Refuse Archeology: Virchow—Schliemann— Freud
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Refuse Archeology: Virchow—Schliemann— Freud Dietmar Schmidt Universität Erfurt In the early twentieth century, psychoanalysis tries to investigate a speciªc logic of the appearance and the incident of what is taken to be unintended in everyday communication and human behavior. What before hardly seemed to be worth systematic research, now becomes a privileged ªeld, in which the meaningful signs of a hidden and unwelcome past appear. For representing this new ªeld of research Freud often makes use of archaeological metaphors. But in quoting the knowledge and the techniques of archaeology, he evokes imaginary landscapes of a reappearing human past, which is not depraved and repressed but glorious and precious. This contradiction or gap between the character of analytical objects and their representation gives reason for an ‘archaeological’ investigation of psychoanalysis itself. To this end one of the heroes of nineteenth century archaeology, Heinrich Schliemann, will be con- fronted with two little works of Rudolf Virchow, in which he follows up the astonishing idea of an archaeology of refuse. Relating treasure troves and rubbish dumps it can be asked whether ‘archaeological’ practices in the late nineteenth century constituted a type of historical knowledge which runs counter to contemporary historicism and is crucial not only for Freud but also for today’s theoretical reºections on archaeological perspectives in cultural studies. I. In the second half of the nineteenth century, refuse became an object of historical research. This event occurred in different contexts, and in each almost casually. Although refuse as an object of analysis ªrst emerged only occasionally or even by accident, in the long run it unfolded a speciªc type of knowledge concerning not only the constitution of culture but also the Translated by Andrew Gledhill. Perspectives on Science 2001, vol. 9, no. 2 ©2002 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology 210 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/106361401317447291 by guest on 26 September 2021 Perspectives on Science 211 structure of the human mind. The practice of, so to speak, ‘digging for dirt’, though at ªrst glance not seeming to be a very spectacular way of ex- ploring cultural phenomena, has contributed to establishing a certain kind of signs which, paradoxically, refer to a given cultural order by being worthless. To make this clear it may be helpful to characterize in general terms the new concept of refuse rising from this practice. Refuse in this context can be described as “matter out of place”, accord- ing to the phrase coined by Mary Douglas ([1966] 1995, p. 36).1 This dis- placement of refuse is not conªned to speciªc places. It is unnecessary to indicate where refuse is out of place as it applies to any place—even to the site of its ªnal disposal where it is left to its own devices. Refuse is “out of place” in the most radical sense: it has no purpose anywhere. At the same time, it becomes clear that refuse is not a singular, isolated occurrence, as Douglas continues to describe. Where there is refuse, there is a system, an order: “[It] is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classiªcation of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropri- ate elements. This idea [...] takes us straight into the ªeld of symbolism” (Douglas [1966] 1995, p. 36). The existence of refuse is dependent upon the recognition of a symbolic order, to which refuse does not belong. Re- fuse, as something that is basically out of place, forms the counterpart to everything that can be missing from its place and, thus, forms part of the symbolic order. This distinction between what is “out of place” and what can be missing from its place was introduced by Jacques Lacan in his lec- tures on Poe’s The Purloined Letter. According to Lacan, this distinction correlates with the differentiation between the two basic spheres of what he calls ‘the Symbolic’ and ‘the Real’. Lacan claims that it is only the Sym- bolic of which one can “literally say” “that it is missing from its place”—like a book that has been lost in the library and cannot be found on its shelf. The Real, on the other hand, has no place where it is either available or not; and its location, therefore, cannot be distinguished from the Real as a place in a speciªc order. In other words, the Real is, so to speak, “always and in every case in its place, it carries its place on the soles of its feet,” it does not leave any trace of its absence. Lacan elucidated this deªnition of ‘the Real’, which is opposited to the idea of a symbolic order, by a reading of Poe’s ‘purloined letter’. This letter, which the police were searching for, using all of their investigative techniques, is openly lying around, crumpled and half torn. The letter cannot be found and cannot even be looked for, because it does not belong to the symbolic order, 1. Although Douglas in her text discusses the cultural status of ‘ªlth’ in general, her statement may here be related to the idea of ‘refuse’ as it emerged in Western industrial- ized societies in the nineteenth century. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/106361401317447291 by guest on 26 September 2021 212 Refuse Archeology within which the police are operating. “A letter, a litter” (Lacan [1966] 1970, p. 35). The example of this letter, which ªgures as refuse, also implies that changes in the position of things from the Symbolic to the Real are think- able. And, one might add, changes in the opposite direction are possible, too. In the same way that a letter can become litter, litter can also be inte- grated into a given order. Refuse, as is well known, can be transformed into useful materials. In this process, however, the refuse ceases instanta- neously to be refuse. But the following passages will discuss another way of handling refuse, which is different from simply recycling it. I will focus on a practice which turns refuse into an academic matter without immediately chang- ing its speciªc status; a practice that appreciates refuse and displays an in- terest in it without primarily wanting to dispose of it or to convert it into useful materials—in other words: a practice that leads to the question how refuse can become the object of an archaeological search. An undertaking which could be described as refuse archaeology does not speak for itself. How can things that are “matter out of place” become the object of an archaeological excavation? How can something that is not missed anywhere and does not attract any attention to itself by any traces it has left behind or by its absence, nevertheless be the subject of archaeo- logical interest? How is it possible to view things that have been disposed of all over the place as archaeological ªnds? What type of knowledge is es- tablished in this way? All these questions are asked (or should be asked) apropos of two short reports made by Rudolf Virchow at the beginning of the 1870’s about a discovery which was made on a building site in the center of Berlin. Dur- ing digging work, refuse was found which evidently did not originate from contemporary times and which aroused Virchow’s lively interest. I want to highlight the peculiarity of this interest and, then, consider the conditions under which Virchow’s unusual refuse archaeology could be- come possible. What links this speciªc archaeology to the excavations that Heinrich Schliemann carried out in the same decade, partly with Virchow’s participation,2 at the supposed scenes of Homer’s Iliad? It seems as if the contrast could not be greater. While Schliemann worked in loca- tions of high symbolic quality, Virchow descended into the unknown sew- ers of the city of Berlin. Furthermore, the topic of refuse archaeology can be linked to a broader context. I would like to suggest that connections can be identiªed be- 2. Cf. also the extensive correspondence between Schliemann and Virchow (Herrmann/ Maaß 1990). Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/106361401317447291 by guest on 26 September 2021 Perspectives on Science 213 tween refuse archaeology on the one hand, as outlined—in a kind of pri- mal scene—through the ªnds of the Berlin excavation, and psychoanalysis on the other. In psychoanalysis the contrast between treasure troves and rubbish dumps, both being objects of an archaeological quest, plays an important role. It is well-known that Freud repeatedly referred to archae- ology in order to present a conception of the speciªc nature of psycho- analytical knowledge to a skeptical audience. Freud sought to adopt tradi- tional archaeology and mythical arenas like Pompeii and Troy, which were of such signiªcance to nineteenth-century historicism, for the representa- tion of both his research and practice. It is, however, questionable whether this attempt did not involve major contradictions, for psychoanalysis is also rather concerned, as it were, with “matters out of place”—in other words, with matters that—although they are based on the validity of a speciªc logic—can nonetheless never have a place in this order. The ques- tion as to the conditions of Virchow’s refuse archaeology provides the op- portunity to simultaneously inquire into the conditions of psychoanalysis, which appeared only a few years later. The connection between the two procedures is not causal, but, rather, an epistemological question. And in this sense even Lacan’s psychoanalytical distinction between ‘the Sym- bolic’ and ‘the Real’ itself might in some respect be in the debt of refuse archaeology.