Eastern Creek Energy from Waste Facility (Ssd 6236) - Supplementary Information
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07 June 2018 Mr David McNamara Director, Secretariat Independent Planning Commission Level 3, 201 Elizabeth Street SYDNEY NSW 2000 Dear David, EASTERN CREEK ENERGY FROM WASTE FACILITY (SSD 6236) - SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION Reference is made to our letter dated 25 May 2018, in relation to the information provided in clarification for floc waste with regard to the State significant development application presently before the Independent Planning Commission (the Commission) for the Eastern Creek Energy from Waste Facility (SSD6236) (EfW Facility). This letter provides supplementary information to the Commission to respond to key items raised at the public hearing on 14 May 2018 which had not previously been raised in relation to the proposal. This information generally seeks to respond to concerns surrounding emergency shut-down procedures and potential risk scenarios. This information should be read in conjunction with the Urbis submission dated 25 May 2018 previously provided to the Commission and is supported by information provided from Hitachi Zozen Innova (HZI) as enclosed in this letter. 1. POTENTIAL RISK SCENARIOS As described in the Amended EIS and the revised RTS Report, there are a number of possible scenarios which potentially could require an emergency shut-down event of the proposed EfW Facility. In these instances, there are a number of safeguards and procedures in place to ensure there is no increase in emissions during any shut-down event. These scenarios are outlined below and are detailed in the attached advice from the facility technology supplier HZI. 1.1. FIRE IN THE FEEDSTOCK There are two potential scenarios that could lead to a fire in the waste bunker: 1. Ignition by means of a source contained in the fuel; or 2. Spontaneous ignition of combustible gases due to anaerobic digestion in the waste pile. These scenarios are unlikely to occur based on the following: TNG_IPAC - Supplementary Information 07 June 2018 1.1.1. Homogenisation of Waste All waste fuel will have been pre-processed at the existing Genesis MPC Facility and transferred to the EfW Facility by conveyor or truck. Any waste that contains oversized pieces or is not able to be processed will either have been removed or reduced in size to fit the specifications of the EfW Facility prior to delivery to the facility. The material supplied to the EfW Facility is expected to be homogenous in accordance with sorting procedures. Notwithstanding, all loads will be inspected as they are tipped at the EfW Facility bunker, using the installed CCTV system or by visual observation of the crane operator. In addition, delivery trucks will be subject to inspection by the EfW Facility personnel prior to discharging their load into the waste bunker. As a consequence, of the pre-processing which has taken place no ignition sources are expected to be contained in the waste deliveries to TNG and it has been the case that no fires have occurred amongst the process material at Genesis since it began operating in June 2012. 1.1.2. Mixing of Waste Waste will be continuously mixed within the waste bunker prior to feeding it to the boiler. This will ensure that waste will not sit undisturbed for lengthy periods of time. The limited components of organic matter in the residue fuel waste stream strongly minimise any risk of the occurrence of anaerobic digestion. As a consequence of the above, conditions within the bunker will not be conducive to the commencement of a fire event. as. Notwithstanding this a sophisticated fire detection and extinguishing system will be installed to monitor the bunker surface at all times. This monitoring system scans the entire surface of the bunker and detects differences in temperature. If it detects areas of elevated temperatures it automatically alerts the operator who will then pick up the waste in that area, feed it to the boiler and/or mix it with other waste in the bunker. Through the above methods, HZI has not experienced any bunker fires. This is true in particular of all EfW plants built by HZI in the UK such as Riverside, Ferrybridge, Newhaven, Tees Valley, Buckinghamshire, Hereford & Worcestershire and Severnside. 1.2. FAILURE OF THE MOVING GRATE This scenario would arise from the mechanical blocking of the grate movement due to jamming of waste fuel components on the grate. Such a blockage is limited to one individual grate element (of a total of 24 elements which comprise the entire grate) where jamming could occur. The jammed movement of one grate element will slow the movement of the fuel bed on that element. Notwithstanding, the movement of the adjacent elements will continue and provide for sufficient stoking of the fuel bed until the jammed grate element can be unblocked – this can generally be undertaken whilst the facility remains in operation. Genesis sorting plant shreds all of the material into a nominal standard size and separates the material based on weight, size, length and composition. Both ferrous and non-ferrous metals are generally removed with a great degree of efficiency as these are of economic value. It is highly unlikely that metallic objects which could conceivably jam a moving grate could survive the process. TNG_IPAC - Supplementary Information 07 June 2018 2 Should a situation arise where a serious jamming of the moving grate occurred this may require the facility to be shut-down in a normal manner in order to unblock the grate element. This would include the controlled shut-down of the boiler and this would not result in any uncontrolled emission releases to the environment. 1.3. CATASTROPHIC EVENT (EXPLOSION) INVOLVING THE BOILERS OR TURBINES 1.3.1. Boiler Event An explosion inside the boiler can only occur if the waste fuel were to contain explosive materials. As the waste fuel received by the EfW Facility will be pre-processed (as described above and in the revised EIS and revised RTS Report) and is subject to inspection upon delivery to the facility, in addition to spot analysis by the operator, there are strict quality control processes in place to prevent any explosive devices forming part of the waste fuel. There have been no reported cases of explosive materials entering the Genesis sorting facility since operations commenced. Despite this, the worst imaginable case scenario might be the explosion of a propane barbeque gas tank. The EfW Facility is designed to withstand such an explosion without any damage to the plant and without any impact on the environment. As such the robustness of the EfW Facility boiler allows the safe disposal of such material. The high pressure elements of the steam boiler are protected by safety valves that are designed to relieve pressure in a controlled manner, should the pressure in the system exceed the designed level. As in any coal fired power plant, multiple safety valves provide redundancy to ensure the safe operation of the boiler at all times. 1.3.2. Turbine Event The turbine used within the EfW Facility will be a condensing steam turbine as commonly used in other thermal power plant (e.g. coal fired, oil fired or gas fired power plants). Thousands of such turbines are in operation throughout the world today and provide a significant portion of electric energy consumed globally. Modern turbine installations are continuously supervised by a wide array of instruments which monitor all the relevant aspects of this machine in operation (temperature, pressure, rotational speed, vibration, bearing positions, etc.). If any of these instruments were to detect a serious anomaly, the machine is designed to safely shut down immediately. Steam turbines use steam as the driving force. As such, they cannot ‘explode’ since there is no explosive element involved (e.g. fuel, oil or natural gas). The worst case scenario is a situation where a turbine blade was to break loose from the shaft. The turbine casing is designed to retain such broken parts within the machine and the vibration sensing instrumentation detects this situation immediately and shuts down the steam supply to the turbine, resulting in a controlled safe shut down. No such events have been known to occur at HZI plants. TNG_IPAC - Supplementary Information 07 June 2018 3 1.4. FAILURE / SHUT-DOWN OF MAINS GRID Under normal circumstances the EfW Facility will feed electric energy to the electric grid. In the event that the grid was to shut-down and not be in a position to receive any input, the electric breaker of the EfW Facility would switch off and isolate the facility from the grid. The energy production system would then switch to ‘island mode’ and produce just enough electric energy to supply the facility with the power it consumes. Excess steam produced by the boiler is then routed to the bypass valve around the turbine and exhausted to the condensers. Consistent with all facilities designed by HZI, the EfW Facility is designed to operate in this mode for extended periods of time until the grid becomes available. This is considered a normal operating mode – the transition from normal electric power export to island mode occurs in an automatic, manner and does not result in any uncontrolled release to the environment. 1.5. FAILURE OF A BAG FILTER The bag filter of the EfW Facility consists of 14 compartments. Each compartment contains 12 rows with 16 bag filter elements each. Thus the bag filter contains a total of 2,688 bag filter elements. The ‘failure of the bag filter’ means that one of these 2,688 filter elements has incurred a hole or suffered the failure of a seam. The continuous bag monitoring system at the exit of the filter will immediately detect such a failure due to a slight increase in particulate matter in the flue gas (broken bag indicator).