DOCSLIB.ORG

Erdogan's Continued Dominance Over Turkish Politics Artical Subject

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Erdogan's Continued Dominance Over Turkish Politics Artical Subject Artical Name : Lack of Alternatives Artical Subject : Erdogan¶s Continued Dominance over Turkish Politics Publish Date: 26/06/2018 Auther Name: Abdel Latif Hegazy Subject : The outcome of the presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey has many significances and implications on the future of Turkey¶s political landscape which has already adopted the presidential system, after years of parliamentary system introduced by the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kamal Ataturk in 1923. This led some analysts to describe the current stage in Turkey as the beginning of the Second Republic-era under the presidential system.Results of the presidential and parliamentary electionsThe turnout in the presidential and parliamentary elections was approximately 87% of around 59.354 million Turkish voters. The results are as follows: With regard to the presidential election, the candidate of the People¶s Alliance (AKP and MHP), President Erdogan won a second presidential term, securing 52.5% of the votes, with about 26 million votes. Erdogan commanded the majority in 63 out of the 81 Turkish provinces. On the other hand, Muharrem Ince, candidate of the Republican People¶s Party (CHP)-the largest opposition party- ranked second by 30.7%, with 15.2 million votes, gaining the majority in 8 out of the 81 Turkish SURYLQFHVPRVWRIZKLFKDUHORFDWHGLQWKH:HVWHUQ(XURSHDQVHFWLRQRI7XUNH\6HODKDWWLQ'HPLUWDúFDQGLGDWHRIWKH3HRSOHV¶ Democratic Party (HDP), ranked third by 8.3%, with about 4 million votes. He achieved majority in 10 Turkish states, most of which DUHWKH.XUGLVKPDMRULW\VWDWHVLQVRXWKHDVWHUQ7XUNH\0HUDO$NúHQHUFDQGLGDWHRIWKH*RRG3DUW\RU ø<ø3DUW\ UDQNHGIRXUWKE\ 7.3%, with 3.6 million votes. She did not achieve a majority in any Turkish state. The candidate of the Felicity Party, conservative ,VODPLFSDUW\.DUDPROODR÷OXUDQNHGVHFRQGWRODVWZLWKWKRXVDQGYRWHV7KHOHIWZLQJ3DWULRWLF3DUW\¶s candidate, Dogu Perincek, ranked last with 97 thousand votes.As for the parliamentary elections, the People¶s Alliance, comprising the ruling AKP (conservative) and the MHP (nationalist-rightist) achieved a parliamentary majority of 343 out of the 600 seats, with 53.6% of the electorate votes. The AKP accounted for 42.49% and 293 MPs, while the MHP accounted for 11.13%, or about 50 MPs.The Nation Alliance, which includes the CHP (secular-leftist), the Good Party (nationalist-rightist which defected from the MHP) and the Felicity party (Islamic-conservative), ranked second with 34.1% of votes and 190 seats. The CHP secured 22.7% (146 seats), while the Good party gained 10.01% (44 seats). The Felicity Party did not get any seats, ranking last with 1.35%. The HDP, which is running for elections alone without any electoral alliances, obtained 11.6% of votes and 67 seats, ranked third in the elections in general after the AKP and the CHP.Significances of election resultsThe outcome of the presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey has several significances, at the forefront of which are the following: 1- Turkish President Erdogan has maintained his popularity at home. This was evident in as he won the majority in 63 out of the 81 Turkish provinces, despite recurrent criticism against his internal and external policies, especially since the failed military coup in July 2016. This may be attributed to the fact that many of Turkey¶s achievements in the economic field have been linked to Erdogan, who has been ruling Turkey since 2003.2- The AKP¶s popularity declined by 7% and lost the parliamentary majority. The party obtained 42.4% in the recent election compared to 49.9% in the previous elections in November 2015. Although the number of seats has increased from 550 to 600 in the current parliament, its seats in parliament has declined from 316 to 293.Although the AKP has lost the parliamentary majority, this will not impact the composition and form of the next government. Under the presidential system, the new president has the sole right to appoint and dismiss ministers without complying to the winning party of the parliamentary majority, and the government does not have to get the confidence of parliament as it has automatically secured the confidence of the president, who gained the trust of people directly in the election.3- The CHP¶s popularity dropped by 2.5%, having secured 22.7% of the votes in the recent elections compared to 25.3% of the votes in the previous elections. On the other hand, the party was able to increase its seats to 146 compared to 131 seats in the previous parliament, benefiting from the proportional representation system and the increase in the number of parliament seats.4- The MHP maintained its voting bloc, securing 11.15%, which is close to that obtained in the November 2015 elections (11.9%), which contradicts many expectations that the party could have failed to exceed the 10% threshold, after the GHIHFWLRQRIVHYHUDOPHPEHUVZKRIRUPHGWKH*RRG3DUW\OHGE\0HUDO$NúHQHUSURPSWLQJWKHIRUPHUWRIRUJHDOOLDQFHZLWKWKH AKP for fear of failure to enter the parliament. The MHP has even succeeded in increasing its seats to 49 seats from 35 seats in the SUHYLRXVSDUOLDPHQW7KH*RRGSDUW\OHGE\0HUDO$NúHQHUPDQDJHGWRH[FHHGWKHHOHFWRUDOWKUHVKROGE\REWDLQLQJDQG seats despite being a nascent party. The votes obtained by the party were detracted from the votes of the AKP, which lost 7% of its votes compared to the previous election, and the CHP whose votes also declined by 2.5%.6- The HDP increased its votes to 11.5% compared to 10.7% in the previous election, and its seats to 67 seats compared to 59 seats in the previous parliament, despite the blows it suffered under the AKP government in the hope of weakening it. Its leader and the presidential candidate, Selahattin Demirtas, has been detained for a year and a half on charges of supporting terrorism. He was campaigning from prison via voice messages. In addition to arresting 13 MPs of the party, it was affected by the confrontations between the Turkish security forces and Kurdish gunmen.7- The Felicity party, an Islamic conservative, failed to secure any significant achievement in the recent election. Although it betted during the pre-election period on taking votes from the AKP and its candidate Erdogan, exploiting the common ideological factor because it represents an extension of the spiritual leader of the political Islam movement in Turkey, Necmettin Erbakan, the conservative Turkish voters seemed to prefer the modern version of political Islam, as represented by the AKP and its 10/2/2021 8:06:17 AM 1 / 2 leader Erdogan.Reasons behind Erdogan¶s victory and the opposition¶s lossThe fact that Erdogan¶s won a new presidential term and the People¶s Alliance, led by the AKP lead the parliamentary majority can be attributed to set of factors, foremost among which are: 1- Turkish opposition parties failed to agree on a single presidential candidate vs Erdogan, splitting the opposition between Islamic, nationalist, secularist and Kurdish candidates, enabling Erdogan to win the presidential election from the first round.2- Ideological heterogeneity of opposition parties under the Nation Alliance undermined their credibility among many Turkish voters. The secular CHP made alliance with the Islamic conservative Felicity party. And while the HDP adopts leftist orientations and defends the rights of Kurds, the Good party espouses rightist and nationalist anti-Kurdish orientations.3- Erdogan and the AKP have secured the biggest number of the nationalist, rightist and Islamic conservative votes, particularly the Kurdish ones. Erdogan was able to do so after garnering the support of the Great Unity Party, which has 18 members on the AKP lists, headed by the party¶s leader Mustafa Destici, and the declaration of the Free Cause Party (Kurdish-Islamic conservative)- the political wing of the Kurdish Hezbollah, one of the main rivals of the Kurdish Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey- its support for President Erdogan in the elections, which has secured a percentage of conservative Islamic Kurdish votes for Erdogan and his party.4- Erdogan¶s success in employing and exploiting the escalation against the Kurds to secure the biggest number of nationalist votes to his advantage, both internally, by continuing military operations against the PKK, or externally, by using the Turkish army to drive Kurdish militants out of the Syrian city of Afrin last March and take control over it, as well his continuous threats to launch a military operation against Kurdish militants in northern Iraq.5- Erdogan and the AKP have succeeded in minimizing the negative effects of the recent economic crises on election outcome, by promoting the idea of foreign conspiracy with the aim of targeting the Turkish economy and influencing the voters in the upcoming elections. In one of his speeches in May, Erdogan described the drop in the Lira as the latest plot to overthrow him from power. Moreover, several Turkish officials promoted the existence of a conspiracy to spread negative perceptions of Turkish markets, in the run-up to the Turkish elections to confuse voters and push them to abstain from voting for the AKP.6- Erdogan and the AKP government espoused populist policies toward the Palestinian cause, which had a positive impact on the Turkish electorate, on top of which was the Turkish stance rejecting the transfer of the US embassy to Jerusalem, recalling the Turkish ambassador in the US for consultation, Erdogan¶s escalation against Israel accusing it of committing a massacre after repeated attacks on Palestinians on the Gaza border, the Turkish government¶s request to Israel¶s ambassador to leave and summoning its ambassador from Tel Aviv, as well as Erdogan¶s presiding over the recent extraordinary meetings of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on the Palestinian issue.In conclusion, by declaring Erdogan and the AKP win in the first presidential and parliamentary elections under the new presidential system, Turkey enters a new era in which Erdogan wields more executive powers that allow him to continue dominating state institutions and decision-making process in Turkey.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations
    Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Updated November 9, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R41368 SUMMARY R41368 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations November 9, 2020 U.S.-Turkey tensions have raised questions about the future of bilateral relations and have led to congressional action against Turkey, including informal holds on major new Jim Zanotti arms sales (such as upgrades to F-16 aircraft) and efforts to impose sanctions. Specialist in Middle Nevertheless, both countries’ officials emphasize the importance of continued U.S.- Eastern Affairs Turkey cooperation and Turkey’s membership in NATO. Observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Clayton Thomas Turkey’s polarized electorate could affect Erdogan’s future leadership. His biggest Analyst in Middle Eastern challenge may be structural weaknesses in Turkey’s economy—including a sharp Affairs decline in Turkey’s currency—that have worsened since the Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic began. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Turkey’s strategic orientation and U.S./NATO basing. Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. A number of complicated situations in Turkey’s surrounding region—including those involving Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh (a region disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan), and Eastern Mediterranean energy exploration—affect its relationships with the United States and other key actors, as Turkey seeks a more independent role. President Erdogan’s concerns about maintaining his parliamentary coalition with Turkish nationalists may partly explain his actions in some of the situations mentioned above.
    [Show full text]
  • The Extreme Right Wing in Bulgaria
    INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS The Extreme Right Wing in Bulgaria ANTONIY TODOROV January 2013 n The extreme right wing (also known as the far right) consists of parties and organi- sations ideologically linked by their espousal of extreme forms of cultural conserva- tism, xenophobia and, not infrequently, racism. They are strong advocates of order imposed by a »strong hand« and they profess a specific form of populism based on opposition between the elite and the people. n The most visible extreme right organisation in Bulgaria today is the Attack Party, which has been in existence since 2005. Since its emergence, voter support for the Attack Party has significantly grown and in 2006 its leader, Volen Siderov, made it to the run-off in the presidential election. After 2009, however, the GERB Party (the incumbent governing party in Bulgaria) managed to attract a considerable number of former Attack supporters. Today, only about 6 to 7 percent of the electorate votes for the Attack Party. n In practice, the smaller extreme right-wing organisations do not take part in the national and local elections, but they are very active in certain youth milieus and among football fans. The fact that they participate in the so-called »Loukov March«, which has been organised on an annual basis ever since 2008, suggests that they might join forces, although in practice this seems unlikely. ANTONIY TODOROV | THE EXTREME RIGHT WING IN BULGARIA Contents 1. Historical Background: From the Transition Period to Now ....................1 2. Ideological Profile ......................................................3 2.1 Minorities as Scapegoats ................................................3 2.2 The Unity of the Nation and the Strong State ................................3 2.3 Foreign Powers .......................................................4 3.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkey 2020 Human Rights Report
    TURKEY 2020 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Turkey is a constitutional republic with an executive presidential system and a unicameral 600-seat parliament (the Grand National Assembly). In presidential and parliamentary elections in 2018, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe observers expressed concern regarding restrictions on media reporting and the campaign environment, including the jailing of a presidential candidate that restricted the ability of opposition candidates to compete on an equal basis and campaign freely. The National Police and Jandarma, under the control of the Ministry of Interior, are responsible for security in urban areas and rural and border areas, respectively. The military has overall responsibility for border control and external security. Civilian authorities maintained effective control over law enforcement officials, but mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption remained inadequate. Members of the security forces committed some abuses. Under broad antiterror legislation passed in 2018 the government continued to restrict fundamental freedoms and compromised the rule of law. Since the 2016 coup attempt, authorities have dismissed or suspended more than 60,000 police and military personnel and approximately 125,000 civil servants, dismissed one-third of the judiciary, arrested or imprisoned more than 90,000 citizens, and closed more than 1,500 nongovernmental organizations on terrorism-related grounds, primarily for alleged ties to the movement of cleric Fethullah Gulen, whom the government accused of masterminding the coup attempt and designated as the leader of the “Fethullah Terrorist Organization.” Significant human rights issues included: reports of arbitrary killings; suspicious deaths of persons in custody; forced disappearances; torture; arbitrary arrest and continued detention of tens of thousands of persons, including opposition politicians and former members of parliament, lawyers, journalists, human rights activists, and employees of the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Cultural Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution
    Cultural Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution Introduction In his poem, The Second Coming (1919), William Butler Yeats captured the moment we are now experiencing: Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere The ceremony of innocence is drowned; The best lack all conviction, while the worst Are full of passionate intensity. As we see the deterioration of the institutions created and fostered after the Second World War to create a climate in which peace and prosperity could flourish in Europe and beyond, it is important to understand the role played by diplomacy in securing the stability and strengthening the shared values of freedom and democracy that have marked this era for the nations of the world. It is most instructive to read the Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy, in which he encouraged Americans not only to do good things for their own country, but to do good things in the world. The creation of the Peace Corps is an example of the kind of spirit that put young American volunteers into some of the poorest nations in an effort to improve the standard of living for people around the globe. We knew we were leaders; we knew that we had many political and economic and social advantages. There was an impetus to share this wealth. Generosity, not greed, was the motivation of that generation. Of course, this did not begin with Kennedy. It was preceded by the Marshall Plan, one of the only times in history that the conqueror decided to rebuild the country of the vanquished foe.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkey's Election Reinvigorates Debate Over Kurdish Demands
    Turkey’s Election Reinvigorates Debate over Kurdish Demands Crisis Group Europe Briefing N°88 Istanbul/Brussels, 13 June 2018 What’s new? Snap presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey appear likely to be more closely fought than anticipated. The country’s Kurds could affect the outcome of both contests. Politicians, especially those opposing President Erdoğan and his Justice and Development (AK) Party, have pledged to address some Kurdish demands in a bid to win their support. Why does it matter? Debate on Kurdish issues has been taboo since mid-2015, when a ceasefire collapsed between Turkish security forces and the Kurdistan Work- ers’ Party (PKK), an insurgent group designated by Turkey, the U.S. and the Euro- pean Union as terrorist. That the election campaign has opened space for such debate is a welcome development. What should be done? The candidate that wins the presidency and whichever party or bloc prevails in parliamentary elections should build on the reinvigorated discussion of Kurdish issues during the campaign and seek ways to address some longstanding Kurdish demands – or at least ensure debate on those issues continues. I. Overview On 24 June, some 50 million Turkish citizens will head to early presidential and par- liamentary elections. The contests were originally scheduled for November 2019. But in a surprise move on 18 April, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called snap polls, leaving prospective candidates just over two months to mount their campaigns. At the time, early balloting appeared to favour the president and the ruling party: it would catch the opposition off guard and allow incumbents to ride the wave of nationalism that followed Turkey’s offensive against Kurdish militants in Syria’s Afrin province.
    [Show full text]
  • Liberia - Researched and Compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 14 October 2010
    Liberia - Researched and compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 14 October 2010 Information on the National Patriotic Front of Liberia including activities In July 1999 a paper published by Writenet states: “Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) became the National Patriotic Party (NPP); Kromah’s ULIMO became the All Liberian Coalition Party (ALCOP), while George Boley lined up behind the late President Doe’s (his kinsman) National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL).” (Writenet (1 July 1999) Liberia, Can Peace Be Consolidated?,p.17) A publication in April 2006 by the United Kingdom Office includes the following outlines organisations: “National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) Formed in 1989, it began the civil war under the leadership of Charles Taylor, with an invasion into Nimba county that led to its control of large parts of Liberia. It acquired largely Gio and Mano support. Between 1990 and 1994, it controlled much of Liberian territory, but ceased to be active in January 1997. In 1990, a substantial faction of the NPFL split from Taylor, forming the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia, but this group collapsed in 1992… National Patriotic Party (NPP) Was led by Charles Taylor. Founded 1997 from the former armed faction the National Patriotic Front of Liberia; won the majority of seats in legislative elections in July 1997. Leader Roland Chris Yarkpah Massaquoi.” (United Kingdom (April 2006) Country of Origin Information Report, Liberia,p.55) A report by the Danish Immigration Service in January 1999 states: “The elections, both presidential and parliamentary, were held a few months behind schedule, on 19 July 1997.
    [Show full text]
  • ECFG-Turkey-2021R.Pdf
    About this Guide This guide is designed to prepare you to deploy to culturally complex environments and achieve mission objectives. The fundamental information contained within will help you understand the cultural dimension of your assigned location and gain skills necessary for success (Photo: A US Senior Airman at a fruit stand in Adana). ECFG The guide consists of 2 parts: Part 1 is the “Culture General” section, which provides the foundational Turkey knowledge you need to operate effectively in any global environment. Part 2 is the “Culture Specific” section, which describes unique cultural features of Turkish society. It applies culture-general concepts to help increase your knowledge of your assigned deployment location. This section is designed to complement other pre-deployment training (Photo: Former President Obama meets with Turkish President Erdoğan). For further information, visit the Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC) website at www.airuniversity.af.edu/AFCLC/ or contact the AFCLC Region Team at [email protected]. Disclaimer: All text is the property of the AFCLC and may not be modified by a change in title, content, or labeling. It may be reproduced in its current format with the express permission of the AFCLC. All photography is provided as a courtesy of the US government, Wikimedia, and other sources. GENERAL CULTURE PART 1 – CULTURE GENERAL What is Culture? Fundamental to all aspects of human existence, culture shapes the way humans view life and functions as a tool we use to adapt to our social and physical environments. A culture is the sum of all of the beliefs, values, behaviors, and symbols that have meaning for a society.
    [Show full text]
  • Turkey: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report | Freedom Hous
    FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2021 Turkey 32 NOT FREE /100 Political Rights 16 /40 Civil Liberties 16 /60 LAST YEAR'S SCORE & STATUS 32 /100 Not Free Global freedom statuses are calculated on a weighted scale. See the methodology. Overview President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has ruled Turkey since 2002. After initially passing some liberalizing reforms, the AKP government showed growing contempt for political rights and civil liberties, and it has pursued a dramatic and wide-ranging crackdown on perceived opponents since an attempted coup in 2016. Constitutional changes adopted in 2017 concentrated power in the hands of the president. While Erdoğan continues to exert tremendous power in Turkish politics, opposition victories in 2019 municipal elections and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the already shaky economy have given the government new incentives to suppress dissent and limit public discourse. Key Developments in 2020 • As the COVID-19 crisis threatened the economy and the government’s political standing during the year, authorities apparently sought to manipulate official health statistics and launched criminal investigations against medical professionals who released independent information about the outbreak or criticized the official response. Hundreds of ordinary people were also arrested for their social media posts related to the coronavirus. • Prosecutions and campaigns of harassment against opposition politicians, prominent members of civil society, independent journalists, and critics of Turkey’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy continued throughout the year. In December, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) called for the immediate release of Selahattin Demirtaş, leader of the Kurdish-oriented People’s Democratic Party (HDP), who had been imprisoned since 2016 on politically motivated charges; the court’s ruling was ignored.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Do Political Parties Split? Understanding Party Splits and Formation of Splinter Parties in Turkey
    WHY DO POLITICAL PARTIES SPLIT? UNDERSTANDING PARTY SPLITS AND FORMATION OF SPLINTER PARTIES IN TURKEY A PhD Dissertation by ÖZHAN DEMİRKOL Department of Political Science İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University Ankara August 2014 To Defne and Günay WHY DO POLITICAL PARTIES SPLIT? UNDERSTANDING PARTY SPLITS AND FORMATION OF SPLINTER PARTIES IN TURKEY Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences of İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University by ÖZHAN DEMİRKOL In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNİVERSİTY ANKARA AUGUST 2014 I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science. -------------------------------------------- Assistant Professor Zeki Sarıgil Examining Committee Member I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science. -------------------------------------------- Professor Elizabeth Özdalga Examining Committee Member I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science. -------------------------------------------- Assistant Professor Cenk Saraçoğlu Examining Committee Member I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science. -------------------------------------------- Assistant Professor Ioannis N. Grigoriadis Examining Committee Member I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.
    [Show full text]
  • Secularist Divide and Turkey's Descent Into Severe Polarization
    One The Islamist- Secularist Divide and Turkey’s Descent into Severe Polarization senem aydın- düzgİt n multiple different measures of polarization, Turkey today is one of Othe most polarized nations in the world.1 Deep ideological and policy- based disagreements divide its political leaders and parties; Turkish so- ciety, too, is starkly polarized on the grounds of both ideology and social distance.2 This chapter focuses on the bases and manifestations of polar- ization in Turkey, the main reasons behind its increase, and its ramifica- tions for the future of democracy and governance in the country. The current dominant cleavage between secularists and Islamists has its roots in a series of reforms intended to secularize and modernize the coun- try after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. These reforms created a deep division within Turkish society, but until the beginning of the twenty- first century, the secularist elite dominated key state institu- tions such as the military, allowing it to repress conservative groups and thus keep conflict over the soul of Turkey from coming into the open. Since 2002, however, the remarkable electoral success of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP) has brought the Islamist- secularist divide to the fore. Despite the AKP’s initial moderation, several developments, including 17 Carothers-O’Donohue_Democracies Divided_i-viii_1-311.indd 17 7/24/19 10:32 AM 18 SENEM AYDIN- DÜZGI˙T the collapse of the European Union (EU) accession process, the success of polarization as an electoral strategy, and undemocratic threats from the secularist state establishment, pushed the AKP toward increasingly populist, divisive rhetoric and politics, beginning with the 2007 general elections.
    [Show full text]
  • Voter Preferences, Electoral Cleavages and Support for Islamic Parties
    Voter Preferences, Electoral Cleavages and Support for Islamic Parties Sabri Ciftci Department of Political Science Kansas State University, Manhattan [email protected] Yusuf Tekin Gaziosmanpasa University, Tokat, TURKEY [email protected] Prepared for delivery at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 2‐5 2009, Chicago, IL Abstract Increasing scholarly attention has recently been focused upon the origins and fortunes of Islamic parties. This paper examines the individual determinants of support for these parties utilizing the fifth wave of the World Values Survey. It is argued that the distribution of individual preferences along political cleavages like left‐right, secularism‐Islamism, and regime‐opposition are critical explanatory variables. The cases under investigation are Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey and Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco. The results of the multinomial logit show that Islamic parties obtain support from a broad spectrum of voters and this support base is best understood in relation to the distribution of voter preferences for rival parties. Furthermore, left‐right and Islamism appear to be the most important cleavages in the electoral markets under investigation. 1 Introduction Increasing scholarly attention has recently been focused upon the origins and fortunes of Islamic parties. In this vein, a good amount of research examined the Islamic party moderation (Kalyvas, 2000; Schwedler, 2007) and their commitment to democracy (Tibbi, 2008, p. 43-48; Nasr, 2005). While there is merit in investigating these questions, it is also important to understand the microlevel foundations of support for Islamic parties. Surprisingly, little empirical research has been conducted toward this end (for an exception see Carkoglu, 2006; Tepe, 2007) and studies with a comparative orientation are rare (Garcia-Rivero and Kotze, 2007; Tepe and Baum, 2008).
    [Show full text]
  • TRANSFORMATION of POLITICAL ISLAM in TURKEY Islamist Welfare Party’S Pro-EU Turn
    PARTY POLITICS VOL 9. No.4 pp. 463–483 Copyright © 2003 SAGE Publications London Thousand Oaks New Delhi www.sagepublications.com TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY Islamist Welfare Party’s Pro-EU Turn Saban Taniyici ABSTRACT The recent changes in the Islamist party’s ideology and policies in Turkey are analysed in this article. The Islamist Welfare Party (WP) was ousted from power in June 1997 and was outlawed by the Consti- tutional Court (CC) in March 1998. After the ban, the WP elite founded the Virtue Party and changed policies on a number of issues. They emphasized democracy and basic human rights and freedoms in the face of this external shock. The WP’s hostile policy toward the European Union (EU) was changed. This process of change is discussed and it is argued that the EU norms presented a political opportunity structure for the party elites to influence the change of direction of the party. When the VP was banned by the CC in June 2001, the VP elites split and founded two parties which differ on a number of issues but have positive policies toward the EU. KEY WORDS European Union party change political Islam political oppor- tunity structure Turkey Introduction The Islamist Welfare Party (WP) in Turkey recently changed its decades-old policy of hostility toward the European Union (EU) and began strongly to support Turkey’s accession to the Union, thereby raising doubts about the inevitability of a civilizational conflict between Islam and the West. 1 This change was part of the party’s broader image transformation which took place after its leader, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan,2 was forced by the Turkish political establishment to resign from a coalition government in June 1997.
    [Show full text]