Pace Law Review Volume 34 Issue 2 Spring 2014 Article 5 April 2014 The Exceptional Absence of Human Rights as a Principle in American Law Mugambi Jouet Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Law and Society Commons Recommended Citation Mugambi Jouet, The Exceptional Absence of Human Rights as a Principle in American Law, 34 Pace L. Rev. 688 (2014) Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. The Exceptional Absence of Human Rights as a Principle in American Law Mugambi Jouet* I. Introduction References to “human rights” are rare in American civil or criminal cases, including those addressing fundamental questions of justice. In the United States, human rights often evoke abuses faced by people in Third World dictatorships. In other words, human rights commonly refer to foreign problems, not domestic ones. The relative absence of human rights as a concept in American law is peculiar by international standards, as human rights play a far greater role in the domestic systems of other Western democracies. This Article begins with a survey of references to “human rights” in landmark Supreme Court cases concerning racial segregation, the death penalty, prisoners’ rights, women’s rights, children’s rights, gay rights, and the indefinite detention of alleged terrorists during the “War on Terror.” The survey reveals that even liberal Justices seldom or never invoked “human rights” in these cases.