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18 PEACE IN VIETNAM , ~ __";-¢...L.i»=. 7 neutraiist government that he had been trying for so iong to estab- lish, from 1956 to 1958 it had openly undertaken to subvert and "'_,,- !.?,' .1 ._~ | topple his government by supporting the right-wing {actions under General Phoumi Nosovan. The Thai government, which joined the United States in backing Phoumi Nosovan. has continued to oppose the establishment of a neutralist Laos. This has not made Souvanna Phouma s subsequent efforts any easier. Whatever the settlement in Vietnam, the several ethnic components of Laos are likely to gravitate in the same directions they did prior to their I artiticiai administrative uni cation by France. Clearly the force of nationalism in the countries of Southeast Asia does not justify any simple domino-theory" approach in United States policy toward that area. The power of this national- ism will remain the watchful guardian of political independence, -- »92~ ;??.' " ~- poised against any hint of outside interference whether from __ " V.-J A", ? China or the United States. As long as Southeast Asian govern- . -A-. -- . . ments are in harmony with their countries nationalism and so long as they prove capable, wise, and strong enough to institute _ _ 92 -I - -- . V -. - .- s" :. ~=:-r 1- r. a*" ,: ._ ¢'=!" "<~ v'»-' » -.<. =- .- .'-.-; : =1-_I the basic reforms necessary to meet the most pressing socioeco- y . n .92 - _., w - : .f-;'; - _.r-I J " V, - .- 92-f _§ :'.-?,%.j_*7 ~ ~ A 3 ;.,";=_~ - L7 -E1 nomic demands of their peoples, indigenous Communist leaders are likely to encounter little success. .. . ~~ 7 "|92:é.:I A -, -1- 1 How well is the United States relating to these demands for I.!~ _=.:~=_"--. ;_Q__=_» ~,:;,M -, ~"-t '> ,,- L _ ,_;:-- pp--7,]; .51 _y_;;.;=i;|.k:~t__'._~; ;.*,;;;4r=-gr;',- .__ .__5_.£ ,-B-7_f_92g;r i'-";y; =35} >.:_;,,_-,- "| 4:'I,*ue<'|s.""l$::|i'--Ii rki-'f¢5-'.92'lZ'1s'i»-$' §;.__~_;;E_,}-_£ ,} »;;;. %;1."- 1 social revolution and thereby contributing to the security and sta- bility of the newly emerging nations of Southeast Asia?
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3: The Need For Socioeconomic __ ;- Fl p'_____e_:Q Changein SoutheastAsia
Too often, in the complexities ofthe Vietnam situation itscli we forget that since World War II a greater percentage ofthl .-,i . - T -».- »-7 ..-- - I -4 _ f »_e- ."-l'!>." ";l.l-!H.7. ---Z-. - r- ..;.=;- .<.~,.»h.~92. .92' _. . " ">;*.':'~.-. . . r wor1d s wealth has become concentrated in the hands of a smalle V;~ '- . - I-.92.92.---"- c.- rm: 3 _.-_'--,, . ~-92 "..- 2'- ~».-w _.-V-1,1-._'_ ,A 1 .?92-1' .. 1;, -'2 percentage ofthe earth spopulation thanever before.Althougl . - - .- - 92 -'. -1=~--92-=r-,- 92,.;=-1.." . t .92".,-3 -. 1 _,'-.1r;1",'-.-.~._i. 4 . . - . r, I p Q3"-3-_ -.'.-";=-"Si 92 there hasbeen someabsolute increase inproduction in the pre .= t. ; , ; -i .' -K.-..-..4;-, . ~ .1 -fa; '- _ F 1 -'.i_-".-_».-<'_'5-,§_i:--=2dominantly agrariancountries of eastern Asia,the increasei ,~'-=*¢4ta»'-=--'---' => .1.7 wtu= J ~ -mu -M---~-.~ --5*.~a=t.~'= ee;:er 1§»hA_a5.u¢ir'--*J.K h"" ~=.=,--.' =_-~ -»" .-.:-ti.-I» 1 " >1w.'£.§-._...l--=l:.=-1"; =' 924u92.11 small comparedwith therapid growthin populationand therisini expectations ofan increasinglyaware populace.Paul Marti: I Canada's Secretaryof Statefor ExternalAffairs, outlinedthe gen eral problemin a speech given in Cleveland,Ohio, in Septembe 1964: . . In thedecade from 1950 to 1960the countriesof theunderdevelopd world were able to increase their production of goods and service r from $110 billion to just under $170 billion. This means thatat th beginning ofthe decadeas at the end of it, these countriesaccounte for only three-tenths ofall the goods and services producedin th free world as a whole. Over the same period the total population c these countries increased from one thousand million to thirteen hur dred million people. Thatis a rate almost twiceas high as that exp: rienced in the advancedcountries of the free world. Whenthe growt _: » . - ' - L of production is discountedby the growth of population, we nd th: 1 _ *-37:? x "ail the less developed countrieswere able to increase their averagept 1*." . :3 k 19 '"
._-._...... ;-= -- _-Y-~~ . ='.-1 ; E-. -;-,-1, ,92 Imp ' -' -" < -.17 .- ..___.;: - 20 PEACE INBVIETNAM -. capita incomeover thedecade byno morethan $25,from $105in 1950 to $130 in 1960. In other words per capita income in these countries roseby a mere $2.50 a year. What is more signi cant is 1; .| . ~*z__:_:-_: that during this ten-yearperiod, the gap betweenstandards ofliving - ,." .. 311,5;- - . . ._ . . _ >-; in these countries and standards of living in the advanced countries . i i. widened in both absolute and relative terms. Naturally conditionsof livelihood and economicgrowth in the underdeveloped countriesof Asia vary from country to country and Lrom men to men countries. The situation in Thailand
,#_ and Burma with their general rice surplus is clearly better than that of India, wherefood shortagesare approachingcatastrophic proportions. Alsothe richdelta areaof southernThailand presents Q =5, a di erent picture from that oi its impoverished northeast. But ; .-- 1_, 1 .-- - 1. . " 1* ii these are relative differences and temporary advantages. In none .1 . . . _ - .,_!: 1-.92- 92 oi these count- es hasa modern economy developed.In varying ai degrees theyall are dominated bytraditional patternsof agrarian subsistence economy.Land is the essentialelement ofwealth, and _ ~ .7 ..-. .,_ what little private capital is accumulatedis usually investedin - :-: l * .. _ ._ .¢i':.;: '- buying moreland, in usury, orin commodity speculation. Seldom . v '.,-~,. ___.r_~"_ ; .. .'_-. -L'92._L',:,; _ <.F_',_, ' -.~.'-- . is it put to work as productive capitalbeyond makingminimal _ 1 .,_ . . _ ,,, .: _" ,_',_+,.~~ _y,-,:-;-;,_.° improvements inland or processing techniques. '3. 4. .- 3 7" - *1-'~-'>"';i .":.:* :';:*.'..§'.f:§;f%'7£i3'.;*..-'75..14%;? 1-mi!-».>l~~.-_;,,.-,_~..j _- ..1:.1-"-'i~,-1 1.. 1-...:;@ '£.§'>-*-ii ,--i Q-".'°=.'-ll ..;¥. 1.. " .-..- s.":~.;:'<-lI'i~.-ii-."*,>,.'ei 1 s ;-.'2~*Ei""'- ,3. -';;;~ The precedingchapter showedthat nationalismis the prime moverin the emancipation fromcolonial rule. The need andde- mand ior socioeconomic innovationaccompanies nationalismand becomes moreinsistent as time goes by. It must necessarily be a dominant preoccupationof any new national government. The United States must learn to deal with this and welcome its con- .: . aw . W J structive aspects. In remarks to editors and broadcasters attending a national foreign policyconference inWashington onApril 21, 1964, Presi- dent Johnson said:
Poverty, hunger,and diseaseare a lictions as old as man himself. But in our time and in this agethere hasbeen a change. The change is not so much in the realities of life, but in the hopes and expecta- tions of the future. If a peaceful revolution inthese areasis impossible, e violent revolution is inevitable. _ 1 , I 1 VitalSpeeches the OctoberDay. of 1965, 31. I5, p. p .
=h 924-2 _. _.-_ _
.1- 92
ii e...#_, _ _ ._. nnsn non SOCIOECONOMIC crumcn IN SOUTI-LEAST ASIA 21 Q-~ - - . _ ~ - ' ->. _- .r- ,-9. ,5 -i -.-ow However, in facing this problem, jilst as in facing the question -- _- . --.'=.: . .__ -" - _ =,< 'I.:~_-'--1 ' 1 92 i ' .92 -" of nationalism in Southeast Asia, the United States governrnerit 92= rs-, " . -J '- = 3 , . 4- - ~ -. --7 '. ' ' I.-:i'92 , _ . .;. . "la--_ . f. :;_..!;. 33:.- -_. ;r-.,;,, =3, has consistently guided its activities with an overriding concern ;';-.;_ - -ta? L, a E 1.-2 ?-if-:"'~.; -.1 to stop Communism." In order to deal with the demands for socioeconomic revolution and also contain Communism, Wash- ington has evolved a two-prongecl approach: economic assistance and military assistance with special emphasis on counterinsurgency programs. This approach is based in part on theories of economic growth propoimded by Walt W. Rostow, now chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Council. According to Mr. Rostow, there are several stages in the transition from the tradi- tional agrarian economy to modern industrialism with its high mass consumption. At the beginning this transition is a slow process requiring the accumulation of vast amounts of capital. When su i- cient capital has been accumulated or poured into the country . 1 from the outside, its economy reaches a take-o stage. At this K. point the various elements of the economy---capital accumulation, --,92 - _- >--- -~. :='s'.-"_92-_- . »_-¢,_--"I-3;-»~_-¢,<--~_--r_¢-¢r-92_-;.»n~-.=.7,,,-ts . ..,,,s,N,.-_' 92 =, ~ '_~; w .;: _1,i.= _--.:"_-'-.»q'~.c_-_- entrepreneurial drives, labor skills, technology-all accelerate j ;'< 1 rv-'4-_-s-. -.=.".r;.. 3.-1 ;=,1. . - r!? r>v~: . -.n--1,1. -. _.= . , . . ,=. . -; .=..". ,92' as, M rapidly, thus leading to a stage of self-sustaining growth. Then the .2 . ~ .;..- - .,,~. .--.. ' ." .. J - .. .-'.. '.-. :r,:' . ,-";~"' ' -.. -_. . '. -- -5, ..Jj-I',1.I"'= an " ' _" country is well on its way toward the development of a modern - E : industrial society. '! ;"_= ~'- :""" :i:' ; -; 1 _.-'..r»_ -_; 1' -.~ .'- . xi -1 '- 1- _ , ,2-.=-_».-'.:.1';. , t -2,". _'~ .--1 P-_= = -'*';-.> 1-1. ' Z 92- "J.-":'-* 5';'§ '3;*';L.-'-' I-jf-':_-__i,,,~, :'- 1'4: ,1-'./,e._|. 71$ - -. .-- _ _ ,. _._,, L. -,_,_, ._. .44 , t4.__¢.-. -_.p;_,L¢ -. ._. _._,.,,, .~ .. .=~.1_,, ----. : 3,; .--.1_ --_1 ~ ,3, - ~,;i-- t ., ,,;,, ¬s_.,. _,, ,, -5.- 'g:;@;,"",;,g g The countries of eastem and southern Asia encompassed in the =.,i vast crescent arch extending from Korea to Pakistan, with the exceptions of Japan, Singapore, and probably Taiwan, are all still in the pre-take-o stage, or just beginning to enter it. In the view of Rostow and other foreign policy planners in l Washington, this is a period fraught with danger, since needs sh! a and desires tend to outrun the capacity to satisfy them, and the a resulting discontent leads to political instability. It is at this point that Communism has its opportunity to gain ascendancy. There- fore, as we pour capital and technical assistance into these coun- tries in order to speed up the process of economic modernization, we also help friendly governments develop counterinsurgency pro- grams on a large scale. By so doing, it is hoped that stability can _ , -u be maintained through the take-o stage, usually a period of a decade or two, and that the Communists will be thwarted in their . > ' '" attempt to gain power during the intervening period. ._ _ . ;;'=L 92 - Our two-pronged approach of economic assistance and counter- I I t ii. ~ ._f
_} -v e- " ' W? _-V ______22 PEACE IN VIETNAM '1'"???- a,-"_ . r ts.- Fe : .,-' » .- ,..- ~ -,~'. . insurgency, however,involves a fatal contradiction. Transitionto , .see .. --.. the stageof self-sustaininggrowth requiresthree elements:capital ""92-.5 u-1" accumulation, technical innovation, and institutional change. The : r_.|_ r-,' -: latter includes such matters as land reform, a switch from sub- == .= . ' . sistence to commercial crops,the widespreadestablishment of credit,Supply and marketing cooperatives,expanded educational opportunities, populationcontrol, andthe introductionof modern l accounting methodsand scalresponsibility ingovernment Italso g l " v necessitates thecurtailment ofprivileges, favoritism,and corrup- tion hallmarlts of traditional Asianpolitical systems. t Without this institutional changethe pouringin of capital and technical assistancefrom outsidecan, atbest, produceonly a thin I , veneer of urban modernizationsuperimposed ona backward, underdeveloped. andincreasingly frustratedsociety. Indigenous capital accumulationremains extremelydiiiicuit, andincreased production basedon improvementsin agricultureand in local in- dustries fails to materialize. All of these changeshave beengoals ofstated Americanpolicy, 92 .- 1- - ,..,. »-n -V -1-;"-1 -r, '92.i_'rFt-!:|'.'§*'?§' I- 92 __ i 1,; ,'.V-_;r,~.___? _ ,:.t. .». _.,_ 1- ., . ,.~. -3 , i92-"C 15; -"-;I'""5"? "Iii but the problem liesin gainingthe cooperationof local ruling 1.-j;__:_ ~ -' 921,:|_=-_'=.~ 1 ;__,_, _ _* ,V -4 -; groups in overcoming vestedinterests andthe inertia of the old v . . . . .» . - :92- . H.:--. :_.: =1; 3. I ~. ":J.."9292r'-is ->t".'9292_; 92,.v7"- society. Inthe pastour chief hopes for bringingabout changehave _-_- , '" J_ i .92~.»' "4. _92 .' §~ .-.;»-t . -= tl = ;--iii5 ~,.-F-1-.~_92', 'I..92'~, 1'5.:. ;»i='§rii-.'3 jii:'1'-.'313:! -dig;'-»_ ii. -1: -i . ;-»-.' ':'-cg-. '- ,92-92.F>..; _' rs- rested withthe newlyemerging, modern-minded,Western-oriented - -'-~-- ~ --~e»---_-¢s___.._.-.- st:-» i X- Z middle class in these countries; whereverpossible wehave sup- ported thisclass andthe "'....'dt .le-r>i=rla%roadgovernments by ledit. Unfortunately thisclass issmall innumbers andalmost entirely con ned tothe majorcities. It has practicallyno politicalstrength at all in the vast countrysidewhere mostof the population live. All too frequently the real political power lies with a group i> . 0 ;i made upof traditionalland-based gentry,a closely associated s ' e1 military caste,and urbanmerchants whoare tiedto the traditional *1 socioeconomic patternand stronglyopposed to any changein the status quothat a ects their immediateinterests. Alsoallied with | this groupare many vestial colonial interests:plantation owners, mine operators,lumber and petroleum rms, and other foreign concerns thatproduce rawmaterials forworld markets. l The chiefpotential counter-force,aside froma small and highly volatile sectionof the urban studentand working-classpopulation, p , ,!_._';;. ._1 Pf " . N,1 consists largelyof the mass ofirustrated peasantryand ethnicor ~ r ' §"92%? as . > 1 11;;
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_ >92slA4 92;4...._...______,,,_ _ g@
,,.,_-j- IQ 1 - _. i__ ,, ; -in e-__ i T3 . .n92-,=-.92-.¢,.. M1» NEED non socioeconomic cameo IN sournnssr ASIA 23 ' V -.. .1t" 92-M. J- ' " - religious minoritieswho feelthemselves oppressedunder thestatus -, ,,.-- r-'29,», W... _ :5 '. _r ,2_ quo. The peasantry, althougha numerical majority, hasheretofore » 92- _ .: ---i ll. -rt,» . _ lived in a state of tradition-boundpolitical apathyand localisola- -- I - i tion. Whenconditions becameintolerable, itwas capableof reac- 1 tion in the ionn of lmal riots but was rarely able to mount an organized massmovement withbroad political and social pro- I grams. Now,however, thesituation ischanging. Withthe great v . 1 advance communications,in peasantry the becomingis moreaware F 92 of theworld aroundit, thepossibilities of political action, andpar- ii l ticularly thepower oforganization. Thedemand ctthese people 1-»- for changemakes themsympathetic torevolutionary programs; programs thatpromise thesocial servicesand materialgoods that signifya fuller, more comfortablelife. Thelesson oforganization tor such programs in usuahyprovided bythose mostinterested in <'1|.. l ' mass revolutionarychange onthe peasantlevel, i.e., Communist or non-Communistleft-wing groups.It is important to point out .. , :- Y -1 --_~,,-e--".,V,_T, -.r-5,»,--.3;92 _-1 ,--_-_=on;-»-.;-;. ,-»q_-1-a; wyv-92 w 92 -1 'i ', l x "*4 I 4 R A 92 gl 1I that thesegroups, althoughthey receivemoral supportfrom some Q1 <._., :_;- as Communist countries,derive theirbasic support from peasantand ,._.;,:,,, . -. 92~_. .;.__. --ex worker discontentand areled primarily;by idealisticintellectuals K 3 .-wtt . -_.' y A. -If 192 ,-- -.i.¢-92~---_..92--3,;_..'...r_;_., '* -92'..:,= : ~'- '=.92:_ =.-»»::_--" i'2 - .F92.-'1:?>J:l 2!--.,,-1;, . from the middle class. " :,- 1- ,,- ' Thus, asthe existingnational governmentscome underincreas- .. :-'1-;-,g_. - ref. ing pressurefrom their people toinstitute socioeconomicreforms, ';9292sL"a -~~- change willbe inevitable. And sincethe needhas alreadyreached v . it a critical point in most of these countries,only a stable, highly organized governmentwith strongpowers seemsto be capable of .1 -*92 '~o carrying outsuch reforms.In someplaces thispower may take the .$;"-1 ,i . -_ form of a left-wing or evenCommunist government.But this does not necessarily mean that a militantly anti-American bloc will 5 emerge. Surelya major factor is the attitude ofthe UnitedStates t toward thesenew regimes.By pmsuinga two-pronged policy s} which, on the one hand, claims to seek peace, stability,and 1 l progress for the area but which, on the other hand, has as its > overriding concern the stopping of Communism, the United States is usuallyobliged tosupport thosecommitted tomaintaining the C status quo, thus almost assuring thevery kind of violent and anti- -I . - | American revolution that it most seeks toprevent. V, ' .. 92A -21"-'.*.'<. On the other hand,it the United States,recognizing thein- I;-1; _ . _' -1 $1, -. evitability of change andthe natural development ofa socio- f .» . 1'-" : E ;* '"E-*~ _1:* ' ~"TT ' _. _ A ' 34 PEACE ti»: warmer . _ _;_I "31 A wt,--~.-.. . I ; econo c revolution in an area, can offer constructive aid free Y r 1 g I I from the threatof accompanying political or military intervention, . v l the governmentsit is dealing with candevelop independentlyin ' _,. :5 .--_: -. the spiritof the nationalism thatgave themtheir rst impetus. -..__- I _...._,»'<-, . _,_'_,, The exampleof eastern Europe illustratesthe importanceof United States policy in matter. A gradnai development of more or less independentattitudes ininternational affairson the part of the eastem European countries came after the Hungarian revolt in 1956. The failure of the United States to intervene at the time demonstratedthat it was notprepared tocarry throughwith its previouslydeclared intentionto assist in the liberation of ji- the captive nations." Thusnot only have the leaders of these 1: ' '' ' countries feltless compelledto seek the protectionof the Soviet §A Union, but the SovietUnion itself has beenmore willingto relax e as M '-its hold- - -- mrer them. - -- - As a result- - ~-i the - - - ; tenriencv tnwnrd ---- - - --" extreme no- |-' larization inEurope, representedby NATO and theWarsaw Pact, has beeneased, andthe chancesfor peacein Europenow appear greater than at any time since World War H. Increased inde ta . pendenceon the part of eastern European countries,although ___:___._2 >_ -__!._:.. ; . _.- .. .3, .../.-..-.¢~.-1.-r :- .,_~ _,..-~ - J--'h<..92<"....*_g92. _.4, PM .;=»-. _.|» at .~?-.- . :1:-mt ;4 _. . ,_:;,__- < -A5 t -i -'-=.~:= -_' >-2-: .- =92 .92:;;~._»>_u --_t-¢._."92-1-N we -= 31¢ !.-;,;»~-w:.92~¢;¢-->.=5-.-;»;92-.~--.g~ -';_ ,-;~ sf made possibleby thesecircumstances, stems primarily from their = t_ ~ .<:~ -5-=~.--r'_".~ ».¢; divergent nationalinterests. Nomatter whatideological tiesmay - - -1-- ..r_'_ _',-1 , ._',Y< ~=-*3. . ! J , exist between Communists, oncea Communist party isin power, ..» Q. "-_', ,-1j~'. . ;.._ §' '_l .-, 1 ~-.;_n, -Y-J. . _-5'1?-".'-'1-'1.-;P .» ,,,;_.-_,;. -;>.. ;.-_,;--I . ;- 1's"§, . -I-f. -i-1'»9. -2"»p5 !-§; t'--$5.1;s'.92',-pt; ;;,.=;-,-gs;-_.1_;..-.¢, -.-*. :1; . .3-3 -L - .44;tr=;.;a- -'i . m. -. - ' -<21. -11.-"tart-.=....»" Ll_ .54JJ>.,lf' '~ -ii -1 Iii-' *5?-Y-eve-:n+- it nds itself movedto meet the needsof its own peopleapart i from the interest of the associated Communist countries as a . i whole. The obvious reluctance of both the Soviet Union and the . 1 Ir. ~71 = ~- l'1 eastern Europeancountries tocommit themselvesto all-out sup- at ..z -.'. r y - I-"£15, _ ~ ;-.:-- port of the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front stems *>.'.I -; i -21,, in large measure fromthis fact. Some may detnur thatto suggestabandonment prmnt of Amer= ican policyin SoutheastAsia infavor of an a1l out emphasison I constructive socioeconomicaid isan over-simpli cationof the prob- lems involved.They wellmay askwhether itis possiblethat the United Statesneed onlywithdraw itssupport of status quo regimes in order to havethem giveway to progressive governments ready and ableto bring about immediatesocioeconomic revolutions,and at the same timewilling to seek theaid of the United States.Of course theprocess by isno means so simple. Thetask facingany government committedto bringing about fundamentalchange in
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.92'4'I92.r-i _ -4 2 NEED FOR SOLJOECONOMIC CHANGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 25 -is -- -er- -< 4'. the underdeveloped countries of Asia is so enormous that it is in ~.-4.4-r_ - certain to involve a long, dit cult, and often extremelybitter process. Left-wingor Communistregimes inthemselves donot constitute anypassport torapid economicprogress. NeitherChina nor the Soviet Unionhas escapedserious e ofsin the process of 4 industrialization, particularlyin regard to the extremely compli- cated problemof maintaininga proper balance betweenindustrial I and agriculturaldevelopment. However,these havegenerally been errors committed in the process ofgrowth a growth possible only after the elimination ofthe restraints imposed bythe old socio- i economic patterns. In this growth both countries have shown a real responsivenessto the needs oi the people.The rise in the is 1 . .. .92 ,_ , I genera] standardof living, literacy, andhealth hasbeen spectacu- >,_;_ 1 _ gr: pg. - lar, oz-mparedwith those countries still following an old social §- "F -1*.- . - <2.,--fr" L -T1 éliiir t-'59 '4 - ii ti . . _/<55; _' l L1" := I l ';i order. An example can be cited from North Vietnam in 1956, e,n;§4:§ where an effort to apply unsuitableChinese patternsof agrarian |l . 5 . reform inone provinceresulted in peasant rioting. Armytroops ' E rsternly subduedthe incipientrebellion. Theparticular reformwas 92-gay! 1-w *' Ll .~w_'92a-_i E s k A then abandonedfor moresuitable methodsand PresidentHo Chi 92 -c 7 15 fMinh removedthe pro-Chinese o icial who had administeredit. . , 1.,-. -_r_-e ,4 -r--. ,1.- ,_. 4 ,. . 5 L. _ D _; _92._.._H.l I- .:.. .;.1-4 ...._i,..,_, 1,.-..:~2 ,.-,. -. . --... v ;F='If--1.--~ _:..'. Revolutionary socialchange hasso far always exacteda cost in : _ -,-92 "1. '... ,-T -'. }._~.-_-,'->:'--,1-.. - .f,»,.f', . -=,92; :92.-.i_ .. -'1'-.'I "?:'l» = . -12';. 1-_.3- ; ;-13'--=. :-"i'.1 ft?" ierms of human lives and misery.This costmust beseen in rela- 1.3.;-'~._*-'4-<¢:1..-.< T-.1-_;;-;,,»_ ,1_,,-'=__; ;5{1,'_-_-3;;1;_i-92";-,; ,-5:-;1'1 :'~§-I1 , <, '- Q -i y i-5;'; -.s~=";é- W7 33-tion to the alternativeof extendingthe hunger,disease, ignorance, _92-< and chronic violence ofthe pastinto an overpopulated andover- -,armed world of the future. §§. -a~ 9.-[J '-= -:' !' .;-- .- i . L92 Many Asiansare nowheaping theonus ofWestern imperialism /,5 " .,_- I ':'J--I 1* -Y1} . -.-" ' _;;._..l .-on Americanshoulders. Thisaccusation is _not without somejus- I.- ~49 . '.'{i Tr ? - .... tification andcannot easilybe shed.Any new revolutionary gov- . - I92 _ i ,.ernment thatcomes to powerin Asia will probably begin with -virulent denunciationsof the United States,if only to provethat it upholding thecause ofanti-imperialism. American-ownedbusi- nesses maysu er and may be nationalized, and Americans and their friends certainly nd life less comfortablethan be- -fore. How long would it be beforenational interestswould lead at -these governmentsto seek some accommodationwith the United ;"States? Thiswill be governed byhow long and in what measure . the United Statescontinues topose athreat. Algeriais a case in ' ll } point.When nallyallowed developto anas independentnation,
._.-,. _.__, -92.. .-.»__ -..;_. .4,--. - ! _ _ ,_ e = F - - - - _:"""" T"_"______- ' 26 ' PEACE IN vrsrmu»
-_;...'.,§, - P _ ' _,-. _:_ Algeria quickly sought the aid of the United States and eve: I France, and today American and French enterprises play a widen- .-;;,. ,_ Q :3 : -~, at ing role in the economic development of that country. 92 -3 This analysis of revolutionary political and soeioecouomii . "4 ~> __,_ _ movements points to the fact that the old days of military domi- ii E I. . nance of Asian countries by white Western powers is over. Eco Ia nomicassistance through trade, loans, and direct aid is more per- tinent than ever, provided it does not jeopardize the newly wor political independence. An interesting recognition of the new er: : comes from the British Tory defense spokesman Enoch Poweil F l who stated at a conference of the Conservative Party on Octobei i - 14, 1965, that Britain's military commitment cast of Suez should. be abandoned because it is self-defeating at some points. , ._-_. .-- ' -= .. 9 _ V _ -~ 92;_ -. 92 '.w < r--w -~ =1v -.» 4* -- - .-=1-,-Q; t 1-. ,-. , _. The United States has not yet acknowledged this new era. The .- 6 -4..-1; V; . M- _-.»,'.= t" . $711 - .1 -F1 reason given for its continuing military commitment is that South- > J, _¢-_- .,_ - 92 ' - -- 2-§;_Qi'-' ~ - .c~,.:- ' I east Asia must be defended trorn Chinese Communist encroach- " '1 H4, .-q=,,.-,- $1.5 'i g tnent. The potential role of China in this area must therefore be considered. -_-Tw-_' .'. --- , . . - --~ F '.. i~'- ' » '1';-".'.*1'<3~..i92-11;"- 1-*1 ; "".<-~i ,, 4 , --_-.,_,_,-_-._, ,;.,,% New York Times, October 15, 196$. K L A ~_d1"1 »= lf :¬_';"{,$ . .- .. ~.; . 2'."--. -' ;- _ inn lgl-92 - :;._ . -:', .-',-'-'»-1-.-._-_<_-.» ,1~'». ., .- 92 _ ,, _ -y _ ._, -:_~__|, ,_. . ~|.. _~_.~-_1_; ~.-W -_J4_..---H-_ ~",_d _-'_-_.-__ ., _,_M_. =.4 :-.- I Z '- , _; .. 3 . '~ ; ___ . i.¢.'- - - - - - -..; .- .i -- -; :- _-~_" .,~.~'_-I --1. *_-J-_-*,?.',-32*-. 3-; -if- : =.;'.g=-::.I=1.<_J_;;e{-.= _, -.=_>'.-J;--_"_ _';.',I-; -'4 4:-~ ».'-'é'=r J. . ; in .';- L- I = --§_--- ,~,,- - ,g; _{:f"_'¢,;;'g;' r§,--c~.'».-;-.- ;;L1;L§23'.*:,- -_:_;< . -'>1:~---it>.=-~_.a -. §=,£~; T q;92- g "<;2'»,;@-gm-5;-- '~».*- 1*-
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4 4: The lRo|e of Chino
The American public seems to be thoroughly convinced that China is the Number One Enemy in Asia. Talk of a preventive war to wipe out China's nuclear potential is prevalent now just as 3 _ | i - T_|92'_<92-'1' 1-1 .-92_- '-*-_- .--acre-»v---921;.;e. g .~v _... ..,_.___ aw:--92<-v-»».._,_,.1q,F < _=__- P .~..'l.-¢-,..- H:-'_» 1;,;.92".',;_5.L _92'»e3_.;.__ 1- -, -1- .,H,-.~.__-.-~,-. e ,-1- 4-_t-..k _ - = ,,_, >5-__ -. 1.. .';.;.=~.~.-;.<. <-.;.~ it was during the early l95O s92in regard to the Soviet Union. South - »:,-:-,-~¢-~*92'.92, ".92,- '-= r -<* 92.,~ ..,; § . . I .4 - .__.,_.H' - - -* Vietnamese often privately complain that, though it is their people ' ' ' ;- _:_ ; _ i ,..»_i--_- _',1",1 'i. ,_ f_:|at r :;. .. r :_ 92 r_ -»-.,-a .|~ .,..-,- ;.,_._.-97.-_'_;L_j.. _'.~__.who are being killed and their country that is being devastated, -" 1 : - " 1 I.-1} _-_ -. 1 _ _-,,. _ . _,-. ._ .3 ¢._s_=. . .._t,t=t 92._t __.__'_,r. ,-.»3 ,92,.-.92 1.r , _ -' -.'..-W . _ .- . ~ ----, a .~ 1~- - -.;.._<-;. _ -. 9292 -2 7 .-L 92.-- ti.-__»..~,. > =_»i .;_.-- ~ 9 __ ~.i _ ;-.,_, tit;-._.-._=92? ;-_v-2,'<. ?q~'=.~.~ .;-..,=;..".§_» the real object of the American military effort is China. Yet there a. -at J .-.n_- -{H1 -' .27--_ :.e'uJ¬5'!92:;92i:Z:_-IIJIII5 - i-.3 . - is no indication that so much as a single Chinese has been in- i 7- i»,-;.»,| - L volved in the ghting so far. .9. " 7 What then can we say about China? Is this a country bent on i»- establishing a Chinese-dominated, Communist empire in Asia at gi through political subversion and outright military conquest? In that case who can talk of independent nationalism or of revolu- tionary governments making accommodations with the United sit , ll States? First of all, it must be stated clearly that any speculation based either on subjective prejudices or wishful thinking concerning just what the Chinese will or will not do in any speci c situation is dangerous. President Truman and General MacArthur, with all i. the intelligence resources available during the Korean War, proved i to be terribly wrong when they arbitrarily chose to ignore Chinese ii, It-E1 .».Tg_ .'i-; _ i warnings against American troops crossing the 38th parallel and t gy ;._f, approaching Chinese borders in the autumn of 1950. . 1"-71 .--- / .;:. = Yet it is possible to make some valid observations concerning = 27
I _.-._-...... --. ..- -in ii - .. -- - --i ' ...=~ _= .. .. _....._.i_... :; 1 ...- , _- J--'o: :."i" .»i>.= .-.». .". . _; v92 is ' »-" *=i= 5+YY-"=" 1 1"-:'_-"-"~.*.e!-'"--" "'-*'*~i,1"' :* ""192"- " " --92" ~ ;;_ 5?:-' 1.e »3 . '. .. 28 Peace m VIETNAM Chinese foreign policy and intentions if we are willing to cut -92 '.'f:-"- -.ri- . . 5 .¢ - _r_.- , _ ._,,...,. ... .-. 92_,. - H, _ through her verbose hostility, distinguish between her general '-i 5'»' " propaganda andspeci c statementsof policy, and at the sametime check theseagainst what she is actually doing. Certainly the Chinese are going through a period of militant nationalism that accounts for much of their bellicosity. At the same time, the /Q , _ g 0 Chinese leadersbelieve theirrevolutionary experienceconstitutes 3 . a model for other underdeveloped countries.But in spite of this 4 seemingly extreme orientation, their speci c activities have been . -5 tempered byrather conservative guidelines.For example, in terms of both speci c statements and actions, the Chinese have been extremely cautiousin dealing with the United States.They have gone to some lengthsto avoid any direct confrontation withthis country, even permitting American convoys of ships to carry Nationalist Chinesetroops to Ouemoy undertheir very guns. Furthermore, althoughthe Chinesehave adheredconsistently to 1 I .t ._ , ' _. .r~.' .~92~-~»-T- .---~ 3 '. _~ -_ .',7';~'.-If-»._* y Q-'1__. , __*-:vAv.-- I-X H _ 7-= r--;,.. -' ,.,,,___ =;;-¢;q,'3/_.-_~.,.'a_ certain demands, such as their insistence that Taiwan is an in- K, -. .92,_ :4" r , _., I ., 1 s 3 - VA s_.-44,;-cf ternal problem that must be settled without any foreign interfer- -1'3 :I " ,-, ,- =_"_'_ . ' f .. ._i_ it-f ; }_. 5 I - ~...... 7 .. . '-15-i"-5 -.'-'=.;f"~ . -* ence, theyhave demonstratedconsiderable exibilityin dealing , , fr]-;~.f_=-; ;;I.~f~,f-.§.~j 1--11'.-s .-:1 -_t ;-"-.51:--_§ with many questions of policy. ' -9:- -, , ; , _ -3 _ 11.1 --: .- ._r-;1- 1..1--'f.e;. ,_--__'.:'1-.';-_',-' =_.~t-v:22;$-=;,<=i,?s;;;.;.g1?;£-g;i";,?§, ;l~-_;,,' _~ _-r-. --_-- .= we-;- : ~..i-. -~= -i,-= -:@L".J2-'¢~%;-i4'"#@? = .,~-,- _.-_.-; -..?...c'-r§--= t'-- -:;_ f.'~--"->--';.-§-" * it.' . -._,7 '"-Ar.-=1- . * '.:-'5,.'="3 £ t1 -'="=1'-MI-1- i ;- ' = .= The chief elementsof Chinese foreign policycan be listed as . -;.~'.n,_:. "5- J follows: ' -pig 1. The Chinese insistthat all boundary orterritorial conces: sions resulting from the unequal treaties imposed upon China by the colonial powers during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries be renegotiated. Recently newboundary agreementshave been negotiated withthe now independent countriesoi Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Burma, and Outer Mongolia under terms that |. more or less preservedthe status quo and were generally lair to all parties. As yet there hasbeen no boundary settlementwith the Soviet Union, India including Sikkhim and Bhutan, Laos, or Vietnam. The Chinese are respecting the terms of the agreements " -. they inherited concerning I-long Kong and Macao, and are not pushing for a return of these territories now. 2. The People s Republicof China considers Taiwanto be an integral partof its territory andthe Nationalistgovernment tobe a remnant counterrcvolutionary force" having no legal status and maintained oniy thr0ugh_Anierican armed intervention. it insists .1 92
" .. .1 ' --*92»'>' - wa- I "rm: ROLE or ctrrrva ' 29
the United States must withdraw its forces from the area. but for ¬ -t ..=-.j-:1-§:5.~ some timehas refrainedfront anyrash actioneither inregard to Taiwan or the Nationalist-held Olishore islands. ' i 3. The Chinese say thatsince 1956the UnitedStates hasbeen engaged in active aggressionagainst the PcopIe s Republicof China, sometimesdirectly andsometimes through its puppets, the Nationalistson Taiwan.Prior to that time theUnited States supplied and often took direct part in Nationalist attemptsto .- ti suppress therevolution. The United Statesis also regarded as _ I having doneeverything possibleto impede the Chineseeconomic construction throughblockades, embargoes,and generalpressure to isolatemainland Chinafrom therest ofthe world.Therefore, the Chinesefeel thatin thein. st of nationalsecurity theycan- - " not toleratethe presenceon their borders ofany Americanforces or of forces underAmerican domination.Such presencewill be __ ,_._ --.~»-in---.~.-as. _, -y --Q1 r .,<~.-I ;r it :- i;~t,. .-" -_>_..-*1.<.:'~_
THE ROLE or CHINA 3i -_ ~ * .- 1»- is an intermediate zonearound her borders consistingof gen- erally friendlyor at least neutralcountries. Sucha zone would not Q necessarily becontrary to the interestsof the United States.It would continueto be an areain which Western andChinese in u- I < ense would complete, but not through subversion or military . conquest. $'92 K But what about Peking sgeneral warlikeattitude, itssupposed Ei {3',.r .1 " . 92i denial of the principleoi co-existence, and its esponsal of_revolu~ Vii ?. -7» *_--.;. ta.2.-; J- tionary warsof liberation as a means ofisolating andweakening -Q a 1% the imperialist" nations ? Thisagain needs to be examined carefully, especially since, as one of the main Components of d . 92 »> 1 .. I-74 .,,,,. the Sino~Sovietdispute, the Chinese positionin regard to co- J. .-. r 'II*1 [ 7| '_r-_1'.-t.-.|1~.7.-, I existence hastended to be twisted by both the Soviet and Western -:__»tL. :>-,1V. ,__:_.<;it. :.r_l _:-x_~rv-;-|-. - - 92._~,_--I-I-.i .1 Fl --..,~.._ _' 5,.92-. .-;,;1. J . _, -> »- - .-.- -.|f;-. .=.-1 l . t r spokesmen. | t 5' . r T.§ First, the Chinese maintain that they adhere to the principle - _ ,r I m .. ,i !92'.| h,- -1' .v ! . i tr '.-/; ' -r»:. _,. ,/.3; l'-;.'._1..'"-; -:5. -.__- ,.., »<_':--,...t| of co-existence of states with different social systems, and re- .'J92:_iL44 I r"-5-.-'~,'.»'-'-:1.">.._¢1. _-;.j'-:5 -: _L-I .92=,, .__, _ -_ |.r;;=!__,s _: _._i. .iI; I-BE,E. -;fp_.;s_g;- .--Y §j':.'-1 j:'~ :_ .-'-i_ ;!;_E _~___m »_ .1--;-it < »_',r~':' guts- t < -.7-92.§'-r.$ ,,= peatedly assertthat they are for peace. Butthey insist that this does notrequire anypeople toaccept dominationby imperialists 1- or reactionaries or to accept outside aggression. In other words, Qt , "92 _ .. '_ .92 wars of liberation and wars resisting aggression are just wars. .2-." 1 - --"'2?.' "_. ,1? .'.~- t ". Furthermore, theymaintain that eo-existence appliesin ditlerent 1 -5-. -; . y _ ... iv -'1. 1 111. V 19'- X - e . - <1 P-I. . ways to different countries and that different policies must be .. .4-' adopted towarddifferent typessuch as other socialistcountries, nonsocialist countriesthat have recently attainedindependence, K ordinary capitalistcountries, andimperialist countries.The United States fallsin a category by itself as the superimperialistpower bent on world empire through the establishment of military bases I and control of puppet governments throughoutthe world. With it, the Chinese maintain, no co-existence is possible as long as the United Statesmaintains whatthey now regard asbeing a policy .. . __ if V of imperialism and aggression. They criticize the Soviet Union s - -:3-u"=" attempt toobtain peacewith the UnitedStates throughnegotiation _ ' M because theysay a lasting peacecan only be assured throughuni- i versal disarmament.Anything shortof this, especially inthe eld of nuclear weapons, simplyperpetuates a military monopoly of t the big powers. But, they say, universal disarmamentis com- pletely unthinkablefor the United Statesat thispoint for two basic reasons. First, according to their analysis, its economy is based -- , _ __J - -. »- _ _ _ p V I
_H _ *4-...-_4 --.5; - - "~17 ~..7eP 1--r -E a92 - _ . . _ _,,- _ l " " ~ i - ii-11% '»-_- - - I - ' @- _ -----v-~.;-.-_.r __ -.= ~ -. .-at _- -' - __ - ' -is-~>w;»_~a-..~--i -92.=- _ " ~ 30 PEACE IN VIETNAM
-92_ :,|: H b -3;-. - _ "# I-. : nese have usedpropaganda aidandin attempts to in uencethese t - -r~.- -. -- < I t , i , 1 . l countries toward anti-imperialist and speci cally anti-American - . ...t --~ _ e.-.. - "92-;_. .. la" * policies. They have also carried on propaganda activities and ' ¥ y -t a given moralsupport _todissident elementsin countriesthat have Q it adopted strongpro-Western positions.In someplaces, suchas the Congo and Algeria, where revolutionary warfare had broken out, Q _ they have suppliedlimited materialassistance aswell. Thus, even though th 1" der t Marxist-Leninists, their policies in actual practice ave been shaped much more by immediate national concerns. They view the United States asan implacableenemy andtheir policiesand activities have been directed more against it than for any program i i for world revolution or the creation of some new Chinese empire. China s threemajor military ventures since1949 havedealt with such national concerns. In Tibet it reasserteda long-standing Chi- neseclaim to sovereignty a claim which is asserted alsoby the , , ~ -_r . .._ . -.- - ..-_._ I gy.-|,-~ u.-I i -_ 1"- -_ -:1.r!*f_ .i.=.:;"- I, t t 1* J.~ _':'_.'I=.- fl Chinese Nationalistgovernment ofTaiwan. Its participation in _ _ " _i ; .;,_.~.... ' , 92 ' T . 92,.<_'> = .» ~..s H92, ,r
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,1 ':-. on war production, and disarmament would lead to economic Collapse. Second,disarmament woul dmenn an end to America: " :- imperialism andits special privileges overseas.Therefore, the! reason, theAmerican rulingclass couldnot possibly enter intc n- negotiations for a meaningful peace in good faith, and the best C a chance ofpreserving peace,they think, is to weaken imperialism - ' 1:;-3 by supporting peace movementsin the advanced capitalist coun- tries and liberation movements elsewhere. t - 1 " 1-Li.» st ' ti i In recent months, with the escalation of the war in Vietnam, the Chinesehave paidincreased attentionto the question oflibera- ..|-4 tion movernents.In a recent speech commemorating thetwentieth . _ WM anniversary ofthe victory over Japan,Lin Piao, one of China's ' + Vl leading Communists,addressed himselfto this very problem. This speecha hasreceived considerableattention because Lin attempts to projectthe experienceof the Chinese Communistguerrilla-type warfare againstJapan andthe Nationalistsin terms of defeating the United States on the world scene. He stresses the fact that, in the faceof a strong enemy capableof seizingthe is
main lines of communication,
the countryside, and eountrjvsicle alone, can provide the rcvolutionarj bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory . . . Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europ- ..4.»<'¢. _. _I J .- 1» 0 '.. . . ;-92 . 1 1. THE ROLEOF CHINA _33 ' I and doesnot rely on the strength of the massesbut leans wholly on ; t1 . foreign aid even though this be aid from Socialist countries which persist in revolutiou no victory can be won, or be consolidated even if it is won. t And further on he states, Of course, every revolutionin a country stems from the demandsof its own people. Only when the people in a country are awakened, x mohiiizctl, organized and armed can they overthrow the reactionary ruie of imperialism and its lackeys through struggle; their role cannot i'_:R-. be replaced or taken over by any people from outside. In this sense, . -sr -I_,..0 I ' -. - revolution cannot be imported. ,r:~_ ,._ v!-"ti ' - T. V-I;-V '1 H1. He chides those who may be fearful of American military power .',_=A ,_ ,_92 by repeating the Chinese argument that, while the United States is strong tactically, it is weak strategically. Its nuclear weapons cannot be lightly used. The more it attempts to suppress revolu- v-~w.r":r< :i '~- = » _-. t»-f-,~-_--. t_. " '1'-* "-P >";l Ji1.ts:l'=i;¢T- -i-'= ~£.e-fit?;-;:t-3 ,"*- i='i --::"<-}~: -i* ....._._..._ _.,.';J? , tionary movcrncnts,the moreisolated andpinned downit becomes y. - .,- ;_-,s 4 ,-,1,--:_. .t,. ..,_.s-;<,._ , . - ; * P . tg so that it is incapable of concentrating its tactical might. In the * * 1: . .-__4 -_.-it. -_".> gt-, *" ~T». _.__;-1.-'_.:§ words of Mao Tse-tang, Whenever it commits aggression,it puts . .. . 1 ._ _~,.» _. _.-.-_~,' 1 -,-_i".~ 1'-t_i;,'».i,.t-_- _ ,',lj":"-/.-'1J-3:-."I;-;'_'J'-' -3-: a new noose around -1»- its neck. It is besieged ring upon ring by the ' .1-.,-t-',,.~ .. . . l;_.'.* . --.92.";'~,I_t i_;_~: -92-y-t_»';t ~ . _~,.¢...~I -' ,2. i:;=,92'-'92;I , ~_*'- . .>- ;,~.»_r.'".¥: , .>-,92..92f SJ »1':_{l~_-'~ 4- - - -4.92 H .-ii. ...,_;,_ 5i" _».. .-l-...,.~._u.">....»A....-1.a.|.s_..m-A-people of the whole world. JE _" 1.-q».._. . i This is not very pleasant readingfor either the dove or the hawk. For the former it constitutes an acceptance of the use of violence as a necessary method; for the latter it raises again the fearof becomingoverextended andbogged clownin the morass of an unwinnable Asian war. ii ../I But actually the entire Chinese proposition is based on the an premise that the United States will continue its present stresson counterinsurgency programsand thus stimulate pressures toward revolution in the various underdeveloped areasof the world, which ? will assume an anti-American slant. Lin Piao's statementin no way suggeststhat the Chinese intend to create these revolutions 1 themselves,even supposing they wereable, whichthey de nitely are not. Though the Chinesehave thecapacity to provide some -1 , training and material support to revolutionaries, their ability to -ft I in uence revolutionary movements is primarily ideological and H t stems from their position as the foremost spokesmanof revolution and de ance of the white West. The success of the Chinese
.|i _.- ._ ._.. _,,_
e' P-' _- *2; .. .._. .._-.1.-,_~_;é ;, .,;-_;-:.,_l t N h_ l 1 s _ J 7* fl l I I r"-Y '- I 34 ' ' PEACE IN VIETN¢92..92- I . '- -- i -3 .-I'l =-75? ."': - : i"i_i '6'-71 I V H . g; Q-F - _ X . .;.;_ - _ ;j_ 3-Y-far. - I ti ; 11- - - 1. -"M ~ l Communists in transforming China from a weak, backward nation ;_:.-~_ =. ' H _--='_,- '- : in the throes of social and economic collapse to a major world power capable of challenging the might of the United States and, l moreover, being accepted by it as its chief threat to world leader- , . __. i ship, cannot help but arouse interest in the rest of the under- r developed world. And even the most eon'servative_member of the r formerly subjugated colored races tends to enjoy :1 certain iden- ti cation at hearing China s bellicose de ance directed toward the great white United States. Thus, just as counterinsurgency tends to intensify the very kind of explosion it seeks to prevent, ,.' V ! : . .- ' -- so the intensity of American efforts against the People s Republic of China tends to increase China s prestige in the underdeveloped areas of the world. For over two thousand years the people of Vietnam consid- ,_ .¢= ered the Chinese their chief foreign menace; and though they were profoundly in uenced by Chinese culture--wet rice farming, -- -»r~_t-,-i _ I --.-. .,<_---no -7.1.-., v--__ >r - _ ''1"£'?"¬j"y-.-::=r¬:-'%-Psi-~%%5-, ; ,-.-,7 political and social institutions, philosophy, law, religion, archi- 2 1~ r F r -7§';1=" <'4- $':.Tr§=J' "'-El"'3"? =#,1.*;=-= ».-.': . -- - - _. 1- . 1 . _"*-1" /"i i _,~_i ,. .»k 592- >* >1'-'.i'.?if" $"" ."..': -"i. <.:"'>"§l. _ Mp - -I _ 33/ .r:>!».__;,. y ,._ , _{_, tecture, and system of writing- the relations between the two areas r #" A I .,, ,¢_~_.: / L_-1;-,;;:_ -'.:l_ -Y_ ,,_,-4: were often marked by erce struggle. The Chinese dominated much " -= 5% - ;..- I. -- - !_'r.' =1.- ,. '..--.92 .- -.13 3'?» .- 5- -Y r ;- of the Vietnam area up to the tenth century A.D. Vietnam retained ._,-_1,..92-,_ _..'. 92" -5:,-., __ -, -_-._ :92-2.- _-_:,_ J _r.._. .--, ;; _ 92~ I -,- -l,.-92-~,_- ";¢_-_- > _.,--,_._- __. - = ~_.~;-A, , ._.. .-as-§,~-; 115.;-_._~.-r.-. ~--.1 i~5=r ,-r,r,3-i'- ,-.-. .t='92- ';.s,mg »-4---4--1.,-.' - -4. "" " - '~i-.._4_..;<. 5 ,Lu-§.-.3l';l4~L.f.|r.~.E1.|:.3L-' - ' ' -3:5 Z§,'3- 2'-:='Ji.' .3 -' -;,, ~_ -J, j¢,;_:$;;; 5 ,;>" ,;'§fi_;S¬-E-92¬};; §',i;~;;E»;£T.}J- Y. i'~s .;".: ". :.- 191; - 6;.l92_ 92!-.'i.*.~I a certain independence within the Chinese tribute system until the middle of the nineteenth century, when the French gained ascendancy largely by supporting local native powers against the 4?" . . , "rs . Chinese or Chinese-supported regimes. Again after the defeat of I. sai-:5 . = 1*. Japan, Chinese nationalist armies occupied the northern area of '' -"<.'.5%- , ' ., __.- '1i- * 1- _ ~ ,2--2. I ;.~ _ '-/, Vietnam, where they incurred further distrust by looting the coun- 4.4- .. _ o,,*._5. _w e _ -_ i. - '.I! __= , try and interfering in its domestic policies. In spite of the tradi- tional fear of Chinese domination, however, events since 1950 have forced North Vietnam into an increasing dependence upon China. Nowhere has the self-defeating nature of Anierican support 1' l for colonial and right-wing anti-Communist regimes become so I apparent as in Vietnam itself. - ' . Relations between Chinese and Vietnamese Communists go 4 . back to 1924, when Ho Chi Minh was sent to Canton as part of the Third International Advisory Mission to Sun Yat-scn s nu- ta. X -7-;. I - 1 tionalist movement there. At this time I-Io is said to have worked l with Mao Tse-tung in a school for training agrarian revolutionaries ' in and in "the late l930 s to have spent some time in Yenan, capital .--M'-
ir , _ i 'L,jiZ._!; -1-2:? -'" W_' "92 '7 3" I. THE Rom on C]-II.92'A i _4;3 _::":_ _. - _ i-.r " >- ' _ _- _ .1 "'_ _.j -,&-,'.'_-of ChineseCommunist territoryin northwestChina. Practiciil -A _i .11_ _ H,_ _,. i QY71 i. . gt if working relationsbetween Vietnameseand ChineseCommunists, '92 however, didnot developuntil after the ChineseCommunists tool-c over the mainland of China in I949. In 1950 the Pc0ple sRepub- lic of China alongwith the Soviet Uniongranted officialrecog- nition to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Although Chinese support for Ho Chi Minh s forces in the war against the French F i was limited at rst, after the end of the Korean War captured American armsand otheraid weresent to Vietnam in signi cant amounts. After the Geneva Conference of I954, the Chinese, and ' ' .",-.1 I - g L also theSoviet Union,continued toprovide North Vietnam with i technical and material assistancein substantial quantities. . __ i . " . : During the early years of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the North _ K, r '1'. . Vietnamese Communistsendeavored toassume a neutral position, clearly hoping to avoid being too closely tied to either party. l Beginning in May 1963, after American activities in South Viet- k 92_92.=- -'}',..--,: ~'*;-W ----1*, ';"' Q-_,V_..w.n ._ _V - - ,, ==":ii . I . ':~ -ii, , "*'7i .- . .1 nam were expanded and intensi ed, the North Vietnamese, while -'-- .; ~' --1.1: Ir §- -~ -_ =--1-:-"1E'=-idiiiii-i'ii lg: maintaining close_ties withthe SovietUnion, commencedto give -' l "- - :' - . ,- .1--'» .1 i :25, :..: I . -_,1'--pct3 =i=' ,; .- __';-.-';-,f-Pl," 1"; 'i~re ;-5 ~, more consistent support to the Chinese position. < -=- -4". -" -~ -~.= :..~- t:'=i="sT¢.~* lei ...;.e'4 i~,.~_,m 1-an: no-1,.'92v§'1. N:--4.-'i'-ii ii"§1§i292">.l .i"Hi 1- -~';'-'l5_ FE-J*s"J15!"'.'l3 h?' gs-i.. .-; --;¢J_.---_- -: :A% ~.-!- ,1--1-!;.1m.;.1~'.siiii;kea.s.&.;.i'.i<..;.i ¢i ,i."i ii;;:-:."?.i . So farthe Chinese have apparentlytaken noinitiative inseeking any negotiations on Vietnam and have insisted that peace can i come onlythrough anAmerican returnto the Geneva Agreement and acceptanceof the four-point basisfor peace laid down by the North Vietnamese. The Chinese have also stated that Chinese volunteers wouldbe availableif requested,and recentpress reports indicate thatChinese techniciansand laborersare playingan in- I creasing rolein helping the Vietnameserepair damagecaused by ¥ American bombing.Though the Chinese areclearly amdousto avoida direct confrontation withthe UnitedStates. anyAmerican invasio of North Vietnamitself would-alrnostcertainly bring i them openlyinto the war. r Thus the course of recent events in Vietnam has served to make 1 ¢ Chinaa more imminent threatto the security andindependence of Southeast Asia than it has been before, and indeed than our earlier analysis suggests it need be. We see little evidence that f China islikely toembark upona policy oi conquest if Arnericrin military forces are withdrawn. China s efforts to influence its . -,_ w -~ . _.'+--U-.1 neighbors throughtraditional instrumentsof cultural penetration n-i---1-- .-no.1.-. _. is 1; -_..L .. .._'_'._ _.-s=_..'...i_...,-'..__ _-__.1.',._ .._n._.n_ ._ _. 'V '-""" -- V -' ' ". ., i- Mu. _ . 4 _ _ -so .- t _ _ __ . A i _ ._ '..._~ -54' . ".401-dI~'-I=1 '~;w --':v.- _. ._. ._ - - -
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Mam.-_~~ _ _ >1? _ ~ 36 PEACE IN _ - _ _ '1 and economic pressure will surely continue, as theyVIETNAM centuries. The new countries stzmd a better chance of have for 92 .,_-_.. . L 1' - 1 _ .- . * independence as 21 result of their own aroused forces of retaining Q___, _ . . isrn than through American miiitzuy intervention. national- Q . . i
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. t 5: History oi United States ..-n~ 'Involvement in Vietnam
at r e Y ~ -- - .->--I :92"'_l! _b92'IY '_'F zs-_,-.._,.,..,...__,,..¢_P-i._,,.., » -*_,¢..-.92_»-.-1... 1 ":i ..:-,.{ _f' 1;.-fg i: @1231,>~-~;';<. ;§ ,.<.;,;~,- 1;=.=_. Q», In most of Southeast Asia, anti-colonial nationalist movements p ya. " -_",- ; -',-J1.-.--.'.;1-..=c;i-';,/-u'_ -; ¥Q_.r,¢/»92....A-_1.r .;-...'my . us. <~',_' _ s _ _ =';-!i":-'~!i~=,~'-__'1_-, -:11, ,-.j.;f;._;" -'.-_'£;I,,_'. ~ .-i _'i', F-i."-:§ secured independence either peacefullyor following a bitter but '._- _ ,-s.-=;.~C r - -1_92~_ ~ 1-=;-L,= 5:5 ; __ v,»' .1- .;', ;,i';.»-;+--,- ;<;': 92 -1 _=:',{=@-';*£92.=*-. P _f"_.§;- .¢'_--- ' ,-:1 .;=j;=>;-_=;,'._-_;'=...,':<=relatively brief struggle. Thenotable exception was Vietnam. There. 'i"'.~' , ':'-".I-, Pi .l'-- 3';-'1 ';!:i §-ii:151.,-':i»i'3xsffgii- f'-ii;1. :-"k'f'. i1 ., ,1, 1-_ ,-__-.,_ 6. __ . .,-...... '_>92'e, -K»! .-":5;-'; .t.r-1:".;3;.~. 5; ; I-FF ¥';J92:921:'£-z ;';¬L{iE_ France s wartimepolicies andher continuingstubborn resistance i to the demands of Vietnamese nationalists brought non-Comrnu- -.. ,5 nist and Communist patriots together i.na common e ort to secure independence. ' In their occupation of colonial Southeast Asia during World J; J War Ll, the Japanese --except thein Frenchcoionies deerned it advantageous towork througheiements ofthe Westerneducated native elites,regarding themas more reliable than the colonial ' LF civil servants.In return for their cooperation inadministering the occupied countries,the Japaneseusually antetl educated na- u l tionals highcr administrative positions and considerabiy greater scope for political activities than they had previously enjoyed. » 1% The Japanesealso made promises ofindependence andsometimes ti. granteda signi cant measure offreedom to organize nationalist movements. Nationalist leaders, therefore, usually found it more ... to th sts to operate above ground,in some sort of ma - riage of convenience withthe Japanese,than to attempt under- ground resistance. The one great exceptionwas Indochina Vietnam, Cambodia, 37 I
- . _.;r.._., ....-- - I-I. 3 - ' FT- 2.1-,-_;__ .,92-.-2-:_._' 92 =._¢ -n '1 __-.,'_rx_j:., "' -ua -A '1 - .-I S . J mi . _, - ,1 i.'-it :'7. .-t" Q i ~ P: 92" I.-. -Jpn 3 33 PEACE IN VIETNAM H- and Laos!. Here in 1941 the pro-Vichy French administration v promptly came to terms with the Japanese, making an arrange-
r ment wherebythey wereto retain their administrativepositions, under general control and supervision ofthe Japanese.In Viet- nam, then,the Japanesewere ableto rely upon the French and had no need to make concessions tothe leading nationalists. Con- t sequently,along with their French collaborators, theJapanese , | cracked downvery hard upon any nationalist activity.Because . _ r of this, non-Communist as well as pro-Communist Vietnamese l nationalists wereforced tooperate underground,a level of political
; . activity in which the Communists werealready experienced.Thus, ,-1-;-;q;+g-~;,-3--,_-_-. -u~,--r-w,-,-_..__-_-,._.---,,.....,_.._ ,y"q --wt-n-- J even at this early stage, the most important channel open to Viet- < t~ = .- - : . A .9 -4 i. .-; -92i ts. ,-J-s . .-_I -.,.,. 1 namese who wished to free their country from French control __- '-_' -'92 -'.,,._i c _ ; _ ..: pr: was onewhere VietnameseCommunists alreadyhad an entrenched r r l i i -.- .92- -' : .- .. w- position. Indeed,the only strong and organized undergroundin A. <-I f'- = - T;..?.<':'3.§-.;T-';.';s+.i.»"'l_92_z_'rss - 1.92 ~ .- =. . it..*. at t;..*2.-._;_;-;.i;;;;;rgi.#_;. . . . . - . '-.rs. .:.»,H -i>*5-1-L=i >3:='-~~.'» ' "~'-F ,'g=» ;§."*j-Z'i.%-l"i 'a':'."- - st:-,-5 existence r-it was that which had been built up by the Vietnamese -, . " Communists under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. Thus most 14- - I Vietnamese nationalists,regardless oftheir political convictions, joined. The ability of the various groups to work together was R.Egg . I - '. '. K undoubtedly increased by the fact that from the very outset the Vietnamese Communist movement had a strong nationalist bias. ._ gag.. Although Ho Chi Minh, the leader of this wide nationalist coali- l tion known as the Vietminh, was a Communist who had spe-nt .r I 1 I some timein Russiaand China,he heldhis positionby virtue of his nationalism rather than his Communism, as even Ngo Dinh Diem acknowledged. E During World War ll the Vietminh received considerablesup- 92 port from Chiang Kai-shek s government and, as the war drew s to a close, from the American Of ce of Strategic Services,forc- runner of the CIA. It developedincreasing power,and by May 1945 had liberated a part of northern Vietnam from Japaneserule. When Japan capitulated, the Vietminh and supporting groups supplanted thediscredited andweakly backednational regime which the Japanese at the eleventh hour had established under T is .t.¢- Bao Dai, the previous French colonial puppet-emperor of Annarn i central Vietnam}. The policiesof the French inVietnam inthe periodafter the i war were of even greater importancein causing nationalism to 92
..i. I ..i" _|.i- mi.-I H I. I.-_.- iii
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92- 92- .'..' HISTORY onUNITED starestuvotvestexr IN VIETNAM _39 ' -,'3"B'I|V-I-C .3i"'V ' --§>'¢'~I92IL§1r'.;, :.».~t- '_ - i-~ .5... . ': ,a ' - _:~ .. __:3,_t_-. ; _'-i:-;?.;4, _ _ _ fuse with Communism. Again, Vietnam stood in contrast to the non-French colonial areas of Southeast Asia. For unlike the Amer- icans andBritish who had the wisdom to grant independenceto is - I . their colonies, and unlike the less powerful Dutch whom the ~ 1 H -1 . United States refused to support after 1949, the French remained 92 4 intransigent. Withincreasing Americansupport, they continued to resist Vietnamese claimsfor independenceto the very last 1. n down to their military defeat at Dienbienphu in1954. This un- yielding French policy gave Vietnamese nationalistsof all political orientations, pro-Communist and non-Communist, no effective al- _ 1 * - -i > ternative but to work together against the French. Thus in Vict- nam, in marked contrast to the other countries of Southeast Asia, -'1 __ the mainstream of the nationalist movement came under the dom- ._ L, ination of a largely Communist leadership;and all Vietnamese _ . . .. - 92 3: recognized I-Io Chi Minh s Communist-led Vietminh as the force * .*~'. _ ~-tar; _. I ' that successfullyopposed Frenchpower and eventually secured Vietnamese independence. V .= 11:;-I-.~=__- .p_92---I, - >- 1',->4--J1.3rm--;92-;!'92f}:'f{9r?92$92f;'"92 §"Tf!'l1 *l_'fV:q~r- E-92i'fI'P:l:'f_ 'l fg92392"i I .:.= i 5.5 ._-" -. 1 -- . ,=-K ',»'-_ §;'»':7.. ~. ->1,-§ .- 'p-1 -=-Ci!'§¬*r,.1$ »91i.;>j>._1;~,_ ..~, -L. .. ./-. ',,. -,_._-..,-' .-.1 _=-'_3_-_iA_--"3 -is-'-va-;.-_.t- T4Although Franklin Roosevelt had made clear his opposition to " i ~. I '-=¢- ~ i -"-92¢'r92i--- l» .-.--,-,- t92 ..>;-*-;-. --. s --i ;-.>92,~r-.~ .¢ ..g Iv , . J.; -:..'~< ¢'-~;'-.2 -_<, - ==.-,-. ,-1 .,.- ">4 5 _ _1- J =-..;r '~.;_-,.-y .4-- >r.- Q4.~ _- i i;_-r ~-J . ,_1~-.- ._..~v.,.____ r-1. .-.;I _i§_any reoccupationof Vietnam by Franceand hadadvocated mak- "_ . ,. -. _ . _ _ .5 :_;.-_;,~f-_.,l-~.- ._-_..,;- ;-._;.-; Y if. - .-; .'-l i'i f'=11" ;1 -J-f'*' i.-iv : " 1'?3-'." "°' -5.-.i'.'..'3'= 3l":'~T I-K-'-if -l;- -' - '-' Y .1 *1 , . i". { - " Fin '-.': .i.* ;-.3, ' ':,r-'1 ing it a United Nations trusteeshipterritory, the Truman admin- . _._, _| _I - .. .7. . If . ._~..l»s .. -_-.;k_._ --K ;.-.;';-;i,'-1:-~ _. _. ___ _._92k: -.--:_-,;t.,I NI. ?:,-:-.4. -3 .'3_._ -7~.',-»~.- l.--_..;;..».Ul!.-.:,..*-. istration while hoping France would ultimately grant Vietnam 92_-'.».-,3.. tr .i"'_LJ.1:;L: ..='.~:-,Z,si=.t'_.s-.gt;i.t-,1 ~,¢ ;ss1t~;'-is;:'ii;f§=~'-Eirsctsae. ~ independencc undertook to back French efforts to re-establish ,, control. To avoid antagonizing France, which it was hoped could 4 be madethe keystoneof an American-sponsored Europeanmili- tary alliance,the UnitedStates temporizedin Vietnam with respect 1 to its general commitmentto self-determination.Our support to . l-$.23-.'-c.-it . -» e1 ;i France increaseduntil we were underwritingtwo-thirds of the costs of her military effort, with well over a billion dollars allocated in the year 1953alone. Bygranting thissupport, theUnited States took its rst long step toward making the Vietnamese cynical Y about Americanprotestations ofsupport for national scIf-clctcr- IHLHZIUGTL.
A 1 l France s military defeat culminated in mid-1954 with Dicti- i bienphu, settingthe stagefor the Geneva Conference ofthat year. Q _ r An understanding of the political failure that accompanied this 7* lr military defeatis most important to any analysisof the present 1 situation. In1950 theFrench hadestablished Vietnamesea regime e . under Bao Dai. Never given political autonomy, let alone inde- '1 . I i ! . . .__.._.a.__ _ ._. _ J F-p-e.-- --1--__ _a -1 Lani
r92 PEACE 1N VlET!92'Al92I r , 2,. .. .. _ .. ' -*:1'."7?*-~-.. . pendence, thisregime hadproved incapableof winning popular support. Mostof itsadministrators wereFrenchmen Vietnameseor } . A who wereregarded by the population asagents ofthe French. ii At the time of Geneva there were, then, two competing gov- ernments. Onewas the Viettninh governmentof Ho Chi Minh, con- > trolling aboutthrec quarters ofthe country,with approximately 4 as muchof its territory southas northof the 17th parallel.The other governmentwas theFrench militaryadministration with 1 its Vietnameseveneer- -the essentiallypuppet governmentof Bao Dai, operatingin French-heldenclaves both north and southof the 17thparallel, andlargely con nedto urban areas suchas Hanoi, Saigon, and their immediate surroundings. The representativesof nine governments participatedin the Geneva Conference of 1954: Cambodia, the People s Republic of China,France, Laos,the DemocraticRepublic ofVietnam the Vietminh!, the State of Vietnam the French-supported Bao Dai :.- .. ~ .-7
_' 1_ ~:_: Inn:. . " _ -_" HISTORY OF UNITED STATES lT92'V JLVE.l92IE. -|'TVIETN.-92l92»I IN 4-i _$_, _ __ .,V:,, ...,__.:_ - that the essential purposeof the agreement relatingto Vietnam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcationline is provisional andshould not rs '51,:in 'r or t tfi oria a . l in any way be interpreted asconstituting a pol boundary. 2 The Vietminh was reluctant to agree to this partition, which I 4 left it with slightly less than half of the territory of Vietnam despite thefact thatat the time it controlled three-quarters.How- ever, Ho Chi Minh s government wasunder strong Soviet and Chinese pressureto give way on this point. The concern of China. __... - . -_,. and probably also the Soviet Union, was that continuation of . . -'i, -.;_.>_.j_'. ¢!.- -:71 . C .. .§13->t the war might cause the introduction of American military power possibly aton1ie in support oi the French,a course ol action which the United States did in fact come very close to taking. _ N ,_,..,,,.-._..._,_c,.,_.._.._.._._..--_.- .,,._._..;_..t._..,...... r- The Vietminh accepted this temporary loss because of the explicit -=- . - .=,;---.i . ,'..»Y-:11;si.~:- i;?,~. - -. -'... »1 .92. -- -.1 ,.'-3". :- ; i promise in both the armistice agreementand in the Geneva Dec- 4. . .»-. .<. W .- Fr ' . ,, ,-- -. ' A * '11-'-.:." laration thatwithin a period of two years nationalelections would i - , w ' ' . I-,'=..-,; -.-j§?92'-j.#_', ._,.',-I.-1-.be held to unify the country. They had every reason to believe . .:- ; , -_ 1:, _~;, ? -;, -;'-,1 -141---5--1-ft--.2 .=;r-.1», ;':l.";~, .21 -'.~.~='-1 -~.. Q g.'~-.:u.:;sai;1.»*-<..".=:,£a24.>§.=' -rs~.=:$-13.11-U.-2:->*?E~*i ~=1*r¥ '.~:1;. that these elections would take place because the agreements stipulated that France. the other party to the armistice, was to maintain control of civil administration in the South until elections -92 . were held Article 14a of the armistice agreement!. In eliect, .¢; -y > i '-1, _ then, the elections and the military truce were interdependent, a .,: Y " ;' L"-.' e . sq. . i t s "" .1.--." tact often disregarded. . L , . p» Despite thisstipulation, lessthan a year after theGeneva Con- ference, France, alleging American pressure, pulledyout of Viet- nam without honoring its obligations concerning the elections; 4 and the United States stepped in to ll the void left by the depar- ture of French power. The United States had not been a party to the military truce and had not actually assented to the Geneva Declaration. in- torrned observers have said that the major reason was the unwill- ingness ofSecretary ofState Dullesto appearto give any ground to Communism, especially at the time of an election campaign. Instead, at Geneva the United States had made its own unilateral declaration wherein it undertook to refrain from the _threat or use of force t0_disturb theGeneva Accords.With respectto the pro- oy * Sec Appendix l~B_ . K
H . I i. _ it-ii _|i.- I. E i , . .
. l T J I _, ._...... $ .._. I_i i i "=_-~~.. V-92 - "- 42 I PEACEIN VIETNAM it ,2 N ._,_ _ _ iV_ e. e -._-h- '-t~g .,-i ,;s,__,_-- -win-.;.-r=lv<92,'-s '-' _| , _ ...., 92>' . __ .- - , YV-.V- .- vision for elections, it had stated: In the ease of nations now ,>a Lt'- >1 . - _ I» ' -,. '233. ?r r ..?=..' 'fv _ ,.j- ~_¢~> -_ --- , . divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve '1" "1 - .=> - V K» i . 'I unity through elections supervisedby the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly. 3 In its declaration the United U ' -..* an _~. 92 States likewisespoke only"of a single Vietnam,not of a South and a North Vietnam. Q It was not until January 1955 that France transferred all the essential attributesof authority to the Saigon regimeheaded by l Bao Dai. But even before this the United States had begun to U support his administration andespecially PrimeMinister Ngo 1 . . ' Dinh Diem, who had been appointedby Bao Daj two weeks before the Geneva Conference concluded. Diem came from a Roman Catholici'viandan'n which family served the vestigial and effectively French-controlledimperial Annamese court at Hué in central Vietnam. After working, in the imperial administrationfor four years, Diemresigned ini933 l because ofa disputewith EmperorBao Dai.In 1949, following » _-._,._-~_»_t-__~_.-r-.~~i ..»t Lg~*III7'Wi1'lI_P'I_§;':¥y'_ -.' la * '> ,- ;- V . '--tw-1 '-"-. . .. =92r<~-1 .t V -. '£:.:'; - . in."-.tV'1ql . -mi-1"- A1-1|I"l_¢1"' '92!¥92b'I];*'- T"<"'? 1 °¬ -f"'92*In'F." -Fr92- -. ,. ..* " " V Wu Q-':~;'-' '~-< -,V , V- '.1g*-n -' , P.-'.i= 71.-- ,.,V y <-Y; ", __.- ,-, _._,_,>.J-; ~52 a long period of political retirement and study, Diem was offered x < 92- ";;__ , .~ .. _92,_t__ii 1 _ , ~ V ,. --: - '-"-'.-.133. the premiershipby Ho Chi Minh. He turned it down, in part P . ¢ -. < 0 because heheld the Vietminh responsiblefor the murder of his , .,_- t -.~ __i ,- .-_ -,i.-.- t_-~V--_-.~_~. ,- _!_.-_-_;y ._-,7, --_-, i}_,9_,,u,._-»__92,;o _ Pp. . _-..'r.t;-_""t'.1-._.;F K-.___§_ »r.-.,____Q»;~' _.92_-:~_3,$, -""1 '..i."' ;.tf§ ~f-§..i.*'_,.."* °i~I4.-K__rt}r_'._ f-"ti-¥_g9292_ "'-'1-si = - .2 §u.~A-t..."~ 92 .:-.1, _:_.;.92,,:_. -éy;§92f_.yz;i;g}B1»:s:t;§~_3-i :"" "e§§ "_.§,.f" '-"t_ brother. After an unsuccessfulattempt todevelop a rival political r.___J,narrv hf-. --_ .._--IPFT . Vietnam--_ .-.-. in..c, Ancntcf a.-.-C,-en IQQH.1 -v an-.. nnrl 92.|IJ92Il.lI-qnnnf fnnr -vs. Jvunu m=~nrc: I-A92.!A92192-Lul, nhrnnri .1... mostly in the United States. At least as early as November 1954, the UnitedStates haddecided tosupport Diemin setting'upan anti-Communist state in South Vietnam, making clear that Amer- ican aid would be given to him alone. While the Saigon regimeof Ngo Dinh Diem soon discncum- bered itself of Bao Dai and freed itself of French control, it failed to satisfynationalist aspirations.Ho Chi Minh, whofor thepre- vious decade had been the acknowledged head of the Vietnamese nationalist movement,simply couldnot be displaced by Ngo Dinh Diem, aman supportedfrom theoutside, littleknown, andabsent uq from the country duringthe critical years of the war against the French. Partition did not mean that the area south of the 17th parallel emergedfree of Communist in uenceor of predispositions est! inwarrl.-.._-_ --_-the re-rvime.-a.-..- _,- nf I In --c hi V... _...... Minh The ...- nnnpupu,...Na 1-trim ...... them r~ Boulhl lrl Ki 'Sec AppendixI-C. | >" ' i I , ' - ii T '' _ ' i him-
__.._A __ ' ' 7 7 . 7 7 77 7 7 - v - ' " __;jii' __ #7. 7. . HISTORY OFUNITED STATESINVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM .43 _.--7 _ _ g " -V_ -»g.1:=.. ' not forget that it was the Vietminh regime, now ensconcedin the North, that drove out the French; and many landless peasants - .7 remembered thatit was the Vietminh that had divided up the " v."~;7;.1a-.2 _ - L l .451 estates of absentee landlords for their bene t. _ " ..l ;_- 7 By helping to establisha separate state southof the armistice line, theUnited Stateswas clearlyacting inde ance ofthe Geneva j . Accords. In effect, boththe United States andSaigon accepted, and insistedthat Hanoi accept, onlythose aspectsof the Geneva Agreements thatthey found advantageous andrepudiated those .1- provisions that they regarded as contrary to their interests. Thus, with American encouragement,Diem announced in " g, , 6;.-c -yh :.=- 1 ' ' <-.=¥,<_*E- V.»- mid-1955 that the elections promised at Geneva would not . yfs >,--..--_ -- ~ Ky/'3'. » 7: ' ' ':' 7,7 <31 _'-,- be held. Until 1958 the Hanoi government persistedin its '_.':V; gig ,_"; ; |_?_?1 .i'.1 _:;,<. .7 ,_._, g 1: '. _ ;_._. . .-1,:» -47 t 92 3,, . efforts to anange for the promisedelections, butDiem, consist- » 5 ently backed by the United States, refused.During at least the : rst threeyears ofthe post Geneva period, therewas a lull in the _, . -7 __ .,..,7.,T._.».,.,,,,>.~n-4-:_y-fy?-vn!yz-fr r~_- .,»...... -a--»».~._.--~- -.w,-_-;-7.,-- .7,-1 military struggle.Hanoi refrained from supportof insurrectionary -2:;-..1 .. .7 _- _-, ~~.- .-_.-i.,. .:_.Asg92: . . .i._._ i *.:i~_",¢ e -.;V.~-'.i.--. ., --'~- -,"- .1;~ " /::_, -._'-J ,4 »l;,_':"."activity inthe South.But byrepudiating theheart ofthe Geneva " .. _ E . Agreements, Diem made civil war inevitable. When, in a civil . _ __ . ,1 1 . H , 2.-_"_-L:___> Z ; I _; :._r',I._.-y _92:i. .':¢ii., ,: E__war, a military struggle for power endson the agreed condition _- _- ._1__.. ,__-;_-*-~ I_:i.92:-_i,..'_~A_i: ~_.-:--._ 3 7 r71.-N, 1 -l~;f._ j :_- 1-3,-.-, ;.j_--'-;_>:,."t.,,.' _=;1_i. »,5 ;-92~,_i 3;:x 7 §..7 .»,1.5'-;7,;},.: ;7.'=7;__,;! y .s,;7;-,.-.-,,.7.,-K er_*__ -is 7-"1' _ 2- 1. 'e._:-=1.- .:;a: at. at that the competition willbe transferredto the political level,the side whichrepudiates theagreed conditionsmust expectthat the military struggle will be resumed. Although American support was given to Diem, the United . .9-2 W :1 , .= " -3..j:' 1 7 -5 .1 . States didnot makea blank-checkcommitment towhatever regime > ' 1* " 1 1;... - happened tohold power in Saigon. Whathas beenreferred to as the U.S. commitment was a limited, quali ed pledge of economic support,and it was madespeci cally toDiem s govern- ment. It was notin any sensea pledge of mr'limr_vsupport. The Q cornerstone of our Vietnam involvement, President Eiscnhowers letter to Diem in October 1954,was simplyan undertaking to & examine" withDiem how an intelligentprogram ofAmerican aid s given directly to your government can assist Vietnam . . . in 5 . developing andmaintaining astrong, viablestate, capableof l'¬Slst . ing attemptedsubversion oraggression throughmilitary means. lg A critical quali cation was that even this economic aid was to be subject to Dienfs carrying through reforms responsive to the _ ,* I » 92
_,_ _ _, ______q,.,.,_;,,,_ _--.... -__- -, ;__' u-._ . "~92-_~- .. ' 'ti-i ...Q-j-ms; -'-I; - r-"F .--_.1..--1 _.... __ _&n& ": .. . ' - J -:' . "F-J1 .-;.;' .1 . - . ._ ._ N _7 :9 :_-a--_ 1; . i ._ #- I-KT i 1? 44 i PEACE IN VIETNAM 2% aspirations of the Vietnamese people. Thus, in concluding his v. - letter, President Eisenhower wrote:
The Government of the United States expects that this aid will be met "E G I by performance on the part of the Government of Vietnam in under- Q taking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an inde- i pendentVietnam endowed with a strong government. Such a govern- ment would, I hope, he so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of 9 P;.,=;. ' - "<;_.; < -t its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance, 1;: -:5 i :r.=,=;:- '-J A that it will be respected both at home and abroad and discourage any PF . "£1-is . . 1 -- - .._. who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people. - L '-P = ,-.;.1- A . <_ "
This is the substance of the Eisenhower commitment to which the present administration often refers when it is invoking Amer- , . . ; .- i '- ¢'1~;."> - -t '~ =1 ...'-,, 92 ican honor. l 4,, t t. w -~&, 92 .1.t | . .<. ,_ r- , 2,. -_r_*:. Except for Eisenhowefs letter, the only other undertaking which i '92 - '1;* »-- D I v- »- . | the Administration cites as a proof of a. Vietnam commitment is _.r | -t. _}.,_ _..> I_ _,._ ~;.,.-é,7 the treaty of the Southeast Asia Treaty Urganization. But this ...... 92 . -. -.. -mgr-:4--.t<--1 ...: r '1 .; i';';L-Liéil-;i 4; . - ; tr-' _ _.?=.;.": _* - 5 .~ '.::.~ _' >';_Lt ..r1i-Y -_-.'~-_-..'.-"l- * L 1; J-L '-.-'.- "-'*?t;s i_'l. e.*. -I»"i -.~, ~- -,'/"c- , "J1 -,,:. l'~:. . i-'_"'i'i§ ='Z-ii-_ .'~.;'¢'-1;-', .s>.?"92Z-*;It~:-=- -'*-- it-1'" treaty involves no American pledge to the South Vietnamese gov- i ernment, which was not and could not be a signatory. With i respect to the area of South Vietnam, and also that of Cambodia and Laos, SEATO provides that in cases of aggression by armed ir . -_-xx i attack, each SEATO power is to meet the common danger_in .,.. 92 , _ ._ ._. i}? .'J accordance with its constitutional processes, and in cases of sub- Q1 .1 version, to consult with the several SEATO sivnatories in | 1 order to agree on the measures to be taken for common defense. u1_;r921.92.1, C l§A"l"f'924|». ut , 1-» W35 nut H,-.4etuu ..¢92Ain '|- nut -"=4E 1.-.92.-L-as t L»92-l5CI» LO 1-Inn tn I92 t 0¬ South Vietnam. The treaty merely provides that each member country should determine whether its own security interests require 4 it to respond to developments in that area and, when this hap- pens, to consult with other signatories on any defense measure to be taken. The United States has certainly never been able to bring its SEATO allies to agree that the treaty s vague language could possibly be translated as any kind of commitment to the govern- ment of South Vietnam. President l- ennedy sview of the United States commitment is best summed up in the statement he made in September 1963, when he said: ln the nai anaiysis, it's their war. They rc the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help _ __ .___.._..___.. i _ ._ i-.i,|_. _ if, . ii
_ _ g ,_ _,--,--..t- _r _ ' - y " :i920't._ . 'A r . ___ - ~ . l HISTORY onumrno stares INVOLVEMENT INVIETNAM '45 -5 her '» -=ire: at -W ' : -- 1; -'-;' . r 1 '__,7 j-- ;-5; ;_."92. 2- r lt-,__ii . them, givethem equipment,we can send our men out there as '7 ..8'-P 1 ...}';"92 - I:-=. ~'-', =i w". :":i tits-' '- . advisers butthey haveto win it. _ _». -.-,=.;-l .=_ - 7 ____.-.. 7 -. _,.~.*.- - t . . ..92 , _ ,. Like those ofHo Chi Minh, the methodsof Ngo Dinh Diem vv f Ztt.tthG: tEZ!i': t .,' ' - ehbu: U12! w'¬{6 . 4 1.'iui'iiini.S92Is':iL1v3lYA st. r ti" 1 AG..- 1...-. CILLLLIVC. Unlike I-Io,Diem lackedContact with the bulk of his people, and he hadno trainedand dedicatedparty cadresand officialsupon 1' whom to rely. Most ofthe educated peoplewho haveworked in Diem s govemmentand the governments thathave succeededit l have beenof two kinds: southernerswho had collaborated with the French and therebyalienated thelocal population; or anti- Communist refugeesfrom the North without roots in South Viet- nam, men who speak a different dialect and most of whom are Roman Catholic,a religion foreign tothe OVC[92Vi'lQl1'1'_li!]gmajority ... -' i of southerners.Moreover, ata very early stageDiem antagonized a large part of the southern peasantryby largely undoing the . . ----t-- .~_ .. .. -. ---- = I .-.-¢. __ agrarian reforms that I-I0 Chi Minh s regime had carried out. .- -$.-~!'."7'.;'-" .- _.-_>~,.j.- 1-> 4 1 92 at ii ~.-.: ~_-;< ' 1- I -* _: .-" -Q ! - -- I »-,,_gq;_ :; Lands previouslydivided amongthe peasantrywere restoredto *'* ' . ' _ -3- ." <:., '-.. 1" i'-3? 1."-5' the landlords,and police supported thecollection of ve years .. . . . l rt.»--~.-;. -. ,-. -- ;__-_: _!_- , .1; .'=;_.-_.-.-_92 .=_ -: ~_i -. *- i_ _ i___.-3, back rent.In mid-I956 Diem uprootedthe traditionalsystem of . r ;~-, ~ = , H ' 1'. . '. ir~-»-'"-;i-»"2:»; =-.a-'1 I, ~*-,3 , -=:.~_'~"I-'_'92.>=3t--P-'.¢r~;¥-all--vi-»";;,1y7~a if-1. -.'.~->'-'_u» ---3..»-1 it .I-.x'-LH.i==92""' Y -; -;-1-i'l',~=,_--=-,,'.~;1>>v*'tr}:5,53"--~<'§,,-.'S -.--.=..1===.i:i...,£.=..ti._92' ~___ _~ .t::i;;.it:. ~;._-;- _.;..j-='_927 : *'*:-""7-'.:;' "i;-1,-.~: s ;p.'1t-"t,-anti 1,. village autonomyby abolishingthe electedvillage "'- councils. Ht. replaced themwith officials who were appointed byand served as agents of the central government. Diem also removed many able and popular of cials, leaders with strong local roots who _ .;$ r" . it* _~~=1 . l had worked underthe previous Viettninhadministration. These men wereoften replacedwith corrupt and oppressive appointees 4 from outside,further alienatingthe rural population. I . Diem governedwith a harsh and heavy hand,countenancing no i genuine oppositionto his regime andindiscriminately denouncing as Communiststhose whoopposed him,whatever theirpolitical views. By 1957 theharshness ofDiem s repressionhad sparked I I uprisings againsthim, often not Communist-led.The Vietcong I was able to build upon these later when its cadres became active. E By 1958, forrner Vietminh supporters livingin the South had begun toorganize guerriilaoperations againstDiem, undertaking by 1959 a campaign of assassination of village chiefs. It must be recognized thatthis campaign,although ofteneffective indisrupt- ing Diern sefforts toestablish hisown administrationthroughout - -~_'r~ " ' . Hill _ ..... - ...._-_.'.~ ' the country, did not antagonize therural population so widely _ .- in is»:-. _; 92;£f,;,..".-r.-_>..». 1., A;_' --_;',__ .. V _.... . sQt§ sa.>_ti. _92..._ 7 i. _. @_._ K
-,7 _ .. . W7 W ___ _ i 92 1 I» »»-=- »~ - _i' I
-:.~.-..:..,_-.-,. 'J.:.-is ',_, _* ,-92- '~ . 1 ' = 9 - ~.-;.-~; . . --:1 - ' . .. -.. --4 . - _ Y-'1.- - -1-» '- re; ' if' 1 . . ..92 .1.-~~ -Fri" ' I5.-392 , l -1rm __---92 .-- -~ .-: .. '1»,_.' t I 01 i , .} 92 I 46 i ' PEACE IN vrsrrmm as some accounts havesuggested. Infact, these assassinations were largely on a selective basis. The underground organization showed canny intelligencein eliminating the most unpopular Diem-appointed of cials.Thus, the veteran SoutheastAsian cor- respondent, DenisWarner, hardlya supporter of Hanoi, writes in his book, The Last Confucian p. S9!: Summary Viet Cong .1 . , justice for a villagechief guilty of corruption or brutality did not o end the peasants. Onthe contrary,it tendedto endowthe Viet Cong with some of the characteristicsof Robin Hood and his band of merry men . . . l -1 Y 7 --_-_ - ~ '~-7* ' "= - ---it-'--'.»~. -:3_ ./ - n-_~:-.-::. 2. -.---so -.. The exactpoint at which Hanoibegan tosupport insurrection- _ ,--, --u ;-.=_92..-4»,--_:f1,,.-_}!:3; w-r- ~.w,-. .r_-.7,"..I -f-'.f.-.';"-.»n- " - T{*'-T 1;;r'{~. ,, *1 - »_L1_t<-;92;~~. .~.'~ .r'.- -. . -, "'"_.Y? ¢ 1"P I -"-1 ary activity in the South is subject to much dispute, but certainly _ . . .._,;~,_.. _ 1 4.:-if -iFI~ ;'-.jI 5.,1, .- -' .~ in 1960 such support was made public by Hanoi. In September of -I .-_. A ,, . .t__,_ ,-_,_'.;'."that . year,Ho Chi Minh s governmentformally acknowledgedthe ;':"i%I~ f' ,_ - -it ..< . ;_-,..- .'. ..£-.=~:*:»s'.a's.-..'.-..~.-¢'-»-_1 -. 11'1"rt -Z"Z:-U_:;| i1l';§.'»;1?92-.- _.,-_;~_-----_~, -.. - _-e~-.;j|t_- .-.E~-:; . .= l _.; .7- E southern dissidents as the National Front for the Liberation of 5:. t-:51; 1?:r;-51*--'» ' i;-ii" ,-.. .11-i-s.-._ai....t<9 £",: §*_i'..i;i'.}fl:.Tl;§South Vietnam NFLSV!. This was in e ect the political arm of B - the insurgents,a grouping that Diem collectively labeled Viet- 2 . 92 . »92. - = .-=1-=. 1' 3,4 _.i_ J t .-__--'-- . cong andthat certainly incorporateda large number ofthe Viet- .92_ >r v minh s former adherents in the South as well as other elements .. ~:£,9» -t., 6 t .3;",'|;:il"1 U opposed to Diem. The leader of the National Liberation Front, 4. ,» _ _ 2, Nguyen HuuTho, is a southerner, a Saigon lawyer rst arrested In i during the period of French control and later, in November of =9 r 1954, byDiem. While still in jail, in 1959, he wrote a lctter to r a ex-Vietminh southernersurging themto form a national front. In May 1961, approximatelya year after the Front wasformally I 2 established, he escaped from prison and soon emerged as the V Front s principal leader. According to Tran Van Huu, who served I as Bao Dai s prime minister from 1951 to 1953, NguyenHuu d a | Tho is very well known in Saigon as a person who was most » 1 activein opposition to the French in the colonial period. By .- - Q '__ l 1960 members of the Vietcong were being given training in the I North, and some arms were being sent south, although the vast I "7 majority of the arms employed by the insurgents continued to be American equipment captured from or sold by Diem s troops. Meanwhile, United States of cials in Vietnam were increasingly i frustrated in their efforts to induce Diem to institute the sort of i reforms necessaryfor winning popular support.The hope that ... ._h ._ l_._ _..._. ..._.. ._ _. . I 4. - -e-+~~1i -1- g _ H I, - ,,~ M, _ E - -, jg my 92@ /' g HISTORY OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNABI A 47 full and unstinting American backing would make him more
92 cooperativein suchmattersprovedtotallyillusory.Criticaliyim- F portant social and economic reforms urged by the United States were either not carried out or were attended by so much corrup~ tion and inef ciency that they resulted in even greater alienation of the population. Diern s program of agrarian reform could hardly have been expected to secure him signi cant political sup- 10- . I '1_ ~ y I port. Even the modest redistribution of land for which it provided , , - < -1:-= did not get underway until 1958. The program was restricted to rice-growing lands; and even with regard to these holdings, land- iyi lords were permitted to keep up to 284 acres. Where rice proper- v ~§ 'i92*'._..-:--1_-+-gv-|g»i- .e-=;~1v_-, '!"'-1.~~.- --aces-_w-~-wry!--1-q»-.~r_~*.'7='v.' ties in excess of this amount were made available for redistribution, as Z-.:.-1 : ;'f Z':.;i'¥'.>'; ~ ~~ 1 ~t-:. -~"_'I:,- ~'_"! 92 .- . :g;_§lthe peasant had to pay for the land in full, and he received title '_, -__' .¬. .-Z:1. to it only after he had paid the last of six installments. For those . J_r ,, ,.; _-t J _. t many landless peasants in the South who had been given such . r .- 1 i, . ~.~._"-QP-.*l%'!:~-r?»7l:'§. 'J.'ir' .l ' _,|=_j;¥_;,;_J-r_- i '.' -.92 1. !,r;,._;'_-'--,;_*_.r " . ~ -:§:j-,_1_~;,:.-;»" t~__»* " _="'3 - .» 92 . "3.-,-',:'1y'-it ,- ~ i ..".-s;>a==~?92= _2-..'~. "?=.kf,5§ L'.»'i-"3 . s.<.:s$-t'lI- ~* 1L~ *al£§'.i,~,~@.~»-#I ii" lands by the Vietminh in the period before Geneva, the right to I purchase what they regarded as already their own did not make i . them particularly grateful to the government in Saigon. The stra- ~< tegic hamlet program, for which American officials initially made such extravagant claims, turned out to be in most areas a tragic failure that worked great hardship upon and further alienated O the rural population. Its objective was to resettle peasants in l l larger and more easily protected concentrations where they were a ll to bene t from new or improved social services. In tact, most oi the peasantry affected were signi cantly worse off than before. Apart from the trauma of being uprooted from their homes and v ancestral lands, they were usuaily quite inadequately compensated for the property they had been forced to abandon, They were Q n often harshly treated, generally unable to discover the new social services they had been promised, and usually no better protected l r is 1- - Ira. 1'- l than before from the ravages of guerrilla warfare. -,. ."v! Despite repeated optimistic pronouncements by American mili- - F». L -. 4/-to tary and civilian officials, by I963 it had become clear to President Kennedy that Diem and his family were incapable of stemming F .. V the rapid political and military disintegration of the South Viet- .l namese regime. The massive build-up of American aid to the South Vietnamese anny had proved ineffective, for the Vietcong 1 it » i __- as. . p P .-31 r 1 J 0-92 <-=-@ .. FEACE TN VIETNAM in bene ted more from the vast infusion of American weapons than . . did the South Vietnamese army and had, in fact, been able to use the government as a supply store. Iv It was the highly publicized, heavy-handed treatmentof South v Vietnam's Buddhists that provided the Administration with the t means of getting off the Diem hook in a way acceptableto mem- 1; 1. 2:. I -. 3?? 1%--.3 ?9. -e bers of Congress who might otherwise have attacked it with the .» I, charge of opposing an anti-Communist government. In effect. {zit -._ 1 , 1 92 Washington signaled to the military in South Vietnam that we had .- gt' 92 abandoned our policy of sink or swim with Diem" and would be ,,.. r--=~.'¢ "Q pleased to see the army take over. This was a calculated risk and a policy born of desperation. lath. :-rt, e, It ._f '1 t 92 ,,/v :_,_:_ For there was no assurance that the Vietnamese army would be = 92 92 * 1 I gt- F _.~ able to establish an e ective government or command su icient popular support. But it was believed that if the army were relieved ,- of the constraints of Diem and his coterie, it would ght more :1 e ectively. This expectation, however, disregarded several facts. First, there was a lack of unity within the army. Second, the Viet- cong had already built up its strength in the South and controlled ;_ iti I »-- :'-"»'. -." -- pr 3 -" -' ".-. 1."--'-.'r'T»' » _ cf->.'='.' , » '-92 - - '2? -'*"£.¥1 .-l~J.=¢>3.-iii -...s ;92l _t-~. >- é~_,r i?§=l;""s*..r*1.=_»=§"-"°3tlE1, . pi I3 over half the area. Third, even in that part of the country con- ",j._~; ~ we t,_. ..;~'-I z_----..-t- - -- .< .: a1_-jlgju-_.92-__. R. = ,- _ trolled by Diem, and particularly in the rural areas, the military leaders enjoyed little or no more support than did Diem. Thus, contrary to expectations, the army was no more successful than Diem, either in building popular support or in carrying out the measures necessary to secure such support. For a period of about three months following the overthrow of Diem, political controls were relaxed and the military junta headed by Big Iviinh Gen- eral Duong Van Minh! gave public opinion greater freedom of expression than it had probably ever enjoyed before. However, with the coup d état of General Nguyen Khanh on January 30, 1964, the government returned to the level of repression that had existed under Diem. and the several governments installed by the subsquent series of coups have been only a little less or a little more repressive. The arca of South Vietnam controlled by Saigon T1? .1-is continued to shrink. By the end of 1964 a crisis was emerging, ' -ft - air lb . . st ;-1? with Saigorfs position being eroded at an accelerating rate, both politically and militarily. The deterioration of the military situation ...;.t.,q-ts_-..J,s_ was re ected in a rate of descrtion among new recruits that had I _ .._'~t IaI T" " - "' " r -- - 1 - ~:" ' _-- _ : .. __-;_..~i_.{-, l> A -.1.- [3
,,.4, 3:-_.'92 _."-V- _- ..~"<'<.i ' -I i HISTORY OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEIWENT IN V_lETN/92l92i .;_ _ -_ ' . _i,;§. ' attz:; - -»§;5 "1 increased to30 percent by January of 1965.The disintegrating ~14.-.=-n-I Wile iiggyw" position ofthe Saigonadministration coincidedwith a perceptible 4 . 1 growth in war-wearinessamong the South Vietnamese.Demands for a peacehil settlement multiplied.In Saigonitself, aswell asin such Buddhist strongholds as Hue. students and monks publicly 1. advocated anend to the ghting and calledfor negotiationswith I . Hanoi. ' 4 l It was at this juncture that the Johnson Administration, fearing l that the Saigon army and governmentwould fall apart, undertook to stiffen their moralewith direct American militaryintervention and the bombing of North Vietnam. Increasing the direct Amer- Gt ican military involvement, to a point where the United States has assumed themaior burden of offensive military operations against the Vietcong, has undoubtedlyreduced the disposition of the ~--==~,--q=-r-~ pr'92zI92'~ ~----l-.-..-..:-_--..-.-. .-q-.__.;. : . _._ _;..-,,. __ _,, __m_,qP?" _ -"I" 'i- - . '.- - , 1-...'-1-_/I 1'.»-'= ~. . ~;.-;92t:'-;_- _.* -'~';'_='-_. 92_»'~_ .'.'.,r» f". 1 _. :> I: South Vietnamese military leaders, and other members of that __ K ., _..s_-,....92_., ,,_,___ J . ._~ .. .t -._.l minority that has a vested interestin the present regime,to 15 _P. . _..__dt._.t_ ._,§.a,__ _, N __,_~;_.._ ._ _<:F . . ._-.i,. __ 92 .. J: come to any negotiatedsettlement with the Vietcong. It is claimed . . - * .. .22 that increasedAmerican involvementhas hada similar CHCUL f°" " UH - -.<. . L i'."'-»" f r '-..:'r"!s'.'»-1"J¢"i ..:;-- ». .-- . -.--»t.:"-*4 I.-:-.i:.--.'-w. .- ii: ._5L 1-~-=;,',;;;- -M J--_ i .i, - M~ - re'Q92 . .al" .¢,| .- .... -35" . ,_ .,.r..,..-,,,..e.. 1" 5?f3?JJ.5.i,§:L.¢ ;l .Qi!,}J.z1t.hi<""'-as-l 92i$?;#l7.=§aQI'it.'§; .-,., fl most of the civilian population, but such an effect is dilticult to demonstrate becausethe presentjunta led by General Ky has out- lawed as traitors ailthose whourge negotiationswith the Vietcong < 1* . or evendiscuss thepossibility ofa peaceful settlement. . " _ - ..'~g1_j The history of these two decades of increasing American in- - v . ' _-lifts '~ it-.1t volvement in Vietnam showsthe danger of ignoring the underlying ground swell of nationalism with its strong. accenton anti-colonial- » Q } 1 . ism. Having reviewed thishistory, perhapswe can understand Y why the school teacherin I-Iué sad that the Americans are O J . Communists ofthe Vietnamesemen. Startingfrom a wrong as- sumption, the Unitcd Stateshas piled one error on another, moving T- deeper and deeper into a deteriorating situation. In the midst of A a full-scale war, the choices arelimited to desperate alternatives. -J Constructive solutionsare hard to nd. What has happened to § the attempts to nd a formula for negotiations ? What kind of a settlement may bepossible? + -~ ;: _p_p**A fie ~:_*_',__, -_ $1; e - -e ,1, *5: '. U WI '* 1'2"-.1 -: __ _ " _!" ' __.__'_:= "".t92f -i:?;""" '-? 7-'~V _--_.! "» -»-.¢_-,»-. >~" 1 i =; V. ., . W - '92 j|_ _ _r-,-; l92é ~;-_ .=.-I - . » i - -r'92 . -"P ;*-;'; "'.' _ _t . -I -.. Ii? = . ;-- =_~ . ,.;,';:_-=*its _ kg :; ._ 92_-5';-';:. "ii" '~ - '3? V if 3'.. i .; t '1. , Lg?" . Q l- _!.~'I -6 - ,, _ _;.1. . 1,-
92 m . Q Q- I
- >.r___t:_t:__ n_....._I_ 0 i IYBQOIIGHOII FULLIB Q ' res t In July 1965, itwas broughtto public n0tice,1 andsubsequent admitted bythe United States Departmentof State, that in Se; tember 1964the NorthVietnamese governmento ered throng 'I n _ . U Thant to send a representative to Rangoon to meet with -__.._._..»-. "Y - v. y.,,_...,y It .. ." .2 92 -.-E: _<'921 ; _1":',i'-'._I--fi__i.1- ~ lC:'-'.1._-_~i-,q- ;_ »i-_ United Statesrepresentative anddiscuss theending of hostilitit -I =- A. » " :=f;=-I-:4 1 3 It ~'~ " 1 i= :». .=_=5;; -=1-'~'=-;=; -3 in Vietnam.The UnitedStates did not reply to this o er for rm - = = - -l :';".,,:;_ . y y ~ , 92_1_ y.,/ ;..<__4 _ ,.;s.;=;;;-"_:"¢:~<=:=f;,r;~=; months, presumablybecause ofthe presidentialelection, andthe t-'1;_ - I. - - y > rs» -=_=.,.-'--;.'t*-sh ,-'-. »'-*-='" ;92_92'i ._92 ."1."'~i '1'-t . ',- ., -.. »---' f;. '. 'Z',;'>'5:_»." l »'92' W ,1 "'-.',~. -< L92'f.!i-LI ./I-j',,{T, §-;*:=1,7$311;.1.i"'3§"t- 1 ;i, 92*"ir'i. f $}i§;'§;'f6"'~ $i?e- »--- -.-. 1%.. -'=9»fwrr--<'.'192.-:_ =. ==i1-4'--"F1-'».;&<."' ..F~1 rejected it. ' __; ;:.;A§;_- iii.,"92:rl ,<_r-1., ~;_:~'-,._ -_f_- 4:. --=_'.!, yfxlr -,1 -_.1.--5; --_E;.F:_»]-siaa-_i§~¢! .s,92I,;2_. I d_._;r - J... ..__-._n.b._tr.__.»_....._._.. ._ 92 THE I92'1?GOT!AT10}JZZLE _ L e Fm '-Q.J_-:;_: I-- ii ;::':'_*'* created somethingof a crisis of con dence in the government,a careful readingof the New York Timesisliows thatthe United ' 'I -= ii :i:1"§- " States hasrejected nofewer thanseven e ortsto negotiatean iii f .- end to the war. A As early as the fall of 1963, at a press conferenceright after Diem s assassination, Secretary Rusk turned down a French pro- posal for a neutral, independent SouthVietnam. Hanoi, at this time, expressedwillingness todiscuss theestablishment of a coali- tion. ncutralist government in South Vietnam. In July 1964, the -r United Statesrejected asuggestion by U Thant for reconvening the GenevaConference of the nine nationsthat had negotiated the original settlementof the Indochina War in 1954. In December 1964, Ho Chi Minh noti ed France of his desire to discuss an $3,, accommodation with the United States; and in early February J Ilat -.__. in-is . _. 1965, Presidentde Gaulle, at the urging of North Vietnam, re- Qéii.! P= quested a reconvening of the Geneva Conference to discuss the . . J-. . *1-';A"t. future of Southeast Asia and the United Nations. There were indications that the People s Republic of China would have been willing to attend and that withdrawal of United States forcesfrom ' - '- -.-..- . < >-J 4-, ..~§,'==~j:-.I r, South Vietnamwould nothave beena prerequisite,provided even- -.i---.,-, _ . :_ . i.l ! tual withdrawal could be expected asa result of a peace settlement. 92 .1 _-__1 . t'f..-_-t.-"V,;-_ i - r-,,. - -,i 1.L Q. i- .-.i -. L. -J . .,,, ~i- -.'..' .~:'-._. 1- ; ;';_. The Administration s reaction was to say that we had given France '1'-':'92,_._. i _ . . ,. ... .--<: .I ' "=.".-.. ,~,, . it ;n_"t-§_,.*.§-1=-_i'vLi;f-i_-git . -n-4-':.'r"'- I-92LLii's41:L..a..u_4' ii--"-4* " " "'-'4":i." -'1i.~--»-Bil:-'5_" ' " " " ":92- ..'=I-ll - Ki-ti1'.'>|.F tn '1 'no mandate to act as a mediator and were not interested in a ! ;__, I int -.-» ,-:1 --92 , _.~ -t".4 .it-.s';;§E.i 92 tt~,,<,92i,i,_'_-t--i-.@ ._;. ,.-W-1,2,-~:-,1 ,?;=1-,/_;_ return to the conference table at that time. On February 24, the Soviet Union, angering some of the other Communist countries by doing so, joinedFrance to pressfor reconvening the Geneva ll _ - 92 J17 Conference to negotiate a settlement for South Vietnam. At this same timeU Thant suggested possiblepreliminaries to a Geneva=tvpe, coiifereiiec to discuss a possible peace settlement: interlinked diaioguesg among the parties most directly involved, and an informal seven-powerconference, including all the Geneva Q Marcus Raskin and Bernard Fail, Vietnam Reader New York: Ran- dom House, 1965!. New York Titties, March 9, 1965, and Manchester Guardian, August 9, 1965. New York Times. March 9, 1965. ' " Drew Middleton, New York Times, February 23, 1965. ' DrewMiddleton, New York Times, February 25, 1965. ' _ ' ' ThomasHamilton, YorkNew Times,February 196$. 25, "5' , --ti -= _= '" 1-; Thomzis ...- .__....._ Haniilto H1 York Times, March 9, 1965. ., ' ., - .i_,,,iQ . .. In-i-*""*" ' ':'-_*~-:'.'.'-'.,_' 35' '-A r }:s.--. ' -5'-1" .§ii'-7:. -;"-ri_ .,.-.: .. r.-_ .. '2-1:.-." - ' , 1_ ~-.-- .¥ii{i+~'.A~.~'- - - -_ '__ .._.,,,';.L_'_._ _.=,-___ ,_, _ _ 52 PEAC r VIETNAI powers exoeptLaos and Cambodia. North Vietnam indicated itseI ._-a.»..-.-t-. __'-- »'r. __,. 1<.~'~;: r.~-~,,..- -»-~-, P receptive to this suggestion, as did France? The United State: however, replied coldly, There are no authorized negotiation under way with Mr. Thant or any other government. 1 U Thai". 7 --1 92- I->;.e:#"- I further drew upon himself the wrath of the United States govern - ~.:".'- ' _ . ' " ~1r"3h_ . merit by saying, I arn sure that the geat American people, i v _ I only they knew the true facts and the background of the develop meats in Vietnam, will agree with me that further bloodshed i unnecessary. 1* Hoping that the mere opening of negotiations might result in ii tacit cease re, France urged that neither the United States no t I the People s Republic of China make any preconditions to nego tiations. But Secretary Rusk said that the United States woult ., .. _ tr _ --.< tkfg-t agree tono conferenceuntil after North Vietnamhad stoppedth -"¢ Sl ow of men and arms to the Vietcong. Furthermore, he refuse va to commit the Administration to any de nite course, even i North Vietnam agreedto end its support of the Vietcong. O; February 27, the State Department published its widely dispute- 92 . -'17 -,-.~.-Y-..,_,|,,.¢,.,--.._-¢,¢s,~_--,1.,,,t.._.,-»-5?... 5. _92i r._,~_-1,4,1, -a;- ._-.,_-tq- -.V-..A_*3 White Paper in an effort to prove that this support was prepon - 4 > 's Pf-~ :;r.t~?i <-.:~ -1.1: 15-i 1,4 5i dcrant. ',._'*fr :'= _;,-._t_:.;._'_u5.>:__~. 5. . -l-13.;_.~, _:--.92.92,-Us .3 P :;_, In February and early March 1965 the United States wasbegin ning large-scaleAmerican-piloted combat missions againstthe Vie! . .;-..-.:;.~.'~.~' it. . J; 1*-'.-» I-:= n.:»= -1*. -"-" t t-' _ .92 7», cong in South Vietnamand massiveair raids against NorthViet .-it--a ..: ~==',r'.. :-.l:":.t' -:=.-=:a. -...."t._-4"-u...s....,._"' , -2-'=~.'t¢t1-= '-" E4- .;"i~l"=--92';13-F1 -i" 5i 7 '' " '* ' - =1-¢--*-»- re -' =t ; ,~I-i=,, -"i',»;;t:;ts-_~*>4~. *: t 1 92. 7 ...... _ _, . ~ -- ..--..-.__ _'=1: a .._, . ¢- . __,- .._ - 4|--+ _.. -- _- - 'lHE i92'EGO'I l'in PUZZLE 53 A LL <1-...-.».;:_ ~ +7 > _ ~ ___}'&_ -.._.., i- that the l_JlllltJki Statesintends to keep its military forces in >oui'n .- .12 I - --.. .,_ ,.-' .i ,1-' __ ___. , 4 . Vietnam inde nitely and that North Vietnam must abandonits goal ofreuni cation ofVietnam. NorthVietnam showedno inter- - -"".§:"< 1 ii}. i :, - +5 #1:-J? est in these termsand the National Liberation Front atly rejected .+;.~ any attemptsto negotiate as long as any United Statesforces ' . ea.-'_J__l.92 '92._:nF' 92.El;- .4 I_' remained in Vietnam." V On Aprii 1, however, " """ Warbey, aBritish Labor reported that his tall-ts with I-10 Chi Minh indicated that the on O precondition for negotiations on which the North would insist was cessationof United States bombingattacks upon it. On April 7, PresidentJohnson, inhis speechat Johns Hopkins S University, declared that the United States would consent to un- conditional discussions." He stipulated, however, that the United States would settle for nothing less than an independent South Vietnam. His speech was predicated on the assumption that the National Liberation Front was an adversarynieh whom the United States was not willing to negotiate. He insisted that North Viet- nam, urged on by Peking, wasthe aggressor,and that orders, men, _92 ,- .. supplies, andarms owingin from the North were the heartbeat w M " " xx ~ -t . ~,._; .':> ~-Z-- i. 1 | .-, ,.- _._. t. 1;. of the war. This lent special signi cance to his proviso that the United States would enter into discussionswith the governments ri . ii-r»-_1..~..'¢;; concerned. .-t. - 4 .-. . l_ ,"'» :_ , .. -. i I-g . , _ ,. . . , ... ts ,t .,. ism. '.~.---,.. ..-92 Reactions to this speechwere predictable.The National Libera- -.m1- . .. _ .1.-.~* .. .- 92- - . ---l , , -L---.i.-t.-'-ll wf 1.- .~ .-.» ..1- _-,,-e..~-_. .._.._ ,., .2.-as'--i ., _ ,- . ,-.3 .~-A "-- __<. at" .,;v,,-.,,. 1'}:..;m£ _.3 -i$m-»i-_ i _,.._.v'w192;_-, ,. -. i~.n..t-.-; 1e,-_»i~.s.--..i¢.i:,_ir'?-,1! _¢ nu, I... . tion Front considered thespeech proof that the UnitedStates was I-st}. ignoring it, the chief antagonist. The National Liberation Front i-K Q. _ . ;;- 4 i ~ -1 -t ,1.-._-, » 1*.- -?iis.-:~' :5. w § ;. :7 . ,..__».. . 5 . :4- and North Vietnam both knew that Hanoi could not end the War on behalf of the National Liberation Front, even if it wanted to 1 do so. Peking rejected the speechas a device for perpetuating the partition of Vietnam and lettinn the United States stav 'onin South Vietnam, thu F ""- 54 PEACE jvirrsi-.:92 be barred from all negotiation, sinceit is only an instrurnen -_'e-..._..a.. _ t» .|»~'. __ created bythe CommunistNorth Vietnamese. The leailetalst Chi -1'- V_ . -~ -~ ~ - -- y 92 -..~ r. . - - .-,.92S. "'' " declared thatnegotiations couldtake placeonly after precondi- _ _ 3: , . . tions such as the withdrawal of Communist troops and cadres: laid out by theRepublic ofVietnam duringeventual prcliminarj .,n...toms .-.:n win 1.....-imvc -92r92492092 uccii ..,-.~.-.aeeepieb n1 EmuA 'C. 1TI'l6£l H . Tlil OBI.Wlii .Lil'tt92.s £ . ' - . ' H AV mi '3-kgee. 4 was furtherspeci ed asmeaning previous,witlidrawal ofthe Viet- 92 cong armedunits andpolitical cadres as well as thoseof tilt North Vietnamese. This amounted to a denial of the President : S - offer of unconditional discussions. A senior North Vietnamese diplomat announcedthat, sine: majorNorth Vietnamese objectives arereuni cation andneutral ization of Vietnam, withdrawal of United States forces and I coalition governmentin South Vietnam were essential to an: settlement, and therefore negotiationson President Johnson terms wouldamount to surrender? OnApril 8, 1965, Premie Pham Van Dong of the DemocraticRepublic North Vietnam: stated the Four Points, to be discussed below, as the basis O1 1'- K~ - v e ~ -s 92.sr -~>~__-_»;-.- _=-5->,-7-t--is-_T,,., 92_,,,,.92_..__t,,,¢g.7,. .5-1-:1; which it ,,#,g ,W,. would agreeto a Geneva-type conference fornegotiatin; 1 ¢'c';i'i /12;".- .92L"-I 3-1" _-1-,.-~. - ts-.-3f._5;:"; _;f 92_'-; ._ I»,--j-..-.-. --F'._- 1 ,1:-.- *1?-1 1 ;-";'-4'_~;'§_i_=--N 131,1ii} -.'~--.'-;'- a peace settlement. N t 5 .._ -7-: , ." - Q _ t" ,_ .. t ' > ' _ ~ '_t.' -i " The NationalLiberation Front snegotiating position,which ha: . - §--. , .0 .' . . . E _ _. __,r _ _.g._t' .:_ __ 2:. .r ii- ___.gti,_. ;.--1%J; hardened in March as soon as the rst United States Marine . .. 1-A-a-1;-,'_.=.. 5 1'=3».;,;i92=itr.1,.* ; .5;;'-,.,-_t;_.--.-;,i;I-.5 -'.-_'¢ i'i» ~, -.--M ,.-1* .- - 1°IT'§It$¥.=1-'3 =.'~ 92 w.'~§iii"-1"." '-7., ---_¬ 5' :- Zi-.£;E i¥;5!~'5-W5-ilanded L'-I in South Vietnam, was now matched by a hardening o - 192u-~----s".-{..1..'.a'_. 92,_;"..t. §L.>'.'i-S13'~: ;-92~m.'i" ,,;_g.§1,-.9-7&1;=.::*-,..Q¢£2k%£f»:';i _, "'¢L,,§- :- -3;-me North Vietnam sposition asindicated by I-lanoi s refusalto re eeive UThant or, nally, even letters fromhim. North Vietnan also refusedto receiveBritish missionsto explore the possibilit; i _t_ 92 _ of negotiations.Even if the United States negotiatingpositioi ._ I _ . s * were tobecome clearand reasonablysatisfactory to North Viet . nam, Hanoi was not likely to agree to negotiate while Unitet States bombingscontinued. In mid-May, hard-pressed bycritics at home andabroad, th United States halted its bombing of North Vietnam. It was late revealed 23that Secretary of State Rusk transmitted a secret mes sage to Hanoi at this time through the North Vietnamese Embass in Moscow. The messagestated that the bombing suspension coul- " New York Times,April 10, 1965. Drew Middleton, New York Times, December 3, 1965. Editorial, New York Times, December 30. 1965. .- 2},- THE rseooriitrir PUZZLE i 5 it .. .4, , __. . .1 .-,_ l be extendedif tncre were signi cant reductions" inCommunist 4 -1-. ' - _ i armed attacksin SouthVietnam. A permanent end to the bomb- t. , ' side ad, t ing inthe North,it said,could onlycome throughan endto armed I-_.¢-W attacks bythe Vietcongin the South. Therewas nomention of negotiations oreven informaldiscussions, suchas PresidentJohn- 3. son hadproposed on April 7. Therewas noreference toHanoi s to u Four Points peace plan of April 8, 1965. The bombingswere resumed after ve days,hardly enoughtime for the NationalLib- eration Front and North Vietnam to consult on any proposal for e 4 negotiations. Inspite of this short interval of time and the tone of the American note. which was close to an ultimatum, a response if.-: did come from Hanoi. The day before the bombings werere- -Est sumed, the government of North Vietnam contacted the French 1f'. .?1-3 ;__>'_. -3;-_ ,-92~.1,,-t._. i!;_»- ~ _, -3- .,,,»_-'E},'l United Statesdid not again haltthe bombingslong enoughto in- -~e e "~6-owvn-rs-1nt,1!bta.s.5.92sss-t'.t:i';iiéZ1i 1 1 V -s ducea possible improvement the in o er. One cannot but be amazed. in view of these seven documented missed opportunitiesfor exploring the sincerity of North Viet- namese oflersfor negotiation, that President Johnson declared at his pressconference onJuly 13, I must say thatcandor compels me to tell you that therehas notbeen theslightest indicationthat the other side is interested in negotiation or in unconditional dis- 1 - s cussion, althoughthe UnitedStates hasmade somedozen separate t attempts tobring that about. The experiencein November and December1965, regarding -4 another apparentpeace feeler,seems toemphasize thelessons of -4- prior incidents.At the very timethat Secretaryof StateRusk was -. t seeking clari cationof a reported statementon negotiationsby ' 1 r Ho Chi Minh, United States planesbombed a power plant only _;:_<;_:. fourteen milesfrom Haiphong,opening up a new phase ofescala- Y .;_-.-:=-; . _ . _ . i..-<_-.t_, " New York Times, November 19, 1965. 56 PEACE IN VIETNAM tion. Rus television interview at this time expressed la most rigid admmstration view with regard tothe NationalLiberation Front?" The United States cannot expect to escalate the war of . -92t- -4 _;.;~.- =~.-.-.-eh .»,.-.--i-I-. -..= .. . t deeds andwords and at the same time talk peace? it -S .~ "M" "'fZ;;;i=F~~"-2: What, exactly, are the points that have been set forth by the North Vietnamese, the National Liberation Front, and the United States asa basisfor negotiation?Are they so far apart that there is no possible basisfor d n at a eonfe table? Let '-is rst look at the various negotiating points, then consider develop- S 2 92l ments that indicate a converging of views. Q : l Q . . t 5 --r. ---<"-J ">r.- _ .. . ., . -. _;_.... ~_¢__,-..-...,_.__.. . . .'e'i'="t:;. -* .»:92 . ":~§.*,-5', ;P.=-.-Ii:-Q 5 T ;___;,?.;. ,.; 1_.-:r,;~ -fr I. I: ..jt..t A. North Vietnam » , - -==.-92».»--.< ii»_..-92 ...--.l._'.t_~ n__2.. .1 1 ;'. * t ~.:- -:- ' t ;. , _: f. . . '. . 'i -> ;i .-n " "-.r , . t..t - »-. -. -, =-~' The rmly repeated negotiatingposition of Hanoi was rst . 2- 1 -'_;.j_.--. :*.-1.-- Y . -. .-;""__i - .--, Z1~;',t;a.:ti. 5; .-J ;..-t; -5 -;»;;r;-i»_+..¬,,~ -|.~- .'-.1 '-M-~»_.e-%-»<- - -- - em- :1 E-it-2.3:-t=-.=t.....t...tt92 " -' " . |'-I'1?'tP§'n ¢ia:'JI.."- ~5 - given in the following statement of Premier Pham Van Dong t on April 8, 1965. t an l It is the unswervingpolicy of the governmentof the D.R.V. [Demo- cratic Republic of Vietna.m] to strictly respect the I954 Geneva Agree- t - , _.92.J - ments on Vict-Nam and to correctly implement their basic provisions ,'r92.' as embodied in the following points: l. Recognition of the basic national rights of the Vietnamese peo- _ pie peace, independence,sovereignty, unityand territorial integrity. According to the Geneva Agreements, the United States government must withdraw from South Viet-Nam United States troops, military personnel, andweapons ofall kinds, dismantle allUnited Statesmili- '3 tary basesthere, ea.nee]its military alliance with South Viet-Nam. 4 1t must end its policy of intervention and aggressio_n inSouth Viet- Nam. Accordingto the Geneva Agreements,the United States govern- ment must stop its acts of war against North Viet-Nam, completely cease alleneroachments ont-he territoryand sovereigntyof the D.R.V. 2. Pendingthe peacefulreuni cation of Viet-Nam, while Viet-Nam is still temporarily dividedinto two zones, themilitary provisionsof the 1954Geneva Agreementson Viet-Nam must bestrictly respected. l The two zones mustrefrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries.There mustbe no foreign military bases, troops, or military personnelin their respective territory. 3. The internal affairs of South 92.1 iet-Nam mustbe settled by the New York Times, December 8. 1965. 2'"Arthur See Kroek, New York Times, December 21. 1965. 5 THE NEGOTIATION PUZZLE 5'7 South Vietnanicsr "iple themselves, in accordance with the prog _£- of the NFLSV [u._ t-South Vietnam National Liberation Front], with- , ,;i-, . ,:;,- ,;, ~ E - __,t,_.._ out any foreign interference. . t ~ T. A. _.' w . . 4. The peaceful reuni cation of Viet-Nari": is to be settled by. the - -- -.;- M-l_7A_"Vf'"r 1 .- - .. :. ;_,__ 1-.» :1 - Vietnamese people in both zones, without any foreign interference? . -. ~ -H ' _ .4. 1- *5" =9-;_r92r-"1 -- . 1 B. The National Liberation Front A ti;.e ~< **a?=%§-.*- - The program of the National Liberation Front of South Viet- -3 - , nam refcrred to in the statement of Premier Pham Van Dong was issued on December 20, I960. It consists of ten major headings with numerous subheadings dealing with the overthrow of the i camouflaged colonial regime of the American imperialists ; pro- s posals for liberal democratic reform and civil rights; for economic I improvement, agrarian reform, cultural and educational develop- mcnt, creation of a national army, a foreign policy of peaceand neutrality, preparation for reuni cation, and the defense of uni- s 3* versal peace. A few of the clauses most pertinent for this nego- Liatioh study are here excerpted? --Elect a new National Assembly through universal suffrage. Rcward o icers and soldiers having participated in the struggle ~~7T3~. ':i* *|'.r'q'*: *'I'*-"1: 92* ~'r V. . .; 1-.-_' Y? -.>¢_» _ ..--. -{.7-1-T :.. .~%_ against the domination by the Americans and their servants; adopt 5- "I. I-' i": , '. : 5;"§i-925;'7=l~. : :'l>"i-'il-".iI'§ll"" .-?i"='§ir"*"i - 3'3 -"~'» -91 _ , -;. . 92 -;. _.._;». _- ; ~-:,.~-_<; ¢ .1 a policy of clemency toward the former collaborators of the Ameri- . J V.._ >92_.;,,_,:, r -- " , = ._ ~,.{,_.,a.. cans and Diemists guilty of crimes against the people but who have . .. I J r. f H. .~ "~5"7 1"'l- P-" -l nally repented and are ready to serve the people. __,¢_92t_! . , I It t- .- -J --" - : "I--.';§--In.=.- I-<14 - }£s~::'-~'-'j3"7.*.-.-t».. _ ,i_ _.v_t __ . - Al-iolish all foreign military bases established on the territory of ....=;.~-.<-.. ,_. _ _ '!'.'>.>. .. _ ,. "- ._£-'_ s,t. |-i,"_-=.i.r':"..'.1¢.'.:.kJ.'t.;L1..-.»..tJ . _ . _. _. __W h_ _ _:~_ -- .-'_~:-._n_ ,.*»_ '- '.1i -';~:- =%;=t=m:r._."~ .5,-3 -_- t-_it_-=.r_;,>~_-; t§a~.r:rclri~-.>r§-.i':~2r~'lt 92 Vict-Nam. - St:ty out of any military bloc; refuse any military alliance with another country. Accept economic aid from any country willing to help us without attaching any conditions to such help. 2 The National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam advocates the peaceful reuni cation by stages, on the basis of negotiation and ti . through the seeking of ways and means in conformity with the interests of the Vietnamese nation. . ~ ~Commercial and cultural exchanges between the two zones will be = implemented; the inhabitants of the two zones will be free to move Submitted in 8 government report from Hanoi dated April 1965. IB- portcd in New York Times, August .l-1. 1965. " The full document is given in Appendix ll. . =-:1 " he . » a.-_ ' _/ -V i-';.f, ; _ ., ,, _._ .__ _ x _ ti ' _it}{__:I.. _ 53 PEACE f 92 l ETl --VA -/W...__|-- 1.4, _ -; _ - about throughout the country. . . . The freedom oipostal l changes will be guaranteed." Statements of the National Liberation Fronfs negotiating 1: /2 -92 .3? mm;-= ~ ..*>i,. " *-it tion were given to an American professor, Robert S. Browne. . ti v ~ 1 -J | _ . ,.-. -g i a Frenchjournalist, Georges Cha ard. These indicate consider . -1 ,»" ."';='-.1 * : . extension from the ten-point program which did not deal dirt F with negotiation or the Geneva accords. ' 0 '!l Browne reports that the National Liberation Front calls 3 0 1. An immediate cease-fire, with a freezing of the current ntili .e position. Q 2. Adjudication by an international body in districts where cor is in dispute. -. . ' ti ' - e_ --i 14- =9 - - tit.- -4; 3. United States preparation and execution of troop withdr: . t- " ii -mi W ea _ 1" .-.. . " over a six-month period. i? 4. A district-by-district election Campaign irom which a coali government could emerge. ..., H " "' '" '" - " .i Ir .-. ._ Chaffard received a longer and more comprehensive stater -. -. . :5-gt -,i ;,_'§'u A , .- 92. 92 V *1 , §. i J - ! - V i": '- . 92i r- i * 92 I § ~ from Huyn Tan Phat, the Vice-President of the National Lil: - i l.iu!1 Front: _,'-_~ "1 " _ . - ."'._ _' ._. W. ,_ :~' 4. ;':,- ,;;.;'; ; i-_- -L;.-:_ _;-.;_i;t_j._: .. - .-. ,.-; _h.;_._'-.;-.1; Our rst task will be to rebuild the economy of South Vietnam. 4--.-n-4;-to-av-v;-.~i.4~--=$-u-i.,<_as.s.[_;_;_,,-- - -~ -" it .; 1 P; ~=-"-";';sf -. r ==.:':<>f£ ~ i-*.-at?-w * -.-. mfi-"'. 1:1 - Fug y. -=; ' " . .- . . _ . ~ f '.!._. that we will need . . . foreign economic aid and foreign investm =..-it . . . To get aid from western countries we will have to follc .' _i.|.~_. policy of neutrality. We know the capitalists. They will want gut tees. We are realists. Even United States aid will be welcome. The uni cation of the armed forces and of the administration coexistence of cadres of diverse origins . . . this is going to pr: D < delicate problems. . . . -:5. We shall be obliged to observe neutrality. How long will that t Ten years? Fifteen? More perhaps. . . . We will not even approach the problem of uni cation for a long time. . . . One can see that the . . . structure . . . will i more from the north. That will delay reuni cation. . . . Wher time comes for uni cation it will take place on a basis precluding nexation of one zone by another. a- -ii 3'». , --_., I .'_< "=1" _ " ~ u- Y i._'--.:1 '~< " Marcus G. Rasltin, Bernard B. Fall, The Vr'et-Nam Reader, pp. 216 .=...~ -.-,1: i _ =;;.i; ; ° New York Timr'.t, July 22. 1965. T5 -* 7i rig"; = r p_ xii! / 1'5 92 i' Vie: Report , July 1965, quoting l Exprcsse, April 25, I965. - Q. ._.. ...____.,._,_i_ , ---_..t ,_.». ....-...~i. . _ 1:-us NEGOTIATIO.92'PUZZLE 59 . . . c. UnitedStat i 1 < -1 ,|__ - ' 5 :"pit,- t ,3.r On August 3, 1965, Dean Rusk set forth the United States I i} W-F. JV >5 position onnegotiating principles. __ I. An end to aggression and subversion. 2. Freedomfo5rwSouth Vietnamto choose and shapefor itselfits own destiny, inconformity withdemocratic principlesand withoutany foreign interference. 3. As soon asaggression hasceased, theending ofthe militarymeas- w 1 ures nownecessary bythe Governmentof South Vietnam and the r nations that have come to its aid . . . and the removal of foreign r military forces from South Vietnam. We endorsethese principles.In essencethey constitutea return to the Ti -_*___ basic purposeof the Geneva accordsof 1954. Further relationscould .73 be worked out by peaceful means.And this means thequestion of a free decisionby thepeople ofNorth andSouth Vietnamon thematter ii" ,3 of reuni cation. . . . When the aggression has ceased and the free- ._ % - doni of South Vietnam is assured, we will withdraw our forces. . . . -r.,..._. 'i V ;»=i;.: .*-!_ < § i92§,r. When the men and arms in ltrated by the north are withdrawn and Hanoi ceases its support and guidance of the war in the south, what- r _. '."',-. . <..<.~ I-.._- 92 Up I ~ '- . ..,_-_§ I .__ .-~., _;a _!< 92 > A 92 t Us. M. 1.3. ever remains in the form of indigenous dissent is a matter for the t -.- t-. .. South Vietnamese themsel92=es.i-*1 .;~ -_-., _- 92- ./ 5 -t » .~.r ,_ ,,.| .;.__7t '. -1- J, -35;.-;~.'-'< ;¢?'=Rt < -. A summary of the United States negotiating positionswas ._-nan.--.->21.-;- er: _r*'r !'.';-'-'" ' ':-1 " "7 -* E e= --' -' -"£tL. L' ' "be -=~-'3&"§'-1.§:i_.Li=a-iiv-.$?-.i- LL. "7-"-''1-. . i.:.' recentlygiven by Arthur J. Goldberg, UnitedStates Ambassador to the United Nations, in a letter to Secretary General U Thant in which he reported on the far- ung New Year e orts of the H government to seek peace. .s =_; = , . > Among the points made in our messages conveyedto a number of - >i r I governments arethe following: that the United States is prepared for discussions or negotiations without any prior conditions what- soever or on the basis of the Geneva accords of I954 and 1962, that a reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be envisaged and that a cease- re might be the rst order of business in any discussions or negotiations, that the United States remains prepared to withdraw its 0 rorces Irom boutn Vietnam as soon as South Vietnam is in a position to determine its own future without external interference, -that the United Statesdesires nocontinuing militarypresence orbases inViet- " Why Vietnam GovernmentPrinting O ice, Washington, D.C.,I965!. . - 1 ._ 60 __ PLACEVIETNA J uuiu,r92'92rI1 |:,||,u, +1-in Ljjli Qtsn !l.-HLJID Cult -= }.|uuu92.a:-n.-Ji r--I riwnnhiu-n Quuuluiu up :10 92.J92JLl92ll Q.-92|921 |'9292/Yiatnqrnvi»; - | u -1| urn-u-u clhnnlri l I determined bythe SouthVietnamese peoplethemselves throughdcm cratic processesand that the questionof the reuni cation of the tv Vietnams shouldbe decidedby the free decisionof their two peoples. Q m 1|;-H.» l _ A close scrutiny of the points above reveals that starting fro" mutually incompatibleand apparentlyrigid 'negotiatin§1_positioi ._1 :.~'u- ' it in the winter of 1964-65-»-eachdemanding from the other tl equivalent ofunconditional surrencler certainaspects ofthe n gotiating positions of both sides became more exible and the peace termsseemed to be converging signi cantly. 1. Geneva Agreentertts. Both sides claim that they want I negotiate on the basis of the I954 Geneva Agreements, althoug at-. __ North Vietnam emphasizes thatthis meansUnited Stateswitl " J-= _.--,i;_-_;;-' J drawal and conducting the elections which the United Stat: ~..__.y_. -_ _ l _ . w . . 92. _ .<>f§~.'-' i " blocked in 1956; whereas the United States has tended to en . tI_ - '.,'. .} t _,._ M _ - ______' -.,-.».kg.. A phasize that it means ! North Vietnamese withdrawal, acceptance ofthe political partition of Vietnam, authorizedoni as a temporary military division in 1954, and ! the acccptanc K31 --V,--;;-_>:_- -r92 ;-- -'11"P1, 3.7- *_'3'1. _r:-*1:T*~** IyT?f92 _"W*" ¥ 92F_92'I92"hf _-vv9292__-_ ~ by the National Liberation Front of political conditionsbefore = 2- -'=.- =.-=5" . -,,'-_;>i-§;:"-sic-rttai 1:. $1-: ~.;~'.;:~;.:-k 1,»: _:i if I;;_;-'.- ;_:--.:-."~ it; vi ,;f.' came into existence. .- t --1~j L» 2. Hanoi : Four Points and United States lV:'rhdrawal.Tl .._.,~.. ._. _;;;_' - _ ,.., - .. r._¢...,<_ .-. -y.-'-. .._ _4 ._.-._-,.,-- . ;.» i '1 - i -= ~ .I.-1:---I rt,» _---_.t'.~:;'-- United Stateshas moved from adamant rejectionof Hanoi sFor . _ ".92 _. .._r,- . _L_-__, _.-At . ,.r ._-,V,_92 .__,92,___ 1,; _,,!;-,:..;f1tc_-J.r.>_,.l _. , s....,..,, Points whenthey wereput forth in April to an avowedwillingne: .'o discussthem as part of the agendafor negotiations.A cruci. .1 . point isthe questionof withdrawalof Americanmilitary force = ' ' i i - i : This is put asthe rst of the Four Points,and in every publ __ .__._. » 'i5.'. _'__ 3- - -_ j__"_. '92ry__ _ '=.1.§iL. _ . utterance fromHanoi it is the implied basisupon whichany negt I31 - 7.3- . F; L tiations mustbe started.There havebeen repeatedhints, howcve -. M-..-till? Q New- y "I-that >1 l from North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front of cia in Algiers, Prague, Paris, and Moscow ? that the withdraw; v of UnitedStates forcesfrom SouthVietnam maynot be apr: condition forstarting negotiationsas longas withdrawalis uncle stood to be a necessary result of a peace settlement. This was als in. United States Mission to the United Nations, PressRelease No.478 January 5.1966. SanfordGottlieh, SaneWorld, September1965. New York Times,October 28,I065, 92 i " Sanford Gottlieb,Srmc Worid, September 1965. :7 LordFenrier Brockway,New YorkTimes, August22. 1965. THE NEGOT._.o.'~.' PUZZLE 61 :5 ' - the messageof Mr. Janos Peter,Foreign Ministerof Hungary, in .._, < _ his messageto the United NationsGeneral Assemblyin October 5 .-'._ .. _ - - _ . . _-55!; --,,. -;»__~ - , __ ,_;'-,, A_ _ 1 _- _- 7- I965. Meanwl1ile,_theUnited States has declared that all it wants H» T is a settlement thatwill permit its honorable withdrawal from . - »=,= _ - ix .'-~ti Vietnam. .| .- J 3 3. Autonomy of South Vietnam and Reurdficntion. Point four r , if . of the Hanoi pronouncementindicates considerablemodi cation of the Geneva accordwhich providedonly a temporary military I ' t dividing line at the 17th parallel. North Vietnam has indicated its willingness to accept an autonomous regime in South Vietnam provided it genuinely represents all major sections of the south- ern population and that both governments should have the right to enjoy economic, cultural,and fraternalrelations with coun- tries of their own choice. This represents a deference to the - .'i-ff6» .~;: -it ff-' '1-'- -¢5:f-;! ;: .~- t t _r>? - ... 2; ;al-r-_ . 3 :-»,-,~ . wishes of the National Liberation Front, which has indicated that ." "ri=¬» *2; _,_, 5., ::.=r'.' 1.1% ._._.;_=. ;,__y ,9292_' _; it'wantsdelay to reuni cation until it is strong and stable enough to negotiate with the North on terms of equality. The United is at States, while continually emphasizing a free, independent South Vietnam, has nevertheless indicated acceptance of the right of -5*»-$9__a;92. -~--.-- - _:=-:--1- I ----.1 IV: - ;:w:...' ,.*.-._' _ __'!__._<'._..,a *w-....,..,.c.., , 4 -x _,,., - _~ -l-1--3.-P-_>;,: ?=n_§ w4-.1. . - - '7 .' " ' "iQ."1'"'<;1"."*i.921'"-'.?.= -"1 . '-- -'-"w'.3?'.'---1'-." "'1- m' §= >I -' North and South to unite, it they choose, without foreign inter- --_ - 1- -- . 1 A :-.r:,- ..92 »~.92._ $---r<',-:-..-,- - , * ; g- 2:0. Q -. .L v.__ - _-. V _ J -..<.r .i , . t. :- -: --rr- - t_ ', -'*- .-_, 1; ference. t l ,.-. F -. .~ q _..,:.- -, ~ tr .- -..~ -., 1 - 1-:- . . , .i. > -.. ,- 7 4. Third Party Presence. The United States has moved f_rom . . I - '2, ' '-.!t_,'-;"_.'.-':..5'.-',',.f -irritated outbursts over U Thant s efforts for negotiation to a .. . - A F ,,; ,._92-,-- .- ., -..~. ~_=.|, . . '__-r;-_'~,.-1.-,. .. ;~.-. . ¢-ii,-;;,§~_.'_=.K ._ . ' I »,;=~;v.92'.=';d.-r.~-='-~ . ,_ . " A "*4.1- - J _-="-> 'Kl~w1-1?-t.'li#927ii=JE1U'-.'a ¢§.t§>& 1*-E1 -3+,s,,,,t-" general appealto the United Nations to use its good omces though the United States has not formally laid the Vietnam prob- lem before the United Nations as it was bound by the U.N. A ~ - I - '6 ! = T3 -'1':- _. iv =1 -; Charter to do before taking unilateral military action!. The North ;H==--.-' "15 1;. '- L < -:.- at: Vietnamese havegiven someevidence thatthey acceptthe need -'. .1 !-.. I i i . of a third-party presence to supervise a cease- re and elections vi in South Vietnam, as specified by the Geneva Agreements of 1954. A question remains as to what kind of third party would 1 be acceptedby all parties andwhat the terms ofreference would re be. This would of necessity be a major part of negotiating dis- ' _, eusstons. I ' William Warbeyreportinginterviews with Ho Chi Minh and Prime ' I Minister Pham Var: Dong in letter to the TfmeS of London, April 1, 1905. * " See Ambassador Goldbergs letter to U Thant, New York Times, Jan- uary 6. 1966. ' FennerBrockway, London Il"rr'brme, September10, 1965. , y . 0 Ii- .. - .-.,_~. --- - » -_ '_Q_;: ,ir~'-¢l.li;-- :_,_*--71;;I7.{=' i, Q . - . r'_ 5.? -~ .. . 62 PEACE ix VIETT --=9.-;_=-~;~, ' P _'= Q? 5. The Pface of the National Liberation From and the Que: of Elections. The United States has moved from a positiot N _ _ .i.._ F. Q A I92 . refusal to recognize anyright of the National Liberation F t to be at the negotiating table to a statementby Pre. including some Communists, in the res'_'I:it1§I Yietnan . *~1.. J - ' -""'.- - .1 K government. In fact, Secretary Rusk has said: .__92a=-i - . . -;'.'.92.'f,.;.__ V -12!.. . _... . . . 4 _ % _ . . . _ _ . _|. . _ ,_,-~_.»-Q-EIi~"".. ,.'~ ;_; -3" 1- , --.-we ... 1...; _ ' -.- """$' -.:.I""'--ea' ..'»:~=.,,. . If the South Vietnamese people have a chance in free election _ V , i .. ._ 1-<_.t*"h!" - _._. i.. 4,'*. i ~--'-'- -'--- -§§S st'§-,1 5 - -*-_ us .~i~.2:....._.;;-.... _.,.....; _{_r _ . make their o-.=.-n choices.they will not elect a Ccr:irrn. rt:=:to pow: Saigon. I do not believe thatthe South92'iet;'!:*.rnese pebble will be rst people in history freely to elect a Cornmonrst r92-:"_:;::;.-. .*3 President lohnsoi-i s press conference. July Z3. 1°45. hint Frankel. New Yorir Times. Deceniber S "3**§_ Max Frankel. New YOrk Times, Deceitiber S. 65. .=_v - __n-..._r t_...___| _ ;___ _ la ; -rm 1 <...» __-,_- K.- - Pg, - i 1 Q , Q ll -i- C l 5 . THE NEGOTIATION PUZZLE ' ,6} S The Secretary of State may not intend this to mean that an elec- 1 tion that chooses Communists is ip.s'0facro not a free election, but to ? l the Vietnamese citizen this must sound like the usual situation un- ,. der the Diem regime in which lists of voters weredrawn to rule out - - ' {T C"T' ii - . -- 1' __ _ g. -_ all dissident elements. Becauseof its political repercussions here .-. i : --.3? "'3 A if 1 M _ ' ;- . in the United States, the proposal of any coalition government including Communists is a principal stumbling block for negotia- tions. "1 -» i s .. _ _,,___ 1 r - __~,' 1 t rn _,, t . < i :- The course of negotiation feelers has gone through several J ~< A I I - :, 92 g;""_ . _._ r , .__ h-:5:_ phases. It is clear that the United States showed a complete cool- I |_ . , 1. -. :-;_-1 :', 92__= , _<_»--..'; ness toward negotiations from the fall of the Diem regime on -. 2" Y. ' ' . .- -,. _ ._ - _~_>.-»...-__»__ 92 _.:-. 151'-'.»'..;r~1- -it 1 _ _92-;, - V; -- -4 92- _-.-;_r,. ._.---.-,1. .4;_t_;._§_ },t~1,: .:;._-§;;i_§-,?'~|*Ql i November l, 1963, up to the President sJohns Hopkins speechon --aw==+.~¢.s.=i.¢.-=-,;..--.' :'. :';,|I1,"'_"r » -1-1' ~i-'~ t---,5.-r..-;':=_--i,,-,f5._.;_jP. ..»~-: ~- Li"92:" ",'l" :v; *.i ='~ - t11-?r-zwr-I;.1"--4:11---a ;,:-it -if .'».§L."-'.';T: gt192_3i92'-..-. 'Q" $Ti'z'7?~_-?"§,:;v&l -=,.'~ -F April 1 7, 1965. Fromthat speech through theJuly 28 presscon- 2,? ference and up to the events of the turn of the year, various . ;_-.,1i expressions weremade indicating an interest in negotiations, and separate elementsof possible settlement were put forth. The sin- cerity of American offers was subject to question on four counts. First, any actual overtures from the other side were ignored or rebuffed as in the incident at the end of the ve-day bombing lull in May. Second, thegovernment inSaigon madefrequent state- ments against negotiations and passed a law in May 1965 that I made talk of peace a treasonable offense. Third, each major U ii statement for negotiations wascoupled with the announcementof T a new phase ofarmed forces build-up andoflensive action.Fourth, there was no attempt on the part of the United States to put all its pieces of negotiation into one package and present it with con- viction and corresponding action. - By the end of I965 the cycle hadrun its complete course,and -i the Johnson Administration, rather than being aloof from any - _~. - talk of negotiation, set forth on a dramatic worldwide effort to ,.'92.I _ .~'.4: _ , . s K ~ f?3 persuade ailnations includingHanoi that the UnitedStates really , <- ts H gt Q4 92 - -3- £3 -~<~ wanted to bring the dispute from the battle eld to the conference 1 table. Ambassador Harriman went to Poland, Yugoslavia, and India. Poland and India are members of the International Control __..__ ¢.,H.. ._.-.-._..,..-92_.___. .... Commission forVietnam; Yugoslaviais one of the nonaligried countries that has offered to mediate.! McGeorge Bundy, Special -1 bee Appendix III. I ._,__ ._,------7 - 3.3;: - i - I .7 ~ -» r e - 1* .'-_,'_j" ,5 -'- Z = »'1- . . .18.-- .1 . 7.1- -- ".4... _ '-'*.~-s" -t '1. - - ..1-_ _ ...... _. -.- __,.- . VIA!r -1. -=;b'"n..- git _ - . -1..=__ - K 1 . -=:1-;, -:= - _ "=- .. ' rs' 'i 4. t ..~-1*» ' '1' -- - . Q -.:_1..-..;~.,.=. ; .'-'.. , '--3 .' '_ 91.. '_.- . _ ,» ~~v- -w» .. 1 er - .; W 1 . T J . . .. 'I I. _ _ ._. . 1 .5 .,.. LL _ 1 -1 In 64 PEACE IN VIEl I Assistant to the President, ew to Ottawa. Canada is the member of the Control Commission.! Arthur Goldber",D U .-p. States Ambassadorto the United Nations, 92FiSiEt'5Ci Pat ?ope and thenhad high-leveltalks in Rome, Paris,and London.' President Hubert Humphrey made a tour to the Far Ea discuss Vietnam, among other things. Ambassador Kohler ferred with Soviet o icials in Moscow. Assistant Secretar State G.Mennen Williamsexplained Washingtotfsposition [1 leaders ofseveral Africancountries, andUnder Secretaryof , ., -92Y... ~._ , _ __ r4- ,,--.1.- .1;..,=. ' Thomas C.Mann did the samein Mexico City. This rather c -' 1'_ '5;'.92 / - Llli. lL0- uuv .. ~~*- ~.- . '-.1»..- .._ =. _ _ . __ _. __ _=_ 1 _ ___ ,0 _ "NE; .. _ .-.7 " _ _ Ab. _ ,_=_ --. _A .-".55."-_ __,_ .1 . . - ... __ _:_ ';,~. ; ._ --__.4 .-_ -.s- I" , 1 . - . ~ V 4 92 _; J g}FH:V I I - ... -* -- *-- ' * .l . T, _ . 3.1. ,' r i 1 ~ .-4, ._ l . -r ..*" THE NEGOTIATION PUZZLE 65 . .I__.. ; _- oi;-:. .' __ -. I i l policy toward Vietnam and much of Southeast Asiafor years. i u . These misleadingguidelines arerecapitulatcd hereas keys for .i understanding thenegotiation puzzleand the kind of proposals Iii that might bring a settlement. The rst such false premise is that 1 this dirty little war can be won. Policy makers in the United it States seem to think that the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam can be bombed, burned, or starved into submission and . : that then a settlement advantageous to the United States and the forces it is backing can be reached. But this is to misread the . fa ' special nature and the thirty-year history of the Communist- ' -4.- _ '-- -1! .- "..'1 nationalist movement in Vietnam. The National Liberation Front 1 §. re. I ..,- -.3. _j- ,;;.- , 1 and the North Vietnamese are red with crusading zeal. Their determination to resist United States intrusion renders victory .,. ">2".*7- - < l impossible in any complete sense. Thusfar every escalation on the l part of the United States hasled to a corresponding effort by the . -. ,92 .-I Vietnamese nationalistsand Communists,backed by increasing l W " 1 t A .'W '. I-i.-_§commitments from the Soviet Union and China. V... in The secondunrealistic premiseis that this is a war of aggression - - I I .-2"" 1.7: J . .11 .-,' =1-' .-'..: -1'-.'. ->51"-1' :=. i;".. :*-"~ ,J; by the North '92".'- Vietnamese instigated by China against the South. ..1;@ .=-Ir;=e.:;!. t1.;:.;..a.¢_.s., -"-" -Y ' * "i 1"=?' < i'=is',t_i~§i*l;=i Such a view distorts ; the origin of the conflict, the role of the .i T- . l _. . National Liberation Front, and the actual relationship between i ir '?..I - ' --'1:- it 'i _ -'-tr."; Hanoi and Peking. This is essentially a civil war. True, the Na- =11--" . 5 tional Libcration Front receives increasing supportfrom the North gg y :- ..= n' Z-"l1 Vietnamese, butthe revolt in South Vietnam was begun and is still sustained by groups of South Vietnamese who turned against the | Saigon government. Resistance againstthe Saigon government is 1 | likely to continue, gaining much propaganda advantage from the I . U.S. military operation. There is no reason to believe that the National Liberation Front will disappear fromthe scene.lt is probably now the strongest indigenous political force in South Vietnam. Pekingis offeringsupport forwhat it considersa move- ment of liberation, but it is clear that the support thus far has not had a signi cant ellect on the Courseof the conflict. - False premisenumber threeis the assumption thatif Vietnam becomesa Communist state, all the other countries in Southeast Asia will follow like a row of dominoes. Vietnam is the setting for a unique convergence of nationalism and Communism. What , " . . ,"_";;'.~._,,_. happens therewill not necessarily determinedevelopments otherin * ----Y" - i . . ._. . .. _ .., .. ~> 4*'~*Y ' A ,. ___ ii. . - c, _- i ea -arms-"1-'-~=»er- r.45..-._'.;.. ~- _ Di so . '1. at.. _,.» ._ ., .-'U_ 5.21"- ._,_ ! >~- . . '3;~ - . _ tn:-. . - .- -.11 ~»-=*-.."-. I -'1'--~ ':=-.'v" us, '-I92 I 66 PEACE IN vnzrt J countries. Even if some countries should turn to Communist their own socioeconomic revolutions, this need not threaten l t imate American interests. The United States has found it pos- i ,-i . to get along with the Communist countries in eastern Europe 4 thus couldpresumably coexistwith Communistcountries inSo east Asia. What the United States wants to avoid is the form: l. of strong hostile states, particularlysuch statesdependent L .1 and aligned with China. But this is precisely what our prc military policypromotes bypreventing thenatural developr of national socioeconomic revolutions and forcing countries as North Vietnam into dependence onChina. E the Unite es ren .. .-.,.__ ~,_... . '""--- -~. -¢» '-. a_'_._'_r;,,__.*,._.._, .. .._.__. "'92 ..v A I THE NEGOTIATION PUZZLE 67 -», .. 1 92 l To give unquali ed, undiseriminatingsupport to a military v junta, as during 1964 and 1965, only makes credible to the world the accusation that the United States has abandoned and . - violated very pol" and * '- '- upon h the country was founded. American military power is credible. An Asian ambassador, interviewed in the summer of 1965, was asked whether a cessa- I I tion of bombing by the United States would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Hereplied: Weaknessll With the 7th Fleet and the U.S. Air Force? All Asia--all the world knows the United States is the most powerful nation in history, and can do what it wants. You don'thave to show us that. We know it, and we don : understand hOw'you can thi 1' yone ' 'T"*"'3 """-""""-"'**""'l "1-iv--...s-i--..--iv»,--..~.;.,-..-..-...,..,1 - will question your power." .1 1"92w92l92._ -1- --,._.. ,._-4-U,--._ _ I 7 t '-.14| -t. u -_.- Q -- ~72 ... " .. '.'92.. """ ' ' ' 92!, 1'. . : .'- '.~ - -. '~ - ='-'-1'-".-r ti : """" "* -'- *"""-" in-__ 1 3',-",» _.~ .-,-; """'-**"~'~--"'* *---»-K-'_. ». 3,},-,-J~..~11 1:'- ;92":_!s_ .'-,. .:l§_;:;, " '';1--1;;;-;.t_,§-.-.;',s;.?;;{¢;3; * 'n'- %. .=;'rt-$1- .>$~i~.i'»-;IY;- r'.1=l£ ._-1 .r .-L1" . - _ . _ , J" ,~ a l 1 l 1 ll ll 1 l _ if ~-.', - . A -* * . .;J'- jg-i w ., £3 - ;-1 1 = ' .. "I? :-;<:r ' 1?-1' is .% sis:-" R5 I It is not the military credibility of the United States thatis lacking, but credibility in matters of rationality, political maturity, and legal and moral responsibility. In the eyes of a large part of the world. United States conduct in Vietnam has already brought its credibility with respect to these nonmilitary qualities into question. Much can be done to restore American credibility and honor if the United States will abandon its clearly ealamitons policy of reliance upon military means to achieve impossible .,_... . political ends. With policies built on such premises,it is understandable how 6 A e, if _ *7 _,_ _ ___~~~ _~ _ if H _ .- - , : - ' ~ - -- -- ' . _ 4' . .'--t-.--._~.r- '2 1, -. .-5--5'-,,.":,-.~ - .,,.e.. -v. A -- __;>- .... . 92 . iv ,, V 1i"-¢ "<'~"~. ~z:S- - _-I -K, --1-.¢.-1: '"-"=£ri»:;--=¢-».~. -F--.= .f'- !';'1 _ nu;-_ - ' -'- ' _;; at. .~_ 1 -- w Fi"ii 1" -'- Ht-"I'92 -ts» i iii -_ I I; 92 'I 4' i; ,.'._ i'-'L.~ .>">. 3" 1. zef' 1. I-r-1." - '_-L7,. - v . if ¢ v § I - 11 1» 7; Possibilities For o Settlement r - 92 ~ ,1--.»-; ->. - -5, » ~ ,., '5"92i_"_"'f¢K:fL,92|-I#.I:_"fl -|"E_':'f92"'-FFR,92f:I :'7v ..,,.? - . - ._92»..n,ls~ -t-.-;.._..,-. ax _.,_ .. .-.- -1, V _-=._ ; _-; _t.j_- 92 . , .',-" . .-- .~_92-_= A i_:-31:12:}settlement withorderly withdrawalof American . a -. _- I -1 .. -V ,A _-_ ti ''.-. . -Q _ _. - e _ .. . ; -- Y, . =.-1.. K -. ,- H, -.., -92~_~ . _-" ii-i?.- .|--..~> *..<.i. ._', 1- 1. ;/;._,;.192-"-': ;';1::; :*;'.i12:f;forces will not be easy to arrange. It is a co ;w;;92<--_-'t_ - _; .- -;._-~; ,'--;-;92,-;.-_» ._;- :93,-it-_;_-r:;.92,._32:3 ;;_ gi,;,t;§t5._ if .-4. i,.s-'="'£ :.¢,'-:;1>:'f. 'e»__:_:.-_;Lt .:'_ .- Q-'" '.>_1~i;':n'=Z:.1i.:t;~'- - ~1'--r 5:: r-ii emoio:1i booby traps and logical nrnbushes.The hc I - In if the '-_*.er's:ti"»:us persevere makesin making proposals, no1 3:? Li; 1:31:25-2or eztsily betrayed bythe nextheadline. ,9" A I . --: 'i i J-5 -'t, ._-'' X: ecieticzt-1:. Vietnamis possiblewithout aclear and uneqt" - 1 .1-J-' :31 ;::::-:1r.ce::*.ent by the United States tl_1nt it intends to end I -t. _""»~ "I .~ ' $3,... - l ' -.P ._ " " *~"_'"se itnent 9. that will include withdrawit __ 'forces 5 =._-_.._ -__=__-i: _:=""'- " i -'iiiif'!1'92 _r._...i..._{ :15 i wcpc ....s-... Ti~'...tS k,.o..o..n.nr n n . s.'_:::::'.:.iLzmedictte by and meaningful actionsto proveour g t';r;':.s"_:ii '.'::il intentions are made clear, neither the Sa t:;:::_: tar the National Liberation Front and Hanoi will take : ;;§;;-" ;:_=rowertures onour partto negotiate.This will be espec" 17.; ;:'ét -2I TQl. 1'1i_< Saigon, suchin as that licatled by Ptc: El;-' Iiis='~'?.i:I: consistentlyavoided anypositive cndorsetrlcn ::;-:-"_ ::'c:sup rift: through the I966 New Your peaceoliensi 21:2 Lil: the UnitedStates wasindicating tothe whole W- ..s 1 -jQ:;.:ss :0 negotiate. The North Vietnamese are extret: .1;-";i:i:l_*s cf_¢ut1en:;in intentionsbecause, sooften in the r :13 3;: 11ilngness to negotiate hasbeen 'dCCUl" Por lI1i¬LI Q:-?»c _ increased5:: ntilitztrycfiorts and because thebases '. azte;SL125 is now building at Cum Ranh Buy, Nha Tr: ".92a- ; ..P.':=. §.]'C~.fll-11H!!16, 1966: Report of inic."~ie9292'Seer: of 9 - =7 -.' 1 i ; _ . n-Iv -*: o .' ._ , - -t." - rah ~=; re--*1 r 1. >1-' --e _ *i.. ~¢- ~ - i" , <-- - ' .- 3. e--. = -- e..e-e-we ere -::-1, -1. ~_ ... __ . It k "92Q"' 92 .<._ - - - _-._¢-gt..- . . V ' v .2 ' --¢-uI- . . " 4- -- K 1 0 P ti _ 2- P #44 1. _g ~92 -. " 1'.-_. ., 7: Possibilities For ct Settlement -'~-I e Q _t»-.».--,~;¢-->~»- ;- ->,->, <1.--,-1,5»?!---;t-9t-1-at,-.-5..-1.-.,"3,- 1" 1 /w ~-- .1; - - ---4 .i---.. --it fi_'-";_" {:92;-J_!,';,_92l| ,-.- as : -.1*'*.1'-;.»'- _- -92- . "If-,- _-y t x 1 .5 . . I " _"'--f.'.' <'_ a. if:-re -~".¢; ,. _. --,-$92:_=_-i_92-12?," ..*. ,_-;.~j_f92,A ,t - ,. .- -.-.- '_ __-_ k: _-;' ._ _;.L - '-H _ - -1- '- - F =~_f.k.__Q_<. __J.;. Q é ,. , .1, V- ;,l? ...__ .1 . ~.- '--i .1 4,.~'- .. at -. ,-=- 1-.= .-1*: , * i. r; 1._i92..:-- J , "-,= _.1" ft-_:~-». -.1.-.1 -_.~, -,-N -1 ..,: '_'- ~g-.- _. -- >1-~-. .-=-, , , .. -'-= '924 -'-e;','~;' -t-- 0". 92. 92_ --92 1 :--;t ,3-t .'r_-t,; .'_»'_-- .--.-Mg-+ Z ~; J i '--a;*:'~ r1- 'ta = :- :-w,§?- J t.*'~r'-,,';_; .-_-.,- .--- ~ -3» ;- - -3 ~' -"-;_-in .¢-.».= . .:-g'~_.;r' ,,.,;,§.'e;-H31 *5 '<'-,:r'~.3- *= .,.1:t.-1 "T a<.,r;: we A esliical 5- ent With orderly withdrawal of American '1 .0: . i a .'f.LilI.'1ITwill not be easy to arrange. It is a ec EEI '1'-". _Q ¬1'QOTLC oby traps and logical ztrnbushcs. The ht 4~_. --' 7'-.= -,'-,I-._--4-_'s us perseverein making proposals, no '*.-' .-._ _ - ~_- . ;|"| t... ,_5-. i -"-'" 4' "A-i _ ,_-.- ..., .e or easily betrayed by the next headline. _92 :92-"92_'!r192:92A» .H. * 4* .'_ _ - t1..3. 1 :;t Vietnam is possible without a clear and uneqt _F92l F---.- -1|-.1 -.92_. * . 92 _.-.._.._.92-92-, J. 92.S -itlt l bv the United States that it intends to enc "_: fD¬ t'1t that will include withdrawing its forces ;'i5:1:'_li;; its military bases. This pronouncement will have t 4: ,- 5: :-:: .:;T .. or . imedittte and meaningful actions to prove our _: i -- "._.. p-'~ Y 1'ii __.-. 2.»sh intentions are made clear, neither the Sa F .-:._.._ -.. -;-_-.1 -- 1,» -2,t_.. National Liberation Front and Hanoi will take . 3:51;-' 1:1; 0*-eziures on our part to negotiate. This will be espec ~ _. ":_; 5: ;;.*'-"a::_:tents in Smgon, such :1s that headed by Pre t-.-- 1 W3: _. 1 1." - ..92 31;: L-.1: consistently avoided any positive enClOI St-tmen _|~ .r __ ail v _, ._ 6_._1_ i c .17 :- {git ,_up through the 1966 New Year peace ofiens 2&5" . a '1"-'-"1 9 -'92._l ;- ;._ -"_I', "__.92. . -_.,_.~ United States was indicating to the whole rt Z ."_= '- -1._§Z_" II; §5to negotiate. The North Vietnamese are cxtrct 5'_'¬: -:;:3_ 5 CI .-krnencan intentions because, so often in the 1 121$ -if :1: Twllingness to negotiate has been accompanied or ls?-ei '31." i::_-eased military efforts and because the bases t 92.rI..n5Lw92-»-|-_-_ -'S;;:es is now building at Cam Rtmh Bay, Nhtt Tr .92 ¢'- 1'1-r-'. T.'Pr:es. January 16, 1966: Report of int».-r92. i~ew of Seer-t ?;_'~.t. ;.;' ?r.:'..:: i92'_92'. 68 . ~ "-"" -e "- ... - . .t» -._ __ ; " ai ' .~.1-_ - -_ " ~= e:-_ -1: S S _ , "'- ,,_ t,.,__r-t vi -. _,,.,,.lr""'" 1 » POSSlBILiTlES non A SETTLEMENT ' 69' and Da Nang appear to them to be of a larger and more permanent kind than required by the present war in Vietnam. It is important, therefore, that while we ask for negotiations we also announce immediate steps of dc-escalation such as the cessation of bombing in both North and South and a freeze on further troop build up. Further steps could include refraining from provocative tactics such as patrols in force, unprovoked attacks, and efforts to expand the areas of occupation. Any pronouncement by the United States must also af rm that the future of Vietnam should be decided by the Vietnamese them- selves. At the same time, the United States should make clear that it is willing to sign and support such agreements as may be developed guaranteeing a settlement. This assurance could erase doubts stemming from the refusal of the United States to endorse the 1954 Geneva Accords. Pharn Van Dong, premier of North ? P " " """* ="""""""' Ir'""'zr-.~- 92. FII-In-Ir V 1 1 ._ Vietnam, has insisted on the importance of full United States participation in any agreement? The pronouncement should make clear that the National Liberation Front would be included in any 92 r< U 7 '1 r J l negotiations and in any political settlement in South Vietnam as _ .t__?_.Ii._ F-r341A_vg:"92_!! ., . *-923~L2 $5 , g:ae' R 1 I- , a party in its own right and not an appendage of the Hanoi delegation. Such a declaration would probably Open the way for desirable changes in the present political situation in Saigon. No one can foretell what might emerge in terms of local political 8 1 forces. But it is possible that the nonmilitary elements that pat ed the way for the overthrow of the Diem regime and that have since been suppressed would re-emerge and could help speed the process of reaching a settlement. Two unilateral steps then constitute the sine qua non for nego- tiations. Variants as to order of announcement or extent of action may be necessary; but before any serious negotiating is possible, the United States needs to make clear rst that it does not plan to continue its military in92"olvernent_ar1d is starting on immediate steps of dc-escalation and. second, that the Vietnamese, including the National Liberation Front, must decide their own fate. It is ~¢ _ often said that by making unilateral moves the United States is giving up bargaining counters or even blue chips" as if the Vict- natnese situation were part of a complicated game. Our goal, William W';1rbey, HP, .92'e1-.' Yurlii T."mr'.s', November 28, 1965. I ¢ r 3 92 P < » 1 . -J 70 PEACE IN vn:"r92r H. however, mustbe to bring the war to an end. Steps _toconvii our adversariesof our sincerity areevidently necessary. F5-'1 While theseinitiatives arein progress,a whole series offore international to local, need to be brought to bear on the problei The followingprogression isset forth, notas a rigid pattern, l as suggestive of the wide possibilities. _r - 1. The United States could call for a general cease-fire for -,92~*,92, it. ./J-9,; at parties, supervisedby an international body to keep order 2 "5,~'. , - prevent reprisals.Such supervisionmight becarried onby International Control Commission ICC!, which was set up it the GenevaAgreements andis composedof representatives l Canada, India, and Poland. The ICC would have to be enlarg i--,--.,-_ .~_'_ -.--- »-s--v-p-M--e-~-. -. ." .<. - F "- -~'*g=_~-rj-::w5.-.-q;-e-_- .~*-r-r;-q-in-w-w-3-|_~,a|or reorganized and givena rmer mandate inorder to meet ;=..= -1:'.=.-ti . ;.i @Z - t objections onboth sides to its presentcomposition andfunctioni r 2. At the sametime, aGeneva-typeconference shouldbe cal _ ;-. y .. ...-r r. . - --:~..92_.H -_ . .- => .-J.___.|-» _ i 4- -all together toreapply the principles of the GenevaAgreements '--'.~.=-92-t.-' . '> '.~. .i" .':l-1 - I- -.,~ '=."ii'-'. - --.-E-1];J>!','I{iJt2 :}. t ; 92 1l2"92. a"'~A';-*~ -.=-1 !92~.-.3LI;,:A2s}iL;§'lfa.'~ t.~.'¢,-, .- -5:-miY ~=~-.; l 1954 to the current situation. The logical group to form sucl conference would be the original Geneva powers, which could "I assembled on request fromconcerned partiesby the co-chairrn ' b~ ~ Britain and the Soviet -Union. Some dil culties would arise it i reconvening thisgroup as originally constituted.For example, National Liberation Front, which had no place in the framem =~ I. 1 [1t of the original body, must be included now. | A more complicated problemis the official representation the present Republic of Vietnam, or South Vietnam. The pres military hierarchy in Saigon can be expected to do all in its poi i to resist eiiorts to end the war on terms it would regard as > favorable. Its suppression ofany expressionsin favor of a peact Q settlement hasmade open organized opposition to the war imp -I sible.3 There is a large non-Communist sector of the populati -y .. it 7 .92. of which the Buddhists and intellectual communities represent c a part, which is vitally interested in ending the war. Some me _ . . ',-1 ~Ir " "H IV ...-.. must be found to permit them to express themselves. This ' require an end to censorship of the press, restored freedom l political discussionand organization,and the institution of st l oilicially recognized body for public representation. See Appendix III: Decree Law outlawing Communism and pm-C l munist neutralism. l i .-P. I. J - rl A ..u_. cc -r1 _» ii ti Q. It 5 d F - ~'-; -- if-rt 1» P'e1v 1?'It'9'- ilvvlflj-w1qwv$Ir - 4 '4I923Ili92-q',,,§ 92'§f< ,_-, M 1 ._ , 92 H 4 ; _; rA_ 1 _,92,._ ,_:__._,_/,:_, _:i:.. -_.,-;-. -;;-§_.";.~r=, U - ..=,¢r __,'-.-¢ 1.;*'92 .-_i is ;,_ . » '92 - r =.s-..--=-- 1" I I--3- -1.3; _..t_-=.,1-92 r Q .1 _"'l.j;. 4I'.""i'd 1 . » I w _ .':_~. _,..,., tar .~:-,--".,- ,.-- , , 2,, "i; » $"_.;;I . - ~..<..t..'.z = -u-i inn .-Qt e.eta~s;¢é-ti>§"il§..Ii5'>a -. 92 ll 5 F -.; 1 I- ' One suggestion for achieving this is that the current Saigon government be pressed to establish a council of notables repre- senting a wide cross section of civilian and religious leaders who, in conjunction with the Saigon government, could form a negotiat- ing authority. Such a council might initiate a representative refer- endum in Saigon and other urban centers on the issue of whether or not the government should enter into negotiations with the ii Nationalliberation Front. Such a referendum might be conducted f : 92 /.'T92 Ki under international auspices, thus providing a precedent for the elections that will have to be conducted after a treaty is negotiated. Even then it would be difficult to arrange a- fair vote because of unsettled political conditions, intensi ed by the large number of displaced persons. If major obstacles arose in setting up a new Geneva-type confer- ence, it might be necessary to convene a new group of concerned powers, possibly through the good offices of the United Nations Secretaly General. Some exploratory efforts, preferably quiet and private, would clearly be necessa before a decision on the best way to solve this problem could be made. The United Nations itself would in normal circumstances be the natural springboard for the launching of negotiations, the over- seeing of a cease- re, the policing of elections, and the carrying on of necessary peace-keeping activities. Expertise in these areas has been developed through years of varied experience. Many per- sons in the United States have suggested a major role for the United Nations. Unfortunately, in this case the United Nations i . __._._ &n-I-I3-'- .;- g ~ W _" if ""1: . . --~w.;~.; - P .-- i - J 1 wt: r I. 73 .. - "?"I"_Tf~'. "-."'f' ' ... '1. '.:';~ - , ---' - - - i -. ,4--__ ' ?92 ii ...,i.-_>--, . ;"f -i. § 92 . .- ,0 92 +3-i " »:>.;, -t .'-_-; - _. . 1 J ..i,."5< ;.*.";;:- ' -. M _- ¥§ zi E .21 u ; l i. B s -Ir '- 72 PEACE IN VIETN.-92l92-l ~r--. i» negotiation see-sawin the fall of 1965, theState Departmentwas 4 engagedin Convincing as manynational representativesas possible that thegovernment of mainland China shouldnot begiven the i-1 credentialsfor representing China in the UnitedNations. UThant 1. . I -. as SecretaryGeneral hasrnacle some helpful offers tomediate and rryilvl Y-V-1.. .-~- _ i I he mayyet playa valuablerole. ._. -._ *. :92_._}";n; < 92--l1 1.2 :-. _ ..r :_L- --s'a1.-;~ - ! A I L_|.:_.__.~,.% . -.~-fl: ,:<- 3. Once the Geneva-typeconference hasbeen convened,its . ~ " T-zl -<1-ii . ..V .. .,. .1 rst taskwould beto encourageSaigon andthe NationalLibera- ., -. 92._ _v . , - _ . .7: ,7 ' _ _. -. .>4:92Il §V : :.V5; ... , -. .. 2.. .1. i...... _ ,-V,-1', -__ . 1-.i tion Front to reach agreement on the formationof a Vietnamese . " _'.;.;~._-;.'.r.., 92 , 1 , ,~~'.-i. _ .,,,~ -, _--.-A -4.: ._-a..i.ia.~r.i.s.92.:t-a.e._-,:.,~...:.i.i..:.-_+-._'ri_.- rt,,.' .;.f92~"-'.-";.:; " .- Ft-=-.1 T I-. : 1Ai|:@:§1§ Provisional Executiveto maintaintemporary adniinistrationof vi 5 South Vietnamand takemeasures necessaryfor theestablishment .-"MI I of a provisional government. Sucharrangements wouldnot be X ' i simple andthe earlyinclusion of an internationalforce is likely , -i'._.i to be required. Inan in ammatorysituation withanarchy and chaos nearthe surface,transitional stepsof government are not * S easily carriedout. However,the experienceof Algeria and the - . F Dominican Republiccan becited toshow that,at leastunder some circumstances,a provisional executive hasbeen a possible formula. 4. Internationalsupervisory forcesshould he brought into South Vietnam underthe aegisof thenegotiating conferenceas eariy as possible. A natural starting point is the International Control Commission ICC! set up for the Geneva Conferenceof 1954. Both sideshave indicatedwillingness touse theICC asa point of departure. Insofar as the provisionalgovernment canestab- X . .-.-_-¢ a V 1; L !| lish stableauthority, thefunction ofthe internationalforces could -I be minimized,and yetthey mightbe neededto restraincertain militant elementson eitherside which might attempt tosabotage the negotiations. Sucha presence might alsobe ofhelp in guaranteeing against reprisals. 5 5. The phased withdrawal of United States forces cannot be blueprinted thisfar in advance ofnegotiations. isIt likelythat as the provisionalgovernment, withthe helpof international police, takes over control, the United States forces should be ivithdrawn 5 as rapidly as possible into three or four enclaves. Theseenclaves could besanctuaries forrefugees fearingreprisals andbases for logistical support that might still be needed for international forces. Thedrawing intoenclaves wouldbe a [Cmpnr:tI'!' move l preparatory tocomplete withdrawaland dismantlingof bases. -i ,. . ._,_ - .._ _: _ - : ,_' . , _ - , _ __ , . _.. _,c- , _- y . .. . _7 . i in ._.__, -r. '_ -_=-.j=t;-1'. _ ; s. E ,;; _;__r' '_-1 _ S , -; :. . " .- i-5'19 .- -I -0 j92._~7»_"; T}. .4 -_~ 0- _- _ ._. ur- ,_ _ "wk, _,i I '1 ._ ~15 '_;-cg m. . '3'. _ - 0 _ _.._. g, I. _ . my 92 _. POSSIBILITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT '7_3 .'.'~_r'> - . "H-.....-/" ' _ --._..- I 6. The provisional government would direct the demobilization .92 If of armed forces on both sides and the withdrawal trom South 2 Vietnam of all outside forces, both North Vietriamcse and Ameri- .l 1 can, under the surveillance of the international presence. The provisional government would also be responsible for conducting 1 elections, again under the scrutiny of an international umpire. The object of such elections might be a Constitutional Assembly r or an actual permanent government. "l. Successful negotiations may still leave some elements in South Vietnam in danger of reprisals. Predictions have varied greatly as to the number of persons on either side who might need .__._ to S¬¬l-C sanctuary. The type of regime developed in negotiations vrqtw it -VA. elections would make an important difference. On the side of opti- ""FY_j4'D92 ...¢.c... ._.=-.1,»-t.--. 1",-1'2 t ,__ mistic predictions is the amazingly favorable experience of the .-, _.. _..,a., .e 92~.,7.- 92< "~::*§: fit . ¢.92i'~.- 1,-- amnesty and exchange of persons between the two zones after the '-;: -_._--J ll . -,9. . t ' -u r- , -._,.___....._.,t...,._...-..' -,1 -..-4 -. .-3 first Geneva Conference. On the pessimistic side is the cruel nature '. .- t. - .-' , 1. . .i . J{ air t-'~. .'r . I- .:,_~_._ n of the current civil War, which may lead to personal vendettas in 1 - J . -- '.'~-- 4- '92 i -TI '.-~'~I»'u -.~. -i--"we. _.'>-:1-ii.-g I-.1 . a- ..;'=...I;;r_-_; a.;£li' .1;-'.- .='.:i...'_. -=,, _, :15 ll ,' _ . the villages and mass repnsals. The United States would certainly ~ . 3- .-.4 .. 4 _.|92 ei-I 5.-,- 92 -i.- -~.- I >."-- "ml-T 1-..t.92.- $.11 owe an obligation to assist persons who felt they might be in jeops =1 1 92 O t- i i a ,s£,*:i ~ » i : .I.]g Y_yH,,r A __1rbg'._| 92--~ W -., . ardy because of the United States military withdrawal. A precedent l t is already at hand in the case of Cubanrefugees. Special legislation 92 ,.-. -,.. s -t. . .._.v- 3" would be needed to bring them into this country. This would be "J. .. ,. ~ 5 3 _. -r: costly, but the war is now being conducted at an in nitely greater $3? i'-'- __.'*¬-ii.-'- .s"f.'>_ -92-J_ ' 1.1 expense. e . g._.- _ .-. . '- _ 8. The nal act of the Geneva-type conference should be an international agreement guaranteeing Vietnam's neutrality and its freedom from any outside interference. Major questions such as reunification should be left to the Vietnamese after the estab- i h lishment of responsible government in South Vietnam and the achieverncnt of relative stability. There should be guarantees .- against armed intervention or in ltration from either North or South Vietnam in the afiairs of the other state, but it should be made clear that nothing in the agreement precludes even- . if i tual reuni cation of North and South should the Vietnamese > *_"¥% so decide. Provisions for commercial and cultural exchange, frec- l r dom of movement, and postal service between the two countries R might well be included. t. 9. The way may then be open to ful ll the long-delayed prom- V vb e r -. H" __'1,,--. " _ we - 92 k an -4 ... * .. 74 PEACE IN VIET _ e ' I. I ises of massive e:::."; : :o pie of Vietnam. In his 1 in 7 speech Presi;e:: .":';s.:: sii: These cop ;-.e5 cf S-:=_"_':e=_=t Asia. are homes for millions oi poverishecl _:>e:_: e. 3;; isj: :'.1ese people rise at dawn and str a. through unnj :e :_;':: .3 steitie existence from the soii. The! s often wrackei :7; pi:-.5-zed by hunger, and death corn the earl}: age cf 4. . . . 7? . -- -'.7:'~,1 ii :-J? -':"';'5; '. '55; ii The United .92's;i:?_s "_s alreaif- active!!-' engaged in developme ., i.r:- . _-= .. I .. "1I '£ ~g;r=.=.u- »',.:. . this area. . . . .l_:.i I ';c;'e :::;';E:c that the Secretary General 0 7'.» . ." -7=. f . 4 , i I United f92'atic'_= :c;I;' _se :';e presjge of his great of ce and his e 1 knowledge oi .=_=1;= 2; ;'_ _=:e. soon as possible, with the COUI of that are:-., 1 _:'1_: 5:: cc-o_:e?::;on i: incre:-nsed development. Y ,-i-.--";,-. --w-? -' _' . - ,,- -=_; ,;=.,.'e_.-,_ .:,..~, T _~ ,,-T_ - _ For Our 1:: I '-=-Q '.':e ::;ess to join in a billion-c ,_: , _ ,,,-.-, t~._-_= ._-, ». _ -, ,..92|i|'.192|. .. I! . L. .. American i.n'-; s:e;; 3. efc.-t seen as it is under way. i 4 1 .,» To the i.t:;'i;:: :';s 77:52: cf poverty has now been adclec ~ F 92 ' ~ =5;-. 1. 1'1 --92:..-N. L1r92r- -1-- 92- fantastic c'es:.'.':'_":: ::' zcéern T-"Jr. The American people -- -e 1 1. ,-'-~ .-:..;s§>4_. --1}; ;lJ:_> 5;¢V"I: 1: 4 l.;'*'4l92 mh _4¢ §:." §';>.iEi92t:-.- . ,?T.- _','_J.t-nfil-:.ii.->.¢1..M' 3 - 1,1,3» gs ~',~;-_;= --,"~ --. t_;.='-§~ ,_ :?___ i E POSSIBILITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT its Economic Developmentand Planning could greatly expand its efforts to train governmento icials. Following the example of the United Nations response to the Congo crisis, a special emer- gency reconstruction fund could be establishedunder the United Nations whichwould mobilizethe sl-tilland experienceavailable 1 through other international agencies. 10. In every effort to achieve a settlement, the long-range goal 1'of stability in SoutheastAsia must be kept in mind. The United 1 Nations couldassist thisprocess ifboth the People s Republicof China and the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam are no 5'55~ - :1"-- .- .1 F .2.-. :_ t-92 - '" . longer outlaws but participants in the world community of nations. . _ 7:- -,E,_ _ L 4 This wouldrequire thatthe issueof Chineserepresentation inthe ;: - " .ir';'» >=-.. -; :~T- 5.. '_ I U.N. be solved. North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, could then -. ;.;. J,~.,,; . . It _ - -''5 become an Observer at the U.N. with full opportunities to take part in the economicand socialprograms ofthe U.N. system and with opportunities for diplomatic consultation at Headquarters. " . ~ ~ t '1~ I . . -_ With Peking as a member, and with some agreement reachedfor 1 ver : -. p , 1 r"I 4 -,.. self-determination in the whole area of Vietnam, steps could be taken for some type of U.N. guarantee of the neutrality of Cam- _. ,-.»., -_ I ,-_ _, . ,_ ._ ., t.-. _i- _~,,i__,. y =,_,-,;_-; tri- bodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Underlying the immediate stepswould --~da~..-.r-1 - »"..-_:--~li ' 'i;|J-ulgi .;~-. V ;':'s'~, -.=.-'<'.92. .5 i I - ,. .t -,1 an-»--~' .".- Q.' _. .. -c '- hiqw --r ,--. >--, ;; . - -r;---7 . -V ' ' - I _,....;-2|-=_i.Cj_l___-._'_ _ __ _ I _l'_7_;92. K" .> ._ é I " Q rm" Q V ~ -- -1. V_ W ~ r 1 92 § - ap» 'wen* N . -< 3 v a s t 1 , Condunon . e19, . '*- Q _ _ -n- -~- 7.1 . .- _ _ 2 r 9. .» As 1966 begins, hopes for a new day in Vietnam hang i . ,-f"=~ 92'.'..=13.1 7J'?J'-_7.__,..=._,,-_-. =¢.-<7-t-.=__ _;. .7_.___.,_A..,¢_7,.,.,,,,,,_.. -._M9R7__i balance. Willthe recordof escalatinghorror in 1965 beexts ..'~: .',% 1; _-j;__ 1;;-- j. _;.:._-, J .-.-.~x.;..3;._ my _92;,.V ?;__-n ;; Q3} in 1966, or will it be succeededby a record ofescalating p -~ .-~ ~ ; - *'it .t wt,-,»."» 1'21,;_ -;--r92=. ._'1 '51! ~: =11 The past year of devastation and deadlock has Shown the =»-:.= ti-T defeating natureof military solutions to political and ccor _ _ -. _-;_ . . - __ ,,'.; _- . =_. -. ,;._ ; .._-'___u, l} _.;:-_= , , pw q.'_j§,_ ..-:.;92'-.7 .- us '. - -"- .i5."".92-"-|92,s':.-- . -M ;1!-{.1-_'r§ }4j-».,:_.',.92 .t - t- - : .-'.-it-, c. ~__,.~_- . .i.;-_:»7- 1-s.,e_ M», problems.H».-Q, A new approach must be found. . Jllkn-£u:~:4Ul~ '0-+ » -1 ._.,-_-Mid.9212¢-1-%i-ti-<-»¢»u#@,333~2'>s> 92;iazir.¢¢92;%:1&==~r;s1.iusi 92_,-. v. -.c"a:92_.- ;~- =--'-:;k.»=92»- =-;:.1- <'-..;;.-v.~t; ..-_"~,1_:=-,. ;,;,_--_'-= The experience .e;'.'.!:-.-.-.t.ut~.i";..92 of Vietnam has shown the need for Arne EAi understanding ofthe socialforces irnpellingchange invast !". of the world. Our future and that of Asia, Africa, and Latin P ica areclearly interlocked.Although mostAmericans bene t our growingproductivity, thegap betweenthe have and not" peoples steadily widens. In their affluence, Americans I . F scarcely realize the desperation of peoples in most deveh nations today.The ghettosof our own cities provide but a . 7' sample ofthe socialdynamite amongthe poorer nations. T conditions cannot be met by dogmatic anti-Communism. Re tionary changeof some kind is necessary. Thetragedy of I nam shows that revolutionary forces can turn to civil war, civil war can lead to outside intervention, and intervention 4 lead toan ever-wideningarena ofcon ict, with the spectero rt Hvbomb looming as the ultimate debacle-all this unlessthe l'~ ., R ._ _ *1 ; = of changeare channeledinto constructive courses. American understandingmust gobeyond turningfrom des tire to can-stnictive approaches.It must become aware oi 1 76 K " '"f"'_ i ' T i " . rt _ _ ,:f"_k ;il. " 7 !..-- 1¬__.__,;,,.,_w .. s 2 ' _ _ "_ 4 - _ i .1.» . - _ : _ :1-_ * re viii;-.-r --_.= __ 92.....-_;-.-* 92___jr Y 92-..8 3'i ll "9 l ll I a CONCLUSION .77 l 1: 1 ll subtle and dangerous assumptionthat the United States can deter- fl» . mine the course of the whole world, either through rniltiary power or economicpower. Wecondemn theconcept ofpolicing theworld * B i only to fall into the trap of. trying to buy the "w'orid sallegiance with our largesse. Thefallacy of the Pax Americana is still con~ ditioning our thinking. In the not-so-remoteday when we werenot a great power and were stilllooked downupon bythe European powers,which were then engagedin exploiting Asia and Africa and parcelling out _ ,, v- c . , , __ W1_t,L _., ,<. »92 9..., ,_ s,..; l. _ .~Mi among themselvesextraterritorial rightsin China, America was _ » 92 .4- - I ,*.__ admired everywhere.Refugees soughtour shores.Patriots took 92 .92 V L ,_,. > .- p t _ inspiration andcourage fromthe Declarationof Independenceand _ _. .. , .1. ..< ", . .- .~'.-'~-"-;,.<~ .. _',.3 '1, the writinm: of .TeiTr-'-rsnnand I inrtnln 1 .-»~ '2 -'- ..__v...c.._,. -____,._._..-_.-__. ._._.__._..... -.-in _ I _. .| l._._.,_-_ -- L -_,i- .- ,l-.- ~. -.--'t~~92<;.~"--- _t_'-;,.__;.*. _i_&.__.-=,?. _t.w;_- ,'|-'J','_v 1 - '~V -'-- . '-.-;- .~_- .~'.» - :.'----1.-1- {;-r,.- ~- -V.r;..4 ;'_'-:>- A--92 Now we are technically developed, rich, mighty and no longer It 54¢ i admired. Thedowntrodden multitudeslook elsewhere,to the very . } .__ .-- elements thatwe are bent on destroying. Wemust refurbishthe ' -. American dream and seek ways to enlarge it into a world dream. A But we must rememberthat we Americans areonly a small por- j_.s._'- I tion of the dreamers. .4. - The world to come must be built on international accommoda- tion and cooperation. Theyear 1965, when violencereached anew C a peak in Vietnam and the United Nations wascrippled for nine months, wassupposed tobe InternationalCooperation Year.The 4 < new orderstruggles tobe born against greatdif culties. Progress 1 in conqueringdisease leadsto a setback inconquering poverty. The stressesof changeproduce strainswithin eachnew nation,and 92 4» lead to heightened tensionsbetween nations. Americans havea natural optimism bornof our experience, at ___ .;é&-JG -1 as ' "I '.'92 faith that every conditionof man can bechanged forthe bctter._If '_I ~'.':'--i_1;, ' A. <_. we canapply this faith with perspective andwith understandingof those whoseexperience hasbeen lessfortunate, we will be able to ll share inbuilding a world ruled byhuman rights andhuman dignity. _ . ..._...... _._.h_ 14-...... ,.._. _' .1. -=,~sr-¢...u»...n._. - _l -_- l ,. l l ll l l I - ---< - -w _ J . ___ V T, 7 -1'» * - h .. -- 1 _> _ 2*. H ,- ~- 11- '-_=. . _ . 1 '._J . '_._,__.,.....,,_ .__,.-I .7 -f-. .>-..__-" ,_:. - . v " 1 "i I _,|. .; 0 : Q |__ ' 1 _A '.l 4 e W - 9 :' - Appendix I: The 1954 Geneva .. ,_____ H Agreements on Vietnam _ k ,.. .__._._,...T,.,92¢_ .;->5, is-.-_..,.,'.. ,,'-.-~-;--yp r;- <--.-;--<--1.-9--.-'-W,-'f-r>-'-_-P;-*=-Q - .- . . -.'-'.<- ,_.. ,,_-_.,;=-_e .. .~.- t I l;_ . ,';j§=": .- J T :- Appendix l A . .1'_,*.,,-,-92 ;,.I haw _.-_-E-1.-4.1» 1 . '_92-,J -.- >| 4 -'7. .-; . 1. i ~ma".--'if£i;-"'/5i -2» , ?._,._. ., 1 _..1-- ..-3%, ..,39 A."-ii ;_ __ ... "~ .1, A--1? ii The GenevaAgreements iheoreiicaiiyended Ikewar ii tween French Union forces and the Vietnrin/1 in Laos, Ca: ii bodia, andVietnam. Thesexrares wereto bet-Onze fully -ind pendent countries,wirh the lax!-named pnrtirinnednear ti 1} =;,:' i 1 17th parallel into two smies pending reuni cationthrozrglz fr. elections to be /re/ dby Jniy 20, 1956. The United Statesm . I ;_ . ;9 . Vietnam aren0! signatoriesto these agreemenis.! Agreement on the Cessation of Hoslili es in Vief~Nc1:T v July 20, 1954 Chapter I Pr0visi0na1 Military DemarcationLine and - _&92 t _; ~| Dcnulitzuized Zone Article I . A provisional military demarcationlinc shall be xed, on eithersid- of whichthe forcesof the{W0 partiesshall beregroupcd alterIhdi 78 - _-.-=.~ _ :._ .¢_. - V _ . , - = _..- -1 _ - __ . 3 . l; A . = "- __ '_f_,_ I ?-7 I-1 1 t__ :_ _ .__,- _ _7._ M T _ _ _- -_/ l r "1 ,. ;,;.:.:-~._ ,.:______;_ __A-, @-"_.f_ _qt __l'. ;'f'_';w Z. W J Vi» _ -5'" ._. .' _ . '. t1- ._:|I92l1v1 ~-'_ _ ;__. _.. 1 7 5 "_- .. '- $5:--;':"£,_.'. . !92. hr APPENDIX r '79 4 3'} _ .~ .r _> .2! withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam to the north ' t *1- .¢;_. !- of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south. -._;-w -I. --t. The provisional military demarcation line is xed as shown on the _,, ._~ .35- l map attached [omitted]. It is also agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established on Q either side of the demarcation line, to a width of not more than S sr l krns. from it, to act as a buffer zone and avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities. O 8 Article 2 '-v The period within which the movement of all the forces of either I . party into its regroupirtg zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall he completed shall not exceed three hundred 00! days from the date of the present Agrcemenfs entry into force. 4 92 t 2 .. --._-"reg. ,.-. _ :. n_,_..._.,.,..:..,.,...,....s_¢,,,,.,__.. ,,,f__,m:_ _r__:_ m_ __';? r 1- F-1-:1 as 1* " = ~$ '.-. =."- t'--. _=-~':-:51" I- ! st- .92._ _. _hK?!__._. _,, ._ __I 1:._,_92_;..,-. H: Article 3 J . > * .,, ._. . 92 4 > '' " ".4: 1 3 at,. When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a 1,4 t -,, -.-I_-, .. . .'/t-- < ~ .--l ~..»~,--_t. . ..._ t= .._.;--;:-_- - l __ = '- .,;;.,l. t. - ,s..- tr 1-'~. 1t waterway, the waters of such waterway shall be open to civil naviga- --iv-.. _-_- - <.-_ ,.._ ._= '-w-'1., , ..v,- . .-* . ,,--_-92,92 . ~_-,t- -92 . .. .-._r~.v_»1,__<'-;-, -. ,~ A ,3» .l.x'~ _- -->1 -c--.»-trrwrt--.<-t.-' -~.'. _.=- - ._. i ._-wt ..-.-'.;:_~_,~-~ . .u~_»._i..--their...-.. - --'-'-'- t_';t__: 7 ,_-,5},-t:-_f1j_-_. - -- A- - t-;_3',__-_:~_~ * ~-.- ;-§;;,_§_,=tfj.*_- " -. ~ w92I r- "5' 15-92=92.-til-J.'Z»a'-2£:,§.'_;_<~;'j.1?-drl r f' w :--._."= V '1 tion by both parties wherever one bank is controlled by one party and the other bank by the other party. The Joint Commission shall estab- lish rules of navigation for the stretch of waterway in question. The -.~<1"; l > merchant shipping and other civilian craft of each party shall have unrestricted access to the land under its military control. . - is Article 4 -G I The provisional military demarcation line between the two nal re- grouping zones is extended into the territorial waters by a line per- pendicular to the genera! line of the coast. All coastal islands north of this boundary shall be evacuated by the armed forces of the French Union. and all islands south of it shall be evacuated by the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam. Article 5 _ To avoid any incidents which might result in the restttttption of hos- tilities, all military forces, supplies and equipment shall be withdrawn from the dernilitarized zone within twenty- ve 5! days of the pres- ent Agreements entry into force. ,. --.:-- 'at 7 . er? 12- ' . :1 " ':' t '1 Jt, t 1 ';l'}3'.'l; re - in. -.?r'.-.3_- := ' C? . islw-l»_.-1. . e 92 r 1 . _ " -' is .. Q 5 if . _ _ 1 ~ . O 1't H1 _,_s_,_-gjitg -H-L1-tr-,-;-:'Il'%.. _- Hi... | | xi- " S i. t l ,- t _.l l .4 I 80 _ AI PE..'92'I .. t-4.»92 . .. . :"Q. A rricle 6 .. _ L, v . 1. -13,1._ '. .i_ .1 No person, military or civilian. shall be permitted to cross the l visional military demarcation lineunless speci callyauthorized 1 t. I so by the Joint Commission. » - 92 . . H .,... , 1 . . s; .:»..; -....- -5-. . ,t ~, t ..{_ . *-. A rticle 7 1.. lA- ii .- -. ._~'_92=I , !92 _ _ 4__. _.. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to entei . . 7 . .'-. . .i-.»._..-. '. -11:- .-....-....:.-,1 -....».- ,,, .. .~ ;. >4. ;;,_;~;=;*=-.'::5»-=-v S-2..-<-__?g,§3 -;'-.-.=§-5*! 1;-_;;r »Z. demllitnrizcd zone except persons concerned with the conduct of administration and relief and persons speci cally authortzed to [1 by the Joint Commission. 1 'Ir I ii " " -. i *.-1; . Artifle 3 ii-. Civil administration and relief in the demilitzirized zone on e '.-" _"'¢. 21 side of the provisional military demarcation line Shall be the rcsp bility of the Commanders-in~Chief of the two parties in their re tive zones. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each § who are permitted to enter the dernilitnrizcd zone for the condu- I .1 civil administration and relief shall be determined by the respe i =- Commanders, but in no ease shall the total number authorizet -5 4 1*. either side exceed at any one time a gure to be determined -by l .-qt Trung Gin Military Commission or by the Joint Commission. I number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shn I determined by the Joint Commission. No one else shall Carry l 92 -r unless speci cally authorized to do so by the Joint Commission. A rricle 9 1 Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as limiting l $_. complete freedom of movement, into, out of or within the de tarized zone, of the Joint Commission, its joint groups, the I national Commissionto be set up as indicated below, its inspet teams and any other persons, supplies or equipment speci cally thorized to enter the demilitarized zone by the Joint Commis Freedom of movement shall be permitted across the territory l. t ~.» the militarycontrol of either sideover anyroad orwttterwtty v. has to be taken between points within the demilitnrized zone 92i such points are not connected by roads or watcrwttys lying compl i -=. within the dC[TlllZll11I'l.Z8d zone. I ' ..-- - . - - ' '-r ___,:T -- V _ -~ . .~ , 4 _ _.~ _ -_,;-- I 1 1 c _. . ear ' ' ¢ ' , - 'I Inr I a-bi...- ii: ~ --. .,__*-_,_ ,. A. -l .1 _~ re.-3. o i'i'§92I I - l :"i¬ -"."t-' 5 - 'K I - 't = rj it . -'3? , I 4;- APPENDIX I 8,1 c In D Chapter II- Pt"inciplesand ProcedureGoverning iii Implementationof the Prcsent Agreement § ll v Article I0 A ' -=;!_t t==$:,= A rricie I2 1 i All the operations andmovements entailedin the cessation ofhos- tilities and regrouping mustproceed in a safe and orderly fashion: _ ' l 1o-=.:' *2. . - -~_ - __92 ¢_3___~ . _ ITO if __: fl.-' I 17"".-L_ _ .,x E . Q- 3.2 I é A ¢ 5% H. | *:'*1.;;,i.';l1;'.o"._ ;._.'."-." . 5. . I V , ,- ,,if 2 - ' .1-_ _»_' " '- Ti . y r Kg. _-, "'_"'aravor '1.. , _-- . 92 ..-;. ;_ --_. ~,, 1;; _- 92- 92 i 7 . 1 ouixog . .r v 92 Iv meeoo 1 Y = . '92j9292:>o92<:11% 9292/Y~:'92od92o92e-5Ycoocoozo Gm ooo 1~-4 " 92 92'9292'929292os . - - -* =- Y ~* r ~ r I ? 1'7 '_"' f.-~ '- .....-..v-- . _.,...._., r ca--"A --.=._-,,. r . -it--_,_-_-i. , ,_.,_,.__.. =.¢,,,: .- . _ " ,,__.._ 92- r ,...t=" -J _.1. l t ~92 ,..t .._.. ,,. - -_ .... v 82 APPENDI "t"~;=392-t iii la! Within a certain number of days after the cease- re Ag - ment shall have become effective, the number to be determi .> on the spot by the Trung Gia. Military Commission, each p shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines Q eluding river- and sea-mines!, booby traps, explosives and 1 other dangerous substances placed by it. In the event of its bet: I 4 impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralizatit q92 in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing v. P ble signs there. All dernolitions, mine elds, wire entangleme and other hazards to the free movement of the personnel of t 1 Joint Commission and its joint groups, known to be present af .tl'Y'=.- the withdrawal of the military forces, shall be reported to t I i I | Joint Commission by the Commanders of the opposing forces; b! From the time of the cease- re until regrouping is CO] pleted on either side of the demarcation line: at " , , ,, _, . . 1-. 3- t-r~ 1;--1--< 4 _*=--":1 P 1' ,H92 tx. =- =, -; -. ~,»-.»i-.;~ 1.:~' _.'-I 92§.r .,i=',; ! The forces of either party shall be provisionally wit ~92 , 1 1" drawn from the provisional assembly areas assigned to tl < _ ' other party. r_ 92 K - . t- _.t .- f 92. L. __ . . ,1 I __ h. - Fl |- ~__ i. :;,_¢ ti-_. tt->... _ 0r ! When one party's forces withdraw by a route road ._, ,0 1 . ~. . .1 - .-1,3. . . _-,-r !,_ ,._...92 1 -,, it-,, ...*_- .. ' -- _, 1.:-.''. . 31 'é. '.'-".1 2 " -_y. 1-I-;~ . - Q :.92_ t,t~---.-'~>.t;¢=:1~1--:.'-.1.1:."Raw.-¢:;,==~;g 5is:w=--t --. ;-»» J;-ti-.; i;-; .~..*' 1 rail, waterway, sea route! which passes through the territor h. 1 ,_i-iirliiti_., _;.fR",:_;i;a:;_ .; _;.'_ 3, ,:._¬_.___ _=92 __-92_.__J¢*._ VJ .. § <11; ..t-an-4. . '1 of the other party seeArticle 24!, the latter part_v s force must provisionally withdraw three kilometres on each side o such route, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering witl :i9292. ' gii. :' ii the movements of the civil population. A rticle I 3 ' 0 ,. 2 - 1, From the time of the cease- re until the completion of the move i ments from one regrouping zone into the other, civil and militar ; transport aircraft shall follow air-corridors between the provisiona 5. i assembly areas assigned to the French Union forces north of the de- marcation line on the one hand and the Laotian frontier and the i regrouping zone assigned to the French Union forces on the other 1 hand. ti . The position of the air-corridors, their width, the safety route for Single-engined military aircraft transferred to the south and the search ii: ,92 and rescue procedure for aircraft in distress shall. be determined on F the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission. ._,: '1 A rriclc 14 ~31 _ .1.,'.?' Political and administrative measures in the two regrouping zones, s'...... - ._.2.._.... .» . ~ -1 l on either side of the provisional military demarcation line: 1-___ - : sf ______'_-' -F _ __ _ Z 'aw : ';- -F-as - .' 7';-_E:'.; '='!rI.:~" --A ~ " '~.'-=.-_"";--"'1" '-I:.r'- - T . it J 7 ______I ~ I ' - ll Ideal» - it _ , :4 : {TE ,;; -.- F; ¥.f.-- _ _ APPENDIX t 83_ "Y-t~ . .,.- -- ,._.J. ._._ st ;= 1 i . . . . 92.-' 's;_t_._3_§_, . _ ; 3 l a!Pending the general elections which will bring about the . ,_ .'..= -.-. - uni cation of 92/iet~Nam, the conduct of civil administration in Q + each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose it forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present Agree- ment; bl Any territory controlled by one party which is transferred i to the other party by the regrouping plan shall continue to be administered by the former party until such date as all the troops i 92 who are to be transferred have completely left that territory so as to free the zone assigned to the party in question. From then on, such territory shall be regarded as transferred to the other party, -<. who shall assume responsibility for it. Steps shall be taken to ensure that there is no break in the transfer of responsibilities. For this purpose, adequate notices r . ..92 ,.c ._- -_-..._1_.. ,. av ~.j; . shall be given by the withdrawing party to the other party. which 92 shall make the necessary arrangements, in particular by sending t . _'. $I.'P'!92 .~,§_»,-,_~- . ?c._,;~, _c-pw-%, ",3; administrative and police detachments to prepare for the assump- :-;i."'~'v ." is f;T'ri- f: 7? . -I .1-Jr 11 =3."- 31* L.-1 ll --Ii . 1- In J tion of administrative responsibility. The length of such notice -.-t I->t _ , ._ , , -_.t_-:._~:..U __§_ M._t .s- J. . ,i,_ --. 92 .. 14.4,-_, :..~ ~ r .~ .'I.». ':": =;."- "- . .| h_s-s- LA :5-.-t.-. .-_,-=~92- Ls .- r .. _..,; -c_..-.1. ;-, t ~;.It.-, -_ shall be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission. The --='§ .-" ' .- .r-'. -'-i,i',._ - transfer shall be effected in successive stages for the various ter- J -. V » --; .5 '.-' . ..'., - - "": . , = i"" I- i ..; /1;-'. "- ,.'- .1 -' . ,;.-='-1,7,".-. "n §i~;.;192_"i . ;; 1:--7 , . --.3;-J-- ,,_-;_~:1- ._:. 1-'~_r.~."5 ritorial sectors. --1;. 1.-., rt:-1 ¢_."-'r; ._,<1' ,}-»1r-*- ix-. » ~s_-.' h -:.£-:92a5'_:+.:5'¢'L' .-said-,'__t- i" '-"es.-.'i~--gs 3.~:»1ss.= ;a=f§t -.='Za .~_2i._">'.*¢ ..,.*?~_=.> ea The transfer of the civil administration of Hanoi and Haiphong ~ ~ 6- " .. _. -it e -F1 - ..-.tr.-.3 ~,. . to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam shall . - :5!-'= it »__ ."-E . K l- ii-1-T :92 u "h' '~» ' l" ':'.'"-3! be completed within the respective time-linuts laid clown in . Q it-4» ' T". ~: --P-1 .. ,9» F rt! _!.-_- Article 15 for military movements. i - c! Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their demo- cratic liberties. d! From the date if entry into force of the present Agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped t to do so by the authorities in that district. n A rricle 15 The disengagement of the combatants, and the withdrawals and transfers oi military forces, equipment and supplies shall take place in accordance with the following principles: 1! The withdrawals and transfers of the military forces, equipment and supplies of the two parties shall be completed .' mi ______7_:;___ __i _ Q =' ,;_ .4,,.:. - -, as --. r V __ a_,. ~ -T H l _~. . . . - J - 1' ii -i V i - ., i = ' , i . _ > i . V ' I .. APPE ~. __ Q :4" - within three hundred 00! days, as laid down in Artie the present Agreement: b! Within either territory successive withdrawals s 1 made by sectors, portions of sectors, or provinces. Transle one regrouping zone to another shall be made in sut monthly installments proportionate to the number of troop transferred; c! The two parties shall undertake to carry out al 1- .- . . - ' . .- - .i withdrawals and transfers in accordance with the aims " r.1 ; - U ~ ta-' _._._| .'.':." . . - t» fa .- . :-' _ vi present Agreement, shall permit no hostile act, and shall 1 ._, - 92 .:-- - _.<_- ,5; _ _ . t. ~-.' 1.: 92 _ r ._ -'7 ' . . . ". '..'~ - step whatsoever which might hamper such withdrawals ant :-- _ a _§Z.. -w- ~ -I... * ' .,_'_ . I fe'rs. They shall assist one another as far as this is possible d! The two parties shall permit no destruction or saho any public property and no injury to the life and property -t - ,- ,1 -., - --.,..,.,q ..,,.,,,.,., ' 7 I, civil population. They shall permit no interference in loc 1 -M ,-.i -. -:- 92--.i- .- 1 administration; - e! The Joint Commission and the International Corni shall ensure that steps are taken to safeguard the forces <92 H t 5 .-l/_ ., .;__ : ; .r__ '5- - 5 t A :1 . ' '- " |- - -»- -::',."§ ,- .v course of withdrawal and transfer: <.. i I ll 1- i"§.~'=. ~.1-5.55" - -. ' 1'.-19.7.": . f! The Trung Gia Military Commission, and later th _, '__ ' *1. 1 . i'_-::,'~"_~ -'.;--.~'... .-4 . ' t 4 . I . _- . ; :_' L-.,. _ .. -m,-,*i.- ._:. ~.-.1,Q{';,.=i-.... ,,.§ - . Commission, shall determine by common agreement the --i~£1=-~P:~s .~. Not reprinted here. "1 v-__ -. . .r_- .- . ff? _.- __ '--.~~__ _.~ ; 4 J ' - ~ '_ »:. i ; . - - e;-.1.. -s » .. E '- i "0 ~- --, ..- 4.. .. . . 92_ ;:vq_: -/ . . .7 92 . ~.»':;-fl = <___..~ . rm. ., - ' .=»; ' '-»=". APPENDIX I 92 35 " .2 S. J mi . " ' ,. J5'= '--t - . --northern coastof the [lo Rousse excluding tlie -e-2.» §f-.__iw- - island!, extendedas far as the meridian of Campbe- . . Mines mericlian of Carnpha-Mines. 2. The withdrawals and transfers shall be effected in the 17 following order and within the following periods from the l date of the entry into force of the present Agreement!: i Forces of the French Union Days 1- -3 I Hanoi perimeter ...... 30 Haiduong perimeter ...... _ _ ...... 100 r Haiphong perimeter ...... _ ...... 300 4 l 1 92 » . .. .~' - ~ 92. ,..n "_,,-, -,,..,, i v !92 I H . A rticle 1 6 With effect from the date of entry into force of the presentAgree- ment, theintroduction into Viet-l92'amany troop reinforcementsof and 6 . additional military personnel isprohibited. 1 _-._ - It is understood, however,that the rotation of units and groups of ,1 ? i personnel, thearrival in Viet-Nam of individual personnelOn atempo- "~ rary duty basis andthe return to Viet-Nam of individual personnel '1 i after short periods of leave or temporary dutyoutside Viet-Namshall be permitted under the conditions laid down he-low: ta! Rotation of units de ned in paragraph c! of this Arti- _ _ .. .----_i----Q--._..._...--M..-92 .. clei and groups of personnel shallnot he permitted for French i Union troops stationed northof the provisional militarydemarca- tion line laid down in Article l of the presentAgreement, during the withdrawal period providedfor in Article 2. However, underthe headingof individual personnel notmore than fty 0! men, including ol cers, shallduring any one ' , lr "" I .i "'-~; "' ." - ii -'-. _ -.. - $__**rr< -:--44 "-I;-7.;,1r;e.Feii¢.~=5;s>:,- atqianwieaiqtsee-.ue=i$-"%1Fr»ee==ir'e;¢ t . it - _ ll _____V, :- I-__ " , 4 _ as APPEND month bepermitted toenter that part of the country north o. provisional military demarcation lineon a temporary duty l or to return there after short periods of leave or temporary outside v"iet-Nam. g b! Rotation is de ned as the replacement of unit: groups of personnel by otherunits of the same echelono: personnel who are arriving in Viet-Nam territory to do l r overseas service there; tc! The its rota .. 3- i or the Corresponding echelon for air and naval forces; ~11» t d! Rotation shall he conducted on a man-for-man basis, vided, however,that in any one quarter neitherparty shall ir duce more than fteen thousand ve hundred 5,500! rnern of its armed forces into Viet-Nam under the rotation policy. e! Rotation units de ned in paragraph c! of this Arti and groups of personnel, and the individual personnel mentic __ _ l. in this Article, shall enter and leave Viet-Nam only through '_ L11. =-_~-f-v*r- :.rf_-qt entry points enumerated in Article 20 below: ' .. 92"r.'I'I92i.i§" ' " 92 -t 1 " 92 , ~ '2". '-:_," t; 2111 92 7_-' if! Each party shall notify the Joint Commission andthe , t ternationl Commission at least two days in advance of any ,,_ __ *_ < '-if-i 0 rivals or departures of units, groups of personnel and indivic ';_ ,-,_:-_''-.' .'-t».;." , i ». = ", " ; ": -_»~,,, ;t;,-.,-.-__. Q -~ . . ,» ------ _ /.;. : ;'_-1",»,- i.j»= ;,1;, -~ ,;'i;~:_t--1.";;.;'.'-:_-.1 -K; personnel in or from Viet-Nam. Reports on the arrivals or ....a.-.'- <1 l':':'l,..a.J-= e_-;.a._t¢..aaa;,is.=4..t;;:@ -udrJ1-ne-'_.e.4,-e- 1..-'i .3 , -~_ ..' ._.'t.-":1. ' 21;»Q§~,l_92:"-'$;~. 7i 1.-=r.i§s,,,,.'-.. , -.3;1/_; ~_~ ,_ ,;"}AAd1 .5,_- ,;5;_;g,;;'_;_,gg'_{t~,Q,',§_ ,,._--;».-=. .-q .i' partures of units, groups of personnel and individual personne or from Viet-Narn shall be submitted daily to the Joint Cornr sion and the International Commission. All the above-mentioned noti cations and reports shall indit the places and dates of arrival or departure and the number persons arriving or departing. g! The International Commission, through its Inspect s Teams, shall supervise and inspect the rotation of units : 1 groups of personnel and the arrival and departure of indii.-id personnei as authorized above, at the points or entry enumera in Article 20 below. I 5' "a .-_ t_92,l _ I1_ < . : -'_ S= -, y. _-at .1 ' .- . ".f-_3-Jj- tr -2s ., - -1. 4- ., - ' , $_:1 t .,t.. :-,. ' .-_, ' _ _ ..¢._92;__ _ V Z. _92| _.a-t +- -, _ . ,4 .-. , _:-J __==_*_ _:_-;£';. _?£z__ _i.;__ .___ . _J_:§____7A -__ ..r .. if" :51? ._ _-~_7 »-m. . _ ii. 5%.. i.. i = Q 1 ya I, _; W _ $3 1 _ APPENDIX1 ' ,3 1 "i .';.'',, .." i .4-1: ! _ , =.: -_ i_:_:_, 92:,M b! It is understood, however, that war material, arms ant J5.1 - -_-;__.-.,~ :4- _ ¢'.=:~:1_- I munitions which have been destroyed, damaged,worn out or user _ up after the cessation ofhostilities maybe replacedon the basi: ur ,! k:__;1- of piece-for-piece ofthe sametype and with similar characteris- ¥ l tics. Such replacements of war material, armsand munitions L! shall not be permitted for French Union troops stationednortl-. J of the provisional military demarcation line laid down in Article .r 1 of the present Agreement, duringthe withdrawal period pro- =~ vided for in Article 2. . I. Naval craft may perform transport operations between the 2 regroupmg zones. T c! The war material, arms and munitions for replacement purposes provided for in paragraph b! of this Article. shall be ..- introduced into Viet-Nam only through the points of entry enu- merated in Article 20 below. War material, arms, and munitions to be replaced shallbe shippedfrom Viet-Nam only through the it Y ~»_~._1___-< ""'I"Ef"" 7"i ---,-;.- 1-<:.--1.»;--»_'¥,.._.t ...t-¢.».>~. ,,~_-..._;__-,, .;.,i'______,,__,,_ _,,_ _,__,1 points of entry enumerated in Article 20 below; -i ~ _ ,---,;._ -.1;:.-'-'_-°'-..'.-,-_ -r_Z; ' _ __ ..,. Article I8 92 f @Z§ E- r e" '- 1 tQ14 With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agree- 1" ment, the establishment of new military bases is prohibited through- " out Viet-Nam territory. l ll - 88 .1 F.NDDtES ' ,2 ' p it 7 ' _, Article 19 ' Q"-1L5" "5. " " With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreo 1 -A;gm e _ M ", ment, no military base under the control of a foreign State may be , F I i : -It-at it .; est_ablis hed inthe regrouping zone of either party: the two parties -'1' i 3 shall ensure that the zones assignedto them do not adhere to any mili- 1 tary alliance and are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy. 1 ' -4 A rtfcle 20 The points of entry into Viet-Nam for rotation personnel and re- lacements of material are xed as follows: Zones to the north of the provisional military demarcation line: t. . P Laokay, Langson,Tien-Yen, Haiphong,Vinh, Dong-Hoi, J , d Mtiong-Sen; Zonesto thesouth the of provisional military demarcationline: Tourane, Quinhon,Nhatrang. Bangoi,Saigon, CapSt. Jacques, Tanchau. v':?J!-.j 92'f'.V'!'I;'-":v'v{: _ _r_ v-i-itiatqw-em-T: _*,:: .- , i_ -k i_-~,-w; -.--: i;~,{,Y.--1*» ,..,; _ - _.x..-. ._.._9 ,t_ . .14 . t_, J IEfi" .§ £ Chapter IV Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees .--_ _: _:. _ , i,-i.l__._ __v.»-_ pi .____..t».E_, -.-- --it , .-_ ~_, '-~ I» I - = N *--;-- _-'.1':- it _ » --i-- r _:i'1 §".|L'<-"' =-i__:-'_ _: »_- ;.92~-.5»1 :_- '»;-.- ---,1,--- E5 -i=; ;15.;-=_: »;§r-> ~h~,-' ~i V em, st -i I-I" é A rriclc 2I 1 he liberation andrepatriation of Ml prisonersof and civilian , i internees detainedby each of the two partiesat the coming into force ;.<_;;_ of the present Agreementshall be carried out underthe following _ "-; conditions: l*=.I_i a! All prisoners of war and civilian internecsof Viet-Nam, .-sf _ French, and other nationalities captured since Lhe beginning of hostilities in Viet-Narn duringmilitary operationsor in any other circumstances of war and in any part of the territory of Viet- Narn shall he liberated within a period of thirty 0! days after -4 the date when the cease- re becomes effective in each theatre. » I3! The term civilian internees"is understood to lriean all I persons who,having inany waycontributed to the political and ' 1 armed strugglebetween thetwo parties,have beenarrested for V that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities. p Q : |I'92r92 *5 ? _ "-92h-F- J, N srrexoor I - S9 _ _ ._ c! All prisoners of war and civilian internees held by either as 1- E t party shall he surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the _. . i '1: other party,who shallgive themall possibleassistance in proceed- - -. r ing to their cotintry of origin, place of habitual residence, or the Qa- 92 Zone of their choice. Chapter V- l92/liscellatteous 1 A rriclc 22 " The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall ensure that persons undertheir respectivecommands whoviolate anyof the pro- 0 visions of the present Agreement are suitably punished. K ¢ . "--:-'§ :11-3!.'._ vii X A rricle 23 I -. 1» In cases in which the place of burial is known and the existence of gra92_'esbeen has established, the Commander of the Forces of either party shall, within a speci c period after the entry into force of the . _"_"Fb-¢§1|p _ __,__ _ _ '1 Armistice Agreement. permit the graves service personnel of the other -rt» , 1 =-.-i:-r- ~ ! t "-11"- Iii .. .- » , . = v party to enter the part of Viet-Nam territory under their military con- t _ ,. > .. .< .1 ... 1? trol for the purpose of nding and removing the bodies oi deceased 1' I» military personnelof that party, includingthe bodiesof deceasedpris- -A oners of war. The Joint Commission shall determine the procedures - r '-"92- P L -A -I Kt"-.:" ii'." 5": and the time limit for the performance of this tasl-L.The Commanders ._ " '__~ --_-t_-' i 1 12- ._--. §_= ;_ *:.92.*92;'_- < _'_;th_~_/5~51-f_,. -"_ _ _._~.-'-t--:r. -_ '._ i..,-,-_- <;_.V_ l92.,| 1, _ ~: .1 4-_92_-V -'i_i.924é~.:-i_~ 92__,'f-»__- - ._t-__.f_ $-T.A_;"-,1 . L-3 -:...i._.E._J-Q.I-..&' .f;';=_,. L¢'92$.1'EL. t";.*l";f 7--l1ii_i.'t>s;,i1 t-. -5 __,.--3t R5,!. M-:3 of the Forces ol the two parties shall communicate to each other all information in their possession as to the place of burial of military personnel of the other party. Article 24 ' 2 A .- ._ _ .5511; - -.*'3."q§ ' 3 "- . x t. The present Agreement shall apply to all the armed forces of either party. The armed forces of each parry shall respect the demilitarized zone and the territory under the military control of the other party, and shall commit no act and undertake no operation against the other 1 party and shall not engage in blockade of any kind in Viet-Nam. For the purposes of the present Article, the vtord territory in- cludes territorial waters and air space. Article 25 ' The Commanders of the Forces of the two parties shall afford full II I . _ L. ' - er; _ '9 protection and all possible assistance and co-operation to the Joint _ _. _ . ' Q ___. i .,iiq§5;w¥r'-'.*,-"m»»-- _ .- .-¢.-.._m r_,,._-V ;"._.~u',.-,,' __ _V . . _._92.__, ..4 .,-in-...~~'-. -' it .r t-_. V ,0.-..__ht-:~.;_.__ t '¢.'. mm V 92 -- V: _1 _1mr_'-.4 ~17 _ 1 ...... 4..-._~J92 to "sh. . . . F -.5 1h»-- ' _'__._- I ->1; I - -r w -. - - _ ,._-.t :»_-.. ' ;92_r._;. ' 1 A;-__-j "97" ,__92 ~,. . , i;;f » » . Es? . -t-=}~."1.1.r 90 Arpsivoitirs ¬ tI . Commission andits joint groups andto theilnlernntional Commission and its inspection teams in the performance of the tunctions and tasks In s assigned to them by the present Agreement. . Q Article 26 The costs involved in the operations of the Joint Commission and 1- joint groups and of the International Commission and its Inspection I Teams shall be shared equally between the two parties. -1-____ 9-... at A rticle 2 7 -_' The signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in - -m_-~<~: --;- »>-e E _ ___ their functions shall be responsible for ensuring the observance and , q-'.-..92-@1- a enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. The Commanders vf ~,_ : ..t-" -.- 3.<,.92--u--=W L J t "92.;'92-;-; ,£ir.._ _;|t.j_ oi the Forces of the two parties shall. within their respective com- -. - 5 . .»,_ . ..- 1 h I " ".'. . mands, take all steps and make all arrangements necessary to ensure full compliance with all the provisionsof the present Agreementby ,5 all elements and military personnel under their command. v ,- t .__ _92 _,._. .~_.. .. 1 -- I ...s- - . . 1 .. -_..t. 1'; Ji-,' -/-=~i.-=--.¢.-.. -. . ,,-=,_ ,;._-;,._; _ - =- A.l 1 ¥ .- , t, *1, 1-411.! 4 -I-.T.».'. $r3'-'*,;-»_-_-..:_-_' » '~-;-.1-4*. .-_:-;.t;..'.~,._L1»4--.-- ,;' ='_1 : "-1»y;¢_|,-!?'92 '..-.~-t tnI-'.:t-3.}§3,,,t;;_$_-,i -,,£'_--,'t#;;:,'~.'a-- '-'{ _!E;'The procedures .1 laid clown in the present Agreement shall. whenever ' 926' '»-I necessary, be studied by the Commanders of the two parties and, it necessary, de nedmore speci callyby the Joint Commission. l . i_»_ Chapter VI Joint Commission andInternational tit Cornmission for Supervision and Control in Viet-Nam l 23. Responsibility for the execution of the agreement on the cessa- 92 x tion of hostilities shall rest with the parties. 29. Art International Commission shall ensure the control and su- § pervision of this execution. 30. In order to facilitate, under the conditions shown below, the execution of provisions concerning joint actions b_v thetwo parties. a 92.__. vi'92J -t | Joint Commission shall be set up in Viet-r92'am. . e , 31. The Joint Commission shall be composed of an equal number m of representatives of the Commanders of the two parties. } - ;-5'; :3.1 --5: ; ta . EH. .~* .,._. ~- , 32. The Presidents of the delegations to the Joint Commission shall hold the rank of General. l The Joint Commission shall set up ioint groups the number of which shall he determined by mutual agreement between the parties. The joint groups shall be composedof an equal number of o icers from | _. P - . ' T as--"_ 4"-L ., it '~_ ;._a <1 _ "-- 4'- 1-:. -.-.-- 1"?!-1 - ,---.,,_, _ -ii: "~~. ~ ._ --~ -I"_.__ - . - 3'-. '~~' . ' APPENDIX I 9.1 ,. .. >-__, i92_ both parties.Their location on the deniarcation linebetween there- '- its L it 1 grouping zonesshall be determined bythe parties whilst taking into 92_'_;E-}::;1_;'_. . ._ account the powers of the Joint Commission. 33. The Joint Commission shall ensure the execution of the follow- ing provisionsof the Agreementon the cessationof hostilities: I a! A simultaneous and general cease- re in Viet-Nam T? '- for all regular and irregular armed forces of the two parties. b! A re~gr0upnient of the armed forces of the two parties. _ c! Observance of the demarcation lines between the re- groiiping zones and of the demiiitarized sectors. v . ti.-V. Within the limits of its competence it shall help the parties to exe- _ 1":-1 to < 7 . I: _ 5,6 _ _...., T-. cute thesaid provisions,shall ensureliaison betweenthem for the pur- 1 -". , - it. 1 I -is _ ==;-F pose of preparing and carrying out plans for the application of these 1: _' provisions, andshall endeavorto solvesuch disputedquestions as may "it arise between the parties in the course of executing these provisions. 34. An International Commission shall be set up for the control and . H-'-; __ -v-.vr _v-,--gr--rw-mr r_'.»"@T{' '! -,,.,,,-..~.-§,_,p..."y_ ;Pw.?1q q V_i supervision overthe applicationof the provisionsof the agreement on i - _- . 3-F-,_T;.»'_'JQ}T_ 92;}'T?'.>%3?.-.*_'~,F'.i I-_~.'.392'-"'§;!'i 1.-'-t: .3.'3.§'_,-_ _'-"if.'I~.*." _, _ ;_-3;" .;:_. - '' ' 3., ' ___:_-- ¢;.- ' f-- TI_92 :1-.2,_' 2 the cessationof hostilities in Viet-Nam. It shall be composed of rep- t,-' -_ ~.-.~ t resentatives of the following States: Canada, India, and Poland. I I m < , ,<, J t U -.. 1: , . . -», ',_'..'_;-'_ =_i-_.»-_ _;--A "-"is It shall be presidedover by the Representativeof India. ,.__ ; -._-,i,l':-,-_1_ .. in .-_:A.. _¢ _ .92 __-_'- ,-- Qij ',l_=_».;-l._~'_'__'i-.11.; -"~_f'ii. i~- f*92 - »i-. :»_-. - -...-.-..i1...... * -- ; 1... '.':|-.92L p. =..§_,-,... ,,,_.c,<-.--.'uL-J2/Q; J,._.,._;..,_ _, .. P. t ;t..-,.t,., 35. The International Commission shall set up xed and mobile in- .-.'.n"_'-'. .*.*'¢, - ;i,l:;t'*',-R sg: .~=1.,MILe >.-.i--'.-..s_ _,,_,,,vi °-F ,i-i»,i;.i__;1. s.i .1i=.;1.t-.t i"*tti='.Q.§;_;§§;ai5 a. _'_ , l :tzX spection teams,composed of an equal numberof officers appointed by v each of the above mentioned States. The xed teams shall be located at the following points: Laokay, Langson, Tien-Yen, Haiphong, T ."' ' - Vinh, Dong-Hoi, Muong-Sen. Tourane,Quinhon, Nhatrang,Bangoi, -_ ,. It H, Saigon, Cap St. Jacques. Tranchau. These points of location may, at a later date, be altered at the request of the Joint Commission, or -1- ._ . ,2 -1-,.~'. . ' -._-Ar_ of one of the parties, or of the International Commission itself, by I - . agreement between the International Commission and the command of the party concerned. The zones ot action of thc mobile teams shall be the regions bordering the land and sea frontiers of Viet-Nam, the .. -1 demarcation linesbetween there-grouping Zones,and thedemilitarized zones. 92Vithinthe limits of these zones they shall have the right to move freely and shall receive from the local civil and military authori- Q ties all facilities they may require for the ful lment of their tasks provision of personnel, placing at their disposal documents needed for supervision, summoning witnesses necessary for holding enquiries, ensuring the security and trcedom ot movement ot the inspection teams etc. . .!. They shall have at their disposal such modern means k of transport, observation, and communication as they may require. Be- yond the zones of action as de ned above, the mobile teams may, by_ . ,,,,... . r -*7-~> - -"'-' '-. -1, -. "_-,- " ._:L~' --- --. " "-. - _ .. _- I *1,. 1 . _. --a.. -- _ :_:._ _, ..- _ _ . ,_ _- - 4.; 1 ._ " _b_ _ I 5 i 4 -.._. :_ ,' 3. --' ll ._.__ L' ' - . " ;=__ '" -_--_,.f» .-' '* .1»,' "'- e - =.I-- . ,1 I .'7 A r ,, ,,,;_1_,,-,____ - 3|-_;.~.,n||1r - _l - _ -. *--- "- .3 _____ 2*; 92- 4'-'"*1 - ,--'- i- I , " '-.1. 7'~' -wt" "=1,'19. 5; . .1-;,-J - » '-_¢_.v : _',_ ' .,1! _. ~ -r n9292:_ ;._- . .i =" gr ; , ti =-= f e' 92 APPENDIXE. :- agreement withthe commandof the party concerned.carry out othe F movements within the limits of the tasks given them by the presen agreement. 36. The International Commissionshall he responsible tor super vising the proper executionby the parties of the provisions of tht agreement. Forthis purposeit shall ful ll the tasks of control, ohsel vation, inspection,and investigationconnected withthe applicationo. -_. __i ,.- _ -'-'-' the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, and it shall in particular: a!Control the movement of the armed forces of the two i V -T':.i%7't-',:=.I">s-l;~l.-tu | -i r . , - J_?§P'.::-'-92II_3§I1il.":[, 1» <-;-»'=. -'."- . - parties, elfectedwithin the framework of the regrouprnentplan. .. t E . " b! Supervise the demarcation lines betweenthe regrouping .. . ~ '2».-~-= ..= u .a : 7,. _. ,, - - _- 7?-_ _',_.u *,_ -fr. <... -1.1 -_' "._-".5;-. F-.1-_': , __ areas, and also the clemilitarized zones. - I a 92» ,, in, '_ _ _ M i'. _ g£j_-_'_'- _'.-._l.':-1.11--.Jtl J1;i-"-i";}l',: .;.':. ; if ""i.it -"-:»"""';ic! Controi the operationsof releasing prisoners of war and .;i-,_;;_-.._i__ ;,.. -. .-.1 -___4._,-_.,, -L. -. *_ .-'-_.._92_ .i,:'1/'92 -92 ._ __-_,;:__ »_." .-._~.-._|L.¢.,._i,-_i<,J go 1'!r92_: 592-, -'4 -g .,,~,.,_.»-;,,_s s§,, 5-i ,4! 4. ;-@- ,_:_ '}1' - i_ .,. .'--',~_=.....s -. ';:-ltjit2:-J. -'.w . riot "¢'_1"l.'-ii -2:?- I- -"-E-zJi Q'L:f" ':-111-92-51-=- *+>~ "i= -:_~':- -!= civilian internees. ta... . - d! Supervise at ports and air elds as well as along all fron- I tiers of Viet-Nam the execution of the provisionsof the agree- ment on the cessation of hostilities, regulating the introduction into the country of armed forces,military personneland of all 1 kinds of arms, munitions, and war material. J s 37. The International Commissionshall, through the medium of I the inspectionteams mentionedabove, andas soonas possibleeither on its own initiative, or at the requestof the Joint Commission,or of one of the parties,undertake thenecessary" investigationsboth docu- l mentary and on the ground. 38. The inspection teams shall submit to the International Com- mission the results of their supervision,their investigation,and their ¥. observations; furthermore,they shall draw up such special reports as they may considernecessary oras maybe requestedfrom them by . -G _ __v,._,,_ ,;; f the Commission.In the case of a disagreement within the teams, the Fr?-2 i-*i-.- s i conclusions of each member shall be submitted to the Commission. » _ 3 - ]'A- _ 92 - 39. If any one inspection team is unable to settle an incident or Li considers that there is a violation or a threat of a serious violation the i International Commission shall be info , th hall study the reports and the conclusionsof the inspection teamsand shall inform the parties of the measures which should be taken for the settlement of the incident, endingoi the violation or removal of the threat of violation. " 40. 92Vhcrtthe Joint Commission isunable to reach an agreement on theinterpretation tobe givento someprovision oron the appraisal Of a fact, the International Commission shall be informed 01'dis- the 1- e . ~. : --. -'.-~. 1 ~ -'_ _ '- " _' ' -- - rf ; _s _H _V j _ " ' '-__ i '1 --i. -t -: , in-. e <.;r=--F " J _. v gt, _. . _-5 .- _a.t;;- __ APPENDIX I n ~ 92 .-*3-='i 1" "- é - puted question. Its recommendations shall be sent directly to the i - ¥"-'.-J~t-;Y '~'-- -. 3 parties and shall be noti ed to the Joint Commission. new _ . i - 41. The recommendations of the International Commission shall be adopted by majority vote, subject to the provisions contained in Article 42. If the votes are divided, the chairman s vote shall be decisive. Y ' C The International Commission may formulate recommendations concerning amendments and additions which should be made to the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam, in order to ensure a more effective execution of that agreement. These recorruncndntions shall be adopted t.lt1:tnimOuSiy. 42. When dealing with questions concerning violations, or threats of violations, which might lead to a resumption of hostilities, namely: a! Refusal by the armed forces of one party to e ect the movements provided for in the regroupment plan; n b! Vioiation by the armed forces of one of the parties of the regrouping zones, territorial waters, or air space of the other -~,-. - 1~v.-s_?;._.-q.-=;= . >e~,~- Y»-p--as-f,_-,--_.,.,.-c ___ 4,;-__,_ .,_.-,,_ _ _FT L Q- RF party; . -.-- ..- ..>'.-;-e3<_>.=;:'r.;1 » s -M" g *1 . ~ ,sr _t..;._._.<, __.:.'-;.-1;-.1.-' .-, ;'-E the decisions of the International Commission must be unanimous. . .'-.2:-"--'_--.-. ~. I- - -< . -' I , - .1 1 <, J ! ,'i s - . -, P r:j .. ;.._.=-_ --at 43. If one of the parties refuses to put into effect a recommenda- _' '_. * i ,. .. R. ._,,T,._ ,. , r_ L _ 5_-,,_',41-'1-. '., .92_ 1; ,'__;:."f'-92'I._.- _,. -,-r . ,92,A _.. , .." ;: - u, vi tion of the International Commission, the parties concerned or the -,-,-.;- ,. i.;. -. -,. __ 92 v 1 Commission itself shall inform the members of the Geneva Confer- -,- _. ._ ._ . _»_~.-_-»-U ,.,;.,,..-,._. ;92 ,._.,»F. v,.,._._t__r.,~.-.t., .-._» 92-, st... - _92.,, .~ l_;;J :-:;,|§§_;:{:>»;.¢.1'.3A§.-.92:v--=-, - -- .1- - . _-- l -- - _.-_.+.._ :-":~ 2 '- , - M-- -1 ' ~%.¢§=-t;» ;::~¢»- ti-1- ~ wJe:i.-$1 :- ¢§.'§. .tt -.t 'A:....S.':: nan":-_..m .- enee. If the International Commission does not reach unanimity in the eases provided for in Article 42, it shall submit a majority report #7 7 and one or more minority reports to the members of the Conference. t The International Commission shall inform the members of the I I Conference in all cases where its activity is being hindered. 44. The International Commission shall be set up at the time of . the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in order that it should be able to ful ll the tasks provided for in Articie 36. ' 4 45. The International Commission for Supervision and Controi in Viet-Nam shall act in close co-operation with the International Com- n 4| missions for Supervision and Controi in Cambodia and Laos. 0 The Secretaries-General of these three Commissions shall be re- sponsible for co-ordinating their work and for relations between them. F 1 46. The International Commission {or Supervision and Control in 8 _ ' -I4: 5;.-. - Viet-Nam may, after consultation with the International Commis- st -" . ' _ ts: _ at _ sions for Supervision and Control in Cambodia and Laos, and having ;_;_,¥" - .- _____U ,_ _ '1 _ -. t regard to the development of the situation in Cambodia and Laos, . ,, . . progressively reduce iLs activities. Such a decision must be adopted unanimously. 1?" l-" ~ V. ' ... ..- ' = '-_ ~ zs.» I~i@-I':.- .-nr».--k-!- .- .'. M _ _ _ '__ _':l1|r-- _.|92;-- __* _L . J A+ '1i . '* p ~-ism. -.',.=._ _ . ¢.. _ 92 94 _ APPENDIXE "*-ii» - ea » -. ,. -D=. .'l /'-*3 ,_,_», "'._ - -K ' _ , , _. . 1. Ii . 47. All the provisionsof the present Agreement,save the seconi > >' E»_;, '' .7-4.1 -'1:-. . l - sub-paragraph ofArticle 11, shall enter into force at 2400 hour -t. ii -"1: Geneva time!on 22 July 1954. I Done in Geneva at2400 hourson the 20th of July 1954 in Frenc and in Viet-Namese, bothtexts beingequally authentic. For the Commander-in-Chief of For the Commander-in-Chief of 1 the People'sArmy of Viet-Nam the French Union Forces in Indo-China 'lA-QUANG BUU, ' Vice-Minister of National Defence Brigadier-General DELTEII. of the Democratic Republic 0! ' Viet-Nam , l V. 1V - v. r --~".r:/ ; !':5_t'-."i=-_ -,,-< :;:.I i -1 92''*'~ <'."Q»="' --"-'1;"w'. -I ~- , Appendix '| B . t -4-, .. 2 i , - - , . .7 i _ ! ,r r - ~ -_ _. _>< r 92- ,_ . ='-;- if-1- .'I..1". -: r';4'..'- ..' , '.92-.92i .*'._'-r-> !';." -- - '-; M-ti:-»"~ -" T .--i - *{ 1-''-L" J 1"-I1~ "',-5 - 5.if$...-'f.;§';i.-11¢ . '1. .1» Final Declaration of the Geneva Conierence July 21 ..,92, . , .~.', - . .';....~. .,= ;-<..~ ,.-.~. 9|>..~.=;?.-i --1; - -r-5 :- ' -'-'-'=~'» -~¢1.=_-»-1-~5.5:?"= ¢.._ e .-. ~ 1;_11:15:-»5i -=i £T»....¢.-r ,,r»=;_-rii:-.92, .".@Z";.E: L2-,-é4iil<¥1'. .:' 14 -" P7?:'§'3'§.-"'19- e .~-.1, -' 1954! I Nations taking part in the Conference: Kingdom of Cambodia 7 I I Democratic Republic 0! Vietnam, France, Kingrlom of Laos People's Republicof China, State 0} Vietnam, Union of Sovie Socialist Republics, United Kingdom Great Britain!, Unite. States of America. r . K 1. The Conference takes note of the agreements ending hostilitie in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and organizing international contro and the supervision of the execution ot'provisions the of these agree menls. 2. The Conference expressessatisfaction at the ending of hoslilitie in Cambodia. Laos, and Vietnam: the Conference expresses its con viction that the execution of the provisions set out in the presen 4' . i Further Docunrerrts Relating to the Di.rcu.s.ri0rt 0] lrrduclrirrrz at lllll Genera C0.rIf:'ri:.rtct Miscellaneous No.10 [195-1].Command Paper.9239! London? Great Britain Pnriinmentary Sessionnl Papers, XXXI _lH 53-54! '-_ :'r:nr""---1 _ PMwere . ""'_, __".._- _ pp. 9-11. > -ll T """" '---.r- ~.,_, ,_....* if C ,i- , .. ts. , W, L / E 9- - 1--1 i<_ -4- -I t Wr-rt- =~,,; 92 .r.' . . _ . . ,.__,_ - . "l " 1 5 - tdt ,..; ' i 4- I "2-' J I- ,1 ,i.i, .- $- areeuotx t " 9 > to declaration and in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities wi permit Cambodia, Laos. and Vietnam henceforth to play their par in tuli independence and sovereignty, in the peaceiul community o 1; tZtttOrtS. _ 3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by th i Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adop s measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the nations community. in particular by participating in the next general election which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot ant in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms. """=. .7?" T" l"7! -'-= - - - /T 4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement O1 >¢~.-r-t._,_t..-c.._..+s,...' 1 .=:._ . L,- :..-,,,.,-._.. .. '7 . . """".-"'""'1'"».*r'-»- i:- -at 1.» =-i= =" £»<;"='.tf *1»;-. the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam prohibiting the introduction inti -2 _ H. ,. ,_ t .1 , _.A_i'_>__>~;_ M s'._.rA- . i-it, _:|_:. ,_ ._.__%_; 4i 1 -w-Q Vietnam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of al r 1 it kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of thi I. .92hi_if_ __,_ 92 i I ;._.=-_-_V_ _-V :5 ; _. ..- '- -t. ---t . . Y? declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of thci - -.t _. . 1 ,. - , __ -to -~u , tr, . ~».~.-_" »', . ~'.-'6: -> »¢f<';;;._ .u. <1-A-=;5,-9,-t-1 .;»_;§=;1-- ~,-=;--. ;'a.;,92.-~~s;,,»'-»t.,y:l;. - ti-:. J: .-t-=.: ->:_'i;.'.i:_."_=;~;;_.'_ ,4-Y -' h ~ ,@5!_;L-,1,"* ,:?£'-_';:éi resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, i1 personnel, or in instructors except for the purpose of the effectivi defense of their territory and, in the case of Laos,.to the extent do at, i; ~35 . . ned by the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos. _-. 5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement or i the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam to the eticct that no military .»,. ._, t, 0 ' base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the i we ,- A at - regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligatiot to sec that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hos tilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference alst takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia ant 1 Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in 2 military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos. with the principles oi t-_ , P:~ Q -as J , the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so tong as I re iv" J 1 l their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases or 21 ; a inks Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of forcigr poxxers. 6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of tht agreement relating to Vietnam is to settle military questionswith 2 view to cndin" hostilities and that the military _ demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as cons1itutin~__i a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its con- w $ 6! ~v@w-;#4,-_ ..__ t T-'1':J,. ; ..>,p.-.:.:_-_ Q c r7a_* I. - ' >t ..'.. 7 ".1I '3 -.» I -tr,1 s . ! 'r _ i --r';I-; -s" . at- . t t 96 APPENDI.K'ES ¬ t viction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present we-it J. . declaration and in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a po- litical settlement in Vietnam. . .7. The Conference declares that, so far as Vietnam is concerned. 1 i the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis ot respect F1 ow5'1 -3 l i for the principles of independence, unity, and territorial integrity, 3 »l-2;. =»- ' "F- f "' sh- "tit the Vietnamesepeopte to enjoy the fundamental free- ii':~== * .i .. vi doms, guaranteedby democratic institutions establishedas a result Y;- I 'tj._ . 1 1 -.¢'*- t; of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that su icient progressin the restoration of peace hasbeen made, and _ Q r I that all the necessaryconditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general electionsshall be held in July, 1956, under the i supervision of an international commission composedof representa- l tives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commis- --urn.-.-,1 - ['1'];--_.__-=-,,_,.... .-._, .7..soar. - .-=-- --t--.-r-'1-.--..~»=2.#@'?. .g sion, referred to in the agreementon the cessation ofhostilities. Con- ,.. l .-_, t, ,,_.'-. ~. :1.-' _»_92.92 E --92 ~ >3-f~_',1 sultations will be held on this subject between the competent repre- ' 1x t- .t,.; .4 . t "I;-_?ii__;_ sentative authorities of the two Zones from July Z0, L955, onward. mt .- Z-qr .-:.:'r 8. The provisions of the agreements on the cessation of hostilities =-' '-1*."»=_'-'.-if "'i.-.':i-v3..i1-';i-T: »%t. 1- . .. ..-U;'-_;-"'1, I:92',;i s:-aft ~ . . -~ .li';-.I'.,~P_ M.,..' ,.».!_ .1' .v intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must --,- .. ', t 1 "» -.= or , -'72.-ea;--is-==s.=>- , i'.*_'i192"-'5-T-ii .- _"~:"'-' "¢i!-:.23 ~_r r~-- i ;_~,£.=n'=J1_§;:.=-,. ,-.-. .':_";g"-.,._=a{- ,-__,- be most strictly applied and mtist, in particular. allow everyone in v Vietnam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live. 9. The competent representativeauthorities ofthe North and South as zones of Vietnam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, 'r must not permit any individual or collective reprisalsagainst persons l who have collaborated inany way with one of the parties duringthe vii 4 war, or against members of such persons families. I _ IO. The Conferencetakes noteof the declaration of the Govern- ~ ment of the FrenchRepublic to the c ect that it is -ready towithdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, at the request of the Governments concerned and within periods which shall be xed by agreement betweenthe parties exceptin the cases B where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of r French troops shall remain at speci ed points and for a speci ed an E time. 1=, ll. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French E - r Government to the etfeet that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in R .'=i"3 Cambodia, Laos,and Vietnam,the FrenchGovernment williprocccd cg from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos. andVietnam. II _ tliiinitl . ._ . ."_ -,i- I, _ ii '7 - - ' .92I|._.-J1--1-___1--_-_-_.._!.- _'*-2: -'1"-"-' _- __}_! _:¥_. . "-5- "- -, _ _ " ~=-. "T" - . --- . .. - , -- ' '- . V 1 " "?,~- " - - APPENDIX 1 _ 3_§'__ ' , . " FR .---5'-" . " I ""*? . .- tr. t 92. .» 12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sov- t ereignty, the independence, the unity, and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned States, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs. 13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may he referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such measures as may 0 prove necessary to ensure that the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are respected. [This section of the Geneva Agreements was not signed by any nation, but rather agreed to by voice v0te.] __ W -_.. -1 ... ' t - - s =- I .. w=--11. ..-. 4- _. .~..-_ I [ ct ; - W ~. $1 t - -"_92' .-.~_._.-,|." :t .92 ;r._= .92"- <_.'n:;..,-§ Appendix I-C t -<. s , D _ - t";'.-.-_..- . _-. _~ ,- qr 4 ,._" y ,. ». [Thit unilateral declaration by the United States Government -' ~ -..ts4:;.";t-1,1 -1-..~ .'- ----~ .--_j,_,_*-H -~ » - 21- ..J4L_;>_n1,e-_t1,-, is -_~»_~'- - - -4 :;. 1i;;.-,92e_i~;-i - ¢_92;;1f _ .m,m.'?_!_._:_:..b"Ll .1_{; __A- ..-$1,»;,,'--' - =.».mm»:-t ;£:é.»; _Q Fi=";§*.:t~m4 S,<.= ¢sets forth its position with regttrtl to the Geneva Accords, which it did not .rt'gn.} ' 4 Statement by the Under Secretary oi State at the .. _;._;. ' ' . H I j ConcludingPlenary Session of the Geneva Conference, q '92 __:.._- 3331 - _ ' 3| 1* :. July 21, 19542 r As I stated on July 18, my Government is not prepared to join in a declaration by the Conference such as is submitted. However, the United States makes this unilateral declaration of its position in these matters: Declaration The Government of the United States being resolved to devote its efforts to the stre_ngthening of peace in accordance with the princi- 92V¬litCl' HCLIQH Smtlh. Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 2, 1954, pp. 162-163. '-" " ' ------»-=---N:- lm-=2'tft _-J-:. 92 , " ' '2-"-ts", :":;~- *-"- - . *" ~l$:* ft-§F'¢'92'¢, ~ "_v *7} .;.l"":¥,;_ " -- 3* "";_..,._*__i§'- ---,. A H . .'1- l- an I -.f~#..~ ,-ea,-,..». ¢~.~e= '1--'51? ' L 1.- _ " -., I _,- " -"1-A " 'sh T __ '- a t - my ' __ _------ - ii-"= _ _P _ __ ._-_ ~3.'-i P,=.a..w'E?- ex. -* _, -- ; ".4: , _,_; jf. _ -z-1-NJ _- . -:3.. Q - ,1 1 I 98 APPENDIXES ? ples and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 195-1». between a! the Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of the Peoples Army , ¢ of 92'iet-Nam; b! the Royal Khmer Arrny Command and the Com- mand of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; cl FIEIHCO-Vietnamese Command and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam and . ~ . . --,- .-,--.»-.»-- -1~r¢-~- -vi-_-=-~--;-.~~ -» ,--- -. w._,.... , 92 fr.-__-7; ;._ ,9. ._-_';. . ;:,_.; ._ ., at _ _ of paragraphs 1 to 12 inclusive of the declaration presented to the ~ ._;_.~,,.,..1_,». =..._.1 P .,,_it ., _t; _,_._t.92 i J.<;_, I '__,, ',=- .-'r' Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954, declares with regard to the 92 r _ » aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that i! it will refrain from > .-_-r __.-, *_ _vr- 1 92 u the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance with . _- __ . _1 . k. - '- . - - r. -{.1-"_= .~ __1:-_;_; a§=}_;;'-,1-3.:-i .,**..-._._i=§~,,;-..=>Q » -i'.= _'._,1~: tr,a .1 tr "-.i '».~ i. =-'.=-P» - , -- - -i-- ~ F11!'_§.;i v[_r;_'___;;.'£i=i-r 1~ "92"-i" i.»ts -""' "-925-{Q1- ~'--4.;- e .:»:. _1 _,- .33. 11* , 1 _1 6' Article 1 ! of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the i T'=':l'¢T-- obligation of members to refrain in their international relations from lul .-i ' I the threat or use of force; and ii! it would view any renewal of 1 the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security. iizgqul - 1:- V. : .92.._;,, _3 » In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning w. . - __. I. l free elections in Viet-Nam my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has exp: ='- a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954. as follows: a _ - l In the case of nations now divided against their Will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly. With respect to the statement made by the representative of the it State of Viet~Nani_ the United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in tic ll J Jun _-H,||1|_|,92.|92- mm]: 1., ie see. infnnrlari92.92. in -.~..nr I-IL rinne 92-h92J§l~Jimlir-urn -~ H . U M - ~ u--J';92'r9292l rl|92nnrt|1rP--1------J fr iis traditional position. We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia. Laos, and 92'iet-Nam to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty. in the peaceful coinmunity of nations. and will enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future. -u_- " i . V 2 Ii :-_. -"!y"w. .._--<-7 _ ._-.i.. 92_ _ ._. tan. . V - 45:-ilk: ¢ -.nim_.. ._'-- unaw- Y M, 3 '~ "Q , . _ . - * . - "'_ -'' - .._ ' -.- 5 -- _--... r_ ." V ~' l J I . C : '..t."*~-"'l@'¢.41".". I HQ" 4 *. .:92-"-,-.~'¬<-- up _ , _ t, 1 .._ .-;;-., of 5'-- - I S - ll J» .n.~-- not : :'-1 17 = ti ' 'lh1 1 |- it i. ' 92 1 Ff Appendix ll "T-*3".- i."'"'- '1"-,""'"*< 5 -"?""» » 1 -t"=¢">'~ - =-- ,»¢.-i;-_-=--,=-1-,-»=-,-=-@»,...,, -,--.-._.,,.,.,. 1 Program of the Notional Liberation Front of South Vief-Noml ', » " ~ ?.».?:".-.7. ~* k { .713 92 5 /~ 1-1,t'* ~ '1 I-'.'~'<=.l'~- J .1 ' --ii: 5 1 J ' r - I 1- 1* - ':t - -. - t .,. *1--.- t .. - - .i.- . -. '~=.--~~,. . _ . 2. ~--; ,. ._t-~-.t_92_,,->_.,. .. V L .2. ;-yr-..,-1 -,--_-----H». .. .»~ H - t ,- -. --., ]c~ i_ - -.- ; =~-vi -. .. 3 i~.: §.;..31..-.92~92..92.. ~.,>"ewe, -~,-- ,---,;:._;»»_r921 ;,, .-»,_...--t _. [On December 20. 1960, the day of its founding, the National . -- -to--:~.4"~- ""»-92:'§Z._i.t- -it-'-':l'.i.Qi.4'1.'l;';.:| -L-'i'&i'|." -moot." .- , -,t.tm.;::>;ie.=,» cu ~»=,§_ ";..'tiiLiberation Front of South Viet-Nam issued :1 manifesto and published its ten-point program, the text of which follows:] "o I. Oi"-errhrow Ike canion nged colonial regime of the American im- 1- I . peri lfrti and the dictatorial power of Ngo Dirzlt Diem, servant of s 1 I_ -r-to _- I + L . the AmerICr:m.r, and iltsririite a goverrzmem of national democratic ~ = J t F .- union. | The present South Vietnameseregime is a camou aged colonial regime dominated by the Yankees. and the South Vietnamese govern- ment is :1 scrvile government, implementing faithfully all the policies of the American imperialists.Therefore, this regime must be over- r thrown and :1 government of national and democratic union put in its place composedof representativesof all social classes.of all nationali- u ties, of the various political parties, of all religions; patriotic, eminent citizens must take over for the people the control of economic. po- = litical, social. and cultural interests and thus bring about independence, ' t - Q, ? I- dcrnocrzacy, well-being,pence, neutrality, and efforts toward the peace- _l ful uni cation of the country. 1 English translation reprinted from The Two I i'<»t-Nmm. A Political mid r92ft'i'r'i'ur_92'by Bernard B. Fall, published Aricrr'_t".ir'.r by Frederick A. Prucgcr, lnC., New York, I964. 99 92 _- iv V . .- _ a..___l . V__1,. . -.__I .,_ ._ _!._. i 5 __. _ ,_ .1, - , .____ _: :_ . .=-.1. _ w _ .; 1. _. a . ..__~=". Aw 1-_-1'-.>:»._ . ___ . .4 J 92- --.--- 100 APPENDIXES --.-I _ II. Institute a largely liberrtl and democratic regime. ' A it - ' 'is 1. Abolish the present constitution of the dictatorial powers of in Ngo Dinh Diem, servant of the Americans. Elect a new National Y. Assembly through universal suffrage. » 2. Implement essential democratic liberties: freedom of Opinion, of press, of assembly, of movement, of trade-unionism; freedom of reli- Qi 3 gion without any discrimination; and the right of all patriotic organ- . izations of whatever political tendency to carry on normal activities. 1 3. Proclaim a general amnesty for all political prisoners andthe 1 t dissolution of concentration camps of all sorts; abolish fascist law 1O/59 and all the other antidemocratic laws; authorize the return to the country of all persons persecutedby the American-Diem regime who are now retugees abroad. - 4. Interdict all illegal arrests and detentions; prohibit torture; and punish all the Diem bullies who have not repented and who have _j._; .f_~.. W. .'?';i v_t;'t ¢ 92'" Gr . -.- . '."- ;''1" 92 , .- ~,».. committed crimes against the people. t t. -;, Ill. Establish an independent and sovereign economy, and improve ./., _ _ . .i:. . 92 . ' . t , . the living conditions of the people. 1. Suppress the monopolies imposed by the American imperialists I-:4~--.-. 7 *<"'>=.. . '.';;;__.| -r..;-.l ,;;»i"ell!.--.J.s2J2..;':.e!'.::,§@H '92 and their servants; establish an independent and sovereign economy . » =~~. '92 t __92 *-:r. ".7~ .- .:- _..;..... -.~¢,* ,.., -.iv -' I and nances in accordance with the national interests; con scate to -t. '-ill",-:.'' " the pro t of the nation the properties of the American imperialists and their servants. 2. Support the national bourgeoisie in the reconstruction and devel- opment of cra s and industry; provide active protection for national products through the suppression of production taxes and the limita- tion or prohibition of imports that the national economy is capable of producing; reduce customs fees on raw materials and machines. Si . 3. Revitalize agriculture; modernize production, shing, and cattle raising; help the farmers in putting to the plow unused land and in developing production; protect the crops and guarantee their disposal. 9 - 4. Encourage and reinforce economic relations between the city u and country, the plain and the mountain regions;develop commercial exchanges with foreign countries, regardless of their political regime, Ti » ...;¢, :i_; l on the basis of equality and mutual interests. 5. Institute a just and rational system ofttutation; eliminateharass- 1* " I .,._,_ . ing penalties. 6. Implement the laborcode: prohibitionof discharges,of penalties, .: - of ill"-treatmentof wage earners; improvementof the living conditions of workers and civil servants; impositionof wagescales andprotective measures for young apprentices. 7. Organize social welfare: nd work for jobless persons; assume 5 . " - ' =-' ' ~ _.- -- - " - ' - . z . , _ __.a»'_ s. . per _ -... .-. ..__,., _-t ._ -,_, _ Ts. Q _,...-__ _. _ ._j 1-_-.. - E_ . I itV . - '. , "92i __- -5'.. -- J, - -rim :-' S ' '' "~;:._ jni I 1:; 4" -V --. . _ _,._.1-..~§h.- .l _ Kai q,.- r - vi 3.1».-3,-'..~., , I "J" --._:y"-I ._,.2 r »_- 2 APPENDIX II ' ' 1 _'-L; __ - the support and protectionof orphans, old people, invalids; cometo the help of the victims of the Americansand Diemists;organize help for areashit by bad crops, res. or natural calamities. -4 u 8. Corrie to the help of displaced persons desiring to return to their v native areas and to those who wish to remain permanently in the South; improvetheir working and living conditions. . 9. Prohibit expulsions, spoliation,and compulsory concentration of the population; guarantee job security for the urban and rural working populations. 5.. IV. Reduce land rent, implement agrarian reform with the aim of K. providing land to the tillers . -__-n- 4?;- e? 1. Reduceland rent; guarantee tothe farmers the right to till the it .;-i i soil; guarantee the property right of accession to fallow lands to those who have cultivated them; guarantee property rights to those farmers who have already received land. Q . - ;.;T _;92;.<~-,+; .;; _ _ ,7__ .,..--.-...-,-»-.-.__ ._,_ ; _ _ _..,....-?___ ,.--_, I ____,___..,,,_,r_... 2. Dissolve prosperity zones," and put an end to recruitment for .:_._ . , .. ;-92*."92 i ' '1 1 - - -». -.. .--;'-iii.~.-.- 1"-' -. - ,-... ~,.=>-.ri92i,:~-ei;:";:~;.~--g ~'.'is . - iv r>'='-'-'.-'.-.i- . . ._; _a-_-~ --- - v . 0: ,_- .. . _ . . ._ 1;, M _ ..... - 4. J A____. / 92 P P e Tl Q IX +- ,_-ve -. .t~¢.__.. ._ ._._..,,.., -. 1 -»-___.;,, 14,- ., -:.',,,_ ._~,=..;. ; '¢T ..i"- 21. v,'-- 1'. ..;_i!_i ,_.¢ i ll; =- 1 - ._xX - . Xi - .1r-ivlqw,-. lt :|l' ---.5--r , *.. til . Saigon Daiiy News, Thursday, May 20, I965. J -i -. ' »- t__-I t, 92 ' a-I"i~l'~ - -,92. - . -'.- < ;-: . '43-» A "-RUIZ :' . r _ n 4 K * r l 92 . - t ,i . . :lIV-:'I W _ -t ,, J < , 1 -; _ ._ '.-,-_;,_ _ .n. _-l"I _ L _; ,;.r._,-.=92 Communists and Pro-Reds Outlowed Anew ...- M :..-i "5, ''i.-_i.. l ; _, !.» _,. _ la gr. .--¢,;;. I8- _;,.-- ___, _| t . - l -V; -- -, i- ,_ 9 .5 '¢,'E." : |'92":i-ii_51-*3 -,1 : 1; - ,a» 1- - _..._,,.92.;$ D»;-92,:92 _-:_1|w. :_"»- _;5..--_' '_;__i'~,;u §.._:_ ~':':;;l .l._92:i-.=_-- i ,- 7? -15' L~_._ "ri';>- -' 'f,'w;'g --"i';.;§1lLi1g§fi$:.'Z>3C-lithe:-5. t ;; '!:l"ibrl » I*I '_z e r-1. . 1- 1-, r- 92 . "" '-LHIBL or more roan nnac buu on Mon- day proclaimed Decree Law 004/65 amending Decree Law tJ I.l- In 1 J vs ..--' SL/CT of February l, 1964, which outlawed Communism and piti- 1'-" .._'r_.A:__ ¢.. t i?'%~P» -;¢ - Communist neutralism. The Decree Law, whose contents are as lul- J '1'.-'__1_-.- lows, had been favourably voted by the National Legislative Council. l I 1 5 " -1 It I -I J;,l I I I ll / ' . .§.. __ - _*,. . * ' ___;§1.- A rrfcle 1 The following actions are deemed as actions speci ed and punislrctl byDecree Law 093-Si. *CT of February l, I964: a! All direct or indirect actions aimed at spreading Con1m1m=~= policies, slogans and instructions by any individual or group of in- dividuals in uenced or controlled by the Communists. bl All moves which weaken the national anti-Communist cflnrl and are harmful to the anti-Communist struggle of the pcopfc and the Armed Forces All plots" and actions under the-false nrtmc of peace and neutrality according to a Communist policy and hlT'llli'lT plots and actions are considered as belonging to the category of such moves as mentioned above. c! The diffusion, circulation, -_ - = ;_-, -,- _ 92- . J , ~=_ i.-'9 _ __ . 1'. _ - ' ~=;. '4 . 1...-_-., __:_ V _ i. - r 92 __ ..,,__,__.,,_._..._92|-..;|_1%|§-;-. |__,__,.___ _ -- ------3 - '__" _. ;.e=ws@#t1,t-=9-14¢-*t»'-;:' _~,,, 1 '.~ *~- ' 1 -. -r -_ -/K. <.:,'v§_;._..,"r zf_=zJ_;;__ ft» ;-,,_,._' H _ . APPENDIX tn 105 I . l, t places, and the keeping of these above mentioned aims, either in printed form. drawings. photographic, or otherwise, with the same effects as stated in paragraphs a and b Article 1!. ' Article 2 - 1 All associations, agencies, and organizations violating Article 1 shall be disbanded and their properties con scated. The Prime Minister will decide on procedures to liquidate the prop- erties of these organizations by decrees. A rticle 3 = .4; ,1r _ Except in cases where the Du No. 47 of August 21, 1956, on l 3: s s es! t J.! external security can be applied, all violations against this Decree incur a penalty of imprisonment from one to ve years. Besides, the court can apply additional penalties mentioned in Art. 42 of the Modi- -'- -.-Q-» 1 .. .-. _ t . , -1, __,t,,_ ed Penal Code of Article 27 of the Pena] Code Viet Nanfs ancient '.'-"_ i' -"'.'iL_ ¢' 11. ,- ;-. 5* V 1 ~ q~,',_'- J '= Z,92;,"'92 *.'.'__-,-". r-'92 =_ . . -is , L A P , at _r t r .. . :":,::%. . codes!. l ..|. :_ ;_.__.. _;-_ r_:_ L; I -La K 4. ,- .- . Qt 1 _ " ' , -: _ v i ,1 -.-'-:~- | ,-'92-; '>.',i, - .- . - ' ' -Q --L : I""I='l*','I5'.1-92' - l-1'-- A rticle 4 4.. t . t -- . 2- -_»,»,-,. .--. -.--<, .'- _ :1 -t.~-F; -.{<.-K151, -. -- " "9292._: .»"3*.r- H H -3 --»1=-:1-.1 -at 1. i.--it , sum-° ;;- -="- =5iE=t'=t:*-:3"=§'1-=- i-"-g?-'-no-' ' :"'92 ._§L1'i>:"':-fiI{i i,z'1§¢:Ii':>é_=.1Ji-t-3:11-iiiThe Corps Area Field Military Court, during the emergency situa- tion, has the competence to judge all violations said in this Decree, which are caught fiagrante dcltcto within the territory of the Corps Area, according to procedures contained in Decree ll-62 of May 21, 1962, on the setting up of the Field Military Court. If not caught fiaqra-rite delicto. or if perpetrated in normal national situation, the perpetrations shall be tried by the ntilitar!; court. Article 5 This Decree Law is promulgated according to the emergency pro- cedttre. .f _. H ' '- .{.?1v-Z . 1'. -3"1' -av _ *1 ~ 92-'92 . ¢Y§r. ; ,1. - .- m,-.-'-an-'»».~*-'"-'1 r 1 we .__..~ '-." "'"'_-.~'"= t " Cl.;.._-~.'W-_,-., . 7 it .. .. ,- ,,I _ I _ _ _ 1-.=-.-r 7.1.4., ___-i__' _ !,'_.. ;1'_tZ%7_'_' 'v|_ 'i _¢ _, ii B eff'_ I _':Q5: .,t=--,-. - r.5-'9: '" 1~"i~$;>T-" . =*?"l" s . "=-at ? " i 1 1- . :- » Appendix IV we _ »;:~=-92--.---.-~- .J-. -w-.-.-9--e--1~:~'- 'r1->_ »-zv- -s--ea -..- - Y .-. ~ ii: *- . , -, :-r'_~ .~ 1.'-*:-'r-< , 3 ~ ~ , t J . Tm 1. > ~ it ,1. -- < 92v fIl"¬, 4,- -- > __ -.~'.=_. ]_,I .:_<_. >- -,_»1.-I Members of the Vietnam Working Party, AFSC . '.- -.-Y 92 -"NJ."-/'.-;.' .~_ 92 7» -; ,<__1,___;:-. . '4t ._-;;;-_:.-92 -. .'>;_- -.. .?.-'5v L_~ . -.-:1 ;'?_"irri-1.- - :-¢;%'--" ,;<,-. .;- ~._ih,?1; -' Bronson P. Clark Vice President, Giiford Instrument Laboratories, U 92 = it - t. .~:. .. -;.~..s;{r..~:r_r-,>¢;1:i.t;_:r it .. I A -92»' A . erice I956!; editor of Governments and Politics of S'oir:lrea.s't Aria l -"'7-'»""I-.-7 _;s:;;; ~;- -.:;- ¢ 51- _ . -- - r1, '5:_ 1 964! and lllajor Gov:-rnrnertts of Asia 963!; has contributed W . -r *_ . u i __.:.z_ articles to various periodicals. 1-1; 5-1' , _~_;:_;,, I_ 1,ln- _ _s__,,-l - _ ' 311.11. _ A 31' |._ _ Jonathan Mirrlcy Instructor, Oriental Studies Department Chinese!, IO University of Pennsylvania; lived and traveled in Southeast Asia 1958- i 61; spent summer of I965 in South Vietnam under auspices of Inter-University Committee for Debate of Foreign Policy; on the national board of snrne; taught Chine Cambridge University, K arr '5; England; articles; chapters on China. A. J. Mime Executive Secretary of Fellowship of Reconciliation; 1940-63; Secretary Emeritus, 1963 to present; author of Nonviolence - .3 in an Aggremive World I947!, Not by Migiir I947!, and numerous articles; editor of Liberation; Associate Editor of the Presbyterian Tribune. r - - ». 4. ¢_ _. e 1'2-vI*"'§7".'92" f', -"-P _':! or-1..-¢ - -r-4 7 "*'.i"» »"1-92 _-.--v.-.-=5,-,,,,,-re,._._,;.;;.~.;_'.-t -it-J-2-*7 2:5-'l:92; r i.-=2 -'+f» 5'5-=.;?='§1-1-~"3 92.;,-,--=1_.>-~.:--.-<,~--,457'. ~_1; :- 1 ;-. J ".'.-.-,i.~;f;'i .? .§,_s ,-5"! -'.- A-M---. i -<0 -.'r.~.'~. 1 W. Allyn Rickert Associate Professor of Chinese Studies, University of Pennsylvania; Research student and part-time lecturer at Tsinghua , _ i National University, China, 1948-SO; special research student, Yen- ..;e;e-;5;-;-;-s;.s4i;:r- 2:,-_ ;..,,.'-,1 :15 " § i": !iIi7 £1;-*,.,Y<,;= -¥F§'¢- ;;Y-3*35#=.'§Ching University, China, 1950-51; author of Prisoners 0! Liberation 957!, The Kitan-Tm. A Repository of Early Chinese Tlinzigizr [965!, and Legal Tliought and Institutions of the Peoples Republic of China in preparation}. Clarence H. Yarrow Secretary, International Affairs Division, AFSC; taught political science at University of Mississippi and Alle- a gheny College; administered and taught in experimental college pro- gram for Telluride Association; Review Officer, War Labor Board, Detroit; Regional Secretary. North Central Region, AFSC; directed Around-the-World Seminar 1962. I -O . j - - .I =j @= ~ .13: n92 . , -A! ! I'LL. ~ .1 - 1%,»:-nae :n-- a~..: . .-4- J93 T5 _' :11- Q1. .-'7 -~ 7 i-~' g'=f:. .-;',;%- --. i . q bag . . #-ac...-¬-1-» . .4 .~ -1; - -- . --* - -- _ _ :.=: - . ,. Ii ';5§-.-.-'_ '_ . .L " "' "- i .- 92,.;*-~. . - »~w=--H-'-=>1'» , _ ,__».. i . . -_,. , V. ."-_ " . 1- . . 5 » " . -.~i'="' -1 .- -' _~ gm*, ti 92 0501'" . . ii > s Q 6 92'._ . it u _,_ » i ',- E .-1~2--- . I A {.1 , t Ly V J J W if . -. . '1'. ,. .,.,,~.:, d -N.-,.~... ;.-,,-~_-t-_._~_»;;'-§;-.9,-,-.~~..-,i92-3-i-r:~!¢=.vn;»-*1-erfv-:-~f=r-41:1-w:e~:.-,»,-. . ._ _ Seiecieci Bibliography -_:._i. "M '-..; -" in_. .. -. _ ,.» . _ t_-__,.-.--.,_92 .P- A--. _92-'_._= , =-.»-~_,--92... -.~ . '41..T .. ... ~ . :.- .r . _ _- F --..'., ,- ' - ' ". .. _*.~-;'- - ,v , ---r. 9; ;-_.-,; A -'. , _,_-_,. M-.~ -. ,- -. .._ -.».__ .:Ii ~ --.'i ;'*'u 92-__ _»= ri .t» ,-. r. r .- ',- -'r = "-. -," -. '1-'1 r- .-92. 4'.-»'1.I- ."'- - ..:' = .i'- ~ -- - ' .- . -. . -.-.92.. . - . . -i 3' -92= L"-:-.».~ -"Q'7=_92'.f~..'=1 ?. "1. -- __--'=92',';..>--. ''_ BARNETT, ;- A. Doak. Communist China and Asia: A Challenge to Ameri- '1 ,/-~» -~.-,1-,_ ;92 --- , . _:_ .92--92_-'-ti? -..-i-,_:', .4. -' >.- ,:92-l..- ~;v- -,__;~¢>,_1- -11 -<'=.'.-X ;92'.-.4-, ¢1._f_- _ _ -TI! i---92=- 5 -,."i." ;' _i-i;'92 ;',|,1.i»_,-"fr. ¢ .. .3 r_.- Eton.-" .-i't..e 1.-L';~'¢s=t..."* i < i*i:;=.i_v-'- ~-in :---'=-w»$--"-"-*-i =¬ ~i -.m can Policy. New York, Vintage V-185 paper!, 1960. 560 pp. Thor- ough introduction by a leading China expert. -.1 -, Communist China: Continuing Revolution. Headline Series 3-,92 '.- . i .-.. - --1'. "ii i '- . No. 153. Foreign PolicyAssociation, May-June1962. 60 pp. A Surn- :-.92,_ -*- -.-.:-.1- ' -.11; Y.:1;- -= mary of Mao s domesticand foreignpolicies. -,..- z '=;'-; i iv-,"=. __ 8% ! .:»!. __- i -92_._ _- _ l - -1 Communist China in Perspective. New York, Praeget , 1962. BROWNE, Malcom W., The Face of War. Indianapolis, Boobs- Merrill, 1965. An on-the-ground report of the struggle in the South, by a Pulitzer-Prize-winning A.P. Correspondent. BURCHETI , Wilfred G., Vier-Nam.- Inside Story of the Gm-rriiitl War. New York, International Pubiishers, 1965. Written from a pro- Communist point of view, this account of warfare in South Vietnam h incorporates an interesting account of the Liberation Front. CLUBB, O. Edmund, 20!]: Century C/tina. New York, Columbia Uni- s versity Press,1964. 470pp. Chin:t srecent history,with ¬£!92pi1L1 .92lSon the impact of Communism, by a former foreign serviceoilficcr who F was in North China in 1949. Ctunn, Oliver E., Jr., The Utiited States and the Sim-Sm-iet Bloc in Soutiwast Asia.Washington, D.C.,The BrookingsInstitution, 1952. 19-. A very useful account and analysis exploring aspect : of American policy and its international context that less courageous and more :- Confotmist writers have avoided in their treatments. '-'. 108 > P ._ ,_._ _ W _._ __. W, .. ' It __ ,7; M 7' 1; __ _- _-_ --- _" _5 i . _ .T_:'M:_-: ,, .V_-.5-V 1 ~- - 92 -9 fr ' . :'_ .- *' 3' _;":'1~¢ls'._. .~--:.-.---;=~ ....t,,. .. W»--.~---;. .92;'l_-' M. ~: 7iAY _, '-__'-.i_. .; - ...1 _ _ -7 _ -,7-, ..-~-'.__ . . - . HM $1-<',.-__'-" - A . 2'1,, . 1 1- |: t i set-acrten BIBLIOGRAPHY ' -109 l COLE, Allan B. ed.!, Con ict in Indo-China and International Reper- Q cussions: A Doctcmentary History, 1945-1955. Ithtltia, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1956. A useful collection of documents pertaining to ,1 _ l - i both internal and international events. ,_ ._ J _9292, - FAIRBANK, John l{., The United States and China. New York, Viking I _ ' -J» J Press C-108 paper!, 1958 ed. 348 pp. Essential background for the t present situation. A standard work by a leading Harvard specialist. t An excellent introduction to modern China. K -. .;-i-----i .-_-5»-.e92-3-11¢--r-r1=~'-3 | ,.-_iL: .._|, .- , ¢ ;; . r .~,;~.92.<. - -, :;':_I§:...-t-._..-.~92..i:- -.,_-.'..,1 FALL, Bernard B., Street wit/tout Joy: From the Indochina War F0 the 92 -i". . - '.-' .-92. ~,'.i>.'~ 92','l"" .~ ,._92 =-»,».- .-'."" .-1 rt-. ,~__. _ ,.,. i . -...... ; War in Viet-Nam. Harrisburg. Pa., Stackpole, 4th rcv. ed., 1964-. Pri- *> -s-. .. I t 11- '.1, -,~..-»=: ,- m 11, ¢-' > a= '-J1 marily a iniiitary history of the Indochina war, 1946-54, with - .- - 4 - Q-,4 :'; #=_-.;.s.-.;.:;__. =-_J..;,_-: parallels in the new war. 7- . ,. . .- '.."92'.'. . .. .-' -_- =. . J - . . . - "-" ~. "92'. . ... -. i 4 '_ 92F *..!___..92.,..p-.,_,z,_,,,~8 J,= _-_-an.-,, -_-.92. _,-_;_ ,. t , f, - -_~__;-.~'. , ~ r 0 ~» . i- , The Two Vie!-Nnrns: A Political and Military Hi.rt0r'y. New , ...:,,_---u,.. l ''. .-.- - ' l York, Praeger. Sth rev. ed., 1965. A description and analysis of . L developments in Vietnam carrying the story through early 1964. It '* »"" . "':.5P""F-!F"'vS"f! .....~.r...... in nrnnrafnc or-rrnnnfe ...... ,...... _.n'F I. b...... -...... - O'l'9292.?Fil"l"II'1 ll'll'92l'-.-tau and nnlitir-al Id!-I------.- r..,c...... _, nrnlwlnnaein ... lwnrl-i..,._..... -4- .1.- ..- J 1 ;:= -:';'South and North and has an excellent biography of I-I0 Chi Minh ,> __ *4t 2- - _ 3' and others. This is one of the most useful and comprehensive '. l.--i- ft coverages. 'P:92l;."I. :*.i-l.: , . r- --at»:-. - ' 1;» ..:- ,, FITZGERALD, C. P., The Chinese View of Their Place in the World. 92..--/' T New York, Oxford University Press, 1964. 72 pp. Traces the connec- tion between Ch.ina s past and present pretensions to world leadership. 1 GE'I'1 I.EMAN, Marvin E. ed.!, Vietnam: History, Documents and Opinions on a Major World Crisis. New York, Fawcett World Library, 1965. An extremely useful compilation of sections of books, articles, and important documents that provide a good coverage of the back- ground and conduct of the French war, the Geneva Agreements, the _ Diem administration, and the increasing American involvement. This is a helpful next step for those who wish to look further into questions - ..-. -1.-t raised in this book and the background which conditioned the Amer- . ' ' ._, . " 1"§ . ican involvement. Paperback! . r.. - § ,,_ .. .u.._. . _,,. . '. ;-if _ ' I-I.92LneP.s'r.-.M, David, The Making of a Quagmire. New York, Random ht- House. 1965. An excellent account, much of it rst-hand, of political and military events in South Vietnam from 1961' through I964, with probably the best analysis available of the 1963 crisis and the fall of Diem. The writer is a correspondent for the New York Times who won a Pulitzer Prize for this book. ._. . .-.._4___.-Q~.u__.-.-@_._-u.-~ »'wAsA.92...». . -- -_..- ».-. I'M-new ., e'- .'_ T17 _ 1 ._ I A ._ - _ _ . _ Ji smip-tar . _ - ale; ._ t_- ,|-e,,e».,.¢_s;. _. * . _- .._;.t-.. ,,..,.-q.i- r. - 1- _ F__ -- -43 £_.i_£ l 110 ssrscrso BIBLIOGRAPHY ; gq-;,4=s-1, - aw _ HAMMER, Ellen 1., The Struggle for Indochina. Stanford, Stanford -*2 5, L University Press, 1954. Probably the most comprehensive study of the French struggle to regain control over Vietnam; a basic work which contributes a great deal to the understanding of current problems. Hotter, P. I. ed.!, North Vietnam Today. New York, Praeger, 1962.The nine articles in this book rst appeared in the China Quar- terly, Vols. IX and X 962!. The most useful sections are those by Philippe Devillers -on the problem of reuni cation; Bernard Fall- on power and pressure groups: George Ginsburgs on local govern- ment and administration; and William Kaye -a survey of the economy and major economic problems. KAHIN, George McT. ed.!, Governments and Politics of Snutlienst Asia. Ithaca, N.Y.. Cornell University Press, 2nd ed., 1964. The I50- page section on Vietnam by Roy Jumper and Marjorie Weiner Nor- T £3 mand provides brief but comprehensive coverage of the nroclcrn polit- ical development of both North and South Vietnam with sections on historical background, contemporary setting, political processes, and -.- .t-._r-- as-§*;~v-*"~> "0 I '? '5' I '*' h F major problems. There are also sections on Cambodia and Laos by I92lw -it.. M . r l.. 1 Roger Smith that incorporate material relevant to some of the prob- ;~1fr1- lems discussed in this book. *',~'9292-"-'1 - =-,..:- : W stB -; -I .,r=. . ' KUO PING-CHIA, C/rind New Age and New Outlook. Penguin Books _.#___- "i.7__sn--"~ >. §£ nears S-179!, 1960. A stimulating and challenging analysis of the Chinese revolution and of the rst decade of the Communist regime by a well-known Chinese historian, now at Southern Illinois University. LANCASTER, Donald, The Emancipation of French Indochina. London, Oxford University Press, 1961. A political history of the achievement of independence, largely devoted to Vietnam. A comprehensive and useful political history, One of the best in English, by a. former merri- ,5 ber of the British diplomatic establishment. - #2 - L. _ LI, CI-{OH MING ed.!, Indiirrrial Development in Commmrirr China. A special issue No. I7, 1964! of the periodical Chitin Quarterly {T l92L¢UH'92.L92J92l!,.92¢1¢l.-..-9292 J-ti.-J-s Wlllbll Ln llt-I-Iiml»,-. GUJUL92.1--92-92 UCCUv-r.-92-I-.i- J ICPIILILCU I.-. I11L,92.92.'|' UUUIL 1UlU.1nI-',._.-. MECKLIN, John, Misnon in Torment. New York, Doubleday, 1965. A revealing inside rcport by a former high oflicial of the United States 4. Iniornmtion Agency in Saigon concerning errors in American policy and its conduct. lvlunrt, B. s. N., Viernain Divided. New York, Asia Publishing House, 1964. The fullest account, other than the actual records, oi the nd- it ._.. ' - -,3 H. __' we tn _- _ '1-r_, '. ' ' -- ' - --' .. -1 t, 2.--4.. 3-I-_ _. 1-y_~-__.§t _ _ . ._.._...__- - -- _-- -, ...- , 4, . ., . -1'; _ I L . . f- A 2-,» .2. l ' , 0 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY '11 1 ings of the international Control Commission, especially useful for -'4 the period 1954-57, during which the author served as Deputy Secretary-General and Public Relations Of cer of the I.C.C. Osnotme, MiltonE.. Strategic Hamlets in South Viet-Nam:A Survey and a Cotnparison. Data PaperNo. 55, Southeast AsiaProgram, Cor- nell University, 1965. The fullest published account: it provides a -r searching assessmentof this unsuccessful program and points to the 1 very diflcrentcircumstances attendingthe earlier resettlement program in Malaya. -. 2 .92.. I»- 4»wt ~.> TY- " t. RASKIN, Marcus G.. and FALL, Bernard B. eds.!, The Vie:-Nam T ; .; my r ,92.1 Render. New York. Vintage Books. 1965. An extremely useful and . g comprehensive compendium of various artistes and documents relating to the background and development of the American involvement in Vietnam: it should be one of the rst things referred to by anyone wish- -as '-. 'F7 ? """-"""- ".-""=5 ing to develop a fuller understanding of the problems discussedin this . _-= . -. -,-.-- :_-. . >'..-~-.--»-.;_.--i,--+1 .-; t--;»,-.-4 -. 1 .92-.. . .'l,-;'-st-..x .. jug . _- . - -..- -t P.-~_» .4. . ,.r.,-.-. . , book. Available in paperback.! < 92 I ~ <.r - ,7-. _»-,...._.u -, pl , i. . it ROBEQUAIN, Charles,The Economic Devcloprnent Of French Indo- _t- .-t := ."-J1".-T "'-' -"f-»r:-'~ .'£a_-.-:_ -. /2' 1.1?-,1.Gt... '-t.7~~.'.i6 - 92,t; _. .-1'.L ; /.;_,-xi -'-1.-"em-,»..92=.~t_, -__,.. r»- ~.t-v-'5 _;,_. '§»..i -- ..,..:tt....._a_, L ',t*_ttr . Cltitm. London, Oxford University Press, 1944. The major survey of -t 'at . . :'.'l".;192.'.|-5-51ItklJ £ ;{L¬}_L.L5{",,;.;1"il',$"g:;21§$]:;i"j3£ y"I'ft»: =..'.*g;; .»i"ri'§"<1;-:65 t as the French colonial economy. First published in French in 1939; it includes a supplement, Recent Developments in Indo-China, 1939- t 1943" by John Andrus and Katrine R. C. Greene. SCIGLIANO, Robert, South Vietnam: Nation under Stress. Boston, " t' , t j 1-°:.;:""': "' P--'~ " ~' ~ it IS I-Ioughton Mitliin Co., 1963._ Probably the most comprehensive and objective accountof the South Vietnameseregime, coveringthe period ti until just before thefall of Diem. Available in paperback! I ;7l 3] - SNOW, Edgar. The Other Side of the River: Red China Today. New York, Random House, 1961. S10 pp. A long. sympathetic account AL of the Communist regimeby almost the only U.S. journalist with recent access to Mao and Chou. Snow interviewed top Communist 5. leaders otter the Long March and more recently in Peking. ii TA!92 H.'92l92{.K.. Communist George Rcvolrtriortary Warfare:The Vict- rriirtlt in lrttlor/riita. New York. Prnceet, 1961. A good analysis of tl"-e organization. operations,and tacticsof the Viet Minh in their sue - /5 ccssful struggle anoinst the French. Zt.Gotu.92,Donald S., The Sitzo-Soviet Con ict, 1956-1961. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962.. Detailed study of how the 51110- -e Soviet ritt came about. - rt 92, _ ' . - .. ._ .. _ _ ,1 A '*»- _ IQ - - 55. _= -r 112 seracreo niiauooR.ti>m' BOOKS IN FRENCH . There are a few extremely important books in French which should be consultedby thosewho havecompetence in that language. C H.u- FARD, Georges,Indochine dix an: ti indépendence. Paris. Colman Levy, 1964. An informative account by a correspondent of Le . t.fori.». <- who hadundertaken considerabletravel i.nVietnam between1949 and I963. DEvIL1.El1S, Philippe,Histoiredu Vie!-Nam de 1940 ii 1953. Paris. Editions du Seuil, 1952. A comprehensive and scholarly study which is especially enlightening for the 1945-49 period. Prohiihly the soundest andrnost comprehensive study ofthis periodin anyliinguiigez by a well-established French scholar who had direct experience in "n . - Vietnam. _ _ §__ 1'» - LACOUTURE, Jean,and DEVILLERS,Philippe, La n June giierre: Indo- cliine 1954. Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1960. A detailed account of events in Vietnam during the period 1945-54, which ciiliitinai-.-.l .n¢--l.= _» A4!-P-1.-.».< in the defeat of France at Dienbienphu andthe partition of Vi.-in-.im at the Geneva Conference-. LACOUTURE, Jean,Le Vie!-Nam emre detix Paix. Paris, Editions tlu Seuil, 1965. An excellent and well-informed account of the decade since Geneva by a rst-rate French journalist to be published in English by RandomHouse, 1966!. H-...__ir Li Mus, Paul, Vier-Nam: Sociologiedune guerre. Paris, ECliIl0riSdu Scuil, 1952. An informative treatment of sociological and CUlIlIf.ll aspects of the French-Vietnamese con ict. l. Ea/ Q? ~._',!' ' V q nI, . 0 _ 4|. . i.-. _~§,- y" .-., > we-~»I . ' 1 :i ,1 WI |i|i _._ Ix n .' Q. 92 1 0 ' 1" . i l v ' a ,1 Peace in Vietnam K - I . " Q ' 92- ANEW APPIIIJAGH Ill SIIIIIIIEASI ASIA at ; _ I . ' ;92_§!. | ' 11- --. - ~ . _: - . . IF 1 92-' t , 1| ,, . . A- *3-Brae-;. ;.; , "You Americans don't understand. You are making b >- _ 9292 J--. of our children, prostitutes of our women, and Communists men!" These words were uttered by a young Vietnamese teacher. :- ;. _ 1 e 92 _ They were directed at "an American G l in Hue, South Vietnam, who lnifi-i. 1 '- ' ia. - '*- .. had been passing out candy to a group of youngsters. The accusa- .! f ,_ V I r. ' t tions made by the teacher may or may not be exaggerated. but they . '. I I do indicate the strong emotions that are aroused in many South ya. 1...... -Q--..-i Vietnamese people by the presence of American soldiers in their country. _ | ' I .'_ .4 - 7-1 I The American Friends Service Committee, a Quaker organi- - -4 ? zation, has been making every effort that it can to end the fighting in Vietnam. A5 a part of this effort. a working party was appointed '1 " : I to search for alternatives to military force. The resulting report 8- -.v 3' provides by no means the only answer, but it does point out paths -i . ._ I , . of action we can follow to halt the war's expansion and to bring _ . _,, .~ the destruction of property and human life to an end. '»;- .;.'. 'A"J f -~' " _".- Responsibility for this tragedy rests on many shoulders, but as Americans we must face the reality of the 5uffe_rjt1_g and death ties.-it-i ".D!_'!,",j""-;r92,l,".>_to which millions of human beings who happen to be Vietnamese are being subjected," say the authors people well equipped to understand and evaluate the situation in Southeast Asia. "It is sim- __ . ply not possible to build a house and burn it'at the -same time." The paper declares that destruction must stop and that Amer- it ican policy must turn to a search for constructive approaches. Americans must be wary of the subtie and dangerous assumption -£. _....__-. that the United States can determine the course of the whole world. 1-. The experience of Vietnam shows the need for a new understand- 4-. . .. i. ,§.. '.' - ' ing of the social forces compelling change in many nations. ' Available in cIoth $3.00 HILL mo WANG, 141 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 _..qb-. Cover photograph by Pa_uI Schutzen LIFE Magazine © Time-II'l¬. .~ ,=' i Cover design by Libra Studios. Inc. - t-¢.r924~|-5. . l _ ,_ s_ K _ _ ._.'._' _- I. - ' " -:_ 1}? fl ? 7 .. .-" _ .- _ ,_ '*. ,*_ _.A:¢* ; . _--Sp--' *""r+ -' *¢- 192': %.9' l92 §92.'v . 1- """ -=-.;Q'" l*w:1!"|-a" 4-= =, .- -- sate: "' _.-, !?1"Ep"5 f if -- ','-3;, . _-,* *Qp . _. -M, 7.," .',4 , -,3. ,:' ,_._ 3; , - .. -"_ § - -Ah " -92,'.- -J1» £'$2$V¬ Vq, .3,w.-,:; _._,>_ I 1;'.§'_w-i,_U$i'§.. : _l __,'*§ ;F__i: _ _ _ '11, £| !J_.i'!*.'-== ,, . J-ea .; wjfar . _ Tl . 5.. ..- tr it I _ ,. ' ' ___ _*r _ i. _ _;*-. =..+v-r -pr----"1 I- D-51° l 092ra- I-15-63! - -' - -u .1 I *! , D __. Mou|-ilfclippingSpy in Eelpw! V i P 'MT 7s!'y, 1;;-1»F2-Emits it P -set -cine t__~.n __.____k_ ffc1r- ' in - .<_ 92 ___e __ AESQ Boon 1 rr F Indicate paqa. newt oi newspaper, city and IN!"-I 92 Jonathan Mireky, instrifcwr "1 "19 8941- in the Oriental Studies Depart- These American "zfalse pre ment, and W. Allyn Rickett, As- mises enumerated by the book 92 sociate Professor oi Chinese let are: that -this dirty littl ._,.,i Studies, have assisted in the war" can be won; that this is preparation of a recently-pub- 1 Chinese -instigated war of ag- lished American Friends Service gression; that if Vietnam be- Committee report on Vietnam. The booklet, "Peace in Wet- :~..:m: A New Approach in South- 92 esst Asia", expresses the be- Iaagf the United Stet-es cs.nr92.et ; expect to achieve peace in Viet- nam while it continues to escalate the war by words and deeds. i North Vietnam, the report con- ,-1 Iinues, will not be1ieveAmeric peace offers as longasthe Unit States increases its milit s 6 "The Daily wstrengthSouth in Vietnamwhile 92 Pennsylvanian" efusing to negotiate with the Phi1ad.elphia,I ational Liberation Front. U-S-.P!'Q!'! !i5¬§"False" Ate The present bargaining posi- Dqtc13/22/66 tions of the United States and North Vietnam are quite close Edition:Vol. 1' to each other. the bookiet notes, but false premises and mis- Author: taken assumptions" held bv the 92Ed1wr=Steven Sershi cU::ii:ec'r"States prevent %T1921Ii C'hc|l'¬l92': lIi': or Clcllli cction: 1 SubmittingO lco: G Bolnq Invol ligated 5_,_.- J M _ _ _..- -n- _ __r-___. _--.-.-»1/~1e ¢-1 __ _. .. - 4- ..4 92 92 I ' NI . U J 4 ___ .,.. 5 - ;.._...... -._-..._.--- - __ __ ,,,.. ._..¢-....._.. _..~,---4-- comgg _a- communist stuel the ti'_n"-.~.i.:.'?v _- - ---_, -..- and --g--' vnnn-Ftrm ..... an -.-... VIM-.--. rest of Southeast Asia will tol- low lil-:e a row of dominoes"; of and that if the U.S. reneges nam situation. Other members éé thll I14 nrr II92l_ .-.__ _92-4-s_ on its commitment, American of the group are: Bronson Clark. ..------31.45 'v"vn.:: uuuyggtcly prestige will be hurt elsewhere. vice president of Gilford In- partthou: financial profit. Tb:.wQrk_ The booklet concludes in- strument Laboratories, Inc., n-"r_Y was not paid to d..- the stead; that victory is impossible Oberlin, Ohio; Woodru Emlen. 1 ting I nor will they collect in the face of Viet Cong zeal : investment counselor; Dorotlr IOyalties from the writing. that this a basically a civil war; Qe'. -ti ,-_'?' Hutchinson, International Chair i i =1-¢.____;_, é that the rise of nationalism in man of the Woma1 slnternat. lon Southeast Asia makes the League for Peach and Freedom "domino theory" inapplicable; George McT. Kahin, Professor and that our original commit- of Southeast Asian Studies, Cor- ment to Diem's government was nell University; A.J. Muste, ex- - in no sense a pledge of military ecutive secretary emeritus o the Fell-owshlp of Reconciliation; support. and Clarence Yarrow, In- ternational A airs Division sec- { Once negotiations are under- trlken, the report states, politicalretary ofthe American Friends settlement must be faced. The Service Committee. ' booklet lists ten steps in such Non-Pro t writing a settlement, including a super- vised cease- fire, a Geneva- Mirsky described the speed type conference,the phased with- and coordination with which the draual of American troops, the pamphlet was put together. The 92 protection and resettling of re- committee started writing in. 3 tueees, D and the provision oi mid-November and completed it massive economic assistance. in January "with no haggling . Mirslty and Rickett were "This is a great example, he members of an eight-man work- said, of how the Quakers make ing Party appointed by the Ameri- people suppress their egos." Q9-i'*_-ads Service Conim_i *"_If9'7"**I§Mir-sky also noted -that-al;.. I O r ______.._..__i_-;- a-* __,...._ 7 * _ _ -cl _.. v J F J § F 5 54-: ' r ' _'-..»~»-----..-A '....-'~..,~ '' j ___ __ ____ 4,....- -. W :-an - -- -- : _ _ .{ -1- . - ,_m - .,,_, ____ .» . .;.::+, »=¢_r.»=~.- m':.§-, v _ ,92 Q;IA. .0.. .._; _92.-. ._._ .. J? : xxw» -_'-_~_ _;%;f;j--.5 B .~ 1 "' - 1' 1 '.1:sf - *3 > $1- 2'? / " Z ,_.> ' '.¢~/-_.: »- - -1% - '<: * ~92-.'., »' f . I '"-!92I."92 - < - _.,,~!/:15 2- -;;:_' '2 92=, . 1 _ ._ __t . . _,§.. V ~ -" *%~ ' ', . -. ___:'92_ .r I. :1 ; L ALLYN RICKETT _ Cb-cu zfof Cf Pong; PMWH" =-l = . -92c -/:- ii l 91>-eett n-'92 -"t"-7 0 r.-k /' -" I 9. 0 92 _ 0 ' D . . __,______92=C.c _ P ____ i sf r~ .., I _..... 92 .. ite-:1.-tic-ti F _ 3.»; L.._2.a.92 92 -' ' a.- 92 rnt_92u l . , - . .. . . , . . P. -""= J" - l l O5 lsiarcr. 20. ll*~:.i. tn} p:a:...;;.;'.;. an; ::.ree n:. ;er F1-|er.t.= " t 0:-L. 2 --a i. - . :'.-on. l'..i..it;:l§.i.i¢ to 92'-'a.si.ingto:a to art"! a concert. aboa: tire Civil War directly to Pr'.:side:'.t Lincoln. On Feb'u:i"§ li. I9 -5. 2:} l'.t:.~E;_r..'f ar.:" l tool. a trair. {ram V Xe» 92o:L to 92'- ati.;n;:oi. to joir. fliv friend; fro: thins"-sex-en Slates. Canada. and the District of Columbia in a "Frienti.<' Conference and Vigil on the War 1:. 92'ietua::.," convened by i':_v:;f:1§ ;:';e, ri::.I cf the Friet.: ..~ Coirtiirzating C0:':.Ir.iuee 0:". Peace. ' ll The -oonierenee K35 a decpit rr.ez.n:ri_::'-..-Y one to all u";io t Q¥Ip5:lZ| EH} CI-1 I33"-J participated, Unfortunately we arrived too late to hear what ii we were told was an eacdlerzt talk on "Prien¢'u Facing time 1 Challenge of War Toc'a}" by Samuel Levering chairman of the Board of Christian Social Service of Friends United Met-tr F ins. but we did reach there in time to hear Stephen G. of the American Friend; Sen-ice Committee speak on 'l92'e92~E 1 Policy Approaches in Southeast Asia." I-le said that as our pruenl policies had not worked out, the gostrnmenl had simply escalated them! The people of Vietnam, he added. feel that a new dag" in Coming, and even though, in their poverty" and they do not know what this new day will be, they ~srant to be a PI-TI of it. Our premise that we mus: make astand or the rest of the world will tall is a false one, as is our theory l that we an go out to Iain the people with {ood while It the tame time destroying them with force. tr llrs. Kjyoko Clio, eatchange professor at Princeton brn International University in Tokyo, speaking on "How Asians Regard U. S. Policy," said that 75 per eem lavor a cease- re and that she is dtsmrbed about so much news of esalation and so little untierstaoelirig oi wda! problems. She spoke oi the great social dtlngcs, such a votes for women, that came about ,92 in japan after 92'92'orld V92 ar II thoughthey had started before!. i and of the great push toward learning in China, where 11 one who can read is trying to teach others. Il America mull i ' 1146,11-L7 ".F r:.enc.t: _ _ Jon: onlv ewe, - understand. "V------1 ah! --- mid -- - i IT -- 6: -» y----j a-a-tit.-a---bus mien. in s.. 92-I-I-I-Ii-III-I61 .-r:|:...... _ Holland Hunter. economist and author from I-Iaveflorcl ii ?hi1et3.e1pl'zie._ College. considered the question: How Shall the United States Deal with Communism?" In the next few years, he said, Date: _ T Edilton: V019 NI 11-- millions ol people-poor, hungry, turbulent. envious, poorly i edu.-zted, ale-sw iate----rill rise in a surf-e oi action. economic Author: Eileen B.'ls'ar: .pre1suI"t. and political desires. Our role should be one 0! a ,=' *"= Fr-emcee Willi reconciliation, but we are under a severe disadvantage, for our_ Y ' " Brown -e ect inheritance social revolutions it a colonial for past others. and but our we background must iearn is all richare - i a 92. comparatively!.educated, white, and healthy. Outsiders cannot ~ Glee.-ester: an about them and help to solve their great problems in OI in .. nonviolent, humane ways. _ . ' Claaailic i-llIlI= Eileen Brinton Waring, whose drawings illustrating Four Friends Hitbmil n Omen: Drop in on Lincoln excerptsfrom her grandfather's alts - peared in the Farezxue jouaniu. of May 15. I965. is a New York Being loves lllqatnd. §_ rore*e'nend. formerlyPhiladelphia! _ __ Friend and artist. Her report on the mn- £ ferenoe and vigil in Washington is augmented by several paragraphs taken from mother report written by sally I-Iona-n. -o t --qa _.i.-..;-1--- @4 ,/' . '92 1! l 4 . - 92 ' -3 -r 0 m . I 3 U --J.-aztesan ltitrsl-92',Orienuif Studies ins:ructo: at t.h:._.l_"n_-;., versizy of Pent1$}l92'at:ia. speaitingon "A Pres}. Apj:-roachto a 1'92'e,:~o:i;.::-3 S-cttlernen:in 92'ietnarr,." s;.E;I :1-,5; we cannot bgiid while we ifr. destroying and than tilt Yietnatnt-_sePBDPIC with whotr. he talked last summer felt that our war is with China but that we are usin; their coun:r3'dcmoxtstratior. lo: pur- PQ5L a- Ht said that as we cor.Li:.t."t to a:;.=c > them t.l.ei.' willto I resist sti ens just as was the case with the English when the GE Tl'!1oIl5bombed them!. andmore and tnort '92'ie;t.amestlei; in line against us. Both sides commit atrocities. he said, and; our idealsoontinue erode. to yearsFor Germanthe PeOplekeptl t. -quiet while a whole community was being destroyed;not-' a community acrossthe world is alsobeing dmtroyecl.Do wewant l to participate in its destruction? At a general session variousoonoernt werebrought forward and referredto severalSaturday-afternoon workshops.the rc- §_ sults of which were summed up at the evening session,which t Friends GeneralConleren'e¬"Gé"o?ge of SawyerFriends U1 _9292'asto brought a meaningful close by Dorothy Hutchinson of Meeting, andEdward Snyderof tin: Friends Gommitte l binglon Meeting, jenkintown, Pa., international chairman National Lzgislatiott. . E the Women's InternationalLeague for Peace and Freedom, During the business sessionsand after intensive discu s hose themewas Strengthenwith Might by His Spirit." The 1 of the workshop reports,the conferenceconcurred in at early Christians.she said,were not afraid of power. In a poll the FriendsCoordinating Committeeon Peaceto sendfor of taxi drivers. she reported. she had found most of them i to Friends bodies a concern endorsed by iiew Tori Y against the war. Think of their power, shesuggested: Taxi Drivers Against the War in Vietnam!" Later we started our MeeLing's RepresentativeCommittee "that every possibleIt be explored to secure unrestricted passageof relief wo own 3.-rollon this, but we must havepicked the exception, ior o and material to the embattled peopleof both North and S I he wasstill shouting at us as weescaped tojoin the vigil!! . Vietnam." The committee wasalso askedto prepare abu] Q Besides nnresstngmoral ludtrrnent on star Dorochs Hutch urging Friends to consider now payingtaxes andbuying 1nson,, reminded us, we must have all the facts: the Genet-; a bonds involved them in nancing the militat'!'.' iocords, this as a dvil war. what the real story of the commit l A minute wa.!- approvedasking Friends to assist pol menu are, and why containment of communism is not only candidates with peace-oriented" platforms.with the 1- - i -ineffectual butinadvisable. Topm} and then to feel relieved 2 gmng guidance by drawing up a "peace platform for 1 of responsibiliry. she said. an lead to nominv beirw done hr o 1: J and a hiBliograpl92'5'how to organise on pol-ltimlaction. 5 I-he individual.Prayer shouldincrease sensitivity,and theaction followingit is a required release.A deep silence followedher intense nonoem with an enlightened China policy bro F lit. "approval oi a greatly expanded politicaland educationale based onthe present ones of the AFSCand the FCNL, X Qtairmenof variousthe sessions conltn-enoeStevi-would included reach all Monthly Meetings in the United Stat: t Meachamof theAmerican 1'- rienm l _2;-mmi;t_¢p__ L5.-1: I conference, vigil,or public witness in the fall of 1956 pot atum Of the Friends P630: Commiwee, George Cory,-inof I W1] _e U.N.! is envi._s_i_o_n_g1."f:'_':-_g_ ' , I i 6 92 ._._ -__i._._ _ -f_' _ _ pI . - _ --i- - 7 ' o O ~ J w ' - a 1 § I I Q 92 - _ V I _ ,,_ :- _ u _ _J92__ ~ _' ¥ -rm 5.:::;;:"§'tn.-».;.ir.;_ l:,-Iirwiri;a s?.:.':buszzzess ee>s:;;__=;7.- ._, " l a :neeLi::; for 92~':.r>E.E_:..:i.e:e wasa alien .mare}. nothe Wniee House and a 92-£5.-E31r. L:-faj-2:1: Park. 9292 :me: awe Hie:-cl. from F 92'i'i1mir:g:or. Ohio: whoCollege had driver.all ni;-T-.1wit. -i some saudcnuno :aLepa.-r. Wefour zoc-ii.our placesin one of eh: longline.» nandingin Lhemoi of ehe park for i; 1-.~..-1 been raining all morning!. There, eacl". iv. silenz lIl¬'ilLiallOl'._' we watched thechanges li;;l".'.oz eh: sk} inand or.zhe WhiteHouse uneil therair. nopped,blue skyappeared, andthe suncame 1 __,--"' our no turn ehe 92'92'ni:eand iu House re eczion in the vex itreet imo a brilliant piczor-e Bu:soon therewen. blackcloud: and djsxamthunder andlighening andour gil was hit.by wind anda drenchingdownpour. Tneguard; whohad been randing arthe V92'hi:eHouse game. wau:l:.ing edus, foroover, If nd oomeof us anempzed10 huddle under umbrellas,bun, 'relief" cameehe'deluge.' Espizeon'T:§l_ lT' _ '1i'&T"'vT'all{ 111:"we rem a'i|-Ted In lookingback to thaz £airl!'lp0m1neo92.Lsol anygand- trip -£a:her'sWashing-r.on no almostI05 years ago l realize that they I cook thelong u-ainride inall expectationof seeingthe Presi- dene, andthat ebeywere acmallyesooned onfool LO the While I-louse andinto PresidentLincoln : presencethat same day by eh: Secreearyof Slate. Those whono ablyplanned ourgather» eang thisFebruary probablyhad no expeczadonthat any such meening couldLake placetoday, andno doub:President john- -son-ond-!-;-ii Seaemyox Sraeewe-re boehhr awav! 4- - 0 - - -- ~ ' . _ - o 1 l . r I _ . ____ . _. Ho .. a ' ______. ._ - _ _ 4 - ' I " - _ .. - 92 1 1 ' - 1 ' 0 _-7 . L! "/4;1 7¥% 1 r I f . . ,_ _/_A,L/'._,:.../-4'. _ c '_- .,» , , _ -'/4'/ _,._.,.< ;!;_. iv f f , [;:¢ , ¢¢'_./_/'._,-5, -'.. "-- , 1.-:4§;';»%._> --J , .:A£;¬%%jf¬iEi_/£ci_/4?2?fA"16{uu~ 42Z§}vu4¢414-¢ @'j$a % /@»»~%+ a* 4&&Zé L7 ' ~~'%;,a,,,%/,,M 11/On i =192 '} - ' . 4 '"' W~§;1w4 92 ,1! . - 'p5§! 92 *- :_~,Ir" mi? H. '- j _ J/rkzgrri _ V V T mmT 1 _ " "" ' ' __ ._- - ---' ' -7 .. '. r ...._ l »92 -.- -41'-"*""h"' - -.z- . ' | £ i' | ' > 1 .. , . [ 92_./" _ ! ~ ! Y '1' I _ _ !.;:'i.1 Z1, i££-it 3 /:-'-- 1 . 3 Dear ?our letter of April i th has been received. A l - In response to your inquiry, information __ -contained in our ies must be maintained as confidential in _=_* 5: accordance with regulations of the De pa rtment of Justice. Ilm. p sure Y ou will understand the reason {or this policy Ind why I _; am unable to furnish the data you requetted. . U __n _. -...... - 5 Iv"-W» ;__- § J. E1188! Hoover x ii NOTE: Bufi1_es contain no record of cor:-espon d e nt . The American Frie Service Committee is we 11 known to the Bureau as a pacifist group withil the Quaker Church. The Bureau has not investigated this group, althoug " -the Domestic Intelligen ce Division is following the activities of certain ' individuals within this organization. The above Qdress has been veriiie 52" through the telephone directory. _ Y _ It JRP:cmc 8!__ _ A. _ _ I _ $3 s _ I Mn sisss 1* a 3 1 "-?=p_p_ _ M 92»'§' *92_ keg COMM FBI Mgr -1?. I :-no, _ _ ,'_y-1-aw - _ o s e '-- ---cs, 1 ___ ' i=M~'$2 . . iihg f 1 Yr-sum-r]:] _ ,;?f¢ . 7.. e. i m I I ' ' ' U I :_: ' ' _. ~J ML Tnllmy-|______0 , 92 _ Hr, 1_!_-.L_,=:__h , - 1 ,;.;:~ 92 I A hr--~-- E .' ---1 I 141:1. 1';--.|-92r -' -- , - ~ - J1! . _ W - ---I; 1 .., 1__ : " . __.. .._- .C " ,:"*"""-- - _ - - .7 . 92 .,;,;-3,! 1 -u..-__.- J. ' ---._. , '; _ 1-"_'-'- __ I. FEI z=:.s;~:- L: - 7 . I 92 M? ££'-_'_/§'_an an , ' ____ - ._4f /5/-,_-; ' ~./-L '1:r_]_ '. x _ :_::- !: [iii . rs: sz:.'rw: 0 1" 1.-TI I, K ri"' I- , ;T _'"L__--' 1050 'raP s-s-as mu i.-1.». G" -- I0 mm:-zcron mo:-1 sauna Mp/573%}, Y7 007/ VIDEM; ARMEDFORCE SPECTACULARSHOW, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON. HAY FIVE -SEVEN, INSTANT. INFORMATION CONCERNING IS!- REMYTELS HAY FOUR AND FIVE I.AST¢ THREE AND FIVE PERSONS, RESPEIITIVELY, OBSERVED AT AFTERIDON AND EVENING DEPDNSTRATION. ATTDVDENCE LOW BRALBE OF HEAVY RAIN- REPRESENTATIVE5 OF SEATTLE UO MEN ACT FOR PEACE, A COMMUNIST INFILTRATED GROUP;SEA'I&I3..E TO COMMITTEEENDUAR INVIETNAM, A OOPPOSITEVI DEM _BROLP; AMERICANFRIEND SSERVICE COMMITTEE, A m:ue1oussnow , nzrhzsmrjznl Onovxouzncz ohARRESTS nrronrnn. 11-{H FOLLOWS O I mo _' A 'wA...Hn_ ' "16 M B6 FBI HASH, DC 1 / . _'- : I cc '7 V gai. ~ - TREE",92'-:-c " "I - Al l- A :.|41k,.._ F :""'° 92* X ' .- V,a» A A-1;-I _ ~...... - - * ' --- - ,__ _.. _..~/92-.J___ -_-. '__-Y._-__.-.._.¢..___..,___.i._. _ ~.__-_t______- r-Iv-_ GQMAYIQIQSS "1 l 7'. '- ' ~ ~ - :-=--A ~_--- _._s _- _;_:___k'?_r;,___.=;__--4e-'.""_-__j '-_ "--______;__- I - . w -I - ' I K , ! 1 I I; " y _e UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION an §_ nrp=_v, l1__ I raqur I'II nqer Z _I_ w -. . ' Fa -Z: No. ' I 100-42817 Czict-.;-Q-__ Illinc- is L.:_;* 1' ,¢1s-as vorn-2's macs §?-* ~:Yaa,lf?,: .1-it 1955,. - Reference is being made to s memorandum dated ay 5, 1966 captioned as above. ' On lay 6, 1566 Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation observed two men and two women distributing voter pledge cards at four different intersections on State Street in downtown Chicago. The pledge cards called for the recipients to pledge to vote for candidates in 1966 who will work vigorously tor peace. The distributing began at 4:30 p.n. Kay 6, 1966 and ceased at 5:30 p.n. e 9n Hay 7, 1956, three =en and Iive ecnen were obsereed - by Federal Bureau oi Investigation Agents distributing rotor pledge cards at the same locations. The individuals wore shirts vhich bore the inscription "Vote_Hov on;Viet Ram" and the dis- tributing took place between 10:30 a.n. and 12:30 p.n. lay 7, H -"1966. The distributing was peaceful in nature and there iere -no incidents in connection with the distribution on either date. ;. .-_r . :..__'- '.'._'.'.- I. " ' '_' _ ~_ -;__ s W _..- - '- e _. 1 ' sncmsuas _ ,_ '92 _ ~ # /00.?//573" _~q Z r 5; i» ' TCTE£'B [LEGS - 14 -if ;_si;o1see I This documext contains neither recommendations nor con- clusions oi the Federal Bureau of Investigat cni It . is 'e propertyth h o of the Federal Bureau oi Investigation and is loaned to your agency; __ __ it and it s contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. U O .5 1 1 --i.-H.._.______.__. _ | -|:"1»" .- h " ' 1 -"____ ~.";~»~ . I - ! I ! . u < - 92'=92':._ '7 -1' ' J"? t:z._:zn suns DEPARTMENT or -JS'I ICE 92-.~ -/ § i.;. __-21';FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION F In Reply, Pique Refer la I712 l'Va. % 1 §hicago, Illinois ! E§-V1--C§C= 100-42817 * 1 VOTERS [ARCH KAY 14-15! 1966 I i 1 1 I . i - The AFSCihad planned to handle air travel ? I . reservations to Iashington, D.C. Ior'the SAFE sponsored demonstration on the weekend of lay 14-15,il96B. 'However, " due to a lack of response in connection with this demonstration ! plans for air travel have been discarded and Chicago BARE n is not handling all travel plans by train and automobile. ¢ I niiiii ...... | 1 - ' I ! t Hay l0, 1966 that the Socialist ! _ Yorkers Party SIP! and the Young Socialist Alliance YSA! are politically opposed to the theme of the SANE sponsored .-_.___ _,_!, I 11.05% /0O__ 'f>§5__. . - r _,.. u 'Lt! ;_> e .,92 92- _ ,-,.- --.,-92 -4--Ii; 3..'.a92vL,,T4--_ .. Q~ 0 ¢Q;*@1.i_ 1.1.": 1-'==-15. 1'?¬o --' demonstration in Iashington, D.C. on n5; 15, 1966, and therefore, no members of the SIP or YSA till be participating in the demonstration. - advised on lay 11, 1956 um the ' response from peace organizations in the Chicago area for the demonstration in Iashington, D.C. on lay 14-15, 1966 is not iarge and most of the deiegates attending this demonstration till be from the East Coast. Chicago SAFE is hoping that 12 delegates from various peace organizations will attend from the Chicago area, but as yet there are not that nany vho have indicated a desire to attend, Iravel till either be by train or automobile. ' I _,3._ * 5 I / ¢-"-"""' "'--' 7 -.-.__._..,-----_-M...-s_ ___,. _ _ . .__,__ --_ -H 0- 3* s I _ I 9 , , p .- L! » 'P! L , 0 i 1 f E up» -.- -ia----. INDIPEKDIYT SG2laLZEi LEAGUL, Y°£lT'EI_1!~ J'_¢_r_¥.<;r §_Y1;_-11;; e The May 4, 1942, issue of "Labor Action," then an oiiicial publication oi the Workers Party WP!, carried an article ahich reflected that the I? was formed in April, 1940, as a result oi a split within the leadership of the Socialist Workers Party QSWP!. The article stated that when the Hitler-Stalin Pact was signed and Poland invaded, the minority group within the SWP, in proclaiming the formation oi the WP, condemned the pact as being imperialistic in nature and stated it would not support either imperialist camp. The April 25, 1949, issue of "Labor action" contained an I account of the Fiith Rational Convention of the HP, held March 24-27, 1949, in New York City, which reilected the change oi name of the organization irom the WP to the Independent Socialist League ISL! in order to emphasize the character of the group as a propa- ganda group for the spreading of socialist ideas and not as a full-Iledged political party. - - The July 14, 1958, issue of Labor Action," an official publication of the ISL, contained an article captioned "The ISL Program in Brief." The article indicated: "The ISL stands for socialist democracy and against the two systems of exploitation which now divide the world: capitalism and Stnlinism. The ISL, as a Marxist movement, looks to the working class and its ever- present struggle as the basic progressive icrce in society. The ISL is organized to spread the ideas of socialism in the labor movement and lmOng all other sections of the people. There can be no lasting and genuine democracy without socialism and there can be no socialism without democracy." The September 22, 1958, issue of "Labor Action" con- tained an undated statement signed by the Political Committee of the ISL which indicated that the ISL had been dissolved. The titenent urged former ISL members to join the Socialist Party- Social Democratic Federation SP-SDF!. 7 1 A source advised on October 10, 1958, that the Chicago nBranch of the ISL, which was an affiliate oi the national organization, was dissolved in September, 1958, and all active members joined the SP SDF on October 9, 1958. . ¥ 1 4' , s I .___;_! 1 J . "1._____ @ b i In 'U1.-1'ED STATES DEPARTMENT O} -JSTICE ' 1 Chicago, DERAL no fflfnoisa '0FINTESTIGATl0N In Reply. Plane Rrfer In - lay 1%, 1966 .F-lc N0. i I . COMMUNIST INFILTRATIOK OF STUDEFTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY INTERNAL SECURITY - C n _-;"-5, '-' '~ - ~ __'; -. k Hay 11 1966 th 2. 1 a DB9 ti ng of the Chicago Peace Council was helé on May 10, 1966, at Roosevelt University, Chicago, Illinois, at which the following organizations were represented: Women for Peace IF?! 1' iomen's International League for ~ I Peace and Freedom WILPF! i~ 1 1 South Side Chicago Ien's Club Shoe Workers Union Southern Christian Leadership Conference SCLC! - Congress of Racial Equality CORE! 1 Teachers for Integrated Schools I American Friends Service Conittee ! AFBC! - G I Chicago Council of Community 1 Organizations CCCO! _ I. E. B. Du Bois Clubs of Chicago - DCA! . i i I 1 , _ K! /' _! _ _ U r , 0 . I... . - - ' L Students for e Democratic Society :5! advised that approximately thirty individuals vere present at this meeting of which ten of these individua1s Iere representatives of the SDS. Among some oi the individuals present were: mi representing APSC representing the Shoe representing EDS representing SDS I I L . - E? I _i - -L___ _.1..-.__...._.....__..-.a_-_ _. _ _ J 1;! 1 1 £PPIYDIX ? S CHICAGO COHEITTEET0 nrrrma ' frsz 511.1. or nrorrrs t i ' The Chicago Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights CCDBR! maintains headquarters in Suite 424, 431 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois. A second source advised on October 31, 1960, that the CCDBR was formally organized on October 26, 1960, with RICHARD CRILEY as Executive Secretary after he motivated organizing the -meeting of October 26, 1960. a A third source advised on lay 5, 1965, that the original stated purposes for the CCDBR continue to be adhered to with CRILEY continuing as the motivating force behind the Committee. The Board of Directors, however, now includes many individuals in the religious, educational and labor fields who .are not known as CP members. APPENDIX =_ _Q " ' ,- -. n 1 APPENDIX 3.2.2,. nu__s<;_>1_s cwaspr AMERICA DCA! A source has advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party CP!, including national functionaries, met in Chicago,Illinois,for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates to this meeting were cautioned against the germ of antiesoviet and anti-CP ideologies. These delegates were also told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself. A second conference of over 20 persons met in Chicago on December 28-29, 1963, for the purpose of initiating a "call"- to the new youth organization and planning for a founding con- eenticn to be held in June, 1954. A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which 0 time the name W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America DCA! was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention. The aims of this organization, as set forth in the preamble to the constitution, are,"lt is our belief that this nation can hest solve its problems in an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence, complete disarmament and true freedom for all peoples of the world, and that these solutions will be reached mainly through the united efforts of all democratic elements in our country, composed essentially of the working people allied in the unity of Negroes and other minorities with whites. We further fully recognize that the greatest threat to American democracy comes from the racist and right wing forces in coalition with the most reactionary sections of the economic power structure, using the tool of anti-Communism to divide and destroy the unified struggle of the working people. As young people in the forces struggling for-democracy, we shall actively strive to defeat these reactionary and neo-fascist elements and to achieve complete freedom and democracy for all Americans, thus enabling each individual to freely choose and build the society he would wish to live in. Through these struggles we feel the American people will realize the viability of the _ n socialist alternative." __ up _ ___,, " -i__ _ A_ , 7 UI"" , .I I -I -- - '92 ;-92 n - p! -. !' - 3. . The constitution further states that this new _organization shall be a membership organization open to individuals, or if five or more people so desire, a chapter can be formed which shall in turn be guided by the policies and principles oi the parent organization. . As of October, 1965, the headquarters of the DCA was -located at 954 IcA11ister Street, San Francisco, California. 4- Over the Labor Day weekend, 1965, the DCA held a conference in hicigo, Illinois. I !.. I I . E . E- l:'._ ,- I--- - | i - nvpxnnxx i Q - 7-_ I-.1 .3 '. @4-u.» T';'_ - .1: _, .-.- - . _ _:! ____ ._ 0 *- - l APPHDIX 1 I w.1:.a. m" 5:25 cuts 4 or c*.»:_1_g:_.go:_»,, i On May 3, 1965, a source advised that on June 30, 1964, a group of young people who attended the founding convention of the W.£.B. DuBois Clubs of America DCA!, met in Chicago and adopted a statement of purpose and constitu- tion forming the DCC as an affiliate oi the national DCA. This source further advised that at a meeting of the Chicago Area of the Hidwest Region oi the BCA held April 3, 1965, the boundary of the Chicago Area was established to E include all of Illinois north oi Springfield, Illinois, and all of Indiana. At this meeting, TED PEARSON,Chairman of the Youth Club of the Communist Party of Illinois, was elected Ikrea Coordinator. A second source advised on November 26, 1965, that as of November, 1965, TED PEARSON continues to be the Chicago Area Coordinator oi the DEA and the oiiieial headquarters is located at the PEARSON apartment, 1808 North Cleveland Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. The second source advised that there is currently only one eluh operating in the Chicago Area and that is on the west side. This club operates a Freedom Center at 2829 West Lake Street, which is open seven days a week to the teenagers on the west side. ..°° duB5°m Tn d_.£._,me,;,{ the of FBI neither It is enntains¬'piltol:.nd'ita h1'BOOT9292n;5.92 ;l til8£'IéOIt1: e rJ1. m'nter.ta FBIare not and tois loaned be distributedto your outsrdelzqncs. J'°"l' Y' Wen APPENDIX 8' ' 1 i _ I'- .- .. _! ,! _ 92 I E ; _ f P _"§ '3 C Q1! - UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 01' JUSTICE 25.'.--- t =2; >- . o.'__e z- _.{" . -.J_ _92 ?~{_ FEDERAL BUEEAF Of INVESTIGATION I In f~92'??_92'. Pleas! Ede 2 File Na. _ '3 Chibago, Illinois Iay lé, 1966 NATIONAL PARK wonzrns ASSOCIATION svmparav DEMONSTRATION AT s a 1 FOOD %l£PANY, 3350 FORTH KEDZIE Avzxur, caxcaco, ILLINOIS, HAY 23, 1966, xx svvponr or srnzxznc DELANO, canrroxxxa, IIGRART GRAPE PICIERS xxroauarxon ooncznxxns ' _it_0n_l:v 23__1966, * ?Y_ 1'y.e "" _,___» fw H " - - _""'."""- e f r" J; stated on lay 2O, J ' 196§, -" - 3 i I ./ was attempting to page out'the Iollowing leaflet on the Ch1cago_ F Circle Campus: | Q . I . 0 Q 1 L_. { r I .1 - _ 1 92. in . _92_ _ ' ie--R - 92 _A- - -. 5;; - 'r-_- Ir f 2"1 - .e! ~ @4744 i570 ,/ ."7'?O/1/O3' 1 1 . 3 : Since ertenber E; 1955, 3532 - ~4- 1 worker fanilies in Delano, Cslifcrnie, have been cn st- to get for thezselves these things other workers gr e legall gsaranteed: the right F to organize into a union and to bargain collectively, the right to e living wage, the r ight to humane working condi- tions an right to dignit Y on the job. The DiGiorgio Corporation, which last year grossed $231,800,000, which owns neon acres in the strike ;one and more than 26,000 acres all together!, which has four dir- ectors on the board of the huge B ank of America, and whose wide-ranging corporate interests make it truly an economic octopus, is being challenged by its field workers, whose I-.v92'lqy u-...-1.-.-1-I--, J-I-..-.1 ...-_.I4--_- -0 -....-_-,--__-- ---A -4--.,.92..-.-.-J-L-. F 4:-J---92_v; = 92-I114.! PUWCL .Lb ULIUJ-4. 92J.£..L92.-J U4 1-11..-ls}-l£.4;'>U Clllh.2:01 I. JLJbl..:L£ Ll H5054 -mination, and whose only weapon is their non violent strike. THEY NEED YOUR HELP! A nation-wide boycott is being conducted against DiGiorgio products. .S-& H Foods warehouses are being - closed down in California and New England by large groups of pickets with the suppa*t of Teamsters unions. The midwest distribution center for DiGiorgio products is here in Chicago. It is crucial that it be closed down temporarily to show DiGiorgio the strength of support for the strike. The Teamsters have indicated willingness to respect picket'1ines at the warehouse. Whether they do or -not may be contingent upon the force of our picket line. - The warehouse is located at 3350 N. Kedzie, one block north of Belmont and the JFK Expressway. On Monday, Hay 23, 1966, at 7:00 AM, people from all parts of the city will meet at the S & H warehouse for a mass demonstration picket. Tge mosteffective aidyou cangive thestrikers is to be t ere. s - - .._ ... _. , _ _ -__ _ _ _k_ _ _ . B oycott and consumer picketing will continue until "the strike is WON. To help, contact the strike coordinate on your campus, call Harry Johnson st 939-2?9h, or write FFWR, 1300 Wabash, Chicago, Illinois. - J &' | Q . ! - fl I RE: h ATIO!¬£.L rerun:- :1 womzns ASSOCIATION sutures nm:o:;sTr..=.':1o:: 1:; s a w roon COLIPANY ssso some xznzn: AVENUE, cmcnoo, 11.1,n:o1s, my 23, 1966, 1:»: suppose? or STRIEEING nenano, w7__ ~ ___ CALIFORNIA, L'.IGP.AN'J. snag: P101-zzns on Hay 23, 1966, advised that the boycott against Di iorgio Corporation products at the B & I Food Company Warehouse, Chicago, began at 7:00 All on lay 23, 1966, and ended at 4:00 FE, that date when the warehouse closed for the evening. The peak oi the demonstration was shortly before; 9:00 Al! when an estimated 60 pickets were participating. lost of the pickets left before 9:00 All and a skeleton force ranging tron four to six pickets remained until the warehouse closed for the evening, at which time the remaining pickets disbursed. The iaicketing was peaceful, there were no incidents and no arrests.r.-an-as the national 0 boycott against the Di iorgiq Corporation, and F chmley _ Products at the 5 & I good Company Iarehouse, 3350 North A Kedzie Avenue, Chicago, thatfdate tron 7:00 All until 4:00 ,Pll., u The purpose of this boycott was torclose down the Chicago Iidwest, California and New Sngland distribution centers of ' Di iorgio products. At the ;p_eak of the demonstration some 60 _ . ~ ' ~-4-' - _-- -.. ' " ______. __ . 1 QM.! * /! " ~ as: 1u.'r1o:<.u_- .= um; renames ASSOCIATION sn:1=-Arm DEMONSTRATION AT s a u"'PooD coupzmr, 3350 xorvrs mozn: w::m:.'~:, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, um" 23, 1966, _ xx SUPPORT or STRIKING nmmo, -1 _ _i CALIFORNIA; fie, * l£1GP.AKT___.___ *- amp: PICKERS 7|-nun pickets were present, made up of persons from the SDS,Cong'reas or Racial Equality CORE!, American Friends Service Committee Quakers!, striking Chicago welfare employees and some Catholic and Protestent groups and/or representatives. A good number of the pickets were students who left before 9:00 A1! and 0. token force of four to six pickets remained at the scene until the warehouse closed in the evening. I I -0 --- -11 -A resumedat 8 I: I Foodgqmpan advised t at picketing "1- - .'i"*' , , _ _ p_ " . - y Iarehouse at 7'00' 41;- gay24 196 ' 6' 1_- :-92:< -_-7- .-; '~-V --I I _.'_ I - - _ 0' 5 " '.", ,,, -___ E ' _ . /- .p_ ./K ' ~.- ' - ~"-- es .- Z t,./ . 5] 92-~ RE: KATIOHALFripg t wsnnzns ASSOCIATION DXMONSTRATIONAT s & w room SYEPATEY3350 nonrn zznzxz AVENUE, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS,RAY 23, 1966, coupnwv,IN SUPPORTor STRIKINGDELANO, " cnnrronxxn, n1cnA§1 GRAPEPICKERS i with only 12 pickets present. Although picketing was scheduled to continue until 4:00 PMthat date, when the-irarebouse closed for .the evening, -ztha. pickets discontinuedat approximately 9:00 AMand did not return. The picketing was peacefuland orderly. There were no incidents or arrests..- -:. .0 , I _ _:::::::dfnna.__, 4 documentationthe I. x. B. Duor the Bois 1|Clubs I I01' er 2 Du 0 Chicago! Bois cm,B O 1 is - 7 0 . _ 0gr __ _ r _ ¢. -92_J F A - I r ll ' ',_!' ! rt 1 , 4=.:=:=:2~"n: 2: W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AKEEFCA DCA!. A source has advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party CF!, including national functionaries, met in Chicago,Il1inois.for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would bunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates to this meeting were cautioned against the germ of anti-Soviet ~and anti CP ideologies. These delegates were also told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP J-UDC4A0 ~l+:n'|f_ - A second conference_of over 20 persons met in Chicago on December 28-29, 1963, for the purpose of initiating a "call", to the new youth organization and planning for a founding con- vention to be held in June, 1964. A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June l9-21, 1964, at -v 150 _-- Golden w--- ats» q- av --v-Q--w, A1.rs=rmn_ Ran -; u I -|-an:-i1:r92n, Q----.--1-.- pup, f _a'I-ifnrnia. -7-----w-----3 --- at which v---_-- time the name W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America DEA! was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention. The aims of this organization, as set forth in the preamble to the constitution, are,"1t is our belief that this nation can best solve its problems in an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence, complete disarmament and true freedom for all peoples of'the world, and that these solutions will be reached mainly through the united efforts of all democratic elements in our country,-composed essentially of the working people allied in the unity of Negroes and other minorities with whites. We further fully recognize that the greatest threat to American democracy comes from the racist and right wing forces in coalition with the most reactionary sections of the economic power structure, using the tool of antieCommnnism to divide and destroy the unified struggle of the working people. As young people in the forces struggling for democracy, we shall actively strive to defeat these reactionary and neo-fascist elements and to achieve complete freedom and democracy for all Americans, thus enabling each individual to freely choose and build the society he would wish to live in. Through these struggles we feel the American people will realize the viability of the socialist alternative." 7 H, ,_ ._--._- o 1 oi '_> m Z 1 The constitution iorther states that this new organization shall be a rnerr.':~e-rship organization open to individuals, or if five or more people so desire. a chapter can be formed which shall in turn be guided by the pO1i¢ieS and principles of the parent organization. _ As of October, 1965, the headquarters of the DC; was located at 954 McA11ister Street, San Francisco, California. aver the Labor Bay weekend, 1965, the QQA held e - conference in Chicago, Illinois. - Q I I 1 ¢ 8 , 92 .._.__o | ! . _ I J 92- _1__ APPENDIX 1312.5. D1 B1 -IS CLUBS or CHICAGO Q32! ' i 0 On Hay 3, 1965, a source advised that on June 30, 1964, a group of young people who attended the founding -convention of the W.£.B. DuBois Clubs oi America DEA!, met in Chicago and adopted a statement of purpose and constitu- tion iorming the DCC as an affiliate of the national DCA. This source further advised that at a meeting of the Chicago Area of the Midwest Region of the DCA held April 3, 1965, the boundary of the Chicago Area was established to include all of Illinois north oi Springfield, Illinois, and all oi Indiana. At this meeting, TED PEARSON, Chairman of the Touth Club of the Communist Party of Illinois, was elected Area Coordinator. A second source advised on November 26, 1965, that as of November, 1965, TED PEARSON continues to be the Chicago Area Coordinator of the DCA and the official headquarters is located at the PEARSON apartment, 1808 Forth Cleveland Avenue Chicago, Illinois. '6 The second source advised that there is currently only one club operating in the Chicago Area and that is on the west side. This club operates a Freedom Center at 2829 West Lake Street, which is open seven days a week to the teenagers on the west aide. I .» APPENDI X 3.l:1is_Jd'c;cume??t;on;aFnsrecommendation:u. Iggy neither cs sans - o.e BE' PT°D Tt! It is the ' - of areFBI and nottols l°a"°dbe distributed *4? Youra one outsideygvouraggeiltzyfonmnh it the I / ,- = a -_ @- Z _w_ |__ _,_- $ uv*"""J- - ! a»"~ -e , , 92 1!!!!!!!!Iil!!l 1 __7": }:-5": Ul'~-_; ._ STATED_ - CD DEPART.MENTO! J ICE - ' z 2 A-2' -_ ful ll BYREAYIKTESTIGLTIDN OF :'§'nh'H:. Bnnnqvlsrnnin -.- _ uuuircgn-B; 4. 92-vllnlh-¢ ,'n»'L|Illot92|i In .Rr; _~,Phn.ceR1gfc"lo . khh June 3, 1955 S s ,_ §§ZiICAN FEIE§DS sznyics sonsiwwss Q furnished Q, a brochure cap- i tioned "Our Role In A Revolutionary World -- Focus" South- east Asia," issued by the American Friends Service Commit- tee AFSC!, Middle Atlantic Region, 1500 Race Street, Phila- delphia, Pa., which described an AFSC World Affairs Insti- tute to be held June 18-25, 1956, at Pocono Crest, Pocono Pines, Pa., 20 miles west of Stroudsburg, Pa., in the Pocono Mountains. __ This institute will deal with how Americans can respond to violence in Vietnam, turmoil in Indonesia, mili- tary leadership in Burma, and experiments with democracy in the Philippines. 1 d Speakers andfaculty at the institutewill in- in c u e: _ F _ WILLIA;$BAG ELL i ______- --__ Quaker United Nationslrrogram - Q-. Z 92 ' tr, /- , - i STEPHEN G ABX_. -_;_ - 0 -~,,--*-~e>»r_- - /{ Associate Service Comittee;member Executive Secretary, AFSC ofmission"to*Bouth'V1etnam, American Friends 1955 f Josrsfdévssron_: ' I 1 I Executive Director, OverseasEducational Service; Ambassador of the United States to Eurma, 1961 - 1963. E £1 KAv l I I _ l-92'_ 92 .. 1, __.- . _,.._.__--' ------_ ._1 . . ll , 92__ - I-._,_ L -.;'.IC.l_T .".~'IP.'fFEI"*".I1"F CT !*1 II'?T_'* 92- 92 . _S.1.I-_-'92 ADOf,. xoezz P -/ J, ~< -~'»J - -" - *" ~*- -_ r _..--7-r~ -T _ _ I 1 _ Ambassador of the P_hi1ippines,__to_ _theUnited Nations; former Foreign Minister of_'EhePhilippines; Philippine repre- Sezifzegivein efforts to mediateIndonesia-Malaysia dispute, 1 1954' 5e RUSSEIL-92CO§D$SON I or of Quaker conferencesfor diplomats and I Bvu ents in §_9l1Il1_A1i1.&. 1961-65 » 7 VUvsg 1-"Z-LAI_ ._/_/-1"' ' j i 7 A_1_¬§,aB a.1Io'_f.ToI_.Yietnam__to_1:h_e___p__z_1 ;;t_ed _.§E_te_§_ , , N . - .. I I -1-.r. ,_ /- o=.r<:.r:&;l: {11I"'1».'£rY--_-,_- r L7/-wt or /~» __,__.4 T /if turer and consultantQuaker in Residence,in peace educatJ.Qn_IIOIL..1?he_.Ame.r-1-B-5-n_FrJ.endB Friends World Institute lec- . » Service Comm.itt'ee- * ' I ncmum éwznson '_ Asia,Qualcer 1963-6592 1 f. },/International Representative,East Affairs Rree 1 e f gn c espondent, hi_s_921orld travels include visits to the Peoples Republic of hina and more recent- ly to IniQ:&m and - _, G invitedl _ . President, TheAsia Society, Ambassador orthe United States to §'_hn;j,lsad, 1961-61¢. There will also ire ayouth program,a children's_pro- gram, and s. program for special interest groups. __ . _ r 2-. V ,- >- ' e 7 . 2 I .,... "8-nu!- E ' ..lY"":92""'? 92'v ._ . -. -._.___.____ C".--. .4 ._:. .-__ - r__ ,. __ ___ -.- . ,____" ' --_ ""1"-'-- -" >- -.-_. '- - ,_..._..... ._ i |5 -.-.-5--T---.-T ,---91 nf-"-1-In? -. A r- |-pf-- £1 ___'...:l.~.... t0 ..-»..... a.-2L...1.L..1:D The "Guide to subversive Organizations end Publications", revised and published as of Decezber 1, 1961, by the Committee on Un-A:nerice.'f£ctivi.- ties, U. S. House of Representatives, docuents the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee as follows: . " "To defend the ceses of Cominist 1.;-..'bres1.cers, frontshave been devised making special appeals in behalf of civil liberties and reaching out far beyond the cor.f5_nes of the Co.-znunist Party itself. Among these organiza- tions are the * * P Emergency Civil Liberties Committee. When the Communist Party itself is under fire, these fronts offer a bulwark of protection. [Internal Security Subconmiittee of the Senate I Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans, s. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p. 91! A source advised December '21, 195'?and January 6, 1958 that IJEDRARJJ BUJDDI, constitutional lawyer and legal counsel for Energency Civil Liberties Committee, made a speech December Z!, 1957, accepting the Philadelphia Associates as a group to work with the national organisation. -This occurred at a Bill of Rights Day celebration sponsored by the Philadelphia Associates, e:-gency Civil Liberties Committee, at the Adelphia Hotel, Philadelphia. A second source advised on Hay 23, 1962 that the Philadelphia Ass-ocistes have not been active in the past turo years, have no current active membership and do not maintain a headquarters in Philadelphia. -1 J 5 |- '1' - |~ _ ---- -1' "-92 . -.' ._a.'- ..'.-I__, ~ __,.---__ g"'<_: * i: * * "-- J "- ." .1 I _ ., . v ¢- ~_ - ¢- _ ii I4,-_ ,1 -hr -1 _ 92_ I - - 92 ¢ I "FP_EE"J0!! Ni? PA°.""?"' The "New York Times," August 2h, 1963, Page 1, carried an article entitled, "An all-Negro party for '61. is fomede The article related that a. national all- egro political party was being organized. T . nooed to run its own slate in the Congressional and lozal elections in 1961 A tentative national committee had opened offices at 81 East 125th Street, New York City. A leaflet entitled A Call For A F reedo'r. Now Party" was publicly circulated in the surrmver of 1963 and called for the formation of a Freedom Now Party "with an all- Black slate and a plat for: for liberation." _ This document contains neither reo0:n_"!1end!! uns nor conclusions of the FBI. I: is ll-9 P!'="l"i'Y1!-' 01 f-be FBI lnd is loaned to your sg-.::;'y it and its eontcntl ire not to be dist:-ilnted Olltiidc your agency. ' D - ,, - _ _ii ~. -_':.-;~ ~_ .'~~ i 1-... ;__ - - - . -_;oV .r- - _ - ,,---,1: . . l . E I" Q T __- - ' £2. - UNI'g D STATES DEPARTMENTOF JQTICE < sag: ..-. Q x ? £1132?v____,a FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION- Z § In Reply,PleaseRefer to w i I *h Philadelphia, Pennsylvania u I July 21, 1965 i 1 I i DEMONSTRATIONS PROTBSTING U..S. INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM _ On July lh, 1965, - '"" » advised that the American Friends Service Committee AFSC! picketed' ' in front of the Federal Building, '' ' Ninth and Market Streets, Philadelphia, Q ? P a. , from B 10: . p m to. 9 H5: p.m. Twelve pickets partici- pated_ The: _ demonstrators_ ere w protesting U. S. interven- tion in the war in Vietnam There were no arrests and no incidents advise at :00 p.m. that» there were ll pic ets from the "Friends" organization at Ninth and Market Streets, Philadelphia, Pa., protesting U.S. action in Vietnam. At I-1:15 l7i l965|advised that the pickets had dispersed, and there were no incidents or arrests. 4 _ _ -- ~ _ ,_ I -I-¢....-_._ - "" ' T *'5F ** f '"sadvised at 7:30 p.m., July 7, 1965, that the eader o the above demonstration was one MICHAEL YARROW, Youth Program Officer of the Friends Peace Committee FPCJ. He said approximately 150 spectators, who apparently did not like demonstration, gathered; however, there were no incidents. He said the picketing lasted from approximately 2:00 p.m. to k:20 p.m. A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, on November 13, 1963, furnished a leaflet captioned "What We'veBeen Up to," issued _,,_92 1 i ENCLOSURE /s was 1 - . C C I DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING u. s. gstssvzsjrcs TN §l§T§§H i I by the Friends Peace Committee, 1520 Race Street, ii Philadelphia 2, Pa., and this leaflet stated in part as follows: "MICHAEL YARROW is a new youth worker for the Peace Committee. MIKE is a 1963 graduate in Sociology of Antioch College who spent a year studying in Wilhelmshaven, West Germany, and a summer in an Bast German work camp. Pending draft board approval, he will be with the Friends Peace Committee the next two years. Says MIKE: I would like particularly to work with Quaker youth groups interested in put- ting their beliefs into action... " The September 15, 196%, issue of Friends Journal," Philadelphia, Pa., pages H23-H25, has an article captioned "A Quaker Visits Mississippi" by MICHAEL N. YARROW, in which he reports on the six weeks he . spent as a voter registration worker in Ruleville, Hiss., with the Council of Federated Organizations Summer Project. The footnote description about the author states "MICHAEL N. YARROW, a conscientious objector to military service, is currently doing his alternative service as a youth worker for the Friends Peace Committee of the Philadelphia area meeting...f previously advised in February 1965 that MICHAEL YARROW, JR., a representative of the Student Peace Union, conducted a demonstration to end the draft and to protest U. S. action in Vietnam at the draft board at 128 North Broad Street, Philadelphia, Pa. This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. i F - i - i i - 0 , 92 .» _ ,'.'.. - -.5-- 92' pm. -pr. --Lu--H4} .' ,_-_ .4 ... ..- n--.-..- . .4r 92l--,- 92,-92l-__- v -.- _ Q -'0- K A-AM " . C..: -:.'.';V.-L. --_.-...... 1.1,: ;. EC " . -.= H"'*>:';I'- . --" 11" . '- r.-Y ' . - ,- - ' - ~ . - ,-. . . - -- '. n ..'-. -_ - ...| _. ' - . c.r-;....- .i.:~.;-... -. ;"...':.'.'i.. A -.." 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' I Y .- - . -- *- .. -I ' -; -. -_- .:.._- '. ..». -_ 2:. 1.151;. --. 3; .-.3» . .* .".;'- .. -92.- Lil-C i"; '.-Fm-:3i '51 fl . -."O$1"- ht. - , .. ..__,_ ..._' 3&1" C- Li 1.3 C-L'Ci=-I:..-.- .5.-- -..,:.-. '. 115', : 0:1, . .- M--. i - _ I _ _ _ ....._o _,_ w. J'- '. .- . I '_ - - " .',-V- '- 1 2..-;-_< r-.-' ;--.=o_"--~~ -3 '.¢-.; -"_no-_ _ . -».:"1-an L _c: .-. ';:'_s.. » mt;-' 5 -_ .-.-. _. - _ ~.» - _ .-.. ',___ 1 . ~---.v .-- . _ . . . - -. _,..- , 2.1-o-'=cr';::~.*._...-.-".:= -.;: .'_r :- '--.21: --.--1;, I -- ._ ---.'.;. -. :» --»' ' ¢-- *92I.-1'1 --v _-4 4-. -._., --A--,__, ..; --r. -- l;.i'. z.--:. forced to take. I - :::f:."_o, me '. _ ;=--e r.=»:.-.-;--1:-.=.1 '-; - -...:...-- '$& 1: this t;*c.:e :.:-;;:'c=.o.'.r..::;'. - J1 . .:;~;. » ~ =:a;.-ely viola»: ..;.!'.* ':'a .:sI.c .1-23.5-.-.. c ;irr.' 5 .' -uti-:.n:.' nut 1+-ou1.c! also rlo 5:'jua'o';~.:-c E ".'_"'.'.i..'*.:z;ix-1;. to E-5:11 Crztiz an-3 in j" ..>u . - .- ...,.-at '- £01101: 1 1-.*:$.s . _, course ever. t.'no;:vr. ' r ~" -"- I92 rezo rize ,0 "z.§:a " 0 in-:: gri~v.:r--.- -= -.-.-hi '- 3'52.-. n.-we: s;;.:.-'-.nrt- Pan Costis h:. ?c~ .2 > IT.- ill oasis 1:1 5' :;'.-1;. as.r;.- z; -1- :~.:.1£- .-:r.s ~ .s- re?-r:.~.-;-.=;;.:.-; from our re.-sponstiw _ - :.i 11 -;;' :"c.' ;;.'2-1 :..= L;.'-.2-- .5. :-'.. - . 1' @ | ... , o 1,: nu. »o.: ...,_a ::o 1; _'}.|.'i{ 1-:; :. - -.-no . 1 -. 1-.r2.1.1:T.c:g to o-.:;:i now-violeno 1:2: * ***" *""'.:=e=-5: :~~"'-'~'-.=.~= 1::-é =.t:':; {~~"-'. .='-=-ina;;:. t-:2 . . _ .3-:1 apps.-zixzg the a_.g.~:+a:ivo polio" -- |-_ atf - A ,,_- 2 r you are pr-s._-5 .1:-ed to jo : -:. BL 4.}-I .. 1. :=...._.L-_.;;1e. -'92 "T. -_ if: 1:"; :.'§- . 7 -err-.':::.;.r-tz:__:: oh this matter. E5-.'-+,_ I . .:'.' A- , , - - . :.- ,-- 1; -St-.1 5-erbercay, Storn-an .i'Or.';¬.~.=; ::=.ta=s»;: I-.m:a:'.1. In the face of possible invaa .;=,-;_:.- --- -- o. - -.'._'. -¢. ..-__J1: = .z:-4-16;-~.. ¢-c:.-.,.:.-.:..1_-. 1.--: .5 _._1-'. t _ . 56?? apaalss. L:-dies and gentleman, » 1?.-.: F;-*c-= -_d:=:;.- r. i-'2'. J.:'l::-.i :- -;' _ _. - 7- _92 ' j . . - . __ - ._ __._ -.__-'-92- ...._.-. .._. * >?'?'§" "- - '1-'r1.}.o:= ¢i+,:i.aor:s - :1 - :2-.2 -r 1:-2a. _=: rm-:1--'2-.-I-.»e-. I call upon you to be etro:1g' ii"- - ~ '_='n:r' :*e9ist2.1ce. Es .~ .92:.~ I ." all":-.e-2::-1» to 05: way of life. Do not aub- - -.______92__ to Una irnaier, _ :--=s:- 3-":>-,. give way to anger and hatred. - - _ 1 S::r=..= a:o:;__ "_' _ -_;1c :: _1.T'~. 5:12, '-.::t . . .21: hc;-.-' to face c;-.=: with courage . ='- y _ All of 1;: -..~ ;_"..~;5;;e92i to cli-'; 1".-.-t-5»:-r ' " -1 to ca-:>;~sr:.~';s=. '.:.'. me:-,7. ILe....-'"=~m--_ ____ "-"***-'*' bar in this hour shat is of. 1-'=+,s.';-:7-:. 3'. -.»'nation, its way of life, and t>u:r' ' '. - - 'Stosian brothers. R-aw;::. i>e:-, 1; V.- he':-arr.-s of Hawaii 2-:11: are dying rather ; 1-.'*___ _. .o o__o:.t.':>n.anbn$.t._ - _ . . -3--7: --~ ---J - Y'- ' ,- - - - -~'-'~' ' --';_.:_;_: . Am non: to 1':-; across tho 1:12. :-ea 1-52.0 cell youraslwes our -.zn:~;:.-.=s, :. _9h'.,"¢,' I repszx ' -1'-e -"7 §?' we remain res.- if! an aim-rays to éiscurs with you our co-...-mar: problL 11:a,' "1:-o '- - 1 .1} help sol-re our 1'-O. mOn diff:'.c:J .':£e:;. 1':-:= will 1 ir-:5 no missile: baaedoalog our " " cc: :?*:.r.," r92o1z-1* planar: or sh?-r: F0 1:--_l<-:~'.z* 92: B3lp0I?.B or bombs. Our vollmtary " 1 .f1*" A 5:r'-_e'. o1?.1ty to resist witla vim.-.-zra is om-~ pledge of good faith. But if 3'02! __ j_f _pc.rs:u 't in attack, we 2:5 11*: not EL;-i3:J:;.-glc Rem-gmber the word: oi Napoleon, _- _ V ',t1~.e_; greatest .0! soldiers: 1;. -r_'.i1 i t ;1_.-.11 z-lmys conqueroci the s':.~ord._] :" _ ,__- ,t:;.::1: ;;>:;:; Yq-L§_hwro gust beafd 1"" voliw _' -'-1 the ~ '-_--_-:;.i.¢.'--;n'b: Bare is 'a late nee : bulletin* §_';:;;_~,-i__- __ 13; fr:-:11 da§'hi.r.-gf-as ;_.i-.-.-_.o_?.::1: rt -.-;_ .=-sum-=_. :.:..@.'1::..u:.-'= t-o:_15.ght issaod last T_4ms'a~w:.".i:~»;.¢. 4.; -.-L. =.-...:-.~;....@~.» :1;-at :41 no: bamg hold by speotsman an-.~ -..-.<-to be -tar;-7;: "an;-o ;::r:.; ;~;»1.1rs depar -. -znz .-:~ izmc-=di.=92to1.y. Sccond, all :i.1 r'w:::i.o:1 QB liq-.1-;: er; to ha é:.:at:ro':o:1 at rr.-.1 .-. i i1ird, all gzeri, sick and in.i i:1:-. .--_.;. pe.ruo:.».-:-» '§_'¢E*_!'1b"- =.-=2 u:zr=.'o?.e to re. -not the jut-'r:Qde:' are to ho evacuated inland at .T'¥';';"- T?I-Tome. .I.x.c r.-m: fa : an aymritncss rep:-;-'1-, we bake you to San Fr.-maiaco, chore F~.-5;. -T -T _-Q-'8 vobzln 1'-ranzzzittor unit is an the :-zar-0. Gaze in San Fr~..n=L$<*0- <1; - - ._ -..- _-.151 --_ v - _ . __ 1- . _ ~ -- -- ' S5 11;!!! ..{ro:-In '1'-h:.shill overlooking; Lise city, .1 can see the h5_:_:.u > O back uzf the ha.1~ nou:~, '~ any r.:v3 blur.» in -the di.st-.Lz'.rsj;_.- and 1-:. 1?. on the face was-.; breeze from thr: _- '0:5-ma. Below tum £rs1gh ce:~.s = 1-re ;,Ius'- -'..:'7'-3¬ 2. the harbour 2;-.2. we -'.=dmaP;1n§; :i3 ;'~lt2'i }15§-- 1-1~;--ii-5-7;-r_.§?§ ;;";:!'%a-{it the -:;'.1;._~.: V;-,.~, 1:.-e do:¢l;&- In the street people go -moat t»?=e:4:=" _ ;§;_¢_§_;a"#;__;"1-_5:_-;;_T:>92,'L'::§.':z=.'s:=o_an uunal, £01; more La s ss.=.:: -..¢ cf benazion here, for uz as;:_u.1 Z'»_ i ' ~"* :3};;';gj'Z_-, ; v- - "-1.;4;-::~.i:.':.~-2 < <;£-;-'1.-1.1-.*.=1,..i.uf.j 1..+:.'.;' is t.i-1011' e>:poc u-e¢5_ .plens,_ moment-srily. urging H19 pr-sple Oivzfiiar.to beErepm-cdness calm and go officiab z-.bo._.r-___ , 0 I . -r - in Q <. ".- p--.- .l';;.','.....I F" -. 92. -- 92_ ._. - . 1 ' ;1n92 :37 ?-|.., .1 ,4_92 -*?'Uq- 0.1 ' 1-..o 92- n::.;=='3..:.1.z.. . -. . _ :. . ~ _- .1-_~_;.:;"q~.~a.-..= :1..- _1. -._~ - - l - - " .- ~.-.r-.-; _--~ - .. .~ . 3..-."*1r=o::'.. . Q ...:_...a.';;v.. , .1 .-41>" 5i :'. .,...... ;-V.-:r:;£. cm}. _'t no:-cl; Lo *.;.:u$~. gzox-p:. WC 5 .".'..l1 I1: ~-ir_-a: it-9 15630-."" b3.c92:-.1: _:;- '92 Q -' *7 .. . ' . ., -4 4.0" 3. .,.Lu'..Z:. -.. . §}. .-215 - - . .5." * 1; c:>;::=* R-.:.;. TC. .* once more from Joan Alden, chain. -.;'. <_-. 'V- > n... -_ I -.4 92-A -... 1-H -AK» J | w, r .1; gone to the Pacific Coast to -_. it < C-6.2: . -::..".' ' .. T :...... ,_. .. -'.!¬;{.>I1. . . -P - 1:0 Ix ? --....-- _ -.¢. .- .-- . -. ... J _,. - -'- 92 92vI u--'Q-J. --. Icr of nu?r~ - . . -.-. -o:-.-.--1:. 1:: to no in 111:-. place. in L . - 1 . - - .. . .1.- inc 1-.~.".:y ~:-..-_.-.-:1 :.r-=n"-~a2- we h;-we hari 44. - .' -92.-J. . .. .2» . 11.,"_'. :7.92-. . . 0..."--:._o.'. arr; -.-.2-.9 like. Jusi. o fez»:- I. 1 1.5. FT. J .T:_¢D-Q-r-G" ' H - - 92. .;.:.1_',r . at r,. ~92-' Uta : .- '.:..§92s a:..".i . .- ;. fu.n:- anion. h .:r:ic-rm: 3;. 1-he at VI :2 - or. p.-.;;o :6 c-.. 1-... m.:1u..';l. Ha nag.-' chanj -1.. -~ _ Q pozmt of a .;"L.'.. .' .,j:,on women and c. :.iJ ..:.-.." at. ail hours ..-';.'|:'2 -berm workim :."'.__1.;'.;=r orders. .=hi.1 .;;. . " .i'.'. 3.7: _--. I-zners: and .:'iEr= ..' ": :.; _-.u:;o: b=.=-rgcs are opp:-ocon1_' If bu ~go:.= co] .. ..-.-r.:- .1'c.£1on"c s1g:1~;;1 oz*c;"1..; .'. - cm <-I by to as.:.-5.oi- in ..]_'L- resume ¢=;.a:a1.i.cns . 1 Ge sh: .':: L yam .'-. - ...:. ,i;'£= . .. curl 1=m:.>l:.c=:. foroll p.;:'.:.¢on:';, at : _.-or-" . 1 0* 92 -¢ -v @- . .-..=..y-"'3 , all A:'.o: i:.-;..:-. Fm. _~~.>-:.r .- .....e :..3 to g ..._ I . -.-. . -.- officials: Ro e-a_ur5:.:ent to my 1. Ho 01:; #1: to ;-. ;-.-::-.:'.'.":. S .T.l.'i-I - ; hm o"i;m:-."- -:3. ' 31- .3 c..».=:.l, simppirg, c1.e;-:. §_:.;, ccokizg, 21 ob -:3-' 2:2, " of- ";he. - " » :.'iL .=_'-.l- 4.-. 1. '4 1 ! _'.Y|'q 1 . _ -I-I . 14 . - izrea things: _ .A1dc.~r._ 92 V Ivu tho: . to tho in-::~.dc»r or '2: _:::I o:*::. ax-,7 ' .;-..:....-Y.-.2.¢.;.- izc c, bot: 124- t '9292v -. . . . , - ._ ,.. _ _ -. 1' , _ _ ., r:z:tl;in=.-:3 in our c1i=.-"c 1;:?:ir;ary code. 0 I l 9-.2. '. -=tnc.. - _..-.- a... .2-.....,; v ars .-.mcp .'. those given -3,? au'*.i=;.-":'.:'.e-:1 offici: -I. ._ -~ .L. "n._ 2'3 ;-.i-. ; "T - 7 1.14 .-4.: L-_,'-J...-_ 121'. H . , n -I -'. IQ .' -- i:..s;.].t. argr of the is'¢ac2;.1g_ar.:g*. I Z; . c." - :3... i.'4'c."Iu"1-U v ...L1.'_-' .3- > "-chir-1. ' '1 we '2-izc sc,:"=2.: <2. . :'+'.5 b1:I _1u'l;in: H-1'-;e.t..L. ..- '1'}.-:.:'a .':r.'.' been heavy . .|.TiL '. -.-L-32.;-,'. 301:2-e oi '-.3-1'.-..+ -o .':t;'~:.p0i"t.'3 that. r-:1.-'-..~j_".:-":25 1'ai'u.-';-.*-; .20 sub.-nit '.--.":.'; '.'r-or. toe 63235 .s3-;:-:-" .-::1 c:;':ss acconmt 112:. ';;:-cz.-least over :4 10381 .-.-.-:=l:i.:".g, bleodixzg man. L~1.-»:_ '...:.; .e521 of srrexaae. c-<.-:.'..::';..-1;-; ';;b.:'oug,h0v.i'. the io- otood by t.'*:a:i:: aides. I ::."..=.. _ 1 ca.I ham: over seer. an-. 2...-3 *.:zo,- our paoplo h~_'-:..:ixri'.':J:. oa c1r.*:~_ c-.::<1 c"+_-:.- z-.g& .:.Imiio piqrsinal pom ba-.1. t-hay lane:-: shat they 11. r-.ouiC:i.d::1'st.'.'Ly balieve they would soon ' 1 .1. few seconds: tho square was a a".:'.a:.h1 "*' hlozis :;i .".}.'. thg»S.'."_ barre ::n:~.-3, Bzzaan .1 C Q4 r._-'...-311' to nlr- 5 -"...-ii .=.-5:.I.n, h=r;¢.:"..~3 of I".-;.. .;".=.: la.-.~.aia:'.: as he was struck on the his 1.; Y-*=_ am} fell, but. foe-cad ;-1 .='.ic;-c. 3.5 I Iratchod, the soldier GIG? - Ion .. !:92:i.£- at ... 1 or 2 1' inn} m.-1:.-3, 1.2.".-an é;.:-1.;;.:' his club. It's no use, he sszi .T-'1 ¥5_; -34 . .. - .. v,.'- .. | .*='- ; Y --- - '.- .¢-1C Q. 1 . :::rZ>o:' 2.3 i 92* 2-;~m:-5 :-1: 3. ; .i'9292.l1 E; . -- - -:-.-.2 -of the D%L j? ' '. 92'92'3 92- -' ¢r92..|.J§.arn-I noun .- y _L.A92 _ -J $1-Ii¢92nlL92-'n1§ FJC J--L92P .- > . ._1._ . .:=- 1;-.-2 3:-at out em} r;-9292-. . '=.".- :..::~.:~ .. . . 92'1l3.'.I-.'- - E J I ¢ . -.¢ or . '. 92'| " » an-W->v. "! I t=-"J1 S-ti. 1;"- ops: in Ii. .'. _:.;: :> .z';-'_-_ a'j:;r":~::'!nrLr-92o'o 1-1.. ;-J .i.rrva.1=.on vesscln J.-ii.- i 5-.<.c..;-.=.L. .~. -:12.-_ ...-.. _ c-can ." " . .- ..J.1:t. a m.'.::nant-E $:;.:a..;.i_::_'j '.: l;.'.;.:;-:.'.;;..... on-c:' :1-.::'.;-.' oz. no-=1 -;' -rs bra ".-1..'r:*e;1 u om of ii-s o'.a-.1 b;..~-res. .' -;::.7:5 5- -:_;; 1.11.. Lida ncj;--.£ . .,= ._...- 4- -- --¢.-I. bu ---R-.,.'.. 'l -. ._, -_u . --.-._92, .J..- "- nun-'C..-Q.-A-u:_ut.=.'92.'~; u- 03;. '.;:LL|;' ...--. .l -.-. arr . ..=.".u:92_-"15; 2 -. ran.-...... 1.r:1 2.}:--_'z-.1 ;_:0:~.;, arm ' . 3-.= . .-1 .-.- ?.~..-1'6 hr-ate ..-_.,_in #1:.-1.3:, too. - .2"? I. is 'arin;3, 3-0.: a spacial : epc:~i; 5 :-'c..-. ...;.-.- :1;'..;.; .._:¢. If ~v9292'-. - _or ¬'_4--H1. :;: .1 t-1:2 ; var? simiblc jet bs.-=:b5.n~ 1.35 a'.t'.=-no ' '.-".'.=.:;":";-"a 1:<.jc»r cities. It is hsliavcd '.'- :.- L; *-:-.-v:':.»::. It La do'.=btf-. u_'L, say car :-1~.r-" -raia." -..."" ¢92 may no ret:J.i..-rtior. oi any k£::: . 4-.- , viii? has 1: Mn . -. tho I L22; ai- ~..ll .:r the :.i;t::ck 1-ms la.u._.."~~h:=: . with the £1".- . -.--. oi '1: .:=E.n F1 C..'::L =CO. . .-_,_._, '1 '.o..'- ex:- ';;:92- :1'.L¬= izras-.c::~_ .*;*.= :.t-:.'.<:'-:,-*_"_. People we = ':.>::ca»;-:::e of 8115?]? t:'.'.;-_.-:;x - -1 Third Strep-t azaz-0:2: £2-cm t.!;c-.- 22.11" - I.i. .'1I'j' 8 i'02 6. 0 0 00 '.- t alcng and zhc_:;~.*_n_¢; as usu.,1~ despi .-.:¢ 92 J, - .92-J s 1-airs £011:-2: ens sumo :Ln c.c_ this ke some c.-z.-:li.'."1.:z::-r, e your t;';:a'£.c-.-;'? ..;. .-.112.-:'.§'; 1:"..- ve gr-send: of po'1'.:a aca:;- Oh ~o ...~I baa 53-D3135 Q." "$1.-I?I".:';'. 7i- .7 ~ -~ - --on-w. -itpacl - F..-.I..o§ .1 E .-'-.';L.I* ire G.'_L' J-I»: - :4 ' mar: :11! la.-P oer, our L1 -khpa have occup$.<.:'- 2:: city - you are 6- -¢. .--rdez-e-d 1:: ;'i:.-I'.i.*s'e;92' :11 bread and f. ras; . vegetables to *.,._.'-- 3'5 .-...~."-"e Hotel, new -if-_-L-can ovs-2' by our troops. You sill do 4:; ; u.L:;.;".' iizriszrr-92.»*>*.ir¢_cg .--Ju:=t. :2 2; T-"- =1:-.~ 'bc:::Lc::s, za zma. 1?-':~.2.1. .... u I-'4' .. ..hB...'._ ; 1'-___ I t.- 1. |.2 _'.- ';'?-Z=.'~.. '.. _'..;". Q.-J .. 1 .'... " .!'_-. .'..~:. .4. ur:-IS.! -J :- ;2naon hasn't fimsimcd yet. Hera are .-.___"_ 7 92 * 0 . t 0 O an H 7 Q ..-E -----J.-I --"--0 -_... O .~-,_ ' "_ 2 .-> - fl '-_ - I .1 -. ..'._..,. . I i Iv L - . . - .. ,. ird £29.-. IR; »=...... -- -?-..--.:92@:- :L .Sy L 2:? -C :_l..'.-4.;'9- F-Q... -~''. kw t»...,..7¢ in . ..J.::.::. I5.-.2321. §:'5:._*_": :-.L. 1 .., 1.4._._1"" 1-1... ".._.'.'-5* $5. . '31" 5.1.... --'2_e;_ 3:1 3:Um ._,, ,,.___ . . . ;__-; . ._aa:.-ac. ':. :.'?J.u: wt.-._ .92 -- -. -- :"Op_l:-:;..._ _, . .'-. _. . ; f". .~-=- 1 1' , L-5 .. - ._ .. _--19-g» -.---.- - - .- - _»~w,'-- . ' _..~ _ . L - . ...-cr~.=' ca-=.&1:_-."' - A _- 92 . _ ___ _ -.,_A___ c_ L, ,. ,_ - -,_..1, __.-.._, ;.~ {W '"!': 92Z'f!'. I-.1 1'._'---.~-'--ll - » I - .-* .. .,..-_ _w ., ,.g2...-._,' -if . 92 . -4, 92.._":'_- _- , hi "¢ --- I 5... ;-.. .--_- IL? ' -@92-. _ 1- 1 -1 _--|-92 v. ._;-r~_r- . ---..- G § '_a_v="'Q _; j',¢l,,__,-._ if, __ - . 4 .-. A-92 .-1-. '..; 92 av _ ' -. 92 .- C-4'21 ' _.. .,--,.,.v. s92. _ 2 .~1U|~- ¬.- ,.¢,._- 1- .'. J 0- . ,. - "_ _ .. ¢¢.-,,.-- 1.-I- . -_.- - »|-_- --"4 § l1.iJr;:;; c-c::..|u;s- 1 I-*2 an--~-:. '3:-1-.-¢. A. v:..is~:-'::e==.a--:,.."..'."_'".*e'c ...-C-;> I-Iul.aIl _0I: 4 _ § -.~~;w:e were beaten, t+:.:.-~.<;e.;1::~'.am _.:.=. =.-3; , bar ; their coamzge prev-z~uv.* :,- I V ,;.1;le pm-son :'z"om cateringit: 5-vi»-2 _-uh, __ $2 1.-':1i.-.4. F '."'::f." the' M31 baa they awn 1- ..i.:-" I-.--1 :.;_m.is. Today our whole m':.'.on embo;;-;=.a --.._-92_ ._ tin» 63:11"; ._ we at no» -.¢;- ...._ 1 - 2'81-Z2. .'2 j:i-.'1». S;:.I":am1sco. r.:'.; 0 u 1» .'; }.1' a ;_:e. :..'.:-'2m :-Pr trcr-,;.. --:.z;,-. '.'. people are 1:-01.-2.13 <11. - . .2; ".... .:= u:- 5-. .-..: :s1;; along the -.~"-i: r.I='..Ii.k6. He Jo :.:.__.- L~.-'.-2.2-a.i:> cliapatchar-5 dear. A z.- are um: at the :-5.1.11-:'.-:=c: es?-..~:.,2., ..- ' 1!}- -- - pr oz-.chsd the d1:=pa'hc'ma: . :.l's-2:"tun and cn1.u3..' -*cn have Just -'.p- '11.. 2-.-:=.-¢;;,'r~edoing here? jgb ¢ '.1-:..3::;.- -31...;-lie." ve gm. to -.121 . yrm. ; e.,--Q-.. :3 in the g:qn'-are5:: Q -I-_ .. } =1...ce Hotel uh-=1; ~ -.. cf the §!"- ---'-.'=1:J baa:-d I the g,==_-r.-=.-r_ . P ¢_ ~ 2124:. tell as-"n to gm . . -- 92UH :-5 ! hi! am to a-and a:-ldiars am-:7 - £==.-.. 92 -' J . g--11315: 1>;,.,> _ 1.1".inlis 'm;c. max:1.he;;'1I cam:here . am-_; =1.1 2. want cars and 1 or mt-. to uiear the . I _ . éak . }'.F;'i';l.'. .. . - 1- .7I .1. IF YO - EL . 3: 1~n>:-3: -:.-1' StewartBill when he s.vt:u3.<.m' 'i'-;'-"~'~35*"-' -1- -T3-ES J18 Kabul. -. vi f-T 1:. 3:;-".1"-2'.- .. ilwv,;l :';,absnt. all we've been :.=...--:-zg= LLTIE 1-4" --.._nes '."::-r5.1.1 92,1a- .;;. ;_. . . ,92. _,,._-.1 7-.- _ :I*92;t- Elan-.e'i-10L ,am. utis. I"m I92I:.~.:=-1'.e":-.-*1-1~."i>h-Ti-H3 - ~43 m. ...-5'. ~..._.~_ _ .1 :_ _1;-* no-e '. - I 1-newas o92=_5ht-not to 'co::;.92'r:rat:: U.-:".é:>_. 2:111. .;.;1.-L .s.-1 we '13 .-.. :;-"ret.he;":-e hen-a, kzilling hundreds. T:|.,_ ;-==- mast -Q zhe fu d. 1-!:-= .dn"i.- it he batter to _1n£=t...0h, I don -1, ir..:.= - -=-goitustoguthm -92 no g .-Z.»_.$_'_-. --L». -92J _ -Q - ...-.1, . = . 4; : - @-:-119:. mm-.:,I just <:ca"<. k11:1....SL~m=--zmcs I think...Gherli¢ I cm-'2.think .I_. - 3,1;-,5§;r;§_3<§;-.31, uithnut,few. 3 can T. of yo=...Oh, Chas.-lie aw Ti'°=I-'=921'"? P- ;. :. will work? v 3's¢ . ._ || 7 ---~~r j .-.2:-e_ aretine: w-banI"ve tc-a::l=':.'¬d -ma. - - 92.-u-_. " ;_=-_' "= * nv :7 ~»~¢-==g¢,.,~.~~." '' - - _. _ --'-- . :.:_-1; 1*. y u < .ie? ¥."n;:.*.. aboutthe ::b.i.:: :*-1:5? ' __ ___....__ _.- --.;.;.;,_' _¢;~-- <-. -_ - .. - _ 1 - _ ..-.- q . ~,._ ."£~'_ -_.--¥?écn"t-hf. I -92 '' £ :. :3'-1:.:.:.3=.-~33-.:%:an-I " '92 'J .-1'"-"-P:_ . children 1:»: Sims yea-'.'.=.;.-.t:5';=g'we . when 1%.- -%-~;-1--5;;-¢¢§;,Zi1.;;ethe a:»t.;-:4;.--:»-_-gm I 1.¢...;.:.--.-;.;;e<1 all up r921.g.ht. i |2¥3"~'11}cc+:s. Tb! -'9' " '-1 to 2: -.:. I-ir.a'-; I d-1-1*can i¬ot;i.§.:=g*'I.1 than. stop A the-u-..=;.a ts-..':.:'.: war; 2+-f .~ ._¢, av}-cu andtar, kid:-».But I knau all I could say I ca:;"t_h you, '54.-,ee_ =u:o:|dcred...... Iwa _ -5- --.-j_~»$- 5%?-*_.~.. -. - Y ~ - ' -' ; ' . ' . ":- §J'~'* 4:" * -92 wk-.1=s= -5 2 an-:2 _z:1c'_-re.ocma. I-col:2+. thezx, by thegoal can-::.._.__;._ ;_;;-7 A --u'_""-1. _*»'r_~'?...;.....'_ -_¬. __%.__7-_e"__ .1 . . ___m_ J_ _r_ _. H: -i * . . . . t - 5 -if, - T11; :.- ' 1-I-.g1'.=t,»hear-.2. go Goa:-Q... " '..;--23. are al-scat hem. Get If-at .=-i-5' 11"_ ?.=n-not Thoma for Hu9_:>':I'.-... - ~45 - . _ A B_¢£._::_-_._;__._ :-=-; -.'*-., - __! __" y ____; h _ _ __ I __ _ " ,-' - 1:. - - .--~-» .u 1 - .7.. ,,,_V .:_".V -, _ ._.,_:-I-'_?::-3?-' N,,. 9_ _ 1q= B<= ?~ " _! - » _ 0 O A J F ,, 0 i -n 0 5 i '.'|I - -I 11.-. 5-u .--2: 2: -'.." ? :11:.~= --:1--:="_"»1-.;-*:.. -11 . E . 2: c-; 'o .- L o¢ _q._..;_I ~ r 2 the isp 1;,-.15:-': . 92. ; e i - I -,,- - » I',_ 92 - . -P." ;...'_'| L . 1 .: a.'._ .|.- _ - -1-.. J. . . -1. _, w__ _-.. '_.. -J -- . ..--.._ g _ to L.C»v¬!_ _, L111.-O _ . S531 JOB? 3';-'_-_3_»;' . . 1_'.g_;---- _-._ . _-; I , ,. , - '- -o ¢-1»--R- -1- .'~- --- ~. Va -__._ M. .-.::.:.. .-92._._ ' ..9" .-.::= ...... -*... r- ; r-92 4:-.n:.._ . a:.u.'} -- - as care- = 4 In t-;;'_-_ it-...921u ' - I1.-..'.="1; I _ 5 -92--_- a .1. ¢ Q-.1... :'".~ -L'u.. I:no ;;:...'. 0:6-er your 3:35? I do II -I *_.01: 3-'o=x.~wdors . I oz: ~'1; -<.-Q wt 92mnt- to shoot. you. C;-ale: -_¢."..;: men to be-gm 51- on-..:=;-.2 -' .1 | . " '.' 1 - v -.5 9. I '--| - 1 92--~'.,rp-Ivv-I-an ;.r1 -- - raid, QEDER1'*C'Ui't"'1'..._.. F 3 ??? ..l ~...~:.-12;: . I - ..-.:* 3."-2;; on 2-1* . 2 £ .!£=; hits aw - =?'==.~3ioIi ¢ ..92- i -'.._- -A _ - - '.:-»¢-3:23#75 Par.-s COTLFO'R.AL .. Thi:nan is - :- an F:-can a 123." 1-1 _..-_n :. :i;.l0'_:.-1."the soldiers as thr-2;: leave with the *? . ..._ 1- . ._,, --..::3¢.-':»-.. 2: v.=.-:- u;.w_- .'.:2~..-'~-11:7.-a-.5 too. They 1:7», are lm-2:1 up ¢.ga1.mS i. = r1._:p;.ri<:3r-.;s'is .; -'i.n,; ..:;.».".:i'.'.|£n;to the B91di£;:'3, $9:,5;§;hjnsl3 :.-.._, r:'~'e:;&1.a::==; 3:: -. 1»-=.-= o1 1'i:-.:sr oorz -;£.:n-.»a-.=to s~'.:nn and about v: ::." :. mu men. £; ~;:»...-.:::1I;v .."-'1: '25.-32-3 ;-.-o1 not are canjrisg out hf-.1. :2-dero. Yes? " 92- -' ii I "'hP-r am ' -P I-.0 ...-uv:'. -r'e0 a-v- '_ . an-; _u-an c_ 1n_ I-*I. 92n92 .-.- +- g-v-u v-..-.:..: 5_..u.:.-,-J,» VT !- n Juc ULL-ll-C-I -8 -92"'3,.,r-no :.:a.aLn.- -,-..i.._-_--_-7 l..L_:»_--sq -,.--Innun u..4..:i LJ-. -..._I":- 1. ,1.nu 0-. ._ 1»:?.x-'e:--is 1:».:ir.1>:-.9;Ht: it 21- - e..'o4|" 3 -'1 .n' '3 :.-__- 1-.:.-;:»i:c.i 1:. ;.i the :':.~15.!2'4 ; L» ..-.?I1_¢ Q ;_~" .? ._;J. -.cr.92-flak: .-2-1-~:-:2 .'.>ga:'-.:~. 1 -;' .11;-'s.:.n -- .l.' :.=.;'-.1.':c-:.c1...... '::r. r.s.- of r-2 =_=;-1 mt: 11- :11. Thayare r:-fuming, to obs}; him. He s:>i=.:.ir=c. 4.-.. 1."L . 11': i£§L;'.r.-io'.'-r.1--:.;.92. 15:55 hifired! 'l h-'2train d:'.:=_ _'-r.1>cl:o:' has I-5&5. J gr-eat 2:»-:.-::t::::s~n':.221-: in I-'i>3."6'?.* £-.. .{';':.-o;:.5- H ¢=.'a don-2it - 1.15 shot bha all :.i:Ee"=:. Fr-tar. S:l3.I |'. ,I. c=;; Yer ..- Q .nd mm the President s'_:>2a.=:s again. I.-afli and gentlemen, -:.:.: .":-esmdent oi . me Uni. - -ed States. - . 1";-E, Fa;-"._'.- .'a:1 ¢iti.zcr.:_ 12' I:.:.'?a :'."_ .-*:.-a1"- :=::ccIc:»:.n;; nr:'.-=3. D?-s:p£.1;e S'td-.':..-.-.-..- ::i'= lu:-..""y 5-'2! 663" !-1{__,lS:I.»J.;1+, w save -ia=-1*. l|;~::-".1.-1:. té.-.t U1 -p;:"ec'edG3'L¬! rains in Stanraa for the' .=a.<.'.t ea-r:'=r imave resulted :i.-:1 c15.s:.:;t.-'-.=;".e; floods 1-!'t:.92 have wipcé -h out mgr v5.1.'i.ag;os an; ;.>;d:=- thcr.::.:.I:d:; homles-s. It taken for gr.:nts.i that $.::.::ri.ca will I1-zip '..._:-ase 5.1sa:;teJ--ridden pcuphc. iI'.?-1& =?6I', aincc at agapacr the Stt>:..i.='.:; '@'_'-;. :*-1-' sink any of cur rhijza going; to thhr aid, I ;'..:.-»:- -.92;I'.':'»*::z.". to 591:1 Talia? fleets to the f."= 0:: vzi.-: .-.'L92':::. 8o:;gr='s;:-'.= in e.r.'.¢»_r ,=;-:.-:. :;~:..=.2.i.on §;*has ap'5.:-op:-:..-;1.c>6 $125',O00,0C>O to .:r.~-:-er tam cont. Ii S"»z=nia 21.3.1 clesmt. frvn $.14: 4/ 7 3::-rs.si:-n, we will be .:1--'12 no c.{ 2 er Gvcn nor-.+ direct airi"c-<- 02.: i .-=3-_Z-.ow czzn in need. Fbaan:-abilu zur polity is nu ¢.92.'.~.'-under, but rasimzmrc ta ti-.-2 eni-.. 1.1 it 1.5 12:12 cine: Thai; we are gaimc-g. .'I#¬!.!i_I-I i;l nation; are r..u* =;'ir:g- to 0:11 -;-c».-ri. and t-he $1;o:in:92 gurerlzvcniz :-.& sire:-.r3y patting out peace fee-lam. We ' shall co:.t.i.n=.zr:- to stesi for-:' at |- a '.'.ru1 cl'-, confidant th-at 0:13; o!':c-a92.;-:1. jaaaca. am: gs-rvi will can 1:: g-min p?.¬'-'!lF- ..=.::'. good 92-"ZiF.1. Ifarxjy 0;? us are r .;,'.i.1'4:, mri; Fc.=:.'.r Z-1: cnlgsr by suffering can we .5-..=. 5'c-crm tcget-luer. Fer e oeat to gr:r¢' 1t in n=-..::e:-:.m *1; --92- that tba seed grain aha.-.'1d parish. Life oer:-as cut of death. By suffari-D3 '55- the e.1-2*-..-9',use arc b:-_1ld ..:.g a Ira -.»and.:.r.i-.1'._'a;.n%. 1:131 813V -E:l die. Once again the ii ,=_ -spirit in->6ccaquuzmd the sword. We am not 30%, free but slowly we 8-1'0 fresh . -. _-x »;-e.--in ...-_ mruelvas. 00:4 sill is ween:-.ng e'~-11 and 2::-.ru1n.r:r: fr'0 Q "1 . r .- -,--l -' v. a- T -.?'.J - ---92¢-[1 -.5 92' -1; V, ---'4'-.. - . '.. .._.-. 1, _.-- ._.... -j .- l-_:~'.: ._'-1. . ..- .l - I | "'r I . I I .|. ...- Q1" -..' -.';:::; -- Q ' .;. .. Q», 1' - no - . .1. . = -r:._ U3 - r- 2 '='1t.-"'. 1.25 a---c.-. _~1..~.-bug ve have 6055-. . 1 , -1 _-I -:1-- :-.l 111 - ,4! In-IQ SJ u _ ' I _: ____ .. I . , . 92.' 1'1. .1 'F"2I .- .. .2-4 1-.?T=.'.".h G.-. .r.F . ;.'G2.1 5v. ._¢'_,!§';.".|.IZZ 1!! i ' ' -.1-'12.".-. .'_ Li?- L .'. .I. - _ . . __ 1 _ _ - _ - _.-.-. _ ~. , 1.--,_,, '* . ' 92 . ."-'. ".- ? . - .C --. U-. u .'_§_;.. -J_ -L ' - 2 _ Q- - ,. ..' 8 -"' _ . ;|.-c 1:. l'.{...--- 2 212:5 .ra.;;. u.-T =41 £=.'b'i .-:a=.'!:a. -..__= ..u..1:.'.:=.r s 1.2- ' -- ' s - 92 .'3. -'. 3-.0 Hazy tir;-air: The pa :;.~¥_;- oz" 5:2:-g .. V1.-1'-xy- Q.-92_;-.; rg u v a-. cnwgconu C:.i.i'.a';§.-: L-aazir-r con:- *. -.* '.'--:- -. r. -+--. -'92 I ...92-- _ - HS '.I- . . .. -- -.---.-'==;. ; ¢;-._: or-g:~.:~_5.-.s-:5 their .-...- --Qrzaticn c~.r.d .-l_ J ' §-. E LI. '.:=h.-_-.:.-:>l. -.'i.;._...... 9 .-=-.; -.-.....=;.. F:1c.*._ .'.. r.s;-:.= - "... .'92...,; .... » .... F-J. '. J-I--é-._, r.~.-I _= ti-*2 will the po;w1:.I-_=_o:. was 5; :-'- ._ _L_:. __-ht._ _ .:.".~:=-s- c=:e-;:.=-'-.- £'.'i;,1: r. ;;riti;;L1 51:2: '.-::~=?'r .: ..'..:;:_n'r.sh_::.*c. 30:2. cg nrrs. ; -1-- - -Q --'~->. "."."*_--:>p; .r:..'i'.*.-:1? -1... SIL.-- -' .'.!. -'. 5; ' I . .: .11i-2. '1' .. '-i; cu:-cas's:"'_;. - - non-violent Z»: Q :-use carpaignr.:~:i:.~.l Ir 9 -.. I ._,'. _!1. - - a . _._,._ -.-Io - -7 av-n-92 + r92'-I ml--r -_ %..-ika in 11:.--:-.-5:1-_*,, _ 1*;.-;.=,. _,;,__.;:.=.. t § ah -1'1-_-2rain as 1% i1rr;:f.92:;;:.-."': '11} $.12l~icnt;.=.~ ! 392'II1.-==- y, Ixlatwsna 1n,19b921- It c 115PI»~%'1'1 ¢ . - . l v- pl L-Ti? "*1 'm_'1§;-.= - nn '1'5;; §1i!';- L '-LE1 : it ,1 . Q 5- 21:3;-,+ 51, ten, 1.:5'r:n:-1:-.::-- -.. -.-.'.c= 1.-;-11;: if 2:3: ti.-.-_~;~. 1-Lat' ~ ix h.'1:....'. - -'-1". I.- "--1 a- S. . ..___ - i H-..92=a 3.:-z:.:'-r::.:.:~ the r.ma.. -. - --1-J; ¥ i ' /'- :=;~p:-uni, ton, and it can 31'; , 32 -- 11:-5 paase -- real passe -- can . =..-2 ?1'.".15L'1 01" hate and distrust and 'e:.....»92"" c»:*.t'1:.2t. all else.- - |92 -1. '| '__-Iv .- ..J'?