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Global Population Growth, Technology, and Malthusian Constraints: a Quantitative Growth Theoretic Perspective

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Global Population Growth, Technology, and Malthusian Constraints: a Quantitative Growth Theoretic Perspective Global population growth, technology, and Malthusian constraints: a quantitative growth theoretic perspective Bruno Lanz, Simon Dietz and Tim Swanson July 2014 Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper No. 161 The Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment was established by the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2008 to bring together international expertise on economics, finance, geography, the environment, international development and political economy to create a world- leading centre for policy-relevant research and training in climate change and the environment. The Institute is funded by the Grantham Foundation for the Protection of the Environment and the Global Green Growth Institute, and has five research programmes: 1. Global response strategies 2. Green growth 3. Practical aspects of climate policy 4. Adaptation and development 5. Resource security More information about the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment can be found at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/grantham. This working paper is intended to stimulate discussion within the research community and among users of research, and its content may have been submitted for publication in academic journals. It has been reviewed by at least one internal referee before publication. The views expressed in this paper represent those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the host institutions or funders. Global Population Growth, Technology, and Malthusian Constraints: A Quantitative Growth Theoretic Perspective∗ Bruno Lanzy Simon Dietzz Tim Swansonx First version: June 2013; this version: July 2014 Abstract We study the interactions between global population, technological progress, per capita income, the demand for food, and agricultural land expansion over the period 1960 to 2100. We formulate a two-sector Schumpeterian growth model with a Barro-Becker representation of endogenous fertility. A manufacturing sector provides a consumption good and an agricul- tural sector provides food to sustain contemporaneous population. Total land area available for agricultural production is finite, and the marginal cost of agricultural land conversion is increasing with the amount of land already converted, creating a potential constraint to population growth. Using 1960 to 2010 data on world population, GDP, total factor produc- tivity growth and crop land area, we structurally estimate the parameters determining the cost of fertility, technological progress and land conversion. The model closely fits observed trajectories, and we employ the model to make projections from 2010 to 2100. Our results suggest a population slightly below 10 billion by 2050, further growing to 12 billion by 2100. As population and per capita income grow, the demand for agricultural output increases by almost 70% in 2050 relative to 2010. However, agricultural land area stabilizes by 2050 at roughly 10 percent above the 2010 level: growth in agricultural output mainly relies on technological progress and capital accumulation. Keywords: Economic growth; Population projections; Technological progress; Endogenous fertility; Endogenous innovations; Land conversion; Food security JEL Classification numbers: O11, O13, J11, C53, C61, Q15, Q24. ∗We thank Alex Bowen, Sam Fankhauser, Timo Goeschl, David LaBorde, Robert Mendelsohn, Anthony Millner, Pietro Peretto, David Simpson, Simone Valente, Marty Weitzman, and seminar participants at LSE, University of Cape Town, IUCN, SURED 2014, Bioecon 2013, and the Foodsecure Workshop. Excellent research assistance was provided by Ozgun Haznedar and Arun Jacob. Funding from the MAVA foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are ours. yCorresponding author. Department of Economics and Centre for International Environmental Studies, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Maison de la Paix P1-633, Chemin de Eugène Rigot 2, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland; Tel: +41 22 908 62 26; email: [email protected]. zGrantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. xDepartment of Economics and Centre for International Environmental Studies, Graduate Institute of Interna- tional and Development Studies, Switzerland. 1 Introduction World population has doubled over the last fifty years and quadrupled over the past century (United Nations, 1999). During this period and in most parts of the world, productivity gains in agriculture have confounded Malthusian predictions that population growth would outstrip food supply. Population and income have determined the demand for food, and thus agricultural production, rather than food availability determining population. However, the amount of land that can be brought into the agricultural system is physically finite, and the predominant view is that population will reach a steady state in the next century (United Nations, 2013). Our aim in this paper is to understand how the evolution of population and land interact with technological progress and income growth that occurred in recent history and that can be expected to continue over the coming century. Despite the importance of understanding global population change, and how it interacts with per capita income growth, food production, and technology, few economists have contributed to the debate about population projections. Instead, the de facto standard source of demographic projections is the United Nations’ series of World Population Prospects, updated every two years. The latest version projects a global population, on a medium scenario, of 9.6 billion in 2050 and 10.9 billion in 2100, by which time the population growth rate is close to zero (United Nations, 2012).1 The crucial assumption of the medium scenario, displayed in Figure1, is that all countries around the world converge to a replacement fertility rate of 2.1 over the next 100 years, irrespective of their starting point (see Lutz and Samir, 2010, for a discussion of the approach). Because of the long time horizon considered, UN projections are highly sensitive to the as- sumed trajectory for fertility. The UN’s two other scenarios, the low and high fertility variants forecast population size in 2100 to between 6.8 and 16.6 billion respectively. The difference between these two scenarios is driven entirely by varying the convergence fertility rate by in- crements of half a child above and below the medium assumption (giving target rates of 1.6 1 The UN uses a so-called ‘cohort-component projection method’, i.e. it works from the basic demographic identity that the number of people in a country at a particular moment in time is equal to the number of people at the last moment in time, plus the number of births, minus the number of deaths, plus net migration, all of this done for different age groups. This requires assumptions about fertility, mortality and international migration rates, which are exogenously determined. 1 Figure 1: United Nations projections 2010 – 2100 (United Nations, 2013) (a) Regional fertility (b) World population and 2.6 children per woman for the low and high variants respectively). Small variations in the fertility trajectories for countries in Asia and Africa in particular account for most of the vari- ance in population projections.2 These are precisely the regions for which uncertainty about the evolution of fertility is large, and empirical evidence in developing countries suggests no clear pattern of convergence towards a low fertiliy regime (Strulik and Vollmer, 2013). The purpose of this paper is to contribute a new, macro-economic approach to global popu- lation forecasting. We formulate a behavioral model linking child rearing decisions to per capita income and availability of food, making the path for fertility an outcome rather than an assump- tion. More specifically, we develop a model of endogenous growth in which households have preferences over own consumption, the number of children they have and the utility of their chil- dren, in the tradition of Barro and Becker(1989). Child rearing is time intensive, and fertility competes with other labor-market activities. In order to capture the well-documented comple- mentarity between human capital and the level of technology (Goldin and Katz, 1998), we posit a positive relationship between the cost of fertility and technological progress. Thus technolog- ical progress implies a higher human capital requirement, so that population increments need more education and are thus more costly. As in Galor and Weil(2000), the opportunity cost of fertility increases over time, implying a gradual transition to low fertility, and a decline in population growth. 2 Using the UN’s cohort-component method, imposing the ‘high’ fertility scenario in these regions alone, so that they converge to a fertility rate of 2.6 rather than 2.1, implies a global population of around 16 billion by 2100. 2 Aside from the time required for child rearing and education, the other key constrain to pop- ulation growth is food availability. We make agricultural output a necessary condition to sustain population, and assume the demand for food increases with both the size of the population and per capita income, the latter capturing changes in diet as affluence rises (Subramanian and Deaton, 1996, e.g.). An agricultural sector, which meets the demand for food, requires land as an input, and agricultural land has to be converted from a stock of natural
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