The Struggle for an Independent State in Southern : measuring

the effectiveness of the Interim Government in mobilizing collective action

Annelou Aartsen

MSc. Conflict Resolution & Governance

University of Amsterdam

Supervisor: Dr. Floris Vermeulen

Second reader: Maria Kranendonk

28 June 2019 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 – Introduction

- Research Structure

Chapter 2 – Literature Review: Diaspora and Conflict

- Diaspora - Diaspora and Conflict - Diaspora’s Practices of Engagement • The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam • Achenese Diaspora

Chapter 3 – Theoretical Framework: Framing

- Studying Social Movements • Framing • Discourse Analysis - Snow and Benford’s Collective Action Frames • The Core Framing Tasks § Diagnostic Framing § Prognostic Framing § Motivational Framing - Assessing the Effectiveness of Frames • Frame Resonance § Credibility § Salience • Contested Framing Processes • Contextual Constraints on Framing Efforts - Existing Framing Research

Chapter 4 – A Multimethod Approach

- Operationalization - Methods • History of the Anglophone Conflict • Collective Action Frames Cultivated by the Interim Government § Framing Analysing Technique • Strategies Employed by the Interim Government - Reflection on Research

Chapter 5 – Results

5.1 History of the

2 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

- Understanding the Root Causes of the Anglophone Problem • Historical Background • and Independence • The Federal Republic of • La République du Cameroun - Crisis in the Anglophone Regions • International Responses - The Interim Government and the Federal Republic of • The Creation of the Interim Government • The Structure and Functioning of the Interim Government • Governance Structure Interim Government • The Amba Peace Plan

5.2 Identifying the Frames Created by the Interim Government - Diagnostic Framing • Colonial Occupation: Identifying the Problem and Attributing Blame • The Genocide Frame - Prognostic Framing • Identifying a Solution • Specification of Targets § International Community § The Diaspora § Ground Zero - Motivational Framing • Severity of the Problem • Sense of Urgency • Propriety of Taking Action 5.3 Strategies to Reach - Fundraising - Raising Public Awareness • The International Community § Advocacy § Lobbying • The Diaspora and Ground Zero - Regulating the War on the Ground from Abroad • Self-Defence • Boycotts • Ghost Towns - Hope • Ground Zero • The Diaspora • Social Media

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Chapter 6 – Assessing the Effectiveness of the Frames Cultivated by the IG

- Reflecting on the Collective Action Frames • Frame Resonance § Empirical Credibility § Experiential Commensurability § Credibility of Frame Makers • Contested Framing Processes § Frame Disputes § Responding to Frame Disputes

Chapter 7 – Conclusion

- Anglophone Struggle - Collective Action Frames of the Interim Government • Consensus Mobilization • Action Mobilization - Effectiveness of the Interim Government’s Collective Action Frames - Future Research - Reflections on Research

Bibliography

Appendix

4 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

Chapter 1 - Introduction

Currently between 450,000 and 550,000 persons from the North West and South West regions of Cameroon are displaced (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). This makes the population of Cameroon the sixth largest displaced population of the world (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). In January 2019, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that 1,3 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance (UN OCHA, 2019). These numbers do not merely result from the government’s conflict with Boko Haram in the far North of the country but are largely due to a current conflict between the English-speaking (Anglophone) and French-speaking (Francophone) regions in Cameroon. In October 2016 political and social tensions between the Anglophone and Francophone regions gave rise to massive protest and strikes of the Anglophone population. While protest started off peacefully, they have taken a violent turn and there has been a sharp escalation of serious violence, crime and human rights violations (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). Over time, various groups, among which separatist groups, have emerged and are fighting French Cameroonian forces. On the 1st of October 2017, one of these Anglophone movements – led from the diaspora – has proclaimed the independence of the Anglophone regions under the name “Federal Republic of Ambazonia”. The self-proclaimed Federal Republic of Ambazonia is led by the Interim Government (IG) located in the diaspora. From the diaspora the Interim Government tries to influence conflict in its ‘homeland’ – also referred to as Southern Cameroons or ‘Ground Zero’. While working in exile, the Interim Government seeks to find movement sympathizers and ultimately establish and independent Southern Cameroonian state. To ensure independence of the Southern Cameroons the IG tries to incorporate both diaspora members and Anglophone Cameroonians located on the ground in its activities.

Even though the conflict has taken a violent turn, the international community has stayed relatively silent and little is known about the current conflict and the role played by the Interim Government, in particular. Therefore, this research is devoted to the Interim Government and its efforts to establish the Federal Republic of Ambazonia. While the Interim Government is not the only Southern Cameroonian movement that has come into being, it will be the focus of this study because it is one of the key players that has influenced and sustained the war at home from abroad (International Crisis Group, 2018). In this research, the Interim Government will be studied as a social movement, which tries to mobilize collective action to achieve an

5 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN independent state. There are various ways through which social movements have been studied in the past. Two common approaches to study social movements are a discourse analysis and a framing analysis. Whereas a discourse analysis stresses the structural constraints posed by a discourse on social movements actors, a framing analysis emphasizes the strategic role played by social movement actors and their ability to deliberately mobilize people. A framing analysis will be adopted to study the independence movement of the Interim Government, because it allows to elucidate the processes by which the IG seeks to mobilize support for its activities, and ultimately tries to establish independence (Gahan and Pekarek, 2013). Hence, it enables to identify the story that has been developed by the IG to mobilize movement adherents. In specific, Snow and Benford’s (1988) collective action framing theory will be used because it allows to identify the frames that have been developed by the IG and it also – as will be explained in more detail in the theoretical framework – offers tools to assess the effectiveness of these cultivated frames. Therefore, Snow and Benford’s theory enables this research to ultimately say something about the mobilization potential of the collective action frames nurtured by the Interim Government. With the aid of the collective action framing theory, this research will explore to what extent the Interim Government of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia is able to effectively frame the Anglophone conflict and thereby generate an independence movement? In order to shed light on this question this research will be divided into three sub-questions namely: 1) What is the history of the Anglophone conflict? 2) What collective action frames have been cultivated by the Interim Government? 3) What strategies, following the Interim Government’s collective action frames, have been employed by the Interim Government to establish independence? These questions ultimately allow us to shed light on the Interim Government’s effectiveness in mobilizing people to participate in the independence struggle.

Research Structure To assess the extent to which the IG is able to effectively frame the Anglophone conflict and generate an independence movement, this study will start with a literature review which will explore the relevant concepts for this research, such as diaspora and collective identity. In addition, an overview of the existing academic debate on diasporas’ role in conflict will be provided and, lastly, this section will touch upon common strategies employed by diasporas to

6 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN influence conflict at ‘home’.1 Secondly, the theoretical framework will be presented. In this section the framing theory of Snow and Benford (1988) shall be explored in further detail, which can then in subsequent sections be used to explore the collective action frames cultivated the Interim Government. Once this research has explored the framing theory of Snow and Benford, it will provide an oversight of the methodology adopted to conduct this research. It will touch upon the various types of data that are used to establish the IG’s collective action and to answer the other sub-questions. Additionally, it reflects on the limitations of the research and the data sample. Subsequently, chapter four will lay out the history of the Southern Cameroons and the creation of the Interim Government in order to understand the context in which the current conflict and the Interim Government has developed. This chapter will be divided into three sections namely 1) the root causes of the Anglophone problem, 2) the crisis in the Anglophone Regions, and 3) the Interim Government of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia. In the fifth chapter, this research will identify the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames that have been cultivated by the Interim Government. Subsequently, chapter six, will explore in more detail the various strategies that have been employed by the Interim Government to reach independence. Once the collective action frames of the Interim Government have been identified, chapter seven – on the basis of Snow and Benford’s framing theory – will assess the effectiveness of these collective action frames. Lastly, conclusions about the mobilizing potency of the Interim Government’s collective action frames will be drawn and an answer to the research question will be formulated.

1 Home in relation to diaspora refers to the ancestral homeland from which the diaspora originates. In the case of the Southern Cameroonians home refers to the Anglophone regions of Cameroon. 7 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

Chapter 2 - Literature Review: Diaspora and Conflict

As mentioned above the Interim Government is made up of Southern Cameroonian diaspora members who try to influence and coordinate the conflict in Cameroon from abroad. The mobilized Southern Cameroonian diaspora has situated itself as a key player within the Anglophone struggle and has been able to perpetuate the war on the ground. Before this research can dive into the case of the Southern Cameroonian diaspora, several concepts, such as diaspora, the role of diaspora in conflict and common strategies engaged in by diasporas to fuel conflict at home, need to be discussed. These concepts are relevant because they elucidate the academic foundation in which this case study is placed. The literature review is divided into three sections. In the first section, the term diaspora will be explored, and subsequently the academic debate on diaspora and their role in conflict will be discussed. Lastly, this chapter will provide some examples of earlier case studies, which have explored the diverse strategies diasporas engage in to sustain conflict in their homeland.

Diaspora The term ‘diaspora’ comes from the Greek word diaspeirein, which translates into the dispersal or scattering of seeds. Originally, the concept was used to refer to the Jews dispersed from their historical homeland (Smith and Stares, 2007). Today, there exist numerous groups, such as the Palestinians, Kurds, Armenians, Mexicans, and Tamils, who all constitute new diaspora groups (Shain and Barth, 2003). Over time, these new diaspora groups have been defined and conceptualized in various ways. However, without going into the substantial conceptual debate about the term ‘diaspora’, I will adopt a broad definition used by Smith and Stares (2007), which describes a diaspora as “transnational communities created as a result of the movement of peoples, living in one or most host countries, organized on the basis of solidarity, shared ideas and collective identities, and showing loyalty to, and affinity with, their host countries as well as their original homeland” (p. 19). In comparison to migrants, diaspora members differ in their extraordinary sense of togetherness, collective identity and shared fate (Missbach, 2013). In addition, diaspora members are distinct from migrants in that they maintain meaningful contact with their homeland; often attempt to preserve a dual identity and retain political, religious and cultural interest in their homeland (Roth, 2015). Unlike retaining the status of guest workers or asylum seeker, becoming or remaining a diaspora member is a voluntary choice (Sheffer, 1993). While diaspora members are all bound by their connection to the homeland, there is general acknowledgment that diasporas are internally complex and

8 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN heterogeneous (Smith, 2007). Therefore, to ensure survival and continuity of a diaspora, a sense of unity and common sentiments must overcome social, educational, ideological and generational differences that exist among diaspora members (Sheffer, 2003). Without a sense of unity and collective identity diasporas will disintegrate and ultimately disappear. Hence, unity and collective identity are crucial for diasporas existence (Sheffer, 2003). As explained by Sheffer (2003), the collective identity of a diaspora tends to be relatively rigid. He stipulates that diasporic identities are more firmly based on primordial, cultural and instrumental components, such as, biological relationship, belief in a common ancestry, and strong sentiments about an ancestral homeland. This collective identity, in combination with solidarity and continuous interaction between diaspora and the homeland serve as the bases for diaspora organization and mobilization. It forms the foundation from which diaspora implement their strategies and carry out their collective activities (Sheffer, 2003). This becomes relevant in this research as it will observe how the Southern Cameroonian diasporas’ strong sentiments about their ancestral homeland enhance diaspora mobilization.

As explained by Shain and Bath, the members of mobilized diasporas can be divided into three categories, namely core members, passive members and silent members. Core members are intensively active in diasporic activities and are often in a position to call for mobilization of the larger diaspora; the organizing elite (Shain and Bath, 2003). The members that are likely available for mobilization when called upon are referred to as passive members. Lastly, the silent members consist of a larger pool of people who are generally removed from diasporic activities, but who may potentially mobilize in times of crisis. The latter category is mostly part of the ‘imagined community’ (Shain and Bath, 2003). This research will predominantly build around core members of the Southern Cameroonian diaspora who actively try to call for mobilization and thereby influence conflict at home.

Diaspora and Conflict The past decades have demonstrated that the mobilization power of diaspora, and its ability to influence conflicts at home are significant. In this regard, the World Bank, for instance, concluded in 2000 that the risk of renewed conflict in post-conflict areas is around six times higher if a country has a large diaspora located in America (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000). The research into diaspora and homeland affairs has further developed throughout the late twentieth century and has resulted in a general recognition of diasporas as politicized players influencing homeland affairs (see, Shain, 2002; Shain and Barth, 2003; Demmers, 2007, and Smith and 9 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

Stares, 2007). This new political role obtained by diaspora is due, amongst others, to the changes in communication, technology and modes of transport which facilitate the maintenance of relationships between diaspora and their homeland (Bercovitch, 2007). In addition, social media nurtures this new role by bringing events unfolding in the homeland closer than ever before (Bercovitch, 2007).

Nevertheless, while there is agreement that diaspora are key players on the international stage and in homeland affairs, opinions differ when it comes to evaluating the exact role of diasporas (Missbach, 2013). In fact, there is debate about whether diasporas are peace-builders or peace- wreckers (Smit and Stares, 2007). Scholars stressing the peace-building potential of diasporas, highlight diasporas ability to promote peace, launch humanitarian programmes, provide relief, complement local initiatives, and assist in post-conflict reconciliation and recovery (see, Bertrand, 2004; Kent, 2006; Fagen and Bump, 2006, and Zunzer, 2004). On the contrary, scholars who view diasporas as fuellers of conflict have stressed their leadership role, financial support and ideas which can contribute to the escalation of conflict (see, Fair, 2005; Lyons, 2007, and Chalk, 2008). In this regard, diasporas are predominantly perceived as being supportive in secession movements and therefore engage merely in maintenance or revival of violence (Lyons, 2007). A perspective of particular interest to the conflict in Cameroon, where the Interim Government of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia tries to separate from and establish a recognized, independent country.

Diaspora’s Practices of Engagement While existing literature lacks an abstract framework on the various strategies employed by diaspora to influence conflict at home, diverse case-studies explore the manners through which diasporas have influenced and fuelled homeland conflicts in the past. For example, two case studies on separatist movements, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the Acehnese diaspora in Indonesia, illustrate various strategies through which diasporas have supported secession in their homeland. In the subsequent sections, both case studies will be summarized shortly to have a better idea of possible activities that the Interim Government engages in to establish an independent Ambazonia.

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The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam One of the well-known separatist movements is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an insurgent group that fought for an independent state of Tamil Eelam in Northern Sri Lanka. This movement is eminent for its highly organized support structures created in the diaspora upon which the LTTE anchored its war effort on the ground. Chalk (2008) highlights two essential functions fulfilled by the diaspora – publicity and propaganda and finance -– which allowed the LTTE to sustain the movement in their homeland. Publicity and propaganda efforts focused on the LTTE’s external diplomatic representation and sought to garner international support for their cause. Thereby, propaganda was targeted towards the Tamil diaspora and various host governments (Chalk, 2008). In addition, cultural and social gatherings were organized to maximize mobilization among committed LTTE adherents and potential sympathisers. During the past decades the Tigers also adopted additional mediums, such as email and other electronic platforms to extend the range and scope of their publicity efforts (Chalk, 2008). Alongside to their propaganda efforts, the LTTE ran a sophisticated fundraising machinery that relied on three types of resources: direct diaspora contributions, investments in Tamil-run businesses, and funds siphoned off from donations given to charities and NGOs (Chalk, 2008). The first funding source – diaspora contributions – were raised through both voluntarily and obligatory donations. While most money was given voluntarily, obligatory contributions in the form of a standard baseline ‘tax’ were levied as a minimum obligation to support the Tamil cause (Chalk, 2008). In addition to the diaspora contributions, funds were also procured from donations given to NGOs and charities ostensibly created to finance development and rehabilitation programs in Sri Lanka (Chalk, 2008). The third funding opportunity was derived from investment in Tamil business and commercial holdings. Finally, the LTTE was widely suspected of financial procurement through exploiting Tamils that wish to emigrate to the West (Chalk, 2008). Apart from the utility of the Tamil diaspora in generating publicity and diplomatic support and raising funds, the diaspora also expanded the Tiger’s contacts for weapons procurement. While less evidence exists in this regard, it is often referred to as a third strategy the LTTE engaged in (Fair, 2005). Before being proscribed a terrorist organization in many countries, the LTTE – through the diaspora – created international support structures upon which its war on the ground was anchored (Chalk, 2008).

Achenese Diaspora Another study which sheds light on the role of a diaspora in a conflict at home, is the case study done by Missbach (2013) on the separatist conflict in Aceh, Indonesia. In this case, the 11 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

Acehnese diaspora, a relatively small diaspora, became an influential factor in the continuance of the independence struggle at home. As demonstrated by Missbach, the Acehnese diaspora engaged in various activities to sustain the independence struggle. Firstly, while the Acehnese diaspora was relatively small, they provided for considerable financial backing (Missbach, 2013). Diaspora funding, both voluntary and obligatory, was one of the movement’s main sources of income and provided a stable financial base (Missbach, 2013). Voluntary contributions to the separatist movement were made by diaspora members who were convinced of the righteousness of the independence struggle (Missbach, 2013). In addition, monthly payments and emergency contributions were demanded by the movement’s leaders. Secondly, similar to the Tamil diaspora, the Acehnese diaspora also engaged in civil actions such as diplomacy, lobbying, networking and the distribution of propaganda (Missbach, 2013). Nevertheless, as demonstrated by Missbach, the greatest strength of the Acehnese diaspora was the moral and ideological support they provided to the people back home. While their hopes were often based on false believes, such as the idea that the movement could organize foreign military interventions, the Acehnese at home thought that independence was near. Through upholding these – often unrealistic – hopes the diaspora kept the conflict going at home (Missbach, 2013). Thereby, the Acehnese diaspora did not only provide for publicity and financial contributions, but also provided moral support which kept the conflict alive (Missbach, 2013).

The case of the Tamil Tigers and the Acehnese diaspora show that diaspora use different strategies to engage in homeland conflict. Through finance, publicity and propaganda, moral support and in some cases the provision of weapons, homeland conflicts were fuelled. While the literature is still developing and existing case studies are highly context dependent, generally diaspora activities can be divided into two distinct areas. On the one hand, physical and military support, such as the provision of weapons, and on the other hand ideational support, for example in the form of lobbying or publicity. Within the current case study on the Interim Government – on which no extensive research has been performed yet – the strategies outlined above will be kept in mind while looking into the case of the Southern Cameroonian diaspora. As will be further expanded on in the next chapter, these strategies engaged in by the Southern Cameroonian diaspora form part of the collective action frames constructed by the Interim Government. Therefore, it is relevant to outline these strategies if we wish to uncover the ability of the IG to generate an independence movement.

12 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

Chapter 3 - Theoretical Framework – Framing

As touched upon in the introduction, framing is one approach through which the mobilization of social movements can be studied. This approach emphasizes the strategic role of social movement leaders in the mobilization of people. In this research a framing theory will be adopted to study the extent to which the Interim Government is able to effectively frame the Anglophone problem and mobilize adherents for their independence movement. Before the frames cultivated by the IG can be identified and assessed, the concept of framing, and in particular Snow and Benford’s (1988) framing theory needs to be laid out. Therefore, this chapter will first discuss the concept of framing and subsequently substantiate more on the differences between a framing analysis and a discourse analysis. The succeeding section dives into the specific framing theory, namely Snow and Benford’s (1988) collective action frames, that will be adopted for this research. Once the core framing tasks have been explored, this chapter will touch upon factors that may enhance or diminish the effectiveness of cultivated frames. Something, which is highly relevant if we wish to assess the effectiveness of the collective action frames cultivated by the IG. Lastly, this chapter ends with various examples of framing studies that have been conducted in the past. These examples demonstrate what a framing analysis looks like in practice and provide a better idea of the various sources which have shaped the method through which the framing analysis on the IG will be conducted in this research.

Studying Social Movements Framing The idea of framing arrives from Goffman (1974) who explained frames as “schemata of interpretation” that enable individuals to attach meaning to events and occurrences in one’s life and the world at large. Frames assist people in rendering events meaningful and, thereby help to organize experiences and guide perception and action (Goffman, 1974). Today, this concept of ‘framing’ is widely used in the social and behaviour sciences – including psychology, political science, communication studies, and policy studies – and takes on different forms and meanings within these various disciplines (Lindekilde, 2014). In sociology, the concept of framing has been extensively used to study social movements and collective action. From the perspective of social movements and collective action, the ability to construct certain frames will influence the success of a social movement (Sandberg, 2006). It emphasizes the role played by social movement actors in constructing their own political opportunities through the use of

13 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN language (Sandberg, 2006). This social constructivist approach – emphasizing the production of knowledge – differs from realist and traditional approaches to the study of social movements, which both explain the emergence of social movements through political opportunity structures and mobilizing structures (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996); Goodwin & Jasper, 2004). The social constructivist approach to study social movements has mainly been represented by Snow and Benford (1988) in their work on collective action frames. This social constructivist approach, which stresses the production of knowledge, will be adopted in this research in order to understand the social reality that has been cultivated by the IG to mobilize movement adherents and ultimately enhance the quest for independence.

Discourse Analysis While this research aims to draw out the social reality – or put differently the frames – cultivated by the IG to stablish an independence movement, a framing analysis is not the only methodological approach through which social movements have been studied in the past. Reiterating from previous sections, a discourse analysis is another common approach to study social movements. Discourse analysis is preoccupied with how social reality is linguistically created, via analyses of the interplay between text, discourses, and wider contexts, (Philips and Hardy, 2002). It aims to understand how broader structures of language shape and limit the ways individuals, actors, and institutions can think, speak and conduct themselves (Hodges, Kuper and Reeves, 2008). In this regard, the structural constraints posed by a discourse determine the possible (speech) acts of strategic actors in a field (Foucault, 1972). From this perspective, social movements are preoccupied with innovative and creative forms of discursive practices, which reproduce or challenge existing discourses in a given social domain or institution (Della Porta, 2014). While discourse analyses and framing analyses are based on similar ontological and epistemological assumptions, and both engage in understanding the relationship between movement “texts” and their wider social, cultural, and political contexts, they may serve different purposes (Della Porta, 2014).

Frame analysis, for instance, differs from a discourse analysis in that it emphasizes the strategic and deliberative use of language by movement actors. Whereas, a discourse analysis emphasizes the structural constraints discourses pose on the language available to strategic actors (Della Porta, 2014) and thereby unconsciously limiting the type of language actors use. In addition, frame analysis focuses on how existing ‘topics’ or ‘objects’ are framed by actors, thereby bending their meaning in certain directions, whereas discourse analysis focuses on how 14 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN an interrelated set of texts, and the practice of their production, reception and dissemination bring an object into being (Della Porta, 2014). Therefore, if one is interested in researching social movement actors as strategic agents deliberately working towards the mobilization of people, a framing method is most suitable. If, however, one is interested in social movement agents as co-producers of social change or reproduction, discourse analysis better fits the purpose (Della Porta, 2014). This research aims to draw out ‘the story’ cultivated by the Interim Government, in which particular emphasis is put on the strategic role played by the Interim Government to reach independence. Therefore, this research will adopt a framing analysis – as stipulated by Snow and Benford (1988) – instead of a discourse analysis.

Snow and Benford’s Collective Action Frames Building on the work of Goffman, Snow and Benford utilize the concept of collective action frames (CAFs) to clarify the processes through which social movements seek to mobilize support for their activities (Snow and Benford, 1988). Collective action frames function by focusing attention, combining events, social facts, and situations, and, thereby, altering someone’s understanding of social reality (Lindekilde, 2014). In this regard, frames are deliberatively constructed and applied to mobilize adherents, to garner bystander support and demobilize opponents of a given cause (Snow and Benford, 1988). From the perspective of the individual, frames provide an important linking mechanism through which a problematic aspect of life can be altered from being perceived as a ‘tragedy’ beyond their control to a grievance which can be acted upon (Gahan and Pekarek, 2013). Social movement actors play a significant role in constructing these grievances and defining solutions; they are not sole carriers of ideas and ideology but deliberatively use language to garner bystander support (Snow and Benford, 1988).

The Core Framing Tasks As stipulated by Snow and Benford (1988), the success of participant mobilization depends on a movement’s ability to move people “from the balcony to the barricades”. Moving people from the balcony to the barricades is contingent upon a movement’s ability to attend to the three core framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing (Snow and Benford, 1988). Together, these three framing tasks serve to classify a situation as problematic; stipulate causal attribution for the problem; and identify solutions and a rationale for the chosen course of action (Gahan and Pekarek, 2013). The more richly developed and interconnected the three framing

15 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN tasks are, the more successful the mobilization capacity of the movement (Snow and Benford, 1988). The collective action frames are action-oriented sets of meanings and beliefs that enable social movements to legitimate and stimulate their campaigns and activities (Sandberg, 2006). Within the existing literature these core framing tasks – diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames – have already been identified and richly developed. Hence, these diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames will be used in this research to analyse the frames that have been cultivated by the Interim Government. In the subsequent sections, the three core framing tasks will be explained in further detail, something which needs to be clarified before the collective action frames can be applied to this case study.

Diagnostic Framing. “Diagnostic framing involves the identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality” (Snow and Benford, 1988, 200). It identifies some event or aspect of social life as problematic and is, therefore, in need of alteration. Nevertheless, while an aspect of social life is strategically identified as problematic it does not mean that the problems are invented and do not exist (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992). In addition to the identification of these grievances, it establishes culpable agents. It follows that action taken is contingent on the identification of source(s) of blame, causality and/or capable actors (Benford and Snow, 2000). Diagnostic framing typically involves social movement actors engaging in ‘boundary framing’ through which boundaries between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are constructed and protagonists and antagonists delineated (Benford and Snow, 2000).

Prognostic Framing. The second core framing task, prognostic framing, involves the articulation of a solution that specifies what needs to be done (Snow and Benford, 1988). It involves the identification of strategies, targets and tactics for action. In short, the prognostic frame, deals with ‘what has to be done’. The identification of the problem and causes within the diagnostic frame tend to constrain the range of possible solutions and strategies available. Often there is direct correspondence between the diagnostic and prognostic framing efforts (Benford and Snow, 2000). Together, the diagnostic and prognostic frames are referred to as ‘consensus mobilization’ (Klandermans, 1984), however these frames do not in itself lead to mobilization. Actual participation is contingent upon the ‘call to action’: motivational framing (Snow and Benford, 1988).

Motivational Framing. Motivational framing, the last core framing task, provides for a ‘call to arms’ to engage in corrective or ameliorative action (Snow and Benford, 1988). Motives

16 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN for participation in actions must be created to persuade prospective activists to participate (Snow and Benford, 1988). In this regard, motivational frames and its push for collective action go beyond the diagnosis and prognosis. Social movement actors must attend to all three framing tasks to ensure that collective action is taken.

Assessing the Effectiveness of Frames As laid out in the previous sections, there are three types of framing tasks that social movement actors must attend to if they wish to ensure that collective action is taken. However, even if social movement actors attend to all framing tasks mobilization is not guaranteed. As explored within the framing literature, the ability of frames to mobilize people is contingent upon the extent to which frames resonate with movement participants. In addition, it is also affected by possible contextual constraints and contested framing processes. These three assets which enhance or diminish the mobilizing potency of frames are of particular relevance for this study, because this research seeks to assess the Interim Government’s ability to generate an independence movement. Therefore, these three assets – as developed within existing framing theory – will be discussed below. Ultimately, this provides this research with tools to assess the effectiveness of the frames cultivated by the Interim Government.

Frame Resonance As recognized by Snow and Benford (1988) the mobilizing potency or effectiveness of proffered frames is constraint by the concept of ‘frame resonance’. ‘Frame resonance’ answers the question why certain frames seem to be effective or ‘resonate’ with movement adherents while others do not. Thereby, frame resonance serves as a way to measure a social movement’s ability to develop frames that enable mobilization (Snow and Benford, 1988). Benford and Snow (2000) identify two sets of interacting factors that shape the degree of frame resonance: credibility and salience. The credibility of a frame is dependent upon three factors: frame consistency, empirical credibility, and credibility of the frame articulators (Benford and Snow, 2000). While the salience of a frame is dependent on the frame’s centrality, experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity (Benford and Snow, 2000). The subsequent sections will further explain the various factors that shape the degree of frame resonance.

Credibility. The first factor that affects frame resonance – frame’s consistency – refers to the congruency between a social movement’s articulated beliefs, claims, and actions (Benford and

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Snow, 2000). Such congruency can manifest itself in two ways, namely through apparent contradictions between beliefs or claims, and through contradictions in what a social movement says and what it actually does. Benford and Snow’s hypothesis stipulates that the more apparent contradictions are, the less credible the framing and the less resonant the proffered framing(s) are, and subsequently the more difficult mobilization. The second factor that influences frame resonance is the empirical credibility the collective action frame provides (Benford and Snow, 2000). This aspect directly refers to the fit between propagated frames and events occurring in the world; is there a specific event which can be pointed to as evidence of the established frames? In this case it is not relevant whether diagnostic and prognostic claims are factually true, but what matters is whether their empirical referents can be read as ‘real’ indicators of the diagnostic frame (Snow and Benford, 1988). The final factor that affects the credibility of a collective action frame is the perceived credibility of frame makers. In this regard, speakers who are perceived to be more credible are generally more persuasive. Assets enhancing the credibility of a frame articulator are variables such as knowledge and status. Following Benford and Snow’s (2000) hypothesis: the greater the perceived expertise and/or status of the frame articulator or organization, the likelier that the frame resonates with potential movement adherents.

Salience. In addition to the issue of credibility, the resonance of a collective action frame is influenced by its salience. The first dimension of salience – as identified by Benford and Snow (2000) – is centrality. This aspect touches upon how essential the values, beliefs, and ideas associated with the frame are to the lives of the potential movement adherents. In general, the more salient the espoused values, beliefs and ideas of a social movement to the movement participants, the greater the potential for mobilization (Benford and Snow, 2000). The second factor that contributes to collective action frame’s salience is the experiential commensurability. This links to the direct, everyday experiences of the movement adherents. If movement frames are congruent with personal experiences, collective action frames are more likely to result in mobilization (Benford and Snow, 2000). That last factor that influences frame resonance is narrative fidelity. Narrative fidelity touch upon cultural narrations and the extent to which frames resonate with these narrations. In this respect, myths, stories and folk tales are part of one’s cultural heritage and function to inform experiences and events in the present (Snow and Benford, 1988). When correspondence exists between such narratives and proffered frames ‘narrative fidelity’ exists and, subsequently, enhances prospect of mobilization.

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Following Snow and Benford’s theory, mobilizing potency of movement framing efforts is contingent upon the extent to which frames are able to establish frame resonance. At least one of the variables outlined in the previous paragraphs needs to be present for consensus mobilization and their presence enhances the likeliness of action mobilization (Snow and Benford, 1988). However, frames’ mobilizing potency is not only contingent upon the extent to which frames resonate with movement participants. This is the case because frames are not constructed within a social vacuum; they are often influenced by processes that occur within or outside a social movement. Within existing framing theory, these processes are identified as contested framing processes or contextual constraints on framing efforts. Below, the contested framing processes and contextual constraints are shortly introduced, which will later be used to assess the frames created by the Interim Government.

Contested Framing Processes Framing activities – as identified by Snow and Benford (2000) – are also likely to be influenced by a number of ‘contested processes’. The authors note that collective action frames can be subject to challenges that arise from within a social movement, namely through frame disputes, as well as challenges that develop externally by opponents or critics, through framing contests. Internally, frame disputes can arise when there is a dispute about the representation of reality. In this regard, the dispute may arise over the substance of a frame within a single social movement but can also arise between separate organizations all belonging to the same social movement (Benford, 1993). The second process that influences framing efforts – framing contests – arrive from outside. Externally, social movements compete with other social movement actors, in which all antagonists promote their own collective action frames as the most compelling interpretation (Benford and Snow, 2000). The ‘counter frames’ produced by antagonist intend to undermine or invalidate a movement’s claims, collective identity and interpretative frame (Benford, 1997). These counter frames may result in the challenged social movement reconstructing or reframing its interpretation. Hence, framing contests can lead to the modification or replacement of frames through interaction with opponents (Gahan and Pekarek, 2013). The evolving and contested nature of collective action frames raises the question of how effectively frames can contribute to the achievement of a social movement’s mobilization goals (Gahan and Pekarek, 2013).

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Contextual Constraints on Framing Efforts As illustrated above, collective action frames are not static entities, but are continuously constituted, contested, transformed and/or replaced during activities of social movements (Benford and Snow, 2000). Hence, framing is an ongoing, dynamic process. Nevertheless, this does not mean that framing occurs in a ‘structural vacuum’. Rather, Benford and Snow (2000), identify three important contextual elements – political opportunity structure, cultural opportunities and constraints, and targeted audiences – that affect framing processes. Firstly, changes in political opportunity structures, especially changes in institutional structure and movement mobilization, may affect the material conditions, and subsequently lead to changes in frame resonance. Secondly, the cultural context may constrain or facilitate movement activity (Benford and Snow, 2000). In this respect, the most relevant cultural aspects include the beliefs, ideologies, practices, values, narratives and myths, which constitutes the lens through which frames are interpreted and evaluated. This contextual constraint correlates with ‘cultural resonance’ discussed earlier. Lastly, the targeted audience may form a contextual constraint to framing efforts. Often social movements target multiple audiences who vary in terms of interest, this may result in reshaping the form and the content of a message. Existing literature on movement framing suggests that the audience targeted can help explain why certain movements seek to modify their collective action frames. These three contextual factors potentially affect framing efforts and have therefore been the focus of various studies in the past.

As illustrated above, existing framing theory provides several tools – frame resonance, contested framing processes and contextual constraints on framing efforts – which enable this research to assess the effectiveness of the frames cultivated by the Interim Government. However, due to the scope of this research and the data gathered not all assets can be explored to assess the effectiveness of the collective action frames nurtured by the IG. The assets that will be explored in relation to the Interim Government are frame resonance, in specific empirical credibility, the credibility of frame makers and experiential commensurability, and contested framing process, in particular frame disputes. These assets have been selected because, on the one hand, these assets can be explored when relying solely on ‘one side of the story’ namely, that of the perspective. On the other hand, these specific assets became apparent in the interviews conducted with movement adherents and Interim Government officials. While recognizing that contextual constraints certainly influence the success of the Interim Government’s framing efforts, this research will not focus on the

20 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN contextual constraints. This is the case, because this research is particularly interested in the strategic role of the Interim Government and the agency it has in developing a certain story; a frame.

Existing Framing Research Previous sections have expanded on the collective action framing theory of Snow and Benford and have shed light on the various ways in which social movements can enhance movement participation. Thereby, specific attention was paid to assets which can enhance the effectiveness of a frame cultivated by a social movement. Existing literature, however, demonstrates that there are various ways, both qualitative as quantitative, through which framing analysis – as described by Snow and Benford (1988) – can be conducted. To have a better understanding of the different ways and methods through which Snow and Benford’s framing analysis has been put into practice in the past, four examples of framing studies will be presented underneath.

A first example of a framing analysis is Gerhards and Rucht’s (1992) research who examined campaign leaflets to identify the movements collective action frames. In this case, two cases of mass mobilization were assessed, namely, the protest campaign against the visit of Ronald Reagan in 1987 and the campaign against the World Bank and International monetary Fund (IMF) Congress in 1988. In order to assess the master frames adopted by both campaigns two leaflets with a text corpus of two pages – signed by all supporting groups – were analysed. On the basis of these leaflets a graphic representation of both master frames was created by the authors. When assessing the mobilization capacity of the frames – the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames – the authors refer to specific excerpt of the graphs (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992). In addition, the authors have provided not only their interpretation, and graphic representations of the texts, but also present the texts themselves, which allows the reader to check the validity of the frame analysis (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992).

A second example is Benford’s research in which he examined the diagnostic and prognostic frames of the college sports reform movement in the US. For this study, Benford gathered data through several qualitative methods, namely semi-structured formal interviews with 12 sports reformers, informal conversational-style interviews, discussion sessions, participant observation and archival documents, such as reports, emails, and position papers. In addition, he conducted topical content analysis of various magazines, websites, and newsletters (Benford, 2007). In order to build his argument and to identify existing frames, Benford quotes excerpts 21 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN from, amongst others, reports and interviews. In addition, he refers to arguments put forward by activists in order to substantiate his argument. Relying on the diverse qualitative data, the author presents and compares reform proposals put forward by two social movement organizations (Benford, 2007).

Another example of a framing analysis conducted in the past, is the research of Walton (2009) into the UK-based Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora groups’ who deployed a ‘genocide’ frame to describe the actions of the Sri Lankan state. This qualitative research based itself on thirty semi- structured interviews with key Tamil diaspora activists, analysts and commentators. The interview data was supplemented by ongoing analysis of media statements made by key diaspora members and news coverage of the groups’ activities (Walton, 2009). The genocidal frame employed by the Tamil diaspora groups is established on the basis of diverse (academic) sources, such as scholarly articles, reports from the International Crisis Group, news articles, and the movement’s founding constitution (Walton, 2009). However, in this particular example it is harder to understand how the author derives at a genocidal frame, because no excerpts of the referenced sources or the interviews conducted are included within the article.

A fourth example of a research that conducted a framing analysis, is the research by Kim, Kim and Yoo in 2014. These authors studied the frames created by the Gangjoeng movement through examining the movement’s Facebook posts and comments – for over a year period – made by activists and the public. A content analysis was adopted in which 453 posts and 111 comments made by activists and the public were placed into the broader collective action frames: (1) diagnostic: define and blame, (2) prognostic, (3) motivational, and (4) no frame. Thereby, Kim, Kim and Yoo looked into the frequency with which a certain frame was used in the Facebook posts and comments. Subsequently, a statistical chi-square analysis was adopted to establish similarities and differences between activists and the public in their use of different frames (Kim, Kim and Yoo, 2014). Thereby, Kim and others do not dive into the content on the basis of which different frames are identified, but rather conduct a quantitative analysis on the basis of the frequency of frames.

The four examples expanded on above, illustrate that there are various methods through which collective action frames can be identified. With these different methods in mind, the next chapter will lay out what method will be used for the study of the collective action frames nurtured by the Interim Government.

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Chapter 4 - A Multimethod Approach

Following the theoretical framework in which this study is embedded, this chapter will present the methodology of this research on the collective action frames created by the Interim Government. It will first lay out the operationalization of this research. Secondly, the methods used to collect the data for each sub-question will be presented separately. This will be followed by reflections on the particular group studied and the implications it has for the research. Moreover, some additional reflections will be made on the research in more broader terms.

Operationalization This case study is about the role of the Interim Government in the Anglophone conflict in Cameroon, and specifically about way the collective action frames that have been developed by the IG to motivate people to participate in this independence movement. The research question that will be answered here is: to what extent the Interim Government of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia is able to effectively frame the Anglophone conflict and thereby generate an independence movement? To answer this research question, three sub-questions have been developed:

1. What is the history of the Anglophone conflict? 2. What collective action frames have been cultivated by the Interim government? 3. What strategies, following the Interim Government’s collective action frames, have been employed by the Interim Government to establish independence?

The preliminarily face of this research consisted of desk research. Once I had familiarized myself with the Anglophone problem and the , the fieldwork started. Quite early in my research I had come across a conference named the ‘Ambazonian Strategic Stakeholder Conference (ASSC)’ that was organized by the Interim Government and to be held in Berlin from the 11th to the 14th of April. The conference, called ‘Syncretizing our master plan for restoration’, aimed to bring together all Ambazonian stakeholders and jointly brainstorm on strategies to move forward in the revolution. Before I went to Berlin, one of the Southern Cameroonians living in the Netherlands, with whom I had been in contact, informed the organizing staff and the Interim Government about my presence. This is how I started off my fieldwork. My presence at the ASSC Conference turned out to be very valuable for this research because, on the one hand, it provided me with the opportunity to familiarize myself with the

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Interim Government, its functioning, and the challenges it was facing. On the other hand, it was extremely useful to get to know other Ambazonians active in this movement from the diaspora. Both individuals working in their own ‘capacity’ as well as individuals who hold a position within the Interim Government. At a later stage in the fieldwork, the people I met at the ASSC Conference were interviewed through online videocalls for the purpose of this research.

Methods The data for this qualitative research is based on two principal methods of data collection: semi- structured in-depth interviews and a content analysis of official documents and television broadcast from the Interim Government. In the following sections, the data collected and analysed for every sub-question will be discussed. In addition, a short overview of the data used can be found in the appendix.

History of the Anglophone Conflict In order to create a better understanding of the Anglophone problem in Cameroon and to provide context in which the Interim Government was created, the first subsection relies on existing academic literature to explore the roots of the Anglophone problem. Additionally, semi-structured in-depth interviews will be used to enhance understanding of the conflict, and in particular what has happened since the protest in 2016. In total, five people of the Southern Cameroonian diaspora have been interviewed, two of whom hold a position within the Interim Government. All interviewees, except for one, were present at the ASSC Conference and, therefore, already involved in diaspora activism. For this first sub-question their insights were predominantly used to confirm key moments, already identified through existing literature, in the history of Cameroon. In addition, the last section on the creation and the functioning of the Interim Government is entirely based on the semi-structured interviews. All interviews conducted were recorded and transcribed.

Collective Action Frames Cultivated by the Interim Government In order to answer the second sub question – identifying the collective action frames and narratives cultivated by the Interim Government – this research will make use of the core framing elements – diagnosis, prognosis, motivation – as theoretically deduced coding categories, which will be defined in advance and then applied to the material (Lindekilde, 2014). The material that will be collected and analysed for the framing analysis are broadcasts

24 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN of ‘ABC Amba TV’, which is that national tv channel of the Interim Government. All these broadcasts are publicly available through the ABC Amba TV Facebook page. This tv channel fits the purpose of the present study in that it is an official page operated by the IG and – as I learned during the ASSC Conference and through informal contacts with Ambazonians – is the most essential source through which the IG communicates with all Ambazonians: both the diaspora and Ground Zero. In addition to the ABC Amba TV broadcasts, data will be complemented with official documents released by the Interim Government on their official webpage named ambazoniagov.org. Thirdly, the semi-structured interviews will be used to establish and validate frames. As demonstrated by Powell’s research on social movement organizations (SMOs), interviews with movement participants can provide insights into the construction of certain narratives and help to understand how certain frames tap into activist experiences (Powell, 2011). Moreover, as highlighted by Johnston and Klandermans (1995), the “true location” of a frame lies in the mind of social movement participants. Therefore, in- depth interviews with movement participants allow one to understand whether the frames created resonate with participants (Powell, 2011).

Based on the three types of data presented above – TV broadcasts, official documents, and semi-structured interviews the frames created by the Interim Government will be identified and analysed. However, due to the large amount of posts published by ABC Amba TV, this research will make use of a sampling method. A method, as highlighted by Lindekilde (2014), which may be used to select data if it is impossible to study all text produced by a certain social movement actor. The messages that will be analysed for this study sample accentuate around critical events that occurred since September 2018: the moment when ABC Amba TV came into existence. In total, thirteen Facebook posts with a total length of 339 minutes generated by the Interim Government will be examined. In addition, all four official documents – the Proclamation of Restoration of Independence, ASSC Berlin Resolutions, A Common Struggle Narrative, and Acting President Addressing the Nation – made available through the webpage of the Interim Government will be included within the data sample.

The data which is used to identify the collective action frames cultivated by the IG, will also be used to assess the effectiveness of the frames cultivated by the Interim Government. In this regard the semi-structured interviews will predominantly be used. Reiterating from above, the data will in particularly be used to assess the empirical credibility of the frames, the credibility of the frame makers, and the experiential commensurability. In addition, the semi-structured

25 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN interviews will also be used to touch upon the frame disputes that exists within the independence movement of the Interim Government. Due to the scope of this research and the data gathered not all aspects, such as contextual constraints, can be explored.

Frame Analysing Technique. Building on the various existing framing studies as presented in the theoretical framework, excerpts of the videos, interviews and official documents will be coded and subsequently placed into one of the broader collective action frames: diagnosis, prognosis, or motivation. This deductive form of coding will not be done solely on the basis of the presence of particular ‘search terms’ or ‘keywords’, which is a dangerous strategy – as highlighted by Lindekilde (2014) - when sampling texts for frame analysis. Therefore, while coding (paragraphs of) the texts and the context in which a certain source was published will be taken into account. In addition, to enhance plausibility of the identified frames, excerpts on the basis of which I will identify certain frames will be included within the text. This allows the reader to validate the identification and interpretation of a particular frame. In this way, I intend to identify the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational (action) frames created by the Interim Government, which, subsequently, enables this research to say something about the mobilizing potential of the movement.

Strategies employed by the Interim Government The last sub-question, which aims to provide insight into the strategies employed by the IG to influence the conflict at home, builds on the information the broadcasts of ABC Amba TV that have been analysed to establish the collective action frames. In addition, this sub-question will predominantly make use of the data gathered through the in-depth semi-structured interviews. Hereby, the interviews who hold a position within the Interim Government, are of particular relevance to understand the strategies that the IG engages in. In addition, the interviews with the individuals who do not hold an official post in the Interim Government will be used to understand how the IG coordinates with movement participants in the diaspora.

Reflection on Research The case studied in this research is a group of people of the Southern Cameroonian diaspora spread over different countries. All of them are Anglophone Cameroonians who grew up in Cameroon and are currently settled in a Western country, actively involved in the struggle at home. The goal of this research was to shed light on the Anglophone Conflict and the Interim

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Government from an Anglophone perspective and did not intend to involve opposing, Francophone, perceptions. Therefore, it must be recognized that the interpretations of the conflict are not neutral, without doubt, this is especially the case in relation to the frames put forward by the Interim Government. Nevertheless, this case study provides for an opportunity to gain understanding in the experiences and perceptions of the Anglophone Cameroonians. Thereby, it draws out some aspects and events in history which are of importance to the Ambazonian community and that contributed to the current escalation of conflict. A second aspect that should be stressed is that this research, in particularly when it comes to reflecting on the frames of the Interim Government, draws on a very active Ambazonian subgroup. Therefore, the conclusions of this research are somewhat constraint because they cannot touch upon the extent to which frames resonate with potential movement adherents, they mostly reflect the extent to which the IG’s frames resonate with active movement participants.

Moreover, it should be stressed that the data used for this research is not neutral, which is particularly the case for the broadcasts of ABC Amba TV and the official documents published by the Interim Government. This data has been published with a specific reason in the first place namely, to ensure movement participation of Southern Cameroonians both in the diaspora and on the ground. It is the main tool through which the Interim Government tries to reach Southern Cameroonians and is therefore a tool of propaganda in itself. Subsequently, it should be stressed that the data on which this case study relies is rather radical and has a goal in itself. While recognizing that this case study will be built on non-neutral data, it is simultaneously a good representation of the message and the story that the Interim Government tries to put out there. Additionally, it must be noted that all data is publicly available -- also for movement opponents such as French Cameroun -- and might therefore not contain the full ‘thruth’.

Building on the limitations pointed out above, this research is unable to give insight into, amongst others, the perceptions and frames that have been created by opponents, in particular French Cameroun. But also, opponents from the Anglophone side who have started a movement separate from the Interim Government are not represented within the research. Moreover, as I came to experience during my interactions with Ambazonians, my interest in their struggle was extremely appreciated. Since, as I have come to understand, I’m part of a relatively small group not from Cameroonian descent which has shown interest in their issue. Therefore, at times it felt as if my interest in the struggle was perceived as a sign that ‘the international community was getting involved’. While I always tried to stress my intentions for this research and that I

27 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN do not have any direct contacts with government officials in the Netherlands, it might have affected their openness or answers to me in some way. Simultaneously, their welcoming attitude and dedicated, personal stories have made me to sympathize with their story and struggle. While I always strived to maintain professional and not to get personally involved too much, there is some form of research bias within the study.

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Chapter 5 - Results

This analysis is divided into three sections. First, the history of the Anglophone problem will be explained. Second, it will be analysed how the Anglophone problem has been framed by the Interim Government of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia. Lastly, the strategies applied by the Interim Government to reach Buea will be discussed.2 By answering these three sub- questions it will be possible to assess in the result section, how effective the frames cultivated by the IG are in mobilizing movement adherents.

5.1 History of the Anglophone Problem

Understanding the Root Causes of the Anglophone Problem The Anglophone regions are situated in the North West and South West of Cameroon and comprise between 4 to 5 million Anglophones, representing between 20 and 25 percent of the Cameroonian population (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). While the Anglophone regions are located in Western Cameroon, Anglophones refer to the region as Southern Cameroons. Tensions between the Anglophone and Francophone regions originate in its colonial history and the period of decolonialization which took place in the late-1950s and early 1960s (Konings and Nyamjoh, 2003).

Historical Background Cameroons colonial occupation started in 1884 when Germany claimed the region as ‘’. In 1919, after the First World War, the split the German Kamerun Protectorate into British and French colonies (Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2003). After the division into British and French zones, both territories became subject to mandates of the . The League of Nations allocated one-fifth of the territory, compromising two areas along the eastern Nigerian border, to British administration and the other four-fifth to the French administration (Lunn and Brooke-Holland, 2018). While still under British and French rule, both territories eventually became Class B United Nations Trust Territories under

2 Buea is the capital of the Southwest region of Cameroon and ‘to reach Buea’ refers to the Ambazonians ultimate goal namely, independence. 29 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN the Trusteeship System following the Second World War in 1946 (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). Due to growing anti-colonial sentiment, both Britain and agreed on the UN Charter’s promise of eventual self-determination for all people residing in trust territories (Lunn and Brooke-Holland, 2018).

At the time of the trust territory both British territories – Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons – were administered from , which was also under British administration (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). In practice this meant that Northern Cameroons was administered as a part of Nigeria, whereas the administration of Southern Cameroons was an appendage of Nigeria; thereby more like a colony of Nigeria (Awasom, 1998). Within the Federation of Nigeria, the Southern Cameroons was granted a quasi-regional status in 1954 and thereby achieved a limited degree of self-government (Konings and Nyamjoh, 2003).

Decolonization and Independence Following the UN Charter’s promise on self-determination, the French-administered territory in Cameroon became an autonomous state within the French Community in 1956 and achieved full independence as the Republic de Cameroon (République du Cameroun) on 1 January 1960 (Lunn and Brooke-Holland, 2018). Similarly, Nigeria obtained independence in 1960. In order to decide over the future of Anglophone regions, an UN-sponsored plebiscite was held on 11 February 1961 (Nfobin and Minang, 2014).3 The plebiscite offered the Anglophone regions two voting options: either independence by remaining in the Federation of Nigeria or achieving independence by reunification with the already independent République du Cameroun (Nfobin and Minang, 2014). Thereby, a ‘third option’ that being an independent state not reunified with Nigeria or République du Cameroun was not offered. While, the Northern Cameroons chose to remain in Nigeria, the Southern Cameroons opted for independence by joining the French- speaking Cameroun (Konings and Nyamjoh, 1997). Following the plebiscite, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1608 XV, invited “the Government of Southern Cameroons and the Republic of Cameroun to initiate urgent discussion with a view to finalizing, before 1 October 1961, the arrangements by which the agreed and declared policies of the parties concerned will be implemented (UNGA Resolution 1608, 1961).”

3 A plebiscite is “a vote by which the people of an entire country or district express an opinion for or against a proposal especially on a choice of government or ruler” (Merriam-Webster, online dictionary). 30 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

Southern Cameroons, which had previously enjoyed a degree of autonomy, with its own Executive Council and Legislative Assembly, now had to negotiate with la République du Cameroun over the constitution for a reunified state (Ndi, 2014). During negotiations French Cameroon had a stronger bargaining position with a majority of population, land and resources as well as French support while the British had already backed out before the 1st of October 1961 (Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2003). In addition, at the time of the negotiations, Southern Cameroons still had to achieve independence by joining the sovereign République du Cameroun. By stressing the ‘senior’ status of French Cameroon territory, the President of French Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo, was able to dictate the terms of federation (Nyamnjoh, 1997). The loose form of federalism, as proposed by the leader of the Anglophone delegation, was disregarded and instead a highly centralized system of government and administration was put in place (Konings and Nyamnjoh, 1997). Under these terms the Federal Republic of Cameroon made up of two federal states – East and West Cameroon – came into existence on October 1, 1961 (Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2003).

The Federal Republic of Cameroon In 1961, Ahidjo took presidency over the newly formed federation. In subsequent years, he adopted various tactics to assert and centralize state power. Amongst others, ‘West Cameroon’ was to be financed by federal funds until a different mechanism was created, however, no new mechanisms were put in place (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). This resulted in an Anglophone territory which was financially dependent upon the federal Cameroonian government. Moreover, he marginalized the radical nationalist movement, led by the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), and he managed to play Anglophone political groups off against each other (Lunn and Brooke-Holland, 2018). This resulted in the gradual erosion of political pluralism and simultaneously reinforced Ahidjo’s control over the political system.

In May 1972, Ahidjo organized a “snap” referendum which intended to transform the Federal State into a Unitary State (Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2003). With little time for public consideration, the referendum was held two weeks after its announcement (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). Through this referendum a majority of the representatives of each of the Federal States – as stipulated in the Federal Constitution – did not have to be achieved (Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2003). On May 20, the Cameroonians massively ‘voted’ in favour of the creation of a unitary, centralized state (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). The arranged elections results and the autocratic nature of Ahidjo’s regime, which prevented Anglophone 31 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

Cameroonians from expressing their real interests, led to dissolvement of the Federal State (Konings and Nyamnjoh, 2003). The Republic of Cameroon’s name changed into the United Republic of Cameroon (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019).

Francophone and Anglophone Cameroonians still remain divided over this referendum. As President Ahidjo declared before voting it was “a matter of finishing off a cycle of national history, that which from independence through reunification was to take us to the pinnacle of total unity” (Nfobin and Minang, 2014). In similar vein, Blaise-Pascal Talla – one of the major journalist in the Francophone press – wrote that it was a peaceful revolution “a major act of political transformation by which the two federal republics of West (Anglophone) and East (Francophone) Cameroon freely constituted a single entity” (Talla, 2004). Such annotations on the referendum in May 1972 are typically Francophone. At the other end of the spectrum, Anglophones reflect on the creation of the United Republic of Cameroon as “Adhidjo’s coup d’état, ‘secession and annexation’ (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019).

La République du Cameroun In November 1982, – the current President of Cameroon – succeeded Ahmadou Ahidjo (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). Ever since his installation a centralized and unitary State has remained. In addition, in 1984 the name of the country changed again, returning to the pre-unification name, La République du Cameroun. However, changes were not solely superficial. Amongst others, the Minister of National Education made French mandatory in English education (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). In 1984, a Cameroonian lawyer Fongum Gorji-Dinka, was the first to refer to the events in 1972 as ‘Ahidjo’s coup d’état’ and described a future independent ‘Ambazonia’ (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). Subsequently, Mr. Dinka was charged with high treason before a military tribunal (Fongum Forji-Dinka v. Cameroon, 2005). In 1990, the first opposition political party was created by the Anglophone minority, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) in . When an inaugural meeting was organized on May 26, 1990, state vehicles and helicopter gunships were deployed and six Anglophones were shot dead in Bamenda (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). In addition, by August 1991, the political and economic marginalization of the Anglophone regions had further intensified. Under the aegis of centralization, the regions’ economic infrastructure was dismantled. Students and teachers increasingly complained about the universities’ loss of autonomy and the lack of English-speaking teachers (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). Throughout the years these events have resulted in the broader 32 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN revival of Anglophone nationalism and stimulated the development of various Anglophone movements. The Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) was amongst the first movements to openly advocate for Anglophone self-determination in 1991 (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019).

The above illustrations are only some examples which illustrate the gradual marginalization over the Anglophone Regions. There is little doubt that the Anglophone territories have been politically, economically and linguistically marginalised since 1961 (Lunn and Brooke- Holland, 2018). These everyday experiences of marginalization gradually resulted in the creation of an ‘Anglophone Consciousness’: “the feeling of being marginalized, exploited, and assimilated by the francophone-dominated state, and even by the francophone population as a whole” (Konings and Nyamnjoh, 1997, 207).

Crisis in the Anglophone Regions In October 2016, the longstanding grievances flared once again when lawyers from the Anglophone regions went on strike in Bamenda (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). The appointment of French-educated judges to courts in the English-speaking regions, as well as the erosion of the common law system in general, was the direct trigger for the peaceful protest. A few weeks later, English-speaking teachers and students joined the protests condemning the appointment of French-speaking staff in universities and schools (Amnesty International, 2017). Several of the protests were led by the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) and the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), civil society groups who exercised their rights to expression and peaceful assembly (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019).

However, what started as peaceful protests by lawyers and teachers marching the streets with peace plants soon degenerated into a conflict with a sharp escalation of serious violence, crime, and human rights violations assembly (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). The protests against the further marginalization of the Anglophone linguistic, cultural, educational traditions and systems were met with force and repression by the Cameroonian authorities and security forces. As phrased by a longstanding SCNC member the police violence was as “petrol that was being poured into a fire that was burning very slowly” (Interview Country Representative the Netherlands). Conflict and violence deteriorated from there. Diverse demonstrations took

33 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN place across the Anglophone regions between 22 September and October 1, 2017. On the 1st of October 2017, Southern Cameroonians, led by Julius Sisiku Ayuk Tabe, proclaimed independence of the Southern Cameroons. The self-proclaimed ‘Federal Republic of Ambazonia’ is led by the Interim Government which is actively working for independence of the Southern Cameroons from exile. The self-proclaimed independence of Ambazonia has deteriorated the situation and resulted in Cameroon authorities arresting hundreds of people, banning of civil society organizations, cutting phone lines and suspending the internet for nearly 6 months in 2017 (Amnesty International, 2017). Simultaneously, the heavy-handed response by Cameroonian authorities and security forces contributed to the emergence of more, at times violent, Anglophone groups who started to advocate secession and armed struggle (Amnesty International, 2017). The armed local groups, sometimes referred to as “Amba boys”, have become increasingly active, engaging in killings, attacks on property and schools, and kidnappings (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). This has resulted in a situation in which Cameroonian authorities and security forces as well as radical separatists have committed numerous human rights violations (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019).

International Responses The crisis is currently unfolding and has resulted in various human rights organizations alarming for an unfolding human rights catastrophe. In June 2019, the Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa (CHRDA) and Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights reported that there is evidence that “much of the violence is intentional and planned, including retaliation attacks on villages by government security forces, often followed by indiscriminate shooting into crowds of civilians, invasions of private homes and murder of their inhabitants, and the round up and shooing of villagers (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019, 7)”. Meanwhile, stressing the role of local armed groups who bear much responsibility for the unfolding violence as well (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019).

So far, the international responses to the crisis have been muted, featuring benign statements about the importance of peace and all-inclusive dialogue. Nevertheless, to date calls by the international community to address the human rights violations through internal dialogue have proved rather ineffective (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). In April 2019, the European Parliament adopted its first resolution in relation to the crisis in which it called the crisis to be considered by the UNSC (European Parliament Resolution 2019/2691) Last May, the UNSC

34 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN has held its first Arria-Formula Meeting on the humanitarian and human rights situation in Cameroon (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019).

The Interim Government of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia While the crisis is unfolding, Southern Cameroonians have proclaimed an independent state of Ambazonia on the 1st of October 2017. This independence movement is led by the Interim Government, which consists of Southern Cameroonian diaspora members dispersed over the globe.

The Creation of the Interim Government Prior to the creation of the Interim Government three different movements preceded the Interim Government, namely the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium, the Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF), and the Governing Council (Interview Norway Representative). Through a series of conclaves, held in Nigeria, these various movements developed into the Interim Government in 2017.

Firstly, in 2016 the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium arose in Ground Zero as a movement which encompassed all civil society movements, such as the lawyers and teachers, based in Cameroon. The Consortium demanded French Cameroon to return to the old system, namely a federation (Interview Country Representative Norway). After the strikes in 2016, where students and teachers got brutally arrested, the movement moved to neighbouring Nigeria where several pro-independence leaders had sought shelter (Forniès, 2017). From Nigeria the Consortium transformed into the Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF). Before SCACUF there were many different Southern Cameroonian factions all fighting for the same cause, therefore they decided to bring everyone together under SCACUF, which enabled them to speak with one voice (Interview Country Representative the Netherlands). Simultaneously, this would ensure that they were taken more seriously by the international community (Interview Country Representative the Netherlands). Successively, SCACUF moved to the Governing Council, which was subsequently transformed into the Interim Government (Interview Country Representative Norway). The Interim Government arose during the fourth conclave held in Nigeria in 2017. At this time, independence of the Southern Cameroons had just been reinstated by Julius Sisiku Ayuk Tabe, and therefore they decided that an Interim Government was needed to speak as ‘a nation’ instead of a group

35 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

(Interview Country Representative Norway). This Interim Government, working from exile, would speak on behalf of all Ambazonians and could represent them on the international stage (Interview Country Representative Norway). Ayuk Tabe was nominated by the Governing Council as the first president of the Interim Government (Interview Secretary of Foreign Affairs). Ever since, the Federal Republic of Ambazonia, led by the Interim Government, has been working “to fast-track the complete independence restoration and international recognition of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia, and to establish a sound governance system for the Federal Republic of Ambazonia” (Interim Government Official Site Federal Republic of Ambazonia). As reflected above, the original goal of the Consortium, namely the establishment of a Federation, is off the agenda and has transformed into a request for full independence of the Southern Cameroons. The main rationale behind this shift is that “you cannot be living together with someone – in this case French Cameroun – who has committed massive atrocities against you” (Interview Secretary of Foreign Affairs).

The Structure and Functioning of the Interim Government The Interim Government of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia is made up of diaspora members spread across various, predominantly Western, countries (Interview Secretary of Foreign Affairs). All individuals who ‘work’ for the Interim Government do so on a voluntarily basis next to their (fulltime) jobs. The dispersed nature of the Interim Government makes its functioning highly dependent upon social media, in particular Zoom,4 through which almost all meetings are hosted.

Governance Structure Interim Government As highlighted in the previous section, the Interim Government works as an umbrella organization that speaks on behalf of all Ambazonian people and movements. The existence of the IG does not negate the existence of any other movements, but it rather presents itself as an overarching structure (Interview Secretary of Foreign Affairs). The IG is headed by a President, Dr. Samuel Sako, and a Vice-President Dr. Abongwa. In addition, you have various departments such as the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Communications, Department of Home Affairs, Department of Self-defence and Security (Interview Secretary of

4 Zoom is a cloud-based service which provides online meetings, content sharing, and the ability to host a virtual conference. A Zoom meeting can be joined through an invitation shared, for example, on WhatsApp. It serves as virtual conference room in which a maximum of 100 people can join. 36 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

Foreign Affairs). Currently, the IG exists of 73 members and there are 23 Cabinet Members (Interview Secretary of Staff). The Interim Government aims to represent all the people of Ambazonia and to ensure bottom-up participation in the movement. In order to establish these all-inclusive processes of governance and simultaneously structure diaspora and Ground Zero activities the Interim Government has created the Amba Peace Plan.

The AMBA Peace Plan The Amba Peace Plan organizes the Ambazonian people on the basis of their local government areas (LGAs). Through the Amba Peace Plan – also referred to as LGA by LGA – diaspora members are connected to their ‘community’ of origin. This structure links a diaspora member directly to its own local government area. In practice this means that if a diaspora member is contributing financially to the Anglophone struggle, his or her donations will directly go to his or her local governing area. Subsequently, the corresponding LGA is in charge of the division of resources in Ground Zero and must account to its own people in the local government area. The idea behind the Amba Peace Plan is that individuals and communities in the diaspora and Ground Zero are linked to one another. This must ensure diaspora and Ground Zero communication and participation in the struggle (Interview Secretary of Foreign Affairs). Hence, the Interim Government tries to align activities of the diaspora and Ground Zero through the Amba Peace Plan.

In the LGA by LGA structure, the LGAs form the smallest ‘administrative’ units in which communities come together. In total there exist 61 local government areas in Ground Zero. These LGAs come together and make up several counties. In total, there are 13 counties in Ground Zero. On a third administrative level, ‘above’ the counties, there is the Interim Government which is the Federal Government of Ambazonia (see Figure 1).

37 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

Figure 1

Federal Government

Counties (13)

Local Government Areas (61)

Through the creation of the LGA by LGA structure, the IG coordinates diaspora and Ground Zero activities. In this regard, the IG has created two separate branches: the LGA Self-Defence Branch and the LGA Executive branch. Both branches represent the people in their local government areas and adhere to the structure explained above: LGA – County – Federal. The LGA Self-Defence branch is located in Ground Zero and is in charge of the actual defending of the LGA on the ground. The LGA Executive branch, located in the diaspora, is the administrative branch which supports defence activities in its corresponding LGA on the ground. In addition to the Executive branch situated in the diaspora, there are also County Representatives located in the diaspora. A County Representative oversees the smooth running of its county and LGAs. Amongst others, a County Representative seeks funding for its county and LGAs expenses and is accountable to its county and LGA communities.

Lastly, the Interim Government tries to coordinate its activities within the diaspora through Country Representatives. The idea behind a country representative is that he or she coordinates the activities of all Ambazonians within his or her host state. For instance, all Southern Cameroonians living in Norway are represented by the Norwegian Country Representative. Amongst themselves the Norwegian Southern Cameroonians host Zoom meetings to discuss Ambazonian activism within their host state. In addition, country representatives host meetings amongst themselves in order to coordinate the activities of country representatives in the various host states.

38 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

To conclude, the Interim Government has been established in October 2017 and has developed a specific structure to coordinate operations in Ground Zero and in the diaspora. This happens through a structure in which there is space for bottom-up input and activities, through the local government areas located in Southern Cameroons itself. The general lines and strategies are coordinated by the executive branch, which is formed of diaspora members located outside the borders Cameroon.

39 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

5.2 Identifying the Frames Created by the Interim Government

The Interim Government is one of the movements that has been actively involved in the Anglophone struggle in Cameroon. As explained by the collective action framing theory of Snow and Benford (1988), the potential of a movement to mobilize people and garner support for its activities is dependent upon its capability to formulate coherent collective action frames. Therefore, this chapter will lay out the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational action frames that have been cultivated by the Interim Government to mobilize support. On the basis of the broadcasts of ABC Amba TV and the Official Documents published by the Interim Government the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames created by the Interim Government will be identified.

Diagnostic Framing “Diagnostic framing involves identification of a problem and the attribution of blame and causality” (Snow and Benford, 1988, 200). In order for frames to resonate with individuals, they must realize that an injustice exists and that it is structurally based (Nepstad, 1997). In the case of the Southern Cameroons, one overarching diagnostic frame is cultivated by the Interim Government, namely the colonization of the Southern Cameroons for which all blame can be attributed to the ‘colonial occupier’ French Cameroon. As will be demonstrated in the subsequent paragraphs, this ‘colonization frame’ is nurtured on the basis of a longstanding colonization history of the Southern Cameroons. In addition, the current unfolding, violent crisis has resulted in the construction of an additional frame, namely a genocidal frame. This frame, as will be demonstrated below, is cultivated on the basis of the current atrocities committed against Anglophone Cameroonians. Similar to the ‘colonization frame’, all blame can be attributed to French Cameroon in this regard.

Colonial Occupation: Identifying the Problem and Attributing Blame The first aspect of the diagnostic frame – the problem identification – is presented by the Interim Government as one overarching issue, namely, the colonialization of the Southern Cameroons. This colonialism results in severe structural problems, namely injustice, terrorisation, marginalization, (structural) violence, discrimination, assimilation policies and fraud. Thereby, the Interim Government defines a multitude of problems – as a consequence of colonial occupation – which all contribute to “the disappearance of the Southern Cameroons from the surface of the earth” (Proclamation of Independence, 25). This colonial frame is visible in

40 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN almost every statement produced by the Interim Government. Amongst others, the Proclamation of Restoration of Independence, the Common Struggle Narrative and the speech of the Acting President after the UN demonstrations make visible this colonial frame:

“Whereas our people have come under continuing colonial domination for over one and a half centuries: British from 1858 to 1887, German from 1888 to 1914, British again from 1914 to 1961, and Cameroun Republic since 1961." (Proclamation of Restoration of Independence, 3)

“French Cameroun thus took over as successor colonialist in Ambazonia. British colonial rule ended. French Cameroun colonial rule began. Ambazonia found itself lumbered with a new colonial authority. White colonial faces were replaced with Black colonial faces in the form of French Cameroun foreign governors, administrators, troops, gendarmes and police.” (Common Struggle Narrative, 3)

“Fellow Ambazonians, the colonial day of slavery 20th of May, is right around the corner. A day, which symbolizes the last nail on the coffin that sealed almost 60 years of our perpetual subjugation of our people on the colonial regime of French Cameroon.” (Acting President Addressing the Nation in Relation to the UN Demonstrations, 39).

As suggested by the excerpts above, the problems that the Anglophone regions are facing stem from the colonial occupation since 1961. This colonial occupation, and resulting injustices, can only be attributed to one single agent, namely French Cameroon:

“Whereas the people of the Southern Cameroons have in the past fifty-six years suffered at the hands of Cameroun Republic a form of colonization, oppression, extreme cruelty, repression and exploitation far more vicious, evil and dehumanizing than anything any African country ever experienced under European colonization.” (Proclamation of Independence, 25).

“A man [referring to former President Sisiku who reinstalled independence of Ambazonia] who looked into the eyes of French Cameroon's gigantic and colonial grip on Ambazonia and told them exactly what we wanted. He said enough is enough. At a time when the 86-year-old tyrant in Yaoundé has built for himself a hegemonic throne of terror right within our own very secret places and punctured our humanity with cruelty.” (Speech Acting President on Genocide Memorial Day). 41 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

The above excerpts suggest that a colonialization frame is created in which the actions of the French Cameroun, and Paul Biya, have been defined as unjust.

Even though, the existing literature suggests that attributional consensus is more problematic to realize than problem consensus, this does not seem to be the case for the Interim Government. Since there is only one actor which can clearly be blamed for the colonial occupation since 1961. In addition, if – following Benford and Snow’s framing theory – the government of Cameroun, and in specifically Paul Biya, can be effectively labelled as the causal agent for the problems identified within the frame, then the frame provides suitable reasons to protest against the regime of French Cameroun.

The Genocide Frame The current, human rights violations taking place in Southern Cameroon, have provided the Interim Government with the formation of an additional, related frame, namely the genocidal regime of Paul Biya. In this frame, blame is attributed to the same actor, namely French Cameroun, however, the problem identified within this frame is the genocide committed against Anglophone Cameroonians. In this regard, the Interim Government frames violent acts allegedly perpetrated by French Cameroun forces as demonstrations of the genocidal intent of French Cameroun. For example, on the 22th of September, a day remembered as ‘Genocide Memorial Day’, the Acting President addressed the nation and said:

“The 22nd of September 2017 was a historic moment. A day our people in their millions, literally, conducted a referendum in Ambazonia. Unfortunately, the region death squad of Biya started their campaign of genocide in our, in our land against our people that same day. All in attempt to deny our people their right to self-determination. We will therefore alternatively, remember this day as our Genocide Memorial Day.” (Acting President Addressing the Nation on Genocide Memorial Day, 2)

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In similar vein, the ongoing genocide against the Anglophones was stressed by the Acting President when he addressed French opposition leader Maurice Kamto after the national elections held in Cameroon on October 8, 2019.5 In his speech President Sako urged Kamto to:

“… immediately open up for an international independent investigation into the ongoing genocide been perpetrated by your barbaric predecessors” (Acting President Addressing the Nation on October 8).

Another example is the United Nations Security Council meeting, which was held in May 2019 to discuss the humanitarian situation in Cameroon. This meeting, as suggested in the abstract below, was framed by the Acting President as a meeting that was the result of Paul Biya’s genocidal acts:

“With 10 countries represented, the United Nations Security Council highlighted the humanitarian suffering of our people as a result of this senseless genocide perpetrated by dictator Paul Biya.” (Acting President Addressing the Nation in Relation to the UN Demonstrations).

As explored above, the ABC Amba TV broadcasts and the official documents of the Interim Government cultivate two diagnostic action frames, namely the colonial occupation of Southern Cameroons and the genocide committed against the Ambazonian people. These frames reach the people through social media, in particular through the Facebook page of ABC Amba TV.

Prognostic Framing Prognostic framing involves the identification of a solution to the problem diagnosed and includes specification of strategies, tactics and targets (Snow and Benford, 1988). It specifies what has to be done. Hence, there is often direct correspondence between the diagnostic and prognostic frames created. In theory, the solutions presented are the reversal of the problems and causes identified above (Gerhards and Rucht, 1992).

5 During this speech, after the national Cameroonian elections, the Acting President addressed the French opposition leader Mr. Kamto, who, as stressed by the Acting President, should not concede to Biya’s victory and should take office. 43 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

Identifying a Solution There is one solution cultivated by the Interim Government to end occupation of the colonial, genocidal ruler, namely separation from French Cameroun. An independent country which is not under the genocidal rule of Paul Biya would solve both diagnosed problems. The Interim Government’s solution to the problem is most visibly in the Proclamation of Restoration of Independence through which Southern Cameroon restored its independence. As reflected in the excerpt of the Proclamation of Independence below, independence is the only solution to end colonial rule – and subsequent injustices – by French Cameroun:

“Declare that the restoration of the independence and sovereign statehood of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia brings to an end the annexation and colonial occupation by Cameroun Republic and the attendant reckless territorial aggrandizement adventure of that country.” (Proclamation of Restoration of Independence, 16)

In addition, the prognosed solution of independence is presented by the Interim Government as the only solution; a remedy of last resort:

“The continuing stubborn refusal by Cameroon Republic to end its annexation, colonial occupation, exploitation, oppression, domination, and massive human rights abuses, conditions exist for the Southern Cameroons to invoke its inalienable right of self- determination as a remedy of last resort and to come into being as a sovereign independent state.” (Proclamation of Restoration of Independence, 11)

Simultaneously, it is made very clear that any other option, such as a Federation – as originally set up between French and Anglophone Cameroon – is not a viable solution to the problem anymore. This is amongst others reflected by the speech of the Acting President on the 20th of May after a boycott of Cameroun’s national Unity Day celebrated in French Cameroun:

“We have buried this idea of federalism today, this is symbolic. We have buried not only the historical date of the 20th of May, we have buried the significance, we have buried this event. We have buried federalism today. It will never emerge; it will never be an outcome in this struggle. I can assure you that. I want to assure you that as long as there is one single restoration force alive, there shall be no co-existence with La Republique. And those who are negotiating, who are skimming to take us into another form of existing together with these people, I hate that name, you are deceiving

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yourselves. […] There shall be no Federation, no outcome that would keep us together with these monsters of people who have chosen to annihilate us, treat us as animals, killing babies, killing women, killing us like they call it in the official communicates that they are killing rats.” (Acting President Addressing the Nation after Boycott of the 20th of May).

As suggested by the excerpts above, the Interim Government has a rather radical prognostic frame in which separation is the only viable solution to the Anglophone problem. The rational – as presented by the Interim Government – behind this is that you cannot live together with someone who has mistreated you so gravely in the past. An idea which is reinforced by the grave atrocities, and alleged genocide committed by French Cameroun against Anglophones.

As mentioned earlier, solutions presented within the prognostic frame are often the reversal of the problem and causes identified within the diagnostic frame. The Interim Government, through its proclamation of independence, tries to reverse the colonial rule of French Cameroun. Hence, there is direct correspondence between the diagnostic and prognostic frames.

Specification of Targets Reiterating from Snow and Benford’s (1988) framing theory, a prognostic frame does not only identify a solution to the problem, but also includes specification of targets and strategies.

The International Community. In order to establish an independent state, the Interim Government has a specific target namely, the international community, which includes international organizations such as the United Nations, but also national governments. The Interim Government frames the struggle as an international issue, rather than a national issue, and actively works to get the international community involved. As reflected in the excerpt below, which comes from the speech of the Acting President after the UNSC meeting was held on the humanitarian situation in Cameroon, the Interim government actively targets the international community:

“The meeting at the United Nations Security Council on the escalating humanitarian situation in the Northern and Southern zones of our country is as a result of our collective and strategic efforts to draw the international community’s attention to the excesses of Biya’s terror regime on our people, and it clearly shows greater international

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involvement in the matters concerning our restoration quest” (Acting President Addressing the Nation on May 14).

Similarly, the call to the international community is reflected in Dr. Sako’s speech on the ‘Genocide Memorial Day’ in which Acting President stated:

“Unbelievably the international community, that the silence of the international community is normal. Sometimes I want to ask: how many Ambazonians will have to be slaughtered before the world reacts to our cries? In spite of this evil, demonstrated by the regime of Paul Biya. Our people have chosen to write our own history, free our land from occupation and transfer to our next generation something better than this colonial piece of fraud who we're all deceived to believe in. […] It is a duty for us, for all of us to get ready as one people with one voice. Let us continue steadfastly our efforts of internationalizing our revolution.”

Ultimately, to stop the genocide committed against the Anglophone people and to establish an independent state in the long run, the Interim Government tries to trigger an intervention of the international community. This, amongst others, comes forward in the speech of the Acting President in which he addresses the nation on the UN Plebiscite Day:

“[referring to the diplomacy efforts taken so far] We will continue to persuade the international community to consider applying targeted economic sanctions against the perpetrators of the genocide and war crimes in our country. We will continue to call on the United Nations to send a peacekeeping mission to our country to impose a cease fire and pave the way for negotiations without preconditions6.”

As suggested above, the Interim Government strategically targets the international community to trigger an international intervention which will stop the genocide and ultimately pave the way for negotiating the creation of two independent states. Hence, the international community is one of the key groups targeted by the Interim Government.

6 With a negotiation without preconditions the Interim Government refers to the possibility to negotiate with French Cameroon on two separate states. In the earlier stages of the conflict French Cameroon refused to engage in any form of meaningful dialogue “with the militant Anglophone federalists” (International Crisis Group, 2018). 46 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

However, the international community is not the only group targeted by the Interim Government to establish an independent state. Southern Cameroonians, both the diaspora and Ground Zero, also need to be motivated to enhance movement participation and, subsequently, strengthen the quest for independence. The targeting of Southern Cameroonians by the IG is in itself implied by the creation of ABC Amba TV, which as explained by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs “is one of the mediums that we use to get information out to the people, especially to Ground Zero”. This suggests that the Interim Government tries to get the diaspora and Ground Zero involved in the movement through their national tv channel. Nevertheless, the members of the Interim Government seem to suggest that Ground Zero and the diaspora are not as actively targeted to be involved in the independence movement.

Ground Zero. In relation to Ground Zero, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of Staff, have a different view on how the people on the ground are motivated. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, when asked how the Interim Government motivates Ground Zero to get involved, replied the following:

“First of all, the people on ground zero, they are feeling it, they are feeling it for over 50 for about 58 years. They are feeling the way that they are being treated like second class citizens, feeling the way we have been suppressed of any benefits that accrue from our own territory, so they live it every day. The despair. So, I do not need more, we do not need more to convince them. But they are the ones who stepped forward in 2016 from ground zero. They are the ones who stepped forward and said enough is enough. […] So, so, in that case, we do less to convince them, and, and we motivate them by the organized by, you know, showing direction by talking to the international community as well, giving them feedback as to what is going on. So, there is that hope.”

As reflected in the excerpt above, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs suggests that the IG does not need to actively target Ground Zero to be part of this movement, because they have first-hand experience of the struggle. However, the Interim Government does provide the people on the ground with direction and hope, which motivates Ground Zero.

On the contrary, when the Secretary of Staff, was asked the same question he responded with:

“The people we really need to motivate are those in Ground Zero, those who are facing the bullets, you know. We tell them, resist, resist, and resist. […] The way to motivate 47 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

Ground Zero is by demonstrating that we are doing something for them: We go around and do town hall meetings, diplomacies with other countries, so that the people know that yes, the Interim Government is at least doing something”.

As demonstrated in the passage above, the Secretary of Staff, points out that people on the ground, in particular, need to be motivated to continue to be part of the struggle, to resist. However, this answer implies that people are already participating in the independence struggle. Therefore, it does not suggest that the Interim Government actively works to target potential movement adherents in Ground Zero.

As suggested above, due to the everyday experiences on the ground, Ground Zero is not actively targeted by the IG, or as suggested by the Secretary of Staff, is actively targeted but only to ensure that they keep resisting the war on the ground. This suggests that the Interim Government while ensuring continues motivation on the ground, somewhat implies movement participation in the first place and does not actively work to enhance movement participation on the ground. Therefore, Ground Zero is not targeted as vigorously as the international community.

The Diaspora. When it comes to targeting the diaspora to be involved in the independence movement, the Secretary of Staff and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, also provide different answers. For instance, when the Secretary of Staff was asked how the Interim Government ensures diaspora involvement in this movement, he answered:

“Well, the diaspora lives in a free world, so you get information freely on your mobile phone or your internet, your email, everywhere, you know. They see the killing, they see the destruction, they see everything, horrible things that are happening down there. So, those are not the people that we need to motivate. […] In the diaspora, it will be stupid for anyone who sits in the diaspora in their confident zone and not to make noise and do nothing. So, they themselves they are motivated by seeing what is out, by seeing how we have been killed on a daily basis, every day, right now.”

The above passage illustrates that the Secretary of Staff relies predominantly on social media to target the diaspora. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, suggested that the diaspora is motivated to participate, namely through:

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“political education, sensitization, telling the people, telling our audience, like I'm talking to you, the facts about our historical evolution, and the truth about what should be done. Then the people buy the message.”

As reflected above, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs suggests that the diaspora members are motivated by the IG to participate, namely through educating the diaspora on the history of Southern Cameroons. This perspective differs from that of the Secretary of Staff who suggested that the diaspora does not need to be motivated, because they are already motivated by the images received from their homeland. The latter logic/perspective implies that there exists some form of solidarity and connection of the/from diaspora to the homeland, which ensures diaspora participation. Thereby, participation from the diaspora is presumed. Despite the fact that the Interim Government is somewhat divided over the role of the IG in relation to the diaspora, the diaspora is targeted to some extent by the IG to participate in the independence movement. Nevertheless, the passages above suggest that the IG does not seem to target the diaspora as proactively as they target the International community.

To conclude, the international community comes forward as one of the communities particularly targeted by the Interim Government to reach independence. Simultaneously, Southern Cameroonians – both in Ground Zero and in the diaspora – or other potential movement adherents are not targeted as deliberately in order to garner further bystander support. As for the strategies used by the Interim Government to target the international community, Ground Zero and the diaspora, also part of the prognostic action frames, these will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter.

Motivational Framing Even if general agreement consists about the causes and solutions of the Anglophone problem – a precondition for mobilization – it does not automatically produce ameliorative or corrective action (Snow and Benford, 1988). Participation is therefore contingent upon the creation of motivational frames that function as prods to action (Snow and Benford, 1988). Hence, motives for participation must be actively created by the Interim Government.

Recalling the above excerpts on diaspora and Ground Zero motivation, the members of the Interim Government suggest that Ground Zero and the diaspora do not necessarily need to be

49 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN actively motivated to participate in the independence movement, because they either personally experience everyday ‘cruelties’ on the ground or are motivated by the images they receive from their homeland through social media. Thereby, active participation of both groups is somewhat presumed by the Interim Government. Simultaneously, on the basis of the ABC Amba TV broadcasts and the official documents published by the Interim Government three motivational frames seem to be cultivated, namely (1) frames highlighting the severity of the problem, (2) frames expressing a sense of urgency and the need for immediate contribution and (3) frames about the propriety of taking action.

Severity of the Problem Motivational frames that stress the severity of a particular situation are closely connected to the consensus mobilization task of problem identification (Benford, 1993). Nevertheless, there are empirical differences between identifying a problem and convincing someone that a problem is so serious that he or she must take corrective action (Benford, 1993). Just because Southern Cameroonians agree with the Interim Government that a problem exists, does not guarantee that they will drop everything else in their lives to mitigate the Anglophone problem, especially considering the fact that diaspora members are not confronted directly with the colonial rule of Paul Biya on a daily basis.

The Proclamation of Restoration of Independence drafted by the Interim Government to reinstate their independence on the 1st of October 2017 is one account in which the Interim Government stresses the severity of the problem to justify why ameliorate action, in this case the creation of an independent state, is needed.

“Whereas it is imperative, in the supreme interest of their very survival and existence, for the people of the Southern Cameroons to solemnly dissolve all bonds with Cameroun Republic.” (Proclamation of Restoration of Independence, 2)

“Calls upon the people of the Southern Cameroons to defend by any means their humanity and dignity, their very survival and existence as a people, and the integrity and honour of their families and Homeland.” (Restoration of the Proclamation of Independence, 12)

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In the Proclamation of Independence, the Interim Government suggest that the survival and the very existence of the people of Southern Cameroons is in jeopardy if they do not defend themselves by all means. Thereby, the IG calls upon all Southern Cameroonians to take action.

The severity of the problem is also particularly emphasized by the Interim Government to persuade diaspora members to take ameliorative action in the form of financial contributions. This demonstrates itself, for instance, in the ABC AMBA TV broadcast in which the Acting President presents the Amba Peace Plan – a strategy employed by the IG to reach independence:

“This IG, we are not yet selling our oil, we are not yet having access to the oil, we are not yet having access to the taxes from the companies. We are being funded by our sacrifices of us, all of us. So, we cannot rely on this for the strength of our revolution. And if we don't, if we don't have that means we fail. And let me tell you, let the Federalists to hear this, if we fail in this, you will also not have a nation. Because if you think by any means that if we fail in this, you the federalist will be in a better place: it is a lie. They will crush everything called Ambazonia, everything called Southern Cameroon. You will be less than a slave to live in this life. If the restoration doesn’t succeed in this struggle. So that's why we don't spare you, everybody has to contribute to this.” (Acting President explaining LGA by LGA)

This excerpt demonstrates that the Interim Government amplifies the problem by stressing what will happen if they do not succeed in this revolution, namely Southern Cameroonians will not have their own nation and live a life which is worth less than that of a slave. Through emphasizing the severity of the problem, the IG tries to collect financial contributions. The leaders of the Interim Government thus attempt to amplify the problem in such a way that Southern Cameroonians are persuaded that any response other than collective action is unreasonable.

Sense of Urgency In addition to the motivational frame which amplifies the severity of the Anglophone problem, mobilizing participants can also be contingent upon cultivating a sense of urgency. Even if someone concludes that the colonial occupation of Paul Biya is most troublesome, rationales for postponing action can easily be reconciled as long as the undesirable consequences are not believed to be immediate (Benford, 1993).

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In the case of the Interim Government a call to action is occasionally imbued with a sense of urgency. The Interim government seeks to obtain active participation from diaspora members in demonstrations, conferences, and financial contributions by heightening the urgency of the cause. The excerpts below from the Acting President addressing the nation on various occasions illustrate such motivational framing efforts. For instance, in advance to the ASSC Conference the Acting President addressed the nation through the ABC AMBA TV and tried to ensure Ambazonian participation in the ASSC Conference through stressing a sense of urgency:

“We have carried this baby for 57 years. We should not do anything stupid to kill this baby at the time of his delivery, this is a very crucial moment in our revolution. You can see the signs of the victory ahead. You want to be heard, you want to make contributions towards the success, the inevitable victory of our revolution. You believe in the Interim Government and you want to make your suggestions. Please, this message goes to all the country coordinators, all the regional coordinators, all the local government administrators worldwide and all the county executives worldwide, please. This is a moment for you to concert, to gather, and make your suggestions to your People's Government, the Interim Government.” (Acting President Addressing the Nation in Advance to the ASSC Conference)

On another occasion, namely during the demonstrations organized by the Interim Government at the United Nations on the 14th of May, the Acting President also highlighted this sense of urgency:

“Currently, we have close to two million internally displaced persons, hundreds of thousands of refugees in Nigeria alone, scavenging with almost nothing for survival. They need us now, more than ever before. That's why the need to continually provide sustenance for our suffering people, especially our women, and our children back home. It can never ever be overemphasized.” (Acting President Addressing the Nation in Relation to the UN Demonstrations)

While discussing the financial contributions needed to sustain the Amba Peace Plan the Acting President stressed that situation on the ground has changed: it is ‘wartime’ and therefore financial contributions are crucial right now:

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“So, it's $1 a day it translates to $30 every month. We can pay $30 every month, and we should pay $30 a month. For those of us who are paying $20, go to the website and you increase that amount to $10. When we started paying that, it was like peacetime it was not wartime. We had a crisis, but this was not where we were at that time. So for what is going on now for us to secure our country, local government by local government, for us to be able to meet up with the challenges that are before us now, and for us to increase our speed, so that we don't dwell long in this wilderness. $1 a day makes a lot of sense and I’m urging you now, listening to me, got to the website, update your information, change it from 20 to 30 dollars.” (Acting President explaining LGA by LGA).

The various excerpts above illustrate how various calls to action – either to join the ASSC conference, to demonstrate or to financially support the struggle – are all combined with a sense of urgency. By stressing that it is wartime and that a different, crucial phase of the revolution has arrived the IG calls upon diaspora members to contribute to the struggle.

Propriety of Taking Action Various studies suggest that action mobilization can be contingent upon the existence of a sense of moral duty among sympathizers (Kaplowitz and Fisher, 1985; Turner and Killian, 1987; Benford, 1993). It follows that, movements must construct beliefs about the propriety of taking action to trigger participation of adherents. If not, micro-mobilization efforts might not go beyond the consensus-building stage and free-riding is likely to occur (Benford, 1993).

As will be reflected below, the Interim Government attempts to frame rationales for participation in moral terms. A moral duty among movement adherents is nurtured in which the IG emphasizes participants responsibility towards their children, the next generations and most of all towards all fallen heroes. This moral responsibility is reflected most clearly in three excerpts below, which are excerpted from the Acting President explaining the Amba Peace Plan to the nation and the Acting President addressing the nation on UN Plebiscite Day:

“Those that were that were killed on the front line, we really, really pray that you, you have rest where you are and that you should be proud of the generation you have left behind that we will not fail you, the best we can do for you is to deliver Buea in our time, in our lifetime” (Acting President explaining LGA by LGA).

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“Our doubters should know that this present generation has risen to stop this fraud and without any iota of intimidation we will fight with our every might to ensure this falsehood is never transferred to our next generation.” (Acting President Addressing the nation on UN Plebiscite Day, 24)

“Our generation has been entrusted with the mandate by the Almighty to liberate our homeland, so our children will not go through the same subjugation we are enduring under this repressive colonial regime of French Cameroun. (Acting President Addressing the nation on UN Plebiscite Day, 25).

As suggested above, the Interim Government tries to dwell on the moral responsibilities Southern Cameroonians have towards to their fallen heroes, the next generation and their children to participate in the struggle. In this way, the Interim Government tries to construct beliefs about the propriety of taking action, and, thereby, trigger adherents to participate.

In conclusion, as came forward in the ABC Amba broadcasts and the official documents of the IG, the motivational frames cultivated by the Interim Government try to stress severity of the problem, to highlight the urgency of the matter and formulate moral responsibilities people have towards casualties, their children and future generations. Thereby, the Interim Government is trying to create prods to action. Nevertheless, the members of the Interim Government suggest that motives for participation do not necessarily need to be actively created by the Interim Government, because participation is presumed from everyday experiences on the ground and the cruel images of the homeland brought to the diaspora through social media. This logic suggests that these images build on some form of diaspora solidarity to the homeland, and thereby ensure active movement participation. On the whole, it can be questioned whether these motivational frames are sufficient to generate active participation, especially in relation to diaspora members who are located far away from everyday realities.

Collective Action Frames of the Interim Government To ensure participation in the independence movement of the Interim Government several diagnostic, prognostic and motivational action frames have been nurtured by the IG. As illustrated in the above framing analysis, two diagnostic action frames have been cultivated by the Interim Government namely, the colonial occupation of the Southern Cameroons and the genocidal regime of Paul Biya. As suggested within the prognostic frame, for both problems

54 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN blame can be attributed to the French government led by Paul Biya. The Interim Government seeks to solve these problems through the creation of an independent state of Ambazonia. To establish an independent state, the international community, in particular, is targeted by the Interim Government. In addition, the prognostic frame suggests that the IG also targets Ground Zero and the diaspora to ensure movement participation, but les poignantly. The concrete strategies used to target the international community, Ground Zero and the diaspora – also part of the prognostic frame – will be developed in the subsequent section. Lastly, in order to move the people ‘from the balcony to the barricades’ several motivational action frames have been cultivated in the broadcasts of ABC Amba TV and the official documents of the IG. These motivational frames try to stress urgency, severity and moral obligations of movement participants to ensure mobilization of movement participants. Nevertheless, as suggested by members of the Interim Government, the IG does not necessarily proactively motivate Southern Cameroonians because their motivation is implicit from their solidarity with the cause.

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5.3 Strategies to Reach Buea

The previous chapter laid out the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational action frames cultivated by the Interim Government in order to ensure movement participation, and ultimately reach their goal: an independent Ambazonia. In this section the specific strategies in which the Interim Government engages in to reach independence will be discussed. The specific strategies which will be identified below came forward during the semi-structured interviews held with IG officials who touched upon the various activities the IG engages in. As will be demonstrated in the following sections, the strategies adopted by the Interim Government to reach Buea can be divided into four main functional areas: fundraising, raising public awareness, regulating the struggle on the ground, and the creation of hope. Although each component nominally operates independently of the other, the activities invariably overlap.

Fundraising Firstly, fundraising is one of the major activities the Interim Government is involved in to reach an independent Ambazonian state. As explained by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Interim Government, for the generation of funds the IG is exclusively dependent upon the Southern Cameroonian diaspora:

“you know one of our major roles, the diaspora roles, is money, to raise the money and support Ground Zero. So, all the funding, most of the funding comes from us in the diaspora, yes.”

In addition, as came forward during the interview with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, up until today, these funds have predominantly been raised on a voluntarily basis:

“When it comes to fundraising, like I said earlier, we depend on the goodwill of individuals. We launch fundraisers and folks donate. We do like our webpage, www.ambazoniagov.org, and we request registration and citizenship registration. And individuals voluntarily donate.”

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs recognized that one of their bigger obstacles is the lack of budget. In this regard, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs recalled that: “we don’t have a budget, that is one of our handicaps. We need sponsors, big time.” Therefore, the IG recently agreed on

56 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN the establishment of an obligatory citizen levy, which can ensure a somewhat more stabilized form of funding. As explained by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs:

“But before then we were depending on individuals chipping in from the goodness of heart. We are also thinking now about taxing the citizens, by setting a levy, a levy compulsory for all Ambazonians to contribute. We just agreed on that with this new government. So, we have always been depending on the goodness of heart and the willingness to give for our state.”

Through a personal registration number, which every Ambazonian receives once subscribing on the website of the Interim Government, the IG keeps track of all donations made by every Ambazonian. While the compulsory citizen levy has not been put in place yet, they anticipate enforcing the compulsory levy of $1 a day through this personal registration number assigned to every Ambazonian. When I commented on the likeliness with which dispersed diaspora members could avoid the compulsory levy, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs commented the following:

“That's true, that's true. People are going to hide. We are anticipating that the spirit and the love for country, and the love for the children of the goal, because as it is more than 90% of Ambazonians want independence. People buy into the concept. So, we are assuming that that goal would drive individuals to participate. Can we enforce it, here? No. On Ground Zero? Yes. When the diaspora goes home, because they go home to visit their relatives, they have families and all that sort of things, then ground zero will say […] show us your proof of participation of paying your $1. If you don't, okay, they will, they will hold it to task there. And secondly, they will boycott supporting you for your burial, you will be going to burry your family alone, they isolate you. So, there are measures that can be taken only when you get to Ground Zero. […] And everyone who assigned got an identification number, you know. So, when you go home, through your identification number they will know your participation.”

As illustrated by the excerpt of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, he recognizes that enforcement of the compulsory levy in the diaspora is difficult, however, they anticipate that people willing contribute because of their intrinsic dedication to the country and the goal of independence. Simultaneously, they anticipate on a form of enforcement through social pressure within the

57 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN local communities, which can be exerted once someone returns to the diaspora. The Chief of Staff also touched upon the enforcement of the compulsory levy and stated in this regard:

“well, ehm, I know some, I come from my own town, from my city, from my village, I know a neighbour who knows another neighbour and the neighbour knows a neighbour. So, if you don’t contribute, we will tell your people down there, and your people in Ground Zero will call you and tell you.”

As reflected above the Chief of Staff suggests that a compulsory tax can potentially be enforced through Ground Zero, which urges its community members, located in the diaspora, that they need to contribute. This ‘mechanism’ also suggests a form of enforcement through community pressure from Ground Zero.

As becomes apparent from the above paragraphs, the struggle, up until now, is financed through voluntary donations of the diaspora. In the near future, the IG anticipates extending these funds with the obligatory $1 a day levy for all Ambazonian citizens. Meanwhile, the voluntarily funds are, amongst others, obtained through fundraisers and conferences hosted in various places in the diaspora. For example, during the ASSC Conference, all participants had to pay a subscription fee of $50 with which the cost of the conference were covered, and the remainder was transferred to Ground Zero. In addition, a fundraising event was hosted during the ASSC Conference, where a bit more than $50.000 dollar was raised that evening. These are some examples of fundraising events hosted by the diaspora community.

All money raised for the independence of Ambazonia is invested in various assets of the struggle. Following the LGA by LGA structure, every LGA is responsible for its own resources that it receives through their LGA members located in the diaspora. It is up to every LGA do decide how they wish to spend their money. In addition to self-defence efforts and lobby activities, money is often used by LGAs in Ground Zero for the following activities:

“humanitarian efforts, these fighters they need to eat, they need to eat. And money is used for things like that. Mostly humanitarian, those who are wounded, those who are displaced, those who are refugees, you know, internally displaced refugees and bereaved families. You know, those in hospitals, sometimes they go and burn the hospitals and many people don't even know where to go again. So, money is used for things like that” (Secretary of Foreign Affairs). 58 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

As explained by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, every local government area can decide for itself where they want to spend their funds on

To conclude, the Interim Government actively engages in fundraising activities to support the struggle on the ground. Up until today funds are predominantly raised on a voluntarily basis and they are highly dependent upon the diaspora for these financial contributions.

Raising Public Awareness The second functional area in which the Interim Government is active is publicity and propaganda. They actively work to raise awareness about their cause. As put by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, they do so through “political education, sensitization and information dissemination (Interview Secretary of Foreign Affairs).” These publicity efforts are directed towards three different levels: the international community, the diaspora and Ground Zero. Nevertheless, the international community is predominantly targeted.

The International Community One of the main strategies of the IG is to raise awareness of the Anglophone problem in the international community. Raising awareness within the international community is crucial for Southern Cameroons, because as expressed by the Secretary of State they ultimately wish to present their case before the United Nations, in particular the Decolonization Committee (Interview Secretary of Staff). Since, they perceive the case of Southern Cameroons as “that of an uncompleted decolonization process by the United Nations” (Interview Secretary of Foreign Affairs). In order to raise awareness in the international community they employ to major strategies, namely advocacy and lobbying. As came forward during the interview with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Interim Government relies heavily on the activities of the scattered diaspora for both lobby and advocacy activities:

“In the diaspora, we organize demonstrations, sometimes we demonstrate in all the embassies of a particular country in the world. All right? And we tackled the UN. Diplomacy is mostly the work of the diaspora. You know, and, that is what we mostly do, try to raise the monies, we try to sell our case looking for a country that can recognize us. And we do business. So, the diaspora is mostly for diplomacy, outreach, education, sensitization of the global community, right?” 59 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

Advocacy. As illustrated above, advocacy takes place in the form of public demonstrations organized by diaspora members at their host governments or at international organizations. For example, during the past months, Ambazonians demonstrated at the headquarters of the United Nations on the 13th of May when the first informal meeting was held on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Cameroon. As reflected on the protest signs, the protesters demanded to ‘stop the genocide committed by the soldiers of French Cameroon’, urged the UNSC that the ‘Time to Act is NOW’ and demanded the release of the abducted Ambazonian leaders (Facebook page ABC AMBA TV, 13 May 2019). Another example is the demonstration held at the Nigerian embassy last April during the ASSC Conference in Berlin. As I observed during this demonstration, they urged the Nigerian government to uphold a recent court decision. A decision in which the Nigerian court ruled that the Ambazonian leaders who were abducted in Nigeria, amongst them former President Seseku Ayuk Tabe, were illegally transferred to French Cameroon territories. During the demonstration they demonstrated to enforce this court decision.

Lobbying. Lobbying efforts are directed towards the same bodies, namely International organizations, such as the EU and the UN, and host governments. During the interview with the Secretary of State of the IG I asked what message the Southern Cameroonians bring across when lobbying at a host government, he responded by:

“well we expose the La République government on their genocide activities that they are committing. But one thing is the Article 19 of the UNHCR that is a right to be informed. This right is delineable. We want to go to the decolonization committee and talk about our problem. We have never, ever been to the decolonization committee to discuss our problem. They should hear from us, right? They should hear from us. That is what we tell most of the governments, the Netherlands government, the German government, please through the United Nations help us to have a session at the decolonization committee to tell our own story. […] That is what we are lobbying for. […] And we would need the UN to intervene to come on Biya to know that it is already genocide going on. Because what is happening in Ambazonia today, is already genocide. It is nothing more or less than genocide, it is total genocide. So, we are lobbying countries to rally behind this issue, and speak with one voice to stop this genocide. To stop this war and let’s sit on the table and negotiate our separate ways. That is what we are lobbying for.”

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As reflected above, lobby activities undertaken by the Southern Cameroonian diaspora are two- folded: on the one hand lobbying efforts focus on the atrocities committed by French Cameroun urging the international community to step in. On the other hand, they lobby to have their case heard by the UN.

Lastly, in order to enhance awareness in the international community, the Interim Government, as explained by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, also makes use of social media, such as Twitter:

“And then we do Tweet, we do Twitter too, because in many worlds, if not most, if not all? Diplomats do Twitter. So yeah, we use, we use Twitter as a medium of education and sensitization of the global community.”

To conclude, through lobbying, advocacy and the use of social media the Interim Government tries to raise awareness of the Anglophone struggle on the international stage. Diaspora involvement is imperative for all activities.

The Diaspora and Ground Zero As illustrated above, the Interim Government, and simultaneously the diaspora, are actively involved in raising awareness about the Anglophone problem through advocacy and lobbying at the international level. However, through social media and worth of mouth, political education, sensitization and information dissemination is also directed towards the diaspora and Ground Zero. It is employed as a way to ensure diaspora and Ground Zero commitment to the struggle.

As for Ground Zero, social media is used to ensure (political) education of Ambazonians on the ground. This particularly came forward when I asked the Secretary of State what ABC AMBA TV brings to the Interim Government. He responded with:

“well that is a TV of the Ambazonians, that eh, the message of what is going on, comes directly from the mouth of the people, you know. They educate the people; they are listening to the news. La République tv will not give you what is happening in Ground Zero. […] So, the ABC is going to talk about all these things to educate all the people

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of Ambazonia not to fall into this trap. We know they are suffering, the people in Ground Zero, we know that it are hard times they are undergoing, but they should try to resist because victory is very soon.”

Thus, as suggested by the Secretary of State their tv channel is able to disseminate information and thereby educate the people on what is going on. In this way, they try to keep the spirits up on the ground.

In relation to the diaspora, political education, sensitization and information dissemination is also used to ensure diaspora involvement in the struggle. The illustration of the Secretary of State in which he explains how he got involved in the struggle from the diaspora exemplifies the importance of the political education and information dissemination that also takes place through the word of mouth in the diaspora:

“we try to motivate the people by telling them, giving them the history. Not all of us know the history of this struggle, I will not proudly tell you that I know the history really well. I've been living in a life of blind fullness, you know. I remember when I came to Germany some people were trying to meet me to talk about Ambazonia, more than ten, fifteen years ago. I was, I was so angry to hear that name, I told them to get out [...] But, I was a fool, I’m sorry to say that. I was an idiot. It is after I started seeing, after I started to listen attentively. […] When I came to listen to what has been happening systematically, and I saw how gradually, gradually these people destroyed everything that I was growing up with and I had in Amazonia! It’s then I said, ‘oh gosh, so this is true?’ These people have really ripped us from our resources.”

As illustrated with the example above, the Secretary of Staff highlights the importance of educating people in the diaspora on the history of the struggle in order to get them involved in the movement. Similarly, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs highlighted the importance of educating the audience in order to motivate Southern Cameroonians to get involved:

“yes, political education, sensitization, telling the people, telling our audience, like I'm talking to you, the facts about our historical evolution, and the truth about what should be done. Then the people buy the message.”

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Thus, the Interim Government tries to enhance the plight for Ambazonia through political education and sensitization of Southern Cameroonians. Hence, the strategy of raising public awareness is not only directed towards the international community but is also used to educate Southern Cameroonians and thereby ensure their dedication to the struggle.

Regulating the War on the Ground from Abroad A third strategy employed by the Interim Government to reach Buea is to create organizing structures – Self-defence, Boycotts and Ghost Towns – which allows the Interim Government to support and coordinate the struggle on the ground from abroad.

Self-Defence As explained before, with the Amba Peace Plan the Interim Government set up structures of governance through which it tries to enhance diaspora and Ground Zero cooperation and thereby support the struggle on the ground. One of the important assets of the AMBA Peace Plan is the pillar of self-defence. Through this self-defence pillar, the IG tries to support self- defence activities on the ground, while letting the people in Ground Zero – the Restoration Forces – in charge of the actual self-defence.

The Interim Government has structured the self-defence branch as follows: each LGA has its own commander, jointly these LGA commanders make up a County Defence Council. One of these commanders is chosen as the County Defence Commander, thereby representing the whole county on a federal level (Interview Secretary of Foreign Affairs). In total there are thirteen county defence commanders who all represent their own county on the federal level, namely in the National Security Council (see Figure 2).

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Figure 2

National Security Council:

consists of 13 County Commanders

County Defence Council:

consists of all LGA Commanders

LGA Self Defence Commanders

Through the creation of the above support structure, the IG tries to provide the people in Ground Zero with self-defence structures, which must strengthen their capacity on the ground. Simultaneously, such support structures form part of their strategies to reach independence.

While people on the ground are in charge of the actual fighting because – as explained by the Secretary of State Affairs – “we don’t go down there [Ground Zero] and hold those guns”, there is some form of physical support in relation to self-defence. Namely, the Interim Government provides for ‘trainers’ on the ground who provide the Restoration Forces with some form of moral training. This came forward when I asked the Secretary of State Affairs what the role was of the IG in relation to Ground Zero, he responded:

“we, how shall I put it, we support them fully: financially, morally, physically. What I mean with physically is that we sneak people in there to train them. To stop some type of brutal, you know, we have lived with La République for 56 years, and some of our people have learned some type of bad thing. I will not hide it to you, that some of us, yeah some of our people used to harass people for money in Ground Zero. So, we make sure we give them some moral training in order to teach them how to behave, not to harass people. Ehm, not to behave like La République soldiers. Yeah, so we sneak people down there, to give them some training. So, that’s how we help Ground Zero and that is the only help they need, that’s all they need from us. We don’t go down there and hold those guns.”

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As reflected above, the Interim Government coordinates the self-defence activities of the Restoration Forces on the ground through the provision of (moral) trainers and the creation of self-defence structures which must strengthen their capacity on the ground.

Boycotts In addition to the self-defence structures guiding Ambazonian actions on the ground, the Interim Government supports in the initiation of boycotts as a form of initiating peaceful protest on the ground. For example, this year, through the ABC AMBA TV channel, a boycott was initiated by President Sako on the 20th of May, also known as ‘Unity Day,’ in Cameroon. The 20th of May as referred to by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs is “the worst day in the history of the Cameroon and Ambazonia relationship (page).” Because it is the day on which Ahidjo abolished the federal system and “totally enslaved us (Secretary of Foreign Affairs).” Therefore, this year, prior to the 20th of May President Sako, called for a boycott of this national day. As explained by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the IG initiates such boycotts to send a message to La République and the international community. The commencement of boycotts is another way through which the Interim Government tries to steer the struggle on the ground.

Ghost Towns A third strategy employed by the Interim Government to guide the struggle on the ground from the diaspora is through the initiation of Ghost Towns. Ghost towns urge all people not to go out for normal activities and stay inside, thereby shutting down the towns. As explained by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ghost towns are initiated in consultation with the people and serve as way to non-violently protest. They serve similar goals as boycotts namely, to send a message to the international community and prove that they can organize themselves (Interview Secretary of Foreign Affairs). Thus, ghost towns serve as another way through which the Interim Government tries to coordinate and support the struggle on the ground through peaceful means.

Hope In addition to the various (material) resources provided by the Interim Government and the diaspora, the IG provides Ground Zero and the diaspora with direction and serves as a ‘nursery of hope’. This form of mental support came forward during the interviews held with members of the Interim Government.

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Ground Zero With regards to Ground Zero, Professor Ayim – the Secretary of Foreign Affairs – was asked how the Interim Government tries to motivate people on to ground to participate in the struggle, he commented the following:

“[…] we do less to convince them, and, and we motivate them by the organized by, you know, showing direction by talking to the international community as well as giving them feedback as to what is going on. So, there is that hope.”

In similar vein, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Interim Government pointed out this form of mental support when he was asked about the greatest strengths of the Interim Government in relation to Ground Zero:

“The greatest strength is that belief and the trust from the people; that the Interim Government is working for them. And we, we, we have built that trust. And the plan we put forward and communicate with Ground Zero, they see that there is hope. So, the greatest strength is that connection and that trust.”

The above excerpts suggest that the creation of trust is an essential activity the IG engages in to ensure Ground Zero participation. As a follow up question, I asked Professor Ayim how the Interim Government built up that trust he referred to. He responded with:

“by, doing what, you know, diplomacy, and, we donate money, support those who are in need of humanitarian assistance, alright? And then help them to do self-defence. So, they see that we are, you know, that, compassion, that commitment. You know when you have one goal, and you see that a person, a government is working towards that goal, that builds a trust.”

Thus, through the Interim Government’s engagement in various activities, such as diplomacy, financial support, humanitarian assistance, and self-defence they have been able to demonstrate their commitment and compassion to the cause, and thereby build up a feeling of trust with the people in Ground Zero. Hence, the believe and trust provides for hope and mental support to the people on the ground, which is one of the greatest strengths of the Interim Government.

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The Diaspora Simultaneously, this ‘psychological’ element is not only relevant for the Interim Government’s relation with Ground Zero; it is also of importance for the IG’s continuous relation with the diaspora. While – as stressed in the previous chapter – the Secretary of Staff explained that the role of the IG is not as crucial in motivating the diaspora to participate, due to the central role played by social media. He simultaneously recognizes that the diaspora still needs to be motivated in order to ensure continuous financial support. In this regard, the Secretary of Staff noted that:

“We don’t have money from any government or caretakers whatever, we contribute our own money and sponsor the movement. So, we have to mobilize the people, we have to give them confidence in order to believe in this struggle. We go around and do town hall meetings, diplomacies with other countries, so that the people know that yes, the Interim Government is at least doing something. […] So, you see they do not have to be motivated, but we still go ahead and motivate them and making them believe in what we do.” (page)

As reiterated in the previous section, the Interim Government is completely dependent upon the diaspora for financial support. Therefore, the Interim Government needs to demonstrate to the diaspora that the IG is ‘doing something’ – through diplomacy and townhall meetings – to make them believe in what they do, and thereby ensure continues financial contributions from the diaspora. This suggests that the various activities engaged in by the IG do not only provide a beacon of hope to the people in Ground Zero, but also provide the diaspora with confidence in the work of the IG and ensure that the diaspora continues to believe in the struggle, which subsequently safeguards diaspora donations.

Social Media As suggested in previous sections social media, in particular Facebook and ABC AMBA TV, play an important role in disseminating information and educating the people. Likewise, social media is crucial to nurture trust and hope. Because it is through social media that the diaspora and particularly people in Ground Zero can observe that the Interim Government is working for them. I personally observed the role of social media during the ASSC Conference in Berlin. Here almost everyone, especially the younger generations, livestreamed everything that what was happening in Berlin on Facebook and Instagram. This enabled Southern Cameroonians,

67 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN both the diaspora and Ground Zero, to observe that crowds from all over the world had gathered to deliberate the future of their country. In similar vein, while not being present, I was able to observe the protest taking place at the United Nations Head Quarters on the 13th of May 2019 this year through livestreams on ABC AMBA TV’s Facebook page. Regardless of the effectiveness of the demonstrations, I could observe the Southern Cameroonian crowds that had gathered in front of the UN to spread awareness of the . This illustrates how social media enables the Interim Government to demonstrate to the people both in the diaspora and at home that the Interim Government is actively working towards the same goal; independence.

To conclude, in order to end the genocide and stop colonial occupation of the Southern Cameroons, the Interim Government actively engages in four strategies – fundraising, raising public awareness, regulating the struggle on the ground, and the creation of hope. These strategies form part of the prognostic action frames and must ensure the independence of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia. As reflected above, some strategies, such as the lobbying and advocacy engagements, are particularly focused on targeting the international community. Whereas other strategies, such as the creation of hope are directed towards Southern Cameroonians both in Ground Zero as in the diaspora. Thereby, the IG tries to ensure (continuous) movement participation in the independence struggle. As came forward in the interviews with the members of the Interim Government, the IG predominantly focuses on the raising of public awareness within the international community – through lobbying and advocacy – in order to reach independence.

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Chapter 6 - Assessing the Effectiveness of the Frames Cultivated by the IG

In the previous chapters the collective action frames created by the Interim Government have been identified to clarify the process through which the IG seeks to mobilize support for its activities. With the aid of Snow and Benford’s (1988) framing theory, this chapter will assess the extent to which these frames are actually able to mobilize support. In other words, the effectiveness of the collective action frames created by the Interim Government will be examined. To do so this chapter will first explore the extent to which the collective action frames resonate with movement participants. Secondly, this chapter will comment on the contested framing processes that arise within the independence movement of the Interim Government. Subsequently, this chapter will shortly touch upon the ways in which the Interim Government has tried to deal with these contested framing processes. Lastly, the chapter will formulate general conclusions about the effectiveness of the collective action frames cultivated by the Interim Government.

Reflecting on the Collective Action Frames Reiterating Snow and Benford’s (1988) framing theory, collective action frames clarify the processes through which social movements seek to mobilize support for their activities. The hypothesis holds that the more richly developed and interconnected the three frames are – diagnostic, prognostic and motivational – the more successful the mobilization capacity of a movement. In addition, mobilizing potency or effectiveness of any proffered frame is dependent upon the extent to which cultivated frames resonate with movement adherents. As explained in earlier sections, the degree of frame resonance is dependent upon the credibility and salience of proffered frames. Moreover, framing processes are often affected by contested framing processes, such as frame disputes and framing contests.

Frame Resonance In the subsequent sections, this research will touch upon the various factors affecting the Interim Government’s frame resonance, which came forward in the semi-structured interviews with both movement participants and members of the Interim Government. Not all factors that potentially influence the degree of frame resonance – as established in Snow and Benford’s framing theory – will be discussed. Only the ones where there is reasonable evidence to draw out conclusions namely, empirical credibility, experiential commensurability, and credibility of frame makers, will be discussed.

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Empirical Credibility. As explained in the theoretical framework, empirical credibility is one of the factors that influences the degree to which frames resonate with movement participants. It refers to the fit between propagated frames and events occurring in the world; is there a specific event which can be pointed to as evidence of the established frames? As illustrated within the framing analysis of the Interim Government, the IG has cultivated two diagnostic frames, which threat the very existence of the Ambazonian people, namely, the colonial occupation of the Anglophone regions and the genocide committed against the Anglophone Cameroonians. Both problems can be attributed to French Cameroun.

The diagnostic frames of the Interim Government are supported by the current events taking place in Cameroon. Both social media and various reports of human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and the Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa, have documented the large scale of human rights violations that are unfolding itself (see for example CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). Violations which are allegedly widely committed by French Cameroun Security Forces, amongst others. These events, which are brought home to the diaspora through social media, provide sound evidence for the brutality of French Cameroun and reinforce the idea that the Ambazonian people are in danger. As demonstrated in the excerpt below, this line of reasoning also came forward during the interview with the Country Representative of Austria. She pointed towards the killing of a four-month-old baby by French Cameroon security forces as evidence of the unfolding genocide against the Ambazonians.

“You can no longer cry because it is every second that you turn around you open your phone, you see, you have every reason to cry. Look at the four-month old baby that they killed a few days back. A four-month-old innocent baby. Because you didn't see who to kill, you killed a baby. […] If you can kill a four-month- old baby, a small baby like this, a small bundle of life, you don't even have the fear of God. You open fire on a baby. I’ve never seen that kind of thing. […] The only thought that came to your head that was if I leave this one alive, it is going to be another Ambazonian. So, let me end the live” (Interview Country Representative Austria).

The particular event described above aligns with the genocidal frame created by the Interim Government. It illustrates that the atrocities currently taking place in Cameroon, provide the

70 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN diagnostic frames of the Interim Government, in particular the genocidal frame, with empirical credibility.

Experiential Commensurability. A second factor which can enhance frame resonance is the experiential commensurability. Reiterating from the theoretical framework, experiential commensurability relates to the everyday experiences of movement adherents. If cultivated frames are congruent with personal experiences, collective action frames are more likely to result in mobilization (Benford and Snow, 2000). Drawing on the various interviews held with diaspora members, the injustices identified within the diagnostic frames of the Interim Government seem to tap into personal experiences of Southern Cameroonians.

For instance, when I asked one of my interviewees whether he had personal experiences with marginalization he referred to regular interactions with administration authorities, in this case police officers, where treatment can differ depending on the origin of the officers:

“Even when you are sitting in a car, driving, the police that will stop you, if they are Francophones, you have to pay them some amount of money. If not, they will not let you go. If you meet a control that is pure Anglophone, then they will understand that and maybe allow you to go. But if it is Francophone, it is a different story. So, in everyday, there is no feed that is left untouched.” (Interview Country Representative Norway).

Moreover, the Country Representative of Austria touched upon several personal experiences of discrimination which she recalled from her youth. As will be demonstrated in the excerpts below, she did not perceive these experiences as problematic in first, however, she suggests that this perception has changed over time:

“[referring to an Anglophone who was propagating separation in her younger years] but I couldn’t lay my fingers on it, because those were things that you couldn’t ask. Thus, this is something where, and then it gets into the educational system. You got to see that something was wrong. You go out, you saw, I remember it was my own year when I wrote my GCEs, very few people passed that year 1989. It was the francophones who marked our GCE. That year when I sat to write, the English teachers were on strike, the government collected the whole scripts and gave it to the French. […] So, it also affected us, our grades, it affected us, because where I knew that I was supposed to have an A, I

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realized that I was going to have a B. Like me, that I grew up in a French region, French was for me no problem, but I had a C in my results list. Technically they gave all the children a C. You while you saw that your French was even A level, they deliberately gave you a C. […] So, the peak of the year, was that year when it was them who marked it. So, then, we did not know, we were still young, we didn’t consider it to be anything much.”

“It was, I remember personally, when I was in the university and we were to write our exams and, you know that you have performed, maybe, your final marks will come out to be 15 on 20 or so, and then you end up receiving an 11 or an 11.5 or 10, you get confused, you say what happened? They will tell you that there was a result commission that came from Yaoundé to come and look at the results. And they decided what students, they gave the marks, ranked students, in the way they thought it was necessary, while not being our teachers. So that was a form of assimilation that, of just, just putting the other group of people at a certain level where they want them to belong. So, with the IG now all those of us who really went through those things, it's now that it's coming back, this is really what these people were doing those years, 20 years back or so.”

The above passages do not only demonstrate personal experiences of unequal treatment, which seems to resonate with the story put forward by the Interim Government, but the passages also suggest that the Country Representative of Austria has started to make sense of personal events through the frames put forward by the IG. Recalling Goffman’s (1974) idea of framing, the IG helps movement participants to render events meaningful and thereby alter someone’s understanding of social reality.

Credibility of Frame Makers. A third factor which can affect the credibility of a collective action frame, and thereby the degree of frame resonance, is the perceived credibility of frame makers. As suggested by Benford and Snow (2000), status and knowledge of a frame articulator can affect the credibility of a collective action frame. As was suggested by one of the interviewees, the credibility of the current president of the IG, Dr. Sako, who recently replaced former President Sisiku Ayuk Tabe, is somewhat contested among the Southern Cameroonian people. This came forward when I asked the Country Representative about points of improvement of the Interim Government:

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“So basically, I think the IG, is doing very well, the leader, the president is doing well, I know that he is a priest, he is a pastor by profession, and the secretary of communication is also a pastor by profession as well. I know that people have been criticizing that a revolution cannot be run by men of god, people believe in god. But to be honest, the way this revolution started, ehm, the main leader, who is now in prison, the main leader who was at the forefront, was a teacher, yeah, he always made it very clear that this struggle is god ordained and that nobody should say anything against, I mean, but this not like godly or something. Because, we are, we are a Christian nation, so we have to respect those values. So of course, people have been criticizing and saying, these are pastors, and eh, pastors, will not understand the game of fighting, but yeah, we’ve been managing to where we are.” (Interview Country Representative Norway)

As reflected above, Southern Cameroonians have been asking whether a pastor can lead a revolution which also involves fighting. Something which could potentially affect the credibility of the frame maker. Nevertheless, credibility of the current President did not seem to be contested by any of the diaspora members interviewed.

Another factor which could potentially influence the credibility of the frame makers is the funding mission called ‘My Trip to Buea’ which was set up by the IG in 2018. As came forward during the interviews and at the ASSC Conference in Berlin, a lot of people have been criticizing this initiative set up by the Acting President because financial contributions of the diaspora never reached Ground Zero (Interview Country Representative Austria, page). While this financial mismanagement is more of an organizational issue, it is something that is prevailing and has potentially affected the credibility and trust of movement participants in the Acting President. Nevertheless, the interviewees did not echo this criticism on the Acting President.

Contested Framing Processes In addition to factors influencing the resonance of a frame, there are a number of ‘contested processes’ – as identified by Snow and Benford (2000) – which are also likely to influence framing activities of social movements. Collective action frames may, for instance, be subject to challenges from within a social movement – frame disputes – as well as external challenges coming from opponents or critics – framing contests. As to the latter, Benford (1993) explained that the very existence of a social movement indicates that differences exists within a society

73 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN regarding the representation of reality. Without doubt, opponents of the IG, in particular the government of Paul Biya contest the way reality is represented by the Interim Government. Nevertheless, this research will not reflect on the counter frames, and resulting framing contests, that have been created by the government of French Cameroun because this does not fall within the scope of this research. On the contrary, the selected data does allow for reflection on frame disputes arising from within the IG. The subsequent sections will reflect on the frame disputes that can be witnessed within the IG.

Frame Disputes. Frame disputes, also referred to as intra-movement disagreements, may arrive within a single movement (Benford, 1993). Such intra-movement disagreements can arise over the substance of a frame in which there is disagreement over the diagnoses and prognoses (Benford and Snow, 2000). Framing disputes seem to be highly applicable to the environment in which the Interim Government operates. As came forward during the various interviews with the Ambazonian stakeholders, different Southern Cameroonian movements have emerged over time. As reflected in the quotations below, these movements often arrived as a result of infighting and criticism on the IG, in particular in relation to the strategies employed in order to reach independence. For instance, when the Country Representative of the Netherlands was asked how he perceives the IG he responded by saying:

“… very honestly speaking is that there is a lot of infight. The government is not yet there, but it is like some people feel that the government is there, and that their position is at stake. […] But you have some people, when they talk about changes or some stuff, then they are afraid that, if these changes are allowed to take place, then maybe they find some other persons who will replace me. […] So, with the IG there are some people that do not want to believe and respect the IG, as their government, because they have their own organization, which they have put in place. And what happens is that because of this confusion in Southern Cameroon, people are contributing money, you saw also in Berlin that money was raised. So, money was raised with IG and some mismanagement took place and made people to be angry. So, this group comes up and raises its own money, this group comes up and raises. So, people are confused. There are so many groups fighting the same cause, why should there by so many groups? So that's exactly the position where the IG finds itself now. Some people are there, and then again sell out. They are like the whistle blowers. They leak the information from the IG to the other people, so these people will use it now to attack the IG and reduce its credibility.” (Interview Country Representative the Netherlands).

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As suggested above various ‘counter movements’ have come up, also in response to the financial mismanagement of the IG, however, those new movements are still fighting the same cause. An example of such a movement is the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGC) a movement that was referred to by several Ambazonian stakeholders:

“[relating to the excerpt above] yeah, that has really brought us setbacks actually, that infighting has helped to ridicule us down, because you see we have this group that is called AGC, the Ambazonia Governing Council. […] So, when the IG goes online, and the IG says we are shutting down our territory for two days, and the reason for doing that was they wanted to avoid our people from being killed, our women from being raped by La Republique du Cameroun territory forces. So, these AGC people they would go also on Facebook and propagate the opposite. They are like counter IG.”

Similarly, when the Country Representative of Austria was asked about the relation of the IG with other Southern Cameroonian movements, she also referred to the AGC, stressing the AGC’s different approach to reach independence. The latter also came forward in the conversation with the Norwegian Country Representative.

“Some like the AGC have its own concept. At one point, they thought that the IG under Sisiku was too slow to pick up arms. And then they could not just pick up arms when, when, you don't have somebody in front of you to start fighting for. So up to that point, the IG didn't see any need for an armed struggle. Then the AGC was on the side of arms, because they could not really flow in this aspect the AGC thought they were wasting their time in the IG.” (Interview Country Representative Austria).

“I’m saying that you have some activist in the movement who believe that we do not have a . So, they tend to be supporting … Who think they can rally some people on the ground, buy them some weapons, and get them to fight. So, they think that the government is so diplomatic, they don’t want to be diplomatic, because we need to fight, so they decide to turn on those that think we must fight, fight, fight, no diplomacy. So, they try to take advantage of the desperation of our people, who really want to free themselves and some of our people believe we need to fight. But they don’t understand that even after fighting is over you still need to sit down and talk.” (Interview Country Representative Norway).

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What becomes clear from the above abstracts is that the Interim Government has to deal with frame disputes, which particularly arise over the strategies that the IG employes in order to reach Buea. Thereby, the diplomatic approach of the Interim Government is predominantly criticized. Hence, frame disputes have arrived over the IGs financial mismanagement and prognoses and have a ‘splintering effect’ on the independence movement led by the IG.

Responding to Frame Disputes. As came forward in the various interviews with Ambazonian diaspora members, the Interim Government has attempted to respond to the critiques highlighted above. In the earlier days of the movement, the IG predominantly propagated non-violent means to reach independence. However, people, especially Southern Cameroonians on the ground, started criticising the IGs non-violent approach, which – as suggested below by the Country Representatives of Austria and Holland – resulted in the creation of a self-defence department.

“So, when the time came after the war was declared on the people of Southern Cameroons, that was when the IG now thought it was wise, ehm… even then, even after the war was declared […] Sisiku, he kept in insisting that diplomacy was the key. And then they kept killing, killing until it led to his own arrest at the Nera hotel on the 3rd of January 2018. So, when he was arrested then Dr. Sako came in as the current assistant Interim President, people started shouting, we are not goods, we are not some kind of… a house cannot be on fire and then we be calling for, for, for, […] you get to start looking for, I don’t know. So, people cried out and said this is the time we should call for, we should defend ourselves. That’s why you see the boys came up from Ground Zero boys were saying ‘IG what are you doing?’ They are killing us, mothers, fathers, they were crying out ‘they are cleaning our children’. […] That is how self-defence came in” (Country Representative of Austria).

“So, these things [referring to cruelties taking place in Ambazonia] that have really made our people to go mad, they say no, no, if you do not react you will still be killed. So, what do you have to do, you will have to set a kind of a self-defence mechanism to at least protect ourselves from being killed. Or even our woman and the girls from being raped, and many other things. That’s how the self-defence group came out. That's why we are calling like the restoration forces of the Ambazonian Government” (Country Representative of the Netherlands).

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As implied above, the Interim Government has been trying to respond to the intra-movement disagreements through the creation of a self-defence department. Thereby, widening its strategies beyond diplomatic efforts in order to enhance movement participation.

To conclude, the collective action frames cultivated by the Interim Government show a degree of frame resonance. In particular, the empirical credibility and experiential commensurability of the frames seems to resonate with movement adherents. Two assets which are likely to enhance movement participation. Simultaneously, the framing efforts of the Interim Government are contested by frame disputes that arise within the independence movement of the IG. Southern Cameroonians criticizes the financial mismanagement and the non-violent strategies employed to reach Buea. This has resulted in the ‘splintering’ of the IG’s independence movement. Reacting to the various forms of critique, the IG has widened its strategies to reach independence, and adopted a self-defence approach. Thereby trying to tackle intra-movement disagreements.

Can the IG Move Southern Cameroonians from the Balcony to the Barricades? Reiterating Snow and Benford’s framing theory, the ability of the Interim Government to move people from the balcony to the barricades is dependent on the presence of at least one of the frame resonance variables – frame consistency, empirical credibility, frame articulator’s credibility, centrality, experiential commensurability or narrative fidelity. Hence, consensus mobilization is contingent on these variables (Snow and Benford, 1988). Subsequently, the presence of these variables “enhances the probability of action mobilization” (Snow and Benford, 1988, 211).

As demonstrated above, empirical credibility and experiential commensurability are two variables that seem to be present in the collective action frames cultivated by the Interim Government. The IG’s frames tap into the personal (everyday) experiences of Anglophone Cameroonians who grow or grew up under the regime of Paul Biya. This enhances the experiential commensurability of the frames nurtured by the IG. In addition, strength is added to the collective action frames through the current atrocities committed in Cameroon. The large- scale organized violence serves as concrete evidence for the brutal, genocidal regime of Paul Biya. Following Snow and Benford’s theory, both empirical credibility and experiential commensurability increase frame resonance and thereby positively affect the mobilizing potency of the Interim Government’s collective action frames. Simultaneously, as becomes 77 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN apparent above, the collective action frames cultivated by the Interim Government are contested by intra-community disagreements. Frame disputes arise as a result of infighting, financial mismanagement and critique on the strategies employed by the Interim Government to reach Buea. This has led to the formation of various, dispersed movements who still fight for the same goal, but predominantly disagree about the approach to reach independence. While the Interim Government has tried to cope with these challenges through the creation of a self-defence department, the mobilization potential of the frames cultivated by the IG are likely hampered. Since movement participants have been lost to other Southern Cameroonian movements.

Overall, the presence of empirical credibility and experiential commensurability in the collective action frames nurtured by the IG, suggests that the IG has been able to establish diagnostic frames which resonate with movement participants. The diagnostic frames have helped Southern Cameroonians to render personal experiences meaningful and thereby altered movement’s participants understanding of social reality. Furthermore, in relation to the prognostic frames cultivated by the IG, the solution – the independent state of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia – seems to resonate well with current movement participants. Nevertheless, the initial non-violent strategies employed to reach independence are contested. These strategies – part of the prognostic action frames – have resulted in frame disputes within the movement. While the IG has been trying to counter intra-movement division through the employment of self-defence strategies, the mobilization capacity of the prognostic frames has been thwarted. It can be deducted from the above that the Interim Government has been able to cultivate effective diagnostic frames and a compelling corresponding solution. However, the contested strategies to reach Buea have rendered the mobilization capacity of the prognostic frames somewhat ineffective. Lastly, with respect to the motivational frames created by the Interim Government, the framing theory of Snow and Benford (1988) stipulates that frame resonance “enhances the probability of action mobilization (211)”. Nevertheless, even if consensus mobilization exists, motives for participation need to be actively created by the Interim Government (Snow and Benford, 1988). Looking into the motivational frames created by the Interim Government, the official documents of the IG and the broadcasts of ABC Amba TV suggests that the IG tries to create a sense of urgency, to stress severity of the problem and to dwell on moral responsibilities of Southern Cameroonians to take action. Simultaneously, the members of the Interim Government interviewed for this research have different ideas on the role of the IG when it comes to motivating Southern Cameroonians to participate in the independence movement. As suggested active participation is somewhat assumed both from

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Ground Zero as from the diaspora, because they either experience everyday cruelties themselves or are able to observe everyday cruelties through social media. Following this logic, the IG relies on some form of solidarity that exists amongst diaspora members towards their homeland. Thereby, their participation is implied from the fact that they are Southern Cameroonians. This presumption of participation suggests that the Interim Government does sufficiently target the diaspora and ground zero to participate. This insufficient contact between the IG and its movement adherents might also explain why new, separate Southern Cameroonian movements have occurred.

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Chapter 7 - Conclusion

Anglophone Struggle The population of Cameroon is currently the sixth largest displaced population in the world (CHRDA and Raoul Wallenberg, 2019). While this is partly due to the government’s conflict with Boko Haram in the far North of Cameroon, it can predominantly be traced back to the current Anglophone-Francophone conflict. The ongoing tensions originate in a complex and contested decolonisation process in the late-1950s and early-1960s. Federal arrangements which had originally been installed in 1961 with the creation of the Federal Republic of Cameroon were scrapped and ultimately resulted in a Francophone-dominated central government in 1972. Ever since many English-speaking Cameroonians have complained that they have been economically, politically and linguistically marginalised, which has resulted in an Anglophone consciousness. In 2016, the current crisis was triggered with the appointment of French-educated judges in English-speaking courts. What started off as peaceful protests in which local lawyers demanded the removal of the French-speaking judges and the restoration of a federal system soon degenerated into a conflict with a sharp escalation of serious violence, crime, and human rights violations. The brutal force and repression with which the protests were met resulted in the creation of various Southern Cameroonian groups ultimately demanding the independence of the Anglophone regions. The Interim Government, which started as the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium, was one of the independence movements that arose and proclaimed the restoration of independence of the Southern Cameroons under the Federal Republic of Ambazonia on the 1st of October 2017. To establish an independent Southern Cameroonian state, the Interim Government – made up of diaspora members – tries to regulate the struggle in their homeland from abroad. To do so the Interim Government seeks to mobilize support for its activities and motivate people to participate in their independence movement.

Collective Action Frames of the Interim Government Various collective action frames have been cultivated by the IG to mobilize movement adherents, and ultimately establish an independent Ambazonian state.

Consensus Mobilization Through the Interim Government’s national tv channel ABC Amba TV and official documents published on their webpage, the IG has nurtured a diagnostic frame which constructs the

80 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN colonialization of Southern Cameroons as problematic. The colonial occupation of the Anglophone regions has resulted in severe structural problems, such as injustice, marginalization, (structural) violence, discrimination and assimilation policies. A second aspect of social reality which has been cultivated as problematic is the genocide committed against the Southern Cameroonian people. For both problems blame can be attributed to French Cameroon. As nurtured within the prognostic frames of the IG, the solution to both problems is the establishment of an independent Southern Cameroonian state. To reach independence the Interim Government has focused on three ‘targets’, namely the international community, the diaspora and Ground Zero. Actions are predominantly directed towards the international community through lobbying and advocacy at national governments and international organizations. In this regard, the Interim Government tries to trigger an intervention of the international community which will stop the genocide and ultimately pave the way for negotiations on two independent states. With respect to the diaspora and Ground Zero, the IG tries to ensure their participation in the independence movement through their national tv channel; ABC Amba TV. On the one hand, ABC Amba TV is able to disseminate information, sensitize the people in the diaspora, and bring the images of the war to the diaspora, which triggers their (financial) support to the cause. On the other hand, the tv channel enables the IG to educate the people on the ground and to demonstrate Ground Zero that the IG is actively working for them through, for instance, town hall meetings and lobbying efforts. This provides the people on the ground with moral support and hope. Additionally, the IG engages in fundraising activities, and establishes organizing structures, such as a self-defence branch, boycotts and ghost towns, which further support the struggle on the ground and ultimately enhance their quest for independence.

Action Mobilization Lastly, the third component of collective action frames that try to enhance movement mobilization are the motivational frames. The motivational frames cultivated by the IG through ABC Amba TV and the IG’s official documents 1) stress the severity of the Anglophone problem, 2) express a sense of urgency and the need for immediate contribution, and 3) highlight the moral obligation movement sympathizers have towards fallen heroes, their children and next generations. In this way the Interim Government tries to construct beliefs about the propriety of taking action and trigger movement participation. Simultaneously, the members of the Interim Government suggest that the IG does not need to actively convince the diaspora and Ground Zero that corrective action needs to be taken. While the IG needs to 81 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN provide Ground Zero with moral support to resist French Cameroon forces, they personally experience cruelties on the ground on a daily basis and therefore do not need to be convinced of the propriety of taking action. Similarly, the IG members suggest that they motivate the diaspora through political education and information dissemination, however, it is stressed that diaspora members do not need to be actively motivated to participate, because social media is able to confront the diaspora with cruel images of the war in their homeland. Thereby, active participation of the diaspora is implied from the fact that they are Southern Cameroonians and therefore bear a sense of solidary towards their homeland.

Effectiveness of the Interim Government’s Collective Action Frames Reiterating from earlier sections, the effectiveness of the Interim Government to generate an independence movement is dependent upon the extent to which the cultivated frames resonate with movement participants. The collective action frames proffered by the IG tap into the personal (everyday) experiences of Anglophone Cameroonians who grow or grew up under the regime of Paul Biya. This enhances the experiential commensurability of the frames nurtured by the Interim Government. In addition, strength is added to the collective action frames through the current atrocities committed in Cameroon. The large-scale organized violence serves as concrete evidence for the brutal, genocidal regime of Paul Biya. Both variables enhance the degree of frame resonance and thereby are likely to positively affect the mobilizing potency of the Interim Government’s collective action frames. Simultaneously, the collective action frames cultivated by the IG are contested by intra-community disagreements. These frame disputes arose as a result of infighting, financial mismanagement and critique on the strategies employed by the Interim Government to reach independence. This has resulted in the formation of various Southern Cameroonian movements and has hampered the mobilization potential of the frames cultivated by the Interim Government. While diagnosed problems resonate with movement adherents who generally agree with the proposed solution namely, independence, strategies to reach the proposed solution are contested. Nevertheless, even if Southern Cameroonians agree with the Interim Government that a genocide is unfolding and that a problem of colonial occupation exists, it does not guarantee that they will drop everything else in their lives to mitigate the Anglophone problem, especially considering the fact that diaspora members are not confronted directly with the colonial rule of Paul Biya on a daily basis. Therefore, one can wonder whether the solidarity of the diaspora towards the homeland – as counted on the by Interim Government for movement participation – is sufficient to secure a vigorous independence movement. To answer the research question, the Interim Government 82 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN seems effective in identifying an aspect of social reality as problematic and has come up with a suitable solution, namely independence. However, the Interim Government could give rise to a more effective, undivided Southern Cameroonian independence movement, if it were more active in the formulation and creation of prods to action.

Future Research The story developed above illustrates the frames that have been created by the Interim Government to ultimately establish an independent Federal Republic of Ambazonia. However, something which is completely neglected within this story is the perspective of Francophone Cameroon, and the various ways through which Paul Biya has attempted to respond to the story developed by the Anglophone side. Therefore, for future research, it would be interesting to investigate the frames that have created by French Cameroon, in particularly the counter frames that came up as a response to the frames cultivated by the Interim Government. Thereby, specific attention can be paid to the framing contests between Francophone and Anglophone Cameroon. In addition, this research did not touch upon other contextual constraints, such as political opportunities, which also put constraints on the framing ability of the Interim Government.

Reflections on Research To conclude it should be stressed that the conclusions drawn above are based on the experiences of a particular group, namely diaspora members who were already actively involved in the Anglophone struggle and recognize the legitimacy of the Interim Government. Therefore, the above conclusions only portray the extent to which the diagnostic and prognostic action frames created by the IG resonate with its active movement participants. It makes it harder to reflect on the movement’s mobilizing potential in relation to prospective movement adherents who do not consider themselves part of the Interim Government. Moreover, it should be stressed that it remains a case study which is built on very specific, non-neutral data. Therefore, outcomes are based on rather radical set of data and cannot be taken out of context.

83 The Struggle for an Independent State A. AARTSEN

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Appendix

Overview Broadcasts Analysed ABC Amba TV

What1 Date Theme 1 Speech Acting President 22-09-2018 Genocide Memorial Day 2 Speech Acting President 01-10-2018 Independence Day 3 Speech Acting President 07-10-2018 Boycott Elections Cameroon 4 Speech Acting President 08-10-2018 Day after Cameroonian Elections 5 Speech Acting President 08-10-2018 LGA by LGA 6 Speech Acting President 15-12-2018 Assassination 7 Speech Acting President 10-02-2019 UN Plebiscite Day 8 Speech Chairperson for Santa LGA 21-03-2019 ASSC Conference Berlin 9 Speech Acting President 27-03-2019 ASSC Conference Berlin 10 Newsflash Secretary of state 18-04-2019 Evaluation of ASSC Conference 11 Speech Secretary of state 02-05-2019 Response to denouncement of IG 12 Speech Acting President 14-05-2019 Day after UN informal talk 13 Speech Acting President 20-05-2019 Successful boycott of national unity day

1 All the above-mentioned broadcasts can be found on the Facebook page of ABC Amba TV: https://www.facebook.com/pg/AmbaTelevision/videos/?ref=page_internal

Overview Documents Analysed

Title Document Date Published 1 The Proclamation of Restoration of Independence 01-10-2017 2 Resolutions ASSC Berlin 14-04-2019 3 A Common Struggle Narrative – Department of Foreign Affairs 14-02-2018 4 Acting President Addressing the Nation 10-02-2019

All the above-mentioned documents can be found on the official webpage of the Interim Government: https://www.ambazoniagov.org

Overview Conducted Interviews

Person Interviewed Date 1 Country Representative of Norway 24-04-2019 2 Country Representative of the Netherlands 25-04-2019 3 Country Representative of Austria 28-05-2019 4 Secretary of Foreign Affairs Interim Government 11-06-2019 5 Secretary of Staff Interim Government 12-06-2019

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