart F. Luxembourg .............................. 60 However, the year 2017 sounded the death knell for old-fashioned cross-border tax planning. By the end of 2017, too many barriers were in place to realistically believe Switzerland ................................ 79 that old planning strategies would still yield benefits. Netherlands ............................... 89 The first barrier consisted of the actions taken by the O.E.C.D. to curtail base ero- sion and profit shifting through the B.E.P.S. Project. The second barrier was a Ireland ..................................... 104 never-ending stream of directives issued by the European Commission and pro- posals by the European Parliament attacking various tax plans involving affiliated Spain ....................................... 115 companies. Finally, the U.S. enacted the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act (“T.C.J.A.”) in late December 2017, which turned cross-border tax planning on its head. The T.C.J.A. United Kingdom ....................... 127 included many changes to U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Foreign Trade Zones of the United States, Free-Trade Zones of the World, and Their Impact on the Economy," Journal of International Business and Law: Vol
    Journal of International Business and Law Volume 12 | Issue 2 Article 11 2013 U.S. Foreign Trade Zones of the United States, Free- Trade Zones of the World, and their Impact on the Economy Susan Tiefenbrun Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Tiefenbrun, Susan (2013) "U.S. Foreign Trade Zones of the United States, Free-Trade Zones of the World, and their Impact on the Economy," Journal of International Business and Law: Vol. 12: Iss. 2, Article 11. Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol12/iss2/11 This Legal & Business Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of International Business and Law by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Tiefenbrun: U.S. Foreign Trade Zones of the United States, Free-Trade Zones o U.S. FOREIGN TRADE ZONES, TAX-FREE TRADE ZONES OF THE WORLD, AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY Susan Tiefenbrun* I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 151 A. Background of FTZs. .............................................................................................. 151 B. W hat are FTZs and SEZs? ...................................................................................... 152 C. Stereotypes and Types of FTZs. .............................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Transfer Pricing Meets State Aid: Conflicting Arm’S-Length Standards and Other Lessons from the Apple Saga by Steven D
    © 2017 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content. SPECIAL REPORTS tax notes international® Transfer Pricing Meets State Aid: Conflicting Arm’s-Length Standards and Other Lessons From the Apple Saga by Steven D. Felgran and Mat Hughes regulations, have dramatically increased the risks MNEs face for their tax positions and the associated reputational risks. This article reviews and analyzes the interaction and dissonance between the OECD BEPS project and EU state aid law, as best demonstrated by the European Commission’s final decision in the Apple case. I. Transfer Pricing and the OECD BEPS Project A. Transfer Prices and Declared Profits MNEs typically operate multiple companies Steven D. Felgran and Mat Hughes are across many tax jurisdictions, with a range of economists with AlixPartners LLP in New York intercompany agreements and operational links and London, respectively. among them. Those agreements and links can include: In this article, the authors discuss transfer pricing, state aid, the Apple case, and how • purchases and sales of tangible goods multinational enterprises should manage risk. between companies; • payments for intangibles, such as for the use A quote widely attributed to Benjamin of intellectual property rights, including via Franklin is that “in this world nothing can be said royalty rates; to be certain, except death and taxes.” However, in • group charges for various head office recent years risk and uncertainty regarding the services and shared services across appropriate levels of tax for multinational companies (such as management, finance enterprises have increased because of substantial and reporting, and IT services); and changes in the tax and state aid environments.
    [Show full text]