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This Thesis Has Been Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for a Postgraduate Degree (E.G This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use: This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author. When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. Stability and Change in South African Public Policy: 1994-2014. Mabutho Shangase PhD in African Studies University of Edinburgh 2018 Declaration I certify that this thesis hereby presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh has been composed by myself, and is my own work, and has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification at any other institution. Mabutho Shangase Date: 07 January 2018 Word count: 92 610 (Thesis only) ii Abstract This thesis narrates the exercise of state autonomy to achieve macro-economic stability and effect incremental policy change in South Africa between 1994 and 2014. Employing a composite case study of the macro-economic policy framework; the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (1996) strategy, and two micro policies, Free Basic Electricity (FBE) (2003) and No Fee Schools (NFS) (2006), it demonstrates how the post-apartheid state introduced reforms at macro and micro policy levels. Taking a historical institutionalist approach, it emphasizes the importance of ideas, context, configurations, temporal arguments and path-dependence to recount a story of policy change. The main sources of evidence comprise semi-structured elite interviews conducted with senior politicians, public servants, trade unionists and academic researchers as well as secondary data such as Hansard, government documents and other research reports. Data collection in South Africa was undertaken over a period of twelve months across various sites such as state departments, parliament, the South African Reserve Bank, university libraries, municipalities, private companies, parastatals and schools in the Gauteng Province. The context of transition from apartheid to a democratic dispensation, 1990-1994, with the negotiation processes forms a backdrop to the study whereby compromises and important policy choices set the scene for the formulation of new policy infrastructure culminating in GEAR in 1996. The implementation of GEAR in 1996 and the achievement of macro- economic stability in turn prepared the ground for intervention at micro policy level. Consequently the introduction of incremental policy change through micro policies such as FBE (2003) and NFS (2006) became possible. Importantly this thesis reveals that whilst incremental policy change has been achievable, it is not totally transformative but rather built upon policy legacies as it proffers gradual adjustments which do not reverse earlier policy decisions and compromises nor effect fundamental change. Nevertheless, even in a difficult international and domestic environment, the South African state has shown a capacity to initiate and sustain incremental change in key areas of public policy. iii A Dedication This thesis is dedicated to my mother, Ntombazanyana Busisiwe Shangase (1945-04-15 to 2011-12-10), I know you are staring down at me, I never cease to feel your love, my spirit is gratified, a great thanks to you. iv Abridged Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction Chapter 2: Literature Review Chapter 3: Research Methodology Chapter 4: The Macro Economic Policy Framework: The Case of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy Chapter 5: Meeting Basic Needs: The Case of the Free Basic Electricity (FBE) Policy in South Africa Chapter 6: Equity in Access to Education: The Case of the No Fee Schools (NFS) Policy Chapter 7: Conjunctural State Autonomy, Macro-Economic Stability and Incremental Change: A Discussion Chapter 8: Conclusion: Change and Stability in South African Public Policy after Apartheid? Appendices Appendix 1: Interview Request Letter Appendix 2: Sample Questionnaire Appendix 3: Anonymised List of Interviewees Bibliography v Table of Contents Declaration……………………………………………………………………………………ii Abstract…………………………………………………………….………………….......…iii Dedication…………………………………………………………………………………….iv Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………..x Table of Figures…………………………………………………………………………......xii List of Abbreviations………………………………………………….…………………..…1 Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Introduction and Overview…………………………………………….……………......8 1.2 Background and Context.………………………………………………….…………...23 1.3 Chapter Outline…………………………………………………………………………31 Chapter 2: Literature Review 2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………...34 2.2 Post-Apartheid Public Policy…………………………………………………………...34 2.3 State Autonomy …………………………………………………………………………42 2.4 Policy Change …………………………..……………………………………………….52 2.5 Conclusion………. ……………………………………………………………………...61 Chapter 3: Research Methodology 3.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………….…..63 3.2 Statement of the Problem………………………....……………………………….……65 3.3 Research Questions and Purposes ………………….…………………………….……65 3.4 Data Types…………….…………………………………………………………………68 3.5 Extended Case Study Method, Positionality and Comparison …………….………..69 vi 3.6 Research Strategies……………………………………………………………………...77 3.7 Data Reduction and Analysis…………………………………………………………...91 3.8 Limitations, Bias and Ethical Considerations………………………………………....93 3.9 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………....94 Chapter 4: The Macro Economic Policy Framework: The Case of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy 4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..…….95 4.2 The Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (1996) Strategy: Defining the Policy Instrument ………………………………………………….........98 4.3 The Democratic Transition and Economic Policy: 1990-1994………………...……102 4.4 Macro-Economic Policy after 1994: The Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy………………………………….…….………114 4.5 The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (AsgiSA) (2005)……………………………………………………………………….131 4.6 The New Growth Path (NGP): The Framework (2009)…………….……………….134 4.7 National Development Plan (NDP): Vision 2030 (2011)…………………..………...138 4.8 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...140 Chapter 5: Meeting Basic Needs: The Case of the Free Basic Electricity (FBE) Policy in South Africa 5.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………..…………...149 5.2 The Free Basic Electricity (FBE) Policy: Defining the Policy Instrument ….……..151 5.3 History of Electricity in South Africa before 1994: A Contextual Background to the Free Basic Electricity (FBE) Policy…………………………………………..156 5.4 The Transition to Democratic Rule and Access to Electricity: 1990-1994………....160 5.5 Electricity Provision after 1994: Towards Free Basic Electricity…………………..162 vii 5.6 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...170 Chapter 6: Equity in Access to Education: The Case of the No Fee Schools (NFS) Policy 6.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….176 6.2 The No Fee School (NFS) Policy: Defining the Policy Instrument………………….178 6.3 A Background on Education in South Africa: Setting the Scene for the No Fees School Policy……………………………………………………………...181 6.4 The Transition to Democracy and Access to Education: 1990 to 1994....................183 6.5 Access to Education after 1994: Towards the No Fees School Policy……………....189 6.6 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...202 Chapter 7: Conjunctural State Autonomy, Macro-Economic Stability and Incremental Change: A Discussion 7.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….205 7.2 The Post-apartheid State and Conjunctural Autonomy…………………………….210 7.3 Incrementalism and Policy Change…………………………………………………..221 7.4 Thematic Discussion…………………………………………….................................221 7.4.1 Macro-Economic Policy Framework: The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy (1996)…………………………………………...225 7.4.2 Micro Policy Case Study 1: Free Basic Electricity (FBE) (2003)……………………231 7.4.3 Micro Policy Case Study2: The No Fee School (NFS) Policy (2006)………………..234 7.5 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………...239 viii Chapter 8: Conclusion: Change and Stability in South African Public Policy after Apartheid? 8.1 State Autonomy: Concluding Theoretical Reflections………………………………243 8.2 Incremental Policy Change: Concluding Theoretical Reflections……………….....246 8.3 Ending Remarks……………………………………………………………………….252 Appendix 1: Interview Request Letter……………………………...……………………261 Appendix 2: Sample Questionnaire………………………………………………...…….263 Appendix 3: Anonymised List of Interviewees………………………………...………...264 Bibliography……...…………………………………...……………………………………267 ix Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors Professors James Smith and Richard Freeman for their indefatigable commitment and support throughout this endeavour beginning in 2012. Your joint advice and direction as provided throughout my stay in Edinburgh has transformed my life as a scholar, your intellectual leadership is certainly invaluable. My thesis has evolved from its raw and rudimentary beginnings
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