- Enika Ngongo -

Between1914and1917,the Force Publique, theBelgiancolonial army,tookpartintheFirstWorldWar.Firstindefensiveactionsin collaboration with French and British forces in Cameroon and in Rhodesia, then with offensive campaigns in German East Africa against the German troops of Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck. Theirintentwastoexchangetheirterritorialconquestsagainstparts ofPortugueseterritoryonthebankoftheCongoRiver,andthusgain accesstotheIndianOcean.Eventhoughitdidnotwork,theForce Publique realisedcrucialvictoriesin(1916)andinMahenge (1917).Ifthesevictories,aswellastheroleofthecolonialtroops duringWorldWar I,haveofferedsomeinterestingstudies,yetthe difculties among Congolese soldiers and indigenous auxiliaries (portersandboys)remainuntold.Duringthesemilitarycampaigns, thousandsofCongolesemenwereindeedrecruitedassoldiersfrom everypartofthecolony,whileabout260,000indigenousauxiliaries wererecruitedas porters, to transportequipmentessentialfor the successofmilitaryoperations.Alongsidethem,womenandchildren served as the logistical backbone of the troops, carrying soldiers equipment and supplies, gathering food and water, cooking and doingthelaundry.Thelivingconditionswererenderedarduousby thehugemobilitydemandedbythewar.Weakenedbyinsufcient food,aharshclimate,thelackofrestortheunsuitabilityofhygiene and medicalcare, many porters died from unhealthy conditions. Men became sick rather than die ghting.After the war, despite thecrucialroletheyplayedandtheharshconditionstheyendured, indigenous soldiers and porters, living or dead, were forgotten and disregarded to a certain extent by the Belgian State. If they were granted multiple expressions of appreciation and gratitude, theywerenotonthenationalagenda. MajorAbbé[sic.], UsingBelgianarchivalmaterial, ofcialreports, ThisisthelastletterIwriteyou.Iwillinform published memoirs, photographs and some all the Congolese people who fought in sourcesoforaltraditionthathadbeenreported, Congo.WedidnotgotoWarforCongo,but suchasschoolsongs,thisessay reconsidersthe forBelgium.TheCongolesepeopleareafraid crucial part played by Congolese troops and tocomplain,butasIsawdeathclosely,Iam indigenous auxiliaries during the Great War in entitledtoclaimmydue.IfIdonotgetposi- Africa,andwhatmighthavebeentheireveryday tiveresponse,Iwillgofurther 1. experiences 3.Althoughtheseexperiencesremain difculttoassessduetoalackofprimarysources InNovember1925,PhilippeMolangi,aCongo- andtestimonieswrittenbyindigenouspeopleor lese veteran of the Bas-Congo Company, sent a registeredbyateamofresearchers,thecrossing lettertoMajorLabbeye,formermilitarydelegate of various sources considered in the colonial to the Ministry of Colonies, in which he com- contextoftheirproductionhighlightsaseriesof plained that he had not received his due for elementshithertounknown.Italsoconsidersthe hisparticipationintheAfricancampaignsofthe recognition shown to them by colonial author- First World War and that he had looked death ities and by the Belgian State during and after in the face. From spring 1916 to winter 1917, the GreatWar, byanalysing thestates acknow- theBelgiancolonialtroops, the Force Publique, ledgmentoftheinvolvementoftheAfricanpart conductedtwomajorcampaignsinGermanEast of the Force Publique 4. Africa:theBattleofTaboraandtheMahenge Campaign.Duringthesecampaigns,wherethe use of heavy artillery was not possible in the large battleelds, the main asset of the bellig- erents were highly mobile troops ofindigenous AsEuropewasslidingtowardswarinJuly1914, soldiers, alongside with porters 2. Yet, although Belgium5 proposed a restatement of the neu- theywereessentialtothesuccessofBelgianand tralityofall thecoloniesinthe CongoBasinto AlliedmilitaryoperationsonAfricansoil,andin the British, French and German governments, spiteofthehugenumberofdeathsamongthem, in accordance withArticle 11 of theTreaty of very little has been written about them, about Berlin. Belgium, wishing at all costs to avoid their living conditions duringtheWar, orabout anextensionoftheconict ontheAfricansoil, the recognition of the Belgian government in thatcouldhaveendangereditscolonialposses- the post-war period the two aspects veteran sion, reiterated its request several times until PhilippeMolangicomplainedaboutin1925. 8 August, when the British bombed the radio

1. MajorAbbé[sic.],Cestladernièrelettrequejevousécris:jevaisminformeràtouslesCongolaisquiontfaitlaguerre auCongo.NousnavonspasfaitlaguerrepourleCongo,nouslavonsfait[e]pourlaBelgique.LesCongolaisontpeur deréclamermaismoiayantvulamortdeprès,jesuise ndroitderéclamer[c]equimerevient;sijenereçoispasuneréponse favorablejemadresseraiplusloin.[]PhilippeMolangitoM ajorLabbeye,20/11/1921(FederalPublicServiceForeignAffairs (FPSFA),AfricanArchives(AA),FP799) 2. See Lucas c atheR ine, Loopgraven in Afrika (1914-1918). De vergeten oorlog van de Congolezen tegen de Duitsers, Berchem,2013. 3. UnlikethepioneerworkofMelvinPageonMalawiansVeteransand,morerecently,theimportantworkbyMichelle MoydonGermanEastAfricansaskari (Africansoldier).SeeMeLvin Page,MalawiansandtheGreatWar :Oralhistoryin reconstructingAfricasRecentPast,inThe Oral History Review,no.8,1980,p.49-61,M eLvin Page,TheWarofThangata: Nya salandandtheEastAfricanCampaign,1914-1918,inJournal of African History,no.19,1978,p.87-100,andM icheLL e M oy d, Violent intermediaries. Africa n Soldiers, Conquest, and Everyday Colonialism in ,Ohio,2014. 4. Iexpressmythank stotheanonymousreviewersofthisarticleandtoDrBenoitHenrietfortheirvaluablesuggestions. 5. Atthattime,thediplomaticrelationsoftheBelgianCongowerehandledbytheBelgianForeignAffairs,whiletheMinistry ofColonieswasinchargeofadministeringthecolonialterritory.Bothworkedinclosepartnershipeventhoughtheydidnt sharetheexac tsamevisionontheinvolvementsofCongoduringthewar,asitappearsinthearchives. stationofDarEs-Salaam,thecapitalofGerman only waytostrengthenitsposition amongstthe EastAfrica.Thiseventresulted inGermanmili- very short list of powerful colonial nations and tary reactions inKenya and militaryoperations to obtain some territorialand nancial rewards against two Belgian outposts established on at the end of the war10 .The Belgians intended the easternborder of Congo: Mokolubu on15 touse any territorythat mightbeconqueredby August and Lukuga seven days later6. In quick them, according to the Right of Occupancy, as response, the Belgian State ordered the Force leverage in the negotiation of the future peace Publiquetotaketheoffensive,inordertodefend settlements11.As claimedby historian GuyVan- Congos territorial integrity7. On 28 August, themsche: the Belgian colonial possessions in Congowenttowar.IncollaborationwithFrench Africa gave another dimension to the countrys and British forces in Cameroon from 1914 to involvement in the Great War 12. A successful 1916, on Lake Tanganyika in a defensive campaign in Africa would have led Belgians to mobilisation on the eastern boarder of Congo, exchangetheirconquestsforpartsofPortuguese andinNorthernRhodesiabetween1914-1915, territory on the bank of the Congo River and, the Force Publique defeated the Schutztruppe of thus,gainaccesstotheIndianOcean. PaulvonLettow-Vorbeck 8. Unlike France or, to some extent, Great Britain, Subsequentlytothesesuccessfulcampaigns,the Belgiumclearlydecidedtoconcentrateitsstrength Belgiancolonialtroopstookupstationineastern onAfricanfronts.Besidesthethirty-twoCongolese CongotoplananassaultonGermanEastAfrica, peopleidentiedinGrietBrosensCongo aan den alongwiththeBritishforces 9.ForbothGreatBrit- Yser,noCongolesetroopfought ontheEuropean ain and Belgium, German East Africa was cru- fronts13.ThereluctancetoinvolveCongolesepeo- cial.Fortheformer, it was the missing element pleonEuropeanfrontsshouldberelatedtothefear fromtheCapetoCairo.Forthelatter,itwasthe that relations between Congolese and European

6. geo Rges deLP ie RRe,Tabora1916:delasy mboliquedelavictoire,inRevue belge d’histoire contemporaine,no.3-4, 2002 (32),p.354. 7. AbouttheForce Publique, see “Lisolo Na Bisu”, Notre histoire. Le soldat congolais de la Force Publique, 1885-1960 , Brussels,2010andbRyant shaW, “Force Publique, Force Unique” : The Military in the Belgian Congo 1914-1939, PhDThesisinHistory,UniversityofWisconsin,1984. 8. DuringtheFirstWorldWar,PaulvonLet tow-Vorbe ck(1870 -1964)wascommandingtheGermanmilitaryforcesin EastAfrica,whichincludedtwelvecompaniesofAskaritroops.Heremainedundefeate duntiltheGermanGovernment agreedtosignanarmistice.eck aRd M icheLs,Lettow-Vorbeck,Paul(von),in1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War,e d.byute danieL, P eteR gatReLL , oLiveR J anz, heath e R J one s, JennifeR keen e , a Lan kR aMeR , and biLL nass on , issuedbytheFreieUnive rsittBe rlin,Berlin2014-10 -08. 9. isid o Re nday WeL è nzie M and PaMPhi Le M abiaLa M antuba -ngo Ma (eds), Le Congo belge dans la Première Guerre mondiale (1914-1918),Paris,2015andMinistèredelaDéfensenationale,Les Campagnes coloniales belges, 1914-1918 ,Brussels,1927. 10. Jean nick vangansbeke, “Comrades in arms ?HetdiplomatiekesteekspeltussenBe lgiëenhetBritseEmpire inAfrika tijdensdeGroteOorlog,inRevue belge d’Histoire contemporaine,no.1-2,2008(38),p.131-158andRog eR W M. Louis , GreatBritainandtheAfricanPeacese ttlementof1919,inThe American H istorical Review,no.71,1966(3),p.887. 11. MinistryofColoniestoCharlesTombeur,LeHavre,25/03/1916(FederalPublicSer viceForeignAffairs,Diplomatic Archives,AF.1.2.).AbouttheRightofOccupancy,seea nnie dePeRchin ,LapetitejusticeauTogopendantlaPremièreGuerre mondiale ,inLe Juge et l’Outre-mer,no.6,2010,p.192-193. 12. guy vanthe Msch e ,BelgianCongoduringtheFirstWorldWar,asSeenthroughtheReportsofJulesRenkin,M inisterof Colonies,toKingAlbertI(1914 -1918),inBulletin des séances de l’Académie royale des Sciences d’Outre-Mer,vol.55, 2009 (4),p.518. 13. See a Mandine L auRo in this issue and M attheW stanaRd, Dig ging-in:theGreatWarandtherootsofBelgianEmpire, in and ReW tait J aR boe, R ichaRd s. foRga Rty (eds), Empires in World War I,London-NewYork,2014,p.23-48.Thoseissues werealsodiscussedwhenFranceandGreatBritainwereconcerned,seedick van gaLen L ast , Black Shame. African Soldiers in Europe, 1914-1922,Bloomsbury,2014,Ruth ginio ,FrenchOfce rs,AfricanOfcersandtheViolentImageofAfrican ColonialSoldiers,inHistoricalReexions,no.36,2010(2),p.60-75andchRist ia n ko LL eR,TheRecruitmentofColonial TroopsinAfricaandAsiaandtheDeploymentinEuropeduringtheFirstWorldWar,inImmigrants&M inorities,no.26, 2008 (1-2),p.111-133. populationswouldhavethreatenedBelgianscolo- reequipit,createthemanyservicesrequiredby nialauthorityandgreatnessinsidethecolony. a large campaign (stewardship, ambulances, chaplaincy,bridgesandroads)[...]19. When the Belgian administration decided to conductamajorassaultinthevastGermanEast From January 1915 onwards, as the reorgani- Africa, numerous men were needed14 . From zation of the colonial forces was in progress, its inception in 1886, the Force Publique was men were massively recruited from every part merelyanumberofsmall-armedunitsatthedis- of thecolony.Atrst, the contingent was set at posaloftheBelgianofcialsinCongo15.By1914, 3,750men,includingreservists,andrecruitments the Force Publiquenumberedsome15,000men of soldiers and porters were mostly made by supervised by hundreds of European Ofcers conscriptions20.Mostofthetime,menwerepro- andNon-commissionedofcers(NCOs) 16.There videdby headmen required to produce a quota were no specialized units of artillery, engineer- andwhousedforcetoachieveit,inexchangefor ing or medical support. It was rather an inter- favoursornancialrewards,orthroughvoluntary nal police force, intended to maintain law and commitments of former soldiers21. During the orderwithinthecolonyandtoundertakemilitary three years ofwar, the contingent was raised to expeditions against recalcitrant populations 17. 5,000soldiers,enlisted forsevenyearsof active Only in Katanga, therewere 2,700 men, better serviceandsomefurtherveyearsinthereserve, organized, armed and equipped and formed in for a daily pay of 0,35 francs and a daily food fourmixedbattalions18 . ration or a monetary equivalent22. Numerous As the Public Force was not an instrument of porterswererecruitedaswell.Thelackofroads war,itsreorganizationwasneeded.Itwasneces- in Congo implied that the bulk of them were sarytoreshufetheunits,trainthemforwar,call intendedtoservetotransportequipmentessential thereserves,givethearmyapowerfulEuropean tothesuccessofmilitaryoperations.Intotal,they framework,provideitwithmodernequipment, were about 260,000, without it being possible

14. Aboutthisforgottenfront,se eRoss a ndeR son, The Forgotte n Front. The East African Campaign, 1914-1918 ,S pellmount, 2014,he W stR achan, The First World War in Africa ,NewYork,2014,a nne saMson, World War I in Africa : The Forgotten ConictAmongTheEuropeanPowers,London,2012andRog eR W M.Louis , Ruanda-Urundi 1884-1919,Oxford,1963. 15. ayLWaRd sho Rte R, African Re cruits and M issionary Conscripts. The White Fathers and the Great War (1914-1922), London, 2007,p.89. 16. Rapport annuel du Congo belge pendant la guerre,Brussels,1919,p.26. 17. guy vanthe Msch e ,BelgianCongoduringtheFirstWorldWar,p.521. 18. Rapport annuel du Congo belge pour l’année 1915,Brussels,1915,p.85-86. 19. La Force Publique n’étant pas un instrument de guerre, sa réorganisation s’imposait. Il fallut remanier les unités, les former en vue de la guerre, appeler les réserves, donner à l’armée un puissant cadre européen, la doter d’un matériel moderne, l’équiper à nouveau, créer les multiples services qu’exige une grande campagne (intendance, ambulances, aumônerie, ponts et chaussées) [.].JuLes Renkin, Deux discours prononcé par M. Renkin, Ministre des Colonies de Belgique, à Sainte-Adresse (Le Havre), le 2 mai 1917 lors de la réception du général Tombeur et à la Sorbonne (Paris) le 10 février 1918,Nancy,1918,p.2-3. 20. Also,itislikelythatwarrecruitmentsmighthavefollowedthebattleeldsarea,accordingtothepreconceptionthat certainAfricanracesliketheUelepeoplewerenaturallymorefondofWarandact ion,andcouldthereforebeexcellent soldiers,anat titudeconsistentwiththemainstrea mwesternEuropeanthought.Lessoldat scongolaisdelaForcePublique, LéonAnciaux,Ofce rintheForcePubliqueinterviewedbyPierreManuel,1914-18. Campagne d’Afrique,RTBF,1965. https://w ww.rtbf.be/auvio/detail_leon-anciaux-ofcier-dans-la-force-publique-du-congo -belge?id=1938015. 21. Itseemsclearthatdistinctionsweremadeintherecruitmentofsoldiersandporte rs.AccordingtotheRoyalDecreeof 30/07/1891,recruitmentsfortheCongoFreeStatenationalarmyconsistedofvoluntarycommitmentsandannualenlistments. LimitationsweretobexedbytheKingandaccordingtothem,theGeneralGovernorsettherequisitenumbersofmen ineachdistrict.However,p orterschosenbyheadmenwe refrequentlythosewhoweredispensableandprobablylesst. Missionariesmayalsohaveplaye daroleinsupportingef fortstorecruitAfric ansforwartimeservicelikeinotherSub -Saharan colonies,butadditionalresearchisneeded. 22. FélixFuchstoDistrictCommissioner,Boma,16/10/1914(FPSFA,AA,GG9161). tocountthewomenandchildrenalsopresent 23. In mid-April 1916, the Force Publique was pre- Some ofthem hadtocarrysupplies from differ- pared to start a major military action against entareasinmainland Congo,some frominland GermanEastAfrica.Bythattime,theCommand- to military depots, and others had to follow the er-in-Chief Charles Tombeur26 had under his Force Publiqueasmilitaryauxiliaries. command in Eastern Congo, two brigades,each composed of two regiments, comprising three Inside the military training camps, soldiers and battalions.Eachbattalionhadanartillerybattery, porterswere trainedanddisciplined,waitingfor acompanyofengineersandatelegraphcompany. an offensive to start. Young married men were Therewerealsoindependentbattalionsguarding targeted at rst because the presence of wives lakesTanganyikaandKivu27.Inconjunctionwith was needed to look after the cooking and laun- theBritishoffensive,theEastAfricancampaignled dry,andit was seen as a guarantee of the good BelgianstotaketheGermanstrongholdsofKigali, behaviour and the morality of the troops24, but Nyanza,Kitega,UjumburainRuandaandUrundi, trainingcampsquicklybecameovercrowdedand thenUdjijiandKigomaontheTanganyika. ill-adapted.Alongsidetheporterswhomovedthe armysmaterial,numerouswomen,children and The living conditions of Congolese soldiers and other dependents (boys)servedasthelogistical African porters were rendered more arduous by backbone of the troops, carrying soldiers per- thehugemobilitydemandedbythewar.Sincethe sonalequipmentandsupplies,gatheringfoodand beginning ofthe campaign,von Lettow-Vorbeck water,cookinganddoingthelaundry 25.Thepres- seemedonlyconcernedaboutstandingupagainst ence of so many non-combatants necessitated a theAllied troops aslong aspossible,in order to longtrain ofporters to transportprovisionsfor engage on African fronts as many Allies armed thewholemobile community;yingcolumns of forces as he could28. By tactical operations and thousands of Africans led by hundreds of Euro- targetedattacks,hesloweddowntheAlliedpro- peanOfcersandNCOs. gression. Belgian authorities were not prepared

23. WhileitisinterestingtoquestionthepresenceofCongolesewomeninBelgiancolonialtroopsoftheFirstWorldWar, asmanywarphotographsattesttotheirpresenceasAnneCorne tstatesinthisissue,Belgianarchivesdonotallowtoanalyze theircaseindetailduetoalackofinformation.Moreover,althoughitistempting,itseemstousinadequatetojuxtapose thesituationofanothercolony,betterdocumented,onthatofBelgianCongo. 24. OnthemilitaryviewofwomeninawidercolonialandAfricancontextseebenoît hen Rie t,OrderingtheWetlands. PolicingandLegitimateViolenceintheLevervilleConcession(BelgianCongo,1911-1920),ineMM anue L bLancha Rd, M aRieke bLoe MbeRgen and a Mandine L auRo(eds.),Policing in Colonial Empires. Cases, Connections, Bounda ries (ca. 1850 -1970), Brussels,Bern,Berlin,FrankfurtamMain,NewYork,Oxford,Wien,2017,p.41-61,JoeL gLas Man ,UnrulyAgents : PoliceReform,Bureaucratization,andPolicemensAgencyinInterwarTogoinJournal of African History, no.5,2014(1), p.79-100,MicheLL e M oy d,MakingtheH ousehold,M akingtheSt ate:ColonialM ilitaryCommunitiesandLaborinGerman EastAfrica,inInternational La bor and Working-class History, no.80,2011,p.53-76,saRah ziMM eRM an, “Mesdames Tirailleurs andIndirectClients:WestAfricanWomenandtheFrenchColonialArmy,1908-1918inInternational Journal of African Historical Studies, no.44,2011,p.299-322andtiMoth y PaRsons,Allaskaris arefamilymen:sex,domesticityanddiscipline intheKingsAfricanRies,1902-1964,indavid kiLL ingR ay and david e. oMissi (eds.),Guardians of Empire. The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700 -1964, Manchester,1999,p.157-179. 25. M icheLL e M oy d,Wedontwanttodiefornothing:askari atwarinGermanEastAfrica,1914-1918,insantanu das (ed.), Race, Empire and First World War Writings,Cambridge,2011,p.97. 26. CharlesTombeur(1867-1947).Heserve dasVice-Governor-GeneraloftheKatangaProvincefrom1912to1920, with aninterruptionduringtheFirstWorldWar.Whenthewarbrokeout,TombeurwasappointedCommander-in-Chief oftheBelgiancolonialtroopsonate mporarybasis.InJanuary1916,hewaspromote dtotherankofMajorGeneral Colonialtroops,temporarilyandforthedurationofthewar.feRnand deLL icou R,TombeurCharlesHenriMarieErnest, in Biographie belge d’Outre-Mer,Brussels,1968,vol.VI,col.1022-1026. 27. ayLWaRd sho RteR , African Re cruits … ,p.90. 28. M ichaeL P esek,TheColonialOrderUpsidedown?BritishandGermansinEastAfricanPrisoner-of-WarCampsduring WorldWarI,inuLR ik e L indne R, M aRen M öh Ring and MaRk stein, s iLke stRoh (ed.),Hybrid Cultures – Nervous States. Britain and Germany in a (Post)Colonial World,Amsterdam,2010,p.23-41. tofacetheGermanperseveranceandasthewar unhealthy conditions (inuenza or tropical dis- went on, the need for men increased while the ease)33.Menbecamesickratherthandieghting. military organization of the Belgians collapsed. Duetolackofbudgetandacriticaldisorganiza- Within fourmonths,thedeath rateamongstpor- tion of the porterage system29, the overcrowded terswassohighthatitraisedthealarmandledthe campshadashortageofmanyitems30andbesides GeneralGovernorofCongo,EugèneHenry,toput their ration the daily allowance rarely allowed an end to massive recruitments34.Yet,thedifcul- soldiersandporterstobuyadditionalsupplieson ties inresupplying andcompensating theloss of indigenousmarketsasnative peoplecommonly those men essential to the proper functioning of request3,50francsforahen31. military operations led him toorderamass levy (levée militaire)of4,500portersinstead35.Recruit- Permanent porters living conditions were even ments were no longer voluntary, as the deadly harsheranddespitetheir crucialrole,theBelgian conditions were known and desertions were so authorities disregarded them. Barely dressed and persistentduringtheenlistments,thatmilitaryand evenmoreill-equippedthanthesoldiers,thepor- administrativeauthoritieswerepermittedtorequi- terscomingintheringlinewereoftenredupon, sition any man if necessary. From that moment, andthereforetheyriskedtheirlivesjustasthesol- one can consider that due to the urgent need of dierswhoreceivedamuchbetterpay.Porterswere men,headmensprerogativessuchastheirright most of the time malnourished, as feeding men tousetheirsubjectsasworkforcewerecom- coming from so many differentcommunitieswas monlymisusedtoobtainmen36. almost as complicated. Rations mainly made of ricewerefor instanceunfamiliartomenwho are As September drew near, Belgians were moving usedtoeatcassava.Extenuatedbythehugework- fast,andbythemiddleofthemonth,theghting loadofcarryingloadsweighing25-35kgoverlong pushedclosetothecityofTabora,thelargesttown distances,seventoninehoursaday,thesemenand andtheeconomiccapitalofGermanEastAfrica, women became the main victims of the conict. where the Germans had moved their capital at Whenever it was impossible to use other means thattime.On19September1916,theForce Pub- oftransport,theportershadtoprovideeverything lique achieved a crucial victory inTabora.After they could think of32. Weakened by insufcient asix-monthcampaignandanobjectivethatwas food, harsh climate, lack of rest or the inade- nallyreached,thedeathrateofsoldiersandpor- quatehygieneandmedicalcare,manydied from terswas evaluated37tothefairly highnumberof

29. AboutsystemsofporterageforGreatBritain,GermanyandBelgiumduringtheFirstWorldWar,seeMichaeL Pesek, WarofLegs.TransportandInfrastructureintheEastAfricanCampaignofWorldWarI,inTransfer,no.5,2015,p.102-120. 30. InventoryoftheequipmentshippedtotheAfricanCampaignsinGermanEastAfrica,13/10/1924(FPSFA,AA,FP2663,1205). 31. CampCommander,Jammes,toDistrictCommissioner,Lukula-Bavu,04/02/1916(FPSFA,AA,GG7477). 32. ada schnee , Bibi Mkuba. M y Experiences in German East Africa during World War I,translatedandeditedby SamE.EdelsteinJr.,SanBernadino,1995,p.33. 33. AboutthistopicforBritishWe stAfrica,seethetimelessworkof david kiLL ingR ay and JaMes M attheWs,BritishAfrican CarriersintheFirstWorldWar,inCanadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines,no.13, 1979(1-2),p.5-23. 34. EugèneHenrytoCharlesTombeur,04/08/1916(FPSFA,AA,FP2663,1205). 35. Rapport annuel du Congo belge pour l’année 1917,Brussels,1919,p.82andhen Ri segae Rt, Un terme au Congo belge : notes sur la vie coloniale, 1916-1918,Brussels,1919,p.69. 36. MeLvin Page,Introduction.BlackMeninaWhiteMensWar,inM eLvin Page(ed.),Africa and the First World War, NewYork,1987,p.5. 37. TheBelgiancolonialauthoritiesrecognize dofciallythatthecampaignconditionsweresuchthatitisnotimpossible thatcertaindesertionsandcertaindeathshavenotbeenidentied.Therefore,anynumbershouldbetreatedwithcaution. Note from the Service of the Force PubliquetotheMinistryofColonies,Brussels,27/01/1921(FPSFA, AA,FP2663). Edward Paice, Tip & Run. The Untold Tragedy of the Great War in Africa, London, Phoenix, 2008, p. xiii, xiv.

Caravan of porters to Mahenge (German East Africa) on September 25, 1917. Photo Album of Second Lieutenant Robert Vincent. Fonds Pierre Daye. ELB-AML-0060-0003. © AML (Archives et Musée de la Littérature). 11,000men38.Thevastmajorityofthemoccurred thelegaladministrationofTaboraarequiredcondi- amongst the porters who walked alongside tiontotheircollaboration,buttonoavail.However, the troops and died as a result of their injuries, manydiscussions later,inFebruary 1917,Belgian orbecauseofdisease,astheTaboraareawasgen- troopswererequestedtoleaveTaboraandtohelp erallyconsideredtobeanunwholesomenestfor the British forces with military support and thou- feveratthattime39. sands of porters41. In April 1917, Congolese bri- gadesledbyLieutenant-ColonelArmandHuyghé42 With this conquest, the Belgians reached their andworkingunderthesuperiorsupervisionofthe goals and decided to end their military opera- British were engaged against the German forces. tions. CommandingGeneralTombeurwas there- Mahenge,theirlastbastioninEastAfrica,fellinto fore put in charge of administering Tabora and Belgian hands on October 9, 1917. Forced back the occupied territories of Ruanda and Urundi to Mozambique,vonLettow-Vorbeck andhis last until an agreement was concluded with Great troopseventuallysurrenderedaftertheArmistice. Britain, its military partner. As colonial rivalries werestrong,theBritishState,ill-disposedtowards Duringthislastcampaign,therecruitmentofpor- the idea of a Belgian administration, or even of ters was rendered almost impossible. Exhausted amixedadministration,refusedtorecognizeBel- by requisitions and frightened by previous mas- giumsclaimsinEastAfrica.Thefutureoftheseter- sive recruitments carried out in all the territories ritorieswastobedecidedatthepeacesettlement crossedby theForce Publique troops,peopleed and in the meantime, the military occupations attheapproach ofrecruiters43.Quickly,measures wereconsideredtemporary,tothegreatdispleas- were taken to increase the numbers of porters. ureoftheBelgiancolonialauthorities40. Crackdowns towards fugitives were deepened andindigenouschiefsweresanctionedwhenthey Inautumn1916,theconditionsworsenedconsid- failed to get enough men. The occupied territo- erablyforallthearmiesinvolved.TheBritishonce riesofRuandaandUrundiwerenotsparedeither. again needed the Force Publique against the Ger- EveniftheyprovidedmeninAugustandSeptem- mantroopsthatthreatenedtheirforcesinthesouth ber1916,theywererequestedtodosoagainwhen of Tabora. As their European and Indian mixed thenewmassiverecruitmentsbeganin1917forthe troopswerenearlydecimatedbytropicaldiseases, secondcampaign,andlosseswerenumerous.Con- theywerehavingdifcultiestodefeattheGermans sequently,newmasslevies wereordered,drivenby ontheirown.TheBelgianauthoritiestriedtomake war needs and pressure from British authorities.

38. Jan de Wae Le,VoorVorstenVaderland:Zwar tesoldatenendragerstijdensdeEersteWereldoorloginCongo, in Militaria Belgica,2007-2008,p.128. 39. a da schnee , My Exp eriences in German Ea st A frica ….,p.29. 40. SeeThomasGraditzkyinthisissue. 41. h. W ebe R,NégociationsdiplomatiquesausujetdeTabora(1916),inLa Belgique Militaire,no.62,1967,p.11-14;no.63, 1967,p.15-16. 42. ArmandHuyghé(1871-1944).DuringtheFirstWorldWar,herstfoughtontheBelgianfrontandthenlef tforCongo whereheparticipated,aslieutenant-colonel,intheBelgiancampaigninG ermanEastAfrica.In1917,hewasappointed Commander-in-chiefofBelgiancolonialtroopsinGermanEastAfricaandledtheoffensivefortheca ptureofMahengeon October9,1917.PauL van den abee Le,HuyghédeMahenge(ChevalierArmand-Christophe),inBiographie coloniale belge, 1955,vol.IV,col.415- 422. 43. Avoidancetacticswereclearlynotspecictothewarperio d.FromtherstyearsofEuropeancolonizationinAfrica, itenabledthelocalpopulationtoescapefromtaxation,forcedlabourorcoercedrecruitmentsofworkersandsoldiers. See M icheLL e M oy d,ResistanceandRebellions(Africa),in1914-1918-online… , 2017-0 6-20andM aRc M icheL, Essai sur la colonisation positive. Affrontements et accommodements en Afrique Noire 1830 -1930,Paris,20 09. About 20,000 porters were recruited in total44. Ifthecolonialarchivesare mainlysilent astothe generalrecruitmentconditions,ormerelystipulate thatitwas very well done45,othersshow a dif- Mpe Bula-Matari molamu afuti ferentrealityasrepressionsoffugitivesandmeas- Basoda baye babundi na bokasi : urestakenagainstindigenousheadmenwhofailed Na basusu apesi dekorasio. to mobilize a sufcient number of recruits were Basusu bazwi o likolo mosolo 50. intensied. While many young people had been AndBula-Mataribenevolenthasrewarded recruited in 1916, 1917 recruitments were less Thesoldierswhohavefoughtwithenergy: demanding with regard to the physical condition Tosomeawards, of individuals andmanyold people andchildren Toothersextramoney. werepartoftherecruits. The very last months of 1918 and the following Desertions and death rates amongst recruits yearwerededicated to thedemobilizationof the fromRuanda andUrundi wereso signicantthat Belgian colonialtroops. Military campaigns were 3,000 Congolese porters were requested in over but the harsh living conditions led to many KatangainMay and 13,000moreinJuly 46,while moredeathsamongstCongolesesoldiersandAfri- therecruitmentofportersoriginatingfromRwanda can porters: they were exhausted and suffered andwasstoppeddenitively 47 .Thisdeci- from constant reduction in rations51 and rampant sion of recruiting in Congo was far from being epidemics.Themostvaliantwereusedforthecon- takenlightly,astheconsequencesofportageonthe struction ofshelters(gîtes)forformercombatants, populationswerewell-knowntotheBelgiancolo- andinrmariesforsickpeoplewhowerekeptaway nialauthorities.Buttheimperativesofwardictated fromtheirhomesinanattempttopreventepidem- the decision-making 48. Within months, recruiters ics,extendingtheirhomecomingforweeks. helped by territorial leaders managed to mobi- lize13,367men,morethantherequirednumber, Athome,thepost-wareffectswerenteasytoman- whichleavesnodoubtastotheextremecoercion agefortheformercombatants.As manyofthem used on people.Of those 13,367,only 10,467 returned with physical injuries and presumably reachedEastAfricaandofthe2,900missing,some psychological ones, the weight must have been willhavedesertedontheway,otherswillhavedied heavy on theirfamily.Itwasindubitablydifcult andotherswillhavebeendeclaredunt 49. togetbacktoanormallife52.

44. Ordonnance du 4 juillet 1917 ordonnant la levée extraordinaire de porteurs militaires, Ordonnance du 18 août 1917 ordonnant la levée extraordinaire de porteurs militaires and Ordonnance du 14 novembre 1917 ordonnant la levée extraordinaire de porteurs militaires. 45. ReportontherecruitmentofportersfortherequirementsoftheBritisharmy,EastAfrican-Belgianoccupation, EasternZone,postRukira,10/04/1917(FPSFA,AA ,RWA344). 46. MinistryofJusticetoForeignAffairs,LeHavre,25/0 6/1917(FPSFA, AD,AF1.3). 47. Commander-in-chiefoft heNorthernProvince sStevens,Kitega,06/07/1917(FPSFA, AA,RWA344). 48. MajorCouchetoMinistryofColonies,LeHavre,23/05/1917(FPSFA, AA,FP2659). 49. Rapport annuel du Congo belge pour l’année 1917,Brussels,1919,p.85. 50. Et Bula-M atari bienveillant a rétribué Les soldats qui ont combattu avec énergie : Aux uns des décorations, Aux autres de l’argent en plus. Bobutwibwabasoda(Retourdessoldats),inPie RRe kita M. M asa ndi and MaRc dePaePe, La chanson scolaire au Congo belge, anthologie,Paris,20 04,p.68. 51. Adailyrationwas500gr.ofriceorourperdayin1918.Incomparison,a1923-dailyrationwa s1kg.ofchickwangue, 100gr.ofpalmoil,500gr.ofbananas,200gr.ofrice,100gr.ofbeans,200gr.ofmeatorshand20gr.ofsalt.EugèneHenry toJulesRenkin,Boma,06/03/1918(FPSFA, AA ,AE370). 52. M icheLL e M oy d,Extra-EuropeanTheatresofWar,in1914-1918 – online… , 2014-10-08. Afterthewarcameatimetorememberthosewho ThevaliantcolonialArmytheWarhadforced fought and those who fell for la Patrie. Despite us to get up, had achieved without defeat, expressionsofappreciationandgratitude,ofcers the task that had been assigned to her. [] and Congolese troopsofthe Force Publiquewere Now, Tabora should be listed in Belgians not on the national agenda of memorial cere- successful military actions alongside Liège, mony53. Unlike the French who commemorate HaelenandYser.First,itsadeservedhomage, since November 1919 the massive participation thenitsapoliticalneed58. ofAfricansandtheheavycasualtiestheysuffered, nothingsimilarwasdoneinBelgium 54. Firstmarksofcollectiverecognitionwereobvi- ously militaryand colonialones 59.Soldiersand Memorialsandceremonies,ourishing,wereded- porterscouldbecommendedintheArmyOrder icatedtoBelgianJass55 and civiliandeaths during of their battalion (Ordre du Jour de l’Armée), thewarbutthecolonialtroopswhohadreturned begrantedhonorarydistinctions60 fortheirloy- fromGermanEastAfricawerenotassociatedwith alty to the ag and their dedication to their theArmisticeparadesorwiththeJoyeuse Entrée of European leaders61. Noticeably, these rewards KingAlbertinBrusselsattheendofthewar.Bitterly and how they have been awarded to Africans disappointed by what was perceived as a lack of were acutely marked with paternalism and the consideration,colonialofcersexpressedtheirdis- vivid racial distinction between European and affectionandstrongdesirethatAfricancampaigns African combatants. Two distinctions existed and the Force Publique weredulyrecognized56. at that time to grant the indigenous people: the Ordre royal du Lion and the Ordre de l’Étoile Attheendofthewar,itwasassumedthatTabora Africaine. Created before the war, as visible andMahengehelpedBelgiumtoassertitsstatusof marksofrecognitiondiscernedtoEuropeansfor victoriousnation.Manywerethosewhorecom- servicestoCongoand,moregenerally,infavour mendedthe bravery and the loyalty ofthe Force of Africas civilization, these two distinctions Publique troops. Congolese soldiers and porters were chosen to give to European ofcers and emergeasvaluablemilitaryassistants,trustworthy NCOs, and soldiers and porters having distin- ofbeing rewarded as their endurance,tenacity, guished themselves, individually, during the enthusiasmwereunalterable57. Africancampaigns.

53. a nne co Rnet ,LaréceptiondescampagnesafricainesdelaGrandeGuerreenBelgiquependantlentre-deux-gue rre s, entreamer tumeetreconnaissance,inPie RRe deJeMePPe and nathaLie tousig nant (eds ), La Guerre 14-18 en Afrique. Des mémoires repliées,Brussels,2016,p.73. 54. MaRc M icheL, L’Afrique dans l’engrenage de la Grande Guerre,Paris,2013andRuth ginio ,AfricanSoldiersbetwee n MemoryandForgetfulness:TheCaseofPost-ColonialSenegal,inOutre-Mers. Revue d’histoire,no.94,2006,p.141-155. 55. JassisatermthatreferstotheBelgiansoldierintheFirstWorldWar,andwaspopularizedintheinter-warperio d. ThistermisthedirectadaptationoftheFlemishwordJaswhichmea nscoat whichisthenanintegralpartofthe Belgianmilitar yuniform.L auRence van yPeRse Le, eMM anue L deb Ruyn e and c hantaL keste Loot, Bruxelles, la mémoire et la guerre (1914 -2014),Waterloo,2014,p.125. 56. anne c oRnet ,LesoldatcongolaisdanslaGrandeGuerre.Unoubliédelapropagandedeguerrebelge?,inOutre-Mers. Revue d’histoire,no.390 -391(Specialissue:L aPremièreGuerremondialeetlese mpirescoloniaux),2016,p.211-233. 57. cha RLes toMbeuR,Campagnescolonialesbelges(1914-1918),inLouis fRanck(ed.),Le Congo belge,vol.2,Brussels, 1928,p.176. 58. Itcorrespondstotheideathatthiswarwasaturningpointinthestrugglebetweencivilizationandbarbarism.Pie RRe daye, Avec les vainqueurs de Tabora,Brussels,1935,p.199anddick van gaLen L ast , Black Shame …. 59. AboutrewardstoEuropeanofcersandNCOs,seeanne c oRnet ,Laréceptiondescampagnesafricaines,p.71-80. 60. ben JaMin yata L okadi,LesmilitairesCongolaisdécorésdelaPremièreGuerremondiale:desmodèlesdepatriotisme, in isid o Re nday WeL è nzie M and PaMPhi Le M abiaL a M antuba -ngo Ma (eds),, Le Congo belge dans la Première Guerre mondiale (1914 -1918),Paris,2015,p.251-264anda.c. boRne ,Lesdistinctionshonoriquesbelgesdelaguerre1914-1918, in Militaria Belgica,1988,p.71-86. 61. c haRLes to Mbeu R,Campagnescolonialesbelges(1914-1918),p.176. FromSeptember1915,bothGeneralTombeuras Besides those colonialawards,threedecorations Supreme Commander of Eastern troops and the were especially established in relation with the Governor General were allowed to confer the wartoawardtothosewhotookpartin theAfri- bronzemedaloftheOrdre royal du Lion to indig- can campaigns: the Médaille Commémorative enous auxiliaries62. Brave soldiers who were des Campagnes d’Afrique 1914-1917;the Croix commendedintheArmyOrderoftheirbattalion de Guerre, 1914-1918 and the Médaille interalliée for having particularly distinguished themselves orMédailledelaVictoire1914-1918.Thesedec- by their commitment during the war could be orationswereawardedbytheBelgianWarOfce giventhesilverorbronzemedaloftheOrdre de attherequestofEuropeanmilitarycommanders66. l’Étoile Africaine . Therstmedal,theMédaille Commémorative des Sergeant-Major Kwangule, register 47075: Campagnes d’Afrique, 1914-1917, was the only Excellentofcer.Distinguishedhimselfduring onethatwasspecicallymadeasaprecioussou- thecampaignbyhismilitaryskills,hiscourage venirandadistinctmarktogivetothosewho and his coolness under re. Has carried out tookpartintheAfricancampaignsandshoweda in various circumstancesdifcult assignments valour andloyaltysuch thattheFatherlandowes entrustedtohim.Beingaplatoonleader,hewas themaspecialmarkofrecognition67.Twodistinct seriouslywoundedinIdetesbattlebylaunch- medals were created, a silver one for European ingtheassaultonenemypositionsatthehead ofcersandNCOs,andabronzeoneforindige- ofhismen.AlreadyholdstheBronzeMedalof nous gradésandsoldiers.Bestowedbyministerial the Ordre royal du Lionforactsofwar63. ordinance,thelatterwereawardedonamassive scale,about16,00068. Adistinctionwasalsoawardedtothemostdeserv- ing ones.Soldiers who had been commended in Both the Croix de Guerre, 1914-1918 and the theArmyOrder of their battalion and those who Médaille de la Victoire, 1914-1918werenational hadbeenproposedanawardseveraltimes,aswell awardscreated torewardactsofbraveryagainst as soldiers killed ordead from their wounds and theenemyoftheBelgianarmy,thatwereextended commended, were also given a posthumous toindigenouspeoplewhoperformedparticularly award64.OnlyafewCongolesesoldiersweregiven well during the African campaigns69. Due to thegoldmedal,likethePremier Sergent Barasi65. the strongracialboundaryandthestrictmilitary

62. Arrêté-royal du 18 septembre 1915 autorisant le Gouverneur Général et le Commandant Supérieur des Troupes en opération à décerner, pendant la durée de la guerre, la médaille de bronze de l’Ordre royal du Lion, pour faits individuels de guerre accomplis par les soldats indigènes sur le théâtre des hostilités. 63. Sergent-Major Kwangule, matricule 47075 : “Excellent gradé. S’est distingué au cours de la campagne par ses aptitudes militaires,soncourageetsonsang-froidaufeu.Sestacquittéendiversescirconstancesdesmissionsdifcilesquiluiétaient conées.Étantchefdepeloton,aétégrièvementblesséaucombatdIdeteenselançantentêtedeseshommesàlassaut des positions ennemies. Est déjà titulaire de la Médaille de Bronze de l’Ordre royal du lion pour fait de guerre. Arrêté-royal du 21 juillet 1918 conférant la médaille de Bronze de l’Ordre de l’Étoile Africaine avec palme et attribution de la Croix de guerre au Sergent-Major Kwangule de la 2/XII et au Clairon de 1e classe, Liba nga de la 1/XII (FPSFA,AA ,DH2112). 64. EugèneHenrytoJulesRenkinaboutthehaute-paie forhonorarygratication,Boma,26/09/1916(FPSFA, AA,DH2246) 65. Arrêté-royal du 20 novembre 1916 octroyant la Médaille d’Or de l’Ordre de l’Étoile Africaine au premier-sergent Barasi. 66. Afourthmedal,theMédaille Commémorative de la Guerre 1914-1918wassolelyawardedtoBelgiancitize nswhofought insidethemetropolitanarmyduringthe14-18War.Arrêté royal du 21 juillet 1919 créant la Médaille Commémorative de la Guerre 1914-1918. 67. PFSFA,AA,FP3833.JulesRenkintoKingAlber t,LeHavre,16/02/1917. 68. Arrêté-royal du 21 février 1917 instituant une médaille commémorative pour les militaires et fonctionnaires qui ont participé directement aux campagnes d’Afrique de 1914, 1915 et 1916.In1931,asilverbarret teinscrib edwithMahenge wasspecicallygiventocivilservants,EuropeanandAfricansoldiersenlistedinthatcampaignfollowingthe Arrêté-royal du 28septembre1931,modiantceluidu21février1917instituantlesmédaillescommémorativesdescampagnesdAfrique. 69. Zwendelaar,attachéoftheMinisterofColoniesCabinetatSainte-Adresse,LeHavre,27/08/1918(FPSFA,AA,DH2117). Gold Commemorative medal of African Campaign, 1914-1918 awarded to Sergeant Major Baras[s]i on 22 December 1917 in Kilossa (East Africa), Musée royal de l’Afrique centrale, HP.1954.95.2-96. guideline,fewerAfricansoldiersandporterswere received 25francs,butonly ifthecontractwas grantedthesetwodecorations. approvedbytheEtat-MajorofceinBomaandon the conditionthattheinterruptionofservicedid On a practical level, the fate of those who notexceedsixmonths75.In1919,LouisFranck, remained wasnotaltogether enviableand nan- thenewMinisterofColonies,decidedtoreward cialgraticationswerelimited.Evenifattheend thosewhoweredirectlyinvolvedinAfricancam- ofeachterm,soldiersandpermanentporters(aux- paigns,asamannerofshowingourrecognition iliaires des troupes) received indemnities and even for their dedication and bravery, once again76. if honorary distinctions wenthand in hand with AnannualbudgetwasdeterminedandCongolese annuities, a haute-paie and a rente tenant compte Veterans of 1914-1918, soldiers and permanent des conditions de la vie indigène70, all of these porters, were thus granted specic allowances weresmall.InNovember1915,CharlesTombeur on demand ofa member of the colonialadmin- shared his concerns with the Minister of Colo- istration.Eachoftheseallowanceswasrelatedto nies,JulesRenkin,tograntspecicallowancesfor the value ofthe man, transcribed in his military indigenoussoldiersandpermanentportersortheir record (livret militaire)andonlyontherecommen- families71. However, those questions were to be dationofahigherauthority.Thosehavingserved pushedasideanddiscussedattheendofthewar, at war during EastAfrica campaigns of 1916 or to determine the budgetary costs that the adop- 1917receivedatwo-monthpayandsoldiershav- tionofgovernmentalfavourswouldentail72.Afew ing served during the demobilization received monthslater,asthewardraggedon,theGeneral 25 francs in addition, only if the contract was Governor Eugène Henry decided to allow each approvedbytheEtat-MajorofceinBomaandon soldieranancialrewardequivalenttoamonths the conditionthattheinterruptionofservicedid pay,thusafewfrancs 73.FromAugust1917,widows notexceedsixmonths77. and parents of soldiersandporters, who diedat warorbecauseofthe war,alsoreceived75francs Besidesthepensiontheyreceivedafterbeingdis- and 20 francs respectively, in addition of the charged (pension de réforme),Congoleseveterans remainingbalance74. with disabilities obtained specic allowances of 150-250francsayear,dependingontheirdisabil- After the demobilization, Jules Renkin decided ity78.Thelower-limbamputeesobtainedasewing tograntatwo-monthpayto thosehavingserved machine in addition79.Evenifsomereportssug- during East Africa campaigns. In addition, sol- gestthatindigenouswar-disabled received,indi- diers having served during the demobilization vidually,othercompensationsbasedontheirdis-

70. Arrêté-royal du 22 décembre 1916 relatif à l’octroi d’une haute paie ou d’une rente viagère aux militaires noirs décorés pour faits de gue rre de la Médaille de l’Ordre de l’Étoile Africaine ou de l’Ordre royal du Lion.M inisterofColoniesto KingAlbertaboutmilitarydecorationsforAfricansoldiers,LeHavre,8/12/1916(FPSFA,AA,DH2246). 71. CharlesTombeurtoJulesRenkin,Elisabethville,0 6/11/1915(FPSFA, AA,FP2663). 72. EugèneHenrytoJulesRenkin,Boma,09/06 /1916(FP SFA, AA,FP2663). 73. NotefromEugè neHenry,Boma,12/04/1917(FPSFA, AA,GG7303). 74. EugèneHenrytoCharlesTombeur,Boma,04/08/1916(FPSFA,AA ,FP2663,1205).Itisobviouslydifculttoquantify thevalueofthissuminrelationtolifelost.However,thefactthatawifeaccompanyingherhusbandinamilitarycampaign receivesvefrancsadayincompensationforthehouseholdchoressheper formsinthecampwouldmeanthatamanslife equals15daysofser vice.(Circularadjustingtheallowance s,27/12/1915). 75. JulesRenkintoEugèneHenry,Brussels,22/02/1918(FPSFA,DA,AE370)and6 thDirection(FP)toGeneralDirector Van Damme,Brussels,16/12/1921(FPSFA,AA,FP2663). 76. MinisterofColoniesLouisFrancktoEugèneHenry,Brussels,27/06/1919.(FPSFA,AA ,FP2663). 77. PFSFA,AA,FP2663,1205.6thDirection(FP)toGeneralDirectorVanDamme,Brussels,16/12/1921(PFSFA,AA , FP2663,1205). 78. Ordinance -lawonreformpensionsfordisabledpersons,10/07/1916. 79. 6thDirection(FP)toM inistryofColonies,Brussels,26/02/1919(FPSFA, AA,FP2663,1205). ability,norehabilitationcentrewaseverbuilt,nor intended for Force Publique troops and gave werepsychologicalinjuriestakenintoaccount80. each veteran an old-age allowance (allocation de vieillesse), those of 14-18 included. At that Yet, when discharged from the Force Publique time, nearly 8,000 of them were living in dire with almost no nancial resources and no poverty and were stirring up Provincial Gover- job, most of the Congolese veterans suffered norstodosomethingastheywerefortoolong from the complete lack of pension system and forgotten, just as indigenous populations were faced the grim reality of extreme poverty that heavilyblamingtheadministration 85.Followinga shocked colonizers and populations81. Despite specicandlengthyprocedure86 ,thisallowance the large increase of these allowances com- gaveeachindigenousveteraninpossessionofhis paredtothoseof1916,theyseemedunsatisfying regimentnumberormilitarypassbook150francs to some veterans who, like the disabled ones, perquarteruntiltheirdeath,withtheexception probably embittered by their living conditions, of the ones condemned to a peine de servitude groupedinvillages de mutilésandusedviolence pénale de deux mois ou plus 87. towards local populations and threatened colo- nial authorities82 .Therefore, from the 1920s to The number of Congolese veteranswhoactually the1930s,moreforcefuleffortshavebeentaken received anallowance is noteasilyquantiable. to nd former combatants and grant nancial Onceagain,completerecordsaremissing.Yet,it allowances,and marks of interest to the wor- is likely that the complex Western-based pro- thy ones, on a more systematic basis, but with- cedureledtothe impossibilityfor some ofthem outanysignicantresult83.Nodiscussionabout toasserttheirrightsto anyallowance88.Was the anaccesstoanyofcialstatusevertook place. unknown mass of unrecorded porters con- Alastmeasurewastakenin194684, as the Sec- cernedbyallthesegrants?Littleisknownbutitis ondWorldWar wasover.TheMinistryofColo- unlikelytheywouldhavebeennumerous,aslots niesdecidedtoreorderallowances,whichwere ofthemwillhaveremaineduntraceable89.

80. LouisFrancktoEugèneHenry,Brussels,21/05/1918(FP SFA,AA,FP2658). 81. Nosnouvelle scolonialesinNotre Colonie,no.9,1920(1),p.130-131,quote dbya nne c oRnet inLaréception descampag nesafricaines,p.73. 82. SankurusDistrictCommissionertoLusamboProsecutor,Ikoka,27/01/1922(FPSFA,AA ,GG5081,1357). Thesevillages de mutilésthusjoinedthevillages de licenciés,regroupingformersoldiers,abovelocalchieft aincies. ItisalsopossibletomakeananalogywiththeaspectsdevelopedbyNancyRoseHunt.nancy Rose hunt, Espace,temp oralitéetrêverie:é crirelhistoiredesfutursauCongobelge ,inPolitique Africaine,no.135,2014,p.115-136. 83. e.g.Circularof26November1927decidingtheannualgrantofablanketandt wobluedrillpagnestocer tain categoriesofindigenousveterans;Decreeof3April1930adjustingthepensionofindige nousveterans;RoyalDecreeof 3December1930onthepensionofindige nousveterans;Circularof8November1932onpayandallowancestoindigenous soldiersoftheForce Publique;Circularof26Nove mber1932set tingthehaute-paie andpensionforhonorarydistinction awardedtoindigenoussoldiersoftheForce Publique. 84. From1January1960,thisold-ageallowancewasincreasedto30 0francseveryquarte rinordertoallowformerse rvants, nowoldandonlyenjoyinglimitedresources,toget ,periodically,awork,ablanketoranyotherobject.MinistryofCongo andRuanda-UrunditoG eneralGovernor,Brussels,24/11/1959(FPSFA,AA,FP2614). 85. PierreRyck manstoM inistryofColonies,Lé opoldville,25/01/1946(FPSFA,AA ,GG2614). 86. Eachterritorialadministratorhadtotransmitaspeciccardlle doutwithasmuchinformationaspossibleontheveteran listedinhisterritorybyTerritorialAgentstotheCaptain-CommanderwhocheckedthisinformationintheMilit aryRecord andalsoiftheveteranhadanysentenceinhisrecord.Ifnot,thecompletedcardwa ssenttotheDistrictCommissionerwho allowedthegrant.EugèneHenrytoProvincialGovernors,Lé opoldville,12/07/1946(FPSFA,AA ,GG10648). 87. TheSectionoftheFPoftheMinistryofColoniestoEugèneHenry,Brussels,16/04/1946(FPSFA, AA,FP2614). 88. Lotsofallowancecardscontainedmisspellednames.E.g.SoldierAOHEwasrenamedAHENE,soldierGWETOwas renamedGWATA,andsoldierITOLIwasrenamedITELU.LtJacobstoTerritorialAdministratorofLibenge,Lisala,14/07/1948 (FPSFA, AA,GG22385). 89. CaptainMaertenstoTerritorialAdministratorofLibenge,Lisala,26/06/1940(FPSFA, AA,GG22384). inGermanEastAfricaduringtheMahengecam- paign,reportedin1919. In theearly1920s,onceterritorialpriorities were Bywalkingthroughthebushes,werealizethat settled, the counting of victims and the question wearecrossingovermounds:notonecrossor of memorials emerged everywhere, thus also for sign whatsoever that would allow this place Belgium 90.Howtohonourthemanydead91?Inthe toberecognizedastheburialplaceofmany caseofBelgianCongo,iftherearenoofcialdata of our war victims,who all deservedbetter! onthenumberofcasualties,itismainly because [talkingabouttherstcemeteries]94. ofcialreportsoftenindicateunmatchedorimpre- cise data 92.HistorianJandeWaeleestablishedthat, Disillusioned, Delattre spoke out against between 1914 and 1918, 145 European ofcers the absence of care and maintenance of the and NCOS, 2,000 soldiers and 24,975 porters gravesites to the Ministry ofColoniesand com- (approximately10%ofthegenerallyacceptedg- mittedhimselftowardserectingtombsinTabora, ureofrecruitment)died,mainlyfrommalnutrition, otherwiseitwouldnotbedone 95.Afewyears ofcialneglectanddiseaseforthelatter93. later,whiletheBelgianStatewasincompliance with practices inauguratedby Great Britainand In the regions crossed by the Force Publique, France,thecolonialauthoritiesdecidedtoleave graveyardsandtombswereourishing.Consider- to each District commissioner of Congo the ini- ingwartimescircumstances,indigenouswhofell tiative to achieve the erection of European and on the battleelds were mostly buried with few African military graves without further delay. marks of recognitionother than a wooden stake For budgetary concerns, the Commissioners withanumberplateontopofit,andsometimesin were invited to improve the situation by using massgraves.LittleeffortsweredoneforEuropeans thecreditsalreadyavailable. whowereburiedinsinglegraves.Yet,yearslater, thosemakeshiftgravesiteswereinpoorcondition Atrst,militarygraveswerelocalizedandgrouped and the four military cemeteries ofTabora were into distinct graveyards for Europeans and Afri- abandonedasCaptainArmandDelattre,whowas cans. Each European tombstone wore a name

90. Par tofthisquestionmustbeansweredwhencomparedtotheBelgiansituation.Se ea xeL tixh on , L auRence van yPeRse Le, Dusangetdespierres.Lesmonumentsdelaguerre1914-1918enWallonie,inCahiers d’Histoire du Temps Présent,no.7, 200 0,p.83-126andLauRence van yPeRse Le, eMM anue L deb Ruyn e and chantaL kesteLoot, Bruxelles …. 91. AbouttraditionalAfricanmourningpracticesseeM eshack oWino,BereavementandMourning(Africa), in 1914-1918-online…, 2017-01-09. 92. Forexample,between1916and1918,theannualrep ortsofBelgianCongogroupedunderde stinationnotreached allthedecea sed,theconvictsandthedeserte drecruits,anduntiltheearly1920s,militaryofcialsadmittedthattheyonly possessedinaccurateinformationaboutsoldiersandporters,recruited,wounded,kille dordeserters. 93. Jan de Wae Le,VoorVorstenVaderland,p.128.Incomparison,theBelgian(metropolitan)armylostabout 34,000 soldiers.L auRence van yPeR se Le, e MM anueL deb Ruyn e and chantaL keste Loot, Bruxelles …, p.24.Theseguresare conrmedbymyownresearchandcanbematchedwiththenumbersestablishedin1933bytheBelgianMinistryof Colonies :3,891soldiersand23,954porterswerekilledordiedasaresultoftheirwoundsbetween1August1914and theArmistice,and120EuropeanofcersandNCOsdiedatthesameperiod.RatingforlossofBelgiantroopsestablished accordingtoreportsoftheMe dicalServiceoftheEa sterntroopsinFebruar y1919,01/1933(FPSFA, AA,FP 2663).Ina recognitioneffort,sinceNovember2017,theBelgianregisterofwardeadmentionedunderFirstWorldWarBelgium CongoForcePubliquenearly1,500men,ofcers,NCOsandsoldierswhodiedduringtheBelgiancampaignsinGerman EastAfrica:https://ww w.wardeadregister.be. 94. C’est en le parcourant, à travers la brousse, que l’on se rend compte que l’on passe sur des tumulus : pas une croix, ou le moindre signe quelconque, qui fassent reconnaître l’endroit où reposent bon nombres de nos victimes de la guerre qui, toutes, méritaient mieux ! ArmandDelattretoCharlesTombeur,Tabora,11/05/1919(FP SFA, AA,GG6902). 95. Idem. 1914-1918 Veteran’s card. Old-age allowance. Soldat de 1 e classe IKOKO, June 26, 1947. FPS FA, AA, GG 7190. engravedinamarbleplate96,whileAfricantomb- deadinAfricaduringthe1914-1918campaigns stoneswereinlavaplates,mostlyanonymous. in July 1927 and it took even longer periods of timetoseeasimilarmemorialinBelgium.While Fromsummer1921,ve memorials 97forAfrican the Rue du Ruanda, the Rue Général Tombeur and soldiers and porters of the Force Publique were the Rue Général Molitorwereinauguratedinthe built by British authorities in present : late1930sintheBrusselsarea,theMonument aux twoinTabora,one inLulanguru,one inKigoma troupes des campagnes d’Afrique, dedicated to andoneinMahenge,inadditiontoalltheEuro- bothEuropeansandAfricanswhoservedinAfrica pean military graves98. Refusing to do less than since the Leopoldian era was nally erected in whattheBritishdid,theBelgiancolonialauthor- Schaerbeek (Brussels) in 1970, on the personal ities decided to erect other memorials in Congo initiative of a colonial association, the Union too99.Theideaofindividualcommemorationand roya le des Fraternelles Coloniales. individual memorials for indigenous people was quickly abandoned as the colonial authorities sawitasawasteofpublicmoneyanddeclaredit impossiblebecauseofthelackofcompletemilitary recordsforindigenousrecruits.From1925,there existedthreememorials:amixedoneinKibati100 ForAndrewT.JarboeandRichard S.Fogarty,the (North-Kivu), a mixed one in Luvungi (South- Great War was an imperial contest fought by Kivu)andinAlbertville(Katanga).EachEuropean empires to determine the fate of those empires memorial bore inscribed marble nameplates for andprotecttheirownpossessions102.Thisisalso eachofcerfallenonthebattleeldorbecauseof trueforBelgium.Theinterestsofthe colony and theirwounds.OntheAfricanmemorialsofKibati, oftheCongolesepopulationweresubordinatedto Lulanguru, andTabora, no individual name was those of the Métropoleand Congosnatural and inscribed but a bronze plate with the following manpowerresourceswereextensivelyusedforthe inscriptionwashung:InMemoryoftheBelgian benet of Belgium ultimately.The complaint of Soldiers and PortersWho fellfor the Fatherland, PhilippeMolangi,theCongoleseveteran,seemed 1914-1919101. legitimate;he faced death closely and probably did notreceive his dueforhis participation in Ittookseveralmoreyearstoseetheinaugurationof the African campaigns of the First World War. anationalmemorialinLéopoldville,dedicatedto Onecansaythatdespitetheveryimportantrole bothEuropeans,Congolesesoldiersandporters, they played during the Great War, soldiers and

96. In1922,20militarygravesweretobeerectedintheEa ste rnProvinceand13inKatanga.FileonM ilitarygraves, 02/05/1922(FPSFA, AA,JUST83B). 97. Thesamedistinctionsweremadeinothercoloniesanddominions.SeeMichè Le baRR et t,Afterword:deathand theAfte rlife:Britainscoloniesanddominions,inDasSantanu(ed.),Race, Empire and First World War Writings,Cambridge, 2011,p.301-320andM aRc M icheL, L’Afrique dans l’engrenage … 98. ListofBelgianWarGravesinTanganyikaTerritory,24/04/1925(FPSFA,AA ,JUST83B). 99. ForadetaileddescriptionoftheBelgiangravesandcemeteriesinGermanEa stAfrica,CongoandtheOccupied Territories,seeLouis hab R an,Tombesetcimetièresbelge sdelEstAfricain,inL’Illustration congolaise,no.64,1927, p.1247-1252and1261-1265. 100. Atrst,thismemorialwasdedicatedtoEuropeanofcersandwa serec tedbytheinitiativeofM.Festraets, mechanic oftheBelgiannavyinKivu,inDecember1922.Lateron,ontheoccasionofitsinaugurationin1924,thismemorial wasdedicatedtobothEuropeansandAfricansdeadin1915-1916ontheKivuboarder.FestraetstoColonelOlsen,, 07/12/1922andRe portontheinaugurationofcemeteryandmonumenterecte dinKibati,Bukavu,19/11/1924(FP SFA, AA , JUST83B). 101. lamémoiredessoldatsbelgestombéspourlaPatrie, 1914-1917.Louis hab Ran ,Tombesetcimetières,p.1250. 102. and ReW tait JaRboe , R ichaRd s. foRga Rty,Introduction.AnimperialturninFirstWorldWarStudies,in a ndR eW tait JaRboe , R ichaRd s. foRgaR ty (eds), Empires in World War I,London-NewYork,2014,p.1. Louis Habran, “Tombes et cimetières belges de l’Est Africain”, in L’Illustration congolaise, no. 64, 1927, p. 1263.

Louis Habran, “Tombes et cimetières belges de l’Est Africain”, in L’Illustration congolaise, no. 64, 1927, p. 1263. porterswere somehow unrecognized byBelgian atedclosecontactsbetweenAfricansandEurope- authoritiesasnothingefcientwassetuptoallow ans.Thesehonorarydistinctions,iftheyundeniably the combatants and their families to effectively provethevalourofCongolesesoldiersandporters improvetheirsituation103. duringthewar,aremostlyaccuraterepresentations of the colonial system and reections of racial During the war, it seems clear that the Belgian conictsandhierarchies.Thesame istruefor the colonial administration, short in money, gave its remembrance of the numerous African deaths. priority to military supplies and not to the wel- InCongo,asinothercoloniesinAfrica,commem- fare of its Forces viveswhoenduredwar in very orations were alsoforms ofcolonialpropaganda, harsh conditions. Besides, the way death rates meansofglorifyingthecolonialprojectratherthan and impact of morbidity amongst soldiers and theAfricanswhoperished inthe war.In order to portershavebeenproduced,countedandrevised erasethePoorLittleBelgiumstatusgeneratedby isrelevanttoapprehendhow Belgian authorities theGermaninvasionandtostrengthenitsposition dealtwiththemthroughoutthewar.Eventhough aspowerfulempire,Belgiumchosetoerectmemo- there seem to have been some ofcial concerns rialsastestimonyofthelargeBelgianinvestmentin aboutwhattheywerefacing,theywereseenasa Africa,sincethemilitaryconquestsoftheLeopol- neededsacrice,intheend. dian regime, and as a statement of the success of Belgiancolonialismagainstbarbarism.Notasingle Whenreturningfromthewar,Africansoldiersand Congolese was directly involved in commemora- porters might have expected thecolonialauthori- tionproject. tiestorecognizeandhonourtheir,mostlycoerced, involvementwithlands,jobsandafairertreatment. Finally,theeffectsofthehostilitiessuchasnumer- But these aspirations were nearly always disap- ousdeathsandthepopulationdisplacementand pointed. Indeed, from the 1920s to 1946, little the violence against the populations should still was done to ensure thateach ofthem was fairly be measured, as well as the permanent changes compensatedforhisinvolvement.Thefactthatthe within Congolese society. Local populations suf- Belgian State expressed its concerns with colo- feredbecauseofarmiesrequisitioningtheircattle, nialmarksofconsiderationmedals,ribbons,cer- foodstocksandlivestock 105duringmilitaryrequi- ticatesorsmallallowancestowardsthevalued sitionsperformedinlegalformbythecompetent ones, those who could prove they had been in authoritiesandwhichhadnootherlimitthanthe the troops was undoubtedly a way to dissuade militarynecessityinwartime106,whiletherecruit- thediscontenttoriseagainstthecolonialadminis- mentsofporterswasdepopulatingthecountryside tration.Byawardingthebraveones 104,theBelgian and contributed to food shortage and to some authoritiesensuredandreafrmedtheirsuperiority extentfamine.Nevertheless,Belgianauthoritiesdid on the Congolese population and restored racial hardlyanythingtorewardthem,bringingoutnew gapsthatcould havecrumbledas thewar gener- grounds of scepticism and mistrust of Congolese

103. AccordingtoMichelleM oyd,withfewexceptions,Africanshadplayedalmostnoroleinthedecisionsandacts thatstarte dthewar,indeningwaraims,orindetermininghowitwouldbeprosecute d.M icheLL e M oy d, “Resistance and Rebellions(Africa). 104. Inthisway,theStanleyville(Kisangani)militarycampSergentKetelewasnamedin1935inhonorofthisCongolese sergeantwhowa skilledin1916duringtheEastAfricancampaign.(Ithanktheanonymousreviewerforthismention). 105. Inhermemoirs,AdaSchnee,wifeoftheformergovernorofGermanEastAfrica,HeinrichSchnee,depicted theCongolesesoldiersofthe Force PubliqueduringtheTaboracampaignasdreadfulblackswhoransackedeverythingin theirpath,rapedwomenandgirlsandmurderedvillagers.ada schnee , Bibi Mkuba ….Thisviolentbehaviourmaynothave beenneworunusualasitwasrelate dwiththecommonpracticeofsoldierstoseizeusefulsuppliesaf teraraid,butthe constraintsandprivationsgeneratedbytheWarmighthaveaggravatedandgeneralizedit,asM ichelleMoydpointeditfor the German askari.S eeMicheLL e M oy d, Violent Intermediaries,p.143-147. 106. CharlesTombeurtoEugè neHenry,Tabora,03/12/1916(FPSFA, AA,GG16453). populationsnotjustformersoldiersandporters oroverthrowthecolonialorder.Forthesituation towardstheBelgianadministration. of Belgian Congo, the hard effects of thecam- paignsinEastAfrica(manydeaths,famines,pop- In addition, the effects of hostilities on acts ulation s indigence and veterans illness) have of resistance have yet to be measured. In the createdanatmosphereofanxietyandinstability. FrenchandBritishcolonialsituations,warexpe- An atmosphere conducive to theemergence of riencesmayhavebeenaturningpointthatexac- acertainmistrustofcolonialauthorityby man- erbatedthedifcultpre-warconditions107.Deep ifestations of hostility that we see appear in grievancesagainstcoloniallabour,exploitation, Congointheinter-warperiodsuchastheKim- taxation,arbitraryviolence,racismandpolitical banguism(1915-1921)orthePendePeoples legitimacy have led many Africans to question Revolt(1931)108.

Enika Ngongo is a Ph.D candidate in Belgian colonial history at the Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles.

107. Foranoverviewofsomeofthesemovements,seeteRRence o. R angeR ,ReligiousMovementsandPoliticsin Sub-SaharanAfrica,inAfrican Studies Rewiew,no.29,1986,p.1-69. 108. Onthistopic,seebogu MiL J eWsie Wicki,LacontestationsocialeetlanaissanceduprolétariatauZaïreaucoursde lapremièremoitiéduXXesiècle,inCanadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines,no.10, 1976(1),p.47-70andsusa n a sch , L'Église du prophète Kimbangu : de ses origines à son rôle actuel au Zaïre (1921-1981), Paris,1983,p.19.