The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market Souphala Chomsisengphet and Anthony Pennington-Cross This paper describes subprime lending in the mortgage market and how it has evolved through time. Subprime lending has introduced a substantial amount of risk-based pricing into the mortgage market by creating a myriad of prices and product choices largely determined by borrower credit history (mortgage and rental payments, foreclosures and bankruptcies, and overall credit scores) and down payment requirements. Although subprime lending still differs from prime lending in many ways, much of the growth (at least in the securitized portion of the market) has come in the least-risky (A–) segment of the market. In addition, lenders have imposed prepayment penalties to extend the duration of loans and required larger down payments to lower their credit risk exposure from high-risk loans. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, January/February 2006, 88(1), pp. 31-56. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION Of course, this expanded access comes with a price: At its simplest, subprime lending can be omeownership is one of the primary described as high-cost lending. ways that households can build wealth. Borrower cost associated with subprime H In fact, in 1995, the typical household lending is driven primarily by two factors: credit held no corporate equity (Tracy, Schneider, and history and down payment requirements. This Chan, 1999), implying that most households find contrasts with the prime market, where borrower it difficult to invest in anything but their home. cost is primarily driven by the down payment Because homeownership is such a significant alone, given that minimum credit history require- economic factor, a great deal of attention is paid ments are satisfied. to the mortgage market. Because of its complicated nature, subprime Subprime lending is a relatively new and lending is simultaneously viewed as having great rapidly growing segment of the mortgage market promise and great peril. The promise of subprime that expands the pool of credit to borrowers who, lending is that it can provide the opportunity for for a variety of reasons, would otherwise be denied homeownership to those who were either subject credit. For instance, those potential borrowers who to discrimination or could not qualify for a mort- gage in the past.1 In fact, subprime lending is most would fail credit history requirements in the stan- dard (prime) mortgage market have greater access 1 See Hillier (2003) for a thorough discussion of the practice of “redlin- to credit in the subprime market. Two of the major ing” and the lack of access to lending institutions in predominately benefits of this type of lending, then, are the minority areas. In fact, in the 1930s the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) explicitly referred to African Americans and other minority increased numbers of homeowners and the oppor- groups as adverse influences. By the 1940s, the Justice Department tunity for these homeowners to create wealth. had filed criminal and civil antitrust suits to stop redlining. Souphala Chomsisengphet is a financial economist at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Anthony Pennington-Cross is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The views expressed here are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, the Board of Governors, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, or other officers, agencies, or instrumentalities of the United States government. © 2006, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Articles may be reprinted, reproduced, published, distributed, displayed, and transmitted in their entirety if copyright notice, author name(s), and full citation are included. Abstracts, synopses, and other derivative works may be made only with prior written permission of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 31 Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross prevalent in neighborhoods with high concentra- subprime lending and how it has evolved, to aid tions of minorities and weaker economic condi- the growing literature on the subprime market tions (Calem, Gillen, and Wachter, 2004, and and related policy discussions. We use data from Pennington-Cross, 2002). However, because poor a variety of sources to study the subprime mort- credit history is associated with substantially more gage market: For example, we characterize the delinquent payments and defaulted loans, the market with detailed information on 7.2 million interest rates for subprime loans are substantially loans leased from a private data provider called higher than those for prime loans. LoanPerformance. With these data, we analyze Preliminary evidence indicates that the the development of subprime lending over the probability of default is at least six times higher past 10 years and describe what the subprime for nonprime loans (loans with high interest rates) market looks like today. We pay special attention than prime loans. In addition, nonprime loans to the role of credit scores, down payments, and are less sensitive to interest rate changes and, as prepayment penalties. a result, subprime borrowers have a harder time The results of our analysis indicate that the taking advantage of available cheaper financing subprime market has grown substantially over (Pennington-Cross, 2003, and Capozza and the past decade, but the path has not been smooth. Thomson, 2005). The Mortgage Bankers Associa- For instance, the market expanded rapidly until tion of America (MBAA) reports that subprime 1998, then suffered a period of retrenchment, but loans in the third quarter of 2002 had a delin- currently seems to be expanding rapidly again, quency rate 51/2 times higher than that for prime especially in the least-risky segment of the sub- loans (14.28 versus 2.54 percent) and the rate at prime market (A– grade loans). Furthermore, which foreclosures were begun for subprime loans lenders of subprime loans have increased their was more than 10 times that for prime loans (2.08 use of mechanisms such as prepayment penal- versus 0.20 percent). Therefore, the propensity ties and large down payments to, respectively, of borrowers of subprime loans to fail as home- increase the duration of loans and mitigate losses owners (default on the mortgage) is much higher from defaulted loans. than for borrowers of prime loans. This failure can lead to reduced access to financial markets, foreclosure, and loss of any WHAT MAKES A LOAN SUBPRIME? equity and wealth achieved through mortgage From the borrower’s perspective, the primary payments and house price appreciation. In addi- distinguishing feature between prime and sub- tion, any concentration of foreclosed property can prime loans is that the upfront and continuing potentially adversely impact the value of property costs are higher for subprime loans. Upfront costs in the neighborhood as a whole. include application fees, appraisal fees, and other Traditionally, the mortgage market set mini- fees associated with originating a mortgage. The mum lending standards based on a borrower’s continuing costs include mortgage insurance income, payment history, down payment, and the payments, principle and interest payments, late local underwriter’s knowledge of the borrower. fees and fines for delinquent payments, and fees This approach can best be characterized as using levied by a locality (such as property taxes and nonprice credit rationing. However, the subprime special assessments). market has introduced many different pricing tiers Very little data have been gathered on the and product types, which has helped to move the extent of upfront fees and how they differ from mortgage market closer to price rationing, or risk- prime fees. But, as shown by Fortowsky and based pricing. The success of the subprime market LaCour-Little (2002), many factors, including will in part determine how fully the mortgage borrower credit history and prepayment risk, can market eventually incorporates pure price ration- substantially affect the pricing of loans. Figure 1 ing (i.e., risk-based prices for each borrower). compares interest rates for 30-year fixed-rate loans This paper provides basic information about in the prime and the subprime markets. The 32 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross Figure 1 Interest Rates Interest Rate at Origination 12 Subprime Subprime Premium 10 Prime 8 6 4 2 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 NOTE: Prime is the 30-year fixed interest rate reported by the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey. Subprime is the average 30-year fixed interest rate at origination as calculated from the LoanPerformance data set. The Subprime Premium is the difference between the prime and subprime rates. Figure 2 Foreclosures In Progress Rate Normalized to 1 in 1998:Q1 5 LP-Subprime MBAA-Subprime 4 MBAA-Prime 3 2 1 0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 NOTE: The rate of foreclosure in progress is normalized to 1 in the first quarter of 1998. MBAA indicates the source is the Mortgage Bankers Association of America and LP indicates that the rate is calculated from the LoanPerformance ABS data set. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 33 Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross Table 1 Underwriting and Loan Grades Credit history Premier Plus Premier A– B C C– Mortgage delinquency 0 x 30 x 12 1 x 30 x 12 2 x 30 x 12 1 x 60 x 12 1 x 90 x 12 2 x 90 x 12 in days Foreclosures >36 months >36 months >36 months >24 months >12 months >1 day Bankruptcy, Chapter 7 Discharged Discharged Discharged Discharged Discharged Discharged >36 months >36 months >36 months >24 months >12 months Bankruptcy, Chapter 13 Discharged Discharged Discharged Discharged Filed Pay >24 months >24 months >24 months >18 months >12 months Debt ratio 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% SOURCE: Countrywide, downloaded from www.cwbc.com on 2/11/05.