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Part II

Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of the Soul, Metaphysics

Introduction

This part comprises selections that pertain to the second main philosophical discipline in Augustine’s division, which in the Dialectica Monacensis (selection number 2) comprehends all “real sciences,” i.e., all disciplines that theoretically study the nature of reality, as opposed to the self-reflective/regulative study of the operations of reason in logic, and to the prac- tical/normative considerations in ethics. Accordingly, the first section contains selections that present the generally presumed conceptual framework for studying the nature of reality in medieval philosophy, namely, Aristotelian hylomorphism, and the discussion of some important problems related to this general framework in connection with natural philosophy. The selections of the second section deal with the nature of the human soul, an entity of particular importance, not only because it constitutes our nature, but also because of its peculiar place in the overall scheme of reality, situated as it is on the (presumed) borderline between material and immaterial reality. The selections of the third section deal with this overall scheme of reality, as it is the proper subject of the most universal metaphysical considerations. Finally, the selections of the last section deal specifically with what we can know by natural reason about the origin and end of this reality, i.e., the existence and nature of God. The first selection of the first section is the complete text of Aquinas’ De Principiis Naturae (“On the Principles of Nature”). This short treatise provides an ideal introduction to the basic concepts and principles of Aristotelian hylomorphist metaphysics and philosophy of nature. Besides its obvious virtues of succinctness and clarity, what is truly remarkable about Aquinas’s presentation is that it makes quite clear how the principles and conceptual distinctions introduced here are generally applicable regardless of our particular scientific, physical explanations of the phenomena that we think instantiate them. For example, it is always universally true that a substantial change results in the ceasing to be of one thing and the coming to be of another, whereas in an accidental change the same thing persists, only in a different state than it was before the change. The universal applicability of the conceptual apparatus developed here renders it a powerful tool in the analysis of all sorts of natural phenomena regardless of our theories MP_C19.qxd 11/23/062:32AMPage152

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 152 activity oftheultimatesourcethismotion.Therefore,Buridan’s the existenceofmotioninuniversecannotprovideevidence fortheactualexistenceand (as isclearlythecaseifits for metaphysicsandnaturaltheology.Forifmotioncanbe present withoutanactualmover ticular problemforAristotelianphysics,Buridan’ssolution hasfar-reachingimplications to beenormouslyinfluential,upuntilGalileo’stime.Although thisseemstobejustapar- solution, intermsofthepostulationanimpressedforce, theso-called of thesurroundingair),basedonkeenobservationandcareful reasoning.Buridan’sown arguments againstAristotle’sownsolutiontotheproblem(providedintermsofmotion we wouldcharacterizeinmodernphysicsas mover, whichdoesnotappeartobethecaseinmotionofprojectiles(i.e.,casesthat Buridan’s criticismoftheAristotelianprinciplethatmotionrequiresactivityanactual theological orarcanemetaphysicalreasons.Thelastselectionofthissectionpresents added totheirnumberinthepresentselection. principle ofindividuation.TherelevantthesestheCondemnationareindicatedbyan‘A’ of thethesesAquinas,especiallythoseconnectedtohisconceptionmatteras targeted theradicalAristotelianismofLatinAverroists,butitalsotouchedonsome already beenindicatedintheGeneralIntroduction,sweepingCondemnationprimarily the textof1277ParisCondemnation,reproducedinpartnextselection.Ashas Algazel, Alkindi,andMaimonides). the critiqueofAristotle,Avicenna,andAverroes(althoughcompleteworkalsodealswith studying thedoctrinalconflictsofperiod.Theselectioninthisvolumeonlyreproduces their reductiontoprinciplesmakethisshorttreatiseaparticularlyusefulsourcefor the systematicpresentation,usefulsummariesofmaindoctrinalpointscriticized,and to Aquinas’student,GilesofRome.WhetherornotitistheauthenticworkGiles, come from between Aristotelianphilosophyandreligiousdogmacatalogedinthenextselection,which Aristotelian metaphysicsandnaturalphilosophy.Thisinevitablyleadstotheconflicts ous miraclesbydivineomnipotencethatareapparentlyexcludedtheprinciplesof claims, suchasthecreationofworld their applicationtophenomenaconcerningwhichreligiousdoctrinemakessomeexplicit psychological phenomena. apparatus isequallyapplicabletophenomenawestilldonotunderstandindetail,suchas the elementsofmodernPeriodicTable.Indeed,thisisalsowhysameconceptual applicable whetherwetaketheelementsinquestiontobefourAristotelianor the presenceofelementsinmixedbodiesorwhatwewouldcallcompounds)isequally problem ofAristoteliannaturalphilosophypresentedinthenextselection(concerning characteristics ofthisorthatphenomenon.ThisisthereasonwhyAquinas’ssolutiontoa as such,abstractingpreciselyfromtheparticularmechanismsthataccountforspecific generality intheseconsiderationsconcernsanypossiblenaturalchangeanditsconditions concerning theparticularmechanismsthataccountforthosephenomena.Forlevelof ving theexistenceofGod. by many(indeed,practicallyall)thirteenth-centurytheologians andphilosophersforpro- serious challengetotheAristotelianargumentforexistence ofaprimemover,adapted By thelatemedievalperiod,Aristotelianphysicscametobecriticizedformorethanonly However, themostimportantdocumentof“officialreaction”totheseconflictsisstill However, thisapparentlyunlimiteduniversalapplicabilityoftheseprinciplesinvites De ErroribusPhilosophorum impetus can moveabodylongafterthemoverhasletitgo),then (“The ErrorsofPhilosophers”)dubiouslyattributed (“The ex nihilo inertial motion (from nothing),orthepossibilityofvari- ). Buridanproducesabarrageof impetus impetus theory posesa , proved MP_C19.qxd 11/23/062:32AMPage153 of intellectandwill.However,thispictureraisesapeculiar problem inconnectionwiththe imagination, and,finally,rationalhumansoulsmustpossess inadditiontherationalpowers developed bruteanimalsoulsmusthaveinadditionpowers ofperception,memory,and plant-souls obviouslyneedtohavepowersfornutrition,growth, andself-reproduction,more by theirpeculiarsubstantialformsmusthaveinordertoperform theirvitalfunctions.So, and soul;rather,thequestionwillbewhatsortofcausal powerslivingbodiesinformed question isnotwhatsortofcausalmechanismscanaccount for theinteractionbetweenbody integral partsofprimarysubstances(whicharethe agentsincausalrelations),the and bodyarenottwodistinctentitiesactingoneachother, butarerathertheessential, form. Notehowthisconceptioncangetaroundthe“interaction problem”:sincethesoul tial beingisitssubstantialform,itfollowsthatthesoulof alivingbeingisitssubstantial to haveitssubstantialbeing,andsincethatonaccountofwhichsomethinghassubstan- a livingbeingisalive.Andsincefortoliveitbe,absolutelyspeaking, which each other). although someauthorswouldtakeonlytwoorthreeofthesetobereallydistinctfrom functions, asensitivesoul,andyetanotheraccountingforherrationality,rational accountingforhersensitive vegetative functions,aornutritivesoul,another her corporealfeatures,suchasbeingextendedinspace,anotheroneaccountingfor several substantialforms;say,inahumanpersontherewouldbeformaccountingfor tial formsinthesameindividual(i.e.,doctrinethatsubstancehas in theformofAugustiniantheologians’endorsementideaapluralitysubstan- exerted asomewhatobliqueinfluencewithingenerallyAristotelianconceptualframework, theory ofthesoulingeneralandhumanparticular,Augustine’sconception unanswered. SoitisnowonderthatafterthearrivalofAristotle’sdetailedandsophisticated quite elegantlydealswiththisproblem,buthisratherskeletalconceptionleavesagreatdeal solution intermsofthesoul’sattentionrequiredbyresistancebodytoitsrule nate inthisasymmetricalrelationcannotaffectthatwhichdominatesit.Augustine’s of thisconceptioncausalityintermsrulingordominance.Forthatwhichissubordi- God’s powertomovetheentireuniverse.Butperceptionposesaproblempreciselybecause power tomovethebody,justasmovementofheavenlybodiesisamanifestation in themicrocosmofhumannature.Thus,voluntaryactsarejustmanifestationssoul’s as Godrulesthematerialworldinmacrocosmofnature,sodoessoulruleitsbody ena arejustmanifestationsofGod’scontinuouscreativeandsustainingactivity,so, universe usuallyassumedinpost-Cartesianthought.Afterall,forhimallphysicalphenom- have amonghisassumptionstheideaofcausalclosurea(mechanistic)physical the soul’sabilitytomovebodyisnotanissueforhim.Thereasonthathedoes has thefirsthalfofthisproblem:whathefindsproblematicisbody’sactiononsoul; on thematerialbody(involuntaryaction).Itisquitetelling,however,thatAugustineonly can actontheimmaterialsoul(insenseperception),andhow like themodern,post-Cartesian“interactionproblem,”problemofhowmaterialbody something Augustinefeelstheneedtoarguefor.Asaresult,hehasdealwith soul andbodyaretwodistinctentitiesahumanbeingiscompositeofthenot according towhichahumanpersonisnothingbutsoulrulingbody.Thatthe brief selectionsfromAugustinearemeanttoillustratehisPlatonicconceptionofhumannature, In theAristotelianframework,soul(inLatin, The selectionsofthesecondsectiondealwithhumannatureandsoul. animates any living–thatis, animate – being.Sothesoulisthatonaccountofwhich anima issimplytheprincipleoflife:that ) 153

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PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 154 the eyeitselfwouldpreventitfromseeinganyothercolors. nature wouldpreventitfromthinkinganyothermaterialnature,inthewaycolor material natures,theintellectitselfcannothaveanature,forotherwiseits activity thatcantakeplaceinamaterialmedium:giventheintellectisabletothinkall by thissortofsoultoperformthespecifichumanactivitythinking. rational soulinparticular:thenatureofintellect,whichenableshumanbeingsinformed Robert Pasnau’s comments and a rejoinder in the same volume, pp. 29–36 and pp. 37–44, respectively. andpp.37–44, Robert Pasnau’scommentsandarejoinderinthesamevolume,pp. 29–36 , Seealso 1(2001),pp.19–28. from theUniversalityofThought,” of theintellectinAquinas,seeG.Klima,“Aquinas’sProofs theImmaterialityofIntellect Foradetaileddiscussionofthisargument,alongwithanotherargument fortheimmateriality 1 material form:forittobe But howisthispossible?Afterall,ifthehumansoulformofbody,thenita subsistent entity,havingitsownoperationinwhichitdoesnotcommunicatewiththebody. Aquinas hastosaythattheintellectivesoulis other formthethingcanhaveonlybeitsaccidentmakingitactualinsomerespect), asubstantial formmakesathingactuallyexistentabsolutelyspeaking,andsoany Nature”), he arguedinaccordancewiththedoctrineofhis the Augustinianthesisofpluralitysubstantialformsasmetaphysicallyuntenable(because, that Sigerattheendofpreviousselectionadmitshehasnoanswerfor. who, inthelastquestionofselectionnumber27,providespreciselysortargument ical andtheologicalcriticismsoftheAverroisticposition.OnemaincriticswasAquinas, several condemnationsmentionedintheGeneralIntroduction,andseverephilosoph- of philosophicalandtheologicalproblems,whichinvitedboththeofficialcensure be onlyoneseparateintellectsharedbyallhumans.Thisconception,ofcourse,raisesahost be distinctonaccountoftheparcelsmattertheyinform),itfollowsthattherecan individuation (accordingtowhichdistinctinstancesofspecificallythesameformcanonly intellect isaformexistingseparatelyfrommatter,then,giventheAristotelianconceptionof be isnotforittoinformmatter);therefore,mustaseparatesubstance.Indeed,ifthe cannot beaforminherentinmatter;so,itmustsubsistent(aforwhichto conclusion abouttheimmaterialityofintellect,AverroësandSigerconcludethatit this issueinthemanneralreadyindicatedGeneralIntroduction.AcceptingAristotle’s of thisbody,therationalsoul. immaterial intellectisrelatedtothematerialbody,indeed,substantialform of thematerialorganization)body.Buttheninevitablequestionisjusthowthis is immaterial,thenitnaturallycapableofsurvivingthedeath(i.e.,disintegration along withthefurtherconclusionthatintellectisthereforeimmortal,forif form, thenithastobeanimmaterialform:for of alivinghumanbeing)aslongthesoulinformsbody, andtoretainthissameact have thesameactofbeingthatisbody(and whichisthesameaslife characterizations? Theanswerisyes,ifweconsiderthatit isquitepossibleforthesoulto Can therepossiblybeamiddlegroundbetweentheseapparently diametricallyopposed Aristotle, inhis But Aquinaswasalsotreadingafinelineinhisownsolutiontotheproblem.Rejecting The followingselectionsfromAverroësandSigerofBrabant,respectively,address To besure,medievalphilosophersandtheologianscertainlywelcomedthisconclusion, De Anima is (“On theSoul”),arguedthatthinkingissimplynotkindof for ittoinformmatter.Ontheotherhand,ifisasubsistent Proceedings oftheSocietyforMedievalLogicandMetaphysics both De PrincipiisNaturae the substantialformofbody snot is 1 for ittoinformmatter. (“On thePrinciplesof and a , MP_C19.qxd 11/23/062:32AMPage155 Vivarium Buridan’s AllegedAlexandrianism:HeterodoxyandNaturalPhilosophy inFourteenth-CenturyParis,” Foranexcellent,thoroughdiscussionofthefinerdetailsBuridan’sposition seeJ.Zupko,“On 2 essence andexistenceincreatures. tinction betweenCreatorandcreaturesintermsofAquinas’ thesisoftherealdistinction conception hastofaceinadifferentconceptualframework thatwould of Ghent,amongothers),quiteclearlyindicatesthesortmetaphysical challengesAquinas’ already presentinthethirteenthcentury,SigerofBrabant,GodfreyFontaines,andHenry Buridan’s argumentsfortherealidentityofessenceandexistencealsoincreatures(anidea differences betweenGodandHiscreatures.So,thelastselectionofthissection,presenting section ofthispart,dealingwithprovingtheexistenceGod,andspellingoutinfinite of thesameinGod. arguments fortherealdistinctionofessenceandexistenceincreaturesidentity tion andasitexistsinsingularsubstancesminds,and,especially,hisfamous of God,hislucidexpositionAvicenna’sideacommonnatureinitsabsoluteconsidera- metaphysical compositionincreatedsubstances,contrastedwiththeabsolutesimplicity physical system.Ofparticularimportancearehisdiscussionsofthevarioussorts full. Aquinas’succinct,yetcomprehensive,discussiontakesusthroughhisentiremeta- “metaphysical gem,”his Introduction. nothing buttheaffirmationofidea“pervasiveformalunity”discussedinGeneral without, however,ascribingindependentexistenceandnumericalunitytothisnature,is of theseinstances(bothinthemindandparticulars)samecommonnature, them inabstractionfromtheirindividuatingconditions.Acknowledgingtheformalunity ticulars thatinstantiatethemandintheindividualmindscanneverthelesscomprehend moderate realistconceptionofhowcommonnaturesexistindividuatedbothinthepar- mental ideaforpracticallyallmedievalthinkersinthirteenth-centurymetaphysics:the with God’sexistenceandwhatissupposedtobeknowableaboutGodbyreasonalone. tions, whichpreparethegroundforselectionsoflastsectioninthispart,deal faith alone. Buridan’s approaches,however,isthatBuridantakesthispositiontobeestablishedby from hisquestionsonAristotle’s have thissameactofexistencewhetherinorwithoutthebody. in thebodyisalsoexistencethatproperlybelongstosoulitself,whence designed toestablishpreciselythisconclusion,namely,thattheexistencesoulhas But Aquinas’argumentsfromtheproper,immaterialoperationofintellectivesoulare of thesoulismerelycontingently,butnotnecessarily,identicalwithbeingbody. of beingafteritsseparationfromthebody,providedweallowpossibilitythat illustrates Augustine’sconceptionofdivinesimplicityand presentshissolutiontothe The firstshortselectionofthelastsection,fromAugustine’s The importanceofthisideawillbeevidentinconnectionwiththeselectionslast It isthisfundamentalidea,amongotherthings,thatarticulatedincarefuldetailAquinas’ The briefselectionsfromAvicennaarethosepassagesthatspelledoutthemostfunda- The selectionsofthenextsectionpresentasamplinggeneralmetaphysicalconsidera- It isthesamepositionthatdefendedbyJohnBuridaninquestionpresentedhere 42/1 (2004),pp.42–57. 2 De EnteetEssentia De Anima . TheimportantdifferencebetweenAquinas’and (“On BeingandEssence”),reproducedherein De Trinitate not spell outthedis- (“On Trinity”), can 155

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PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 156 with Gaunilooverthelatterargument. of God,frombothhis His change(whichisexcludedbysimplicity). problem ofhowcertainpredicationscancometobeandceasetrueGodwithout of GodwithoutwhichAnselm’sreasoningcannotwork. greater canbeconceivedcannotprovidealogicalshort-cuttotherequisiteconception mere linguisticunderstandingofAnselm’sdescriptionGodasthatthanwhichnothing Academic Publishers,2000),pp.69–88. something thatcannotbeathinginthisworld. this idea,theideaofradicaldependencyeverythinginworldforitsexistenceon identity ofthesameinGodwasdevisedpreciselytoprovidemetaphysicalgroundsfor Aquinas’ thesisoftherealdistinctionbetweenexistenceandessencecreatures does notneedanysustenance,andwhich,therefore,issomethinginthisworld. this worldcanexistonlyifthereisagenuine,ultimatesourceofenergy,whichitself and forthesustenanceofthoseitsustains,thenseemsaplausibleideathatanythingin just areceiver,transformer,andtransmitteroftheenergyneededforitsownsustenance thing intheworlddependsforitsexistenceonsomething,andeverythingis philosophers whohaveseriouslyengagedwithAquinas’thought.Forifanythingandevery- from differentconceptualframeworks. metaphysical principlesthatcanbeopentoattackfrommanydifferentangles,especially posteriori “Saint Anselm’sProof,”inG.Hintikka(ed.), ForadetailedanalysisofAnselm’sargument andAquinas’sreactionalongtheselines,seeG.Klima, 3 approach inhis despite somefundamentalagreementsbetweenthem.AquinasfindsAnselm’s inability tocomprehendHisessence. his considerationsconcerninghowwecanmeaningfullytalkaboutGod,despiteour his criticismofAnselm’sapproach),actualproofsGod’sexistence,andsome texts fromhisnaturaltheologyconcerningtheprovabilityofGod’sexistence(containing Finally, thelastsetofselectionsfromAquinas’s The nextsetofselectionspresentsAnselm’sargumentsconcerningtheexistenceandnature Nevertheless, thefundamentalideaoftheseargumentsisstillquiteappealingtomany There isasharpcontrastbetweenAquinas’andAnselm’sapproachestothesameissues, approach, which,however,isveryintimatelytiedtohisAristotelianphysicaland Proslogion Monologion unpersuasive, becauseheclearlysees,justasGaunilodid,thatthe and his Medieval PhilosophyandModernTimes Proslogion , alongwithselectionsfromhisdebate Summa Theologiae 3 Thus, Aquinasoptedforhis presents somekey (Dordrecht: Kluwer a priori a MP_C19.qxd 11/23/06 2:32 AM Page 157

Hylomorphism, Causality, Natural Philosophy

19

Thomas Aquinas on the Principles of Nature

Chapter 1 Note that something can be, even if it is not, while something [simply] is. That which [only] can be [but is not] is said to be in potentiality, whereas that which already exists is said to be in actuality. But there are two kinds of being. There is the essential or substantial being of the thing, as for a man to be, and this is just to be, without any qualification. The other kind of being is accidental being, as for a man to be white, and this is [not just to be, but] to be somehow.1 It is with respect to both kinds of being that something is in potentiality. For something is in potentiality toward being a man, as the sperm and the menstrual blood; and some- thing is in potentiality toward being white, as a man. Both that which is in potentiality in respect of substantial being and that which is in potentiality in respect of accidental being can be said to be matter, as the sperm can be said to be the matter of man and the man the matter of whiteness. But they differ in that the matter that is in potentiality in respect of substantial being is called matter from which [something is made – materia ex qua], while that which is in potentiality in respect of accidental being is called matter of which [something is made – materia in qua].2

1 The contrast in the Latin is that between esse, to be, absolutely speaking, and esse aliquid, literally, to be something. But since Aquinas’ point here is the contrast between the substantial being of a thing on account of which it exists as a substance of some kind and its accidental being on account of which it is in a way, say, as being of such and such a shape, size, color, etc., the idea is better brought out in English by contrasting being absolutely with being somehow. 2 The literal rendering of the distinction in Latin (between materia ex qua and in qua, i.e., matter “from which” and “in which” something is made, respectively) would not be as helpful as the existing English distinction between matter that a thing is “made from” and matter that it is “made of.” The former member of the existing distinctions in both languages indicates the transient matter of a thing, that from which it is made through some substantial transformation of this matter. This is how we say that bread is made from flour. But we cannot say that the bread is made of flour. The latter construction indicates the permanent matter of the thing, which is actually present in the constitution of the thing as long as the thing exists. This is how we say that a statue is made of bronze (but, again, a bronze statue is made from tin and copper). MP_C19.qxd 11/23/062:32AMPage158

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 158 that itisinasubject. subject, forwesaythatanaccidentisinawhileofsubstantialformdonot matter. Anditissignificantthatwhatinpotentialitytowardaccidentalbeingcalleda subject, whilethatwhichisinpotentialitytowardsubstantialbeingproperlycalled in theothercategories. absolutely speakingareonlyinthecategoryofsubstance,whilethosewithqualification ruption inanabsolutesense,andcorruptionwithqualification.Generation And tothesetwokindsofgenerationtherecorrespondcorruption,namelycor- white, wedonotsaythathecomestobe,absolutelyspeaking,butbewhite. without qualification,butthatsomethingcomestobethis;justaswhenamanbecomes But whenanaccidentalformisintroduced,wedonotsaythatsomethingcomestobe, stantial formisintroduced,somethingsaidtocomebe,withoutfurtherqualification. while toaccidentalformtherecorrespondsgenerationwithqualification.Forwhenthesub- kinds ofgeneration:tosubstantialformtherecorrespondsgenerationabsolutelyspeaking, actual insubstantialbeingisform. something actualinaccidentalbeingisform,andthatwhichmakes And sinceformmakessomethingactual,isalsocalledactuality.Thatwhich and thesperm,whichisamaninpotentiality,willbeactuallyonaccountofsoul. just asaman,whoiswhiteinpotentiality,willbeactuallyonaccountofwhiteness, which somethinghasbeing,whetheraccidentalorsubstantialcanbecalledaform; of thethingsthatstartedoutasequalorsimilar. dissimilar obviouslytakeplaceonaccountofthequantitativeorqualitative changeinoneortheother account oftheseprimarychanges:forexample,therelational changesofbecomingunequalor diminution), quality(alteration),andplace(locomotion).Allother accidentalchangestakeplaceon argues thatprimarilythereisaccidentalchangeonlyinthecategories ofquantity(augmentationor by termsclassifiedunderoneortheotherofcategoriesaccidents. Inhis logical categoryofsubstance.Accidentalchangestakeplacewith respect toaccidentalformssignified in thecategoryofsubstance,i.e.,withrespecttosubstantialforms signifiedbytermsfallingintothe Again,thisisanallusiontoAristotle’sdoctrineofthe 4 a substantialpartofcompletesubstance,alongwiththematter of thissubstanceitinforms. Accordingly, asubstantialformisnotanaccident,althoughit acompletesubstanceeither:itis without thisform,sinceithasactualexistencepreciselyonaccount ofactuallyhavingthisform. cannot existinasubjectthisstrictsense,forwhatitinformshaveactualsubstantialexistence its actualsubstantialbeingwhetheritactuallyhasthisaccidentornot.Aform,bycontrast, only anaccidentthatcanbesaidtoinasubject,namely,actuallyexistingsubstancehas accident intermsof ThisisanallusiontoAristotle’sdoctrineinthe 3 and the accident,evenifsometimesonetermistakenforother,i.e.“matter”“subject,” Therefore, formgivesbeingtomatter,absolutelyspeaking,butthesubject for matterinitselfdoesnothavecompletebeing,butincomplete[i.e.,merelypotential]being. speaking] fromhiswhiteness.Matter,however,doeshaveitsbeingwhatcomestoit, it, asithascompletebeinginitself.Forexample,amandoesnothavehis[absolutely Again, properlyspeaking,whatisinpotentialitytowardaccidentalbeingcalleda Since generationismotiontowardform,tothesetwokindsofformtherecorrespond Again, justaseverythingthatisinpotentialitycanbecalledmatter,sofrom So, matterdiffersfromsubjectinthatadoesnothavebeingwhatcomesto vice versa. not beingin 3 4 or being in a subject.Aquinas’pointhereisthatstrictlyspeakingit Categories Categories. , wherehedistinguishessubstanceand Substantial changetakesplaceonly Physics , Aristotlealso MP_C19.qxd 11/23/062:32AMPage159 on whenitisshapedintoastatue. the bronze,whichiscoincidentally( from itssubject,asrisibility builder, whohappenstobeadoctor. accidens [by coincidence],namely,becauseitcoincideswithmatter,justaswesaythatthisis preserve thatshape.So,the root oftwo,wouldhavetobeabledoso),butonaccount of its shape ofthestatue(forotherwiseeverythingthatdoesnothave shape,say,anangelorthesquare of theform;butitisfordifferentreasonsthatcalledbronzeandshapeless. differ intheirconcepts.Fortheverysamethingthatisbronzeshapelessbeforeadvent generation proceeds.Therefore,matterandprivationarethesameintheirsubject,but able to principle thatrenderschange the oppositeform,thenitcouldnot ThisisanallusiontoPorphyry’sdoctrineinhis 6 “Risible”:capableoflaughter.See“JohnBuridanonthePredicables”(selectionno.8,n.1above). 5 is So, therearethreeprinciplesofnature,namelymatter,form,andprivation,whichone Chapter 2 Privationisthe 7 opposed tosomegenuinenaturalpotentiality). their casethe“may”inPorphyriandefinitionshouldbeunderstood asmerelogicalpossibility, from theirsubjects,althoughsubjectscanbeconceivedtoexist withoutthoseaccidents(so,in corruption ofthatsubjectaccordingtoPorphyry’sdefinition,someaccidentsarenaturallyinseparable separable accidents.Foralthoughaccidentsmayornotbelongtothesamesubjectwithout existence. are accidental,becauseartworksonlyonwhatissuppliedbynaturealreadyincomplete its existencedoesnotdependonthisshape,butisanaccidentalform.Forallartificialforms for thebronzewasalreadyactualevenbeforeintroductionofthisformorshape,and shape, onaccountofwhichitiscalledastatue,itsform,thoughnotsubstantial tiality towardtheformofstatue,ismatter;itsshapelessnesscalledprivation;and form. Forexample,when,frombronze,astatueisformed,thewhichinpoten- being inactuality,whichisprivation,andthatbythethingwillbeactual,namely generated frombronze,whichcanbeastatue,butisnotactuallystatue. of non-being,butfromanon-beingthatisbeinginpotentiality:forexample,statue conversely, shouldbefrombeingtonon-being,generationstartsnotjustanykind ness, whichcanbeseparatedfromman. conversely, asinfirethereistheprivationofformair. stripped ofprivation;forinsofarasitisunderoneform,hastheprivationanotherand, accidens that towhich But therearetwokindsofaccidents:namelynecessary[accident],whichisnotseparated Therefore privationiscalledaprinciplenot So, forgenerationthreethingsarerequired:abeinginpotentiality,whichismatter,non- And sincegenerationisakindofmutationfromnon-beingintobeing,andcorruption, become astatutethroughitsownchange thedoctorbuildsahouse,forhenotonaccountofbeingdoctor,butas : itdoesnotfollowthatisrequiredforgeneration,becausematternever , generation proceeds,namelyform,andtheothertwoare logically necessary per se naturally possible 5 from man,andnotnecessary[accident],forexample,white- principle ofthischange(thatonaccountwhichitcanoccur)is per accidens come starting pointofanycoming-to-be(forifthethingalreadyhad to havethatform).Yetprivationmerelycoincideswiththe namely,matter.Foranamorphouslumpofbronze , 6 ), butlogicallynecessarilylackingtheshapeitwilltake Therefore, althoughprivationisaprinciple not per se on accountofthefactthatitdoesnothave Isagoge [on itsownaccount]but wherehedistinguishesinseparableand , 7 natural ability that fromwhich to takeonand per accidens per per is 159

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PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 160 matter without anykindofformorprivationassubjecttoallformsandprivationsiscalled bronze isnotcalledprimematter,forithasmatter.Butthatmatterwhichthoughtof matter inrespectofthestatue,butbronzeitselfiscomposedandform;wherefore in itsconceptispermanent,whilethatmatterwhichdoestransient. is composedofmatterandprivationdoesnot,thatwhichnotimply thing flour,thisdoessignifyashapelessnessorformlessnessoppositetotheformofbread. the conceptofflourdoesimplyprivationformbread,forwhenIcallsome- call somethingbronze,thisdoesnotimplythatitisshapelessorformless.Ontheotherhand, concept ofbronze,whenitisthematterstatue,doesnotimplyprivation:forI as itisinthebronzethatformandformlessnessarethoughttobe. privation initsconcept.Formatteristhatwhichformandarethoughttobe, principles similarly neithercanprivationandhabit. privation oftheshapestatue,foraffirmationandnegationcannotstandtogether, be doesnotyetexist,apartfromprocesses.Butwhenthestatuealreadyexists,thereisno exist. Forifitalreadyexisted,wouldnotbecomingtobe,forwhatisstill being, forwhilethestatueisstillcomingtobe,itnecessarythatdoesnotyet two alsohavetoexist.However,privationisonlytheprincipleofcomingbe,butnot there hastobetheformofstatue,and,further,whenstatuealreadyexists,these coming tobe.Forinorderthatastatueisgeneratedtherehasbebronze,andtheend non-fire inwhichtheformoffireisapttocomebe),wesaythatprivationaprinciple. (for itisnotfromjustanykindofnon-beingthatfiregenerated,but non-being insomesubject,andnotjustanykindofbutadeterminatesubject blind thatarenaturallyapttosee[butactuallylacksight]. the oppositehabitisnaturallyapttooccur,forexample,onlythosethingscanbesaid that] arockdoesnotsee.Butprivationcanbesaidonlyofdeterminatesubject,inwhich does notsee,andalsoofabeingthatisnaturallyincapablehavingsight,as[whenwesay For thatitdoesnotseecan[truly]besaidalsoofanon-being,as[whenwesaythat]chimera principle isnegation,butthatitprivation,foranegationdoesnotdetermineitssubject. this form.Andmatteriscalledprimewithoutqualification. which istoallformsandprivationsasbronzetheform ofthestatueandtolack cognized ordefinedinitself,onlybycomparison,aswhen we saythatprimematteris proceeds ismatter,andthat for everygenerationproceedstosomethingfromsomething. That matter andform,soithaspriortoit. matter ofallliquids.Butitisnot We shouldknowthatsomematterhasform,forexample,thebronze,whichis And sinceintheprocessofgenerationmatterorsubjectremains,butprivationwhat Sometimes matterisnamedwithprivation,andsometimeswithoutit.Forexample,the Again, privationisaprinciple But itdiffersfromtheothersinthatothertwoareprinciplesbothofbeingand And sincegenerationdoesnotproceedfromnon-beingabsolutelyspeaking,buta We shouldknowthatevenifgenerationproceedsfromnon-being,wedonotsayits For somethingcan[also]becalled Now, since[any]definitionandcognitionis[obtained]byform, primemattercannotbe We havetoknowthatprimematter,aswellform,is not generated(orcorrupted), , becausethereisnoothermatterbeforeit.Andthisalso called per se . Fromwhathasbeensaiditisclear,then,thatmatterdiffersfromformand to which per accidens prime matter prime generation proceedsisform.Therefore,ifeither matter , aswasexplainedabove,andtheothertwoare without qualification,foritiscomposedof in respectofagenus , aswateristheprime from which hyle . generation prime MP_C19.qxd 11/23/062:32AMPage161 a voluntaryagentmayactwithoutdeliberation,]itfollows by there wouldbedelaysbetweenthesinglesounds,which resultindissonance. erate thepluckingofitsstrings,asthesearedeterminedfor it[bytheplayer],forotherwise And thisiswhatAvicennaillustrateswithhisexampleofthe guitar,whichneednotdelib- of naturalagentsaredetermined,soitisnotnecessarythat theyelectthemeanstoanend. have torecognizetheirendsbywhichtheydetermineactions.However,theactions determined, butwhichcanhavealternativesfor[their]action,namely,voluntaryagents,who the end.Fortorecognizeendisnecessaryonlyforthoseagentswhoseactsarenot end. Butfromthisitdoesnotfollowthatallagentsrecognizeend,ordeliberateabout by theagent,andthisiscalledend. intending something,therehastobealsoafourth[principle],namelythatwhichisintended And since,asAristotlesaysinthesecondbookofhis acts, andthisiscalledtheefficientormovingcause,agentprincipleofmotion. it isnecessarytohaveanotherprinciplebesidematterandform,namely,somethingthat has cometobe,butwhatisactingalreadyexistingduringtheprocessofgeneration.So, generated, whichwecalltheendofgeneration),forformdoesnotexistuntilit potentiality intoactualityeither(andIamspeakinghereabouttheformofthingbeing of thestatuefrompotentialitytoactuality.Andformwouldnotbringitself does notmakeitselfintoanactualstatue,butitneedsagentthatbringsouttheform itself intoactuality,forexampleachunkofbronze,whichisinpotentialitytobecomestatue, matter, form,andprivation.Butthesethreeareinsufficientforgeneration,nothingdrives From whathasbeensaiditisclear,then,thattherearethreeprinciplesofnature,namely Chapter 3 and soon, matter orformweregenerated,thenwouldhaveandform, nothing inactualexistencecanbecalledprimematter. something canhaveactualexistenceonlythroughitsform),butitexistspotentially.So of itsveryconceptitdoesnothaveanyform,whenceactualexistence(since form, whilesometimesitisunderanother.Butcanneverexistinitself,becauseonaccount nevertheless, matterisneverstrippedofformorprivation,forsometimesitunderone tion, asintheconceptofbronzeneithershapenorlacksomeisincluded; numerically different,anditisinthiswaythatmattersaidtobeone. also besaidtonumericallyonebecauseitlacksthosedispositionswhichmakethings numerically oneinthisway,foritselfitdoesnothaveanyform.Second,athingcan which hasonedeterminateform,forexampleSocrates;butprimematterisnotsaidtobe thing issaidtobenumericallyoneintwoways.First,that his Aquinasalludesheretoadialecticaltopic(aformofprobableargument discussedbyAristotlein 8 if athingthatismorelikelytohaveanattributethananotherdoes nothaveit,thentheotherdoes appearance) reliesonthefollowingmaxim(ageneralobservation thatlicensesaprobableinference): Now avoluntaryagentratherappearstodeliberatethan natural agent.So,[sinceeven We havetoknow,however,thateveryagent,naturalaswellvoluntary,intendssome We shouldknowthatalthoughmatterdoesnothaveinitsnaturesomeformorpriva- We alsohavetoknowthatmatterissaidbenumericallyoneinallthings.Butsome- Topics , hislogicalworkonprobablereasoning).The in infinitum . So,properlyspeaking,onlythecompositesubstanceisgenerated. locus amaioriapparentia Metaphysics whateveractsdoessoonly , locus amaiori (the topicfromgreater 8 that itis 161

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PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 162 nevertheless, ashesaysintheeleventhbookofhis whatever isfirstcanbecalledaprinciple, the conceptofcauseseemstoaddsomethingthatprincipleinitsordinarysense,for every causecanbecalledaprincipleandcause,though and bothcanbecalledcauses.Butsometimesthesetermsareusedinterchangeably.For extrinsic causesareprinciplesandtheintrinsicthatpartsofthingelements, for whateveris used interchangeably,asisstatedinthefifthbookof material, efficient,formal,andfinal.Andalthoughtheterms“principle”“cause”canbe ing anendisnothing,buthavinganaturalinclinationtowardit. possible foranaturalagenttointendsomeendwithoutdeliberation.Andthiskindofintend- causes, wemeanthe derives simplydenotesthebeginningorfirstmemberofanyseries ofitems. Initsordinary,common,sense,theLatinword 9 involuntary agentscanalsointendsomethingwithoutdeliberation. cannot solveiteither.Likewise,ifvoluntaryagentscanintendsomething withoutdeliberation,then maxim licensestheconclusionthathisstudents(whoarelesslikely tosolveaproblemthanheis) solve theproblem,basedonhisgreaterknowledgeandexperience. Butifhecannotsolveit,thenthe form ofargument.Forinthiscasethereisagreaterappearance thattheteachershouldbeableto he cannotsolve,hisstudentscanarguethattheyshouldnotbe expected tosolveit,relyingonthis that islesslikelytohaveit.Forexample,ifamathteacherassigns aproblemtohisstudentsthateven ( thing thatwouldbemorelikelytohaveit,i.e.,concerningwhichthere wouldbeagreaterappearance not haveiteither.Themaxim,therefore,licensestheinferencefrom thelackofanattributeinsome- the elementsofaman,forlimbsthemselvesarealsocomposedothers;butwedosay of whichthethingisprimarilycomposed.Wedonotsay,forexample,thathislimbsare is composed,whichareproperlymaterial,andnotjustanymaterialcauses,butonlythose a cause causes, forprivationisthatfromwhichgenerationstarts.But[privation]canalsobecalled se from thebeingofwhichtherefollowssomethingelse. from whichtherefollowsthebeingofaposteriorthing;sowesaythatcauseissomething blackness theredidnotresultthebeingofwhiteness.Butonlythatfirstthingiscalledacause everything fromwhichsomechangebeginscanbecalledaprinciple–still,this can saythatblacknessistheprinciple[beginning]ofthischange–andgenerallyspeaking results thebeingofknife.Butwhensomethingturnsfromblacktowhite,thenwe not. Forexample,acraftsmancanbecalledtheprincipleofknife,asfromhisworkthere extrinsic, fortheyareoutsideofthething.But[inthispassage they areconstituentpartsofthething;butefficientandfinalcausesaidtobe extrinsic andintrinsicones.Nowmatterformaresaidtobethething,for distinguished fourcausesandthreeprinciples.For[there]hetooktocompriseboth causes, forprivationisa the intrinsiccausestobeprinciples.Onotherhand,privationisnotcountedamong maior apparentia , evenifitisaprinciple,whenceprivationcountedamongprinciples,butnot But evenifinthefirstbookofhis From whathasbeensaid,then,itisclearthattherearefourkindsofcauses,namely, However, onlythosethingsareproperlycalledelementsthatcausesofwhichthething For thisreason,thatfirstthingfromwhichthemotionstartscannotbecalledacause per accidens ) thatitwouldhavethisattribute,tothelackofsameattribute insomethingelse per accidens , insofarasitcoincideswithmatter,wasexplainedearlier. per se per accidens causes, butalso is reducedtowhat principle, aswesaid.So,whenspeakaboutthefour Physics 9 per accidens whether thereresultssomeexistencefromitor principium Aristotle takesintrinsiccausesforprinciples, per se. causes arereducedtothe from whichtheEnglishword‘principle’ Metaphysics Metaphysics properlyspeakingthe , inthe , Physics Physics ] hetookonly per se Aristotle ones, per MP_C19.qxd 11/23/062:32AMPage163 the formexistsonlyinmatter;andsimilarly,iscause ofmatter,insofarasmatter cause ofthecausalityallcauses.Formatterissaidtobe thecauseofform,insofaras for thesakeofend.Whenceitissaidthatend causeofallcauses,foritisthe not receiveform,exceptforthesakeofend,andform doesnotperfectmatter,except be efficient,andsimilarly,itcausesmatterto form tobeform,formatterdoes efficient, sotheendiscauseofcausality foritcausestheefficientto the healththatisproducedbyoperationofdoctor), butitcausesthedoctortobe be efficient:forhealthdoesnotcausethedoctortoa (andIamspeakingabout the endisnotcauseofthingthatefficient,but isthecauseforefficientto doctor causeshealth,buthedoesnotcausehealthtobe theend.Onotherhand, of thethingthatisend,say,health;butitdoesnotcause theendtobeend;as insofar astheagentoperatesonlyforsakeofend.Whenceefficientiscause the endcomestobebyoperationofagent,butiscauseefficient, the soulisformofbody.Also,efficientsaidtobecauseend,for a walksometimesforthesakeofourhealth.Again,bodyismattersoul,while is thecauseofhealthasitsefficient,butwalkingend:forwetake be bothcauseandeffectinrespectofthesamething,butnotway:forwalking while oftheotherbyhisabsence.Wealsohavetoknowthatitispossiblesomething the causebothofsalvationandsinkingship,butonebyhispresence, it impossibleforthesamethingtobecauseofcontraries.Forexample,pilotcan bronze andthesculptor,butsculptorasefficient,whileitsmatter.Noris for thesamethingtohaveseveralcauses,asastatue,causesofwhichareboth Having seenthattherearefourgeneraofcauses,wehavetoknowitisnotimpossible Chapter 4 of the than “element.”AndthisiswhattheCommentatorsaysincommentaryonfifthbook of expressions.Soitisclearthat“principle”coversmorethan“cause,”and“cause” indivisible alsointhisway,thenitiscalledanelement,aslettersaretheelements in quantity,butitissufficient,ifnotdivisibleaccordingtospecies;something is water.Foritnotrequiredforsomethingtobeanelementthatshouldindivisible But anelementisnotdividedintopartsthatdifferinspecies,aswater,ofwhicheverypart as, forexample,ahand,thepartsofwhicharefleshandbones,differentinspecies. distinguish anelementfromthosethingsthathavepartsdifferentinform,i.e.,species, Away. remain, sincetheydonotpassaway,asitissaidinthebook whence breadcannotbesaidtoanelementofblood.Butelementssomehowhave bread fromwhichitisgeneratedpassesaway;sothedoesnotremaininblood, generation. Forexample,breadisthematterofblood,butbloodnotgenerated,unless is putheretodistinguishelementsfromthatkindofmatterwhichtotallycorruptedin composed,” isevidentfromwhathasbeenjustsaid.Thesecondpart,namely,“isinthething,” is inthething,andnotdividedaccordingtoform. the them thatallnaturalbodiesareprimarilycomposed.ThereforeAristotleinthefifthbookof that earthandwaterareelements,forthesenotcomposedofotherbodies,butitisfrom The firstpartofthisdefinition,namely,“somethingfromwhichathingisprimarily Metaphysics The thirdpart,namely,thatanelementisnotdividedaccordingtoform,meant Metaphysics. says thatanelementissomethingfromwhichathingprimarilycomposed, On ComingToBeandPassing 163

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PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 164 second bookof has actualexistenceonlybytheform.Formatterandformarecorrelatives,asissaidin generated. tree generatesanolivetree.Butthismaynotbethought to applytheendofthing generated bysomethingofthesamespecies,aswhenman generatesman,andanolive sometimes coincideswithtwooftheabove-mentionedcauses, namely,whensomethingis knife, istheendofthinggenerated,namelyknife. Nowtheendofgeneration the formofknifeisenditsgeneration;butcutting, whichistheoperationof of generationandtheendthinggenerated,asisclear inthegenerationofaknife.For operation oftheagentisterminatedinit.Buttherearetwo kindsofends,namelytheend potential, andagain,itistheend,insofarasintended by theagent,andinsofaras insofar asitgenerates;again,fireisform,makes actualthatwaspreviously efficient, asisclearinthegenerationoffire.Forfiregenerates fire,sofireistheefficient, the necessityofend. conceive, butunderthiscondition,namely,thatifamanistobegenerated.Andcalled to begenerated;andthisisconditional,foritnotabsolutelynecessarywoman namely, formandtheend.Forexample,wesaythatconceptionisnecessary,ifaman necessity, ontheotherhand,proceedsfromthosecausesthatareposterioringeneration, it cannotbeimpeded.Andthistypeofnecessityisalsocalledthematter.Conditional and thedispositionofcontrarycomponentsbody;thisiscalledabsolute,because which arematterandtheefficient:forexample,necessityofdeathderivesfrom tional necessity.Absolutenecessityproceedsfromthosecausesthatareprioringeneration, end arepriorinperfection. two causes,namely,matterandtheefficient,areprioringeneration;butform stance andcompletion,fortheactionofefficientiscompletedonlybyend.Sothese starts towardtheend.Butendispriortoefficient,insofarasitinsub- the efficientispriortoendingenerationandtime,foritfromthatmotion matter inperfection,sincehasnocompleteexistence,exceptbytheform.Similarly, to whichsomethingiscomingpriorwhatit.Form,however, imperfect, isitselfperfect.Nowmatterpriortoformingenerationandtime:forthat what reducesthatwhichisinpotentialitytoactualityactuality,andperfectsthe actual), nevertheless,absolutelyspeaking,whatisactualandperfectnecessarilyprior:for thing thatisimperfectpriortobecomingperfect,andinpotentiality is imperfectpriortowhatperfect,andpotentialityact(consideringthesame prior tothemaningenerationandtime.Butalthoughamonggenerablethingsthatwhich So wecansaythatamanispriortoboyinsubstanceandperfection,butthe what isperfectinrespectofgenerationandtime,butpriorcompletion. is perfectandfromwhatincompletetocomplete,imperfectprior and completion.Nowsincetheoperationofnatureproceedsfromwhatisimperfectto prior tosomethingelseinrespectofgenerationandtime,again,substance erior inrespectofthesamething,andbothcauseeffect.Forsomethingissaidtobe On Animals that somethingiscalled“prior”intwoways,asAristotlesaysthesixteenthbookofhis as simpletocomposite. We shouldalsoknowthatthreecausescancoincide,namelytheform,end,and And weshouldnotethattherearetwokindsofnecessity:absolutenecessityandcondi- But sinceeverycauseinsofarasitisanaturallypriortoitseffect,weshouldknow . Andonaccountofthisdiversitysomethingcanbecalledbothpriorandpost- Physics . Theyarerelatedtothecompositesubstance,however,aspartsand MP_C19.qxd 11/23/062:32AMPage165 as falbig ohrta tef)assuch. cause ofallbeings(otherthanitself absolutely firstefficientcause,thenithastobethemostuniversal cause,i.e.,theabsolutelyuniversal universal form,andsoaffectingamoreextensiveclassofparticulars). Therefore,ifthereisan well: themoreremote,thatis,priorcauseisalwaysuniversal (i.e.,actinginvirtueofamore of correlationbetweenpriorityanduniversalitycanbeobserved inthecaseofefficientcausesas AlthoughAquinasexemplifieshisclaiminthecaseofformalandmaterial causes,thesametype 10 the wood[insofarasitiswood]matterofbench.Acause insofar asitissuch,thebuilder[insofarheabuilder]causeofhouse,or remote oneisbody. ximate matterofthestatueisbronze,whilemoreremotemetalandeven more remoteoneissubstance.Forallsuperiorsareformsoftheinferiors.Similarly,pro- signifies, namelyrational,mortalanimal,buthismoreremoteformisanimalandtheeven proximate cause.Forexample,wesaythattheformofmaniswhathisdefinition universal causeisalwayscalledtheremoteandmorespecific posterior andintoproximatevs.remote,signifythesame.Butweshouldknowthatmore cause ispriorandthatitremote.Sothesetwodivisionsofcauses,namely,intovs. that itisthesamethingtosayacauseposteriorandproximate,or How didhecurehim?Theansweris:byhisknowledgeofmedicine.Andweshouldknow ask: Whyishehealthy?Theansweris:becausethedoctorcuredhim.Andthen,further: of causes. cause; andsimilardistinctionsapplyinthecaseofformalcauseotherkinds doctor arebothcausesofhealth,buttheartisprior,whileposterior called priorandsomeareposterior,aswhenwesaythattheartofmedicine we havetoknowthateachofthesekindsisdividedinvariousways.Forsomecausesare Having seenthattherearefourkindsofcauses,namely,efficient,material,formal,andfinal, Chapter 5 by theirnatureperfect;butwhatisperfectandimperfectnevercoincide. potentiality, isbyitsverynatureimperfect,whiletheothercauses,sincetheyareactual, However, matterdoesnotcoincidewiththeothers,becausematter,sinceitisabeingin man generatingandthegeneratedarenumericallydifferent,butspecificallysame. but theycanbethesamespecifically.Forexample,whenamangeneratesman,then specifically. Foritisimpossibleforthemakerandthingmadetobenumericallysame, generation. Butwiththeefficientitdoesnotcoincidenumerically,butcan numerically thesameitemthatisformofgeneratedthingandend when wesaythatthedoctoriscauseofbuilding. But acauseiscalledcomposite, accidens when itisnamedonlybythenameof insofar ashecoincideswiththebuilder.Andsituationissimilarinallothercases. is acause coincides withthecause Again, somecausesare Note herethatinourinquirywealwayshavetogobackthefirstcause,aswhen We shouldknow,however,thattheendcoincideswithformnumerically,foritis Again, somecausesaresimple,composite.Something iscalledasimplecause, cause, aswhenwesaythatthebuilderiscauseof building,andsimilarly per accidens 10 of thebuilding,becauseheisbuildingnotinsofarasadoctor,but per se per se aswhenwesaythatthedoctorisbuilding.For , , othersare per accidens. per se cause, oronlybythenameof A per se cause ofathingisits per accidens is onethat per 165

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PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE, PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOUL, METAPHYSICS 166 time, sothatifoneofthemexists,thentheotherhastoexisttoo. ing. Andweshouldknowthattheactualcauseanditseffectexistatsame not actuallycausingthething,butcancauseit,asbuilder,whenheisbuild- the statueisactuallybeingmadeofit.Apotentialcause,onotherhand,what actually causingthething,asbuilderwhenheisbuilding,orbronze, be thematterofahouse,butmanystonescan. be thecauseofmovementaship[bytowingit],butmanycan,oronestonecannot several thingsneedtocometogetherconstitutethecause;forexample,onemancannot the doctorcauseshealth,orfireheat.Wehaveacompositecause,however,when statue ismadeofbronzewithouttheadditionanyothermatter,orwhenwesaythat is acausewithouttheadditionofanythingelse,asbronzestatue,for of thebuilding. when wenameitbytheofboth,assaythatbuilder-doctoriscause particular. the causeofabuildingingeneral,butalsothatthisbuilderis singular causeiscomparedtoaeffect.Forexample,wesaythatbuilder potential causes. then thebuilderactuallyhastobeworking.Butthisisnotnecessaryincaseofmerely actually working,thenhehastobebuilding,andiftheactofbuildingtakesplace, actual existenceofcreaturestotheCreator, i.e.,God. as thelightsgooutifpoweristurnedoff.Itthisconception thatallowstheinferencefrom of continuouscreation( is theactualefficientcauseofhiscreaturescontinuouslysustaining theirexistenceintheongoingact preservative cause.Accordingtothemedievalconception,itisinthis lattersensethatGod,theCreator, it isagenerativecause,oraslongactuallysustainstheactual beingofthething,ifitisa Anefficientcauseofathingisitsactualonlyaslongitactually generatesthething,if 11 is thedefinitionofanimal.Somethingpredicatedequivocally ifitispredicatedofseveral [man anddonkey]aresaidtobeanimalsbothanimated sensiblesubstances,which same conceptordefinition,as“animal”ispredicatedofaman andadonkey,becauseboth Something ispredicatedunivocallyifitbythe same nameandaccordingtothe thing canbepredicatedofseveralthings:univocally,equivocally,andanalogically. genus, becauseitisnotpredicatedunivocally,butanalogically. but agreeonlyanalogically:fortheyinthatarebeings.Butbeingisnota the sameonlyanalogically,assubstanceandquantity,whichdonotagreeinsomegenus, same, asamananddonkey,whichbothbelongtothegenusofanimals;stillothersare but arenumericallydistinct.Again,somethingsdifferspecifically,genericallythe are numericallydifferent,andspecificallythesame,asSocratesPlato,whobothhuman, things arenumericallyidentical,asSocratesandthisman,pointingtoSocrates;some ciples intermsoftheagreementsanddifferenceswhattheyareprinciplesof.Forsome We shouldalsoknowthatwecanspeakabouttheagreementsanddifferencesofprin- Chapter 6 Again, somecausesareactualcauses,otherspotential.Ancauseisonethat But, accordingtoAvicenna’sexposition,somethingcanalsobecalledasimplecause,ifit We shouldknow,further,thatauniversalcauseiscomparedtoeffectand To understandthisbetter,wehavetoknowthatitisinthreedifferentwayssome- creatio continua ), withoutwhichcreatureswouldsimplyfallintonothing,just 11 For ifthebuilderis MP_C19.qxd 11/23/062:32AMPage167 stated inthefourthbookof definition orsignificationofthisname:forwhatissignifiedbyanameitsdefinition,as the barkinganimalandofconstellation,whichagreeonlyinthisnamebutnot things bythesamename,butaccordingtodifferentconcepts,as“dog”ispredicatedbothof other categories,sotheprinciplesofsubstancearerest. is tosubstanceasthematterofquantityquantity.Butjustcause fer generically,andagreeonlyanalogicallyorproportionallyinthatthematterofsubstance categories. Butthematterofsubstanceandthatquantity,similarlytheirforms,dif- and formorpotentialityactualityaretheprinciplesbothofsubstanceother of thosethatagreeonlyanalogically,alsotheprinciplesanalogically.Formatter and ofahorsedifferspecifically,butarethesamegenerically.Again,insimilarmanner, the same,alsoprinciplesaregenericallysame:assoulandbodyofadonkey specifically thesame,asSocrates’andPlato’s.Likewise,ofthosethingsthataregenerically the same,butnumericallydistinct,alsomatterandformare numerically thesame,asTully’sandCicero’s.Ofthosethings,however,thatarespecifically substance andquantitydiffergenerically,buttheyarethesameanalogically. its species,but“being”ispredicatedanalogically.Andthiswhatwesaid,namely,that Whence “being”isnotagenus,fornogenuspredicatedprimarilyandsecondarilyof ject ofallthem.So“being”issaidprimarilysubstance,andonlysecondarilytherest. the rest,butallthesearesaidtobebeingsonlyinrelationsubstance,whichissub- the sameconceptaccordingtowhichasubstanceissaidbebeing,andquantity, predicated ofsubstance,quality,quantity,andtheothercategories.Foritisnotentirely art ofmedicine.Again,sometimestheyarerelatedtothesamesubject,aswhen“being”is it issaidofsomemedicalinstrument,alwaysinrelationtothesameagent,namely who operatesbytheknowledgeofmedicine,asadoctor,orwithoutit,nurse,when they arerelatedtothesameagent;forexample,when“medical”ispredicatedofsomeone similitude, arerelatedtothesameend,asisclearinpreviousexample,butsometimes For sometimesthosethatagreeanalogically,i.e.,proportionally,orinsomecomparison cause ofhealth;butalltheseconceptsarerelatedtooneandthesameend,namely,health. of health,thebody,insofarasitissubjectandfood, but itdoesnotsignifythesameinallthesecases.Forissaidofurine,insofarasasign same thing.Forexample,“healthy”issaidofthebodyanimalsandurinefood, it ispredicatedofseveralthings,theconceptswhicharedifferent,butrelatedto Therefore, ofthosethingsthatarenumericallythesame,alsoformandmatter Metaphysics. Finally, somethingispredicatedanalogicallyif 167

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