1

THE BATTLE OF JEBSHEIM FROM A GERMAN POINT OF VIEW

INTRODUCTION

Jebsheim was in the Colmar Pocket, one of the last parts of France held by the Germans in 1945. The Germans called the Colmar Pocket the "Colmar Bridgehead" or the "Alsace Bridgehead". The Colmar Pocket was defended by the German 19th Army. The northern part of the Colmar Pocket, including Jebsheim, was defended by the German LXIV Army Corps. At the beginning of the battle, Jebsheim was in the zone of the German 708th Volksgrenadier Division. This division was severely weakened after months of combat in Alsace. It was reinforced by the German 2nd Mountain Division. Additional German units were thrown into the battle of Jebsheim during its course from 25-29 January.

The German 19th Army was opposed by the French 1st Army commanded by General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. The German LXIV Corps in the northern part of the Colmar Pocket was opposed by The French II Corps commanded by General Joseph de Goislard de Monsabert. The US 3rd Infantry Division was temporarily under command of French II Corps. The commander of US 3rd Infantry Division was John "Iron Mike" O'Daniel. The US 254th Infantry Regiment was attached to the US 3rd Infantry Division. The 254th Regiment was part of the 63rd Infantry Division. It was sent to France early without the division staff and supporting units. The US XXI Corps was ordered to the Colmar Pocket on 28 January but it was not involved at Jebsheim.

Hitler's mistrust of the Army overshadowed the German commanders. In the early years of the war, Hitler thought the Army commanders were too cautious. In the last year of the war, Hitler assumed that the Army was disloyal. On 20 July 1944, a group of Army officers headed by Lieutenant Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg attempted to assassinate Hitler. Obviously, this did not improve his opinion of the Army. By 1945, Hitler trusted no one except proven loyalists such as Heinrich Himmler.

The 19th Army did not have enough men to cover its front line. Units were rushed to the focal points of Allied attack at the last minute and immediately thrown into combat. They had no time to familiarize themselves with the terrain or their neighboring units. Morale among the German troops was mixed. Some deserted, some surrendered, some fought to the end.

The winter weather during the battle of Jebsheim was some of the worst on record. Temperatures at night were below zero. It snowed heavily on 26, 27 and 28 January.

Figure 1 shows an overview of the Colmar Pocket with the sectors of the Allied and German divisions.

Figure 2 shows Jebsheim and surrounding villages. 2

FIGURE 1 COLMAR POCKET

Reference: Riviera to the Rhine, Clarke & Smith, Center of Military History 3

FIGURE 2 JEBSHEIM AND SURROUNDING VILLAGES 4

GERMAN ORGANIZATION IN THE COLMAR POCKET

ARMY GROUP OBERRHEIN (Heeresgruppe Oberrhein)

Army Group Oberrhein was created in December 1944. Its main function was to lead "Operation Nordwind", the last major German offensive on the Western Front. Technically it was not an Army Group since it only had one army, the German 19th Army. The commander was Heinrich Himmler. On 23 January 1945, Himmler was reassigned to command Army Group Vistula on the Eastern Front. During the battle of Jebsheim, the top officers of Army Group Oberrhein were

Commander in Chief SS Senior Group Leader (Oberstgruppenführer) Paul Hausser

Chief of General Staff SS Group Leader (Gruppenführer) Werner Ostendorff

First General Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Dankworth

When Army Group Oberrhein was dissolved on 29 January, Hausser assumed command of Army Group G which included 19th Army.

19th ARMY

German 19th Army was responsible for defending the entire Colmar Pocket. Its top officers were

Commander General of Infantry Siegfried Rasp

Chief of General Staff Colonel Kurt Brandstädter

First General Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Walter Barth

19th Army had two Corps. LXIV Corps was responsible for the northern half of the Colmar Pocket including Jebsheim. LXIII Corps was responsible for the southern half.

LXIV ARMY CORPS

Commander General of Infantry Helmut Thumm (Thumm was replaced by Lieutenant General Max Grimmeiss on 29 January)

Chief of General Staff Colonel Köhler

The following infantry divisions were under command of LXIV Corps:

16th Volksgrenadier Division 189th Infantry Division 708th Volksgrenadier Division 198th Infantry Division

2nd Mountain Division was sent to the Colmar Pocket to shore up the defense. 2nd Mountain Division arrived in fragments. Initially its units were assigned to other divisions. On 28 January 5 it was formed again as a division. Some of its units remained under command of other divisions. (1)

LXIV Corps also included 654th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion and one company each from 93rd and 525th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalions.

JEBSHEIM

Figure 3 shows Jebsheim, Jebsheim Mill, key terrain features and the streets of the village.

The terrain around Jebsheim is almost completely flat. Jebsheim Woods (Bois de Jebsheim) between Jebsheim and Riedwihr provided cover for German defenders, as did the woods north and east of Jebsheim Mill. The Blind River flowing past Jebsheim Mill was an effective tank obstacle. The bridge over the Blind River at Jebsheim Mill was not demolished by the Germans. It provided an essential crossing for Allied armor. It was a favorite target for German artillery, but it remained intact throughout the battle. Two tributaries of the Blind River, the Rigole de Widensolen and the Ohnengraben, provided cover for infantry. All three waterways could be waded by infantry at the risk of frozen feet.

According to General Thumm, commander of LXIV Corps: (2)

Certainly the village had tactical significance due to its location, but it was much overrated by the Allies. Jebsheim lay directly in the axis of their advance to the Rhine and blocked access to the intersection of the Colmar and Rhine-Rhône canals, and thus to Neuf Brisach, the most important Rhine crossing for the German 19th Army. At this time, however, the 19th Army lacked the necessary forces to effectively defend the entire area around Jebsheim. 6

FIGURE 3 JEBSHEIM 7

GERMAN UNITS AT JEBSHEIM

708th VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

From 25-27 January, Jebsheim was in the sector of 708th Volksgrenadier Division. Its commander was Colonel Wilhelm Bleckwenn. (1)

At the beginning of the battle of Jebsheim, the 708th Volksgrenadier Division was responsible for a long front sector extending from Seléstat in the north to Jebsheim in the south and west to the Ill River. It suffered heavy losses from 22-24 January when the US 3rd Infantry Division and the 1st Free French Division attacked its sector. By the time the Allies attacked Jebsheim, most of its manpower was from the 2nd Mountain Division. (1) At the beginning of the battle, Jebsheim was in the zone of the 748th Grenadier Regiment. By 26/27 January, 748th Grenadier Regiment was down to a combat strength of about 60 men. (3)

2nd MOUNTAIN DIVISION (2. Gebirgs Division)

On 28-29 January, most of the units at Jebsheim were under command of 2nd Mountain Division. Its commander was Lieutenant General Hans Degen who arrived in the Colmar Pocket on 27 January and established a division command post in Widensolen. On 28 January the division staff arrived and 2nd Mountain Division was assigned its own sector which included Jebsheim. (1)

The 2nd Mountain Division was originally composed of men from Austria. It was deployed in Finland against the Russians west of Murmansk. After Finland switched its allegiance from the Germans to the Allies, it made its way to the Colmar Pocket via Norway, Denmark and the bomb-damaged railways of Germany. It was deployed in both the northern and southern parts of the Pocket.

When the units of 2nd Mountain Division arrived in Denmark, they were re-equipped with new weapons, but there was no time to be trained in their use. The men did their best to familiarize themselves with their new weapons on the train ride to Alsace. (4)

Inexplicably, the men had to leave their winter equipment behind in Denmark. According to one soldier: (4)

"This measure was incomprehensible to us. Was it because so far to the south we would no longer need our winter gear? That was not possible yet. The devil knows who gave this crazy command! Beside the fact that this happened in January in Denmark, which itself was fiercely cold, the troops missed their winter gear even more in the harsh winter of Alsace. In every unit, the casualties due to frostbite were worse in Alsace than they were on the coast of the Arctic Ocean."

When the men of 2nd Mountain Division reached Hamburg, Germany, they were shocked by the destruction they found: (4)

"What we saw was a dead, burned-out city. Ruins, nothing but ruins, smoke-blackened houses, semi-collapsed walls, piles of rubble and debris. So this is our reunion with Germany. Certainly we knew what had happened. The soldiers returning from leave and the replacements had told us as much. But none of us had formed a correct idea. No words could have made a picture of this destroyed city. We had lived in the tundra, in a land where nothing could be destroyed because there was nothing to destroy. But here an entire city had been destroyed, 8 where had lived hundreds of thousands of women, children, old men. What had they done to deserve this? This was different than the war we were used to. This was not a fight of soldiers against soldiers. Here, war was fought with technically perfected means against innocent people, against life itself. Each of us knew that our enemies would wage war to the end without mercy."

The railways were under constant attack from Allied fighter-bombers: (4)

"During the trip south one air raid warning followed another. The destroyed tracks forced the trains into wide detours. Again and again the Allied squadrons forced us to spend hours waiting in the ruins of railway stations or in darkened carriages. We admired the railway men who performed their duty with unwavering calm and serenity, as if they were immune to the threat of bombs. Our train creeps closer to Freiburg under cover of night. An unforgettable image: under the winter moon, over the vast snow-covered ruins of the city stands the lonely tower of the Gothic cathedral among the stars. It is fiercely cold. And our warm gear is in Denmark!"

The elements of 2nd Mountain Division arrived in the Colmar Pocket by rail or march from Freiburg, Germany. All of them crossed the railway bridge over the Rhine River between Breisach, Germany and Neuf Brisach, France. The railway bridge survived all Allied attempts to destroy it with artillery, bombs and floating mines. The Germans awarded the bridge an Iron Cross for its durability in combat.

"Hurriedly we detrain at Freiburg. In dim morning we march through the Rhine valley to Breisach on the German side of the Rhine. Heavy American artillery fire covers the town and the access roads. Only the railway bridge is still passable.

"We had Americans to face. They fought a technical war with outrageous, wasteful expenditure of material. We were also opposed by the French. To them, although it was basically inhabited by Germans, Alsace was French territory. The name 'Strasbourg' brought the last poilu to his feet. We had little time to learn this new way of fighting. But what was completely new and deeply touching, was the fact that we no longer had the deserted tundra before us, in which the only human beings were soldiers, but that we now fought in populated areas. It was about cities, villages, farms, where there were old people, women and children who should be spared the suffering of war if possible."

At full strength, 2nd Mountain Division included:

136th Mountain Regiment (Gebirgsjäger Regiment 136) 137th Mountain Regiment (Gebirgsjäger Regiment 137) 67th Recon Battalion (Aufklärungs Abteilung 67) 55th Mountain Antitank Battalion (Gebirgs Panzerjäger Abteilung 55) 111th Mountain Artillery Regiment (Gebirgs Artillerie Regiment 111) 82nd Mountain Engineer Battalion (Gebirgs Pionier Bataillon 82) 67th Mountain Signals Battalion (Gebirgs Nachrichten Abteilung 67) 67th Mountain Supply Troop (Gebirgs Nachschubtruppen 67) 67th Medical Battalion (Sanitäts Abteilung 67) 67th Mountain Veterinary Company (Gebirgs Veterinär Kompanie 67) 67th Field Post Office (Feldpostamt 67)

The two rifle (Jäger) regiments, the 136th and 137th, were the infantry core of the division. Each regiment had three battalions. Each battalion was organized as follows: 9

1st Battalion:

1st, 2nd, 3rd Companies Rifles, light machine guns, 80 mm mortars, Panzerfaust 4th Company Heavy machine guns, Panzerfaust 5th Heavy Weapons Company 75 mm mountain howitzers, 120 mm mortars Battalion HQ Company Staff, signals, engineers Light Supply Columns Horse-drawn two-wheel carts

2nd Battalion: Same as 1st Battalion except companies numbered 5-10

3rd Battalion: Same as 1st Battalion except companies numbered 11-15

Each regiment had an HQ Company and a 16th Antitank Company equipped with 75 mm antitank guns.

136th MOUNTAIN REGIMENT

Most of the German troops at Jebsheim were from 136th Regiment.

3rd Battalion:

11th and 14th Companies arrived in Neuf Brisach on 22 January. 12th and HQ Companies arrived on 23 January. 15th Company arrived on 24 January. 13th Company arrived on 25 January. (1) Most of the companies in 3rd Battalion marched to Neuf Brisach from Freiburg, Germany (17 miles) because of bomb damage to the railway. (3) 3rd Battalion was the only battalion of 136th Mountain Regiment to be fully committed in Jebsheim.

2nd Battalion:

HQ, 6th, 7th and 10th Companies of 2nd Battalion arrived by train in Neuf Brisach the morning of 25 January. The railway had been repaired. 6th Company was committed near Holtzwihr the morning of 26 January. (3) 7th Company went to Colmar. 6th and 7th Companies were committed west of Jebsheim on 26 January. (1)

1st Battalion:

HQ, 1st and 3rd Companies of 1st Battalion arrived in the Colmar Pocket on 27 January. (1) 1st Company was committed south of Jebsheim on 28 January. (3)

On 27 January, 16th Antitank Company was committed in Jebsheim. (3)

On 28 January, Major Vesper, acting commander of 136th Mountain Regiment, took command of the troops at Jebsheim. The defenders of Jebsheim became known as Combat Group (Kampfgruppe) Vesper. (5)

137th MOUNTAIN REGIMENT

1st Battalion was not committed until the final attempt to retake Jebsheim on 29 January. It had been transferred from the southern part of the Colmar Pocket where it suffered heavy losses. (1)

2nd Battalion was assigned to 189th Infantry Division north of Colmar. (1) 10

3rd Battalion was assigned to 708th Volksgrenadier Division around Grussenheim. (1)

67th RECON BATTALION

The 2nd Bicycle Company of 67th Recon Battalion was committed as infantry at Jebsheim on 29 January. (5)

111th MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY REGIMENT

3rd Battalion was the only battalion of the 111th in the Jebsheim sector. 3rd Battalion had 7th, 8th and 9th Batteries. Each battery had four horse-drawn 105 mm howitzers. (3)

VETERINARY COMPANY

2nd Mountain Division had an unusually large number of horses. The German mountain divisions were organized to function in bad weather and rugged terrain. Most of their supplies were carried by horse-drawn carts and wagons. The 2nd Mountain Division had 5,170 horses in the Colmar Pocket. (1)

REPLACEMENT MOUNTAIN TROOPS

The 2nd Mountain Division received replacement troops from other mountain units which were transferred from Italy and Germany.

The first shipment arrived on 16 January at Rouffach. It was made up of units from Mountain Lehr Battalion (Gebirgsjäger Lehr Bataillon) from Mittenwald, Germany and 4th High Mountain Battalion (4. Hochgebirgs Batallion) from Pievepelago, Italy. This shipment had about 800 men. (3)

The second shipment arrived on 22 January. It had 540 men from 5th Mountain Division near Monte Viso, Italy. (1)

The replacements generally had lower morale than the original members of 2nd Mountain Division. (3)

The 2nd Mountain Division, though highly-regarded, was badly used by the German high command. According to General Thumm: (2)

The village of Jebsheim itself was defended by the 3rd Battalion, and later elements of the 2nd Battalion, 136th Mountain Regiment. The mountain troops faced terrible hours and days ahead; Jebsheim was to become a furnace for them, many of whom would not escape.

The fact that the incoming troops were not deployed in an organized formation, but handed out to various divisions on the north and south fronts of the 19th Army, and so could not have the all-important camaraderie, which helped to bridge unfamiliar situations in the war, caused the mountain troops to feel they were being senselessly used as cannon fodder.

According to the troops themselves: (4)

"What hit us hardest was that the regiments and battalions of the division, as they arrived at the front, were assigned to unfamiliar units and separated from one another. What held these 11 men together was the feeling of standing in a firmly established group of comrades with whom they had shared year after year of sorrow and joy in war. Breaking this cohesion broke more than can be expressed by words. In these terrible battles of attrition any captain or lieutenant was only able to gather a handful of men. This was all he saw of his own division. The men who fought beside him were from other units, hurriedly combed out from the last reserves of orderlies, stragglers, kitchen help: men who mostly lacked experience of war."

654th HEAVY TANK DESTROYER BATTALION (Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 654)

The 654th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion provided highly mobile firepower for the German defense. Its 88 mm guns could fire armor piercing or high explosive rounds. It remained under command of LXIV Corps and was used where needed. Its commander was Major Karl-Heinz Noak.

The 654th had three companies equipped with Jagdpanther tank destroyers each armed with an 88 mm gun mounted on a Panzer Mark V (Panther) chassis. It did not have a rotating turret. The crew was protected by an armored hull with an integral superstructure. The companies arrived by train at Neuf Brisach from 23-25 January. On 25 January, the 654th had 20 operational Jagdpanthers with an additional 17 undergoing maintenance or repair. (6)

93rd HEAVY TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

1st Company, 93rd Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion was under command of LXIV Corps. (1) It was equipped with Rhinoceros (Näshorn) tank destroyers each armed with an 88 mm gun mounted on a Panzer Mark IV chassis. It did not have a rotating turret. The crew was protected by an armored shield on the front and sides. The top and rear were open. It had a higher profile than the Jagdpanther and presented a larger target to incoming fire. On 27 January, the company had 4 operational Näshorn. (1)

525th HEAVY TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

1st Company, 525th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion was under command of LXIV Corps. It was equipped with Näshorn tank destroyers. On 27 January the company had 3 operational Näshorn. (1)

XVII GRENADIER BATTALION OBERRHEIN

XVII was one of several battalions thrown together by Heinrich Himmler while he was commander of Army Group Oberrhein. It included convalescents and comb-outs from industry and rear installations. XVII Battalion spent some time on the Swiss border. Many of its Alsatian members deserted into Switzerland. The Alsatian members of the battalion were subsequently removed. XVII Battalion was then deployed to Haguenau in northern Alsace. (5)

The battalion consisted of 1st, 2nd and 3rd rifle companies and 4th heavy machine gun company. Starting about 22/23 January, the battalion moved from Haguenau on foot and by rail to Breisach, Germany where it arrived the night of 26 January. Most units crossed the Rhine by train to Neuf Brisach. 4th Company crossed the Rhine on ferries and assault boats. (3) 12

16th VOLKSGRENADIER DIVISION

The 2nd Mountain Division received a small number of men from the understrength 16th Volksgrenadier Division. This division was responsible for the front in the Vosges Mountains. LXIV Corps pulled forces out of the mountain front and placed them at the focal points of Allied attack. 2nd Mountain Division was assigned the following units from 16th Volksgrenadier Division: (1)

Staff, 223rd Grenadier Regiment 223rd Grenadier Regimental Units (heavy infantry, antitank, artillery) Remnants of 2nd Battalion, 223rd Grenadier Regiment Remnants of 1st Battalion, 225th Grenadier Regiment

These remnants were grouped under command of 223rd Grenadier Regiment. A few elements turned up in the vicinity of Jebsheim. (3)

993rd HEAVY ARTILLERY BATTALION

This battalion was assigned to 708th Volksgrenadier Division (1). On 27 January, the battalion at reduced strength was organized as follows: (3)

1st Battery 2 150 mm howitzers 2nd Battery 2 122 mm Russian howitzers 3rd Battery 4 152 mm Russian howitzers

The batteries were located near Bischwihr and Widensolen. (5)

235th ARTILLERY REGIMENT

This regiment belonged to the 198th Infantry Division in the far north sector of the Colmar Pocket. On 26 January, 11th Battery was moved south and positioned in Muntzenheim. (3) On 29 January the battery was in Widensolen. (5) It had 2 horse-drawn 150 mm howitzers. (3)

1316th ARTILLERY REGIMENT

This regiment belonged to 16th Volksgrenadier Division. The 3rd Battery with three 105 mm howitzers was in the vicinity of Jebsheim. (3)

21st MORTAR BATTALION

Only 4th Company was in the vicinity of Jebsheim. It was equipped with twelve 80 mm mortars and three heavy machine guns. Due to lack of ammunition, only one platoon could use its mortars. The other platoons were used as infantry. (5)

607th FLAK BATTALION

3rd Company with six 20 mm AA guns was assigned to support 3rd Battalion, 136th Mountain Regiment at Jebsheim (5). 13

THE BATTLE OF JEBSHEIM

25 JANUARY

At 0830 hours, 3rd Battalion, 15th Regiment, US 3rd Infantry Division arrives at the intersection of Routes D3 and D45 just west of Jebsheim Mill. They are supported by four M-10 tank destroyers of 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion. (7)

At the same time, elements of Combat Command 6 of French 5th Armored Division are turned back by German Jagdpanthers after they cross the Riedbrunnen creek northwest of Jebsheim Mill. (8)

LXIV Corps reports to 19th Army: (1)

"At Jebsheim Mill several recon troops repulsed, at 0830 hours 3 enemy tanks with mounted infantry attacked and are at 0900 hours turned to the south. Enemy now stands in front of Jebsheim Mill with 3 tanks and infantry."

At 1100 hours, the Germans begin sending reinforcements. 3rd Battalion, 136th Mountain Regiment is rushed to Jebsheim where it establishes its command post. 3rd Battalion has a total strength of about 600 men. General Thumm heads for Muntzenheim to organize the reinforcements. (1)

At 1440 hours, 3rd Battalion, US 15th Infantry Regiment reports "we have the mill". (7)

The German 708th Volksgrenadier Division reports: (1)

"In the mid day hours the enemy penetrates in a surprise thrust with 2 companies and 3 tanks to Jebsheim Mill. At 1500 hours, 3rd Battalion, 2nd Mountain Division counterattacks supported by 3 Jagdpanthers."

The attack is supported by fire from 993rd Heavy Artillery Battalion. (9)

At the same time, another unit of French Combat Command 6 arrives and helps 3rd Battalion, US 15th Regiment beat back the German counterattack. One Jagdpanther is destroyed after being hit several times by French tank fire. (8)

At 1830 hours the 9th Company, 2nd Battalion, French 1st Paratroop Regiment arrives and at 2200 hours attacks and occupies the woods north of Jebsheim Mill. (9) In the evening, the 3rd Battalion, US 15th Regiment departs to attack Riedwihr, leaving Jebsheim Mill in the hands of the French. (7)

General Rasp and Colonel Brandstädter try to explain to their new boss why they are losing ground in Alsace: (2)

The new Commander in Chief of Army Group Oberrhein, SS Senior Group Leader Hausser, arrives in the bridgehead and discusses the situation with General Rasp and his staff. Himmler had just before his departure to the Eastern Front required of the 19th Army a written statement on the reasons for the "evacuation" of the territory south of the Ill River. His military expertise apparently could not understand that troops under his command could retreat under the pressure of circumstances. 14

Rasp and Brandstädter, therefore, endeavor to make it clear to Hausser that this is not an "evacuation" but a tenacious clinging to every part of the forest and every little stream, and that we are forced to retreat in deference to a tremendous superiority. Of the 708th Volksgrenadier Division, which had to bear the brunt of the offensive in recent days, there was not much left.

At 2115 hours, the 3rd Battalion, 136th Mountain Regiment is ordered to take up defensive positions around the Maginot Line pillboxes and the forests on both sides of the road (D3) from Jebsheim Mill to Jebsheim. (9) From there they can fire into the advancing US 254th Infantry Regiment from the front and both flanks. Elements of 3rd Battalion,137th Mountain Regiment are further to the northeast near Grussenheim along with remnants of 748th Grenadier Regiment. (5)

Around 2230 hours, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, US 254th Infantry Regiment cross the Blind River at Jebsheim Mill and attack towards Jebsheim. (10) German reports note the presence of the US 254th Infantry Regiment: (1)

"At Jebsheim Mill the enemy tried using parts of the 63rd American Division to push to the east."

26 JANUARY

At 0245 hours, Jebsheim receives an Allied artillery barrage.

General Thumm describes the attack from the receiving end: (2)

At 0245 hours, four Allied field artillery battalions opened their murderous fire on Jebsheim. The barrage shredded the houses and whole streets; after a few minutes, the sky began to turn blood red. The livestock, as far as it was not in the stables, now ran like mad with fear through the streets and lanes, while many animals went helpless under the collapsing beams and burning roofs.

In the cellars, the civilian population crowded together up to 40 persons. Many of these were refugees from the former front area. They had to endure the horrors of a merciless war for the second time.

At 0430 hours, the attack on Jebsheim stalls due to frozen weapons, frozen feet and heavy resistance. The units fall back to Jebsheim Mill to thaw out their frozen limbs and weapons. (10)

The US 254th Regiment takes 13 prisoners from 4th Company, 21st Mortar Battalion. The unit was moved from town to town for two weeks and ended up near Jebsheim. The men had low morale and surrendered quickly. (5)

In early morning, three Jagdpanthers take up positions in the Bois de Jebsheim (6).

At 1035 hours, General Rasp is still trying to explain the retreats of the preceding days to SS Group Leader Ostendorff at Army Group Oberrhein: (1)

Ostendorff: "I need from you a message for Hitler about the evacuation of the Ill River sector."

Rasp: "The 708th Volksgrenadier Division has been really beaten here and has bled heavily. Individual formations have been completely wiped out. It is a pity that I did not have more 15 forces available so I could do something. It is unclear to me how Himmler came to the conclusion that the Ill sector has been evacuated. The enemy deployed after heavy artillery preparation with massed attacks and constantly pushed on. I would like to ask that Hitler be told that we did not evacuate the Ill sector, we fought to the last. The regiments in the section were wiped out.

"A proper defense depends on ammunition. The enemy fired 20,000 rounds in preparation for his attack and subsequently proceeded with tanks and infantry. With the quantities of ammunition available to me, it is not possible to think of defense and even less of attacking. I want to point out the condition of the troops. The enemy attack is already on the fourth day. The huge shot volumes complicate any activity."

At 1042 hours, LXIV Army Corps reports to The Chief of Staff, 19th Army, Colonel Brandstädter, that 3rd Battalion, 136th Mountain Regiment still holds a line around Jebsheim Mill. (1)

Colonel Brandstädter offers his advice:

"Is it not possible for us to distance ourselves from Jebsheim Mill and then for heavy field howitzers to shoot in? Then it becomes soft and we attack. It should be done that way. According to a captured map the enemy wants to attack south from Jebsheim Mill. Tonight I can accommodate you with two battalions of battle-hardened people who fought at Haguenau."

At 1634 hours, LXIV Corps reports to 19th Army: (1)

"Strong vehicle traffic (about 100 trucks) in the direction of Jebsheim is being fought with artillery. We have captured a plan of operations, from which we have seen that the enemy intends to take Colmar and from there to advance on Neuf Brisach."

General Thumm continues his story: (2)

So gathered during the day before Jebsheim a considerable force. Besides the US 254th Regiment, the French Combat Command 6, the 3rd Battalion of the French Foreign Legion and the French 1st Paratroop Regiment are deployed.

In the early morning hours of 26 January, it had snowed again with subzero temperatures. The German soldiers on the open Alsatian plain or in the woods around Jebsheim often sank to their knees in the snow. The progress through the fields or through the jungle-like impassable trees caused unspeakable hardships. At noon it cleared again, and the sky became a playground for the hated fighter-bombers who were chasing anyone who moved in the unprotected terrain. Camouflage or snow parkas were a rarity. Often the pilot with impunity could go down to a few meters above the ground, so that one clearly recognized his face under the thick aviator goggles.

Although most of the civiian population wished for the withdrawal of Germans, since this meant the end of the fighting and suffering, the relationship with the German soldiers remained almost always a good one. Hitler's stubborn, inelastic and often arrogant party regime had not been able to eradicate the last remnant of mutual solidarity in this once German land. It was less than three weeks ago that Himmler, in an order to the 19th Army, threatened every Alsatian with the death penalty, who hid or even gave food to a fleeing enemy soldier. 16

On the evening of 26 January, the command of the 19th Army must have realized that the assault on Jebsheim and on the north bank of the Colmar Canal would probably begin that night. The armor accumulations reported by the infantry and artillery forward observers and the massing of infantry around Jebsheim left no other conclusion.

Now the Allies had gathered sufficient tank strength, and it seemed like a miracle that they had not long since used this for the decisive breakthrough on Colmar and Neuf Brisach. Of course, one knew the careful fighting of the French and especially the Americans. However, it was certain that once their ammunition and weapons had piled up to mountains behind their front line, they would no longer hesitate to literally crush the German defense with them.

General Rasp issues orders for 27 January: (1)

"Despite the addition of new strong forces, the enemy failed to break our defensive front. Troops and leadership have done exemplary work despite snow, cold and enemy superiority. We will defend the current Main Line of Resistance to the last man.

"The ammunition situation in the artillery necessitates an increased, focused use of heavy infantry weapons. Through agile leadership, light infantry guns, heavy infantry guns and mortar groups are to give the hard-fighting infantry the greatest possible support at the points of attack."

To make matters worse, Hitler issues another impossible command.

From General Rasp: "The following Führer command will be announced to the divisions: (1)

1) "The Commander-in-Chief, Commanding Generals and Division Commanders are personally responsible to me that a) any decision to make an operational move, b) any intentional attack from the Division level onwards, which is not in the frame of general instructions of the highest leadership, c) any attack operation on the quiet fronts beyond the normal raid activity, which may cause an enemy response, d) any intended withdrawal movement, e) any intended operation from a position, a place, a base, or a fortress will be reported at an early stage, so I am in a position to intervene in this decision and that a possible counter-order will reach the foremost troops in time.

2) "The Commander-in-Chief, Commanding Generals and Division Commanders, the Chiefs of General Staff and every separate General Staff officer or Command Staff officer are to me responsible, that every message contains the unvarnished truth.

"In the future, I will punish severely every attempt at concealment, be it deliberate or negligent or carelessness."

Signed Adolph Hitler

For emphasis, General Rasp adds his own orders to the 19th Army commanders: (1)

"The Commander in Chief of Army Group Oberrhein, SS Senior Group Leader Hausser, has ordered that any undertaking that goes beyond the normal recon and assault activity is to be 17 reported at least 48 hours in advance. He has pointed out the special importance of maintaining communications by all means.

"I urge the commanding generals and division commanders to make all troop commanders and their assistants aware of their duty to communicate.

"The reports of the corps on impending operations are to be submitted on time to me so that the deadline ordered by the Commander of Army Group Oberrhein can be met."

General Thumm offers his reaction: (2)

In these last months of the war, as one no-retreat order followed the other, a German staff officer or commander had to wonder why he was under such regimentation of his decisions and judgment - or why he had ever been entrusted with the responsibility of "leading" - this had to cause such a commander additional fear and confusion.

At 2100 hours, the remnants of 6th Company,136th Regiment take positions west of Jebsheim. (5) 6th Company was committed near Holtzwihr the morning of 26 January. It joined the ill- fated attack on the woods north of Holtzwihr the afternoon of 26 January which was repelled by Lieutenant Audie Murphy with the help of air and artillery bombardment. 6th Company started the day with a combat strength of 90-100 men. By evening only 40-50 are left. (3)

7th Company, 136th Regiment arrives from Colmar. It takes positions in the Bois de Jebsheim east of Riedwihr. 7th Company has 80-85 men. (5)

Around 2200 hours, the two Battalions XVI and XVII Oberrhein arrive at Neuf Brisach.

At the same time, 1st and 2nd Battalions of US 254th Regiment resume their attack from Jebsheim Mill toward Jebsheim while 3rd Battalion launches its attack to the south and east from Riedwihr. (10)

27 JANUARY

At midnight of 26/27 January, eight battalions of Allied artillery pound Jebsheim for fifteen minutes. (10)

General Thumm: (2)

After the barrage, 1st and 2nd battalions of the US 254th Infantry Regiment, supported by some tank platoons from Combat Command 6 of the French 5th Armored Division, entered the village from Jebsheim Mill.

At 0515 hours, LXIV Corps reports to 19th Army: (1)

"In the Jebsheim Mill zone the enemy attacks in strength of two companies on Jebsheim. Combat still ongoing."

In the early morning hours, 2nd Company of 654th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion is transferred from LXIII Corps in the south to LXIV Corps in the north. After reaching the LXIV Corps zone, its three operational Jagdpanthers are positioned near Durrenentzen. The arrival of 2nd Company commits the entire 654th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion in the vicinity of Jebsheim. (6) 18

During its attack, US 254th Regiment takes 63 prisoners from 136th Mountain Regiment. (5)

"Many of the prisoners give up with no resistance. Some said they made up their mind to desert when they learned they would be committed on the Western Front. They knew they were fighting for a lost cause. The Austrians expressed resentment for the Germans. Some deserters expressed surprise over a rumor that General Degen had received a Knight's Cross for evacuating 2nd Mountain Division out of Norway." (3)

More prisoners are taken from various units of 708th Volksgrenadier Division on the right (north) flank of 3rd Battalion, 136th Mountain Regiment: (3)

1st and 2nd Companies, 708th Engineer (Pionier) Battalion 1st Company, 748th Grenadier Regiment 602nd Mobile (Schnelle) Battalion

Many German troops were confused about unit boundaries. One deserter from 1st Company, 748th Grenadier Regiment was sent out to find which units were on its flanks. He found 3rd Battalion, 136th Mountain Regiment on the left and 708th Engineer Battalion on the right. (3)

General Thumm: (2)

US 3rd Infantry Division commander General O'Daniel now brings over the 3rd Battalion of the US 254th Regiment from Riedwihr and orders the cleaning of Bois de Jebsheim between Riedwihr and Jebsheim, from which German fire had brought the Americans telling losses. Meanwhile, the two other battalions with 11 tanks repeat their attacks, in which now the French 1st Paratroop Regiment and the Foreign Legion join in. This common rush succeeds at 0800 hours to penetrate to the upper town square. The French and Americans have absolute supremacy in the village with tanks and artillery; however, it is constantly being challenged by six German anti-tank guns, tank-fighting troops and courageous lone fighters. Each cellar window serves as an embrasure for their Panzerfäust and their concentrated charges.

XVII Grenadier Battalion Oberrhein marches to Artzenheim in the early morning. It establishes a command post in Artzenheim. (3)

At 0910 hours, General Rasp calls Colonel Brandstädter: (1)

"Rasp: I am in the north, here the situation is pretty serious. The XVII Battalion is at Artzenheim and will then move from there to the west on Jebsheim. XVI Battalion should be in Durrenentzen by 1000 hours. I need a regimental staff, do you know anything about it?"

Brandstädter: "No."

Rasp: "Jebsheim is a cheap tank defense, nothing can pass. There are six antitank guns there and I also sent the tank-fighting people."

Brandstädter: "When XVI and XVII Battalions are in position, things will ease a little."

Rasp: "My intention is to push from east to west with both battalions, unfortunately there is only one battalion here at present and I also need a regimental staff."

At 0923 hours,19th Army reports to Army Group Oberrhein: (1) 19

"The enemy has pushed through and occupies the north edge of Jebsheim. The rest of Jebsheim is still in our hands. He has pushed through the Bois de Jebsheim to the south edge of the woods. West of Muntzenheim all bridges over the Colmar Canal are blown. Battalion XVII will move from Artzenheim in the direction of Jebsheim. General Rasp is there to lead the attack."

At 0953 hours General Ostendorff of Army Group Oberrhein offers some critical remarks about General Thumm to Colonel Brandstädter: (1)

Ostendorff: "I was not aware that the front was so far pushed in and I had the impression that the withdrawal was done without enemy pressure. There was still the possibility of returning to the old position. No one ever comes up with the idea to move the front line forward. It must be pointed out to General Thumm that he is not allowed to carry out any front straightening backward."

Brandstädter: "At the last consultation, General Thumm understood exactly that he was not to retreat. Now the XVII Battalion in Artzenheim gets the order to attack at Jebsheim to the west. Tonight we are sending a close-combat group to Jebsheim with Lieutenant Zubrod."

Lieutenant Heinrich Zubrod was a Panzerfaust specialist. He was credited with knocking out 11 French Sherman tanks near Sigolsheim. He was later killed in action near Muntzenheim. (11)

Around noon, 3rd and 4th Companies of XVII Battalion march to Jebsheim and are thrown into combat. 3rd Company has about 100 men, 11 light machine guns and 15-20 Panzerfaust. 4th Company has about 60 men, three heavy machine guns and five 80 mm mortars. (3)

2nd Company of XVII Battalion is placed in reserve near Bischwihr. 1st Company is deployed near Grussenheim. (3)

At 1230 hours, General Rasp advises Colonel Brandstädter: (1)

"We need leadership energy on the canal, the section has become too big for Bleckwenn."

Thumm continues: (2)

The street fighting in Jebsheim, however, became harder and more costly for both sides during the day. It became very difficult for both leaders to say which part of Jebsheim was still occupied, recaptured by the enemy or occupied again. Several times, the commander of 708th Volksgrenadier Division, Colonel Bleckwenn, intervened personally in the combat and led the mountain troops and the men of XVII Battalion Oberrhein to counterattack. The cemetery on the east exit of the village to Artzenheim was fought over particularly bitterly. Here close combat raged between the German mountain troops and the French paratroops and Foreign Legion. Unfortunately, there were atrocities; German prisoners seemed to be unwanted in this ruthless stage of the battle. After the final occupation of the cemetery, the walls served as a welcome barricade against the German counterattack. Around noon, German artillery from the Bois de la Hardt, as well as the 525th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion intervene in the fighting and bring some relief to the mountain troops.

At 1500 hours, Jagdpanthers of 654th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion are positioned in the south part of Jebsheim from where they can interdict all movements on the main north-south 20 street (Grand Rue). At 1530 hours, under protection of the Jagdpanthers and with artillery support, elements of 136th Mountain Regiment counterattack. (9)

At 1650 hours, Lieutenant Colonel Barth at 19th Army reports to Lieutenant Colonel Dankworth at Army Group Oberrhein: (1)

Barth: "The enemy occupies the north part of Jebsheim. We are in the south and trying to throw him out."

Dankworth: "How stands it with our countermeasures?"

Barth: "In Jebsheim it is tough. It is a street fight against 5 tanks and artillery. Here the XVII Battalion has been inserted."

Thumm continues: (2)

But in the main street, which was paved with numerous mines, the tanks of French Combat Command 6 progressed only with difficulty. In house to house combat, and garden after garden, their infantry had to break open breaches. The situation for the LXIV Corps was very threatening in the late afternoon. All communication to the Jebsheim combat troops was temporarily lost. When it started to get dark, the Allies already patrolled with tanks and infantry to the east to the Rhine-Rhône Canal. Between them and Artzenheim there was no more German infantry.

In early evening, 2nd Company of 654th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion with 3 Jagdpanthers is deployed to screen against enemy tanks advancing along the Jebsheim-Artzenheim road (6).

At 1915 hours, Colonel Köhler at LXIV Corps reports to Colonel Brandstädter at 19th Army: (1)

Köhler: "The situation is bad for us. At 1817 hours the bridge north of Durrenentzen has been blown. We have no more reserves. If the enemy succeeds in breaking through somewhere, we can do nothing about it. We are now getting a battalion from the 198th Infantry Division down here, that's tomorrow morning."

Brandstädter: "We must have teams on the Colmar Canal and the Rhine-Rhône Canal."

Köhler: "Between Grussenheim and the Rhone-Rhône Canal there are no more people. Will we be getting something soon? "

Brandstädter: "1st Battalion, 136th Mountain Regiment is expected to be there tomorrow. The staff and 1st Company are already unloaded in Neuf-Brisach."

Köhler reports again at 2210 hours: (1)

Köhler: "The enemy has a free ride towards Artzenheim, he has the road from Jebsheim to Artzenheim. We still have 3 Jagdpanthers and 2 Nashörn there, but no infantry."

Brandstädter: "Is XVII Battalion in Jebsheim yet?"

Köhler: "We are using it. We must try to withdraw the people who are still in Jebsheim; they are sacrificed uselessly. We have no power to stop a breakthrough in the east or south direction." 21

Brandstädter: "What you propose is the last solution. I will present your proposal to General Rasp. Does General Thumm agree?"

Köhler: "General Thumm thinks I am judging the situation correctly. Yesterday I was very worried and reproached myself for not expressing my concerns yesterday. The gap in the front between Grussenheim and Jebsheim is out of control. Eastwards of it stands artillery in the Bois de la Hardt, further west nothing."

Brandstädter: "Has the artillery really reported that they are attacking?"

Köhler: "No not yet. If I had precise information on when and what we get reinforced, then of course the situation looks different."

At 2315 hours, General Ostendorff from Army Group Oberrhein calls Colonel Brandstädter: (1)

Ostendorff: "Do you think you can do the thing with the current forces?"

Brandstädter: "If the enemy does not bring new forces, it is possible. The condition, however, is a sufficient supply of artillery ammunition. We cannot foresee how long we can maintain the current front. We have to sit out the current major attack and then after the enemy is exhausted try again to clear the breakthrough points."

Ostendorff: "The question of withdrawal from the entire Alsace bridgehead is not at all up for debate. It could only be a matter of shortening the front within the bridgehead."

Colonel Brandstädter sends the following message to the corps commanders: (1)

"The Commander in Chief of Army Group Oberrhein is intimately aware of the tight ammunition situation. Each commander Is responsible for the ammunition restrictions and moderate use at the points of attack. The difficulty of replenishing ammunition is due to the major struggle on the Eastern Front. It has to be accepted on our front. The Commander in Chief of Army Group Oberrhein expects each commander to be accountable."

For emphasis, General Rasp issues the following orders for 28 January to LXIV Corps and General Thumm: (1)

"The gap in the Main Line of Resistance between Grussenheim - Jebsheim and the Colmar Canal north of Muntzenheim is to be closed, defended and consolidated with all forces available to the Corps. New reserves will be made available in the zone east of Jebsheim and south of Muntzenheim."

19th Army reports to Army Group Oberrhein: (1)

"The enemy attacks in strength of three battalions with 11 tanks from Jebsheim Mill and Riedwihr. The enemy managed after hard combat to penetrate the north part of Jebsheim and to the south edge of Bois de Jebsheim. Our counterattack by part of 2nd Mountain Division failed against the enemy breakthrough into the north part of Jebsheim even after the addition of the XVII Battalion Oberrhein.

"2nd Company, 654th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion and reinforced 1st Battalion, 137th Mountain Regiment were detached from LXIII Corps and sent to LXIV Corps." 22

At the end of 27 January, LXIV Corps has 17 operational Jagdpanthers and 7 operational Nashörn. (1)

The replacements are starting to show up in 136th Mountain Regiment. On 27 January it receives about 80 men from 5th Mountain Division. (5)

28 JANUARY

The early hours of the morning were relatively quiet.

General Thumm: (2)

Again it snowed very heavily like the day before. The sky remained gray and overcast. At 0500 hours the 2nd Mountain Division takes over the section from Jebsheim south to the Colmar Canal and then west along the canal to the bridge 1.5 km south of Holtzwihr.

At 0518 hours, LXIV Corps reports to 19th Army: (1)

"Scattered harassing fire with infantry weapons in Jebsheim sector. Light artillery and mortar harassing fire."

At 0800, 1st Battalion, 137th Mountain Regiment departs by truck from Gueberschwihr on its way to LXIV Corps reserve in Fortschwihr. In Gueberschwihr, 1st Battalion receives 300-400 replacements from 4th High Mountain Battalion. 2nd Company was down to about 30 men and received about 100 replacements. (3) 3rd Company was down to about 40 men and received about 80 replacements. (5) By this time, the replacements outnumber the original Austrian troops.

Thumm continues: (2)

Around 1100 hours the fight breaks out anew; a French tank group and a company of Foreign Legion make an attempt to bypass the village from Jebsheim Mill from the east and occupy the southern edge. The attempt fails; three tanks are knocked out.

The three tanks are knocked out by three Jagdpanthers and two Näshorn from positions in the Bois de la Hardt north of the Jebsheim-Artzenheim road (6). There are an additional three Jagdpanthers in Artzenheim and a fourth on the way from Colmar. (1)

Thumm: (2)

At 1400 hours, further violent attacks take place, especially along the main street, where Americans and French must work together house to house. Their superiority in tanks is becoming ever more oppressive and clear. The commander of 3rd Battalion, 136th Mountain Regiment falls after a brave fight.

At 1640 hours, the Allies go concentrically from north, east and west against the south part of the village to finally break the resistance. The Legionnaires reach the train station.

Then they are stopped by German counterattacks. But these can not prevent the fighting from already shifting to the road toward Muntzenheim to the Colmar Canal, where the bridge has not yet been blown up. 23

At 1900 hours, Colonel Köhler at LXIV Corps calls Colonel Brandstädter at 19th Army: (1)

Köhler: "Around 1730 a convoy with mounted infantry and 3 tanks made an advance into Jebsheim. In the Bois de la Hardt there is a security force in the strength of a reinforced platoon, 3 Jagdpanthers and 2 Nashörn."

Brandstädter: "What combat strength has the 136th Regiment?"

Köhler: "2nd and 3rd Battalions 100 men each and regimental units 150 men.There is a newly introduced platoon of mountain troops from 1st Battalion, 136th Mountain Regiment. The battalion was in Durrenentzen. The command staff of General Degen moved to Muntzenheim to keep in touch with Jebsheim. We still keep the southernmost quarter of the village. According to the radio message, there we are attacked from three sides and there is heavy combat."

Brandstädter: "Do you still have reserves?"

Köhler: "The 1st Battalion,137th Mountain Regiment at Fortschwihr and as of morning the reconnaissance unit (2nd Bicycle Company) is ready for use. It seems to me crucial that we keep the security force in the Bois de la Hardt."

Thumm: (2)

Enemy armored cars already patrol as far as the Bois de la Hardt, to the east of Jebsheim, where the main mass of the German artillery stands. Without them, the defenders of Jebsheim are completely lost. The situation is becoming increasingly desperate for the defenders. At 1900 hours the 19th Army gets a radio message from Jebsheim: "The south part of the village is still held, but the fighting is heavy."

At 1940 hours, Colonel Brandstädter talks with Lieutenant Colonel Dankworth at Army Group Oberrhein: (1)

Dankworth: "A few comments on the situation from Ostendorff":

"The operation around Jebsheim should be particularly well prepared with smoke shells, smoke generators, maybe an attack in the dark, tank killer troops and flamethrowers."

Brandstädter: "I called Army Command West (Oberbefehlshaber West) myself and learned that there was no way that we could expect the number of artillery rounds we were allowed to increase. We have already shot too much."

At 2100 hours, taking advantage of the noise from an artillery barrage, a unit of German tank destroyers moves into position southeast of Jebsheim. XVII Battalion Oberrhein regroups south of Jebsheim and transports its wounded to the field hospital in Muntzenheim. (9)

Thumm: (2)

General Rasp still does not want to give up: Jebsheim is decisive for the battle for the bridgehead and thus for his army. Himmler's presence seems still ubiquitous, although he has now taken over Army Group Vistula in the east and there his ingenious leadership is better employed. Army Group Oberrhein, since 23 January under the command of SS General 24

Hausser, will be on 29 January from 1200 hours again assigned to Army Group G, which now includes the 19th Army in addition to the 1st Army.

General Rasp wants to try again, with the last reserves, to stabilize the front and to build a blocking position at the west edge of Jebsheim to the north. To do this the 2nd Mountain Division from the south, the 708th Volksgrenadier Division with the now available 326th Infantry Regiment of the 198th Infantry Division (350 men) and with 6 Jagdpanthers will advance towards Grussenheim to close the gap in the front. The LXIV Army Corps headquarters, which had moved that day from Widensolen to St. Croix-en-Plaine, still keeps 1st Battalion, 137th Mountain Regiment as a reserve.

The line Elsenheim - Grussenheim - Jebsheim must therefore be kept, cost what it will. However, an effective support by our own artillery is out of the question. This with an ammunition limit of 15 rounds for the light artillery, and 12 rounds for the heavy artillery, per day per artillery piece.

The 19th Army orders for 29 January repeat the orders from the day before: (1)

"LXIV Army Corps will close the gap between Elsenheim and Jebsheim by counterattack and will win back Grussenheim. The villages of Grussenheim and Jebsheim must be occupied by all available means."

LXIV Corps reports to 19th Army: (1)

"In the north part of Jebsheim the enemy added 15 tanks. Our assault was unable to advance. In the south part of Jebsheim and on the road to Muntzenheim our defense successfully resisted enemy attack from north and west. Three enemy tanks were knocked out. Our losses were one Jagdpanther and one Näshorn.

"At 0500 hours, 2nd Mountain Division took over the sector including Jebsheim, south to the Colmar Canal, and along the Colmar Canal to the blown up bridge 1.5 km south of Holtzwihr.

"The units assigned to 2nd Mountain Division are:

Staff, 136th Mountain Regiment 2nd Battalion, 136th Mountain Regiment (less 3 companies) 3rd Battalion, 136th Mountain Regiment XVII Battalion Oberrhein Staff, 223rd Grenadier Regiment 223rd Grenadier Regimental Units Remnants of 2nd Battalion, 223rd Grenadier Regiment from 16th Volksgrenadier Division Remnants of 1st Battalion, 225th Grenadier Regiment from 16th Volksgrenadier Division 2nd Battalion, 1316th Artillery Regiment 4th Battalion, 235th Artillery Regiment (2 batteries) 3rd Battalion, 111th Mountain Artillery Regiment"

After receiving replacements, 1st Company, 136th Mountain Regiment arrives in Muntzenheim with a combat strength of about 150 men. It is assigned a sector north of the Colmar Canal near Jebsheim. (5) 25

29 JANUARY

1st Battalion, 137th Mountain Regiment is finally thrown into the battle in a last attempt to retake Jebsheim. Its men march from Muntzenheim to Jebsheim in the early morning hours. (3)

2nd Bicycle Company of 67th Recon Battalion supports 137th Regiment. It has about 200 men serving as infantry. (5)

1st Battalion, 326th Grenadier Regiment, 198th Infantry Division also joins the attack. (5)

According to General Thumm: (2)

At 0500 hours, the 2nd Mountain Division concluded its preparations for the push to the north. General Degen led these preparations.

At 0800 hours, General Degen briefs his unit commanders on the plan of attack: (9)

"At 0845 hours, all units will be ready for action under total radio silence.

"At 0900 hours, without artillery preparation, the units will launch their assault on Jebsheim. The mountain troops will attack from the south; the 1st Battalion, 326th Grenadier Regiment will attack from the east; the XVII Battalion Oberrhein will attack from the west. The 88 mm guns of 654th and 525th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalions will fire to fix the enemy in place."

Including the 1st Company, 136th Mountain Regiment which defends the western approach from Bois de Jebsheim, this makes a little more than 1,000 men who at 0900 hours will join the battle for Jebsheim. (9)

At 0900 hours there is yet another change of command. General Thumm is sacked. General Max Grimmeiss takes over command of LXIV Corps. (1)

At 0926 hours, LXIV Corps reports some initial success: (1)

"Jebsheim is taken from south up to the lower square (Place de Tilleuls). General Degen is present to check that everything is going well. The enemy shoots smoke at the road to Artzenheim, probably to blind our observation points there."

At 1100 hours LXIV Corps reports: (1)

"2nd Mountain Division's attack on Jebsheim came up to 200 m north of the lower square in the south part. Against strong enemy defense it went no further. Heavy street fighting with enemy groups hidden in cellars. Attack will be continued after renewed artillery preparation."

In General Thumm's words: (2)

The attack of 2nd Mountain Division on the northern part of Jebsheim has no resounding success. In troublesome and difficult house-to-house fighting, the mountain troops work their way to the lower square of town, then the enemy superiority comes back in full force. To make matters worse, the snowfall of recent days has stopped and a cloudless blue sky covers the battlefield. Immediately, fighter-bombers bring effective support to their ground force.

"At 1300 hours, General Degen calls the commanders of the units to order a new attack. Before describing his plan, he asks the opinion of the unit commanders on the morning's 26 failure. Unanimously they deplore the absence of artillery cover, which enables the enemy, well sheltered in the houses, to use their automatic weapons and prevent exploitation of the attack." (9)

At 1330 hours, General Degen presents his plan to the commanders: (9)

"At 1430 hours, intense artillery barrage on the south part of Jebsheim.

"At 1445 hours, advance the artillery fire forward.

"At 1500 hours, general assault of the units with the same objectives as in the morning.

"The commanders point out that the combat effectives are reduced following the losses during the attack in the morning. The general thinks the artillery support will help. He must do his best to execute the order from 19th Army. From 1,000 men engaged in the first attack, he has just over 700 left. He also fears the lack of artillery ammunition. But he still gives the order.

"At 1500 hours the Americans are suddenly attacked. Their reaction is violent and they block the attack. However, the Americans are fixed in position. Other German units infiltrate to east and west and threaten the positions held by the French." (9)

General Thumm describes the last attack: (2)

During the second German attack, the Allies fire barrages and smoke shells at the south part of the village and the surrounding area. Rolling fighter-bomber units support this shelling. The northern part of Jebsheim could not be reconquered. All the efforts of the past three days, which had cost such inhuman casualties, had failed.

From a curtain of haze and smoke, the Allies start their own attack at 1600 hours on the last German positions in Jebsheim. More than 15 tanks support them.

The totally exhausted defenders were no match for this onslaught. When, in addition, another enemy battalion from the west advanced against the south part of the village, the encirclement threatened the entire defense.

At 1900 hours, General Degen orders the retreat of all units engaged in Jebsheim. (9)

Thumm: (2)

Fighting and with heavy losses, the last mountain troops and grenadiers retreat to the canal bridge near Muntzenheim.

It is 1900 hours in the evening: The decision has been made, the fight lost.

Commander Boulanger (3rd Battalion French Foreign Legion) reports: "Jebsheim has fallen."

At 2000 hours, as German prisoners are collected, 88 mm harassing fire from the east continues to fall on Jebsheim at the rate of one round per minute. (3)

LXIV Corps reports the loss of Jebsheim: (1) 27

"Our attack on the north part of Jebsheim stalled north of the lower square due to persistent enemy resistance with support of at least 15 tanks and strong artillery and mortar fire. After smoke and fighter-bomber attack, around 1600 hours the enemy launched a strong counterattack from the north part of Jebsheim and with another battalion from the Bois de Jebsheim. The enemy was able to take the place after a hard fight despite tenacious resistance."

19th Army explains to Army Group G: (1)

"The combat strength of our troops continues to decrease due to enemy action and frostbite and allows only incomplete occupation of the Main Line of Resistance. As a result of the fighting and the technical failures caused by the weather, the number of mobile tank defense weapons has dropped to a third of the original stock."

General Thumm concludes: (2)

On 29 January, a Monday, on a sunny day, the last German reserves bled and died in Jebsheim in a struggle with unequal means. Bravery and sacrifice alone could not do it at this stage of the war.

GERMAN LOSSES

From 25-29 January, the 254th Infantry Regiment took 544 prisoners. Most of these were taken on 29 January, the last day of the battle. Nearly all were from 2nd Mountain Division and its supporting units. (5)

The French claimed 750 prisoners at Jebsheim. (12)

The French estimated 500 German dead. (12)

"Most officer PWs agree that they cannot see why so much strength is wasted in a futile effort to hold on to a few villages when every bit of strength is needed in the East. Most claim they knew they were fighting a lost battle at Jebsheim the moment they crossed the canals." (5)

"The two main factors in the surrender of so many prisoners at and near Jebsheim were the appearance of Allied armor (according to prisoners) and exceptionally low morale among men as well as officers of the 2nd Mountain Division. Several officers (Austrians) state they were aware of the futility of prolonging the war. They considered their mission, to retake all of Jebsheim, impossible and resented the way in which their tired and under-equipped troops were used. The various company commanders and staff officers also comment on the lack of briefing and the general ignorance of the situation which led to much confusion." (3)

Officer PWs from XVII Grenadier Battalion Oberrhein said that 3rd and 4th Companies were practically wiped out at Jebsheim (5)

The number of prisoners did not escape the attention of Lieutenant Colonel Dankworth, formerly of Army Group Oberrhein. In response to an inquiry by Dankworth, General Rasp must explain to Army Command West (Oberbefehlshaber West):

"The Army has so far not reported any deserters from 2nd Mountain Division in the Daily Report. The subordinate Corps have received orders to carry out another investigation, and to comment on the question of whether units of the 2nd Mountain Division have not fought well. Verification is delayed by the current fighting." (1) 28

According to one GI of 254th Infantry Regiment: (13)

"Krauts are peculiar; one time they resist right to the last man; the next time you say 'Boo' and they surrender. Jebsheim was like that. One time over a hundred surrendered from a good position, hard to take; they had plenty of ammunition, but they gave up. A little farther down the street, 17 men and an officer holed up in a concrete building. Bazookas, grenades, rifles, machine guns, mortars fired everything they had into it, but no Kraut came out. Finally only stretcher cases and dead were left and the building fell."

The German 19th Army could not recover from such enormous losses. On 9 February, after more bitter combat, its last remnants retreated across the Rhine River. The Colmar Pocket was liberated.

REFERENCES

(1) Kriegstagebuch der 19.Armee. Bundesarchiv RH 20-19/174-175. Freiburg, Germany

(2) Helmut Thumm, "Der Endkampf der deutschen 19. Armee im Brückenkopf von Colmar, 20. Jan. - 9. Feb. 1945". Bundesarchiv RH 20-19/278. Freiburg, Germany

(3) G-2 Periodic Reports, US 3rd Infantry Division, 26-30 January 1945. US National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD

(4) M. Kräutler and Karl Springenschmid, "Es war ein Edelweiß". Leopold Stocker Verlag 1962

(5) IPW Reports, US 254th Infantry Regiment, 26-30 January 1945. US National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD

(6) Karlheinz Münch, "The Combat History of Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 654". J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing 2002

(7) War Room Journal, US 3rd Infantry Division, 25 January 1945. US National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD

(8) 6e Regiment de Chasseurs d'Afrique, Journal de Marche et Operations. Societé Historique de la Defense. Paris, France

(9) Bernard Fauquet and Robert Wagener, "La Bataille de Jebsheim". Musée Memorial des Combats de la Poche de Colmar, Turckheim, France

(10) Harris Peel, "The Trail of 254 Thru Blood and Fire". 63rd Infantry Division Association

(11) Steven Zaloga, "Panzerfaust vs Sherman". Osprey Publishing Ltd. 2019

(12) Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, "The History of the French First Army". George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1952

(13) Ralph G. Fox, Jr. Letter to family, February, 1945

Copyright James Sellers 2020