Jebsheimgermanpointofview
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1 THE BATTLE OF JEBSHEIM FROM A GERMAN POINT OF VIEW INTRODUCTION Jebsheim was in the Colmar Pocket, one of the last parts of France held by the Germans in 1945. The Germans called the Colmar Pocket the "Colmar Bridgehead" or the "Alsace Bridgehead". The Colmar Pocket was defended by the German 19th Army. The northern part of the Colmar Pocket, including Jebsheim, was defended by the German LXIV Army Corps. At the beginning of the battle, Jebsheim was in the zone of the German 708th Volksgrenadier Division. This division was severely weakened after months of combat in Alsace. It was reinforced by the German 2nd Mountain Division. Additional German units were thrown into the battle of Jebsheim during its course from 25-29 January. The German 19th Army was opposed by the French 1st Army commanded by General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. The German LXIV Corps in the northern part of the Colmar Pocket was opposed by The French II Corps commanded by General Joseph de Goislard de Monsabert. The US 3rd Infantry Division was temporarily under command of French II Corps. The commander of US 3rd Infantry Division was John "Iron Mike" O'Daniel. The US 254th Infantry Regiment was attached to the US 3rd Infantry Division. The 254th Regiment was part of the 63rd Infantry Division. It was sent to France early without the division staff and supporting units. The US XXI Corps was ordered to the Colmar Pocket on 28 January but it was not involved at Jebsheim. Hitler's mistrust of the Army overshadowed the German commanders. In the early years of the war, Hitler thought the Army commanders were too cautious. In the last year of the war, Hitler assumed that the Army was disloyal. On 20 July 1944, a group of Army officers headed by Lieutenant Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg attempted to assassinate Hitler. Obviously, this did not improve his opinion of the Army. By 1945, Hitler trusted no one except proven loyalists such as Heinrich Himmler. The 19th Army did not have enough men to cover its front line. Units were rushed to the focal points of Allied attack at the last minute and immediately thrown into combat. They had no time to familiarize themselves with the terrain or their neighboring units. Morale among the German troops was mixed. Some deserted, some surrendered, some fought to the end. The winter weather during the battle of Jebsheim was some of the worst on record. Temperatures at night were below zero. It snowed heavily on 26, 27 and 28 January. Figure 1 shows an overview of the Colmar Pocket with the sectors of the Allied and German divisions. Figure 2 shows Jebsheim and surrounding villages. 2 FIGURE 1 COLMAR POCKET Reference: Riviera to the Rhine, Clarke & Smith, Center of Military History 3 FIGURE 2 JEBSHEIM AND SURROUNDING VILLAGES 4 GERMAN ORGANIZATION IN THE COLMAR POCKET ARMY GROUP OBERRHEIN (Heeresgruppe Oberrhein) Army Group Oberrhein was created in December 1944. Its main function was to lead "Operation Nordwind", the last major German offensive on the Western Front. Technically it was not an Army Group since it only had one army, the German 19th Army. The commander was Heinrich Himmler. On 23 January 1945, Himmler was reassigned to command Army Group Vistula on the Eastern Front. During the battle of Jebsheim, the top officers of Army Group Oberrhein were Commander in Chief SS Senior Group Leader (Oberstgruppenführer) Paul Hausser Chief of General Staff SS Group Leader (Gruppenführer) Werner Ostendorff First General Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Dankworth When Army Group Oberrhein was dissolved on 29 January, Hausser assumed command of Army Group G which included 19th Army. 19th ARMY German 19th Army was responsible for defending the entire Colmar Pocket. Its top officers were Commander General of Infantry Siegfried Rasp Chief of General Staff Colonel Kurt Brandstädter First General Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Walter Barth 19th Army had two Corps. LXIV Corps was responsible for the northern half of the Colmar Pocket including Jebsheim. LXIII Corps was responsible for the southern half. LXIV ARMY CORPS Commander General of Infantry Helmut Thumm (Thumm was replaced by Lieutenant General Max Grimmeiss on 29 January) Chief of General Staff Colonel Köhler The following infantry divisions were under command of LXIV Corps: 16th Volksgrenadier Division 189th Infantry Division 708th Volksgrenadier Division 198th Infantry Division 2nd Mountain Division was sent to the Colmar Pocket to shore up the defense. 2nd Mountain Division arrived in fragments. Initially its units were assigned to other divisions. On 28 January 5 it was formed again as a division. Some of its units remained under command of other divisions. (1) LXIV Corps also included 654th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion and one company each from 93rd and 525th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalions. JEBSHEIM Figure 3 shows Jebsheim, Jebsheim Mill, key terrain features and the streets of the village. The terrain around Jebsheim is almost completely flat. Jebsheim Woods (Bois de Jebsheim) between Jebsheim and Riedwihr provided cover for German defenders, as did the woods north and east of Jebsheim Mill. The Blind River flowing past Jebsheim Mill was an effective tank obstacle. The bridge over the Blind River at Jebsheim Mill was not demolished by the Germans. It provided an essential crossing for Allied armor. It was a favorite target for German artillery, but it remained intact throughout the battle. Two tributaries of the Blind River, the Rigole de Widensolen and the Ohnengraben, provided cover for infantry. All three waterways could be waded by infantry at the risk of frozen feet. According to General Thumm, commander of LXIV Corps: (2) Certainly the village had tactical significance due to its location, but it was much overrated by the Allies. Jebsheim lay directly in the axis of their advance to the Rhine and blocked access to the intersection of the Colmar and Rhine-Rhône canals, and thus to Neuf Brisach, the most important Rhine crossing for the German 19th Army. At this time, however, the 19th Army lacked the necessary forces to effectively defend the entire area around Jebsheim. 6 FIGURE 3 JEBSHEIM 7 GERMAN UNITS AT JEBSHEIM 708th VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION From 25-27 January, Jebsheim was in the sector of 708th Volksgrenadier Division. Its commander was Colonel Wilhelm Bleckwenn. (1) At the beginning of the battle of Jebsheim, the 708th Volksgrenadier Division was responsible for a long front sector extending from Seléstat in the north to Jebsheim in the south and west to the Ill River. It suffered heavy losses from 22-24 January when the US 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Free French Division attacked its sector. By the time the Allies attacked Jebsheim, most of its manpower was from the 2nd Mountain Division. (1) At the beginning of the battle, Jebsheim was in the zone of the 748th Grenadier Regiment. By 26/27 January, 748th Grenadier Regiment was down to a combat strength of about 60 men. (3) 2nd MOUNTAIN DIVISION (2. Gebirgs Division) On 28-29 January, most of the units at Jebsheim were under command of 2nd Mountain Division. Its commander was Lieutenant General Hans Degen who arrived in the Colmar Pocket on 27 January and established a division command post in Widensolen. On 28 January the division staff arrived and 2nd Mountain Division was assigned its own sector which included Jebsheim. (1) The 2nd Mountain Division was originally composed of men from Austria. It was deployed in Finland against the Russians west of Murmansk. After Finland switched its allegiance from the Germans to the Allies, it made its way to the Colmar Pocket via Norway, Denmark and the bomb-damaged railways of Germany. It was deployed in both the northern and southern parts of the Pocket. When the units of 2nd Mountain Division arrived in Denmark, they were re-equipped with new weapons, but there was no time to be trained in their use. The men did their best to familiarize themselves with their new weapons on the train ride to Alsace. (4) Inexplicably, the men had to leave their winter equipment behind in Denmark. According to one soldier: (4) "This measure was incomprehensible to us. Was it because so far to the south we would no longer need our winter gear? That was not possible yet. The devil knows who gave this crazy command! Beside the fact that this happened in January in Denmark, which itself was fiercely cold, the troops missed their winter gear even more in the harsh winter of Alsace. In every unit, the casualties due to frostbite were worse in Alsace than they were on the coast of the Arctic Ocean." When the men of 2nd Mountain Division reached Hamburg, Germany, they were shocked by the destruction they found: (4) "What we saw was a dead, burned-out city. Ruins, nothing but ruins, smoke-blackened houses, semi-collapsed walls, piles of rubble and debris. So this is our reunion with Germany. Certainly we knew what had happened. The soldiers returning from leave and the replacements had told us as much. But none of us had formed a correct idea. No words could have made a picture of this destroyed city. We had lived in the tundra, in a land where nothing could be destroyed because there was nothing to destroy. But here an entire city had been destroyed, 8 where had lived hundreds of thousands of women, children, old men. What had they done to deserve this? This was different than the war we were used to. This was not a fight of soldiers against soldiers. Here, war was fought with technically perfected means against innocent people, against life itself.