DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM

a symposium on

the fusion of authoritarianism and

democracy in and the world

symposium participants

14 THE PROBLEM Posed by Kanchan Chandra, Professor, Wilf Family Department of Politics, New York University 16 AUTHORITARIAN ELEMENTS IN DEMOCRACY Kanchan Chandra, Professor, Wilf Family Department of Politics, New York University 23 THE AUTHORITARIAN TEMPTATION Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University 27 THE AUTHORITARIANISM OF DONALD TRUMP Scott Malcomson, International Security Fellow, New America Foundation, New York 32 WHAT IT MEANS TO RULE LIKE PUTIN Henry Hale, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC 37 THE AGE OF AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT Manu Bhagavan, Professor of History and Human Rights, Hunter College and the Graduate Center, The City University of New York 43 MODI’S COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM Rajeev Deshpande, Chief of National Bureau, ‘The Times of India’, Delhi 47 KARUNANIDHI AND TAMIL POLITICS Andrew Wyatt, Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Bristol and C. Manikandan, independent scholar 52 LIVING UNDER AMMA John Harriss, Professor, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia 56 MORAL TRANSCENDENCE? THE GURU IN DEMOCRACY Aya Ikegame, Associate Professor, Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, University of Tokyo 59 THE CULT OF THE BOSS Lucia Michelutti, Department of Anthropology, University College London 65 INDIA’S DEMOCRATIC MARKETPLACE FOR CRIMINALITY Milan Vaishnav, Senior Fellow, South Asia, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC 70 AFSPA: THE DARKER SIDE OF INDIAN DEMOCRACY Sanjib Baruah, Professor of Political Studies, Bard College, New York 77 BOOKS Reviewed by Sudhir Chandra and Sushila Ravindranath 13 81 COMMENT Crime and Punishment in Syria Vithal Rajan, writer and playwright, Hyderabad 84 BACKPAGE COVER Designed by www.designosis.in India’s democratic marketplace for criminality M I L A N V A I S H N A V

ONE of the most distinctive develop- At first glance, the affinity ments in India’s post-independence between crime and politics paints a political evolution has been the grow- mental picture of democracy being ing nexus between crime and politics.1 subverted by rogue actors who regu- Indeed, a statistic often quoted in larly employ coercion or violence and reference to India’s present political whose actions defy the popular will. economy is that as many as one-third And coercion, to be sure, is very much of elected Members of Parliament a part of many criminal politicians’ (MPs) face ongoing criminal cases. standard repertoires. Indeed, a candi- While many of these cases involve date’s coercive reputation can be minor charges, one in five MPs face viewed as an asset insofar as it helps at least one case involving potentially to weaken or counterbalance political serious infractions, ranging from mur- opposition from rival groups through der to physical assault.2 (actual or threatened) violence and The group of lawmakers (and intimidation. alleged lawbreakers) include figures But criminality cannot be such as Pappu Yadav, a notorious reduced to coercion or the perpetra- bahubali who once bragged that tion of violence alone. Especially there was no jail in his home state of since the mid-1990s, when the ECI Bihar whose insides he was not fami- (Election Commission of India) came liar with; Rajan Vichare, the into its own as a powerful ‘referee’ strongman hailing from in institution, booth capturing and brazen , who faces a dozen cases intimidation at the polling booth have winding their way through the courts; precipitously declined.3 Operating in and the Congress Party’s Adhir environments where there are serious Ranjan Chowdhury, the self-styled governance gaps, criminal politicians ‘Robin Hood of Baharampur’ in West also rely on non-coercive mechanisms Bengal. Despite the anti-corruption – such as redistribution, social insur- rhetoric of ance, and dispute resolution – to win (BJP) Prime Minister Narendra Modi, over voters. eight legislators in his first cabinet were Therefore, while scholars must connected to serious criminal cases. acknowledge that coercion is typically Indeed, the prevalence of criminal taint part of the modus operandi of seri- is widespread, touching all parties and ous criminal politicians, they must also reaching all corners of the country. devote sufficient attention to under- standing how ‘tainted’ politicians do 1. This article is based on edited excerpts from not simply survive, but thrive in some the author’s book, When Crime Pays: Money and Muscle in Indian Politics. HarperCollins of the most competitive elections in the India, New Delhi, 2017. The author is grate- 3. E. Sridharan and Milan Vaishnav, ‘Election ful to Rebecca Brown for research assistance Commission of India’, in Devesh Kapur, and Kanchan Chandra for her comments. Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Milan Vaishnav 65 2. Data compiled by the Association for (eds.), Rethinking Public Institutions in India. Democratic Reforms; for more information, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2017, see http://myneta.info. pp. 415-461.

SEMINAR 693 – May 2017 world. Like all politicians in India, those akin to free agents, in the early post- electoral politics. Much like private with criminal reputations also live and independence era. Indeed, even in the firms seeking to ‘vertically integrate’ die at the ballot box. And, arguably, first general election of 1951-2, the their operations, criminals decided to elections today are freer and fairer ECI found scattered evidence of Con- cut out the politician middleman in than they have been at other points in gress Party politicians contracting order to maximize control over their India’s post-independence history. with local strongmen to influence own survival and protection by becom- To that end, I argue that it is elections by coercing opponents, ing politicians. 6 For example, a gang- useful to view the relative success of mobilizing supporters, distributing ster such as Suryadeo Singh – a huge criminal politicians as a byproduct of clientelistic handouts, and, in some player in the Dhanbad coal mafia – par- democratic practice, rather than its extreme cases, stuffing ballot boxes.5 layed his rising clout into a successful authoritarian antithesis. Indeed, under In providing assistance to politicians, career in politics, contesting and win- certain conditions, malfeasant politi- criminals occasionally engaged in ille- ning assembly elections in 1977 and, cians and democratic accountability gal activity, but they also used their eventually, a seat in the in can be compatible. Granted, this form social capital and local standing to bridge 1984. of accountability is often partial, the divide between state and society imperfect, or counterintuitive. Yet, it in ways that political parties increas- offers a corrective to the traditional ingly struggled to do, especially as their This transition played out in the 1970s narrative that the very existence of a organizational foundations atrophied. and 1980s; by the 1990s, the predomi- large number of corrupt or criminal nance of elected representatives fac- legislators is symptomatic of a break- ing criminal charges, including those down in the standard chain of demo- Over time, a number of trends pulled of a serious nature, had been locked in. cratic accountability. criminals into a more direct role in elec- For instance, an estimated eight per toral politics; these included the cent of Uttar Pradesh Members of the gradual erosion of the Congress Par- Legislative Assembly (MLAs) elected It is helpful to think about politicians, ty’s hegemonic status, rising social in 1984 assumed office while under of all types, operating within an elec- demands often expressed through criminal scrutiny. In 2012, that share toral marketplace.4 In elections, there identity politics, the deterioration of stood at 45 per cent. are buyers (voters) and sellers (parties public sector institutions, and the col- The supply of criminally linked and politicians). As with any market, lapse of the prevailing system of politicians, however, cannot be reduced there are both supply and demand fac- financing elections. However, criminals to a story of individual incentives alone. tors at work that allow the market to were also pushed into politics by their In nearly all democracies, parties are survive. The idea of supply can be ultimate desire for self-preservation. the key gatekeepers that decide which disaggregated into two components: As political competition intensified politicians eventually get a spot on the decision of individuals to step for- and the party system grew increasingly the ballot. Candidates always have the ward as candidates, and the selection fragmented, criminals allied with the option of running as independents, of candidates by political parties. Congress could no longer take their but the success of those choosing this In India, the initial supply of political patrons’ re-election for option is rather limited, in India and criminality resulted from strategic granted. This uncertainty created elsewhere. Indeed, according to ECI decisions taken by criminal entrepre- huge new risks for criminals: without data, of the 4,300 MPs elected bet- neurs who had long been active in the secure political protection, they would ween 1977 and 2014, a mere 1.4 per political sphere. Indeed, the historical be subject to retribution, either at the record dating back to the early days of hands of the state or from their politi- 6. ‘Vertical integration’, a concept popular- ized by the Nobel economist Oliver William- the republic is replete with evidence of cal rivals. son, refers to the ‘substitution of internal politicians conniving with ‘antisocial’ The obvious solution to this organization for market exchange’, or the or ‘lumpen’ elements, who functioned dilemma was for criminals to take merging together of two businesses that are matters into their own hands and join at different stages of production. A classic 4. Elections and markets are, of course, not example is an auto manufacturer that decides completely analogous. For instance, the elec- 5. Election Commission of India, Report on to make its own tyres in-house rather than toral market is shaped by social realities and the First General Elections in India, 1951-52. contract with a third party to manufacture 66 imperfections that prevent it from consist- Election Commission of India, New Delhi, them. See Oliver E. Williamson, ‘The Vertical ently operating as a ‘free market’ in the pur- 1955, http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/eci_publica- Integration of Production: Market Failure est sense. These caveats aside, there is a utility tions/books/genr/FirstGenElection-51-52.pdf Considerations’, American Economic Review to employing the market analogy. (accessed 5 July 2013). 61(2), May 1971, pp. 112-23.

SEMINAR 693 – May 2017 cent (or 82 in total) lacked a formal democratic politics have often assumed rigged by political elites. As such, they party affiliation. that voters do not willingly support do not leave much space for ‘affirma- Why parties recruit candidates so-called ‘bad politicians’ – shorthand tive’ sources of support for criminal linked to wrongdoing is not obvious, but for politicians involved in illegal or candidates. However, there is an alter- parties’ underlying quest for ‘rents’ unethical behaviour – but instead native explanation that suggests vot- suggests one possible explanation.7 In do so inadvertently due to a lack of ers can have an underlying strategic settings where elections are costly yet information.9 logic for supporting criminal candi- parties are weakly organized, seeking In a poor country such as India, dates when two conditions are present. out self-financing candidates is an where widespread illiteracy and attractive option. Candidates with deep uneven media access are a reality, it is pockets can contribute financial rents certainly plausible that many voters In places where the rule of law is weak in numerous ways; in addition to plug- make their decisions on election day and social divisions are rampant, poli- ging election funding gaps, they can with a heavy dose of ignorance about ticians can use their criminality as a directly provide financial payments to the qualifications of their local candi- party leaders or engage in other kinds dates. If this were the case, the elec- 10. Toke Aidt, Miriam Golden, and Devesh of rent-seeking behaviour that could tion of suspected criminal candidates Tewari, ‘Criminal Candidate Selection for the Indian National Legislature’, unpublished ultimately benefit the party. Indeed, would be incidental, rather than a paper, Department of Political Science, Uni- qualitative evidence suggests, and genuine expression of latent demand. versity of California, Los Angeles, November quantitative analyses confirm, that 2015, http://www.golden.polisci.ucla.edu/ single-post/2015/11/11/Criminal-Candidate- money is a prime motivation for why Selection-for-the-Indian-National-Legislature parties are willing to embrace ‘mus- It is also conceivable that so-called (accessed 18 January 2017). cle’.8 Candidates with greater financial ‘low information’ voters could be 11. Indeed, numerous official documents, and resources (read: spending capacity) more susceptible to coercive threats by various committees and commissions reveal are much more likely to win elections. strongmen politicians. As one recent that the Government of India itself is very concerned by the interaction of crime and poli- And candidates linked with criminality, paper on India’s criminal politicians tics. Indeed, the government has repeatedly in turn, often have better access to suggests, ‘literate voters are endowed identified the need to rid politics of criminals resources. Data from the last three with a whole panoply of resources, as a key public policy objective. The most well known of these reports is that of the Vohra general elections reveal that the rich- including access to information and Committee. See Ministry of Home Affairs, est quintile of candidates (the wealthi- access to police protection, that toge- Government of India, Final Report of the est 20 per cent in terms of personal ther offers them greater resilience in Vohra Committee. Government of India, New 10 Delhi, 2005, http://adrindia.org/sites/default/ financial assets) were more than the face of electoral violence.’ files/VOHRA%20COMMITTEE% twenty times as likely to win elections Such arguments often portray 20REPORT_0.pdf (accessed 20 April 2016). when compared to candidates in the voters as unwitting pawns in a game 12. Nishith Prakash, Marc Rockmore and poorest quintile. Yogesh Uppal, ‘Do Criminally Accused Poli- James Manor, ‘Changing State, Changing ticians Affect Economic Outcomes? Evidence Society in India’, South Asia: Journal of from India’, unpublished paper, Department South Asian Studies 25(2), 2002, pp. 231-56. of Economics, Youngstown State University, What remains a mystery, however, For a recent quantitative study, see Bhaskar October 2015, http://yuppal.people.ysu.edu/ is why voters might support candidates Dutta and Poonam Gupta, ‘How Indian Vot- criminal_mla_11_08_14.pdf (accessed 23 ers Respond to Candidates with Criminal January 2016). with serious criminal reputations. Charges: Evidence from the 2009 Lok Sabha 13. Given India’s first-past-the-post electoral Scholars who have studied the con- Elections’, Economic and Political Weekly system, in which elections at the constituency nection between malfeasance and 49(4), 25 January 2014, pp. 43-51. level are regularly won with substantially less 9. Alicia Adsera, Carles Boix and Mark Payne, than a majority of votes, winning coalitions 7. ‘Rents’ are typically defined as an economic ‘Are You Being Served? Political Accountabi- can be quite narrow. For instance, in the 2014 payoff where the ultimate beneficiary incurs lity and Quality of Government’, Journal of general election, 37 per cent of candidates won no costs in producing that payoff. When Law, Economics, and Organization 19(2), a majority of votes cast in their respective economists think of rents, they typically 2003, pp. 445-490; Claudio Ferraz and constituencies. That number was actually a think of illicit acts of corruption. But a more Federico Finan, ‘Exposing Corrupt Politi- significant increase from 2009, when just 22 expansive definition could include funds can- cians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly per cent were ‘majority winners’. See Milan didates provide to cover the expenses of con- Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes’, Vaishnav and Danielle Smogard, ‘A New Era testing elections or contribute to party coffers. Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(2), 2008, in Indian Politics?’ Carnegie Endowment 8. For a qualitative exploration of the link pp. 703-45; and Eric C.C. Chang, Miriam for International Peace, 10 June 2014, http:// 67 between money and muscle, see Christophe A. Golden and Seth J. Hill, ‘Legislative Mal- carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/10/new-era- Jaffrelot, ‘Indian Democracy: The Rule of feasance and Political Accountability’, World in-indian-politics/hdc6 (accessed 15 June Law on Trial’, India Review 1(1), 2002, p. 98; Politics 62(2), April 2010, pp. 177-220. 2014).

SEMINAR 693 – May 2017 signal of their enhanced capacity and asked about his tendency to create a Third, when it comes to social willingness to do whatever it takes to ruckus for political gain: ‘I am a mafia welfare, it is true that there is some protect their supporters’ interests. This man. How can I be Gandhi? I have segment of the electorate that stands ‘protection’ typically involves substi- forty cases lodged against me,’ the MP to gain from the presence of criminal tuting for a state administration that is stated. ‘How can I be any good? I try politicians – namely, their core sup- unable (or unwilling) to effectively and to do my best. This is the public. I want porters. Yet these improvements are impartially fulfil its basic functions, to be of some help to them.’ The vot- not likely to be evenly distributed; there such as guaranteeing public security, ers, for their part, have been quite may be gains for certain segments of resolving disputes and providing core helpful in return; in 2014, Sharan Singh society, but politicians who tout their public services. rang in his fourth term as an MP. criminal reputations thrive by exploit- The constituent ‘interests’ poli- ing – not resolving – social divisions. tician’s pledge to protect are often cast Their modus operandi relies principally in terms of preserving the status of the The existence of a marketplace for on catering to narrow segments of the ethnic community (or communities) in criminal politicians does not mean electorate, rather than the population question, which further allows a can- that one should gloss over the corro- at large.13 didate to spin his criminal reputation sive effects the fusion of crime and as doing whatever is necessary to politics can have in democratic sys- ‘defend’ his allies. According to this tems. To the contrary, the symbiosis But even for their supporters, crimi- logic, information about a candidate’s between crime and politics should be a nal politicians arguably have a mixed criminality is not only well known to cause for concern on several counts.11 impact. On the one hand, candidates many voters, but it is also intrinsic to First, the fact that many of India’s lead- known for flouting the law regularly their voting behaviour. ing lawmakers are also among its campaign on pledges of delivering foremost (alleged) lawbreakers has benefits of various sorts to their adher- serious implications for the sanctity of ents. While these can be material in Many politicians therefore wear the rule of law. If citizens believe that nature, they also involve things like their outlaw bona fides as a badge of laws can be openly flouted without physical protection or dispute resolu- honour. Examples abound, but con- repercussion, these perceptions can tion and justice. But while politicians sider a strongman politician such as create a self-fulfilling reality, thereby suspected of wrongdoing appear to Brij Bhushan Sharan Singh of Uttar encouraging widespread disrespect plug a governance vacuum, they also Pradesh. Sharan Singh, a one-time for the rule of law. benefit from the persistence of a bro- student activist turned Thakur caste Second, one recent study finds ken public sector machinery. If the leader, at one point had racked up as that constituencies with an elected state were able to consistently and many as forty criminal cases, ranging representative who has an ongoing effectively carry out its core duties, from murder to kidnapping and even criminal case experience significantly these candidates would certainly lose abetting terrorism. The defiant neta lower rates of economic growth. This much of their relevance. This way of once claimed his controversial actions negative effect is even larger when the functioning finds an analogy in the are done with the intent of helping the incumbent faces serious cases, cases operations of mafia groups in other helpless, remarking: ‘I have never trou- involving financial crimes, or hails from parts of the world. bled the poor and the decent and I have states with endemic corruption and In his landmark work on the never shied away from taking on weak institutions. The authors of the Sicilian Mafia, sociologist Diego those who oppress others.’ Once, when study surmise that this is a byproduct Gambetta argues that a lack of social launching a protest over the inaction of of lower investment in public goods trust in Italy first gave rise to the mafia. the local police, Sharan Singh was provision.12 What mafia members could offer – to

FIGURE 1 FIGURE 2 FIGURE 3 Bad Politicians and Accountability: Bad Politicians and Accountability: Bad Politicians and Accountability: Standard View Reverse Induction Revisionist View

Voters Ability to Democratic Failure of Result of Provide Success of Access to ‘Bad’ armed punish accounta- democratic asymme- support ‘partial’ informa- politi- with 68 > ‘bad’ > bility > accounta- > tric infor- > for ‘bad’ > accounta- tion cians informa- politicians preserved bility mation politicians bility tion

SEMINAR 693 – May 2017 all parties involved – was the credibi- lawmakers contain an assumption that lity that a transaction would be hon- the political success of bad politicians oured, thus overcoming the social trust in democratic countries is inherently deficit. But, as Gambetta explains, the symptomatic of a breakdown in the ‘Mafioso himself has an interest in chain of democratic accountability. making regulated injections of dis- This is taken as a given; an alternative trust into the market to increase the scenario in which bad politicians and demand’ for the very protection he accountability might coexist is typically offers.14 After all, if citizens were able not envisioned. to organically develop bonds of trust among themselves, the mafia would be out of business. In a few instances, some scholars actually begin with this premise and then work in reverse. Once the accoun- From the standpoint of democracy, tability failure is identified, scholars the intimacy of crime and democratic work backwards to identify the primary politics confounds many commonly cause. In many instances, information accepted notions. After all, many of the is often believed to be at the heart of leading lights from political science this breakdown – the missing ingre- and political philosophy who have dient which, when absent, creates the written eloquently about democracy space for bad politicians to creep in over the past several centuries suggest under the cover of darkness. This pro- that what distinguishes democracy cess of reverse induction (Figure 2) is from autocracy is that the former more likely subliminal than intentional. engenders accountability because Whichever causal logic is pur- elections offer voters the opportunity sued – that depicted in Figure 1 or – at regular intervals – to punish law- Figure 2 – the ignorant voter thesis is makers who betray the public trust. a compelling narrative and has been This mechanism is at the heart of the shown to be true in a great many cases. democratic project and is thought to But it is not a universal truth. Assum- provide the carrot and the stick by ing away the possibility that connec- which ‘bad’ politicians can be weeded tions to illegal behaviour can sometimes out and ‘good’ politicians ushered in. be an asset, rather than a liability, for Later, scholars came to the reali- politicians in consolidated democra- zation that democracy did not always cies can be deeply problematic. work as advertised. On the contrary, This turns the standard logic on they postulated that democracy could its head: well informed voters may, in facilitate accountability only when vot- fact, have good reasons to lend their ers participating in democratic pro- support to bad politicians, thus creat- cesses had access to information ing a victory for democratic account- about the behaviour of their represen- ability (Figure 3). Granted, the ensuing tatives. Armed with this information, form of democratic accountability is voters could then make rational deci- partial, imperfect, and flies against sions about whether to re-elect or reject many common normative concep- their incumbent politician, thus facili- tions. Furthermore, it is not without tating true accountability (Figure 1). its adverse side effects. Yet, it offers a Based on this reasoning, it is no corrective to the narrative that voters, surprise that most studies of wayward and parties, are saddled with malfea- sant politicians. To the contrary, they 69 14. Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection. Harvard might have rational, affirmative rea- University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 25. sons to give them support.

SEMINAR 693 – May 2017