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US Won't Recognize Exile Government WEATHER WATER Clear Charlie U. S. NAVAL BASE, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA Phone 9-5247 Friday Date February 10, 1967 Radio (1340) TV (Ch. 8) Parliament Seeks US Won't Recognize Sukarno's Ouster JAKARTA (AP) INDONESIA'S PARLIAMENT has adopted a reso- Exile Government lution calling on Congress to WASHINGTON (AP) (By Ben F. Meyer) CUBAN EXILES are talking dismiss President Sukarno and once again about the possibility of establishing a Cuban gov- investigate his links with the ernment in exile but the official word here is that the United Communist Party, members said States would not recognize it. today. There was no comment at the State Department on the question The resolution will be pre- of whether. Washington's ef- senteden Saturday to Congress, forts to establish closer re- Indonesia's highest legisla- lations with the Soviet Union tive body, which is scheduled might be a factor in its posi- to meet early in March. tion against recognition of a The resolution also urged Cuban government in exile. The Congress to name an Acting Soviet Union is credited with President. keeping the Castro regime a- Significantly, Parliament float with economic and mili- members from the pro-Sukarno tary aid of an estimated $1 Nationalist Party--the PNI-- million a day. supported the resolution after Asked about the U.S. posi- initial resistance, members tion regarding recognition of said. a Cuban government in exile, The shift by the Nationalist a State Department official Party constitutes a further said today: critical blow to the fast-fad- "There has been no change ing support for Sukarno. whatever in the previously de- Sukarno, who has been Presi- cared policy of the United dent since he declared Indo- Tonight all the queen can- States against recognition of nesia's independence from the didates will be at the Acey- a Cuban government in exile." Dutch in 1945, remained in se- Ducey Club during bingo. And He conceded there might be clusion in his palace in Ja- they may not be the only good arguments, sentimental special guests there this and otherwise, for sympathy evening. An uninvited guest for such .an idea. But there has vowed to make the even- are overpowering practical ling interesting.I reasons why the United States GITMO GAZETTE PAGE 2 FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1967 WASHINGTON--CUBAN EXILES--(Continued from GUANTANAMO BAY--MARDI GRAS--(Continued from Page 1) lics, expected to be held in mid-April Page 1) continue operating, funds must be in Punta Del Este, Uruguay. raised. For some months the exiles have entertained Examples of where the money received by the hopes that the Latin American republics might fund goes are listed below. These pertain extend some sort of help to them,either in only to the calandar year of 1966. harboring an exile government, or in pushing --Funds to the American Red Cross to pur- for representation of the exiles in the Organ- chase paperback books to be used by patients ization of American States. at the Hospital. Should an ecile government be established --W.T. Sampson Library Fund for the pur- in some Latin American nation and get recogni- chase of new books. tion from any appreciable number of other --Guantanamo Bay Junior Baseball League for countries, there would be new consideration of the purchase of equipment to replace unusable the situation in Washington. old equipment and purchase needed new equip- ment to support an expanded League. JAKARTA--SUKARNO OUT--(Continued from Pagel) --Funds to defray cost of transportation in- before it was adopted. Its main points are curred in the bringing of Auxilliary Bishop that Congress meet in March to discuss the Moran to dedicate the new Cuban-American future of Sukarno, dismiss him from office, shrine. and name an Acting President. --Scholarships for selected W.T. Sampson Political observers believe Congress Wil.l High School seniors. carry out the resolution, but the country's --Guantanamo Bay Teen-Age Club for part of new rulers, headed by Army strongman General the operating costs for fiscal year 1967. Suharto, are urging Sukarno to step down be- --Costs of the Jamaican Independence Day fore Congress meets to minimize chances of a picnic. violent reaction from his supporters. --Naval Base Christmas program--tree light- ing and the festival of music. KINGSTON (AP) A JOINT POLICE-MILITARY con- --Funding of the Mardi Gras of 1967. trol center has been set up here as part of a The Community Fund helps you to help your- plan to keep political violence in check dur- self and your Base. Buy your chance on the ing the ,present general election campaign, a Mustang today, support the candidate of your source close to the government said Thursday. choice for Mardi Gras queen, and plan now to The center will direct all police operations attend the carnival on Feb. 22 through 25. against any form of violence and military par- ticipation if found necessary,the source said. SAIGON (AP) (By Robert D. Ohman) THE U.S. COMMAND today reported a massive supply build- TOKYO (AP) (By John Roderick) The firsta- upinNorth Vietnam during the first three days tomic spy case in Red China, the newest and of the lunar new year truce and the suspension probably least advanced member of the five- of American bombing raids. nation nuclear club, was reported today. There U.S. officials said the four-day cease-fire was speculation in Tokyo that it would be used proclaimed by the South Vietnamese government to whip up more fury against the Soviet Union. remains in effect. But they would not rule Quoting the "Revolution Worker's Daily" a out the possibility that air strikes against newspaper loyal to Mao Tse-Tung, the Peking North Vietnam might be ordered before the correspondent of the Tokyo newspaper Mainichi truce ends Sunday, should the Communist build- Shimbun said two armed men in the Chemical In- up reach levels considered "intolerable" by dustry Ministry-have been arrested on a charge the U.S. command. of stealing atomic secrets. The North Vietnamese movement of supplies One of them was identified as an officialna- southward is "not technically a violation of med Ting Tiensheng. The nature of the secret the stand down," these sources said, but it was not specified. The paper said Security was obviously long planned and "creates doubts Minister Hsieh Fu-Chin, an ally of Mao was in- as to North Vietnamese sincerity about the vestigating to determine whether any of the in- truce." formation had gone to a foreign country. The U.S-. sources said it appeared unlikely that the four-day truce would be extended to match cont i i irng the seven-day cease-fire proclaimed by the Pekin and Pages Missing or Unavailable GITMO GAZETTE FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1967 PAGE 7 . NEW YORK (UPI) LEW ALCINDOR, UCLA's prize NEW YORK (UPI) IN LAST NIGHT's only NBA ac- package continued to top the scoring and field tion, Gus Johnson popped in 28 points to lead goal percentage leaders and could set an NCAA Baltimore to a 128-124 win over Boston. This record if he keeps going. evening Chicago plays New York and San Fran- Alcindor, who boasts a 30.1 points average cisco visits Boston in a doubleheader at Bos- despite the freeze tactics of Southern Callast ton Gardens. Los Angeles visits Philadelphia week, could become the fitat collegiate of any and Cincinnati plays host to Detroit. class in 20 years to win both scoring and fiela .OAKLAND (UPI) THE COMMISSIONER OF the newly goal accuracy championships. formed American Basketball Association, George Providence's Jim Walker is close behind the Mikan, says his League will in no way tamper UCLA giant with a scoring average of 29.4. with players under contract with the rival Na- He's followed by Bob Lloyd of Rutgers with a tional Basketball Association. Said Mikan, 28.6, a two-way tie for fifth finds Gary Gray "There are enough players around for two pro- of Oklahoma City and Mel Graham of NYU both fessional leagues. The woods are full of play- with 27.8. ers who never got a chance to make it in pro ball, and those are the players we aregDing to LOUISVILLE (AF), THE WORLD BOXING Associaticl, go after." Mikan spoke at a news conference while acknowledging Cassius Clay as its new in Oakland, home of one of the ABA's ten fran- Heavyweight Champion, said today it could not chises. find a recipient for the 1966 "Boxer Of The Year" award. NEW YORK (UPI) THE VETERAN PLAYERS who will "There was no boxer who could be considered make up the New Orleans Saints football club outstanding both in and out of the ring during next season will be revealed today by National the past year," said Arch Hindman, WBA ratings Football League Commissioner Pete Rozelle. chairman. The Saints chose 42 out 5f a possible 154 He said Dick Tiger of Nigeria has been cdn- players from 14 of the other 15 NFL clubs yes- sidered but was not chosen because of his loss terday. The only beam not to lose players was to Emile Griffith. "Certainly Tiger deserves Atlanta, which only began competition last se- credit for his comeback." son. On Clay, Hindman said: Former Denver Broncos head coach Ray Mala- "By his winn over Ernie Terrell, Cassius Clay vasi has signed a two-year contract to serve is now recognized as Heavyweight Champion of as an assistant coach with the Hamilton Tiger the World by the WBA. the WBA. enjoins the Cats of the Canadian League. new Champion to set a champion's example in Kansas City Chiefs' Assistant Coach Chuck high ideals and sportsmanship." Mills has quit in order to become head coach Before the Feb.
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