American Negotiating Behaviour Towards Nuclear Rogue States

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Master's Thesis

BC. LUCIE BADALOVÁ

Supervisor: Mgr. Martin Chovančík, Ph.D.

Department of International Relations and European Studies International Relations

Brno 2018/2019

AMERICAN NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES

Bibliographic Record

Author: Bc. Lucie Badalová Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University Department of International Relations and Euro- pean Studies Title of Thesis: American Negotiating Behaviour Towards Nuc- lear Rogue States Degree Programme: International Relations Supervisor: Mgr. Martin Chovančík, Ph.D. Academic Year: 2018/2019 Number of Pages: 121 Keywords: negotiations, nuclear rogue states, United States of America, negotiating style, Iran, North Korea, Obama, Trump, nuclear diplomacy

1 AMERICAN NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES

Abstract

This Master’s Thesis sets out to identify American negotiating style towards Nuclear Rogue States. First, a literature review isolates five negotiating style typologies and main negotiating tools used by Ameri- can negotiators and consequently a comparative analysis is made between the Obama and Trump administrations’ negotiating behaviour towards Iran and North Korea, which for the purpose of this study represent nuclear rogue states. We find that the general American negotiating behaviour towards nuclear rogue states is strategic hard-positioned realist superpower approach, while we also discover that the partisan identity of the administration plays a role as well. Even though there are important points in common, Republican administrations tend to act in a moralistic competing way while Democratic administrations are are more likely to act as a principled negotiator that collaborates with nuclear rogue states.

2 AMERICAN NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES

Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that I have written the submitted Master's Thesis con- cerning the topic of American Negotiating Behaviour Towards Nuclear Rogue States independently. All the sources used for the purpose of finishing this thesis have been adequately referenced and are listed in the Bibliography.

In Brno 4 May 2019

...... Bc. Lucie Badalová

AMERICAN NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Mgr. Martin Chovančík, Ph.D., for his much needed input and notes that helped me not to get lost on the way. His commentary was critical but did not lack praise, in short it offered carrots and sticks in just the right ratio. An immense thank you is due to my parents and twin sister who did not doubt me for one second and kept supporting me on the way. There are a few friends I would like to thank: Ivana „Malina“ Balgová and Barbora „Bajza“ Doležalová, who were part of a small diploma thesis support group offering a mix of motivation and nihilist jokes during long writing sessions. I would like to thank Mi- chal Šindelář and Lukáš Lehotský for telling me to „just write it already“. Last but not least I would like to thank Café Atlas and its whole crew who are a second family to me, Tři Ocásci just around the corner with their friendly (writing) space, and Bike Kitchen Brno for just existing and being the most wonderful community of bike enthousiasts, where I always found a friendly face when I needed it most.

TABLE OF CONTENTS 5

Table of Contents

List of Tables 7

List of Terms and Acronyms 9

1 Introduction 11

2 Theoretical Background 13 2.1 Negotiation and Culture: Case of the United States of America ...... 14 2.2 Typology of negotiating styles ...... 18 2.2.1 From cooperative to competitive negotiations ...... 18 2.2.2 Strategic and tactical negotiator ...... 21 2.2.3 A Psychiatrist, a theologian and a realist ...... 23 2.2.4 Positional bargaining and principled negotiation ...... 25 2.2.5 Four-faceted negotiator ...... 27 2.3 Most common tools backing American negotiating campaigns ...... 31 2.3.1 Relationships ...... 32 2.3.2 Incentives and threats ...... 36 2.3.3 Other influential strategies and characteristics ...... 40

3 Negotiating with Nuclear Rogues 44 3.1 Negotiating with Iran: quick overview...... 44 3.2 Iran and Obama: towards a nuclear deal ...... 46 3.2.1 Relationships ...... 47 3.2.2 Incentives and threats ...... 50 3.2.3 Other negotiation campaign tools ...... 52 3.2.4 Obama and Iran negotiation typology ...... 54 3.3 Iran and the Trump era: no carrots, all sticks ...... 60 3.3.1 Relationships ...... 61 3.3.2 Incentives and threats ...... 63 3.3.3 Other negotiation campaign tools ...... 65 3.3.4 Trump and Iran negotiation typology ...... 65

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS 6

3.4 Negotiating with North Korea: a quick overview ...... 70 3.5 North Korea and Obama: strategic or tactical patience? ...... 72 3.5.1 Relationships ...... 72 3.5.2 Incentives and threats ...... 74 3.5.3 Other strategies ...... 77 3.5.4 Obama and North Korea negotiation typology ...... 78 3.6 North Korea and Trump: maximum pressure or maximum engagement? ... 83 3.6.1 Relationships ...... 84 3.6.2 Incentives and threats ...... 86 3.6.3 Other negotiating campaign tools ...... 88 3.6.4 Trump and North Korea negotiation typology ...... 89

4 Conclusion 95

Bibliography 101 Primary sources ...... 101 Secondary Sources ...... 103

6 LIST OF TABLES 7

List of Tables

Table 1: Collaborating/Competitive negotiations ...... 20 Table 2: Strategic/Tactical negotiations ...... 23 Table 3: Psychiatric/Theologian/Realistic negotiator ...... 24 Table 4: Positional bargaining/ Principled negotiators ...... 26 Table 5: Four-faceted negotiator ...... 29 Table 6: Obama and Iran-Psychiatrist/theologian/realist ...... 55 Table 7: Obama and Iran-Positional bargaining/ Principled negotiators ...... 57 Table 8: Obama and Iran-Cooperative/Competitive negotiations ...... 58 Table 9: Obama and Iran-Strategic/Tactical negotiations ...... 59 Table 10: Obama and Iran-Four-faceted negotiator ...... 60 Table 11: Trump and Iran-Psychiatrist/Theologian/Realistic negotiator ...... 66 Table 12: Trump and Iran-Cooperative/Competitive negotiations ...... 67 Table 13: Trump and Iran-Positional bargaining/ Principled negotiators ...... 68 Table 14: Trump and Iran-Strategic/Tactical negotiations ...... 69 Table 15: Trump and Iran-Four-faceted negotiator ...... 70 Table 16: Obama and the DPRK-Positional bargaining/ Principled negotiators ...... 79 Table 17: Obama and the DPRK-Cooperative/Competitive negotiations ...... 80 Table 18: Obama and the DPRK-Strategic/Tactical negotiations ...... 81 Table 19: Obama and the DPRK-Psychiatrist/Theologian/Realistic negotiator ...... 82 Table 20: Obama and the DPRK-Four-faceted negotiator ...... 83 Table 21: Trump and the DPRK-Positional bargaining/ Principled negotiators ...... 89 Table 22: Trump and the DPRK-Cooperative/Competitive negotiations ...... 91 Table 23: Trump and the DPRK-Psychiatrist/Theologian/Realistic negotiator ...... 92 Table 24: Trump and the DPRK-Strategic/Tactical negotiations ...... 93 Table 25: Trump and the DPRK-Four-faceted negotiator ...... 94 Table 26: American negotiating behaviour towards nuclear rogues- Cooperative/Competitive negotiations ...... 95 Table 27: American negotiating behaviour towards nuclear rogues-Positional bargaining/ Principled negotiators ...... 96 Table 28: American negotiating behaviour towards nuclear rogues- Strategic/Tactical negotiations ...... 97

7 8 LIST OF TABLES

Table 29: American negotiating behaviour towards nuclear rogues- Psychiatric/theologian/realistic negotiator ...... 98 Table 30: American negotiating behaviour towards nuclear rogues-Four-faceted negotiator ...... 99

8 LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 9

List of Terms and Acronyms

BATNA – Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement DPRK – The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea E3+3/EU3+3 – France, Germany and the United Kingdom plus the United States, China and Russia, coallition that negotiated the Joint Comprehensive plan of Acti- on with Iran IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency JCPOA – Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action JPOA – Joint Plan of Action or the interim agreement NPT – The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or the Non-Proliferation Treaty P5+1 – Five permanentn members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany, coallition that negotiated the Joint Comprehensive plan of Acti- on with Iran ROK – Republic of Korea THAAD – Terminal High Altitude Area Defense UN – United Nations U.S. – United States of America USIP – United States Institute of Peace USSR – Union of Sovietic Socialist Republics

1 INTRODUCTION

1 Introduction

For the past two years, American approach to states with nuclear am- bition that do not cooperate with the international community, so-called nuclear rogue states, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Is- lamic Republic of Iran being two of them, has been a bit of a rollercoaster ride. “We fell in love”, proclaimed Donald Trump before a large crowd at a rally in West Virginia in September 2018, and according to the BBC report “North Korean leader had sent him "beautiful" letters. The pair met in a landmark summit earlier this year after previously exchanging threats” (Trump on Kim Jong-un, 2018). At the same time, Trump withdrew the U.S. from the “Iran nuclear deal” in March 2018, calling it “one of the worst deals he’s ever seen” (Donald Trump denounces Iran over nuclear deal, 2017). These quotes by current President of the United States of America paint a picture of how radically the approach towards these states has changed in comparison to the Trump administration’s predecessor–the Obama administration. Donald Trump is trying to make a deal with North Korea, on which the Obama administration’s policy of Strate- gic Patience had limited impact, while withdrawing the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal, one of its predecessors biggest foreign relations successes. Diplomatic development in last years and even months has therefore been full of twists and turns and the seeming discrepancy of approach towards these two countries is what motivates this work. Most research that has been done on negotiations with Iran and North Korea have either been pure analysis of U.S. foreign policy (Davis, 2011), (Husenicova, 2018) or taken from a cross-cultural point of view (Limbert, 2009), (Snyder, 1999). Consequently, there is a lack of analysis from the point of view of American negotiating culture: authors have described how the culture of respective nuclear states influence negotiations, but no author has specifically focused on how American culture with all of its historic, structural or demographic aspects influence the negotiations with states possessing a nuclear programme and showing low level of cooperativeness with the international community. The purpose of this work is to identify how American culture influences negotiations with two states with which the U.S. have been in conflict for several decades, posing what seems to be almost insurmountable hurdle for the diplomacy and foreign policy of not only the United States of America but the whole international community.

11 1 INTRODUCTION

After identifying types and models of negotiating behaviour in the international arena and the way negotiators behave in general manner, this work will proceed to look into the behavior of American negotiators and American diplomacy during the Obama (January 2009 – January 2017) and Trump (January 2017-) administrations in regard to international nuclear crises induced by Iran and North Korea. The Obama and Trump administrations were chosen for case-analysis for two reasons. Firstly, because as was mentioned earlier, a radical development in diplomacy with these states has taken place in past years, during which these two administrations were in office, and a probe into possible factors behind American response to these events may bring more understanding into the issues the international community is dealing with at the moment. Secondly, the Obama and Trump administrations themselves each represent a type, this time within the domestic borders of the U.S.: Obama administration represents a Democratic U.S. government whereas Trump administration can be used as an example of a Republi- can one. The different worldview of American Republicans and De- mocrats that translates in their approach to foreign policy will therefore be taken into account in our case studies by the choice of these two administrations and hopefully will paint a more complete picture of Ame- rican negotiating style towards the nuclear rogues.

12 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2 Theoretical Background

The purpose of this master’s thesis is to identify main styles of negotiating behavior and among them pinpoint those that were in the past and in the present, both consciously and unconsciously, used by American negotiators during negotiations with Iran and North Korea. These states are two of the few representatives of so-called nuclear rogue states and by identifying negotiating patterns among main negotiation styles, we set out to identify style or styles of American negotiating behaviour with nuclear rogue states. From methodological point of view the two main tools used in this work are typology and comparative study. Typology is an appropriate tool to use in this comparative research as it allows us to generalise from particular cases (Chamberlayne et al., 2000, p.155), which for the purpose of this work are the negotiating campaigns of Obama and Trump adminstrations towards Iran and North Korea. Consequently, from these generalisations we will attept to isolate a more particular American negotiating style towards nuclear rogue states through a comparative study. Comparative study is, like typology, a method of qualitative research, which looks into one or more cases and analyses them (Karlas, 2008, p.62). The advantage of this approach is that we will be able to asses whether there is a constitutive relationship between the types of negotiating behaviour empoloyed by both administrations, one Republi- can and one Democratic. Before we can continue, it is important to design what is meant by international negotiations in contrast with bargaining and diplomacy as a whole. In this work we understand international relations as a subcat- egory of diplomacy. Some researchers also define a difference between negotiations and bargaining, like for example Christer Jönsson (2013, p.291) who sees negotiations as a sub category of bargaining that does not include informal channels and thus negotiations are in this view com- pressed to represent formalised process consisting mainly of verbal communication. For the purpose of this work, this definition is too nar- row, as we hope to look into not only formalised negotiating processes but in behavioural patterns of American negotiators of officials participating on the negotiation campaign, which are often connected to personal traits and character of negotiators, but to cultural aspects as well.

13 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Another important aspect of this work is the realisation that international negotiations are a sub-category of negotiations and that many studies in the field are interdisciplinary, meaning that they borrow from many different fields when forming theories and models. Last but not least, it is worth mentioning that the purpose of this work does not lie in critically evaluating past negotiating events of the U.S. with the People’s Democratic Republic of North Korea or the Islamic Republic of Iran. We do not seek to judge the success or failure of the negotiations but merely wish to identify the methods or tools that were used by American negotiators. The limits of this work are several. On of them is mentioned just two paraghraphs above. By attempting to isolate the negotiating style of an American administration we are forced to generalise to a considerable degree: we are forced to attribute actions of individual negotiators to the whole administration and vice-versa. However, by later defining negotiations as negotiating campaign with all its aspects and that comprehend structural factors as well as personal input of individuals that are interconnected and influence one another (as will be demonstrated in chapter 2.1.) we hope to create an image of overall negotiating approach of both Obama and Trump administrations towards the nuclear rogues. The choice to study negotiating styles, while applying those to the overall approach of an administration is seeking to bring something new to the debate: as was already mentioned, foreign policy or cross-cultural analyses already exist in instance of both Iran and North Korea. Second limit of this work is the fact that we’re relating the behavior of two U.S. administrations to American negotiating behavior towards nuclear rogues in general. This could prove to be a problem, but as was already explained in previous part, one of the reasons we chose the Obama and Trump administrations as cases for our four case studies is the fact that they offer a large scale of styles of negotiating behaviour and wide range of diplomatic events, from very cooperative to borderline hostile.

1.1 Negotiation and Culture: Case of the United States of America

As was mentioned above, the overall purpose of this master’s thesis is to determine in what manner the United States of America negotiate with

14 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND nuclear rogue states. In order to determine whether there exists a specific style of negotiation with these states, first we need to assess whether culture can influence negotiations at all. Without culturally in- fuelnced negotiations there would not be specific American negotiation behaviour towards so called nuclear rogues. First, we will briefly discuss the relation of culture and international negotiations and then we will proceed to the second part in which the main factors influencing American negotiating style will be determined. Do negotiations differ from culture to culture or do all negotiators adopt same style of behaviour? In the field of political science and international relations in particular, the realisation that there is a connection between cultural background and behaviour of other states in international community has come some time ago. One of the key terms of international relations field has been so-called strategic culture. The term has been used since the end of 1970s, when political scientist Zack Snyder used it for the first time when referring to the strategy used by the Soviet Union in his 1977 report The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Li- mited nuclear Operations. He describes the term thusly:

“Strategic culture can be described as the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imi- tation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy” (Snyder, 1977, p. 8).

Strategic culture is therefore the projections of cultural background of a country into its view on strategic questions in close connection to its security, mainly through individuals at key posts in the government structures or structures connected to it. Just as a projection of cultural background into a country’s view on (grand) strategy creates a strategic culture, the similar process can be seen in the case of communication and consequently negotiation style. Much research can be found on the subject of personal or cognitive level negotiations being heavily influenced by cultural settings. Morris and Gelfand, for instance, publish research on negotiation biases that are apparent in only certain cultural settings. They present their findings on how cultural knowledge structures guide personal judgements in nego-

15 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND tiations (2004, p.45-70). From the same personal level area another research by Rajesh Kumar looks into manners in which cultural differences influence emotional dynamics within cross-cultural negotiations mainly in the form of different cultures setting different goals during negotiations and thus creating conflict when cross-cultural negotiation situation arises (2004, p.95-113). Adair and Brett add to this research on goal-setting in cross-cultural negotiations. In their research they connect exchange of information (or communication, which according to them is highly cultural - people from different cultures rely on different signs or norms in communication) and culture, focusing on identifying differences between West and East cultures (2004, p.158-176). If cultural setting influences negotiating behaviour on the emotional and cognitive level, it is safe to say that it has impact on the overall negotiating strategy a country’s representatives tend to turn to. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) whose goal is prevention, management and peaceful resolution of international conflicts, focuses precisely on the research of cross-cultural conflict management, of which negotiations are an indispensable part. Apart from aiming to establish negotiation styles of main world state players, the bulk of their research focuses on the American negotiation style and its origins. It is important to realise what factors form the negotiation style unique to America’s diplomats and officers and researchers from USIP offer following list: Firstly, it’s the structural factors: geopolitical situation and political system, economic and demographic makeup, educational system and so forth. The position of U.S. after the end of Cold War with no imminent need to form containment coalitions results, according to USIP experts, in American official often adopting the “take-it-or-leave-it” position, often being very insistent and uncompromising. Their tendency to moral- ise with the side-goal of revealing the “right” American worldview to their negotiation counterparts is more prominent when in bilateral negotiation settings and when in multilateral or mediation situations they are usually known to be good listeners, showing much more understanding to other parties’ grievances (USIP Special Report 94, p.3). The U.S. Congress acts as both constraint and possible leverage to negotiators: it obliges them to watch at all times its position on foreign affairs’ issues as it has the power to block a signing of a treaty or take opposition to U.S. diplomats’ negotiating positions in general. At the same time this fact can be used as a pressure point during international negotiations (Ibid, p.3).

16 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Another important fact that diplomats and their negotiating counterparts need to bear in mind at all moments is the electoral cycle, imposing a time limit on U.S. diplomats, in which they can deal with conflictual issues at their place of appointment (Ibid, p.4). Secondly, the cultural factors play an important role: the negotiators’ conceptions of conflict and negotiations, use of language and media, general patterns of communication, attitude towards time and other. American negotiators tend to see negotiations as a linear process, a very technical approach to a negotiated problem results in a belief that a mutually beneficial solution can be found (Ibid, p.5). As the US represents an individualistic culture, its diplomats usually prefer to be absolutely clear about their position, rarely bluffing sometimes being very blunt (Ibid, p.6). Among other characteristics of an American negotiator influenced by culture can be named the use of time and deadlines and other pressuring tactics, usually being very professional and down-to-business while projecting themselves as cordial, friendly people. The up-side of english being native language of American negotiators and use of mass media to their end by creating the “CNN effect” to serve their ends (or conversely being influence by it in their agenda) is just another example of American culture and circumstances on negotiating behavior (Ibid, p.9). Other factors that influence negotiation are of course the negotiated problem itself and the personality and character of negotiator (or negotiators) that deal with these specific issues. In our attempt to delineate a style specific to the American negotiator we will look into aspects that are influenced by the cultural and structural factors. A personality of a negotiator is indeed very important and, one might argue, influenced by cultural and structural factors as well, adding personal psychological and cognitive processes to our analysis would reach far beyond the scope of this work. The United States of America has had a unique position in the international system ever since the end of the Second World War, through the period of competing with the Soviet Union during the Cold War and after its end, when the U.S. became a de facto hegemon in the international arena (whether its viewed as one that is currently on decline or not). From this unique circumstances arise properties that can be attributed to American diplomatic personnel. In this field, Richard H. Solomon’s and Nigel Quinney’s work American Negotiating Behavior: Wheeler-dealers, Legal Eagles, Bullies, and Preachers is almost unique as it pinpoints key

17 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND attributes of American negotiators, and the authors that partake on the research by USIP already mentioned earlier focus on the subject of relationship of culture and negotiation style, not only in the case of American negotiators. The use of this book as a framework for identifying behaviour that would suite American negotiators during talks about nuclear disarmament of states that do not have the best record of cooperating with the international community is relevant as it does not offer only typology of negotiator types, but most common tools U.S. diplomats use as well. For the sake of this chapter, we will therefore borrow from this Solo- mon’s and Quinney’s, summarising publication, but will elaborate on key aspects with the help other theoretical works and biographies of Ameri- can negotiators and press reports and analysis of American diplomacy.

1.2 Typology of negotiating styles

Without any doubt, the character of the (lead) negotiator is very important to the negotiating process as it has direct influence on the outcome of the negotiations. It is the negotiator himself or herself that organises the overall effort: pick the negotiating team, gets familiar with the overall context either historical, social or political, communicates directly or in- directly with negotiating counterparts and, among others, rallies support for the negotiating strategy adopted on the home front. The personality and background of the negotiator has therefore direct impact on the negotiations. Together with the cultural and social influences, values and other complex factors, these create mindsets, a kind-of typology. So before getting more into detail of concrete aspects of negotiations led by American officials, a review of types of negoting behaviour will be offered in the following paragraphs.

1.2.1 From cooperative to competitive negotiations The most basic typology which is derived from Morton Deutch’s psychological approach to negotiations. Deutch identifies two possible dimensions in regard to what goals negotiators tend to aspire to: assertive or competitive position in which the negotiators want to reach their own goals and cooperative position in which the goals they aspire to are mutual (Spangler, 2003). In cross-cultural negotiation settings, negotiators often think in instances of cooperative or competitive negotiations

18 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND where the cooperative negotiator “uses principled or problem-solving techniques, sometimes called interest-based negotiation” and the competitive negotiator “is though of as aggressive, adversarial and someone who negotiates by setting out positions” (Cooper, 2006, p.12). Researchers have since created a scale of five conflict management styles that range from competitive towards cooperative approaches and which are well summarised by Lewicki, Saunders, Barry and Minton. A competing style is high on assertiveness and low on cooperativeness. In competing style, the negotiator is concentrating on the pursuit of their own goals at the expense of others, trying to maximise their own outcome. Other characteristics of this style are secrecy and defensive- ness, low trust in others and high trust in own teams, a competitively negotiating party will not let their counterpart know their true interests, will make an extra effort to look committed to their own position. Often will try to create a bad image of their counterpart and use argumenta- tions and manipulation of the other (Lewicki et al., 2003, p. 32-33). A collaborating style of negotiation is high both on assertiveness and cooperativeness. A collaborative negotiator seeks to maximise joint outcome of parties involved, is trusting and open and actively listens in order to explore alternatives. The parties that are involved in collaborative negotiations seeks to know their own needs and interests and it is important to them to address those as well as the needs of other parties, are usually very predictable, and make effort to find mutually satisfying solutions (Ibid). In cooperative style the negotiating parties show high interest in own and other parties’ outcomes (Lewicki et al., p. 20-21). Par- ties share gains between them and usually act amicably and are eager to close the gap in negotiations and closing the deal quickly (Shell, 2006, p. 11-12, p. 210). An accommodating style is low on assertiveness and high on cooperativeness. The goals of accommodative negotiators are subordinated in favour of the other party. An accommodating strategy may be used in order to bring peace quickly or in long term to encourage future reci- procity. In this case the behaviour is predictable - always putting the needs of the other party before their own and their success is determined by minimising or avoiding conflict at all costs (Ibid).

19 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Table 1: Collaborating/Competitive negotiations

Charecteristics of the Subcategories negotiationg behaviour - Adversarial, set out positions, focus on their own goals at expense of others, do not share interests Competing behind their position. - Characterised by high assertiveness and low cooperativeness. - Exercise moderate efforts to pursue their goals, but usually want to close the deal quickly. Compromising - Characterised by moderate assertiveness and moderate cooperativeness. - Often, there is a bad relationship between the parties in case, resulting in their seeing no advantageous outcome in Avoiding negotiations, or a bad BATNA for the avoiding party. - Characterised by low assertiveness and low cooperativeness. - If employed, might mean that the

Cooperative/Competitive negotiations Cooperative/Competitive avoiding party is attempting to bring peace as quickly as possible. - Negotiator puts needs of the other Accommodating party before their own and is avoiding conflict as much as possible. - Characterised by low assertiveness and high cooperativeness.

20 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

- Problem-solvers, seek to maximise outcome of all parties, are interested in knowing interests behind positions, aren’t known to Collaborating be unpredictable and usually are good listeners. - Characterised by high assertiveness and high cooperativeness. An avoiding style is low on both assertiveness and cooperativeness. When negotiations are avoided it can have several reasons or purposes. For once it can mean that either the other party will concede without having to negotiate at all, on the other hand the reason can be that no fruitful outcome is seen in possible negotiations, often due to bad relationship between the parties. Another prominent reason is that the party avoiding the negotiation may come to the conclusion that their alternatives (or BATNA)1. A side can choose to avoid negotiations if the alternatives to negotiated agreement are excellent in order to cut costs of reaching such an agreement or conversely, if their alternatives are too weak negotiations may lead towards an undesirable outcome (Ibid, p.29). A compromising style is moderate on both assertiveness and cooperativeness (Spangler, 2003). When negotiating in compromising style, the parties involved exercise moderate effort to pursue their own goals while exercising moderate effort to pursue other parties’ goals which creates main difference from collaborating style described in previous paragraphs.

1.2.2 Strategic and tactical negotiator When looking for a typology of an American negotiator, studies of behaviour style of a concrete diplomat or negotiator offer some insight. For instance, the authors of 2018 book on one of the most iconic American diplomats of all times, Henry Kissinger, offer such an analysis. In Kissinger, the Negotiator James Sebenius, Nicholas Burns and Robert Mnookin attempt to capture Kissinger’s negotiating style and in doing so, offer a sort of typology of American negotiators. Henry Kissinger is described as a

1 BATNA stands for “best alternative to negotiated agreement” and as any kind of alternative in negotiations it can be used as a leverage as it gives the negotiator the power to walk away from the bargaining table (Lewicki et al., 2003, p.63).

21 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Strategic Negotiator by the authors (Sebenius, Burns and Mnookin, 2018, p. 67). The characteristics of such a negotiator are following: strategic negotiator is focused on long-term objectives and is always aware of the broader context of the problem laid before him or her. This means that he or she keeps track of the whole negotiating campaign2, meticulously planning each negotiation event, creating incentives, or penalties, for all the parties involved. This, the authors argue, is characteristic of Henry Kissinger himself and is inherently American as it mirrors American position in the international arena: such a negotiator may concentrate on primary issues while serving long-term American objectives (Ibid, p.68). In contrast to the negotiating style of the strategic negotiator lies the tactical negotiator style. A tactical negotiator is more concentrated on the task laid before him and deals with issues as they arise, he or she doesn’t orchestrate the whole negotiating campaign as in the previous case (Ibid, p. 71).

2 Negotiating campaign encompasses negotiations as well as other aspects mostly serving to build favourable conditions to closing of deals, including incentives, threats, unofficial diplomatic efforts, relationship-building and even longer-term public policy efforts.

22 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Table 2: Strategic/Tactical negotiations

Charecteristics of the negotiationg Subcategories behaviour

- Focus on long-term objectives, keep mind on broad context of negotiations, keep track of the whole negotiating Strategic campaign. - Plan negotiating events int o detail, create negotiations incentives and threats for all parties involved. - Tactical negotiator does not have long term strategy worked out in order to reach their goals. Tactical - Does not orchestrate the whole

Strategic/Tactical Strategic/Tactical negotiating campaign and deals with issues as they arise.

1.2.3 A Psychiatrist, a theologian and a realist It is interesting to note that Sebenius, Burns and Mnookin (and Henry Kissinger himself) make the division of these two groups also on the basis of realistic and idealistic approach to international relations. Another terms the authors use is division into so-called Theologians and Psychia- trists (Ibid, p.82-83). Tactical negotiators and theologians (or what the authors call idealists) will take a moralistic position, will be very high- principled, refusing to negotiate with counterparts on ideological grounds. On the other side of the spectrum, the division is more complicated: there is no straight line between so-called Psychiatrists and realists. Whereas a Psychiatrist3 will always negotiate with a counterpart, no matter what her or his moral position is, a realistic negotiator will assess

3 According to the authors, Pychiatrists “believe in negotiation for its own sake in nearly all circumstances” (Sebenius, Burns, Mnookin, 2018, p.82).

23 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND whether negotiating with a counterpart, that would not meet moral re- quirements necessary, is beneficial or not for the overall process and will act accordingly (Ibid, p.83-84). Although the reader would now wonder if there really is such a thing as an American negotiation style if it consists of these two rather contrasting views on negotiation, we can argue that both these views are inherently American in their substance. Even Henry Kissinger, himself a realist, writes on how both idealism and realism composes American political identity, especially visible in the international arena.4

Table 3: Psychiatric/Theologian/Realistic negotiator

Charecteristics of the Subcategories negotiationg behaviour

- Negotiators usually take positions based on moral code: never bargain Theologian with the Devil, as it signals weakness.

- Negotiations are a tool for imposing their own terms.

- Realistic negotiator does not take positions nor does he/she negotiate at all cost, is driven by interests of parties involved. sticnegotiator Realist - Is willing to negotiate with a counterpart that does not meet moral Psychiatrist/Theologian/Reali requirement if it’s deemed beneficial for the negotiating campaign.

4 An interesting reading on this matter is offered in chapter 2 of “Diplomacy” by Henry Kissinger, where he accounts for roots of both American isolationism and interventionism, going back to Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson (1994, p.29-55).

24 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

- Views disagreement as a misunderstanding to be cleared up, largely attributed to a failure in the process. - Often ignores strategic factors of the Psychiatrist negotiating campaign and believes that if one shows patience and devotion, spillover to counterparts will occur. - Believes in negotiation for its own sake in almost all circumstances: always bargain with the Devil.

1.2.4 Positional bargaining and principled negotiation Another prominent negotiating typology, so-called positional bargaining, divides negotiators in two groups according to, as the name suggests, positions that they adopt during the negotiations. The two positions a negotiator or negotiating team are following. The soft position in which the participants are typically friends, their goal is agreement and during the negotiations they tend to value and try to cultivate their relationships by making concessions to the demands of the other party. They usually are usually soft on the people they negotiate with as well as the negotiated problem, they change positions easily. Moreover, a negotiator that adopts a soft position is more willing to accept one-sided loses that could lead to an agreement which is an ultimate goal they insist on. On the other hand, a negotiator that adopts the contrasting hard position has a victory as his or her ultimate goal. They tend to see participants in a negotiation as adversaries, being hard both on the negotiated problem and the people involved. They are more likely to distrust others and will not reveal the motivation behind their position. On top of that they will insist on their position which is more important to them then reaching an agreement and consequently tend to search for an answer to the negotiated problem that the other side will accept, looking on negotiations as a zero-sum game (Fisher, Ury, 1991, p.9-10). Robert Fisher and William Ury come with an alternative to taking these two highly polarised positions by introducing a third possibility: principled negotiation. In principled negotiations the authors propose to concentrate on negotiations on two levels: one that concentrates on the

25 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND negotiated problem, the substance, and the other that concentrates on the process. In contrast to positional bargaining, principled negotiation sees negotiating parties as problem-solvers, whose ultimate goal is a wise outcome that is reached efficiently and amicably. A principled negotiator separates people from the problem: he or she is hard on the problem while being soft on the people involved. Their negotiations are not based on positions but rather on interests, inventing multiple options the parties can choose from for mutual gain and they insist more on objective criteria rather that positions or agreement, trying to reach a result based on standards and not imposing of their will on others (Ibid, p. 10-13). Table 4: Positional bargaining/ Principled negotiators

Charecteristics of the Subcategories negotiationg behaviour - Counterparts are often see each other as adversaries, are very likely to distrust each other. -Their ultimate goal is winning. - Does not reveal true interests behind their position, which is more important Hard position to them than an agreement. -Are hard on people as well as the negotiated issue. - Does not rely on relationships but uses position of power to demand one-sided concessions. - Counterparts are typically on friendly terms. - Their ultimate goal is coming to an agreement. Soft Position - Discloses their interests and usually

searches to an answer to the problem Positional bargaining/ Principled negotiators bargaining/ Positional Principled the other side will accept. - Are soft on people as well as on the negotiated issue.

26 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

- Cultivating their relationship is an important aspect and to this end the parties tend to make concessions.

- Counterparts are problem-solvers. - Their goal is a wise outcome that is reached in an amicable and efficient way. Principled - Aiming for a result based on standard Negotiations not imposing their will on others. - Separate people from the problem: are soft on the people but hard on the negotiated issue.

1.2.5 Four-faceted negotiator The typology provided in previous paragraphs is one that can be useful to get the overall outlook on the way American diplomats and negotiators think, it is however rather vague. For the purpose of identifying a concrete negotiating behaviour towards nuclear rogue states, a more tangible typology of the American negotiator would be useful. Such a typology is offered by Richard Solomon and Nigel Quinney. In “The Ameri- can Negotiating Behaviour: Wheeler-dealers, Legal Eagles, Bullies and Preachers” Solomon and Quinney identify four main types (or what the authors call mind-sets) of an American negotiator: the businesslike negotiator, the legalistic negotiator, the moralistic negotiator and the superpower negotiator. The first type of an American negotiator according to this typology, the businesslike negotiator, is very often an official with a business background, drawn from the corporate world but it need not be so in all cases. The main characteristics of this type are, according to the authors, straightforwardness, focus on results and a tendency not to regard personal ties with negotiation counterparts as a silver bullet of negotiations. (Solomon, Quinney, 2010, p. 23). Straightforwardness is in this case char-

27 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND acterised by emphasis on negotiation outcome, not giving the process itself as much importance. On semantic level this very often translates as a use of technical engineering argot, often brought in from previous corporate position, by the American businesslike diplomat (Ibid, p. 26-27). Culturally, the authors argue, this may be imbedded in the lack of conflict on American soil, which translates into energetical approach and a certain naïveté that shapes their attitude towards international affairs (Ibid, p. 28). Second type of Solomon and Quinney call the “four-faceted negotiator” is a legalistic negotiator type. In a way this negotiator character is very similar to the businesslike negotiator but lacks the idealist approach to negotiations. Among the main characteristics can be named the pref- erence of concrete details over abstract principles, caution and prepar- edness, always verifying information available and for this relying heavily not only on negotiation teams doing research but on American intelligence agencies as well. When dealing with officials from other countries, this type of negotiator would be honest to a fairly high degree, not using bluff as a strategy used to reach an agreement. An interesting aspect of this well-prepared American diplomat is that very often such a person or team may help prepare officials from allied governments that may be a part of winning negotiation coalition an American diplomat is trying to build by doing lending the force of American intelligence agencies and providing the data needed for smooth progress of negotiations (Ibid, p. 29-32). Third of these four negotiator types, the moralistic negotiator is more related to the legalistic negotiator than to the businesslike negotiator, but the main difference lies in the approach to dealing with emotions when at the negotiation table. Whereas the legalistic negotiator has a methodical and law-based view on the negotiation process, often almost instrumental, the moralistic negotiator does not hesitate to bring emotions into the equation (Ibid, p.33). Culturally and historically speaking this notion of international affairs would be rooted in American exceptionalism.5 When dealing with nations from weaker nations, Ameri- can officials would often adopt a self-righteous stance, trying to spread American ideals to other countries. This approach is in close connection

5 American exceptionalism is an idea that the United States of America occupy a unique place in the world, due to their history, political system and values embed- ded in the American culture (Ledbetter, 2012).

28 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND to the self-image of Americans generally, believing that the United States of America hold a special status in today’s world and when dealing with other nations and cultures, acting accordingly (Ibid, p. 35-37). The superpower or hegemonial negotiating mindset may seem similar to the moralistic type but there is a significant difference. Whereas the moralistic mindset is rooted in times before American rising to superpowers status and therefore drawn from the exceptionalism rooted in American history as a whole, the superpower mindset is more connected to the situation in which the United States found themselves after the end of the Second World War. If a moralistic approach can change from diplomat to diplomat, the superpower mindset is somewhat present in the behaviour of most American officials. On the outside the result in negotiating behaviour may seem similar, both moralistic and superpower negotiator will try to promote values seem by them as universal and beneficial to all nations, the superpowers negotiator’s is rooted in their realising the power position in which the US find themselves, pursuing national interests with threat or use of military power, if deemed necessary. Moreover, when dealing with an American representative, the counterpart in question would often feel this military and economic su- periority, that is omnipresent and American officials are looked upon as representing a (hegemonic) superpower (Ibid, p. 38-40). This typology offered by Solomon and Quinney is most helpful as it encompasses not only possible behavioural patterns, but it the motivations behind and their roots as well. Table 5: Four-faceted negotiator

Charecteristics of the Subcategories negotiationg behaviour - Rooted in corporate background, is

straightforward, focuses on results. - Does not regard personal

Businesslike relationship as an important part of faceted faceted - negotiator the negotiations.

- Focuses on the outcome of the negotiator

Four negotiations and pays relatively little attention to the negotiating process.

29 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

- Semantically uses engineering or technical argot and is precise. - Has an energetic but naive approach towards international negotiations. - Sees negotiations as a linear, technical, process starting with prenegotiations, going through opening moves, middle phase to an endgame and an agreement. - Prefers concrete details over abstract terms, is cautions and well-prepared. Use facts to build their negotiating position and often emphasise advantages of coming to an agreement. - Are very honest and do not like bluffing. - Often see to it that the counterpart is as well prepared as the American side Legalistic when in a multilateral negotiating negotiator situation. - Do not share the Businesslike negotiators’ energetic and optimistic approach to negotiations, tend to trust their counterparts but will always verify the facts. - Prepared to make concessions on subsidiary issues, if the final deal is not compromised. - Relies heavily on emotions when at the negotiating table, which he or she brings directly into the negotiating process. Moralistic - Is motivated by idealism that he or she negotiator expresses through outbursts of emotions. - Expects counterparts to break the rules, places high demands on others and can be self-righteous.

30 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

- To counterpart can appear arrogant, condescending and often culturally- insensitive. - Rooted in American exceptionalism, tries to promote American values that are seen as universal. - Similar to the Moralistic mindset, but is rooted in American superpower status, acquired in the 20th Century. - Usually present to some degree or other among all American diplomats. - Realises the position of power, in which the U.S. find themselves and uses this in pursuit of American interests Superpower and does not hesitate to use threats. negotiator - Is inclined to impose his or her will on others. - Manifests itself in a contrasting way: the U.S. can behave very at the same time very confidently, with an exceptionalist self-image and a confidence rooted in its superpower status, and act uncompromisingly as a nation at threat.

1.3 Most common tools backing American negotiating campaigns

However useful it may be to identify American negotiating types, there are some characteristics that cannot be encompassed by a typology as they can vary across the spectrum, being consistent with more than one type of negotiator. In the following part of this chapter we will identify main concepts that are found repeatedly in the course of negotiations in which Ameri- can officials take part. As in the previous part of this chapter, we draw mainly from theoretical works and biographies and studies of American negotiators. It is also important to emphasise again that for the purpose

31 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND of this work, negotiation is not looked upon as verbal exchange between two (or more) counterparts, but as a complex, dynamic, process. A broader concept that conforms much more to the definition of negotiation required by this work is the already mentioned negotiating campaign (or multifront negotiating campaign). In this sense, negotiations go beyond track-one diplomacy at the negotiating table, but are run at multiple fronts simultaneously. They can encompass many different forms of diplomacy that form the whole negotiating campaign, including so-called track-two and track-one-and-a-half diplomacy as well. Also, in this part we will not differentiate directly between the so-called at the table aspects of negotiations and the aspects of negotiations that are taking place aways from the bargaining table. This is for three reasons mainly: first, because the line is often so blurred that the division is up for debate. Second is because the two “different” negotiation types do not exist without each other in reality, even though they may do so on paper. The last reason is that for the sake of this work, such a division would be redun- dant, as the scope of this work is not such that it would allow us to go into more detail of each of the negotiation types.

1.3.1 Relationships In the preceding paragraphs we have seen basic typologies of the Amer- ican negotiator and already there we can see, that building personal relationships with their negotiating counterparts is not his or her goal. One could almost say that American officials have almost instrumental approach to their negotiating counterparts, but this is not entirely true. The four-faceted negotiator typology shows that there is little space and, more importantly, will left for the American diplomat to invest in building relationships with their counterparts, whether it is a legalist or businesslike negotiator, the focus on the goal, that is the agreement at hand, seems to take precedence.

2.3.1.1. Teams and lower-level diplomatic personnel This, however, does not mean that American diplomatic personnel, especially on lower levels, separates themselves from their surroundings. So- lomon and Quinney (2010, p. 53-54) note that U.S. officials tend to nurture relationships with counterparts that have the same tendency. This concerns especially American diplomatic personnel posted away from the homeland, even though this can be complicated by the fact that

32 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND diplomats are moving posts every three to four years. Nevertheless, even this helps to form bonds over longer periods of time, that may influence possible future negotiations. Another relationship building that is relevant in relationship to the negotiation campaign at hand is the relationship within a negotiating team. Negotiation is seldom a one-man (or woman) effort and even though the lead negotiator personality is important, many other people are involved in the effort. Some of the most prominent US negotiators have distinctly mentioned their negotiating teams. Not only is the team often handpicked by the lead negotiator (this meaning he or she would already have a pre-existing relationship with an expert or diplomat they choose for a position on their team), but their relationships are built overtime, giving each other motivation to carry their cause to a successful conclusion. In his memoirs of events that precede and encompass the peace conference in Dayton, ending with the Dayton Agreement, the leader of American negotiating team, Richard Holbrook, mentions his team in several instances. In order to get the Bosnian leader Slobodan Milosevic to negotiate on meaningful subjects and not to let him divert attention, he cut down on the people that were to accompany him to the direct negotiations (Holbrook, 1998, loc.269). After loosing two members of their team during a roadside attack in Sarajevo, Holbrook and his team show a determination to finish what their colleagues started and could not finish themselves, mentioning their sacrifice several times in his memoir (Ibid., 1998, loc.476, loc.562). In the study of negotiating style of an almost legendary figure of American diplomacy, Henry Kissin- ger, the authors James Sebenius, Nicholas Burns and Robert Mnookin point out how much emphasis Kissinger himself put on staffing his negotiation team and building the intelligence bureau at home. During the negotiations leading to Rhodesia abandoning it’s white-minority rule, “Kis- singer had rebuilt the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, staffing it with trusted diplomats” (Sebenius, Burns and Mnookin, 2018, p. 23).

2.3.1.2. Allies and negotiating counterparts Special position of the United States in the international system has brought forward a question of its relationship with own allies. Not even an unchallenged hegemon cannot go without having allies and in past decade the US has seen the rise of China, with ambitions of becoming a leader, if not of the entire system, than at least in Asia-Pacific, as well as

33 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND the Russian federation and the European Union becoming increasingly important players in the international arena. Nevertheless, in the past, the U.S. have been known to act unilaterally rather than multilaterally. Even though the self-presentation of the U.S. has often been as one of a nation being a strong de-facto leader of a worldwide multilateral net of allies, their actions have often shown opposite: George W. Bush making a case for American multilateralism in his presidential campaign in 2000 followed by his administration formulating American foreign policy in much more unilateral terms after his election (Nye, 2002). Solomon and Quinney mention other prominent examples of this behaviour: 2003 in- vasion of Iraq by the Bush administration before being able to secure a support for a resolution that would authorise a multilateral military action by the UN Security Council, American withdrawal from the Anti Bal- listic Missile Treaty in 2002, rejecting of the Kyoto Protocol and so on (Solomon, Quinney, 2010, loc.1227). However, it is important to note two things: Firstly, this tendency is not only inherent to the Republican administrations (as the examples from the Bush Jr. administration may im- ply). The 1999 American lead NATO bombing of Yugoslavia happened under the Bill Clinton Democratic presidency and happened without a United Nations mandate as a support (Hehir, 2009, p. 245). Secondly, that the American unilateral tendency is still a tendency, on the unilateralism - multilateralism scale, the U.S. may have an inclination to turn towards the unilateralism part of the spectrum, to act in this manner in all instances would be unsustainable. In relationship to negotiating counterparts, there are two main positions American diplomats adopt. This issue was already mention in the paragraphs on negotiator typology. Depending whether the negotiator in question adopts the moralistic or pragmatic position, he or she will decide if the negotiations will or will not take place at all. As was mentioned before, pragmatic (or psychiatric, as called by James Sebenius and his colleagues (Sebenius, Burns, Mnookin, 2018, p.84) negotiators will negotiate with the counterpart always, moralistic negotiators will never engage in negotiations that would have them sitting at the same table with counterparts whose moral stance is deemed insufficient. Realistic negotiators will consider pros and cons and decide whether it makes sense to “bargain with the devil”. Henry Kissinger was realistic in his approach towards negotiations with Rhodesia’s Prime Minister Smith who was an advocate of the minority-white-rule, a position with which the U.S. could not identify (Ibid). When in a similar situation, forced to entertain and

34 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND fraternise with Slobodan Milosevic, Richard Holbrook came up with a name for it: “Bonding with a Godfather” (Holbrook, 1998, loc. 2432).

2.3.1.3. Hospitality A part of negotiation campaign is not only the talks themselves, prelimi- nary talks, or other important aspects that form the whole negotiating campaign. Environment and the manner of hospitality play a large role in the outcome of the negotiations as well and American style of hospitality is illustrative of the overall cultural context. American negotiators are aware of the importance of negotiating environment. Preceding the 1995 Dayton agreement, leader of American negotiating team Richard Holbrook spent much effort on choosing the perfect venue for the up- coming peace conference, even consulting former President Jimmy Carter on his Camp David talks with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, realising that an immense part of the success of the Jimmy Carter 1972 Izraeli - Egyptian mediation was the setup at Camp David. On top of choosing the right venue, Holbrook considered many issues that may arise from setup of the rooms, personal relationships of attending parties, access by transport and to media and reporters, possible fatigue arising from being isolated at a compound for several days, even possible leisure activities like museum visits and dinners designed to “break ice” between participants (Holbrook, 1998, loc.4246 - 4285), (Ibid. loc.4995). Even though Americans give importance to location setup, Solomon and Quinney argue that when foreign diplomats report that Americans aren’t known to be the best of hosts. On top of being unimpressed by locations, the hospitality personally given to them is not seen as something exceptional. As has been previously mentioned, Americans, more often than not, see negotiations as an avenue for getting things done and not building relationships and when they do, they are more at ease doing so in informal and more relaxed settings. When high-profile negotiations are at play, either they are at play either they are executed in European- style protocol or they are moved to more informal and secluded settings away from the capital when on American soil, already mentioned Camp David or Dayton being prominent examples (Solomon, Quinney, 2010, loc.2701-2820). In addition, these low-key locations may hold a high value among foreign diplomats and officials, thanks to their connection to prominent high-profile visits and events: upon deciding to hold the 1995 peace talks on a relatively unknown military base in Dayton, Ohio,

35 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND all negotiating parties were unimpressed by the location chosen due to its isolation and unknown character (Holbrook, 1998, loc.4259).

2.3.1.4. Relationships at top-level When executing a mandate, officials on highest levels tend to nurture long-term relationships with their counterparts, but rather they cultivate personal relationships than national (Solomon, Quinney, 2010, p.51-53). Just like their subordinates, they may have a similar downpart: these relationships can be limited by the length of their mandate. This, however, does not need to be the case always as the positions of American top leaders, the President and most senior personnel like the Secretary of State is so prominent that their influence can linger after their mandate ends. An example of this in the negotiating arena is the persona of Jimmy Carter, whose effort at mediation between Israel and Egypt in 1972 was so famous and his influence on American foreign affairs even after his retirement considered so high, the Bosnian leaders turned to him hoping he would plead for their case during the negotiations leading to ending the 1992-1995 war in the Balkans (Holbrook, 1998, loc.2103). The position of US top leaders in the international aren can also be exploited and used as an inducement, which will be discussed later.

1.3.2 Incentives and threats The United States of America are without any doubt one of the most common users of incentives and threats, often called “carrots and sticks”, in the international community, due to their specific circumstances. The simple fact that the U.S. can afford to offer inducements, be it financial aid or other, less tangible, forms of enticement, bears testimony to its power. The same goes with threats or exercising pressure on its counterparts, where before using explicit threats, the U.S. diplomats exploit their position of power by pointing out the costs of not reaching an agreement (Solomon, Quinney, 2010, p. 59). Research on the subject of incentives confirms that the identity of the sender of incentives matter a great deal as well as the relationship of the sender and the recipient: highly conflictual relationship may result in failure to design an effective incentive policy (Cortright, 1997, p.280). According to Martina Klimesova, another thing that has to be considered is the fact that incentives and threats often make a significant difference when employed together and sometimes it may be hard to differentiate between the two (2011, p.65). Some

36 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND forms of incentives can be conditioned and threat to withdraw the incentive in question is an excellent example of blurring these fine lines between a “carrot” and a “stick”. In the following paragraphs we will look into main categories of incentives and see how they are employed by American diplomatic personnel, however it is important to note that even though the incentives may be used directly by diplomats and negotiators, they are often a part of overall (grand) strategy the U.S. adopts towards a region or conflicting area.

2.3.2.1. Political When the U.S. gets involved in an international dispute, this fact itself can be seen as an incentive. This may concern cases of mediation (which are not a subject of this work) but negotiation as well because of the Ameri- can membership in many prominent international organisations and its status of “indispensable power” (U.S. Department of State. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Interview, 1998) which results in the neces- sity to take position on almost every issue discussed within the organisation the U.S. is a member of. Among the most frequently used political incentives can be state visits to the U.S. or by the U.S. President and/or their senior personnel like the Secretary of State to another country. American negotiators realise this and often use it actively in their strategies. When thinking about how to include President Clinton into the negotiations at Dayton Richard Holbrook had to consider under what circumstances the negotiating team could involve the president without “devaluing the presidential coin” (Holbrook, 1998, loc.6269). When negotiating with Ian Smith in 1976 on ending white-minority rule in Rhode- sia, Henry Kissinger, then the Secretary of State, refused to meet with the Rhodesian leader Ian Smith, being aware of his position and what image it would project (Sebenius, Burns and Mnookin, 2018, p. 12). Among other prominent political incentives frequently used can be political and diplomatic recognition of a state, de-proscribing (removing state from the list of states supporting terrorism), ending isolation, promise of access to regional or international organisations, political training and support with institution building, in case of asymmetric conflict a promise of equal treatment of conflicting parties and so on (Klimesova, 2011, p. 65-67).

37 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.3.2.2. Security Either by their power alone or through membership in international and regional organisations the US can exercise their power and give inducements by offering security guarantees and monitoring or security assistance. These can take different forms: forming security alliances (the U.S. are member of number of security Alliances, including NATO, Rio Treaty with nation from both American continents and several bilateral security alliances) (U.S. Department of State, U.S. Collective Defense Arran- gements), support in training troops, participation on Security Sector Re- form and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programmes or supply of weaponry. In last two decades most notable cases of this have been in post-war Iraq and Afghanistan. A fine example of security enticement being actively used as a means of putting pressure by the U.S. diplomatic personnel is the 2007 ambassador Ryan Crocker threatening to withdraw logistical support for Iraqi national police in order to make the Iraqi president al-Maliki replace sectarian commanders of Iraqi police forces (Berman, Lake, Macdonald, 2019, p.271). Among explicit threats can be named threat of military intervention, nonconsensual deployment of peacekeeping forces, embargoes on arms trade, withdrawal of monitoring missions and other (Klimesova, 2011, p. 68-69). It is also important to note that due to American position in the world, when dealing or negotiating with an American representative, almost every action at the bargaining table or away from it contains an implicit threat. American diplomats are aware of this position which, according to Solomon and Quinney, results in their not stooping to using explicit threat of the use of force unless it is deemed absolutely necessary and U.S. vital interests are at stake (2010, loc. 1754). Explicit threats can take following forms: threats to disengage form the negotiations and leave parties to their fates, threats to blame the failure of negotiations on the other negotiating counterparts (especially effective during high profile negotiations closely monitored by the media), threats to penalise or punish, threats to treat the other side as adversary and finally threats of military force. During Dayton peace conference that preceded the end of 1992 - 1995 conflict in the Balkans, the American side reminded the Bal- kan leaders several times that if they did not come to an agreement, the blame of failure would be on their shoulders (Holbrook, 1998, loc.5867). Similarly, when facing a stalemate of negotiations, the lead negotiator or- dered his team to pack their bags and put them in the parking so that the

38 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND other negotiating counterparts would have to consider the withdrawal of Americans from the negotiations (Holbrook, 1998, loc. 6107). Some examples of American diplomats taking the “side with us or be agains us” position from recent years is the ultimatum to the Russian Federation by then U.S. Secretary of State issued Rex Tillerson issued in April 2017 in which Tillerson reminded the Russian leaders that if they did not join the American coalition side in Syria, they would find themselves on the side of their adversaries (Lederman, 2017).

2.3.2.3. Aid, Economy, trade and finance U.S. foreign aid is often not only means of providing financial and development aid to conflict or post-conflict areas but an avenue to induce government leaders of potential recipient countries to act according to American wishes (again, it is important to bear in mind that with incentives and disincentives, conditionality is almost ever present). Willian Ascher and Ann Hubbard note that the American side plainly admits that their security and economic assistance programmes are an inherent part of overall national security and economic well-being plans and used as used as instruments of U.S. foreign policy, in this instance mentioning specifically the case of El Salvador during mid 1980s (Ascher, Hubbard, 1989, p.415). Martina Klimesova notes on the subject of foreign aid that its conditionality does not necessarily need to take place in post-conflict circumstances and the failure to comply can lead to reduction, postpone- ment or termination of the aid in question (Klimesova, 2011, p. 70). The main forms of foreign aid are humanitarian aid, post-conflict reconstruction, rehabilitation, development or post-conflict development, infrastructure reconstruction, reconstruction of key communication and transport facilities, aid in agriculture and others (Ibid, p.69). Economic strength is another area which American negotiators exploit to it’s full potential. Solomon and Quinney call the economic power of the U.S. “probably the single most effective incentive” citing several instances of American negotiators using economic incentives as means to their political ends (2010, loc. 1530). In a 2002 report, the authors name the U.S. economic power as one of the main structural factors shaping American negotiating behavior (USIP Special Report 94, 2002, p.3). Among more concrete types of economic incentives can be found access to regional or international markets, credit forgiveness, debt relief and loans, guaranteeing investments, encouraging capital imports and ex- ports etc. (Klimesova, 2011, p. 71). Among the most prominent economic

39 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND threats frequently used by the U.S. is the threat of using general trade and economic sanctions which are imposed by the U.S. Treasury Department with thirty active sanctions programmes in 2018 (U.S. Deprtment of Treasury, Sanction Programs and Country Information). American diplomat and negotiator Robert Frasure actively used economic sanctions imposed on the Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 as his main bargaining chip with Serbian leaders during the 1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia (Holbrook, 1998, loc. 255) and many other examples could be found. Nevertheless, Solomon and Quinney add that not all types of American negotiators are likely to use (the threat of) economic and other sanctions: the businesslike negotiator, for instance, is likely to refrain from this strategy as it could damage American corporations (2010, loc. 1669).

1.3.3 Other influential strategies and characteristics Building relationships with negotiating counterparts and using incentives and disincentives are among the most common strategies employed by American negotiators, nevertheless, there are other negotiation tools that can be found in the arsenal of American diplomatic personnel although their exact classification would be difficult. In this part we will give insight into some of them. Using the time factor and ultimatums can definitely be cited as one of those tactics. As was mentioned in previous paragraphs on the subject of relationship-building, the outlook in which American diplomats tend to think is limited by their mandate, which can make their outlook relatively short-sighted (although not in all instances as we will see later). The shortness of time can have two different effects: firstly, imposing an ultimatum on negotiating counterpart or counterparts. Among some of many examples of this can be the 1962 Robert Kennedy demanding the Soviets to give and answer within a day (Lauren, 1972, p.140) or the American negotiation team giving an ultimatum to the attendees of Day- ton conference to come to an agreement until midnight on the last day of the talks (Holbrook, 1998. loc.6336). Secondly it can translate in Ameri- can diplomats acting in a manner that takes into account their limited time possibilities. Ultimatums imposed by American diplomats and officials are backed by strong position of the US, taking advantage of the already mentioned implicit threat of dealing with the U.S.

40 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2.3.3.1. Back Channels Back channels are secret, official negotiations among parties to a dispute that supplement or replace open, existing front channel negotiations (Wanis-St.John, 2011, p.4). American diplomacy uses them although they are not a routine diplomatic tool (Solomon, Quinney, 2010, loc.2363). Back channel negotiations are usually used when there is a stalemate in the front channel negotiation process, often due to public opinions and other structural constraints (the Congress in the case of the U.S.). They are often combined with track-two diplomacy and track-two negotiators can often be closed to top decision makers than front channel negotiators, although sometimes one person handles back and front channel negotiation at once. Due to these factors, back channel negotiators have usually wider navigating space and reaching an agreement can be much easier (Wanis-StJohn, 2006, p.120). Anthony Wanis-St.John identifies these five variants of back channel negotiations: Secret prenegotiations (used primarily in order to determine the feasibility of track-one negotiations), direct, secret negotiations (a classic form of track-two secret negotiations or diplomacy, exercised by official representatives and without the presence of front channel diplomacy), mediated, secret negotiations (secret mediation where official third parties go between parties who cannot or will not engage in track- one negotiations), intermittent, sequential use of open and secret channels (Front and back channels are chosen intermittently according to levels of uncertainty experienced due to spoilers or cost of entry, usually concern preparations for and negotiations leading to an agreement that will be presented to the public) and finally secret channels in parallel with open negotiations (most complex variant, back channel exists on the same level and extent as front channel, these secret negotiations are usually used strategically: while front channel negotiations are prone to public opinions and scrutiny, secret negotiations that are not limited by these constraints are used mainly to manipulate subparties and internal spoilers) (2011, p.8-10).

2.3.3.2. Mass Media and Use of Public Diplomacy Modern mass media can be used to the advantage of negotiations but at the same time can present a significant constraint. The “CNN effect” is a well-known phenomenon. Even though some research suggests that it

41 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND does not influence policy-makers’ decision to an extent previously as- sumed, it can help forming public opinion and build domestic support for actions the policy-makers have decided to do for non-related reasons (Robinson, 2002, p.71). American news agencies have coverage all over the globe. This has influence on negotiations by American officials which materialises in several forms. American diplomats have to be constantly aware of media and either endeavour to exploit this to their advantage by letting out only information favourable to them or try to conceal sensitive information which could endanger the results of ongoing negotiations. However, if managed carefully, American officials can use the media actively in a negotiations as a pressuring tool in order to influence negotiating parties by letting media issue a statement intended for their counterparts’ ears (1995 Dayton being a prime example, when the American side tried to break a stalemate by forcing negotiating parties to act by means of media report (Holbrook, 1998, loc.6384). Some U.S. diplomats tend to nurture relationships with journalists Public diplomacy is another form of diplomacy that American negotiators can use to their advantage and is mainly aimed at foreign publics. It usually takes form of government sponsored international broadcast- ing (the Voice of America) that can include cultural, educational and in- formational programmes, or citizen exchange (the Fulbright program) (Izadi, 2016, p.13) (Dizard, 2004, p4). The key idea is to advocate policies or in more severe cases bring about regime change in hostile countries by forming public opinion that forces a policy change in target country (Izadi, 2016, p.13) and even though its direct effects are almost unmeas- urable, public diplomacy can help create a more favourable environment for advancing American positions during negotiations even though the negotiation team themselves often do not have direct influence over it (Solomon, Quinney, 2010, loc.2848).

2.3.3.3. Track-two and track one-and-a-half diplomacy Contrarily to what one might think, track-two and track-one-and-a-half diplomacy do not encompass all parts of the negotiating campaign that takes place away from the official negotiating channels. They are both targeted at elite groups within the counterpart states. Track-two diplomacy is, according to Joseph Montiville,

42 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

“unofficial and informal interaction between members of adversial groups or nations, that have as their goal a development of strategies and influencing public opinions on all fronts, organising human and material re- sources in ways that might help resolve conflict” (1991, p.262).

Intermediates are not usually officially appointed on both sides and can be parts of government or other influential people with ties to the negotiating problem at hand. Prominent examples of American diplomats and officials engaging in track-two efforts are famously the “ping-pong” diplomacy of 1971 between the U.S. and China, marking a change in the bilateral relationship of the two states (Graham, Kelley, 2009, p. 83). Ac- cording to Sarah Graham and John Kelley, track-two diplomacy is in-fact one of the main active tools of conflict management in Southeast Asia (Graham, Kelley, 2009). Track-one-and-a-half diplomacy may involve some officially appointed diplomatic personnel but the discussions take place in informal working sessions, with both governmental and nongovernmental experts present, often used as a method of bringing in new point of view during brainstormings (Fisher, 1986, p.233-235).

43 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES

3 Negotiating with Nuclear Rogue States

In the previous theoretical part, rough description of the most common tools used by American negotiators and diplomatic personnel was given as well as typologies of negotiating behaviour from several different fields of expertise. In this following practical part of this work we set to analyse the diplomatic dealings of the Obama (January 2009 - January 2017) and Trump (since January 2017) administrations, respectively, with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from the point of view of negotiating styles and diplomatic tools we have just pinpointed as being central to American negotiating style.

1.4 Negotiating with Iran: quick overview

Diplomatic relations with many countries in Middle East have not been unstrained for the United States. With the Islamic Republic of Iran, the relationship was strenuous from its very beginning. In November 1979, after the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was exiled and the regime in the country changed, a group of students fervently supporting the islamic revolution captured the staff of U.S. embassy, leading to their fourteen- month imprisonment (1981: Terhran frees US hostages, para.1), as a result of which the United States severed diplomatic ties with the country in April 1980 (The World Factbook: Iran). Even before the revolution the relationship was, the least to say complicated, mainly due to American involvement in the region after the end of World War II. The U.S. and the Soviet Union played important role in the Azerbaijan separatist crisis of 1945-1947, caused by their interest in Iranian reserves of oil as well as geopolitical interests (Limbert, 2009, p.50-51). Iranian oil has been the main driver in another event that has shaped relations between the two states. The American-orchestrated overthrowing of nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh who opposed settling of the dispute over the 1933 agreement between the government of Iran and the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company (in which the British owned a majority), has become yet another case of humiliation of Iranian people by the American (and British) government (Ibid, p.68-69).

44 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES

Another major complication to the already damaged relationship became the discovery of Iranian de-facto secret6 nuclear facilities in Na- tanz (at the time under construction, planned to be a uranium enrichment plant) and Arak (heavy-water reactor). Iranian nuclear programme dates back to the 1950s where it was started by Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, then in the 1960s Iran not only signed, but ratified as well, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). After a brief hiatus following the 1979 revolution, the programme has been reignited during the war with Iraq in the mid-eighties (Tabatabai, 2017, p.227). Its nature has been unclear: on one hand, to this date, Iran has not actually made the political decision of following the path of a military nuclear programme, on the other hand it has acquired the materials and technology necessary to develop a nuclear weapon (Davis, 2011, p.19). In more recent history the first significant public engagement between the United States and Iran happened during the George W. Bush presidency, when for a short period of time the two states cooperated in their support of the Afghan Northern Alliance in its effort to defeat the Taliban. This alliance was however short-lived and ended after the Is- lamic Republic grew stronger and stronger in its support of Shia extrem- ist groups in Iraq and later even Taliban in Afghanistan (Hadley, 2010). In the area of foreign policy, the Bush administration continued to exert pressure via sanctions imposed by the Department of the Treasury which, apart from trying to compel Iran to stop supporting terrorism and limit its power in the Middle East, now had the objective of assuring the newly discovered Iranian nuclear programme was purely civilian in its nature (Katzman, 2019, p.1). This was mainly in order to dissipate international concerns due to the fact that Iran did not allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor its nuclear sites although the country was (as a non-nuclear-weapon state-party) legally bound by its signing and ratifying the NPT to accept the IAEA safeguards (Kerr, 2019, p.1). On diplomatic level little progress was made as the administration has behaved mostly within the lines of hard position complemented by moralistic stance.7 The administration had set a precondition on direct

6 In 2002 Iran acknowledged the existence of these facilities but only after the secret had been compromised by foreign intelligence agencies (Tabatabai, 2017, p.227). 7 The hardline position can be illustrated by the famous George W. Bush speech at the State of the Union Address, during which he called Iraq, Iran and North Korea an

45 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES negotiations with the Islamic Republic: first it needed to freeze its uranium enrichment programme and then the U.S. would join European diplomats or the E38, trying to make a breakthrough with Iran at the negotiating table (Press conference on Iran, 2006). As Iran was unwilling to accept this condition, American team never joined the negotiations between E3 and Iran, and even though the negotiations brought some fruit in the form of the Paris Agreement of November 2004 (as part of which Iran halted its enrichment program), the whole deal collapsed and Ira- nian nuclear activities resumed as newly elected president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took office (Tabatabai, 2017, p.228), marking the end of any more substantial diplomatic efforts during the Bush administration.

1.5 Iran and Obama: towards a nuclear deal

It goes almost without saying that any past relations between the two states will have influence on the negotiations and diplomacy as a whole. The Obama administration hasn’t, however, let itself be held down by past differences, and its officials have been able to start a dialogue with the Islamic Republic of Iran and craft a groundbreaking nuclear deal: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed on July 14, 2015.9 In following paragraphs, we will first outline the most common tools supporting the administration’s negotiating campaign and then focus on overall typology corresponding to its negotiating behaviour towards Iran.

“Axis of Evil” (George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002), or by the Vice President Dick Cheney’s statement on the U.S. “not negotiating with evil” as was remarked by Sebenius, Burns and Mnookin (2018, p.82). 8 E3, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, can also be sometimes referred to as the EU3. 9 It is important to note that this effort was not unilateral in its nature. The U.S. was a part of international diplomatic effort which is referred to in American literature as the P5+1: the five United Nations Security Council permanent members (The United States, China, Britain, France, Russia) and Germany. In European circles the coalition is more commonly known as the E3/EU+3, referring to France, Germany and the UK, which were joined by representatives of the EU, and three more countries outside Europe: The U.S., China and Russia. More on the debate in Lewis (2015).

46 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES

1.5.1 Relationships Described in the previous theoretical part, relationships are undoubtedly an aspect of American negotiating campaigns, that play important role on many levels even though relationship-building is not considered by American diplomats as a silver bullet in their negotiations.

3.2.1.1. Negotiating team and lower-level On the lower-level relationships dimension the so-called Iran talks (negotiations leading to signature of the already mentioned Joint Compre- hensive Plan of Action) are almost a textbook example of this aspect of American diplomacy. In her memoir depicting some of the most important events of her career, American lead negotiator for the Iran talks Wendy Sherman, mentions her team in several instances. She focuses very intensively at the relationships within her own team and her own side of the table (allies included) and how important (and hard) it is to build consensus within their own ranks (Sherman, 2018, p.131). She pro- ceeds to express her opinion how all their collective knowledge, every- body putting in his or her expertise, helped them come to the final conclusion: “[…] individuals don’t go their own way” (Ibid, p. 133). Just as we saw Richard Holbrook mention earlier, she pays attention to the size of the negotiating team and realises that smaller more informal surroundings are to her advantage and when faced with a stalemate during the talks, withdrew members of team that weren’t explicitly needed at the time and let Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Zarif, U.S. Secretary of State Kerry and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov move the negotiations forward themselves (Ibid, p. 186). This is illustrative to a way in which the negotiating campaign is carefully, strategically orchestrated: no detail is deemed too small when at the negotiating table. Sherman has not been the only one who mentions the importance of negotiating teams in relation to the Iran talks. President Barack Obama has expressed an opinion that the staff chosen for the American negotiating team has been chosen right, underlying the importance of lower-level diplomatic personnel (Mohammed, 2014).

3.2.1.2. Allies and counterpart In regard to the negotiating counterpart, Iran, the approach of the Obama administration has changed radically when compared to the previous

47 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES

George W. Bush administration. The administration has decided to engage with Iran directly which is apparent in the speech given by Presi- dent Obama at the United Nations General Assembly in 2013:

„[…] I do believe that if we can resolve the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, that can serve as a major step down a long road towards a different relationship, one based on mutual interests and mutual respect” (Address to the United nations General Assembly, 2013).

This shows how the administration acted in a realistic negotiating manner when it comes to Iran. This bearing itself has provoked changes on lower levels, allowing regular staff to see the Iranians as people they can interact and negotiate with (Hirsch, 2015, p.20) and is in itself illustrative of how the negotiating style changed between the Bush Jr. and Obama administrations from positional bargaining and the latter practices principled negotiating with regard to its counterpart. Americans being more prone to engage diplomatically with nations they had been refusing to talk to mainly on ideological grounds and being more invested in acting in unison with their allies are both sides of the same coin. The American “new era of engagement”10 encompasses new approach of the Obama administration to their allies, including in regard to the Iranian nuclear programme. United States have joined the previously failed efforts of the E3 countries and the P5+1 coalition has been formed, steering the U.S. significantly towards multilateralism, despite this shift there are exceptions. Even though the U.S. decided to join the P5+1 negotiating effort, secret pre-negotiations were held in bilateral settings, just between the U.S. and Iran. Afterwards, when the Americans officially joined in on the P5+1 talks, they de-facto took over (Sherman, 2018, p.61-63), drawing legitimacy from their superpower status, acting like a superpower negotiator, while strategically building ideal conditions for the closing of the final deal.

10 New era of American engagement expresses the Obama administration’s new hea- ding towards working closer together with its allies in dealing with international issues (Spillius, 2009).

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3.2.1.3. Top-level When considering high-profile contact between the U.S. and Iran, during the Obama administration the number has increased significantly as all teams were beginning to seriously negotiate. American Secretary of State John Kerry was in regular contact by email with Javad Zarif, Iranian Min- ister of Foreign Affairs (Hirsch, 2015, p.20). On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2013, marking the beginning of P5+1 talks, Kerry and Zarif met in person, being the first meeting of prime ministers of the two countries since 1970s. This meeting was then followed by a telephone call between Barack Obama and Hassan Rouhani, prompting Wendy Sherman to comment that the future of the nuclear deal would rely on human connections (2018, p. 30-31). The prominence of high-ranking officials is used strategically in building up negotiating momentum. Just as other negotiators before them, the American team for Iran talks has realised the importance of high-profile contact and used it actively in the negotiations. An episode from negotiating table somewhere between high and low-profile level is illustrative of this. When the Irani- ans decided to bring Vice President and head of Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation Dr. Ali Salehi to the negotiating table, American team has decided that they had to respond by bringing in their own cabinet-level nuclear expert, and the U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz joined the team (Ibid, p.145-146). This big-gun for big-gun strategy is illustrative of how American negotiators have calculated and used the prominence of their officials during negotiations with Iran and again capitalised on their superpower status, actively using high-profile meetings in their strategic campaign leading towards the agreement.

3.2.1.4. Hospitality In regard to hospitality and choosing of negotiating venues, little information is available. This may be due to the fact that first meeting between Iran and the U.S. were happening on sidelines of international events such as the meeting that took place while UN General Assembly was going on in 2013. It is also important to mention that for a long time, the meeting between the counterparts were closed to public and press, de- facto secret. This translated in their taking place at venues that were more convenient for the Iranian delegation (Baghdad in 2012, Almaty in April 2013, Muscat in November 2014), on other occasions the meetings

49 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES took place at prominent international sites (Geneva, New York, Vienna) (Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, 2019). This could signify that American negotiators were not actively shaping the negotiating environment to their advantage, even though this could be up for discussion. I argue that this approach is more characteristic of principled, collaborative negotiating style: Wendy Sherman mentions that even though her team faced many inconveniences while having to move constantly around the globe for another round of talks, the sites were left for Irani- ans to determine in order to make them feel more comfortable (2018, p.51), she focuses on the underlying issues that take priority, while being able to let go on issues not essential for the American side but relatively important to their counterparts, such as choosing venues. This strategy of letting the counterpart choose the site according to their wishes could therefore mean the opposite of American team resigning themselves on helping their environment shape the outcome of negotiations.

1.5.2 Incentives and threats During the presidency of Barack Obama, the U.S. has been using both incentives and threats in it’s negotiating campaign with the Islamic Repub- lic. Obama’s foreign policy has retained the same goal and even the “dual track” approach (refers to combination of diplomacy and sanctions) with regard to Iran as his predecessor George W. Bush - to stop the regime from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Obama administration has however put much more emphasis on the diplomatic dimension (Castiglioni, 2013, p.3). It has acted in an assertive but at the same time cooperative way, being characteristic of a collaborating negotiating campaign. This translates in the way the “cocktail” of carrots and sticks has been used during the Obama years and will be described in following paragraphs. It is also important to note that this dimension of negotiating campaign has manifested itself mainly through foreign policy and the way sanctions and embargoes were imposed, as those represent the main way the administration put pressure on the regime.

3.2.2.1. Political The simple fact that the administration initially decided to engage Teh- ran “without preconditions” (Castiglioni, 2013, p.5) can be seen as a form of incentive and a psychiatric approach to negotiations. On the other hand it is arguable how much the U.S. can play this card with a nation

50 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES such as Iran where it is unforeseeable how favourably the domestic au- dience looks at its leader engaging directly with the U.S.11 and after 2010 the U.S. was forced to change its strategy due to the fact that Iran under President Rouhani’s predecessor wasn’t responding to incentives as ea- gerly as expected (Castiglioni, 2013, p.5-6), prompting a more realistic approach of putting pressure on and assessing if negotiations are possible. De-proscription of Iran as a state sponsor of international terrorism, however, has been under discussion between the counterparts. As part of the implementation of the JCPOA, U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran for its support of militant groups would be eased in order to allow trade with a limited number of luxury goods (Katzman, 2019, p.8), acting as a possible political incentive. The already mentioned manner in which the negotiating team calculated with the prominence of its officials as a political incentive and discussion on de-proscription show how strategically the negotiating team was using tools available.

3.2.2.2. Security From the beginning, the Obama administration’s preferred approach toward Iran has not been one of military force and explicit threats. In spite of this the administration has not completely given up the power that its military produces. Obama’s proclaiming that “when it comes to Iran, all options are on the table and the United States will not hesitate to use force” can be taken as an explicit threat of force, however vague it may be (Hirsch, 2015, p.21). According to Jordan Hirsch, most officials in the Obama administration agreed that if a military operation was to be launchd against Iran, it would be a large scale operation that would have to bring the regime on its knees, which may be the reason why the administration was unwilling to use force as its main foreign policy tool (Ibid, p.21-22) and chose the path of low level of assertiveness, characteristic of the collaborative negotiating style. During negotiations however, when attempting to persuade Iran to come back to the negotiating table in 2011, Sherman recalls how the team “backed their diplomacy with credible use of force” (2018, p. 126-127) which in this case meant a

11 From Iranian people demonstrating in the streets agains the deal (Sherman, 2018, p.41) to domestic political opposition and establishment whose goal it is to main- tain the nature of the Islamic regime (Nader, Scotten and Hoobler, 2017, p.4).

51 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES threat of limited strike agains Iran’s nuclear facilities, threat who’s cred- ibility was supported by deployment of U.S. conventional forces in the region (Davis, 2011, p.20).

3.2.2.3. Economy, trade and finance In economy, trade and finance, main diplomatic tools have been the sanctions imposed in (generally) increasing trend since 1979 hostage crisis. The Obama administration’s view on imposing sanctions has been luke- warm in the beginning, their “diplomacy first” commitment bordering compromising negotiating style (characterised by moderate assertiveness and moderate cooperativeness), was however forced to draw back between 2010 and 2012 when new sanctions were imposed due to Iran not responding to incentives the U.S. has offered during a 2009 round of talks held at Geneva (Castiglioni, 2013, p.5-6). Some experts however think that it was this sanction regime that eventually brought Iran back to the negotiating table in 2012 (in combination with election of moderate president Hassan Rouhani) (Tabatabai, 2017, p.226). Sanctions were, according to memoir of Wendy Sherman one of the main issues discussed during the JCPOA talks between 2013 and 2015 and negotiating teams were endlessly trying to figure out under what terms they should be waived or lifted (2018, p.155). Jordan Hirsch describes the sanctions imposed on Iran as one of the main financial leverages and incentives used by the P5+1 later in the negotiations, citing the example of rewarding Iran with a 700 million dollars per month in sanction relief after signing the Joint Plan of Action (interim agreement or JPOA) in 2013 (2015, p.19), employing collaborative style of negotiating: being highly cooperative and actively seeking solutions to issues at hand while being highly assertive, not afraid of using credible threat of economic pressure.

1.5.3 Other negotiation campaign tools

3.2.3.1. Back channels The use of back channels during the Obama administration has been a prominent trait of its negotiating campaign with Iran. First contact preceding the beginning of negotiations leading to signature of the JCPOA happened at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2013 where State Department experts met privately with Ira-

52 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES nian negotiators Abbas Araghchi and Majid Ravanchi, and was established by private network of Secretary of state John Kerry through his ties to the Sultan of Oman (Sherman, 2018, p.36-37). Bilateral negotiations between the counterparts continued, first as secret pre-negotiations, when the sides were assessing whether an agreement was even possible - these negotiations were led on the U.S. side by the Deputy Sec- retary of State William Burns and Vice President’s security advisor Jacob Sullivan (Mohammed, 2014). Then secret negotiations parallel to the multilateral P5+1 effort ensued, as Wendy Sherman states, partly because the sides still lacked trust in one-another, partly because they didn’t want the potential failure of this bilateral effort to undermine the UN led talks (Sherman, 2018, p.65), acting strategically and gradually building up conditions ideal for coming to an agreement. American allies were informed of the results of the talks in November 2013 when the signing of the interim agreement (Joint Plan of Action) was under way (Ibid, p.60) (Mohammed, 2014).

3.2.3.2. Public diplomacy and track-two initiatives When in comes to track two initiatives, in years leading to the JCPOA track two efforts led to significant improvement in relations, addressing not only nuclear issues but other security issues and cultural aspects as well (Wertz, 2017, p.4). According to Daniel Wertz, back channels that consequently led to the JCPOA talks were established also thanks to personal interest and ties of Obama officials that were working in think- tanks establishing academic and other ties to Iran during the previous George W. Bush administration (2017, p.6). There seem to be a process of gradual relationship-building that begins in the dimensions of public, track-two and track-one-and-a-half diplomacy. Then as administrations change these (semi)unofficial channels become official channels with relationships based on trust already in place, facilitating official diplomatic efforts. American as well as Iranian senior negotiating staff participated on track-two and track-one-and-a-half dialogues during which potential for a compromise was discovered and later incorporated in the interim agreement, being illustrative of the American principled approach towards the negotiated problem and enhanced cooperativeness in building a strategic negotiating campaign. There is little information on track-two initiatives that weren’t directly connected to the Iran talks, one reason might be that those over- shadowed any more long-term efforts whose effect might have not been

53 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES directly seen on the outcome of official talks. Even so, Search for Common Ground, an international non-profit organisation specialising in resolv- ing conflicts in international environment, has in place an Iran pro- gramme12 and during the Obama administration played a role in the release of two U.S. hikers held under suspicion of espionage in 2011 (Wertz, 2017, p.6). Another one one of Obama administration’s track- two efforts was so-called banjo diplomacy: the administration brought a small group of Iranian musicians to Owensboro, Kentucky, in hope that this gesture would ease tensions between the two countries (Broader, 2015).

3.2.3.3. Dealing with internal spoilers during negotiations In the introduction to American negotiating style it was established that structural factors play an important role. During the JCPOA negotiations these factors played an important role, namely the political constraint of domestic opposition to the JCPOA in Congress. In March 2015, 47 Sena- tors warned Iran in an open letter to the Majlis13 that any accord without legislative approval could be easily revised by next U.S. president (Time- line of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran, 2019). In April 2014 the Senate For- eign Relations Committee passed a bill that required any possible nuclear deal between the U.S. and Iran to be submitted to a congressional review: the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. American lead negotiator Wendy Sherman described how after finalising the deal between the P5+1, the members of her team had to actively contact members of Con- gress, making their case and attempting to persuade them not to block the deal (Sherman, 2018, p. 198), again building conditions for the deal in a strategic way, paying attention to domestic political factors.

1.5.4 Obama and Iran negotiation typology By analysing the tools that were used during the years of the Obama administration, we can now attempt to assess what overall styles does the negotiating behaviour correspond to.

12 The NGO specialises in organising citizen-to-citizen and religious exchanges (US- Iran Program, 2014). 13 Islamic Consultative Assembly also known as the Iranian Parliament.

54 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES

3.2.4.1. Theologians, psychiatrists or realists? As was mentioned earlier, there is a great degree of continuity between the Obama and George W. Bush administration (see part 3.2.2.) in mat- ters of foreign policy choices, both adopted the dual track diplomatic approach towards Iran, with the difference of Obama putting more emphasis on the diplomatic dimension: “diplomacy without preconditions” (Castiglioni, 2013, p.5). This testifies to Obama administration’s initial psychiatrist approach to the negotiations: their ultimate goal was reaching a non-proliferation agreement with Iran mainly through diplomatic channels. After the failure of this first attempt in 2009 when Iran under president Ahmadinejad failed to provide a definite answer to the proposed fuel-swap deal and the talks broke down the administration changed strategy. The new “hybrid option” strategy was a combination of tightening sanctions and negotiating without preconditions with Iran at the same time (Ibid, p.4). Between 2009 and 2012, Obama administration put increasing pressure on Iran, waiting for a ripe moment, which happened after Iranian president Rouhani coming into office, and then proceeded to negotiate the future JCPOA without preconditions. This changed approach is much more characteristic of the realistic approach - negotiating with the counterpart after one assesses a real chance of reaching an agreement exists.

Table 6: Obama and Iran-Psychiatrist/theologian/realist

Subcategories Obama administration

Theologian /

- After drawing back from

“Diplomacy first” the U.S: decide to negotiator Psychiatrist/Th Realist engage again after Rouhani is

eologian/Realistic elected.

55 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES

- Engagement with Iran despite its status of a “Rogue state”. - The administration does not take positions. - Negotiators were dedicated to building relationships with their counterparts but not as a goal of the negotiations - dividing people from the issue. - 2009-2010 period of “Diplomacy Psychiatrist first” policy.

3.2.4.2. Positional bargainers or principled negotiators? When it comes to positional bargaining, the Obama administration started on the softer side of the spectrum, although describing it as soft position would not do the negotiating style justice. However, one may be inclined to describe the initial Obama negotiating position as soft when compared to George W. Bush’s approach, which set an almost insurmountable precondition of Iran freezing its nuclear enrichment activities (Tabatabai, 2017, p.228). After 2012 however, with the talks gaining a new momentum, the negotiating style began to resemble principled negotiations much more than any positional bargaining. Not only were the negotiating teams highly motivated to reach an agreement, they concentrated on real interest of their counterpart, which was their pursuing a nuclear programme, instead of advocating a zero-enrichment position that would put the teams in a situation of impasse, as halting its programme unilaterally was simply unacceptable for Iran. American negotiating team was able to, as principle negotiators, separate the Iranian negotiators from the problem at hand, helping them to pursue their ultimate goal, while forming meaningful relationships with their counterparts (Sherman, 2018, p.43).

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Table 7: Obama and Iran-Positional bargaining/ Principled negotiators

Subcategories Obama administration

/ Hard position

Soft Position /

- Separates people from the problem: builds a persuasive Principled Positional bargaining/ Positional negotiating position while being

Principled negotiators Principled Negotiations able to address the other party’s issues.

3.2.4.3. Competitive of cooperative negotiators? As stated above, in 2009 the Obama administration was in high hopes of engaging Iran with a nuclear agreement in mind. The unprecedented no preconditions to talks policy showed a high degree of cooperativeness. Although the U.S. never considered waiving sanctions until a deal was reached, the low will to even use a threat of force supports this. American desire to reach a deal was indeed high, the overall administration approach towards Iran would therefore fall within the bracket of collaborating style which is characterised by being high in assertiveness as well as cooperativeness: the U.S. were pursuing their goal which meant engaging actively with the Islamic Republic, while trying to build a strong negotiating position by imposing new sanctions between 2009 and 2012. Only the beginning negotiating initiative of 2009 would approach the compromising style (characterised by being low on assertiveness and high on cooperativeness) on an imaginary scale, due to the administrations desire to put diplomacy first.

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Table 8: Obama and Iran-Cooperative/Competitive negotiations

Subcategories Obama administration

Competing /

- 2009-2010 period of “Diplomacy Compromising first” policy.

Avoiding /

Accommodating / -The administration is “soft on people” (low assertiveness). - Incentives and threats (both political and economic) are used in highly assertive and cooperative way): Collaborating creating incentives while backing

Cooperative/Competitive negotiations Cooperative/Competitive diplomacy by sanctions and moderate threat of force. - After 2010, the administration relies more on sanctions as a leverage.

3.2.4.4. Strategic or tactical negotiators? In dealing with a conflict that drags along for such a long time as the U.S.- Iranian conflict does, with changing conditions and establishments in both countries, it is always hard to adopt and overall strategic approach. However as far as Obama administration is concerned, the officials were able to systematically create favourable conditions for closing a deal in a strategic way by combination of pre-planning and dealing with arising issues. In the initial stages the administration was able to use secret back channels to build a momentum for negotiating the JCPOA, using economic and political pressure when needed to signal its commitment to their goals, letting go issues that were not of imminent importance (like

58 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES the question of negotiating venues), exploiting its prominent position in the world, all in order to create a favourable climate for the negotiations.

Table 9: Obama and Iran-Strategic/Tactical negotiations

Subcategories Obama administration

- The negotiating campaign takes into account almost all aspects of negotiations. - Team-building. - Slowly building ties to Iran first through Strategic

negotiations back channels. - Dealing with internal spoilers. - Using the right amount of incentives and threats.

Tactical / Strategic/Tactical Strategic/Tactical

3.2.4.5. Superpower negotiators towards allies? It is interesting to see how the U.S. treated its P5+1 allies during the talks. Wendy Sherman describes that even though the P5+1 JCPOA talks were in its nature multilateral diplomatic effort, they were de-facto bilateral - between Iran and the U.S.:

“But there was more than a little truth to the idea that the nuclear talks were fundamentally between the Uni- ted States and Iran. And for good reason. The world would expect the United States, still the reigning superpower, to enforce any nuclear agreement reached with Iran with a realistic threat of sanctions” (Sherman, 2018, p.61-62).

Sherman’s certitude of American conditions being particularly disposed as a leader in their coalition is illustrated by her citing America’s military being able to provide the only credible use of force or its institutional

59 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES infrastructure making America be able to write a document as complicated as a nuclear agreement as examples (Ibid, p.62-63). This can be supported by the fact that the U.S. decided to negotiate the JPOA signed in 2013 in secret in parallel to the P5+1 international talks.

Table 10: Obama and Iran-Four-faceted negotiator

Subcategories Obama administration

Businesslike

negotiator /

Legalistic / negotiator

Moralistic /

negotiator facetednegotiator

- - Heavily relies on its superpower status, on the prominence of its

Four officials and its economic and military Superpower power. negotiator - On the base of these claims virtually takes over the negotiations from its European allies.

1.6 Iran and the Trump era: no carrots, all sticks

On 20th of January 2017, Donald Trump became the 45th president of the United States. From the beginning, Trump administration has been bound to comply with terms of the JCPOA, even though the Congress has passed legislation aimed at opposing the deal.14 Donald Trump has not

14 Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 23rd 2017, Countering Adversarial Nations Through Santions Act of July 25 2017, and the already Existing Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of May 2015.

60 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES made his bad opinion about the deal a secret, calling it “one of the worst deals” he has ever seen and on May 8th 2018 he withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Donald Trump denounces Iran over nuclear deal, 2017). On the following lines main diplomatic tools of the Trump administration used so far will be outlined as well as overall typology of Donald Trump’s negotiating campaign towards the Islamic Republic of Iran.

1.6.1 Relationships

3.3.1.1. Top-level meetings and relationship to negotiating counterpart The administration of Donald Trump has taken over their predecessors’ jobs, the JCPOA was already in place. During the Obama administrations the highest-level meeting between Americans and Iranians since the Is- lamic revolution in 1979 took place.15 The Trump administration has not continued in this approach and when it comes to top-level meetings, they have been very scarce since Donald Trump took office, shifting from their predecessors’ approach towards hard negotiating position on the matter: meeting with Iranians meant giving their government legitimacy it, according to the new establishment, didn’t deserve (Coaston, 2018). Trump’s Secretary of State Rex Tillerson met with Javad Zarif at UN Gen- eral Assembly in September 2017 to discuss future of the JCPOA (Gaouette and Koran, 2017), but Tillerson was later dismissed by Trump, his soft approach to Iran being among one of the reasons (Horsley, 2018), the already hard position has consequently hardened even more. After the American withdrawal from JCPOA in May 2018, negotiations have not been resumed, even though the U.S. has made several propositions to meet with its counterpart, all rejected by the Iranians (Rouhani: US made 11 attempts to negotiate, 2018). At this point the theologian character of Trump’s negotiating style is visible even though the administration might have wanted to project itself as a realist negotiator on the outside: even though the administration stated that they were willing to negotiate with Iran, the set of twelve conditions (that include issues like human rights

15 Previously discussed meetings and correspondence of John Kerry with Javad Zarif and president Obama’s phone call to president Hassan Rouhani (see chapter 3.2.1.3).

61 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES and support of terrorism) that have to be met in order for the talks to resume (After the deal: a new Iran strategy, 2018) were hardline to the point where it would be unrealistic to expect Iran to comply. Top-level (or lower-level) meetings with Iran have not been a priority to the U.S. and consequently choosing of venues is not a tool the administration had actively used so far in pursuing their policy goals. It is therefore safe to say that the Trump administration does not rely on high-profile relationships and trust-building through meeting as a negotiating tool, rather it uses the lack of the mentioned to punish, illustrative of the theologian mindset - negotiations with Iran are a tool use to impose their own terms on the regime.

3.3.1.2. Allies and the counterpart When in comes to meetings not only has the number of top-level or even lower-level meetings between the two counterparts fallen almost to zero, after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, the administration has been actively fishing for supporters of its new policy towards the Islamic Republic (e.g. Saudi Arabia or Israel), participating in events, strategically rallying nations with the same mindset. Top-level American officials including the U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton participated on 2018 United Against Iran Summit, Bolton accusing Tehran of aggressive behaviour agains the U.S. and its allies and warning the regime that failure in changing its behaviour would lead to U.S. retaliation (Meixler, 2018). President Trump has spoken at UN General Assembly in September 2018, calling the regime in Iran “corrupt” and accused its leaders of sowing “chaos, death and de- struction”, asking UN members to support the U.S. in isolating Iran, adopting a highly competing, moralistic position (UN General Assembly 73rd Session, 2018). Accepting the JCPOA and engaging in meetings and negotiations with the regime is seen as a sing of weakness by the Trump administration, being illustrative of a theologian mindset. This however has as a result American shifting away from traditional allies in Western Europe on this particular matter: the rest of the P5+1 allies are still committed to the nuclear deal, crafting a special purpose vehicle designed to strengthen commercial and political ties, facilitating trade for companies pursuing legitimate business in Iran (O’Toole, 2019), the administration is therefore strategically building support for its position.

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1.6.2 Incentives and threats

3.3.2.1. Economy, trade and finance When it comes to incentives and threats, prior to withdrawal from the JCPOA, the U.S. was bound to waive the Treasury Department’s sanctions against the regime as long as Iran kept implementing on its side of the deal. Being bound by the agreement, president Trump issued recertifica- tion16 of Iran’s compliance with the deal twice in April and July 2017 (President Trump Refuses to Recertify Iran Nuclear Deal, 2018). In Octo- ber 2017, he refused to do so again (Ibid). Even though two months later, in January 2018 the administration waived sanctions (as required by the deal), the President stated it was the last time before his administration announces withdrawal from the JCPOA (Statement by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal, 2018). After the withdrawal in May, on November 5 2018 the administration has fully reimposed all sanctions lifted or waived as part of JCPOA implementation and added additional sanction targeting Iran’s energy, shipping and financial sectors, adding more than 700 individuals, companies, aircrafts and vessels on black list of entities that are prohibited from trading on international market (Iran Sanctions, 2019). This behaviour was highly assertive and lacked cooperative dimension, making the approach highly competing. The conditions of the deal, however, have not stopped the Trump administration from attempting to impose economic pressure on the regime even before March 2018: the Countering Iran’s Destabilising Activ- ities Act of 2017 has been designed to exercise pressure while complying with the JCPOA conditions, targeting mainly Iran’s ballistic missile programme by attempting to impede its foreign suppliers (Shabad, 2018). As most recent development however, the administration has waived sanctions and granted accord to eight oil buyers, an action that is according to some analysts to be renewed in May 2019 although the number of buyers may be cut down (Tan, 2019). Nevertheless, in economic sector, intensifying pressure though sanctions has been the main strategy employed by the new administration in order to make the Iranians come back to the bargaining table and renegotiate the JCPOA, a fact that has

16 The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 requires the President to issue a certification of compliance every 90 days. If the President fails to do so, the JCPOA is open to scrutiny by the Congress which can afterwards impose new sanctions on the regime if deemed appropriate.

63 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES been officially stated by the Secretary of State Pompeo (2018, p.64). In its attempt to renegotiate the JCPOA, the administration has therefore acted strategically with the goal of withdrawal and then renegotiation of the agreement.

3.3.2.2. Security In comparison to the Obama administration, Trump administration officials use a much more aggressive rhetoric when communicating with the Islamic Republic, falling into the brackets of the competing negotiating style. Where the Obama administration made its resolve clear by supporting its claims by limited threat of force together with deployment of conventional forces in the region, the Trump officials, including the Pres- ident himself are not afraid to threaten with force. Donald Trump has not spoken aggressively only in international forums, he often turns to social media, especially twitter (Davidson Sorkin, 2018). He has dismissed more moderate voices inside his cabinet, exchanging them for much more “hawkish” figures. Rex Tillerson has been swapped for Mike Pom- peo, who while describing the administrations approach toward Iran stated that the United States will defend its vital interests with force if necessary and called the U.S. campaign agains Iran “maximum pressure” (Pompeo, 2018, p.61-62). At the same time the U.S. refuses a long-term military engagement in the region (Ibid, p.62). Former moderate Na- tional Security advisor Herbert McMaster has been replaced by John Bol- ton, an advocate of a U.S. military action in Iran (McKean and Granfield, 2019). When in office Bolton’s highly assertive, competing rhetoric campaign against the regime has not changed, giving an ultimatum for Teh- ran to change its behaviour, unless it wanted to have a “hell to pay” (Gaouette, Hansler and Cohen, 2018). Trump’s administration brinkmanship has however not been supported by recent President’s actions. Although Trump himself is in line with his hardline cabinet’s rhetoric, his most recent actions seem to bamboozle analysts: his ordering to withdraw 2000 American troops from Syria is in contradiction to Bolton and even his Secretary of Defence James Mattis (Bew, 2019).

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1.6.3 Other negotiation campaign tools

3.3.3.1. Back channels, track-two efforts Both back channels and track-two diplomacy can serve to establish in- terpersonal connections between personnel already in office or (in case of track two efforts) people close to the (present or future) establishment. After Donald Trump became President, much of the already established connections have not only fallen apart, the administration does not seem to favour these tools at all (Wertz, 2017, p.7). Moreover, any future track-two efforts or citizen exchanges that could possibly lead to re-establishing of closer ties between the two countries may be complicated by presidential executive order 13780 that places entry limits to the U.S. for citizens of five predominantly muslim countries, including Iran (Executive Order 13780, 2017). Public diplomacy for that matter, seems to have shrunk into fiery exchanges in international media and twitter between high-ranking officials (Wainwright, 2019). Donald Trump’s administration therefore gives up virtually all the negotiating tools that are used to build trust and cooperation which is in line with its hard negotiating position, together with the competing style of negotiating behaviour. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo even disclosed that public communication, including the President’s, serves as a deterrence mech- anism employed as part of the administrations pressure campaign (Pom- peo, 2018, p. 66), in an attempt to force the desired change in Tehran’s behaviour.

1.6.4 Trump and Iran negotiation typology The tools used in diplomacy or negotiating campaign with Iran during the Trump administration so far testify to the overall negotiating style.

3.3.4.1. Is Trump a theologian, psychiatrist or a realist? Even though the no closer talks took place in the two years president Trump has been in office (except for a few scarce meetings before the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA), the official goal of U.S. government has been to bring Iran back to the negotiating table in order to renegotiate the nuclear deal in terms deemed by the administration more favourable while conditioning the negotiations by the regime changing behaviour mostly related to its nuclear and missile programme, regional activities and human rights (Secretary of State Pompeo listed twelve demands that

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Iran must meet before the U.S. is willing to negotiate again) (After the deal: a new Iran strategy, 2018). This behaviour is mostly consistent with the theologian perception of negotiations. As mentioned above, one of the main reasons Trump’s administration had for backing out of the JCPOA have been concerns of ideological and geopolitical nature against the regime in Iran. Table 11: Trump and Iran-Psychiatrist/Theologian/Realistic negotiator

Subcategories Trump administration

- Accepting the JCPOA is a sigh of weakness: feruses the JCPOA as bad deal with a “rogue” state. Theologian - See negotiations as imposing of their own terms on Iran.

- The administration would accept to negotiate with Iran, but only after hard preconditions were met.

negotiator Realist Psychiatrist/Theologian/Realistic

Psychiatrist /

3.3.4.2. Does Trump cooperate or compete? On the scale between collaboration and competing, the Trump administration places in area characterised by high assertiveness as well as low cooperativeness: the approach is highly competing when it comes to dealing with Iran. The administrations highest officials don’t hesitate before making threatening statements and setting preconditions. Other characteristics of the strategy have been attempts to isolate their counterpart in the international arena and attempting to make it accept the precon-

66 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES ditions by applying intense economic pressure, not focusing on cooperation but mainly on deterrence as incentive and offering almost no opportunity for cooperation. Table 12: Trump and Iran-Cooperative/Competitive negotiations

Subcategories Trump administration

- Highly assertive, especially in use of

therats (economic, political and military). Competing - Shows a very low level of cooperativeness, goal is for Iran to accept the administration’s terms without concessions.

Compromising /

Avoiding /

Accommodating /

Cooperative/Competitive negotiations Cooperative/Competitive Collaborating /

3.3.4.3. Does the Trump administration take positions or focuses on interests? At this point it comes as no surprise that the Trump administration’s overall approach to reaching a desired outcome with Iran falls mainly into the brackets of positional bargaining, more specifically the administration adopts a hard position towards the Islamic Republic. Where Obama officials focused on interests (in Iran’s case it being the advancement of the country’s civil nuclear programme), Trump’s strategy merely focuses on its existence, complete denuclearisation being its goal, demanding one-sided concessions from their counterpart in order to come to an agreement. No attempts to meet their counterpart halfway in order

67 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES to come to a mutually acceptable outcome have been made so far, the hardline position has even been supported by a very aggressive rhetoric employed by the administration’s representatives, the counterparts’ mutual distrust and perception of the negotiations as a zero-sum game supporting this contention. Table 13: Trump and Iran-Positional bargaining/ Principled negotiators

Subcategories Trump administration - The administration sees Iran as an adversary. - Goal is to make Iran accept all U.S. conditions without concessions.

negotiators - The administration practically severed ties built by their Hard position predecessors: are hard on people and the problem. - The administration basically gives up using all negotiating tools used to build trust and cooperation (incentives, track two efforts, high-level meetings).

Soft Position

/ Positional bargaining/ Principled bargaining/ Positional Principled Principled / Negotiations

3.3.4.4. Does Trump negotiate strategically or tactically? In the beginning of Donald Trump’s first term, his short-term goal was to withdraw from the JCPOA, and to achieve this, his administration has acted rather strategically, trying to build up legislative support even before the change of leadership in the White House, as described above. The same can be told for the behaviour towards allies, the administration is

68 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES attempting to actively build a coalition that would isolate the Islamic Re- public by turning towards allies in the Middle East. Table 14: Trump and Iran-Strategic/Tactical negotiations

Subcategories Trump administration - In its goal of isolating Iran acts

strategically: uses all the pressure tools available (sanctions, lack of high-level meetings, aggressive rhetoric). - Strategical acting can also be seen in the Strategic gradual manner the administration withdrew from the JCPOA, - Even before the withdrawal, the Trump administration was able to find ways in which pressure Iran.

Strategic/Tactical negotiations Strategic/Tactical Tactical /

3.3.4.5. Trump’s “four faces” in regard to Iran Which of the four faces of U.S. negotiators do Trump’s officials adopt? In terms of direct negotiations there have not been many cases available to the analysis of concrete negotiation style of Trump’s diplomatic personnel. Public statements of high officials including the President himself could however be designated either as characteristic of moralistic or superpower negotiating styles: speaking mainly in terms of higher values like human rights and national interests of the U.S., not avoiding emotional statements, supporting their claims and demands by American military and economic power.

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Table 15: Trump and Iran-Four-faceted negotiator

Subcategories Trump administration

Businesslike negotiator / Legalistic / negotiator Moralistic - The administration’s rhetoric is negotiator highly emotional.

facetednegotiator - Speak in terms of U.S. intereset. - - Do not hasitate to use threats.

Four Superpower - Relies heavily of U.S. miltary and negotiator economic power.

1.7 Negotiating with North Korea: a quick overview

Relations between North Korea and the United States of America have been complicated since the birth of the former in 1948 and so far have been largely influenced by regional geopolitics, mainly in regard to the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union (after 1989 the Russian federation). After the cessation of the Korean War with the 1953 armistice, no official diplomatic relations were formed between the United States of America and the Demo- cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), due to Ameri- can support of South Korea and its role in the war. In fact, up until the 1970s, Korean Peninsula did not represent a priority to American foreign policy which was largely preoccupied by its Cold War competition with the USSR. Growing U.S. presence in the Republic of Korea together with the American involvement in Vietnam led to DPRK’s establishing closer relationship with the Soviet Union (French, 2014, p. 275). During the presidency of Richard Nixon, an event that catalysed a radical change of

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DPRK’s behaviour in the international arena took place: the Sino-Ameri- can rapprochement after which China changed its view on American military presence in ROK, marking a starting point of DPRK’s security dilemma (Kim, 2011, p. 3). Together with the (later abandoned) military nuclear programme of South Korea, this led to DPRK’s decision to con- vert their modest nuclear research programme in place since the 1950s into a military project. (Wit, Poneman and Gallucci, 2005, p.2-3) After Bill Clinton came to the White House in 1993, American strategic community ruled out the possibility of a military solution to the North Korean problem, at the same time economic sanctions did not seem like a viable possibility to pursue at the UN, due to the recent cata- strophic example of Iraq and probability of such steps being vetoed by China. Instead the administration chose concessions for humanitarian aid, a bargain Pyongyang was willing to accept at the time (French, 2014, p.292-293). Situation on the Korean peninsula escalated when DPRK threatened to become the first country in history to withdraw from the NPT17 in March 1993, after failing to come to an agreement with the IAEA and refusing inspection of its nuclear facilities. The first North Korean nuclear crisis was eventually solved by diplomatic efforts as part of which Clinton sent former president Jimmy Carter to negotiate with Pyongyang, and the 1994 Agreed Framework was signed, committing the DPRK to give up its illicit nuclear weapons programme in exchange to sanction relief, humanitarian aid and two civilian light-water reactors (Ibid, p.295-296). In late 2002, after confronting North Korea about existence of illicit uranium enrichment programme and accusing the regime of having vio- lated the Agreed Framework, North Korea withdrew from the agreement and in 2003 from the NPT (Wertz, 2018, p.10). George W. Bush did not share his predecessor’s view on North Korea policy and instead of bilateral relations the administration favoured including China and other regional partners in negotiations, that started in 2003 and later became known as the Six-party talks (Nolan, 2009, p.23). Bush’s two track effort of putting on pressure while negotiating multilaterally bore fruit in the form 2005 Joint Statement that would see North Korea abandon its nuclear programmes in exchange for energy assistance and normalisation

17 DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT, that would have become valid after three months. In the end North Korea suspended the withdrawal in 1993 but ultimately came through with it in 2003.

71 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES of diplomatic relations. These efforts nearly crashed when the U.S. De- partment of the Treasury designated the Delta Asia bank in Macau as a primary money laundering institution used by the DPRK and froze its funds there (Wertz, 2018, p.10-11). Upon North Korea’s first nuclear test and advancing missile programme, the Six-party talks resumed, leading to the 2007 Action plan according to which North Korea would halt its nuclear tests in exchange for heavy fuel oil shipments and de-freezing of funds in Delta Asia bank. The main issue proved again to be verification and in a final attempt to come to an understanding the Bush administration de-listed the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in late 2008, after which North Korea destroyed its testing facilities at Yongbyon (Ibid, p.11-12).

1.8 North Korea and Obama: strategic or tactical patience?

After Barack Obama’s inauguration in January 2009, the administration decided to lower the priority of North Korea in its foreign policy. The policy adopted was called Strategic Patience and was characterised by coordinated disengagement in regard to North Korea. The administration had to deal with several crises, the sinking of South Korean patrol ship Cheonan in March 2010 and exchange of artillery fire at the island of Yeonpyeong among the most serious of them, as well as with a change of DPRK’s leadership: in December 2011 Kim Jong-un replaced his de- ceased father Kim Chong-il. After disappointing results of the policy of Strategic Patience, Obama tried for bilateral engagement which resulted in the so-called Leap Day agreement of 2012 (Delury, 2013, p.149). In following paragraphs, we will focus on main diplomatic tools employed in Barack Obama administration’s negotiating campaign with North Ko- rea.

1.8.1 Relationships

3.5.1.1. Top-level relationships When it comes to relationships, either at lower or top levels, the Obama administration has not been very successful in forming closer ties. The administration had to face serious issues with regard to North Korea not

72 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES long after new officials took their seats in U.S. institutions: in April 2009 the DPRK executed a launch-test of a missile that carried a satellite which was followed by an underground nuclear test later in May (Collins, 2017). A handful of bilateral high-level meetings took place, nevertheless. In December 2009, the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Bosworth met with DPRK’s Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan in Pyongyang to explore the possibility of resumption of Six-party talks (Database: U.S.-DPRK Negotiations from 1990 to 2018, 2018). However, this meeting was facilitated due to a back channel initiative in the form of former president Bill Clinton vis- iting North Korea earlier that year.18 The meetings were then cut short after new crisis erupted when Cheonan was sunk by a North Korean tor- pedo, and later that year DPRK’s uranium enrichment programme became known to the world (Collins, 2017). Later, in a run-up to the 2012 Leap Day deal, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Bos- worth met again with Kim Kye-gwan in October 2011. After this, such high profile meetings between senior officials took place only three times, ending with North Korea agreeing to a moratorium on long-range ballistic missiles launches in 2012 and after this date, no official top-level meetings between the Obama administration and the DPRK leadership occurred, making the administration’s use of top meetings as a negotiating tool tactical, practicing avoiding style low in cooperation but in assertiveness as well, dealing with issues as they arise (Database: U.S.-DPRK Nego- tiations from 1990 to 2018, 2018), not really deciding to actively use the prominence of U.S. leaders as a diplomatic tool. As far as lower-level relationships go, no U.S. diplomat has disclosed details of negotiations in a memoir or any kind of document so far. The arguable success and limited number of direct negotiations During the Obama administration could be among the reasons.

3.5.1.2. Relationship with allies and the counterpart As part of official strategy to dealing with the North Korean regime, the administration has followed a multilateral approach even though, as was mentioned above, on a handful of occasions bilateral high-level meetings were held. U.S. Special Representative for North Korean Policy disclosed the administration approach in a statement before the Subcommittee on

18 More on this initiative in chapter 2.3.3.1. and 2.3.3.3. about back channels and track two diplomacy.

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Asia in 2014, putting emphasis on Six-part diplomacy and relationship between the two Koreas (Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 2014). When the DPRK offered resumption of negotiations after former U.S. president Jimmy Carter visited the country on his own initiative in 2010, the Obama administration put inter-Korean relations first, making their amelioration a precondition to any new round of talks (Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy, 2019), being mostly collaborative towards allies. When it comes to the relationship to its counterpart, in this case North Korea, the view of U.S. strategic community that helped forming Obama’s policy towards the regime has been marked by years of strenuous negotiations, and coming to agreements that were consequently bro- ken from the point of view of the U.S. While the U.S. personnel responsible for North Korea negotiating campaign were trying to dissociate themselves from the “axis of evil” view of their predecessors from the Bush administration, the inability to come to an agreement on the DPRK’s nuclear programme and incessant violations of international and bilateral agreements caused in many scepticism toward a possibility of peaceful solution under existing circumstances. This resulted in an approach that would see the diplomats responsible for North Korea policy wait for an opportunity to restart negotiations under different conditions, the policy of Strategic Patience, marking their negotiating style as somewhere between compromising avoiding - after the first attempts at negotiations, the administration first responded by being low both on cooperativeness and assertiveness, as provocations from DPRK arose, so did American responses but never really considering a military intervention as an option (Kirk, 2016). The approach was realist at the same time, the U.S. were willing to negotiate but the right circumstances never came about.

1.8.2 Incentives and threats

3.5.2.1. Security and political incentives and threats Security and political incentives in regard to the DPRK come hand in hand as they form the pillar of issues on which past negotiations have been focusing. For DPRK the question of security and recognition have been critical and Pyongyang’s Byungjin policy of pursuit of economic and military self-sufficiency is illustrative of this.

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For the U.S., military force has not been for many years the means of choice when it comes to dealing with North Korea and diplomatic solution has been favoured instead, with confidence that the regime would eventually collapse on its own (Choi, 2015, p.60), this again being illustrative of the compromising, eventually avoiding style of negotiations. Even though, the Obama administration hasn’t been using threats of military force apart from warning that it would defend its allies (Barack Obama warns North Korea over nuclear testing, 2014) the fact that Ame- rican policy towards the country have been framed within the collapsist rhetoric adds to North Korea’s sense of insecurity and threat from the U.S. (Choi, 2016, p.66). Consequently, even without direct threat of the use of military force, the U.S. menace is acutely felt by North Korean elite. The fact that U.S. conditions normalisation of relations, which the DPRK sees as a security guarantee (Kim, 2015, p.33) together with close relationship with the ROK, their annual military exercises, installation of THAAD19 anti-ballistic missile defence system on ROK territory, and American status of nuclear power adds to the regime’s insecurity in regard to the U.S. (Wertz, 2018, p.14). For North Korea the political and security sectors are interconnected, and when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed this American view on the matter: first denuclearisation and only then normalisation of relations, the North Korean side simply could not meet those condition (Kim, 2009). Consequently, whether the Obama administration wished it or not, the engagement with its ally the ROK, on the Korean peninsula, together with discourse in the strategic and academic circles constantly focusing around DPRK’s imminent collapse, has served as everlasting threat to North Korea, char- acterising their approach to negotiations as hard-positioned and bringing about (almost) permanent state of crisis.

3.5.2.2. Economic sanctions and humanitarian aid The official policy of the Obama administration towards North Korea played a role in the manner in which economic sanctions were used. At the same time both relaxation of economic sanctions agains the regime and humanitarian have been used as diplomatic tool. On the American side, the conditions of the so-called Leap Day deal of 2012 have been shipment of large amounts of nutritional assistance to

19 THAAD stands for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense.

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Pyongyang (Panda, 2016).20 The conditionality of foreign aid in combination with using economic sanctions and embargoes as carrots and sticks have been quite characteristic of the administration’s hard-positioned approach. In their analysis of the use of sanctions on the regime as part of the Strategic Patience policy, Stephan Haggard and Marcus No- land describe the pattern of conditionality of aid and economic sanctions during the Obama administration. Usually, small reciprocal steps were taken, imposing new sanctions or withdrawing some of humanitarian aid, which was usually followed by an escalation of tension on the side of DPRK (2017, lo.3639), making the administration’s use of economic sanctions and embargoes a tactical negotiating tool used in a negative manner as a disincentive, showing low cooperativeness of the administration’s approach to negotiations. North Korean provocations between 2009 and 201021 forced the U.S. together with ROK to shift their focus from attempts at negotiating to deterrence, by imposing more serious sanctions and discontinuance of humanitarian aid since early 2009 (Chanlett-Avery et al., 2018, p.31). This policy was relaxed only in order to make the DPRK agree to the Leap Day deal, but after third nuclear test and satellite launches, sanction pressure on the regime was renewed with new vigour, being almost characteristic of a competing style, high in assertiveness, coming to its peak in 2013. Between 2013 and 2016 these provocations and answers by the U.S. (and its allies) in the form of economic pressure cooled down, but no tangible diplomatic progress has been made (Haggard and Noland, loc. 3653).

20 On the counterpart’s side, the condition was coming to an agreement on a moratorium that would result in stopping the ongoing ballistic missile tests and launches. 21 According to dataset of DPRK and U.S. negotiating and provocation events 19 different North Korean provocations took place between April 2009 and November 2010, including the already mentioned sinking of Cheonan, shelling of Yeonpyeong island, revelation of secret uranium enrichment programme, missile tests and several cases of artillery fire near the Northern Limit Line (Collins, 2017).

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1.8.3 Other strategies

3.5.3.1. Back-channels, track two diplomatic efforts and public diplomacy Given the extremely complicated nature of official diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and the DPRK, it comes as no surprise that back channels and track-two diplomatic efforts have been used quite extensively in the past by American diplomatic personnel, however it does not seem that the administration would actively use back channels in a strategic manner, rather back channels were used as a tool to tactical dealing with rising crises. The goal of back channels has been addressing of non- pressing issues that were not directly related to nuclear and security concerns, but they have been used as means to probing their counterpart in search for signals of willingness to engage in serious negotiations (Wertz, 2017, p.8-9). First case of a high-profile back channel used during the Obama administration was former President Bill Clinton’s (and husband to then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton) visit to Pyong- yang in August of 2009. His official mission has been to personally negotiate with Kim Jong Il the release of two American journalist held in North Korea on suspicions of espionage. However, some sources attribute to this meeting DPRK’s return to the negotiating table after the country’s withdrawal from the Six-party talks earlier that year as response to ex- pansion of UN sanction due to a satellite launch (Johnson, 2016). The Obama administration has not only used high-profile back channels in its dealing with the regime. According to some reports, a secret back channel exists in New York, at the United Nations, where secret meetings between U.S. and North Korean diplomats have been going on ever since the 1990s (Wit, 2017). Although as a result of worsening relations among nuclear and missile tests followed by tightening sanctions, and especially after the U.S. Department of Treasury put Kim Jong-un himself on a black list of people and entities sanctioned by the U.S. in 2016, the channel was shut down, after the election of Donald Trump, it has been reopen and some security dialogue has resumed (Ibid). According to Daniel Wertz, track-two efforts have been quite characteristic of American relationship and negotiating efforts with the DPRK, in past they have been used extensively not only to establish closer ties and build trust when negotiating efforts were failing but also to gather information and the Obama administration is not an exception

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(2017, p.10). Several U.S. based foundations have been organising track- two initiatives in cooperation with the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, notably the Carnegie, MacArthur and Korea foundations, organising events such as conferences or citizen exchanges (Rock, 2018, p.96). During the Obama administration however, the projects of higher importance were scarce and show low to medium cooperativeness of the administration. For most notable projects that took place during the presidency of Barack Obama we can mention a visit of a group of North Korea’s officials that came to the U.S. to attend a series of lectures on eco- nomics as a part of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Dialogue in 2011, Stanford University researchers’ visit to Yongbyon facilities in North Ko- rea in 2010 or a long running project, again initiated by Stanford Univer- sity, that helped to build laboratories and train medical personnel in a bid to help the DPRK fight its tuberculosis epidemic (Wertz, 2017, p.9). Track two efforts, just as back-channels, were used rather tactically by the administration - not really serving to achieve a higher goal once the policy of Strategic Patience was adopted.

1.8.4 Obama and North Korea negotiation typology

3.5.4.1. Is Obama’s approach principled or positional? Even though senior officials might have come to the White House with a resolution that the “axis of evil” approach was not to be continued by this new administration (Kirk, 2016), it is apparent that Obama administration has not been able to entirely dissociate themselves from this view. Contrary to expectations of academic and strategic community, the administration’s initial willingness to negotiate did not transition into a dialogue-oriented approach (Kim, 2015, p.32) and did not show any substantial efforts in building trust with the DPRK that would for example translate in using track-two initiatives that would lead to formation of stable back channels. Instead of focusing on real issues behind North Ko- rea’s position, mainly its security dilemma, Obama’s officials set themselves the goal of, in short-term, stop DPRK’s proliferation activities, and in the long-term, achieve a complete denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula (Ibid, p.3). So, while the administration remained open to dialogue, their goals forced them into adopting a hard position towards the DPRK, instead of a more constructive principled approach.

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Table 16: Obama and the DPRK-Positional bargaining/ Principled negotiators

Subcategories Obama administration - Lack of trust between the

counterparts, especially after 2012. Hard position - The administration demanded one-sided concessions after Leap Day deal collapsed.

Soft Position

/ Positional bargaining/ Positional

Principled negotiators Principled Principled / Negotiations

3.5.4.2. Does Obama compete or cooperate with the DPRK? As was mentioned above, the approach of Obama officials to the question of North Korea cannot be characterised as a constructive, problem-solving approach. The hard position the administration forced upon themselves, however, does not translate in a competitive style of negotiations as one would assume. On one hand, between 2009 and late 2016, the number of North Korean provocations grew rapidly (Collins, 2017). On the other hand, even though the administration responded by imposing both unilateral and multilateral sanctions and embargoes on the regime, their efforts did not go beyond. In this light, the administration’s negotiating style falls, for the first Obama “Leap Day deal term“, into the category of a compromising style. The administration is moderately cooperative (with some cooperative back channel and track two efforts) and assertive towards its counterpart. For the second term since 2014, where North Korean provocations culminated (Ibid), their efforts did not go beyond the necessary minimum, contenting themselves to, more or less, symbolic gestures of imposing sanctions as response to each new crisis (Haggard and Noland, 2017, loc.3639). This approach is more characteristic of the avoiding style, low both on assertiveness and cooperation,

79 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES with the negotiating counterpart, even though for a short period culmi- nating in 2016, the mindset seemed almost competing. This was however a response to North Korean provocations and was, in fact, very passive in its nature. On the other hand, the administration seemed to favour the relationship with its allies, mainly the ROK, conditioning any diplomatic progress by normalization of DPRK-ROK relations. Table 17: Obama and the DPRK-Cooperative/Competitive negotiations

Subcategories Obama administration

Competing /

- After 2012 and the failure of the Leap Compromising Day deal, the level of cooperativeness kept falling. - Even though additional sanctions were being imposed, those were responses for North Korean provocations-level of assertiveness Avoiding was kept between low and moderate. - Assertiveness reached its peak in 2016 (additional sanctions and adding of Kim Jong-un on “black list”). Accommodating / - Cooperative towards allies, the Cooperative/Competitive negotiations Cooperative/Competitive administration mostly acts in a Collaborating multilateral manner.

3.5.4.3. Is the approach towards the DPRK strategic or tactical? U.S. does not act like strategic negotiator, even though its policy is called “Strategic Patience”. Instead of strategically crafting a negotiating campaign that would lead to the ultimate goal of achieving an agreement on non-proliferation or even denuclearisation, the administration deals with issues as they arise, most often by imposing sanctions. Back channel

80 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES initiatives never leading beyond dealing with the crisis at hand, track two efforts and public diplomacy not being used consistently, as described above. Daniel Wertz describes the negotiating events that were executed according to the policy of Strategic Patience as episodical, it focuses on stopping of “rewarding bad behaviour” and conditional willingness to negotiate, and North Korea shows a commitment when achieving these goals (2018, p.12). The overall characteristic of the negotiating campaign is therefore not strategical but corresponds to a tactical style much more: what happened was that the administration essentially waited for a change to happen on its own instead of actively trying to shape the game themselves. Table 18: Obama and the DPRK-Strategic/Tactical negotiations

Subcategories Obama administration

/ Strategic

- After the first attempts at negotiations failed, the overall negotiating style ca be described as tactical: inconsistent in levels

negotiations Tactical of cooperativeness and assertiveness.

Strategic/Tactical Strategic/Tactical - Incentives and threats mostly used only to deal with a crisis currently at hand, responding only to provocations.

3.5.4.4. Psychiatrists or theologians? The question of whether the approach of the Obama administration is realist, psychiatrist or theologian, is a complicated one. I argue that the approach is realist, even though it would not appear that way at first glance. If Obama refused to negotiate with the “rogue” North Korean regime, then the approach would have been idealist or theologian, but as we have seen above, the administration distances themselves from the approach of George W. Bush and does not want to label DPRK as “axis of evil”. Neither can the style be described as psychiatrist, as the administration did not intend to negotiate at whatever cost, playing their waiting game of Strategic Patience. Instead, the approach is realist: they were

81 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES willing to negotiate, given the DPRK met the preconditions set. Only those conditions, according to the administration, never came about, and the administration did not engage with their counterpart except for several episodical negotiating events. Table 19: Obama and the DPRK-Psychiatrist/Theologian/Realistic negotiator

Subcategories Obama administration

Theologian /

- The administration wanted to

dissociate themselves from the

approach of their predecessors Realist (George W. Bush) and were open to negotiations (which after 2012 never

negotiator happened).

Psychiatrist/Theologian/Realistic Psychiatrist /

3.5.4.5. Four-faceted negotiator The four-faceted typology can be used only when an access to a more detailed depictions of negotiations is available. With what little information we have acquired, the U.S. under the Obama administration stands closest to the superpower negotiator, relying on their economic and military power mostly. The lack of memoirs of American diplomatic personnel from this period of diplomacy with the DPRK can either mean that not enough time has elapsed that would allow such details to become declassified, or that the overall approach did not bring much fruit and no diplomat has deemed it important to leave his or her memories of diplomatic efforts.

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Table 20: Obama and the DPRK-Four-faceted negotiator

Subcategories Obama administration

Businesslike negotiator / Legalistic / negotiator Moralistic /

negotiator facetednegotiator - - Relies heavily on economic and military power, while being open to

Four Superpower negotiations. negotiator

1.9 North Korea and Trump: maximum pressure or maximum engagement?

Ever since the North Korean fourth nuclear test in January 2016, the international community has been pursuing a campaign of heightened pressure, severing last channels of inter-Korean engagement, imposing new UN sanctions with support of China and Russia and U.S. Department of Treasury secondary sanctions on any foreign entity with ties to DPRK’s missile and nuclear programmes. Sanctions have even been imposed on Kim Jong-un himself (Wertz, 2018, p.15), marking a new low point in bilateral U.S.-DPRK relations. In following paragraphs we will look into negotiating tools that were employed by the Trump administration since January 2017, in first period characterised by ongoing, even strengthening pressure, of the Maximum Pressure campaign, and since January 2018 characterised by what seemed to be a radical change towards Ma- ximum Engagement.

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1.9.1 Relationships

3.6.1.1. top and lower-level relationships According to the database of U.S.-DPRK negotiations between 1990 and 2018, the Trump administration engaged in no less than eleven meetings with the negotiating counterpart, if we count the February 2019 Hanoi summit (which the database does not take into account), this number reaches twelve negotiating events. Out of these meetings, six were top- level, either between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un (at two summits in June 2018 in Singapore and February 2019 in Hanoi) or between prime ministers of both countries. All of these meetings however happened between March 2018 and February 2019 (Database: U.S.-DPRK Negotia- tions from 1990 to 2018, 2018). Before March 2018, no official meetings on higher or lower took place, and even though the Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stresses that U.S. hoped to resolve the North Korean issue through peaceful pressure campaign and negotiations (Remarks at a Press Roundtable, 2017), the President himself did not seem to support this approach and later dismissed Tillerson and replaced him with more “hawkish” CIA Director Mike Pompeo (Wertz, 2018, p.16). After Kim Jong-un’s reaching out to ROK in order to ease tensions in the beginning of 2018, the U.S. saw this as a possibility to start bilateral talks and the Maximum pressure transitioned into engagement leading towards the two leader summits mentioned above. The negotiated issues have not moved forward after the first summit, even though four official follow-up meetings on implementations were held in 2018 (Database: U.S.-DPRK Negotiations from 1990 to 2018, 2018). This approach can be seen as collaborative-the negotiators were pursuing U.S. interests, being highly assertive, while actively trying to advance negotiations with their counterpart. Even though, at the second Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi in February 2019, no progress was made, and the leaders did not come to make a deal, President Trump made a final attempt to save the negotiations by unilaterally pulling back additional U.S. sanctions. Victor Cha, analyst working for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, sees the turn away from the period of Maximum engagement as a test designed to uncover whether the DPRK would respond to top-level meetings (a feature that was missing from the Six-party talks), and offer an acceptable deal (Cha, 2019). Even though Cha does not see resumption of high-level meetings between the U.S. and DPRK as probable (Ibid), in March 2019 during a briefing, a Department of State senior official did

84 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES not rule out future negotiations if North Korea is willing to make progress on issues discussed at the two summits (Senior State Department Official On North Korea, 2019). The way top-level relationships are used by the administration during their negotiating campaign in 2018 seems to correspond mostly to the collaborative approach, showing high level of assertiveness but cooperativeness as well - the administration decided to “play the president” card and even though this move seems to have failed in face of the North Koreans.

3.6.1.2. Counterparts and allies As we have seen above, during the January 2017 - March 2018 period, no high or low level official meetings were held between the counterparts and even though some member of the administration were inclined to hold a dialogue over conflicting issues, the Secretary of State Rex Tiller- son made it clear that the U.S. is willing to negotiate only after North Ko- rea takes concrete steps, dismantling its nuclear programme, and thus setting tough preconditions to the possible negotiations (Senior State Department Official On North Korea, 2019). Taking this into account, the first year of the Trump administration is characterised by a hard-positioned, competing approach towards the counterpart, the DPRK. When it comes to allies, the Trump administration mostly adhered to its predecessors approach, prioritising the amelioration of inter Ko- rean relations and only considering serious negotiating22 after Kim Jong- un reached out to South Korea in his New Year’s speech (Wertz, 2018, p.17) followed by DPRK’s accepting to attend 2018 Olympic Games in Pyeongchang (Ibid, p.4). In the run-up to the two summits between Kim and Trump, the efforts were largely coordinated both with China and South Korean President Moon Jae-in in trying to advance the Korean peace process (Moon, 2019) and China has not only joined international pressure campaign against their Korean ally by enforcing sanctions but has reached out to Pyongyang in order to facilitate the Singapore summit (Skylar Mastro, 2018). Even before the 2018 turning point, the administration’s official policy towards North Korea consisted of building of international coalition that would help the U.S. pursue its goals (North Ko- rea Policy, 2017). This again, bears testimony to highly assertive, non-cooperative, competing strategical approach.

22 See part 3.5.1.2.

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3.6.1.3. Venues For the purpose of this work, we did not have the benefit of having access to memoirs or notes of U.S. negotiators or details of the negotiations led by the Trump administration. Nevertheless, we might attempt to theo- rise from the number and places of official meeting venues. When the official channel was opened, out of the twelve already mentioned high and senior level meetings, only one was held on U.S. soil, more precisely the North Korean Vice Chairman of the Central Committee traveled to New York in order to meet with U.S. Secretary of State. The rest of the meetings all took place in Asia, four of them in the Demilitarised Zone, three in Pyongyang and the rest of them elsewhere (Database: U.S.-DPRK Negotiations from 1990 to 2018, 2018). The U.S. was forthcoming in choosing venues for the official bilateral meetings, trying to make the venues convenient and comfortable for their counterpart, we argue that this adds to the strategic approach of the administration - trying to make most of the momentum created.

1.9.2 Incentives and threats

3.6.2.1. Political Political leverage has been used both as an incentive and threat by the Trump administration. In 2008, the George W. Bush administration has de-listed North Korea as a state-sponsor of terrorism, when attempting to advance denuclearisation steps on North Korean side after 2007 Ac- tion Plan was proposed.23 The status of DPRK has not changed since until after the sixth North Korean nuclear test, when the new administration revealed its Maximum pressure campaign, as part of which the U.S. set itself a goal of politically isolating the regime. To meet this end, the administration called for its allies to suspend or downgrade diplomatic relations (North Korea Policy, 2017) and the U.S. put the country back on the list of state-sponsors of international terrorism, mainly for its proliferation activities (Merica, Diamond and Cohen, 2017), the administration is acting in a hard-positioned, competing way on this subject. Conse- quently, when the negotiations began, the U.S. used recognition issues as a political incentive. At the Singapore summit, the Trump administration

23 See part 3.4..

86 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES gave North Korean the promise of normalisation of bilateral relations (Chanlett-Avery et al., p.5), a matter that for North Korean elite represents not only a political but security matter as well.24

3.6.2.2. Sanctions The Trump administration’s Maximum pressure campaign adopted in second half of 2017 has as its goal to isolate DPRK not only politically but economically as well, by strengthening domestic U.S. sanctions but urg- ing the international community to implement UN sanctions as well (North Korea Policy, 2017). In this period the imposing of sanctions corresponds to the Obama administration’s: they are usually used as a response to a provocation from the part of North Korea (Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy, 2019). When it seemed that the U.S. got (at least partially) what they wanted: a North Korea willing to make concessions and come to the negotiating table, as a gesture of good will, the administration started re- laxing some of the sanctions in place (Preventing Proliferation in Iran and North Korea, 2019). This behaviour would be characteristic of strategical employment of this negotiating tool based on hard-positioned approach. After the failure of Hanoi summit to bring about any concrete progress on the issues at hand however, the question stands what negotiating strategy will U.S. adopt next. Victor Cha argues that both North Korea and the U.S. will return to their respective Maximum pressure campaigns, even more increased, as the fact that the high-profile negotiations took place is accredited specifically to this hardline strategy by the U.S. administration (Cha, 2019).

3.6.2.3. Security In security sector, majority of statements and actions taken during the Trump administration so far were used as a display of military power and deterrent. Among the most prominent cases we can count the following. The anti-ballistic missile defence system THAAD, planned under the Obama administration, has been installed on South Korean territory in 2017. Its function is to serve as a defence for U.S. and allied troops, infrastructure and population centres (THAAD on the Korean Peninsula,

24 See part 3.5.2.1..

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2017). The deployment of THAAD has been combined with military exercises and shows of power and aggressive rhetoric by personnel responsible for North Korea policy and the President himself, stating on several occasions that a war on Korean peninsula cannot be ruled out (Wertz, 2018, p.16-17). After the Singapore summit, incentive in the form of agreement to suspension of joint U.S.-ROK military exercises was offered together with hints that a declaration of the end of the Korean war could be signed. The administration however retained its aggressive rhetoric even after the summit, notably by the Security Advisor for North Korea John Bolton (Ibid, p.18). With these events in mind, the Trump administration’s approach towards North Korea in the security department can be characterised as highly assertive, competitive hard-positioned approach.

1.9.3 Other negotiating campaign tools

3.6.3.1. Track-two efforts and back channels Back channel diplomatic efforts have been used primarily as a probe to the possibility of official negotiations. Before the possibility of direct talks between the two leaders arose in early 2018, these have however been quite scarce. Although the back channel in New York was closed as a retaliation for targeting Kim Jong-un by U.S. sanctions in 201625, in 2017 the channel reportedly quietly reopened while the Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis hinted at a possibility of talks. These initiatives were later undercut by President’s tweets about futility of negotiations with the regime (Wertz, 2018, p.16). In early 2018, after North Korean delegation attended the Winter Olympics at ROK invitation, secret back channel was open by the CIA in order to plan a meeting between the two leaders, a mark, as some see it, of diminishing role of the Department of State in U.S. Foreign policy (Lander, 2018). Track-two efforts that often serve as a first venue for gradual building up towards official negotiations were during the Trump administration more or less neglected. One of the reasons may be the already mentioned emphasis on the intelligence community in foreign policy and diplomacy. Since 2016 nuclear test and consequential worsening of bilateral relations, U.S.-based NGOs have reported a diminution of track-two

25 See part 3.5.3.1..

88 3 NEGOTIATING WITH NUCLEAR ROGUE STATES programmes and according to a Congressional Research Service Report, new efforts, including humanitarian and material aid, are expected to be hampered by new Trump sanctions and travel restrictions (Chanlett- Avery et al., 2018, p.33).

1.9.4 Trump and North Korea negotiation typology

3.6.4.1. Positional bargaining or principled negotiations? The Trump administration mostly adopts hard position. Even though the high number of top-level meetings took place, resulting in an attempt to come to an agreement, the Trump administration does not seem to be able to shake of aggressive rhetoric and is not willing to compromise on preset conditions, being highly suspicious of their counterpart. As we have seen, even at the Hanoi summit, the U.S. administration was not willing to offer anything more than mild security and political concessions, taking a hard position on this matter. Even on lower diplomatic level, no exceptional effort to build ties that would facilitate a principled approach took place, illustrated by almost complete lack of track two efforts and public diplomacy rarely surpassing the realm of aggressive tweeting campaign. Table 21: Trump and the DPRK-Positional bargaining/ Principled negotiators

Subcategories Trump administration

- Demand of concessions before

negotiations can begin. - Low level of trust between Hard position counterparts.

bargaining/ - The administration sees the counterpart’s gains as their losses. / Soft Position

Positional Positional

Principled negotiators Principled Principled / Negotiations

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3.6.4.2. Cooperative or competitive? As was said in part 3.5.4.1. and 3.5.4.2., there is a certain amount of continuity between the second term of the Obama presidency and the first year of Trump administration and the overall approach towards negotiations with North Korea was hard-positioned. When assessing the level of competitiveness however, the similarities seem to disappear. The Trump administration adopts a competing negotiating style. Sanctions were generally being hardened, widening older sanction programmes and adding new ones, where the similarity with the Obama administration stays and both administrations show to be low on cooperativeness. The similarities disappear when we consider security sector: while the Obama administration did not favour extensive threat of force, the Trump establishment brinkmanship puts the administration within the brackets of high assertiveness and thus the overall approach towards the North Korea negotiating campaign is competing, even though between the two summits it has shown some level of cooperativeness.

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Table 22: Trump and the DPRK-Cooperative/Competitive negotiations

Subcategories Trump administration

- As part of the Maximum Pressure campaign, the administration’s

behaviour is high in assertiveness but Competing in cooperativeness as well. - Uses military, political and economic threats in high concentration.

Compromising /

Avoiding /

Accommodating /

- Between the Singapore and Hanoi summits, the administration shows high levels of cooperativeness:

Cooperative/Competitive negotiations Cooperative/Competitive Collaborating promising to make some concessions, and initiating several high-level meetings.

3.6.4.3. Psychiatrist, theologian or realist? Trump administration has, according to the data gathered, showed itself to be quite realist in its approach to negotiations with North Korea. Even though one might argue that their behaviour corresponds more to the theologian approach, that would mean Trump would refuse to negotiate on ideological or moral grounds. The rhetoric employed in the administration’s first year certainly seems to suggest this. However, when the right circumstances occurred, the administration did not let the opportunity no negotiate slip away and thus their approach can be designated as realist.

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Table 23: Trump and the DPRK-Psychiatrist/Theologian/Realistic negotiator

Subcategories Trump administration

- Up until March 2018, certain part of the administration opposed Theologian negotiating with the DPRK.

- After March 2018, an opportunity presented itself in the form of the DPRK reaching out to ROK and the administration was willing to

Realist negotiate despite its preceding negotiator

hardline approach. Psychiatrist/Theologian/Realistic

Psychiatrist /

3.6.4.4. Strategic or tactical? The strategy was to make North Korea negotiate by the maximum pressure campaign. Even though there seemed to be some discrepancy in domestic politics as to what is U.S. ultimate goal with North Korea, the administration’s ultimate goal was to get DPRK to the negotiating table and by crafting a high pressure campaign, some momentum was gained and the two summits between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un took place. In the light of these events the administration’s negotiating campaign would be characterised as a strategic one. To assess the administration’s overall approach, we will have to wait for future events, especially after the Hanoi summit failed to deliver a deal with North Korea.

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Table 24: Trump and the DPRK-Strategic/Tactical negotiations

Subcategories Trump administration - Overall, the administration acts strategically in orchestrating its Strategic Maximum Pressure campaign which had as a goal to bring DPRK to the negotiating table. - Possible critique of this contention is the fact that on several occasions the

negotiations administration did not seem to act in Tactical Strategic/Tactical Strategic/Tactical unison, some statements of highly-placed officials contested for example by the President.

3.6.4.5. Trump and Four-faceted negotiator As was already said for the Obama administration’s negotiating style with North Korea, the lack of memoirs or details from direct negotiations makes it impossible to identify precisely wchich of the “four faces” the Trump administration adopt in regard to the DPRK. What information is available to us however suggests that the overall negotiating behavior falls somewhere between the moralistic and superpower negotiator. The Trump administration acts very emotionally, making public flaming statements and threats, being characteristic of the moralistic mindset. The administration also relies heavily on American military and economic power in the pursuit of what they perceive as American interestst on the Korean Peninsula.

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Table 25: Trump and the DPRK-Four-faceted negotiator

Subcategories Obama administration Businesslike negotiator /

Legalistic / negotiator - Emotional, flaming statements Moralistic and threats. negotiator

facetednegotiator - Administration builds upon - the American military and

Four economic power. Superpower - Administration’s behaviour negotiator towards DPRK is hghly motivated by American interests in the matter.

94 4 CONCLUSION

4 Conclusion

The analysis on previous pages offers some insight into the way the United States have been acting when faced with so-called nuclear rogue states from the point of view of styles of negotiating behaviour. Without wanting to repeat what was said in previous parts, it is nevertheless important to note similarities and differences between the behaviour of the two U.S. administrations. The Obama administration never acted in a competing manner and always collaborated with the nuclear rogues at least to some degree, whereas the Trump administration’s style always had a strong competing dimension to it. Both administrations have in common a collaborative approach, except for Trump’s approach towards Iran. Table 26: American negotiating behaviour towards nuclear rogues-Coopera- tive/Competitive negotiations

U.S. Administration

Iran DPRK

Subcategories Obama Trump Obama Trump

Competing / Yes / Yes

Compromising Yes / / /

Avoiding / / Yes /

Cooperative/Competitive negotiations Cooperative/Competitive Accommodating / / Yes /

Collaborating Yes / Yes (Yes)

95 4 CONCLUSION

In instaces of positional bargaining and principled negotiations, the Trump administration always adopted a hard position towards the nuclear rogues, whereas the Obama administration acted as a principled negotiator towards Iran but adopted hard position towards North Korea. This makes the U.S. approach towards nuclear rogues predominatly hard- positioned. Table 27: American negotiating behaviour towards nuclear rogues-Positional bargaining/ Principled negotiators

U.S. Administration

Subcategories Iran DPRK

g/ Principled Obama Trump Obama Trump

Hard Position / Yes Yes Yes negotiators

Soft Position / / / / Principled Yes / / /

Positional bargainin Positional Negotiations

When it comes to strategic and tactical negotiating style, the findings of this comparative study are following. While the Obama administration has acted strategically in case of Iran, regarding North Korea these findings are not so coclucive. According to our analysis, the overall approach seems to be strategic, but occasional statements from government officials and sometimes even the President sometimes seem to undermine this contention. However, one possible explanation of this finding can be found in similarity with the Collaborative/Competing table above. How can the Trump administration act strategically and tactically and collaborate and compete at the same time? We argue that the administration is acting strategically and competitively. The aggressive competing rhetoric that determins the administration’s seeming attempts at cooperation is illustrative of the fact that the Trump government is divided on the subject of DPRK: the cooperative voices are being silenced and even though the administration might have seemed to show some level of cooperativeness between the two top-level summits, no important

96 4 CONCLUSION concessions have been made on either side. A wonderful illustration of this is the fact that while Kim Jong-un seemed to offer a step towards nuclear transparency at the Hanoi summit (records of nuclear activities at Yongbyon reactor), he in fact offered nothing: the Yongybon reactor is one of North Korea’s oldest facilities and represent just a fraction of its nuclear programme while being technologically outdated at the same time (Cha, 2019). The U.S. gave nothing in return: Trump only hinted at possibility of future cooperation, but no tangible reciprocal steps towards resolution of the dispute have actually been made. With this commentary we can conclude that the overall American negotiating style with nuclear rogue states is strategic.

Table 28: American negotiating behaviour towards nuclear rogues-Strate-

gic/Tactical negotiations

U.S. Administration

Subcategories Iran DPRK

Obama Trump Obama Trump

Strategic Yes Yes / Yes

Strategic/Tactical negotiations Strategic/Tactical Tactical / / Yes (Yes)

In regard to the Theologian/psychiatrist/realist style of negotiations our findings are following. Our case studies of American negotiating behavior show that both administrations studied were willing to negao- tiate with both Iran and North Korea: the realist aspect of the negoatia- tion style weaves through all four cases. The psychiatrist approach of the Obama administration towards Iran illustrates the administration’s pre- disposition to negoatiate and its willingness to find a diplomatic breakthrough. In the table below, we can see that the Trump administration’s realistic willingness to negotiate was complemented by a theologian approach. This again underlines the administration’s hadrline approach towards the nuclear rogues: while the willingness to negotiate existed,

97 4 CONCLUSION the administration hoped to achieve its goal by pressuring their counterparts to a considerable degree. Table 29: American negotiating behaviour towards nuclear rogues-Psychiat- ric/theologian/realistic negotiator

U.S. Administrations

Subcategories Iran DPRK

Obama Trump Obama Trump

Theologian / Yes / Yes negotiator

Realist Yes Yes Yes Yes Psychiatric/theologian/realistic Psychiatric/theologian/realistic Psychiatrist Yes / / /

The analysis of negotiations through the prism of the four-faceted negotiator typology brought following results. Both administration, Obama and Trump, act as a superpower negotiator in their negotiating campaign with the nuclear rogues. This means that they project themselves a a world power and communicate mainly in terms of military and economic incentives and threats. The difference between the two Ame- rican administrations is that the Trump administration adds to this another dimension, that of a moralistic negotiator, whose behavior is rooted in conviction of own exceptionality complemented by a highly emotional behavior which is illustrated by many fiery and aggressive proclamati- ons by Trump administration diplomatic personnel.

98 4 CONCLUSION

Table 30: American negotiating behaviour towards nuclear rogues-Four-faceted negotiator

U.S. Administrations

Subcategories Iran DPRK

Obama Trump Obama Trump

Businesslike / / / / negotiator

facetednegotitor Legalistic - / / / / negotiator

Four Moralistic / Yes / Yes negotiator Superpower Yes Yes Yes Yes negotiator

When we look closely at the common points both administartions share in their negotiating behaviour, we conclude that tha American negotiating behaviour towards nuclear rogue states is strategic hard-positioned realist superpower negotiating style: the U.S. is mainly building upon its position of military and economic power in the international arena in trying to bring the rogues to negotiating table by projection of force. This finding is generally in line with what we would expect from the U.S. behaviour towards nuclear rogues. There are however several points in which the styles differ between both administrations. The existence of these anomalies despite the fact, that we can clearly see a common basis in the overall American negotiating behaviour towards nuclear rogues, bears testament to the different negotiating styles of Republican and Democratic administrations. One of the main differences is that the Obama Democratic administration acts predominantly in a collaborative way, while the Trump Republican ad- ministation acts as a competing negotiator. The Democratic Obama administration, while being predominantly hard-positioned, shows signs of softer behavior when compared to the much mure hardline Republican

99 4 CONCLUSION

Trump administration: in case of Iran, Obama administration acts fundamentally as a principled negotiator, in case of North Korean negotiating campaign its failure to provoke a favourable response forces it to act tactically for the most of its being in office, while in both cases showing signs of a psychitric approach, therefore being much more open to their counterpats’ issues and demands. The Trump administration’s hardline approach is illustarted by its consistent strategic building of coallitions and unfavourable conditions agains the nuclear rogues, positioning themselves as a theologian negotiator. This basically helps the administration to build a hardline image but it does not mean that the Republican Trum administration would not engage with the rogues, in fact it means quite the oposite, but the administration hopes to achieve this goal by being as hard as possible on its counterparts. Before we conclude this work we must mention that not only the U.S. domestic factors influence its behaviour towards Iran and North Ko- rea, but their counterparts’ structural and cultural factors as well. „Nuclear rogue“ is clearly yet another typology that heps us reduce and thus understand better the complicated reality around us and the differences in the American negotiating behaviour towards these states can be partially explained by domestic differences on the counterparts’ side, political system, level of advancement of nuclear programme, ideology, culture, international allies and position of ellites among others. In the beginning of this work, its limits were briefly mentioned, the possible critique of attributing behaviour of two administrations to Ameri- can negotiating style being on of them. To move past this inadequacy, we suggest a widening of the the research scope by adding other American administratives’ negotiating styles with the nuclear rogues possibly through the qualitative comparative analysis. With all this in mind it is however important to remember that even though the differences are not insignificant, the points in common bring us to our ultimate conclusion. We can understand better and therefore attempt to predict the future development of American negotiations with Nuclear Rogue States, and after the U.S. JCPOA withdrawal and the Hanoi summit’s failure to bring about any positive developments, this is not a neglectable outcome of our study.

100 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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